Arthur_M._Langer_Information_Technology_and_Org.pdfInf.docx

Arthur_M._Langer_Information_Technology_and_Org.pdf
Information Technology
and Organizational
Learning
Managing Behavioral Change
in the Digital Age
Third Edition
http://taylorandfrancis.com
Information Technology
and Organizational
Learning
Managing Behavioral Change
in the Digital Age
Third Edition
Arthur M. Langer
CRC Press

Taylor & Francis Group
6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Suite 300
Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742
© 2018 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
CRC Press is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa
business
No claim to original U.S. Government works
Printed on acid-free paper
International Standard Book Number-13: 978-1-4987-7575-5
(Paperback)
International Standard Book Number-13: 978-1-138-23858-9
(Hardback)
This book contains information obtained from authentic and
highly regarded sources. Reasonable
efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information,
but the author and publisher cannot
assume responsibility for the validity of all materials or the
consequences of their use. The authors and
publishers have attempted to trace the copyright holders of all
material reproduced in this publication
and apologize to copyright holders if permission to publish in
this form has not been obtained. If any
copyright material has not been acknowledged please write and
let us know so we may rectify in any
future reprint.
Except as permitted under U.S. Copyright Law, no part of this
book may be reprinted, reproduced,
transmitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or

hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and
recording, or in any information stor-
age or retrieval system, without written permission from the
publishers.
For permission to photocopy or use material electronically from
this work, please access www.copy-
right.com (http://www.copyright.com/) or contact the Copyright
Clearance Center, Inc. (CCC), 222
Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, 978-750-8400. CCC is a
not-for-profit organization that
provides licenses and registration for a variety of users. For
organizations that have been granted a
photocopy license by the CCC, a separate system of payment
has been arranged.
Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be
trademarks or registered trademarks, and are
used only for identification and explanation without intent to
infringe.
Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at
http://w w w.taylorandfrancis.com
and the CRC Press Web site at
http://w w w.crcpress.com
v
Contents
Fo r e w o r d xi
Ac k n o w l e d g m e n t s xiii
Au t h o r xv

I n t r o d u c t I o n xvii
c h A p t e r 1 th e “ r Av e l l” c o r p o r At I o n 1
Introduction 1
A New Approach 3
The Blueprint for Integration 5
Enlisting Support 6
Assessing Progress 7
Resistance in the Ranks 8
Line Management to the Rescue 8
IT Begins to Reflect 9
Defining an Identity for Information Technology 10
Implementing the Integration: A Move toward Trust and
Reflection 12
Key Lessons 14
Defining Reflection and Learning for an Organization 14
Working toward a Clear Goal 15
Commitment to Quality 15
Teaching Staff “Not to Know” 16
Transformation of Culture 16
Alignment with Administrative Departments 17
Conclusion 19
v i Contents
c h A p t e r 2 th e It d I l e m m A 21
Introduction 21
Recent Background 23
IT in the Organizational Context 24
IT and Organizational Structure 24

The Role of IT in Business Strategy 25
Ways of Evaluating IT 27
Executive Knowledge and Management of IT 28
IT: A View from the Top 29
Section 1: Chief Executive Perception of the Role of IT 32
Section 2: Management and Strategic Issues 34
Section 3: Measuring IT Performance and Activities 35
General Results 36
Defining the IT Dilemma 36
Recent Developments in Operational Excellence 38
c h A p t e r 3 te c h n o l o gy A s A vA r I A b l e A n d re s p
o n s I v e
o r g A n I z At I o n A l d y n A m I s m 41
Introduction 41
Technological Dynamism 41
Responsive Organizational Dynamism 42
Strategic Integration 43
Summary 48
Cultural Assimilation 48
IT Organization Communications with “ Others” 49
Movement of Traditional IT Staff 49
Summary 51
Technology Business Cycle 52
Feasibility 53
Measurement 53
Planning 54
Implementation 55
Evolution 57
Drivers and Supporters 58

Santander versus Citibank 60
Information Technology Roles and Responsibilities 60
Replacement or Outsource 61
c h A p t e r 4 o r g A n I z At I o n A l l e A r n I n g th e o r I e
s A n d
te c h n o l o gy 63
Introduction 63
Learning Organizations 72
Communities of Practice 75
Learning Preferences and Experiential Learning 83
Social Discourse and the Use of Language 89
Identity 91
Skills 92
v iiContents
Emotion 92
Linear Development in Learning Approaches 96
c h A p t e r 5 m A n A g I n g o r g A n I z At I o n A l l e A r n
I n g A n d
te c h n o l o gy 109
The Role of Line Management 109
Line Managers 111
First-Line Managers 111
Supervisor 111
Management Vectors 112
Knowledge Management 116
Ch ange Management 120
Change Management for IT Organizations 123

