REPORT

1. U.S. EMBASSY IN ULAANBAATAR MONGOLIA
2013 MONGOLIA INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT
ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL SECTION, U.S. EMBASSY ULAANBAATAR, MONGOLIA
1/15/2013

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Table of Contents
A.1 OPENNESS OF GOVERNMENT TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT ............................... 3
A.2 CONVERSION AND TRANSFER POLICIES ........................................................... 21
A.3 EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION ............................................................. 22
A.4 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT .......................................................................................... 28
A.5 PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS AND INCENTIVES......................................... 32
A.6 RIGHT TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND ESTABLISHMENT ................................ 39
A.7 PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS ................................................................. 42
A.8 TRANSPARENCY OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY PROCESS ......... 48
A.9 EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT .................... 53
A.10 COMPETITION FROM STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (SOES)......................... 58
A.11 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)................................................... 63
A.12 POLITCAL VIOLENCE............................................................................................ 64
A.13 CORRUPTION ......................................................................................................... 65
A.14 BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS AND TAXATION ISSUES ................ 70
A.15 OPIC AND OTHER INVESTMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS............................. 73
A.16 LABOR...................................................................................................................... 74
A.17 FOREIGN TRADE ZONES/FREE PORTS .............................................................. 76
A.18 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT STATISTICS ................................................... 77

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A.1 OPENNESS OF GOVERNMENT TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The Government of Mongolia (GOM) has consistently said that it supports foreign
direct investment (FDI) in all sectors. As recently as December 2012, President of
Mongolia, Ts. Elbegdorj, publicly stated that the GOM will keep key foreign
investment commitments because it recognizes the value of FDI for Mongolia.
However, investors assert that Mongolia’s support for FDI seems more an
aspiration than a reality. Specifically, they report that government action affecting
both FDI and resource extraction show a declining GOM commitment to the
transparent rule of law and free market principles.
Observers argue that the 2012 Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law of
Mongolia (SEFIL) limits foreign ownership of assets and access to use rights in
three key sectors, among them natural resource extraction. Although SEFIL’s full
impact remains unclear, investors worry that the law may bar them from
participating in key sectors of the Mongolian economy or force divestment of
Mongolian assets and equities in the affected sectors. Consequently, both foreign
and domestic investors consider Mongolia a riskier place to invest than it once
was; and perhaps riskier than similar emerging markets.
More positively, the key Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold project (OT) moves forward,
having brought over US $ 7 billion in capital, technology, jobs, and tax revenues to
Mongolia through 2012. Although some clouds loom over the OT horizon, this
marquee project justifies Mongolia’s investment potential for most investors.
However, doubts persist over both the GOM’s commitment to honoring the OT
Investment Agreement (IA) and its ability to manage public expectations over
mining revenues and related development. In addition, delays in striking deals on
important coal projects at the world class Tavan Tolgoi coking coal deposit (TT)
and delays in reforming Mongolia’s security laws and equity markets spur concern
that the GOM lacks both the will and the capacity to execute multiple reforms and
projects. Investors worry that Mongolia, overwhelmed by these demands, will
simply cease to complete vital reforms, impose new burdens on investors, and
delay or effectively cancel projects.
Investors also suggest that Mongolia’s ambivalence to FDI may be driven by the
GOM’s aim to create state-owned national mining champions for coal, uranium,
copper, and rare earths. GOM representatives have argued in the media and to
contacts that a national champion owned and operated primarily by Mongolians for
Mongolians would be more inclined to conduct value-added operations and

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development in Mongolia than would a company primarily owned and operated by
foreign investors.
Recent Legislative and Governmental Trends affecting FDI in Mongolia
Foreign and domestic investors argue that Mongolia’s processes for crafting both
laws and regulations negatively impacts FDI into Mongolia. A key concern is that
the proposal of amendments to a given law seems to freeze, or at least significantly
slow, the Mongolian regulatory process; thus threatening access to use rights
granted under current Mongolian laws. For example, the ongoing amendment
process to the 2006 Minerals Law of Mongolia has adversely affected the regime
for issuing exploration and mining licenses.
In 2010, the President of Mongolia criticized the existing minerals licensing
regime, setting into motion an amendment process for the entire law. This process,
well into its third year, has produced numerous draft amendments by the
government, Parliament, and most recently from the President of Mongolia.
Although the 2006 Minerals Law is in force, officials at all levels now delay—or
openly refuse—to process normal requests for extending or issuing exploration and
mining licenses; and state that the amendment process effectively invalidates
current law, because actions taken under current law might be subject to post facto
changes imposed under a new statute. Therefore, officials are reluctant to issue
licenses and permits that might eventually become invalid or require alteration. In
certain cases, investors report that officials have threatened to revoke valid licenses
because they might ―illegal‖ under the pending legislation.
The effect has been to generate long and costly bureaucratic delays in many
economic and commercial sectors, raising investment risk.
Legislating the Resource Pie
Investors may expect that investments, particularly in the resource sector, will be
subject to uncertain legal and regulatory regimes as the GOM reconciles fiscal
demands with public expectations.
The GOM has claimed that it must amend laws related to resource extraction to
insure that Mongolia gets its fair share of revenues from such activities; and to
insure that investors and operators fulfill their environmental obligations and
corporate social responsibilities to the national and local communities in which
they work.

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Public misperception and impatience fuel this trend. First, media and observers
report that the Mongolian public believes that current statutes and regulations grant
foreign and domestic investors all the benefits of extracting resources, while
leaving local communities with all the costs. Second, the Mongolia public expects
that mining revenues will finance significant infrastructure and development needs,
and has grown increasingly impatient over delays in receiving long-promised
benefits from major mining projects.
Faced with a restive public, the GOM amends both statute and regulation to gain
more revenue and to quell public unease. This process has been extremely chaotic,
characterized by abrupt, non-transparent attempts to change laws. These efforts
impose higher licensing and permit fees, greater obligations on the part of investors
to pay for local and regional development, higher royalties and taxes, and larger
equity stakes for either Mongolian state-owned or private entities in resource
extraction companies
Passage of the Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law (SEFIL)
In May 2012, Parliament passed the Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law
(SEFIL), just before parliamentary elections. Investors widely interpreted this
statute as Parliament’s response to voter concerns that Mongolia’s sovereignty was
threatened by the acquisition of mining rights by foreign state-owned and private
firms. The Parliament’s short deliberative phase had little public transparency,
limiting review and comment of the bill by affected parties. The general consensus
among the investor community is that the current law will be difficult to
implement. In late 2012, senior officials suggested that the GOM might amend
SEFIL in 2013, but investors indicate that GOM statements are currently too vague
to quell concerns.
The law defines sectors of strategic importance to include (i) mineral and metal
resources (and perhaps hydrocarbon resources); (ii) banking and finance; and (iii)
media and communications; and imposes the following restrictions and obligations
on foreign state-owned and private investors active in Mongolia:
 Private foreign direct investors (inclusive of affiliates and third parties) must
obtain Cabinet and/or parliamentary approval to operate in the specified sectors
of strategic importance or to conclude certain transactions with business entities
operating in sectors of strategic importance (BESI) in many cases. The
language ―to operate‖ has not been defined in the SEFIL or clarified through
regulations.

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 Specific to shareholding, private foreign direct investors (inclusive of affiliates
and third parties) must obtain approval from the Cabinet of Ministers for
transactions to acquire one-third or more of the shares of a BESI. If the
shareholding by a private foreign direct investor in a BESI exceeds 49 percent
and the investment at the time is greater than 100 billion Tugriks (about $75
million USD as of this report), then parliamentary approval is required.
 Foreign state-owned legal entities, entities with state ownership and
international organizations (inclusive of affiliates and third parties) must obtain
Cabinet and/or parliamentary approval to operate in Mongolia or to invest in
any company (inclusive of affiliated entities or third parties). This includes
investment in sectors outside of sectors of strategic importance.
 Specific to shareholding, so far SEFIL’s provisions are being widely interpreted
to require foreign state-owned legal entities, entities with state ownership and
international organizations (inclusive of affiliates and third parties) to obtain
Cabinet approval to acquire any amount of shares in any company in Mongolia.
SEFIL does not clearly state whether Parliamentary approval is required if
shareholding by foreign state-owned legal entities, entities with state ownership
and international organizations (inclusive of their affiliates and third parties) in
a BESI or other company is greater than 49 percent and the investment at the
time is greater than 100 billion Tugriks .
 Investors may also be required to seek approval for stock transactions for
companies listed on both the Mongolian Stock Exchange and foreign
exchanges.
 Stock and other equity transactions on both foreign and domestic exchanges on
assets and companies in the specified strategic sectors may be subject to
Mongolian taxation.
 All entities subject to the law may also be required to submit to GOM
involvement in management, procurement, hiring, and other normal business
operations and decisions.
 Current investments may not be subject to the law’s provisions; however, if the
foreign entity changes its status (i.e. tax or corporate restructuring with the
same beneficial ownership), it may become subject to the law’s provisions.
 International treaties, such as the U.S.-Mongolia Bilateral Investment Treaty,
which allows U.S. investors to be treated as a Mongolian legal entity for
investment purposes, appear to take precedence over SEFIL.
 The Foreign Investment Regulatory and Registration Department (FIRRD) of
the Ministry of Economic Development (MED) will serve as the secretariat and
first reviewer of requests for FDI approval, making recommendations to the
Cabinet of Ministers and ultimately Parliament as required.

