Presented as part of the IFPRI Gender Methods Seminar Series, hosted by the IFPRI Gender Task Force. Presented by: Jessica Hoel.

1. Measuring Gender with Games
IFPRI Gender Methods Seminar
October 25, 2013
By Jessica Hoel, PHND Postdoctoral Fellow

2. How I came to study gender with games

3. Why games are good
 Answer very specific questions
 Controlled environment
 Abstract away from many things going on in the
background
 Put specific numbers on abstract concepts

4. What games miss
 Answer only the specific question you asked
 Context
 Subtlety
 Contingency
 Heterogeneity

5. Goals for this presentation
 Framework for thinking about gender differences in
outcomes
 Helped me to get to more specific questions
Examples of laboratory games used to measure
different factors
 Not comprehensive
 Inspiration for future work
 Tips for new lab experimentalists

6. An Economist thinks about Gender
max
[ ]

7. An Economist thinks about Gender
max
[ ]

8. An Economist thinks about Gender
max
[ ]

9. An Economist thinks about Gender
max
[ ]

10. An Economist thinks about Gender
max
[ ]
such that ∗ ≤

11. An Economist thinks about Gender
max
[ ]
Agency
such that ∗ ≤

12. An Economist thinks about Gender
max
[ ]
such that ∗ ≤
Constraints
Agency

13. An Economist thinks about Gender
max
[ ]
such that ∗ ≤
Preferences
Constraints
Agency

14. An Economist thinks about Gender
max
Beliefs Preferences
[ ]
such that ∗ ≤
Constraints
Agency

15. Reasons for Gender Differences in Outcomes
 Agency
 Constraints
 Preferences
 Beliefs

16. Beliefs
 Exploring gendered behavior in the field with
experiments: Why public goods are provided by
women in a Nairobi slum by Fiona Grieg and Iris
Bohnet JEBO 2009
 Research Topic: Why are informal savings groups most
often composed of only women?
 Research Question: Do people contribute differently to
public goods in mixed gender v. same gender groups?

17. Voluntary Contribution Game

18. Voluntary Contribution Game

19. Voluntary Contribution Game
First Stage
Everyone gets same endowment;
can contribute to Common Pot or
keep for self

20. Voluntary Contribution Game
Second Stage
Multiply Common Pot by 20
KSH, then distribute evenly
Tokens kept for self
are worth 10 KSH

21. Beliefs
 270 slum dwellers outside Nairobi
 Men and women give equally in same gender groups
 Men give the same in mixed and same gender groups
 But women give less in mixed gender groups.
 Women in mixed gender groups say they expect other
participants to contribute less
 Women have different beliefs about how much men will
contribute.

22. Preferences
 Gender differences in risk attitudes: Field
experiments on the matrilineal Mosuo and
the patriarchal Yi by Binglin Gong and Chun-Lei
Yang JEBO 2012.
 Research Question: do men and women have
different preferences for risk?
 If so, are gender differences consistent across
matrilineal and patrilineal societies?

23. Investment Game
100% chance tokens
will payout 10 RMB
50% chance tokens will
payout 30 RMB
50% chance tokens will
payout 0 RMB

24. Categorizing Games
 Note that Investment Game is a twist on the
Voluntary Contribution Game
 VCG
 Outcome determined by other players
 Distribution of outcomes is wide
 Investment Game
 Outcome determined by chance
 Only two possible outcomes

25. Preferences
 132 men and women from two villages, one matrilineal
and one patrilineal.
 Men invest more in risky asset than women in both
groups, but difference between them is smaller in
matrilineal society.
 Suggests men and women have different risk
preferences, and that the difference is partially
influenced by culture.

26. Constraints
 Does Africa Need a Rotten Kin Theorem?
Experimental Evidence from Village Economies by
Pamela Jakiela and Owen Ozier (November 2012)
 Research Question: Do men and women feel different
social pressure to share income with relatives and
neighbors?

27. Twist on Investment Game
50% of people get BIG
endowment: 18 tokens
50% of people get SMALL
endowment: 8 tokens

28. Twist on Investment Game
PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE
50% of people get
Private Treatment
50% of people get
Public Treatment

29. Constraints
 If social pressure doesn’t matter, people who get
big endowment should invest the same amount in
the risky cup regardless of public v. private
treatment.
 But if social pressure matters, and respondent gets
the big endowment in the public treatment, should
invest no more than 8 tokens in the risky cup.
 2145 subjects from rural villages in Kenya.

30. Constraints
 Men invest the same amount in the risky cup in the
Private and Public treatments.
 Women are substantially more likely to invest no more
than 8 tokens in the risky cup when their decision is
public and they receive the large endowment.
 Suggests that women face different pressures to share
with their friends and relatives than do men.
 This reflects different constraints on choices.

31. Agency
 What Causes Inefficiency between Spouses? A Within-
Subject Structural Test of the Relative Importance of
Asymmetric Information and Limited Contracting with
Experimental Evidence from Kenya by Jessica Hoel
(September 2013)
 One Research Topic: do spouses act as if they have equal control
over household resources?
 One Research Question: are spouses willing to sacrifice
household income to maintain some personal control?

32. Dictator Game
PUBLIC DECISION
Tokens pay
30 KSH
Tokens pay
20 KSH

33. Agency
 If husbands and wives share resources, respondents
should put all tokens in the Spouse cup.
 Maximizes total winnings for the household.
 Can go home and reallocate later.
 But if a respondent doesn’t believe that settling up will
happen, may keep some tokens for Self.
 Play Public Spouse dictator games with 370 couples in
Kenya

34. What this looks like

35. Agency
Not very many
people play
efficiently.
Lots of people split the
money exactly evenly.

36. Agency
Women more likely than men to split money exactly evenly.
Efficient
Even
distribution
of money.

37. Agency
 Suggests that men have more control over
household resources than women do.
 Women sacrifice more household resources to
maintain personal control over some.
 Women choose even allocation more often,
perhaps because they don’t believe reallocation
will happen later.
 Women have different agency than men do.

38. Structural Behavioral Model
 Model that parameterizes motives to give money in dictator game
 Play 5 types of dictator game with spouses and strangers
 Structurally estimate parameters of model for each individual
 Measure 5 motives to share money
 Efficiency between spouses
 Limited Contracting between spouses
 Asymmetric Information between spouses
 Altruism to strangers
 Fairness with strangers

39. Tips for new lab experimentalists
 Be creative
 But “read” the literature (i.e. ask someone who
knows the literature)
 Be specific
 Keep your design and script as simple as
possible

40. Questions and Discussion