Social Networks and Information Technology 134
c h A p t e r 6 o r g A n I z At I o n A l tr A n s F o r m At I o n
A n d t h e
bA l A n c e d s c o r e c A r d 139
Introduction 139
Methods of Ongoing Evaluation 146
Balanced Scorecards and Discourse 156
Knowledge Creation, Culture, and Strategy 158
c h A p t e r 7 vI r t uA l te A m s A n d o u t s o u r c I n g 163
Introduction 163
Status of Virtual Teams 165
Management Considerations 166
Dealing with Multiple Locations 166
Externalization 169
Internalization 171
Combination 171
Socialization 172
Externalization Dynamism 172
Internalization Dynamism 173
Combination Dynamism 173
Socialization Dynamism 173
Dealing with Multiple Locations and Outsourcing 177
Revisiting Social Discourse 178
Identity 179
Skills 180
Emotion 181
c h A p t e r 8 sy n e r g I s t I c u n I o n o F It A n d
o r g A n I z At I o n A l l e A r n I n g 187
Introduction 187
Siemens AG 187

Aftermath 202
ICAP 203
v iii Contents
Five Years Later 224
HTC 225
IT History at HTC 226
Interactions of the CEO 227
The Process 228
Transformation from the Transition 229
Five Years Later 231
Summary 233
c h A p t e r 9 Fo r m I n g A c y b e r s e c u r I t y c u lt u r e
239
Introduction 239
History 239
Talking to the Board 241
Establishing a Security Culture 241
Understanding What It Means to be Compromised 242
Cyber Security Dynamism and Responsive Organizational
Dynamism 242
Cyber Strategic Integration 243
Cyber Cultural Assimilation 245
Summary 246
Organizational Learning and Application Development 246
Cyber Security Risk 247
Risk Responsibility 248
Driver /Supporter Implications 250
c h A p t e r 10 d I g I tA l tr A n s F o r m At I o n A n d c h A

n g e s I n
c o n s u m e r b e h Av I o r 251
Introduction 251
Requirements without Users and without Input 254
Concepts of the S-Curve and Digital Transformation
Analysis and Design 258
Organizational Learning and the S-Curve 260
Communities of Practice 261
The IT Leader in the Digital Transformation Era 262
How Technology Disrupts Firms and Industries 264
Dynamism and Digital Disruption 264
Critical Components of “ Digital” Organization 265
Assimilating Digital Technology Operationally and Culturally
267
Conclusion 268
c h A p t e r 11 I n t e g r At I n g g e n e r At I o n y e m p l oy
e e s t o
Ac c e l e r At e c o m p e t I t I v e A dvA n tA g e 269
Introduction 269
The Employment Challenge in the Digital Era 270
Gen Y Population Attributes 272
Advantages of Employing Millennials to Support Digital
Transformation 272
Integration of Gen Y with Baby Boomers and Gen X 273
i xContents
Designing the Digital Enterprise 274
Assimilating Gen Y Talent from Underserved and Socially
Excluded Populations 276
Langer Workforce Maturity Arc 277

Theoretical Constructs of the LWMA 278
The LWMA and Action Research 281
Implications for New Pathways for Digital Talent 282
Demographic Shifts in Talent Resources 282
Economic Sustainability 283
Integration and Trust 283
Global Implications for Sources of Talent 284
Conclusion 284
c h A p t e r 12 to wA r d b e s t p r A c t I c e s 287
Introduction 287
Chief IT Executive 288
Definitions of Maturity Stages and Dimension Variables in
the Chief IT Executive Best Practices Arc 297
Maturity Stages 297
Performance Dimensions 298
Chief Executive Officer 299
CIO Direct Reporting to the CEO 305
Outsourcing 306
Centralization versus Decentralization of IT 306
CIO Needs Advanced Degrees 307
Need for Standards 307
Risk Management 307
The CEO Best Practices Technology Arc 313
the CEO Technology Best Practices Arc 314
Maturity Stages 314
Middle Management 316

The Middle Management Best Practices Technology Arc 323
the Middle Manager Best Practices Arc 325
Maturity Stages 325
Summary 327
Ethics and Maturity 333
c h A p t e r 13 c o n c l u s I o n s 339
Introduction 339
g l o s s A ry 357
re F e r e n c e s 363
I n d e x 373
x i
Foreword
Digital technologies are transforming the global economy.
Increasingly,
firms and other organizations are assessing their opportunities,
develop-
ing and delivering products and services, and interacting with
custom-
ers and other stakeholders digitally. Established companies
recognize
that digital technologies can help them operate their businesses

with
greater speed and lower costs and, in many cases, offer their
custom-
ers opportunities to co-design and co-produce products and
services.
Many start-up companies use digital technologies to develop
new prod-
ucts and business models that disrupt the present way of doing
busi-
ness, taking customers away from firms that cannot change and
adapt.
In recent years, digital technology and new business models
have dis-
rupted one industry after another, and these developments are
rapidly
transforming how people communicate, learn, and work.
Against this backdrop, the third edition of Arthur Langer’ s
Information Technology and Organizational Learning is most
welcome.
For decades, Langer has been studying how firms adapt to new
or
changing conditions by increasing their ability to incorporate
and use
advanced information technologies. Most organizations do not
adopt
new technology easily or readily. Organizational inertia and
embed-
ded legacy systems are powerful forces working against the
adoption
of new technology, even when the advantages of improved
technology
are recognized. Investing in new technology is costly, and it
requires