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Investors and lenders recognize that SEFIL is consistent with international
practices, because Mongolia has the sovereign right and responsibility to subject
FDI to national security and anti-trust reviews. However, investors tell us that
they are extremely concerned about the potential level of GOM and parliamentary
involvement with FDI in the targeted sectors. SEFIL’s remit grants the GOM
broad authority to interfere in day-to-day management decisions, over and above
crucial decisions on investment, capital spending, and share acquisition; and
makes it difficult to plan investments and raises risks of open-ended government
intervention to potentially unacceptable levels.
Although the Constitution of Mongolia appears to bar retroactive application of
both criminal and civil statutes, investors have told us they remain concerned over
whether the GOM will retroactively apply SEFIL to foreign investments made
before the law entered into force; and if the government will force companies to
divest assets to come into compliance. Given negative perceptions, investors have
stated that a definitive and official statement from the appropriate government of
Mongolia entity regarding the non-retroactivity of SEFIL would quell persistent
doubts.
Pending regulations governing SEFIL’s application may answer many of these
questions. Officials have promised to consult with stakeholders in advance of
approving any set of regulations.
Limitations on Participation in Real Estate, Petroleum Extraction, and Strategic
Minerals Deposits, and Law Practice
Only Mongolian citizens can own real estate. Ownership rights are currently
limited to urban areas in the capital city of Ulaanbaatar, the provincial capitals, and
the county seats (called soums). No corporate entity of any type, foreign or
domestic, may own real estate. However, foreigners and Mongolian and foreign
firms may own structures outright and can lease property and obtain use rights for
terms ranging from one (1) to ninety (90) years. Mongolian law and regulation
generally cedes control of the land, usually through lease, to the owner of the
structure built upon a given piece of property.
Mongolian law also requires oil extraction firms to enter into production sharing
contracts with the government as a precondition for both petroleum exploration
and extraction. However, investors in Mongolia’s nascent unconventional
hydrocarbon sector suggest that the current statutory and regulatory framework

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does not allow for exploration and extraction of these resources. The GOM has
told investors that it will craft new legislation to deal with these concerns.
Passed in 2006, Mongolia’s current Minerals Law enacted the concept of the
strategic deposit, which empowers the GOM to obtain up to a 50% share of any
mining enterprise on or abutting such a deposit.
The current law defines "a mineral deposit of strategic importance" as "a mineral
concentration where it is possible to maintain production that has a potential
impact on national security, economic and social development of the country at
national and regional levels or deposits which are producing or have potential of
producing above 5% of total GDP per year." Ultimately, the power to determine
what is or is not a strategic deposit is vested in the State Great Hural (Parliament).
To date, the GOM has only identified two world class copper and coal reserves,
some iron ore deposits, and all deposits of rare earths and uranium as reaching this
threshold.
If a mineral deposit is labeled strategic and if the state has contributed to the
exploration of the deposit at some point, the GOM may claim up to 50% ownership
of the operating entity that may ultimately mine the resource. If the deposit is
explored with private funds and the state has not contributed to the exploration of
the deposit, the GOM may acquire up to 34% of that entity.
State participation (or share) is determined by an agreement on exploitation of the
deposit considering the amount of investment made the state; or, in the case of a
privately-explored strategic deposit, by agreement between the state and the firm
on the amount invested by the state. Parliament may determine the state share
using a proposal made by the government or on its own initiative using official
figures on minerals reserves in the Integrated State Registry.
Importantly, the state equity provision is not expropriatory on its face, because the
GOM has committed itself to compensating firms for the share it takes at fair
market value. So far, the GOM has honored this commitment, as experience with
the OT Investment Agreement confirms.
In addition, the 2006 Minerals Law and Petroleum Law restrict licenses to entities
registered in Mongolia under the terms of the relevant company and investment
laws. A foreign entity, in its own right, cannot hold mining or petroleum licenses.
Should a foreign entity acquire a given license as either collateral or for the
purpose of actual exploration or mining, and fail to create the appropriate

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Mongolian corporate or financial entity to hold a given license, that failure has
served, and continues to serve, as grounds for the GOM to invalidate the license.
In essence, the foreign entity may lose its security or its mining rights. We advise
investors with specific questions to seek professional advice on the status of their
licenses.
Since 2010, the President of Mongolia, members of Parliament, and successive
government officials have questioned whether the 2006 Minerals Law adequately
protects Mongolian national interests; and have engaged in long debate on how to
reform Mongolia’s administration of mining to ensure that foreign investment does
not compromise Mongolia’s perceived rights. Currently, two distinct draft
amendments from Parliament and the President of Mongolia are working their
respective ways through Parliament with some resolution expected in spring 2013.
Investors indicate they want Parliament to agree on a set of laws that brings
certainty and clarity to a legal environment that has been in flux for years.
Proposed Amendments to the 2006 Minerals Law
In December 2012, the President of Mongolia offered amendments to the 2006
Minerals Law. The President’s Office says that the draft is largely modeled after
international practices, particularly those employed in Australia; however,
Australian investors and others familiar with Australian mining rules and
legislation see no resemblance in President’s draft.
Both domestic and foreign investors have unanimously and unambiguously
responded negatively to these amendments. They argue that the amendments grant
the government broad and vague discretionary authority to revoke exploration and
mining rights without meaningful checks on these powers; and impose taxes and
fees, development obligations, and production, management, and employment
practices that may render commercial mining impossible in Mongolia.
Uranium and Environmental Laws Negatively Affect Investor Rights
The 2009 Uranium Law of Mongolia
In 2009 the Parliament imposed significant new controls on mining and processing
uranium (and some rare earths) in Mongolia. The law created a new regulatory
agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Energy Agency of Mongolia (NEA), and a state-
owned holding company, MonAtom, to hold assets that the government acquires
from rights holders. The law imposes several conditions:

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 Requires all holders to register uranium exploration and mining licenses with
the NEA;
 Requires investors to accept that the Mongolian state has the right to take --
without compensation -- at least 51% of the mining enterprise -- as opposed to
mining rights -- as a condition for developing any uranium property;
 Imposes a uranium-specific licensing, regulatory regime independent of the
existing regulatory and legal framework for developing mineral and metal
resources. Prior to the Nuclear Energy Law, exploration licenses gave their
respective holders the rights to discover and develop any and all mineral and
metal resources discovered within that license area. (This does not include
petroleum resources, which are governed separately). According to GOM
officials, this law lets the state issue a distinct license for uranium exploration
on a property otherwise dedicated to other mineral and metals exploration.
New Laws Affecting Mining Activities in Water Basins and Forested Areas
In May 2012, Parliament passed a suite of environmental legislation:
 Law on Air
 Law on Air Pollution Fees
 Law on Soil Protection and Prevention of Desertification
 Law on Waste
 Law on Forest
 Law on Water
 Law on Animals
 Law on Natural Resource Use Fees
 Law on Water Contamination
 Law on Environmental Impact Assessment
As these are new laws, the regulations of which have yet to be promulgated,
neither we nor observers know how they will impact projects in Mongolia.
However, it is clear that the Water Law and the Forest Law have effectively
replaced the 2009 Law on Prohibition of Minerals Exploration and Mining
Activities in Areas in the Headwaters of Rivers, Protected Water Reservoir Zones
and Forested Areas, more colloquially known as the Law with the Long Name
(LOLN). The LOLN imposed the following on mining projects:

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 Revoked or modifies licenses to explore for or mine any and all mineral
resources within an area no less than 200 meters from water and forest resource.
 Required the government to compensate rights holders for exploration expenses
already incurred or revenue lost from actual mining operations.
 Empowered local officials to determine the actual areas which can be mined. In
effect, the local official can extend the 200 meter minimum at his discretion.
The new laws appear less proscriptive regarding mining activities near water
basins and forests; and apparently allow discretion for local and regional
authorities, working in concert with the central government, to determine where
and when extractive and industrial activities can occur near environmentally
sensitive areas. While the 200 meter minimum appears as something of guideline
in the two new laws, the new legislation, unlike the LOLN, does allow for
flexibility in the imposition of the 200 meter setbacks. Investors are waiting if
pending regulation will confirm this flexible concept.
Oyu Tolgoi on Schedule to Commence Operations in Early 2013
In October 2009, the GOM, Ivanhoe Mines of Canada, and Rio Tinto negotiated
investment and share-holders agreements for the Oyu Tolgoi (OT) copper- gold
deposit located in Mongolia’s South Gobi desert. The OT agreements vest the
government of Mongolia with 34% ownership of the project and provide
guarantees for local employment and procurement. With estimated development
costs in excess of US $7 billion and a 40-year plus mine-life, OT is conservatively
expected to double Mongolia’s annual GDP by the time it reaches full production
around 2017. With power contracts with China in place, initial production of
copper concentrate is set commence in the first third quarter of 2013.
With construction on the open-pit operation completed, most observers of
Mongolia’s investment climate still consider this agreement the landmark foreign
and domestic investment in Mongolia. The consensus is that the OT agreement:
 Shows Mongolia can say ―Yes‖ to key projects undertaken with foreign
involvement and investment;
 Confirms GOM commitment to compensating private rights holders of most
deposits considered strategic under the 2006 Minerals Law;

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 Demonstrates GOM willingness to amend laws and regulations to enhance and
ensure the commercial viability of mining projects.
The positive message of the OT for investors should not be underestimated. Its
passage is largely considered responsible for spurring progress on other mining
projects and for these projects successful listing on foreign stock exchanges.
However, since 2011 some within the GOM and Parliament have sought to re-open
the OT IA that sets the project's legal, tax, and regulatory regime for the next few
decades. The issue came to a head again in September 2011 when members of
Parliament and a broad array of public and private entities demanded that the GOM
void the agreement, claim a larger ownership share of the project, and impose
higher royalties. The National Security Council of Mongolia(NSCM)—composed
of the President of Mongolia, Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament—
unilaterally and unanimously declared that the GOM and Parliament would honor
the existing agreement without exception in September 2011. Although the NSCM
lacks constitutional or statutory power to bind Parliament to any particular course
of action on OT, its statement calmed but did not completely remove investor fears
that the Mongolian government would not keep its commitments
Resurrecting the issue in September 2012, twenty-three (23) Members of the newly
elected Parliament petitioned the government to renegotiate IA. Concerted action
by OT LLC, diplomatic missions, and elements of the GOM and Parliament
produced agreement to review the issues in a more formal, less acrimonious way.
However, matters are unresolved.
Absent an explicit GOM commitment to honor the IA, the business community
questions the sanctity of contracts in Mongolia. Left unaddressed, uncertainty over
OT's future may raise investor risk perceptions and limit FDI in Mongolia, thus
inhibiting domestic development and employment from the resource sector.
Recent Amendments to the Practice of Law in Mongolia
In 2012, Parliament amended the Law on Lawyers, adding new restrictions on
foreign-owned and operated law offices. Previously, law offices could be owned
and operated by foreign lawyers and parties. Entering into effect April 2013, the
amendments require foreigners to pass the Mongolian bar examine as a condition
of owning or operating law firms in Mongolia.

