Gender and Games - IFPRI Gender Methods Seminar

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Presented as part of the IFPRI Gender Methods Seminar Series, hosted by the IFPRI Gender Task Force. Presented by: Jessica Hoel.

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Gender and Games - IFPRI Gender Methods Seminar

  1. 1. Measuring Gender with Games IFPRI Gender Methods Seminar October 25, 2013 By Jessica Hoel, PHND Postdoctoral Fellow
  2. 2. How I came to study gender with games
  3. 3. Why games are good  Answer very specific questions  Controlled environment  Abstract away from many things going on in the background  Put specific numbers on abstract concepts
  4. 4. What games miss  Answer only the specific question you asked  Context  Subtlety  Contingency  Heterogeneity
  5. 5. Goals for this presentation  Framework for thinking about gender differences in outcomes  Helped me to get to more specific questions Examples of laboratory games used to measure different factors  Not comprehensive  Inspiration for future work  Tips for new lab experimentalists
  6. 6. An Economist thinks about Gender max [ ]
  7. 7. An Economist thinks about Gender max [ ]
  8. 8. An Economist thinks about Gender max [ ]
  9. 9. An Economist thinks about Gender max [ ]
  10. 10. An Economist thinks about Gender max [ ] such that ∗ ≤
  11. 11. An Economist thinks about Gender max [ ] Agency such that ∗ ≤
  12. 12. An Economist thinks about Gender max [ ] such that ∗ ≤ Constraints Agency
  13. 13. An Economist thinks about Gender max [ ] such that ∗ ≤ Preferences Constraints Agency
  14. 14. An Economist thinks about Gender max Beliefs Preferences [ ] such that ∗ ≤ Constraints Agency
  15. 15. Reasons for Gender Differences in Outcomes  Agency  Constraints  Preferences  Beliefs
  16. 16. Beliefs  Exploring gendered behavior in the field with experiments: Why public goods are provided by women in a Nairobi slum by Fiona Grieg and Iris Bohnet JEBO 2009  Research Topic: Why are informal savings groups most often composed of only women?  Research Question: Do people contribute differently to public goods in mixed gender v. same gender groups?
  17. 17. Voluntary Contribution Game
  18. 18. Voluntary Contribution Game
  19. 19. Voluntary Contribution Game First Stage Everyone gets same endowment; can contribute to Common Pot or keep for self
  20. 20. Voluntary Contribution Game Second Stage Multiply Common Pot by 20 KSH, then distribute evenly Tokens kept for self are worth 10 KSH
  21. 21. Beliefs  270 slum dwellers outside Nairobi  Men and women give equally in same gender groups  Men give the same in mixed and same gender groups  But women give less in mixed gender groups.  Women in mixed gender groups say they expect other participants to contribute less  Women have different beliefs about how much men will contribute.
  22. 22. Preferences  Gender differences in risk attitudes: Field experiments on the matrilineal Mosuo and the patriarchal Yi by Binglin Gong and Chun-Lei Yang JEBO 2012.  Research Question: do men and women have different preferences for risk?  If so, are gender differences consistent across matrilineal and patrilineal societies?
  23. 23. Investment Game 100% chance tokens will payout 10 RMB 50% chance tokens will payout 30 RMB 50% chance tokens will payout 0 RMB
  24. 24. Categorizing Games  Note that Investment Game is a twist on the Voluntary Contribution Game  VCG  Outcome determined by other players  Distribution of outcomes is wide  Investment Game  Outcome determined by chance  Only two possible outcomes
  25. 25. Preferences  132 men and women from two villages, one matrilineal and one patrilineal.  Men invest more in risky asset than women in both groups, but difference between them is smaller in matrilineal society.  Suggests men and women have different risk preferences, and that the difference is partially influenced by culture.
  26. 26. Constraints  Does Africa Need a Rotten Kin Theorem? Experimental Evidence from Village Economies by Pamela Jakiela and Owen Ozier (November 2012)  Research Question: Do men and women feel different social pressure to share income with relatives and neighbors?
  27. 27. Twist on Investment Game 50% of people get BIG endowment: 18 tokens 50% of people get SMALL endowment: 8 tokens
  28. 28. Twist on Investment Game PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE 50% of people get Private Treatment 50% of people get Public Treatment
  29. 29. Constraints  If social pressure doesn’t matter, people who get big endowment should invest the same amount in the risky cup regardless of public v. private treatment.  But if social pressure matters, and respondent gets the big endowment in the public treatment, should invest no more than 8 tokens in the risky cup.  2145 subjects from rural villages in Kenya.
  30. 30. Constraints  Men invest the same amount in the risky cup in the Private and Public treatments.  Women are substantially more likely to invest no more than 8 tokens in the risky cup when their decision is public and they receive the large endowment.  Suggests that women face different pressures to share with their friends and relatives than do men.  This reflects different constraints on choices.
  31. 31. Agency  What Causes Inefficiency between Spouses? A Within- Subject Structural Test of the Relative Importance of Asymmetric Information and Limited Contracting with Experimental Evidence from Kenya by Jessica Hoel (September 2013)  One Research Topic: do spouses act as if they have equal control over household resources?  One Research Question: are spouses willing to sacrifice household income to maintain some personal control?
  32. 32. Dictator Game PUBLIC DECISION Tokens pay 30 KSH Tokens pay 20 KSH
  33. 33. Agency  If husbands and wives share resources, respondents should put all tokens in the Spouse cup.  Maximizes total winnings for the household.  Can go home and reallocate later.  But if a respondent doesn’t believe that settling up will happen, may keep some tokens for Self.  Play Public Spouse dictator games with 370 couples in Kenya
  34. 34. What this looks like
  35. 35. Agency Not very many people play efficiently. Lots of people split the money exactly evenly.
  36. 36. Agency Women more likely than men to split money exactly evenly. Efficient Even distribution of money.
  37. 37. Agency  Suggests that men have more control over household resources than women do.  Women sacrifice more household resources to maintain personal control over some.  Women choose even allocation more often, perhaps because they don’t believe reallocation will happen later.  Women have different agency than men do.
  38. 38. Structural Behavioral Model  Model that parameterizes motives to give money in dictator game  Play 5 types of dictator game with spouses and strangers  Structurally estimate parameters of model for each individual  Measure 5 motives to share money  Efficiency between spouses  Limited Contracting between spouses  Asymmetric Information between spouses  Altruism to strangers  Fairness with strangers
  39. 39. Tips for new lab experimentalists  Be creative  But “read” the literature (i.e. ask someone who knows the literature)  Be specific  Keep your design and script as simple as possible
  40. 40. Questions and Discussion

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