x ii Foreword
aligning technology with business strategies and transforming
cor-
porate cultures so that organization members use the technology
to
become more productive.
Information Technology and Organizational Learning addresses
these
important issues— and much more. There are four features of
the new
edition that I would like to draw attention to that, I believe,
make
this a valuable book. First, Langer adopts a behavioral
perspective
rather than a technical perspective. Instead of simply offering
norma-
tive advice about technology adoption, he shows how sound
learn-
ing theory and principles can be used to incorporate technology
into
the organization. His discussion ranges across the dynamic
learning
organization, knowledge management, change management,
com-
munities of practice, and virtual teams. Second, he shows how
an
organization can move beyond technology alignment to true
technol-
ogy integration. Part of this process involves redefining the
traditional
support role of the IT department to a leadership role in which
IT
helps to drive business strategy through a technology-based

learn-
ing organization. Third, the book contains case studies that
make the
material come alive. The book begins with a comprehensive
real-life
case that sets the stage for the issues to be resolved, and smaller
case
illustrations are sprinkled throughout the chapters, to make
concepts
and techniques easily understandable. Lastly, Langer has a
wealth of
experience that he brings to his book. He spent more than 25
years
as an IT consultant and is the founder of the Center for
Technology
Management at Columbia University, where he directs
certificate and
executive programs on various aspects of technology innovation
and
management. He has organized a vast professional network of
tech-
nology executives whose companies serve as learning
laboratories for
his students and research. When you read the book, the
knowledge
and insight gained from these experiences is readily apparent.
If you are an IT professional, Information Technology and
Organi-
zational Learning should be required reading. However, anyone
who
is part of a firm or agency that wants to capitalize on the
opportunities
provided by digital technology will benefit from reading the
book.

Charles C. Snow
Professor Emeritus, Penn State University
Co-Editor, Journal of Organization Design
x iii
Acknowledgments
Many colleagues and clients have provided significant support
during
the development of the third edition of Information Technology
and
Organizational Learning.
I owe much to my colleagues at Teachers College, namely,
Professor
Victoria Marsick and Lyle Yorks, who guided me on many of
the the-
ories on organizational learning, and Professor Lee Knefelkamp,
for
her ongoing mentorship on adult learning and developmental
theo-
ries. Professor David Thomas from the Harvard Business School
also
provided valuable direction on the complex issues surrounding
diver-
sity, and its importance in workforce development.
I appreciate the corporate executives who agreed to participate
in the studies that allowed me to apply learning theories to
actual
organizational practices. Stephen McDermott from ICAP
provided

invaluable input on how chief executive officers (CEOs) can
success-
fully learn to manage emerging technologies. Dana Deasy, now
global
chief information officer (CIO) of JP Morgan Chase,
contributed
enormous information on how corporate CIOs can integrate
tech-
nology into business strategy. Lynn O’ Connor Vos, CEO of
Grey
Healthcare, also showed me how technology can produce direct
mon-
etary returns, especially when the CEO is actively involved.
And, of course, thank you to my wonderful students at
Columbia
University. They continue to be at the core of my inspiration
and love
for writing, teaching, and scholarly research.
x v
Author
Arthur M. Langer, EdD, is professor of professional practice
of management and the director of the Center for Technology
Management at Columbia University. He is the academic direc-
tor of the Executive Masters of Science program in Technology
Management, vice chair of faculty and executive advisor to the
dean
at the School of Professional Studies and is on the faculty of the

Department of Organization and Leadership at the Graduate
School
of Education (Teachers College). He has also served as a
member of
the Columbia University Faculty Senate. Dr. Langer is the
author
of Guide to Software Development: Designing & Managing the
Life
Cycle. 2nd Edition (2016), Strategic IT: Best Practices for
Managers
and Executives (2013 with Lyle Yorks), Information
Technology and
Organizational Learning (2011), Analysis and Design of
Information
Systems (2007), Applied Ecommerce (2002), and The Art of
Analysis
(1997), and has numerous published articles and papers, relating
to digital transformation, service learning for underserved
popula-
tions, IT organizational integration, mentoring, and staff
develop-
ment. Dr. Langer consults with corporations and universities on
information technology, cyber security, staff development, man-
agement transformation, and curriculum development around the
Globe. Dr. Langer is also the chairman and founder of
Workforce
Opportunity Services (www.wforce.org), a non-profit social
venture
x v i Author
that provides scholarships and careers to underserved
populations
around the world.