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Completing Reform of the Securities Law of Mongolia
Essential reforms to the Securities Law of Mongolia remain incomplete. Most
observers see the current law as insufficient and obsolete, and the consensus is that
an up-to-date law would:
 Formally distinguish between beneficial owners and registered owners.
 Allow for Custodians (financial institutions with legal responsibility for
investors’ securities).
 Institute new rules that would allow companies listed on the Mongolian Stock
Exchange (MSE) to list their shares on other exchanges.
An amended securities law, consistent with practices, regulation, and statue used
by other exchanges, will allow Mongolia to list and raise capital for important
projects, such as Oyu Tolgoi and Tavan Tolgoi. Without such a law, Tavan Tolgoi
and other public and private investments will face severe impediments to raising
capital and valuing assets. Amendments to current Securities Law remain before
the Cabinet but are not expected to pass Parliament before mid-2013.
Revisions of the Mongolian Tax Code
Revocation of Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs)
Mongolia is leaving its DTTs with the Netherlands, Kuwait, Luxembourg, and the
United Arab Emirates; and may do so for all other DTTs it maintains. The GOM
argued (with some correctness) that many companies using these DTTs were not
actually headquartered in the nations with bilateral DTTs and were using the
treaties to avoid taxation in Mongolia, denying Mongolia substantial revenues.
The GOM asserted that it would not have entered into these treaties if it had fully
understood their implications, although the IMF had long advised the GOM to be
wary of DTTs impact on revenues.
Foreign and Mongolian domestic investors have strongly criticized the government
and Parliament for revoking key DTTs. Viewed from the context of the recently
passed Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law (SEFIL), the chronic attempts to
change the OT Investment Agreement and moves to amend other laws affecting
investment in Mongolia, investors argue that revoking DTTs sends a clear message
that Mongolia does not fully respect contractual or treaty obligations.

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Other Tax Code Issues
The 2007 code taxes all salary and wage income at 10% while allowing interest
income from securities and capital gains to be tax free until 2013. As of January
2013, all types of income will be taxed at a rate of 10%.
Businesses are taxed at 10% for profits less than 3 billion Tugriks (US$ 2.2
million) and at 25% for any profit 3 billion Tugriks or above. The Value Added
Tax (VAT) is currently10%. Mongolia also imposes a variety of excise taxes and
licensing fees upon a variety of activities and imports.
Mongolia also imposes a 20% withholding tax on interest earned on foreign-held,
interest-bearing banking accounts and other deposit types.
The OT project has had a salutary effect on key tax provisions long-desired by
foreign and domestic investors alike. Before OT, firms could only carry-forward
losses for two (2) years after incurring the loss. While most businesses approved
of this provision, many, especially those requiring large and long-term
infrastructure development, noted that the two year carry-forward limit was
insufficient for projects with long development lead times, as is typical of most
large-scale mining developments. As a condition precedent of passing the OT
Agreement, Parliament extended loss-carry forward to eight (8) years.
On the down side, Mongolia’s Parliament has revoked and refuses to reinstate an
exemption available on value-added taxes (VAT) of 10% on equipment used to
bring a given mine into production, except on equipment to be used in the
production of highly processed mining products.
Most jurisdictions, recognizing that mines have long development lead times
before production begins, either waive or impose no tax such on imports at all.
Parliament, with no consultation with investors, international experts, or its own
tax officials, chose to impose the VAT, which immediately makes Mongolian
mining costs 10% higher than they would otherwise be, impairing competitiveness
and dramatically varying from global practice. Whether any mining output
qualifies for this exemption seems completely at the discretion of the GOM, which
has not set out in regulation or statute a process by which it will regularly
adjudicate such VAT exemption requests.

15. 15
Unfinished Business with Administering Taxation (and other functions)
International financial institutions and foreign and domestic investors report that
enhancing Mongolia's business environment requires that reform must also include
improving how key agencies—the tax department, the customs administration and
the inspections agency—interact with firms and individuals.
Specifically, many investors have reported increasingly abusive enforcement by
elements of the Tax Authority, the Anticorruption Agency, and the National Police
in 2012. Officials show up unannounced, and without formal writs authorizing
their activities, accuse the business of committing some sort of tax fraud or other
abuse, and order immediate payment or compliance with demands. If the business
refuses to comply, insisting on its rights under law and regulation, the officials
immediately threaten to turn the case over to the Anticorruption Agency or the
National Police—an act which can lead to seizure of assets, closure of the business,
and detention or arrest of personnel while under investigation. In some cases,
officials have followed through on these threats. Because the law lays out no clear
way to determining when a matter is criminal or civil, officials have discretion on
how to proceed, raising the perception of risk among investors.
Public Private Partnership/Concession Law
In 2010, Parliament passed legislation authorizing the government to tender
concessions for certain functions and to enter into public-private partnerships
(PPPs) in a variety of areas. Hundreds of separate projects—ranging from key
power projects to major rail expansions to the north, east, and south to education
centers—are listed as available for private entities to engage with the GOM.
The GOM aims to enlist private industry to support social and economic
development by ostensibly providing commercial incentives for participation.
However, while approving the concept in principle, foreign and domestic investors
criticize the operative legislation. Chiefly, potential investors relate that they see
few incentives in the design of the PPPs. As currently envisioned, most Mongolian
PPPs seem to allow for recovery of costs and a very limited horizon for operation
(and profit generation) before the asset must be returned to the GOM. In essence,
investors argue that the GOM wants them to act like fee-for-service contractors but
declines to compensate as they would such a contractor.
Until the GOM amends these unattractive features, investors will likely pass on
Mongolia’s PPP opportunities.

16. 16
The Mongolian Judiciary and the Sanctity of Contracts
Generally, investors report no concerted, systematic, institutional abuse
specifically targeted at foreign investment. Issues of corruption and judicial
partiality aside, observers argue that most problems reflect ignorance of
commercial principles rather than antipathy to foreign investment as such. (See A.
13 for a detailed discussion of corruption in Mongolia.) In principle, both the law
and the judiciary recognize the concept of sanctity of contracts. However, the
practical application of this concept lags, with both foreign and domestic investors
reporting inconsistent enforcement of contracts by the judiciary. This inconsistency
comes from the slow transition from Marxist-based jurisprudence to more market
oriented laws and judicial practices. As more judges receive commercial training
and gain practical experience, observers expect gradual improvement of the entire
judicial system.
However, hoped for improvements aside, many investors perceive that the courts
will side with Mongolian disputants in strictly commercial cases involving
business to business disputes, regardless of relevant laws, regulations, and
contractual obligations. (See Chapter A.4 for a discussion of the role of the
judiciary in dispute settlement.).
Concerns over Exit Visas
Regularly reported since 2010, Mongolian public and private entities continue
to abuse the exit visa system to pressure foreign investors to settle civil and
commercial disputes. Immigration officials normally issue a pro forma but
required exit visa at the port of departure (e.g. the international airport), but
may deny or revoke an existing visa for a variety of reasons, including civil
disputes, pending criminal investigations, or for immigration violations. If
denied for a civil dispute, the visa may not be issued until either the dispute is
resolved administratively or a court has rendered a decision. Neither current
law nor regulation establishes a clear process or time-table for settlement of
such issues. Nor does the law allow authorities to distinguish a criminal and
civil case when detaining a person. In fact, the Mongolian government
maintains the right to detain foreign citizens indefinitely without appeal until
the situation has been resolved.
Research reveals that abuse of the exit-visa system also affects investors from
countries other than the U.S. All cases have a similar profile. A foreign investor
has a commercial dispute with a Mongolian entity, often involving assets,

17. 17
management practices, or contract compliance. The Mongolian entity responds by
filing either civil or criminal charges with local police or prosecutorial authorities.
It is important to note that at this point there need be no actual arrest warrant or any
sort of official determination that charges are warranted: mere complaint by an
aggrieved party is sufficient to deny exit.
An investor in this situation is effectively detained in Mongolia indefinitely. Some
foreign investors have resolved these impasses by settling, allowing them to depart
Mongolia. If unwilling to settle, the foreign investor will have to undergo the full
investigatory process, which may lead to court action. Investigations commonly
take up to six months, and in one case an American citizen could not depart
Mongolia for over two years while under criminal investigation for a failed
business deal. In addition, even if a dispute seems settled, it can be re-filed in the
same venue —if local police and prosecutors are willing—or in a different venue.
Mongolian citizens require no exit visas to depart Mongolia and can only be denied
exit or detained if an actual arrest warrant has been issued.
Privatization Policies and Resistance of Mongolian firms to Foreign Investment
Privatization policies have favored foreign investment in some key industries,
including banking and cashmere production. The bidding processes for
privatizations and other tenders have generally been transparent. Although the
GOM routinely announces plans, we have seen little real movement to privatize
state holdings in the aviation, telecommunications, power, and mining sectors.
Ongoing GOM acquisitions of mining assets– especially in uranium, rare earths,
and coal – indicates that the GOM will expand the state’s role in some areas.
That said, the GOM continues with plans for initial public offerings (IPO) for
certain state-owned power, infrastructure, and mining holdings. It has stated that
funds from such IPO’S will be used to underwrite these projects and to pay for
needed infrastructure. To date, the IPO discussion has not moved beyond the
conceptual level. The GOM has told the Mongolian public and investors that it
will hold an international IPO for at least one mining asset, specifically the world-
class Tavan Tolgoi (TT) coking project as early as spring, 2013; and has sought
advice from international investment advisors to achieve this end. However,
beyond talk of IPO’s, the GOM has made insufficient progress to create a
functional coal mine at TT that could be capitalized through an IPO.

18. 18
While most observers believe a TT IPO is viable in the long run, they argue that
the GOM’s 2013 time table is too ambitious given that TT remains an
undeveloped, remote Gobi site with little infrastructure, owned by a government
that has no track record in bringing such projects into operation.
Mongolian Businesses vs. Foreign Direct Investors
Other than the limitations imposed by the Strategic Entities Foreign Investment
Law of 2012 (SEFIL), foreign companies and investors are subject to the same
legal regime imposed on Mongolian domestic firms regarding incorporation and
corporate activities.
Generally, Mongolian private businesses seek foreign participation and equity in
all sectors of the economy. However, some Mongolian businesses use Mongolian
institutions to stop competitors, if they can. These actions represent no animus
against foreign investment as such; rather, they reflect individual businesses desire
to keep competitors, Mongolian or foreign, at bay.
Key Investment Laws
Foreign Investment Law of Mongolia
The Foreign Investment Law of Mongolia (FILM)—not to be confused with the
SEFIL of 2012—transformed the anti-business environment of the socialist era
into today’s regime. Under the old system, everything not provided for in law was
illegal. Because such economic activities as franchising, leasing, joint venture
companies were not specifically mentioned in earlier Mongolian statutes, they
were technically illegal. In 1993, the GOM enacted FILM to legalize all manner of
foreign investment in Mongolia (amended in 2002 to allow for representative
offices and franchises).
This law and its subsequent amendments define broad ranges of activity that would
otherwise have limited validity under Mongolian law. It also defines the meaning
of foreign investment under the civil code without limiting activities that foreign
investors can conduct. FILM also establishes registration procedures for foreign
companies: The law requires investments with 25% or more of FDI to register as
foreign-invested firms. The law created a supervisory agency, the Foreign
Investment and Foreign Trade Agency (FIFTA), that ran the registration process,
liaised among businesses and the Mongolian government, and promotes in- and
out-bound investments. Under the Terms of SEFIL and 2012 re-organization of

19. 19
the GOM, FIFTA was abolished and its functions transferred to the newly-created
the Foreign Investment Regulation and Registration Department (FIRRD) under
the new Ministry of Economic Development.
In 2008, the Parliament of Mongolia amended FILM. The stated intent of the
revision was to improve FIFTA’s—now FIRRD’s— ability to track foreign
investment and to enhance services to foreign investors. The 2008 FILM requires
foreign investors to invest a minimum of US$100,000 and imposes a series of
requirements on foreign investors seeking registration. Registered foreign
companies must have FIRRD certify that their by-laws, environmental practices,
their technologies, etc., comply with standards determined by FIRRD.
Since FILM’s passage, foreign investors have expressed concern over what they
perceive as the government’s broad and seemingly un-transparent regulatory
authority. As with its predecessor FIFTA, FIRRD officials report that procedures
are still under evaluation and development but investors continue to claim that this
drafting process lacks transparency and offers them no clear way to comment upon
regulations that will affect investments. Investors still tell us that they do not know
the exact standards FIRRD will apply for any given investment; how it will
determine those standards; and how an investor might seek redress if FIRRD
denies a registration request.
Ministerial Structure Related to Foreign Investment
As a result of the parliamentary elections of 2012, the current structure of
government has changed. The government has expanded from 13 ministries to 16.
The principle change affecting foreign investors has been the creation of the
Ministry of Economic Development (MED). The new government transferred all
trade and investment related functions from the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade (MFAT) to MED. MED now administers FDI in Mongolia. The
independent trade promotion agency FIFTA, formally housed under the now
defunct MFAT, has become FIRRD, under the explicit authority of MED. FIRRD
is the frontline administrator for SEFIL. MED also has the remit to develop trade
policy and conduct trade-related negotiations with other nations; and crafts,
coordinates and assists with the implementation of all government economic
development policies and projects. For those investors not affected by SEFIL, the
new structure should not affect the day-to-day conduct of their businesses.

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Mongolia’s Ranking as a Place to Do Business
Measure Year Index/Ranking
TI Corruption Index on Corruption Perceptions:
(http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/ )
2012 36/100
Heritage Economic Freedom
(http://www.heritage.org/index/country/mongolia)
2012 World
Ranking:81/179
Freedom Score:
61.5
World Bank Doing Business
(http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/mongolia)
2012
2013
Doing Business:
86/185
Doing Business:
76/185
MCC Government Effectiveness:
http://www.mcc.gov/documents/scorecards/score-fy13-
mongolia.pdf
FY 2013 -0.17 (34%)
MCC Rule of Law FY 2013 0.12(66%)
MCC Control of Corruption FY 2013 -0.16 (25%)
MCC Fiscal Policy FY 2013 -2.4 (67%)
MCC Trade Policy FY 2013 79.8 (72%)
MCC Regulatory Quality FY 2013 0.12 (66%)
MCC Business Start Up FY 2013 0.988 (94%)
MCC Land Rights Access FY 2013 0.66 (39%)
MCC Natural Resource Protection FY 2013 69.3 (69%)
MCC Access to Credit FY 2013 43 (69%)
MCC Inflation FY 2013 7.7 (24%)

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A.2 CONVERSION AND TRANSFER POLICIES
Foreign and domestic businesses generally report no regular problems converting
or transferring investment funds, profits and revenues, loan repayments, or lease
payments into whatever currency they wish to wherever they wish. There usually
is no difficulty in obtaining foreign exchange, although large transactions may be
affected by availability of the required currency.
Current law requires all domestic transactions be conducted in Mongolia’s national
currency, the Tugrik, except entities granted limited waivers for non-Tugrik
transactions by the Mongolia’s central bank, the Bank of Mongolia (BOM).
Businesses report no regular delays in remitting investment returns or receiving in-
bound funds. Transfers generally require 1-2 business days or, at most, a single
business week. (For details on Mongolia’s conversion and transfer policies, please
refer to the Bank of Mongolia: http://www.mongolbank.mn/eng/default.aspx.)
Ease of transfer aside, foreign investors note Mongolia’s lack of regular access to
mechanisms for facilitating trade and investing cash balances. Letters of credit are
difficult to obtain, and legal parallel markets in the form of government dollar or
Tugrik-denominated bonds or other instruments for investing cash in lieu of
payment are nascent. In regard to the latter, the government auctioned 270 billion
Tugriks (US$ 200 million) of 12- and 28-week bills in December and has
scheduled weekly auctions in the first half of 2013.
Because these mechanisms are in their early days, the immediate impact of their
lack has been to limit access to certain types of foreign capital, as international
companies resist maintaining cash balances in Mongolian banks or in local debt
instruments. That said, the government of Mongolia, the BOM, and several donor
agencies are continuing efforts to develop and deploy such instruments by 2013.

22. 22
A.3 EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION
Mongolia has generally respected property rights as they apply to most asset types.
However, investors suggest that the 2012 Strategic Entities Foreign Investment
Law of Mongolia (SEFIL) limits foreign ownership of assets and use rights in three
strategic sectors, among them natural resource extraction. Investors suggest that
SEFIL may require foreign investors to seek local partners and source goods and
services locally. This legislation is consistent with, and represents a continuation
of, actions that represent both ―creeping expropriation‖ and explicitly
expropriatory acts sanctioned through force of law, especially but not exclusively
limited to the resource extraction sector.
Expropriatory Aspect of the Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law (SEFIL)
Investors suggest that some of SEFIL’s provisions seem expropriatory. Of
particular concern, investors worry that the GOM will retroactively apply SEFIL to
foreign investments made before the law entered into force and will force
companies to divest assets to come into compliance, with no apparent provision
made to compensate investors for losses incurred to comply with SEFIL. Given
these negative perceptions, investors have stated that a definitive and official
clarification from the government of Mongolia would quell persistent doubts. For
a fuller description of SEFIL’s provisions see Chapter A.1.
Security of Ownership
The U.S.-Mongolia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) entered in force in 1997, and
specifically enjoins both signatories from expropriatory acts against private
property and investments. In addition, both Mongolian law and the national
Constitution recognize private property rights and the rights associated with its use,
and specifically bar the government from expropriating such assets. To date, the
government of Mongolia (GOM) has not expropriated any American property or
assets. However, observers suggest that the GOM’s use of the Nuclear Energy
Law to revoke a Canadian company’s uranium exploration rights without
compensation is expropriatory; and infer from this action that GOM will revoke
use rights and resist compensating companies for revocations. (For a copy of BIT:
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/43303.htm.)
Like most sovereigns, the Mongolian government may exercise eminent domain in
the national interest. Under the current land law, Mongolian state entities can
claim land or modify use rights for the following purposes:

23. 23
 Lands under special government protection;
 Land near national borders;
 Lands given for ensuring national defense and security;
 Land given to foreign diplomatic missions and consulates, as well as resident
offices of international organizations;
 Land for scientific and technological tests, experiments and sites for regular
environmental and climatic observation;
 Aimag level reserve rangelands;
 Hayfields for government fodder reserves.
 Contracted petroleum exploration sites to be utilized according to product
sharing contracts;
 Free trade zone areas.
 Building and using nuclear reactors.
 Governors of aimags, Ulaanbaatar Capital City, and soums may take land for
special needs of the local government for the purposes referred to in provisions of
the law.
 Land belonging to any classification of the unified land territory may be taken for
special needs.
Investors have expressed little disagreement with most of these categories but
express concern over the taking of land for special needs by local municipal
governments and provincial administrations. As the relevant statutes do not
definitively define what constitutes special needs, officials have broad discretion in
determining what is and is not a special needs zone.
With regard to the issuance of both exploration permits and mining licenses,
observers routinely report that provincial officials use their authority arbitrarily to
block access to mining rights legally granted under the current law. For example,
reports regularly circulate that some provincial government officials use their
authority to designate land as special needs zones to usurp mining exploration
tenements. Commonly, provincial governors often reclassify property that has
never felt the touch of the plow or felt the tread of a tourist for agricultural use or
cultural tourism respectively, although the central government has legally granted
exploration rights to miners.
Other investors criticize seemingly arbitrary use of the local officials’ rights to
―comment‖ on permits for water use and mining licenses. Under the current law,
comments are advisory, and have limited legal force to disallow activity, but the
central government hesitates to reject a governor’s negative comment no matter the