Dr. Langer earned a BA in computer science, an MBA in
accounting/finance, and a Doctorate of Education from
Columbia
University.
x v ii
Introduction
Background
Information technology (IT) has become a more significant part
of
workplace operations, and as a result, information systems
person-
nel are key to the success of corporate enterprises, especially
with
the recent effects of the digital revolution on every aspect of
business
and social life (Bradley & Nolan, 1998; Langer, 1997, 2011;
Lipman-
Blumen, 1996). This digital revolution is defined as a form of “
dis-
ruption.” Indeed, the big question facing many enterprises
today is,
How can executives anticipate the unexpected threats brought
on by
technological advances that could devastate their business? This
book
focuses on the vital role that information and digital technology
orga-
nizations need to play in the course of organizational
development

and learning, and on the growing need to integrate technology
fully
into the processes of workplace organizational learning.
Technology
personnel have long been criticized for their inability to
function as
part of the business, and they are often seen as a group outside
the
corporate norm (Schein, 1992). This is a problem of cultural
assimila-
tion, and it represents one of the two major fronts that
organizations
now face in their efforts to gain a grip on the new, growing
power of
technology, and to be competitive in a global world. The other
major
x v iii IntroduCtIon
front concerns the strategic integration of new digital
technologies
into business line management.
Because technology continues to change at such a rapid pace,
the
ability of organizations to operate within a new paradigm of
dynamic
change emphasizes the need to employ action learning as a way
to
build competitive learning organizations in the twenty-first
century.
Information Technology and Organizational Learning integrates
some
of the fundamental issues bearing on IT today with concepts

from
organizational learning theory, providing comprehensive
guidance,
based on real-life business experiences and concrete research.
This book also focuses on another aspect of what IT can mean
to
an organization. IT represents a broadening dimension of
business life
that affects everything we do inside an organization. This new
reality is
shaped by the increasing and irreversible dissemination of
technology.
To maximize the usefulness of its encroaching presence in
everyday
business affairs, organizations will require an optimal
understanding
of how to integrate technology into everything they do. To this
end,
this book seeks to break new ground on how to approach and
concep-
tualize this salient issue— that is, that the optimization of
information
and digital technologies is best pursued with a synchronous
imple-
mentation of organizational learning concepts. Furthermore,
these
concepts cannot be implemented without utilizing theories of
strategic
learning. Therefore, this book takes the position that technology
liter-
acy requires individual and group strategic learning if it is to
transform
a business into a technology-based learning organization.
Technology-
based organizations are defined as those that have implemented

a means
of successfully integrating technology into their process of
organiza-
tional learning. Such organizations recognize and experience
the real-
ity of technology as part of their everyday business function. It
is what
many organizations are calling “ being digital.”
This book will also examine some of the many existing organi-
zational learning theories, and the historical problems that have
occurred with companies that have used them, or that have
failed
to use them. Thus, the introduction of technology into
organizations
actually provides an opportunity to reassess and reapply many
of the
past concepts, theories, and practices that have been used to
support
the importance of organizational learning. It is important,
however,
not to confuse this message with a reason for promoting
organizational
x i xIntroduCtIon
learning, but rather, to understand the seamless nature of the
relation-
ship between IT and organizational learning. Each needs the
other to
succeed. Indeed, technology has only served to expose problems
that
have existed in organizations for decades, e.g., the inability to
drive

down responsibilities to the operational levels of the
organization, and
to be more agile with their consumers.
This book is designed to help businesses and individual manag-
ers understand and cope with the many issues involved in
developing
organizational learning programs, and in integrating an
important
component: their IT and digital organizations. It aims to provide
a
combination of research case studies, together with existing
theories
on organizational learning in the workplace. The goal is also to
pro-
vide researchers and corporate practitioners with a book that
allows
them to incorporate a growing IT infrastructure with their exist-
ing workforce culture. Professional organizations need to
integrate
IT into their organizational processes to compete effectively in
the
technology-driven business climate of today. This book
responds to
the complex and various dilemmas faced by many human
resource
managers and corporate executives regarding how to actually
deal
with many marginalized technology personnel who somehow
always
operate outside the normal flow of the core business.
While the history of IT, as a marginalized organization, is rela-
tively short, in comparison to that of other professions, the
problems
of IT have been consistent since its insertion into business

organiza-
tions in the early 1960s. Indeed, while technology has changed,
the
position and valuation of IT have continued to challenge how
execu-
tives manage it, account for it, and, most important, ultimately
value
its contributions to the organization. Technology personnel
continue
to be criticized for their inability to function as part of the
business,
and they are often seen as outside the business norm. IT
employees
are frequently stereotyped as “ techies,” and are segregated in
such a
way that they become isolated from the organization. This book
pro-
vides a method for integrating IT, and redefining its role in
organiza-
tions, especially as a partner in formulating and implementing
key
business strategies that are crucial for the survival of many
companies
in the new digital age. Rather than provide a long and extensive
list of
common issues, I have decided it best to uncover the challenges
of IT
integration and performance through the case study approach.
x x IntroduCtIon
IT continues to be one of the most important yet least
understood
departments in an organization. It has also become one of the

most
significant components for competing in the global markets of
today.
IT is now an integral part of the way companies become
successful,
and is now being referred to as the digital arm of the business.
This
is true across all industries. The role of IT has grown
enormously in
companies throughout the world, and it has a mission to provide
stra-
tegic solutions that can make companies more competitive.
Indeed,
the success of IT, and its ability to operate as part of the
learning
organization, can mean the difference between the success and
failure
of entire companies. However, IT must be careful that it is not
seen as
just a factory of support personnel, and does not lose its
justification
as driving competitive advantage. We see in many organizations
that
other digital-based departments are being created, due to
frustration
with the traditional IT culture, or because they simply do not
see IT
as meeting the current needs for operating in a digital economy.
This book provides answers to other important questions that
have
challenged many organizations for decades. First, how can
manag-
ers master emerging digital technologies, sustain a relationship
with
organizational learning, and link it to strategy and performance?