24. 24
motives behind it. The effect has been to stop progress for months, limiting access
to the resource and costing rights holders’ time and money. Whatever the motive,
investors see these actions as creeping bureaucratic expropriation through denial of
access and use rights.
The 2006 Minerals Law provides no clear limit on provincial control of permits
and special use rights or guidance on how to apply these powers beyond codifying
that the provincial and local authorities have some authority over activities
occurring in their provinces and soums (counties). Faced with these unclear
boundaries of authority, the central government often interprets the rules and
regulations differently from the provincial authorities, creating administrative
conflicts among the various stakeholders. The central government acknowledges
the problematic ambiguity but has yet to clarify the situation in law or practice.
Mongolian and foreign permit holders have advised the government that letting
this problem fester raises perceptions among investors that they may risk losing
their economic rights.
I: Expropriatory Potential of the Current Minerals Laws
2006 Minerals Law
Investors suggest that the Minerals Law potentially denies access to use rights
without formally revoking these rights. The law does not allow the GOM to usurp
rights to explore and exploit natural mineral, metal, and hydrocarbons resources
per se. Instead, the law imposes procedural requirements and grants powers to
central, provincial, and local officials - powers that, if abused, might prevent
mineral license holders from exercising their exploration or mining rights.
An example is the tender process for apportioning some exploration rights. The
old law awarded exploration rights on a "first come, first served" basis, a process
that gave little discretion to government officials to intervene. The current law
establishes a different procedure for obtaining exploration rights on land explored
with state funds or lands where the current holder has forfeited exploration rights.
The Mineral Resources Authority of Mongolia (MRAM) will tender such
exploration rights only to firms technically qualified to conduct minerals work.
The current tender procedure neither requires nor allows for cash bids. Ostensibly,
only the technical merits of exploration proposals will determine who gains
exploration rights. MRAM staff has the authority and responsibility to assess the
merits of proposals to determine who wins the tenders.

25. 25
Both MRAM and its new supervising authority, the recently created Ministry of
Mining, have broad discretionary authority to select who wins exploration rights.
Under the current system, a company can prospect virgin territory and scope out a
potential exploration site, only to risk losing the site should MRAM decide to
auction those rights to other exploration companies. This power disturbs miners,
who see it as a potential source of corruption and arbitrary decisions by MRAM.
Expropriatory Potential of the 2009 Nuclear Energy Law (NEL)
The NEL requires investors to accept that the Mongolian state has the absolute
right to a free-carried share of no less than 51% of the mining company that will
develop and operate the mine as a condition of being allowed to develop any
uranium property. (For a review of the NEL’s key provisions, see Chapter A.1.)
Many foreign and domestic investors consider this non-compensated acquisition of
uranium assets as form of statutorily-sanctioned expropriation, which heretofore
had not been practiced by the government of Mongolia. Although the Minerals
Law, other relevant laws, and the Constitution of Mongolia state that the GOM
must compensate rights holders for any taking, the NEL gives the GOM the right
to take uranium holdings with no obligation to compensate rights holders.
Complicating the issue is that the law seems to conflate the deposit and the
company mining it, allowing the GOM to claim an uncompensated share in any
such entity. In effect, the GOM is demanding a free-carried, non-compensated
interest of no less than 51% of any uranium mine. The GOM has stated that this
licensing regime also applies to deposits of radioactive rare earths.
Observers argue that ongoing implementation of the NEL validates fears of
expropriation. In 2010, the GOM acted against a Canadian company in what
observers defined as a taking of the company’s rights to develop a uranium deposit
without apparent due process or compensation. The GOM has vested those rights
in a Russian-Mongolian state-owned company. The Canadian firm has sought to
settle its claims through international arbitration and expects a decision in 2013.
National Security Concerns May Lead to Loss of Rights
In 2010, the President of Mongolia used his authority as head of the National
Security Council of Mongolia (NSCM) to suspend the issuance and processing of
both mining and exploration licenses. He argued that the flaws of the licensing
regime constituted a threat to national security that justified the NSCM suspending
issuances. Domestic and foreign investors and Mongolian government officials

26. 26
disputed this moratorium, claiming that neither the President nor the NCSM had
neither constitutional nor statutory authority to supersede the government’s
regulatory authority over mining. A constitutional crisis was only averted when
Parliament imposed a moratorium on the issuance of the certain types of mineral
licenses. Having expired at the end of 2012, Parliament extended the moratorium
through 2013, pending amendments to 2006 Minerals Law.
Since this initial move, the NSCM has made additional forays into regulating
commercial activities. In 2011, NSCM powers were formally used to assure that
the Mongolian state would honor the OT investment agreement and reject a
proposed consortium agreement for the Tavan Tolgoi coking coal project.
Observers also noted that the NSCM had informally involved itself in specific
mining projects centering on coal conversions, urging that licenses and use rights
be revoked or granted for national security reasons. In all cases, NSCM justified
its involvement by claiming that neither Parliament nor the GOM would be able to
render appropriate, timely decisions on the projects in question, necessitating
definitive action by the NCSM on the grounds that lack of action constituted some
sort of national security threat.
No NSCM, to our knowledge, has used its power so broadly and publicly to
intervene in activities not normally associated with national security. GOM
officials have explained that the powers granted to the NSCM are quite broad and
without any apparent institutional limit in emergency situations. However, these
same officials claim that neither the OT agreement, nor TT, nor mining licenses,
nor specific commercial or state-owned projects rise to the level of national
security threat as defined by statute. Consequently, it seems the NSCM has no
statutory or constitutional remit to act in areas clearly the responsibility of either
the government or Parliament.
Investors remain ambivalent over NSCM interventions into the commercial realm.
On the one hand, they are relieved that at least one Mongolian institution has acted
to stabilize important national projects (OT and TT) and associated rights. On the
other hand, they question the practicality of subjecting regional and local projects
or such day to day activities as issuing permits and licenses to a highly-politicized,
non-transparent set of security criteria more appropriate to mega projects.
How the Amendment Process Affects Mineral Rights
Going into 2013, investors remain concerned that merely proposing amending a
given law seems to freeze, or at least significantly slow, the Mongolian regulatory

27. 27
process; which consequently threatens exercise of rights granted under current law.
For example, the ongoing amendment process to the 2006 Minerals Law has
adversely affected the regime for issuing exploration and mining licensing.
In 2010, the President of Mongolia announced his concerns about the existing
licensing regime, which set into motion an amendment process for the entire law.
This process, well into its third year, has produced numerous draft amendments
between the government and Parliament. Although the 2006 Minerals Law
remains in force, officials at all levels delay, or openly refuse to process, normal
requests for extending or issuing exploration and mining licenses. They justify
delay and refusal by stating that the amendment process renders the current law
―effectively‖ invalid because any act may face post facto changes under a new
statute. In certain cases, we have reliable reports of officials threatening to revoke
currently valid licenses under the pretext that such would be ―illegal‖ under draft
legislation—that is, un-ratified amendments.
Overall, business observers suggest that the amendment process for mining and
other laws has generated lengthy and costly bureaucratic delays for many
commercial sectors, especially in mining; and thus raised the perceived risk that
officials will reject permits and licenses executed in good faith under valid laws
under the pretext that the law will change in the future.

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A.4 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Observers indicate that the GOM inconsistently supports transparent, equitable
dispute settlements. These inconsistencies largely stem from both a lack of
experience with standard commercial practices and the opportunistic targeting of
foreign investors by some public and private entities. The framework of laws and
procedures is functional, but many judges and officials remain ignorant of
commercial principles as well as partial to Mongolian plaintiffs and defendants in
disputes with foreign investors.
Problems with Dispute Settlement in Mongolia’s Courts
Court structure is straightforward and can support dispute settlement. Disputants
know the procedures and the venues. Mongolia does not use juries in court
proceedings; rather, plaintiffs bring cases at the district court level before a single
district judge or a panel of district judges, depending on the complexity and
importance of the case. The district court renders its verdict. Either party can
appeal this decision to the Ulaanbaatar City Court, which rules on matters of fact
as well as matters of law. It may uphold the verdict, send it back for
reconsideration or vacate the judgment. A disputant may then take the case to the
Mongolian Supreme Court for a final review. Matters regarding the
constitutionality of laws and regulations may be taken directly before the
Constitutional Court of Mongolia (the Tsetz) by Mongolian Citizens, Foreign
Citizens, or Stateless Persons residing legally in Mongolia.
Problems with dispute resolution arise for several reasons. First, commercial law
and broad understanding of it remain in flux in Mongolia. It has become necessary
to pass new laws and regulations on contracts, investment, corporate structures,
leasing, banking, etc., because generally Mongolian civil law does not work from
precedents but from application of the statute as written. If a law is vague or does
not cover a particular commercial activity, the judge’s remit to adjudicate can be
severely limited or non-existent. For example, until recently leasing did not exist
in the Mongolian civil law code as such, but seemed to be covered under various
aspects of Mongolian civil law regarding contracts and other agreements. But
judgments on leasing made under these laws might not have applied to an
arrangement not otherwise specifically recognized under its own exclusive law.
Further, because precedents are not legally relevant or binding on other judges and
Mongolian courts, decisions reached in one case have no legal force in other suits,
even when the circumstances are similar or even before the same court and judges.

29. 29
In addition, many judges lack training in, or remain ignorant of, commercial
principles, in some cases willfully. Most observers argue that this view is not a
problem of the law but of faulty interpretation. For example, they dismiss such
concepts as the sanctity of contracts. In several cases courts have misinterpreted
provisions regarding leases and loan contracts, allegedly intentionally in some
cases. Judges regularly ignore contract terms in their decisions. If someone
defaults on a loan, the courts often order assets returned without requiring the
debtor to compensate the creditor for any loss of value. Judges routinely assert that
the creditor has recovered the asset, such as it is, and that is enough. Bad faith and
loss of value simply have no formal standing in judicial calculations of equity.
Judicial and Arbitral Prejudice Against FDI
Investors inform us of numerous and consistent accounts where rulings apparently
ignore contract terms. Further, the judges adjudicating such cases have told
investors or to third party intermediaries that such decisions are justified based on
the foreign identity of the plaintiff or defendant. Examples of arguments include:
the foreign investor can afford the loss; the foreigner must be stealing from
Mongolia in some way and so deserves to lose; or that Mongolian judges must
support Mongolians or risk being accused of being unpatriotic. While the validity
and accuracy of these claims is difficult to assess, the number and consistency of
the complaints suggest that that Mongolia’s judiciary is not treating foreign
investors equitably
Bankruptcy and Debt Collection
Mongolia’s bankruptcy provisions and procedures for securing the rights of
creditors need comprehensive reform. Mongolian law allows for mortgages and
other debt instruments backed with securitized collateral. However, rudimentary
systems for determining title and liens and for collecting on debts make lending on
local security risky. Banks frequently complain that onerous foreclosure rules are
barely workable and unfair to creditors.
Although a system exists to register immovable property—structures and real
estate—for the purpose of confirming ownership, the current system does not
record existing liens against immovable property. Nor does a system currently
exist to register ownership of, and liens on, movable property. Consequently,
lenders face the added risk of lending on collateral that debtors may not actually
own or which may have already been pledged as security for another debt.

30. 30
Since 2008, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has worked with the
GOM to create a modern and efficient property registration regime. The project is
expected to increase access to loans and property investment for households. In
addition, the project aims to streamline the business registration process and reduce
the time and cost of property registration. The urban component of the MCC-
funded Property Rights project has improved Mongolia's property registration
system and helped households obtain title to land in urban "ger" districts. The
project is working in eight provinces and in the capital city of Ulaanbaatar.
Progress to date includes the renovation of eleven property registry buildings,
training of citizens and officials, the digitization of some 7.5 million pages of land
registry records, and the strengthening of cadastral mapping capacity. For program
details: http://www.mca.mn/?q=eng/Project/PropertyRights.
Overall, the legal system does recognize the concept of collateralized assets as
security for loans, investment capital, and other debt-based financial mechanisms.
The legal system also provides for foreclosure, but this process is exceptionally
bureaucratic and time consuming. Waits of up to 36 months for final liquidations
and settlement of security are not uncommon.
Bankruptcy is an option on paper, but we can offer no example of a successful
bankruptcy process. Indeed, local law firms suggest that the process is so
apparently vague and onerous that the option is more a theoretical concept than
practical step to wind down a business.
Purchase financing remains tricky. Numerous cases have come to our attention in
which domestic and foreign distributors finance sales, complete with a local bank
guarantee. Buyers subsequently default on loans, banks refuse to honor their
guarantees, and the dealers take the buyer to court. Under current Mongolian law,
interest payments are suspended for the duration of such a case, from first filing to
final appeal before the Supreme Court of Mongolia. Thus months of interest-free
time can pass while the now impounded asset wears away. In such cases, dealers
simply reclaim the asset and drop the lawsuit, swallowing the lost interest
payments and loss of value. Domestic and foreign businesses often respond by
requiring customers to pay in cash, limiting sales and economic expansion.
Binding Arbitration: International and Domestic
The Mongolian government generally supports and has submitted to both binding
arbitration and international settlement procedures. However, glitches remain in
local execution. Mongolia ratified the Washington Convention and joined the

31. 31
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes in 1991. It also signed
and ratified the New York Convention in 1994.
To our knowledge, the government of Mongolia has accepted international
arbitration in several disputes where claimants have asserted the government
reneged on a sovereign guarantee to indemnify them or in which the government
engaged in an improper taking of property or rights. In all cases the government
has consistently declared that it would honor the arbitrators’ judgments.
More widely, Mongolian businesses partnered with foreign investors will accept
international arbitration, as do government agencies that contract business with
foreign investors, rather than avail themselves of the Arbitration Bureau operated
by the Mongolian National Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
Regarding the Mongolian Arbitration Bureau, foreign investors tell us they decline
local arbitration, and seek redress abroad because they perceive domestic
arbitrators as too politicized, too unfamiliar with commercial practices, and too
self-interested to render fair decisions.
Although arbitration is widely accepted among business people and elements of the
government, support for binding international arbitration has not penetrated local
Mongolian agencies responsible for executing judgments. Investors routinely
report that the most common problem preventing resolution of debt-driven disputes
is that the State Court Enforcement Office (SCO) often fails to execute collection
orders and court-ordered foreclosures.
The U.S.-Mongolia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) entitles both U.S. and
Mongolian investors to seek third country arbitration for business disputes.

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A.5 PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS AND INCENTIVES
Mongolia has traditionally imposed few performance requirements on, and has
offered few incentives to, investors. For the most part, the few requirements
imposed have been neither onerous nor limited foreign participation in any sector
of the economy. However, investors suggest that the recently passed 2012
Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law of Mongolia (SEFIL) imposes some
strict performance requirements on foreign investors in three strategic sectors.
Under the current Tax Law of Mongolia, the government of Mongolia (GOM)
attempts to limit both exemptions and incentives and to make sure that tax
preferences offered are available to both foreign and domestic investors. The GOM
occasionally grants tax exemptions for imports of essential fuel and staple food
products; or for imports in certain sectors targeted for growth, such as the
agriculture sector. Such exemptions can apply to both import duties and
Mongolia’s value-added tax (VAT). In addition, the GOM will occasionally
extend a 10% tax credit on a case by case basis to investments in such key sectors
as mining, agriculture, and infrastructure.
Revocation of the VAT Exemption
Investors view Mongolia’s treatment of exemptions as a mixed bag. On the down
side, Mongolia does not exempt equipment intended for mining from the 10%
value-added tax (VAT) unless the equipment will produce highly-processed
mining products in Mongolia. For example, if the Oyu Tolgoi (OT) copper-gold
project were to smelt copper, imported equipment supporting production of
metallic copper might qualify for an exemption from the VAT. However, to
promote value-added production in Mongolia, the GOM defines the production of
copper concentrate as non-value-added output; and so, equipment imported to
develop and operate this sort of operation would not qualify for the 10% VAT
exemption. Most jurisdictions, recognizing that most mines have long
development lead times before production begins, either waive or do not tax such
imports at all. Parliament has chosen to impose VAT, making Mongolian mining
cost 10% more than it would otherwise be, thus impairing sector competitiveness
and dramatically varying from global practice.
New Royalty Regime
In 2011, the GOM formally rescinded the Windfall Profits Tax (WPT) as a
condition for the GOM entering the OT agreement. OT’s private investors

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successfully argued that they would not be able to operate OT commercially if
burdened with the WPT. However, the end of the WPT represents a significant
loss of revenue to the GOM; and so, Parliament passed a revised royalty scheme.
The new regime imposes sliding rates on a variety of mineral and metal products,
which depend on the market price of the commodity on certain world exchanges
and the amount of processing the mineral or metal receives in Mongolia. The more
value added done in Mongolia, the lower the increase in royalty.
More Generous Loss Carry-forward provisions
Parliament also extended the loss carry-forward period from two (2) to eight (8)
years as part of the package of tax reforms made to conclude the OT Agreement.
Most investors find eight years sufficient for many Mongolian investments that
require long, expensive development horizons before producing any sort of profit.
Increasing Restrictions on Foreign Investment
Restrictive Aspects of the 2012 Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law (SEFIL)
As passed, some of SEFIL’s provisions seem potentially restrictive on foreign
investment. The new law specifically limits the amount of FDI in the resource
extraction, media, and financial sectors respectively; and subjects these
investments to government and parliamentary scrutiny, which may lead to forced
divesture of a given investment. (See Chapter A.1 for a discussion of the SEFIL.)
Other Restrictions on Investors
Restrictions on hiring expatriate labor aside, foreign investors currently need not
use local goods, services, or equity, or engage in substitution of imports. The
government applies the same geographical restrictions to both foreign and
domestic investors. Existing restrictions involve border security, environmental
concerns, or local use rights. There are no onerous or discriminatory visas,
residence, or work permits requirements imposed on American investors. Neither
foreign nor domestic businesses need purchase from local sources or export a
certain percentage of output; or require foreign exchange to cover their exports.
Although there remains no formal law requiring the use of local goods and
services, the GOM encourages value-added production and local sourcing of
human and material inputs in Mongolia, especially for firms engaged in natural
resource extraction. All Mongolian senior officials and politicians make in-
country processing a consistent feature of their public and private policy statements