Second, what is the process by which to determine the value of
using
technology, and how does it relate to traditional ways of
calculating
return on investment, and establishing risk models? Third, what
are
the cyber security implications of technology-based products
and
services? Fourth, what are the roles and responsibilities of the
IT
executive, and the department in general? To answer these
questions,
managers need to focus on the following objectives:
• Address the operational weaknesses in organizations, in
terms of how to deal with new technologies, and how to bet-
ter realize business benefits.
• Provide a mechanism that both enables organizations to deal
with accelerated change caused by technological innovations,
and integrates them into a new cycle of processing, and han-
dling of change.
• Provide a strategic learning framework, by which every new
technology variable adds to organizational knowledge and
can develop a risk and security culture.
x x iIntroduCtIon
• Establish an integrated approach that ties technology account-
ability to other measurable outcomes, using organizational
learning techniques and theories.
To realize these objectives, organizations must be able to

• create dynamic internal processes that can deal, on a daily
basis, with understanding the potential fit of new technologies
and their overall value within the structure of the business;
• provide the discourse to bridge the gaps between IT- and non-
IT-related investments, and uses, into one integrated system;
• monitor investments and determine modifications to the life
cycle;
• implement various organizational learning practices, includ-
ing learning organization, knowledge management, change
management, and communities of practice, all of which help
foster strategic thinking, and learning, and can be linked to
performance (Gephardt & Marsick, 2003).
The strengths of this book are that it integrates theory and
practice
and provides answers to the four common questions mentioned.
Many
of the answers provided in these pages are founded on theory
and
research and are supported by practical experience. Thus,
evidence of
the performance of the theories is presented via case studies,
which
are designed to assist the readers in determining how such
theories
and proven practices can be applied to their specific
organization.
A common theme in this book involves three important terms:
dynamic , unpredictable , and acceleration . Dynamic is a term
that rep-
resents spontaneous and vibrant things— a motive force.

Technology
behaves with such a force and requires organizations to deal
with its
capabilities. Glasmeier (1997) postulates that technology
evolution,
innovation, and change are dynamic processes. The force then is
tech-
nology, and it carries many motives, as we shall see throughout
this
book. Unpredictable suggests that we cannot plan what will
happen
or will be needed. Many organizational individuals, including
execu-
tives, have attempted to predict when, how, or why technology
will
affect their organization. Throughout our recent history,
especially
during the “ digital disruption” era, we have found that it is
difficult,
if not impossible, to predict how technology will ultimately
benefit or
x x ii IntroduCtIon
hurt organizational growth and competitive advantage. I believe
that
technology is volatile and erratic at times. Indeed, harnessing
tech-
nology is not at all an exact science; certainly not in the ways in
which
it can and should be used in today’ s modern organization.
Finally, I
use the term acceleration to convey the way technology is
speeding up

our lives. Not only have emerging technologies created this
unpre-
dictable environment of change, but they also continue to
change it
rapidly— even from the demise of the dot-com era decades ago.
Thus,
what becomes important is the need to respond quickly to
technology.
The inability to be responsive to change brought about by
technologi-
cal innovations can result in significant competitive
disadvantages for
organizations.
This new edition shows why this is a fact especially when
examining
the shrinking S-Curve. So, we look at these three words—
dynamic,
unpredictable, and acceleration— as a way to define how
technology
affects organizations; that is, technology is an accelerating
motive
force that occurs irregularly. These words name the challenges
that
organizations need to address if they are to manage
technological
innovations and integrate them with business strategy and
competi-
tive advantage. It only makes sense that the challenge of
integrating
technology into business requires us first to understand its
potential
impact, determine how it occurs, and see what is likely to
follow.
There are no quick remedies to dealing with emerging
technologies,

just common practices and sustained processes that must be
adopted
for organizations to survive in the future.
I had four goals in mind in writing this book. First, …
Legal Digest 1
n virtually every instance
where a person's constitu-
tional rights were violated
by a police officer, a plaintiff
will be able to point to some-
thing the employing entity-
county or municipality-
could have done to prevent
the unfortunate incident. Fre-
quently, where the alleged
violation of rights is caused by
the use of force by a police
officer, the injured party will
attempt to hold the county or
municipality responsible by
asserting that the harm caused
could have been avoided by
a more adequate training
program. This article addresses
the issue of county or muni-
cipal liability under the federal
statute Title 42, United States
Code, Section 1983 (herein-
after Section 1983), which

permits individuals to hold
government employees and, in
some cases, their employers
accountable for violation of
rights secured by the U.S.
Constitution.' In particular, this
article explores the contours of
employer liability for claims
that the constitutional violation
was caused by a failure to
adequately or properly train
employees.
In resolving the issue of
liability for failure to train,
focus is placed on the ade-
quacy of the training program
in relation to the tasks parti-
cular officers must perform.
However, it is not enough to
merely show that a situation
will arise and that an officer
taking the wrong course of
action in that instance will
result in injuries to citizens.
Even adequately trained officers
occasionally make mistakes; the
fact that they do says little about
the training program or the legal
basis for holding a city or
county liable for that mistake.
22 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

A city or county will not be
liable simply because it em-
ployed the officer whose actions
resulted in a deprivation of a
citizen's constitutional rights.
Rather, a plaintiff must estab-
lish that government policy-
makers either were or should
have been aware that a training
program was inadequate and did
little or nothing about the prob-
lem. Which is to say, policy-
makers were deliberately indif-
ferent to the harm that would
likely result from the failure to
train.2
"Deliberate indifference" is
a standard of fault that requires
a showing that government
policy makers acted with con-
scious disregard for the obvious
consequences of their actions.'
A pattern of constitutional vio-
lations by officers may indicate
that a lack of proper training,
rather than a one-time negligent
administration of the training
program or factors peculiar to
the officer involved in a single
incident, is responsible for the
plaintiff's injury.4 If a training
program does not prevent con-
stitutional violations and a
pattern of injuries develops,
officials charged with the

responsibility of formulating
policy for the agency may be
put on notice that a new pro-
gram is needed and a failure
to address the problem may
constitute deliberate indiffer-
ence.' In the absence of a
pattern of violations, deliberate
indifference may be inferred
from the policy makers' contin-
ued adherence to a training
program that they knew or
should have known would fail
to prevent violations in usual or
recurring situations.6 In such
cases, the constitutional viola-
tion must be a highly predict-
able or plainly obvious conse-
quence of the failure to train.
A training program must be
quite deficient for the deliberate
indifference standard to be met.
To hold the city or county
liable, a plaintiff must show
that the level of training was so
deficient that it fell below what
is constitutionally acceptable.
Liability does not attach where
an otherwise adequate training
program has occasionally been
negligently administered. Nei-
ther will it suffice to prove that
an injury or accident could have
been avoided if an officer had

received better or more training
sufficient to equip the officer to
avoid the particular injury-
causing conduct.7 The fact that
training was imperfect or not in
the precise form that a plaintiff
would prefer is insufficient to
make a showing of deliberate
indifference.8 Such second-
guessing could be made about
almost any encounter resulting
in injury.
While a city or county may
be exposed to liability only
when it deliberately ignores
the obvious consequences of
the inadequacies of its training
program, there is no neat set
of rules that permits a city or
county to determine with pre-
cision when a consequence
will be deemed obvious. Pre-
dicting how a hypothetically
well-trained officer would act
under a specific set of circum-
stances is no easy task, par-
ticularly because matters of
individual judgement may be
involved. Nevertheless, one
guiding principle is that by
October 2005 / 23
...a plaintiff must

establish that
government
policymakers... were...
aware that a training
program was
inadequate and did
little or nothing
about [it]. Y
Special Agent King is a legal instructor at the FBI Academy.
choosing the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard of liability for
Section 1983 claims, the U.S.
Supreme Court has made it
difficult for individuals to hold
city and county governments
liable for violations of rights
secured by the U.S. Constitution
based on an alleged failure to
train.
Employer Liability
Under Section 1983
In Monell v. Department of
Social Services of City of New
York, the U.S. Supreme Court
established the fundamental
principle in the law of munici-
pal liability under Section 1983

that local governments may be
held liable only for their own
conduct and not merely for the
conduct of their employees. 9
That is, the government entity
is not vicariously liable for the
actions of its police officers
simply because it employed the
officer and the harm was caused
while the officer was acting
within the scope of his or her
employment. Instead, liability
only attaches to the county or
city for injury caused by actions
or omissions attributable to the
government itself.10 Govern-
ment (as opposed to individual)
liability under Section 1983 is
restricted only to those cases in
which "the action that is alleged
to be unconstitutional imple-
ments or executes a policy state-
ment, ordinance, regulation, or
decision officially adopted or
promulgated by that body's
officers."" I Government conduct
by way of its policy, in addition
to the individual employee's
conduct that directly resulted in
the harm, must be identified as
causing a violation of a recog-
nized constitutional right.'2
A plaintiff seeking to find a
city or county government liable

under Section 1983 must estab-
lish a causal connection be-
tween the injury and a govern-
ment policy or custom.13
...a plaintiff must
show that the level
of training was
so deficient that it
fell below what is
constitutionally
acceptable.
Locating a policy ensures that
liability attaches only for those
deprivations of constitutional
rights resulting from the deci-
sions of its duly constituted
legislative body or of those
officials whose acts may fairly
be said to be those of the gov-
ernment itself. '4 City or county
government liability under
Section 1983 attaches "where-
and only where-a deliberate
choice to follow a course of
action is made from among
various alternatives by the
official or officials responsible
for establishing final policy
with respect to the subject
matter in question."' 5 The
assessment of what official