34. 34
regarding the development of mining. For example, the new royalty scheme offers
reduced royalty rates for companies that do more value-added processing in
Mongolia. Government talks on coal production constantly feature discussions of
power generation and coals-to- liquid processing in Mongolia. Government plans
also call for increased investment in businesses and activities that keep the ―value‖
of a resource in Mongolia. Consequently, companies should continue to expect the
GOM to press aggressively for value-added production in Mongolia.
Generally, foreign investors set their own export and production targets without
concern for government imposed targets or requirements. There is no requirement
to transfer technology. As a matter of law, the government generally imposes no
offset requirements for major procurements. Certain tenders and projects on
strategic mineral deposits may require agreeing to specific levels of local
employment, procurement, or to fund certain facilities as a condition of the tender
or project, but as matter of course such conditions are not the normal approach of
the government in its tendering and procurement policies.
Investors, not the Mongolian government, make arrangements regarding
technology, intellectual property, and similar resources and may generally finance
as they see fit. Foreign investors currently need sell no shares to Mongolian
nationals. Equity stakes are generally at the complete discretion of investors,
Mongolian or foreign—with key exceptions for investments affected by SEFIL and
strategic mining assets, as discussed below.
Although Mongolia imposes no statutory or regulatory requirement, the GOM, as a
matter of foreign policy, sometimes negotiates restrictions on what sort of
financing foreign investors may obtain and with whom those investors might
partner or to whom they might sell shares or equity stakes. These restrictive
covenants will most likely be imposed in certain sectors where the investment is
determined to have national impact or national security concerns, especially in the
key mining sector.
Regarding employment, investors can locate and hire workers without using hiring
agencies—as long as hiring practices are consistent with Mongolian labor law.
However, Mongolian law requires companies to employ Mongolian workers in
certain labor categories whenever a Mongolian can perform the task as well as a
foreigner. This law generally applies to unskilled labor categories and not areas
where a high degree of technical expertise not existing in Mongolia is required.
The law does provide an escape hatch for all employers. Should an employer seek
to hire a non-Mongolian laborer and cannot obtain a waiver from the Ministry of

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Labor for that employee, the employer can pay a monthly waiver fee per employee
per month. Depending on the importance of a project, the Ministry of Labor may
grant an employer a 50% exemption of the waiver fees as an incentive.
Increasing Performance Requirements
Requirements Imposed by the Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law (SEFIL)
Investors have expressed concern that SEFIL apparently requires foreign
investment in the targeted sectors to submit to GOM involvement in management,
procurement, hiring, and other related processes and decisions. In particular,
SEFIL appears to require foreign-invested entities to use Mongolian suppliers and
labor. Whether this constitutes a formal requirement to use Mongolian labor and
suppliers under all circumstances or whenever possible remains unclear. As many
skill sets, goods, and services are not available in Mongolia, investors tell us a
strict local-sourcing requirement may cripple investment in Mongolia. Given these
lingering, negative perceptions, investors have stated they require clarification of
SEFIL’s potential performance requirements from the government of Mongolia.
For a fuller discussion of SEFIL see Chapter A.1.
Requirements in the Petroleum and Mining Sectors
Performance requirements are sparingly imposed on investors in Mongolia with
the exception of petroleum and mining exploration firms. The Petroleum
Authority of Mongolia (PAM), now a department of the newly created Ministry of
Mining, issues petroleum exploration blocks to firms, which then agree to conduct
exploration activities. The size and scope of these activities are agreed upon with
PAM and are binding. If the firm fails to fulfill exploration commitments, it must
pay a penalty to PAM based on the amount of hectares in the exploration block, or
return the block to PAM. These procedures apply to all investors in the petroleum
exploration sector.
Under the 2006 Minerals Law, receiving and keeping exploration licenses depends
on conducting actual exploration work. Each year exploration firms must submit a
work plan and report on the execution of the previous year’s performance
commitments, all of which are subject to annual verification by the Minerals
Authority of Mongolia (MRAM). Failure to comply with work requirements may
result in fines and suspension or even revocation of exploration rights. Exploration
work commitments expressed in terms of US dollar expenses per hectare per year:

36. 36
 2nd and 3rd years miners must spend no less than US $.50 per hectare.
 4th to 6th years miners must spend no less than US $1.00 per hectare.
 7th to 9th years miners must spend no less than US $1.50 per hectare.
Moreover, in the case of strategic deposits, the GOM can acquire a sliding
percentage of the mine’s operating entity ranging from 34% to 50%. It also
requires the holder of the strategic asset to sell no less than 10 percent of the
enterprise to Mongolian citizens on the existing Mongolian Stock Exchange
(MSE). Mining companies that operate or seek to develop non-strategic deposits
have reported that GOM has also vigorously pressed them to list on the MSE,
although neither law nor regulation requires listing. While foreign and domestic
investors and mining companies have supported the GOM’s call to list in principle,
they argue that they require clear, transparent guidance from the GOM on how to
list on the MSE. (See Chapters A.9 and A.10 for details on the Mongolian Stock
Exchange.)
In 2009, Parliament passed the Nuclear Energy Law (NEL). NEL imposed
significant controls on mining and processing uranium in Mongolia and created a
new regulatory agency, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), and a state-owned
holding company, MonAtom, to hold assets that the government acquires from
current rights holders. The law imposed several conditions:
 Requires all exploration and mining licenses for uranium and some rare earths
to be registered with the NEA, for a fee.
 Allows the Mongolian state the right to take—without compensation—at least
51% of the company that will develop the mine as a condition of being allowed
to develop any uranium property.
 Creates a uranium-specific licensing, regulatory regime independent of the
existing regulatory and legal framework existing for mineral and metal
resources. Prior to the Nuclear Energy Law, exploration licenses gave their
respective holders the rights to discover and develop any and all mineral and
metal resources discovered within that license area (this excludes petroleum
resources, which are governed separately). According to GOM officials, this
law means that the state can issue a distinct license for uranium exploration on a
property otherwise dedicated to other mineral and metals exploration

37. 37
Requirements Imposed on Foreign Investors Only
The Foreign Investment Law of Mongolia (FILM) requires all foreign investors to
register with the Foreign Investment Regulation and Registration Office (FIRRD)
and to show a minimum of US$100,000 in assets (cash, working stock, property,
etc.) registered in Mongolia as preconditions for registration. Foreign investors
must also pay an initial processing fee of some 12,000 Tugriks (US$8.50) and a
yearly extension fee of 6,000 Tugriks (US$4.25). (For more on FIRRD, see
Chapter A.1)
In addition to these fees, foreign investors must annually report on their activities
for the coming year to FIRRD. Businesses need not fulfill plans set out in these
reports, but failure to report may result in non-issuance of licenses and registrations
and suspension of activities. This requirement differs from that imposed on
domestic investors and businesses. Domestic investors have no yearly reporting
requirement. Mongolians pay lower registration fees, which vary too much to say
with any precision what the fees actually are.
FIRRD explains that the higher registration costs for foreign investors arise from
the need to compensate for the services it provides to them, including assistance
with registrations, liaison services, trouble-shooting, etc. The different reporting
requirements provide the government with a clearer picture of foreign investment
in Mongolia. Foreign investors are generally aware of FIRRD’s arguments and
largely accept them, but they question the need for annual registrations. Investors
recommend that FIRRD simply charge an annual fee rather than require businesses
to submit a new application each year.
Regarding reports, foreign businesses are concerned about the security of their
proprietary information. Foreign investors routinely claim that agents of FIRRD
use or sell information on business plans and financial data. We have yet to verify
these claims, but FIRRD acknowledges that data security largely depends on the
integrity of its staff, as it has few internal controls over access to investor data.
In 2012, investors complained about FIRRD’s attempts to impose arbitrary
requirements on foreign-invested business not otherwise specified in law. For
example, FIRRD refused to issue required documents unless investors agreed to a
set of FIRRD-imposed company charters, even though neither the Foreign
Investment Law nor the Company Law of Mongolia requires investors to use a
particular format.

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Tariffs
Mongolia has one of Asia’s least restrictive tariff regimes. Its export and import
policies do not harm or inhibit foreign investment. Low by world standards, tariffs
of 5% on most products are applied across the board to all firms, albeit with some
concerns about consistency of application and valuation. However, some non-
tariff barriers, such as phyto-sanitary regulations, exist that limit both foreign and
domestic competition in the fields of pharmaceutical imports and food imports and
exports. The testing requirements for imported drugs, food products, chemicals,
construction materials, etc., are extremely nontransparent, inconsistent, and
onerous. When companies attempt to clarify what the rules for importing such
products into the country are, they routinely receive contradictory information
from multiple agencies.
WTO TRIMS Requirements
Mongolia employs no measures inconsistent with World Trade Organization Trade
Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) requirements, nor has anyone alleged that
any such violation has occurred.

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A.6 RIGHT TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND ESTABLISHMENT
Generally, unless otherwise forbidden by law, foreign and domestic businesses
have been able to establish and engage in any form of business activity. All
businesses can start up, buy, sell, merge; in short, do whatever they wish with their
assets and firms, with exceptions in the minerals and hydrocarbon, banking and
finance, media and telecommunications, and real estate sectors. However,
investors suggest that that the passage of the Strategic Entities Foreign Investment
Law (SEFIL) signals Mongolia’s retreat from what was once one of Asia’s most
liberal ownership and establishment regimes.
Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law of 2012 (SEFIL)
Investors have indicated that SEFIL’s provisions may limit the rights of private
ownership and establishment that had typified Mongolia’s investment regime.
The new law specifically limits the amount of FDI in the resource extraction,
media, and financial sectors respectively; and apparently limits how investors can
buy, sell, merge, or develop assets in the affected sectors. In this respect, SEFIL
appears a sea change in a heretofore fairly liberal investment regime. Given these
lingering, negative perceptions, investors have stated that a definitive and official
statement regarding private ownership of assets and enterprises in the sectors
covered by SEFIL from the appropriate government of Mongolia entity would
quell persistent doubts. For a fuller discussion of the SEFIL see Chapter A.1.
Competition from the State-Owned Sector
Mongolia passed and implemented a competition law applying to foreign,
domestic, and state-owned entities active in Mongolia. As a practical matter,
competition between state-owned and private businesses had been declining for the
simple reason that many parastatals had been privatized. Exceptions include the
state-owned power and telecom industries, a state-owned airline, the state-owned
rail system (half-owned by Russia), several coal mines, and a large copper mining
and concentration facility (also half-owned by Russia).
Currently, firms from Mongolia, China, Japan, Europe, Canada, and the U.S. are
actively seeking opportunities for renewable and traditional power generation in
Mongolia. However, few want to invest in the power generation field until the
regulatory and statutory framework for private power generation firms up and
tariffs are set at commercial rates.

40. 40
Regarding its railway sector, Mongolia has no plans to privatize its existing
railroad jointly held with the government of Russia, but current law does allow
private firms to build, operate, and transfer new railroads to the state. Under this
law several private mining companies have proposed rail links, and obtained
licenses to construct these new lines from their respective coal mines to the
Chinese border or to the currently operating spur of the Trans-Siberian Railroad.
These public-private rail projects are part of the GOM’s current national rail
expansion plan. The plan requires that railroads linking key coal deposits in the
South Gobi desert region must first link those deposits to Russia’s Pacific ports
before linking with Chinese markets. Further, these projects may use international
gauge used in China only after the links with Russia are completed, using Russian
gauge. The GOM argues that this approach will keep Mongolia from being
dependent on one market for its mining products, namely China. As construction
on the Russian lines has stalled, there has been no progress on the China lines.
Some observers question the rationale and sequencing of government plans. In
their collective opinion, the Chinese market, the largest and most lucrative, should
be developed first, followed by (or parallel with) diversification strategies. They
see few commercial and economic benefits from GOM plans.
Government Re-enters the Mining Business
Although the trend had been for the GOM to extract itself from ownership of firms
and other commercial assets, the 2006 Minerals Law of Mongolia and the newer
2009 Nuclear Energy Law keep the state in the mining business. (See Chapter A.1
for fuller discussions of both laws.) Under both laws, the GOM grants itself the
right to acquire equity stakes ranging from 34% up to 100% of certain deposits
deemed strategic for the nation. Once acquired, these assets are vested with two
state-owned holding companies respectively: Erdenes MGL, for non-uranium
mining assets; and MonAtom for uranium resources. State mandates require these
companies to use proceeds from their activities to benefit the Mongolian people.
The role of the state as an equity owner, in terms of management of revenues and
operation of mines, remains unclear at this point. Many question the GOM’s
capacity to deal with conflicts of interest arising from its position as both regulator
and owner-operator. Specifically, investors worry that the GOM’s desire to
maximize local procurement, employment, and revenues may comprise the long
term commercial viability of any mining project.

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Investors also question the GOM’s capacity to execute its fiduciary responsibilities
as both owner and operator of mines. In the case of its Erdenes MGL Tavan
Tolgoi mining operation (EMTT), the GOM received a prepayment of US $250
million prepayment for coal from a Chinese state-owned entity. Rather than
allowing EMTT to retain these funds to cover substantial start up costs, the GOM
claimed the balance of the payment, US$200 million, for its Human Development
Fund, which has redistributed primarily mining revenues to the Mongolian public
in the form of monthly cash payments. Throughout 2012 (and it appears into
2013), this GOM action has left EMTT chronically insolvent, thereby crippling
operational activities.
Consequently, investors worry that the GOM will divert future revenues gained
from mining activities—for example capital raised through initial public offerings
from strategic mines—for unrelated expenses. Going forward, the GOM will
likely have to provide binding assurances that it can responsibly steward company
interests rather than seeing state-owned companies as nothing more than transfer
mechanisms for payments to the Mongolian public.
Observers are also concerned that the GOM may waive legal and regulatory
requirements for state-owned mining companies that it imposes on all others.
These claims seem borne out by the GOM’s treatment of state-owned EMTT.
Generally, private mining firms take at least two years to submit and receive
approval for relevant environmental and operating permits for coal mines in
Mongolia. However, there is no indication that GOM required EMTT to follow
the statutory or regulatory requirements imposed on other operations. A review of
timelines suggests that the normally lengthy approval processes cannot have been
followed. This preferential treatment creates the appearance that the GOM has one
standard for its SOEs and another for foreign-invested and private domestic
invested companies; and also the appearance that SOEs receive substantial cost
advantages via a more lenient interpretation of the legal requirements.

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A.7 PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Both Mongolia’s constitution and statute recognize the right to own private
property, movable and immovable. Regardless of nationality (except for land,
which only Mongolian citizens can own), owners can generally do as they wish
with their property. One can collateralize real estate and movable property.
Mongolian law does allow creditors to recover debts by seizing and disposing of
property offered as collateral. The only exceptions to this liberal regime are the
current mining laws and the newly passed Strategic Entities Foreign Investment
Law (SEFIL). Both foreign and domestic investors suggest that these laws restrict
how they may own and use property and property rights in the mining, banking and
finance, media and telecommunications sectors.
Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law (SEFIL)
Investors tell us they believe that SEFIL limits their property rights in violation of
existing law and the Constitution of Mongolia. SEFIL appears to allow the
government to intervene in daily management decisions, not to mention crucial
decisions on investment, capital spending, and other key practices. Investors
believe that these changes diminish property rights protections. Given these
lingering, negative perceptions, investors have called for a definitive, official
statement regarding protection of property rights in the sectors covered by SEFIL
from the appropriate government of Mongolia entity. For a fuller discussion of the
SEFIL see Chapter A.1.
Mongolia’s Current Regime to Protect Creditors
Mongolia law does protect creditors but reform is needed. Although courts
recognize property rights in concept, they have a checkered record of protecting
them in practice. Part of the problem is ignorance of, and inexperience with, best
international practices regarding land, leases, buildings, and mortgages. As noted
in Chapter A.4 Dispute Settlement, some judges, whether out of ignorance or
apparent partiality for Mongolian disputants over foreigners, have failed to follow
such practices. Newly trained judges make good faith efforts to uphold property
rights but need more experience adjudicating such cases.
The legal system also allows only judicial foreclosure but bans non-judicial
foreclosure for any contested foreclosure action. Because all contested foreclosure
actions require court review and are subject to appeals up to the Supreme Court of
Mongolia, final resolution and debt collection often takes up to 36 months.

43. 43
In addition, rudimentary systems for determining title and liens and for collecting
on debts make lending on local collateral risky. Banks and other creditors
frequently complain that onerous foreclosure rules are barely workable and unfair
to lenders. Although a system exists to register immovable property—structures
and real estate—for the purpose of confirming ownership, it does not record
existing liens; nor does the system record ownership and liens on movable
property. Consequently, creditors risk lending on collateral that debtors may not
actually own or which may have already been offered as security for other debts.
Since 2008 the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has worked with the
GOM to create a modern and efficient property registration. The project is
expected to increase access to loans and property investment for households. In
addition, the project aims to streamline business registration process and reduce the
time and cost of property registration. The urban component of the MCC-funded
Property Rights project has improved Mongolia's property registration system and
helped households obtain title to land in urban "ger" districts. The project is
working in eight provinces and in the capital city of Ulaanbaatar. Progress to date
includes the renovation of eleven property registry buildings, training of citizens
and officials, the digitization of some 7.5 million pages of land registry records,
and the strengthening of cadastral mapping capacity. For program details go
tohttp://www.mca.mn/?q=eng/Project/PropertyRights.
Debt Collection Procedures
Even with the delays, lenders report that getting a court ruling is easier than
executing the court’s decision. The problem is not the law but the enforcement.
A judge orders the State Collection Office (SCO) to move on the assets of the
debtor. The SCO orders district bailiffs to seize and turn those assets over to the
state, which then distributes them to creditors. However, foreign and domestic
investors claim that the state collection office and the district bailiffs frequently fail
in their responsibilities to both courts and creditors.
In some cases, bailiffs refuse to enforce court orders. Bailiffs are often local
agents who fear community retribution if they make collection. In some cases,
bailiffs will not collect unless the creditor provides bodyguards during seizure of
assets. Creditors also have reason to believe that the state collection office accepts
payments from debtors to delay seizure of assets.

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Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
Mongolia supports intellectual property rights (IPR) in general and has protected
American rights in particular. A member of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), Mongolia has signed and ratified most treaties and
conventions, including the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (WTO TRIPS). WIPO Internet treaties
have been signed but remain un-ratified by Mongolia’s Parliament. Despite this,
the Mongolian government and its intellectual property rights enforcer, the
Intellectual Property Office of Mongolia (IPOM), make a good faith effort to honor
these agreements.
Under TRIPS and Mongolian law, the Mongolian Customs Authority (MCA) and
the Economic Crimes Unit of the National Police (ECU) also have an obligation to
protect IPR. MCA can seize shipments at the border. The ECU has the exclusive
power to conduct criminal investigations and bring criminal charges against IPR
pirates. The IPOM has the administrative authority to investigate and seize fakes
without court orders. Of these three, the IPOM makes the most consistent efforts
to fulfill Mongolia’s treaty commitments.
Problems stem from ignorance of the importance of intellectual property to
Mongolia and of the obligations imposed by TRIPS on member states. Customs
still hesitates to seize shipments, saying their statutory mandate does not allow
seizure of such goods, but Mongolian statutory and constitutional laws clearly
recognize that international treaty obligations in this area take precedence over
local statutes and regulations. A clear legal basis exists for Customs to act, which
has been recognized by elements of the Mongolian Judiciary, the Parliament, and
the IPOM. Customs officers may occasionally seize fake products, but it seems
that Mongolian customs law will have to be brought into formal compliance with
TRIPS before Customs will fulfill its obligations. The ECU has also hesitates to
investigate and prosecute IPR cases, deferring to the IPOM. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that ECU officials fear political repercussions from going after IPR
pirates, many of whom wield political influence.
The IPOM generally has an excellent record of protecting American trademarks,
copyrights, and patents; however, tight resources limit the IPOM’s ability to act.
In most cases, when the U.S. Embassy in Ulaanbaatar conveys a complaint from a
rights holder to the IPOM, it quickly investigates the complaint. If it judges that an
abuse occurred, it will (and has in every case, so far) seize the pirated products or
remove fakes, under administrative powers granted in Mongolian law.