possesses final authority to
establish policy is determined
by state law. The discretionary
decisions of lesser officials will
not be imputed to the agency as
actionable policy.'6
Identification of a "Policy"
Generally, three possible
avenues are open to plaintiffs to
show the existence of a "policy"
that allegedly caused a constitu-
tional violation.
1) An express written policy
or an actual directive from a
policy-making official that,
when enforced, causes a
constitutional violation-in
short, an unconstitutional
policy. Where a plaintiff can
demonstrate that an existing
policy is itself unconstitu-
tional when applied as
intended or that a specific
action taken or directed by
the government itself vio-
lated a citizen's constitu-
tional rights, resolving the
issues of fault and causation
is relatively straight for-
ward. In these cases, there is
clear governmental action
that can be attributed as
the cause, or moving force,

behind the injury of which
the plaintiff complains.'" A
policy also can be inferred
even from a single decision
made by the highest official
responsible for setting
policy within that area of
a government's business."
2) Widespread conduct that
results in violations of con-
stitutional rights, although
not authorized by any writ-
ten law or policy, that is so
permanent and well-settled
as to constitute a custom or
practice with the force of
law may serve as the func-
tional equivalent of a writ-
ten policy.' 9 Essentially, a
practice of condoning con-
stitutional violations must
be established. Because a
custom or practice must be
established, evidence of
only a single alleged inci-
dent, particularly if it in-
volved only actors below
policy-making level, will
typically not be sufficient.

3) An inadequate written
policy or a practice that is
not unconstitutional itself
but which reflects deliberate
indifference to persons'
constitutional rights because
the deficiency causes offi-
cers to violate constitutional
rights.,0 This is often diffi-
cult for plaintiffs to estab-
lish because the deprivation
of rights is allegedly caused
not by affirmatively uncon-
stitutional acts attributable
to the government but by
omissions or failure to take
adequate steps to safeguard
constitutional rights. 21 Most
failure-to-train cases fall
into this category. Few
training programs are
unconstitutional when
applied as intended. For
example, a county or mu-
nicipality will rarely have an
express written or oral
policy permitting the exces-
sive use of force. Thus, for
liability to attach, it is
necessary to establish the
existence of a custom or
practice-a policy-that
permitted excessive force to
occur by demonstrating that

the municipality deliberately
failed to adequately train its
police officers in a relevant
respect.22
"Deliberate Indifference"
as "Policy"
In City of Canton v.
Harris,z3 the U.S. Supreme
Court established deliberate
indifference as the standard
required to show the existence
of a policy or custom when a
constitutional violation alleg-
edly results from a failure to
train. The Court described this
standard as follows:
Only where a failure to train
reflects a "deliberate" or
"conscious" choice by a
municipality-a "policy" as
defined by our prior cases-
can a city be liable for such
failure under Section 1983.
Monell's rule that a city is
not liable under Section
1983 unless a municipal
policy causes a constitu-
tional deprivation will not
be satisfied by merely
alleging that an existing
training program for a class
of employees, such as police

officers, represents a policy
for which the city is respon-
sible.... [I]t may happen that
in light of the duties as-
signed to specific officers
or employees, the need for
more or different training is
so obvious, and the inad-
equate training so likely to
result in the violation of
constitutional rights, that the
policy makers of the city
can reasonably be said to
have been deliberately
indifferent to the need. In
that event, the failure to
provide proper training may
fairly be said to represent a
policy for which the city is
responsible, and for which
October 2005 / 25
the city may be held liable if
it actually causes injury.2 4
Liability should attach
only if the failure to train is a
"deliberate choice to follow
a course of action," and this
failure to train must have led
to-caused-the injury in
question.25 This standard en-
sures that isolated instances of

misconduct are not attributable
to a generally adequate policy
or training program. The delib-
erate indifference standard
requires a high degree of culpa-
bility on the part of the policy
maker. A plaintiff must not only
establish defects in training
procedures but also that policy
makers did nothing to cure
those defects when they knew
or should have known that
violations of constitutional
rights would be the obvious
result. For example, where there
has been a demonstrable effort
to train officers to handle usual
and recurring situations, evi-
dence of a single alleged inci-
dent involving excessive use of
force by an officer typically will
not suffice to prove deliberate
indifference that equates to a
policy permitting the excessive
use of force.
After the 20-week basic-
training course, the city
required.. .all officers to
attend an annual 3-day
training program that pro-
vided updated information
on laws concerning arrest,
detention, and search and
seizure. [The plaintiff] has

provided no evidence of
defects in the city's training
procedures. [The plaintiff]
has shown neither that
decision makers continued
to adhere to a training
program they know or
should have known had
failed to prevent officers'
use of force, nor that a
The deliberate
indifference standard
requires a high
degree of culpability
on the part of the
policy maker.
pattern of tortious conduct
by inadequately trained
officers indicated lack of
proper training. At most,
[the plaintiff] has shown a
single violation of federal
rights, which does not alone
permit an inference of
municipal culpability and
causation. [The plaintiff]
has shown that only [the
officer] may have acted
culpably, not the city.26
Taken together, the often
intertwined considerations of

fault in the form of deliberate
indifference and causation
amount to a requirement that
liability be based on a finding
that the policy makers have
actual or constructive notice
that a particular inadequacy in
a training program is likely to
result in a constitutional viola-
tion.27 Therefore, in addition to
establishing a constitutional
violation, a plaintiff must make
the following showings to
proceed against a government
employer under a failure-to-
train theory.2 8
1) Inadequate training:
Training must be shown to
be deficient in a relevant
respect given the injury
sustained. The focus is
on the deficiencies in the
training program itself, not
on whether the particular
officer involved was ad-
equately trained.
2) Causation: The failure
of the program to provide
training caused the injury.
That is, the injury would
have been avoided had the
employee been trained un-
der a program that was not

deficient in the identified
respect.
3) Deliberate indifference:
The inadequate training
program must be a "policy"
of the municipality. This is
demonstrated by circum-
stances that evidence that
policy makers-individuals
with final decision-making
authority in the respective
area of municipal responsi-
bility-knew or should have
known about the need for
the identified training but
remained deliberately
indifferent to that need.
In Canton, the Court used
training on deadly force to
illustrate the standard of delib-
erate indifference. The Court
noted that "city policy makers
know to a moral certainty that
their police officers will be
required to arrest fleeing fel-
ons."29 Moreover, "[t]he city
has armed its officers with
firearms, in part to accomplish
this task.""3 In such a situation,

"the need to train officers in the
constitutional limitations on the
use of deadly force.. .can be said
to be 'so obvious' that a failure
to do so would properly be
characterized as 'deliberate
indifference' to constitutional
rights."'" Even where the need
to train would not be obvious
to a stranger to the situation, a
particular context-such as a
documented pattern of viola-
tions-might make the need
for training or supervision so
obvious to a policymaker that a
failure to do so would constitute
deliberate indifference. Thus,
the Court suggested that "[i]t
could also be that the police,
in exercising their discretion,
so often violate constitutional
rights that the need for further
training must have been plainly
obvious to the city policy
makers, who nevertheless,
are 'deliberately indifferent'
to the need."32
The "Deliberate
Indifference" Standard
It is possible to discern three
closely related requirements that
must be met before a failure to
train will constitute deliberate
indifference to the constitu-

tional rights of citizens.3 3 First,
the plaintiff must show that
policy makers know to a moral
certainty that their employees
will confront a given situation
as opposed to rare or unforeseen
I
events. Second, the plaintiff
must show that the situation
either presents the employee
with a difficult exercise of
judgment that training will
make less difficult, or that there
is a history of employees mis-
handling the situation. There
must be awareness of a problem
that is susceptible to improve-
ment through training. Third,
the plaintiff must show that the
wrong choice by the employee
is likely to cause the deprivation
of a citizen's constitutional
rights. Training resources may
appropriately be concentrated
on those situations where an
error in judgement by an officer
is likely to result in a constitu-
tional violation. Where a plain-
tiff can establish all three
elements, then it can be said
that the policy maker should
have known that inadequate
training was "so likely to result
in the violation of constitutional

rights, that the policy makers...
can reasonably be said to have
been deliberately indifferent to
the need."34
In Zuchel v. City and
County of Denver, Colorado,3 5
the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, found that a
city police department was
deliberately indifferent due to
its inadequate training of police
officers as to the practical
aspects regarding use of deadly
force. The court concluded that
the circumstances giving rise to
an unconstitutional shooting of
a suspect by a police officer
represented a usual and recur-
ring situation with which city
police officers were required to
deal, so that the city could be
liable under Section 1983 for
the officer's actions. In reaching
this conclusion, the court
referred to a letter from the
district attorney to the city
police chief discussing six
police officer-citizen encounters
involving deadly force that had
occurred in a 6-week period and
recommending that periodic
October 2005 / 27

I
shoot-don't-shoot live training
should be made part of the
training program to minimize
unjustified shootings. In addi-
tion, testimony from the district
attorney was provided at trial to
the effect that it was foreseeable
that officers would be placed in
situations where they would
have to make decisions on
whether to shoot. An expert also
testified that it was predicable
in large cities that police offi-
cers would encounter situa-
tions in which they would have
to make judgements as to
whether to shoot.3 6 Prior to the
incident, the department's
shoot-don't-shoot training
consisted of a lecture and a
movie presented to officers
during basic training at the
police academy. The inadequa-
cies of that training program
were identified by an expert
witness as the cause of the
shooting in question. The wit-
ness offered the opinion that
strategic judgement cannot be
taught in a classroom-particu-
larly based only on the showing
of a single film-and that the

officer, due to lack of training,
handled the situation with the
suspect as a layperson, rather
than a trained professional.37
The city argued that as a
matter of law, it could not be
found deliberately indifferent
because it had some shoot-
don't-shoot training and, thus,
recognized the problem and was
addressing it. The court rejected
this argument, finding that the
city did not properly apply the
definition of deliberate indiffer-
ence under Canton. In establish-
ing deliberate indifference, fo-
cus must be placed on whether
the need for more or different
training is so obvious, and the
inadequacy so likely to result in
the deprivation of constitutional
rights, that the policymakers can
be said to have been deliber-
ately indifferent to the need.
The inadequacies
of that training
program were
identified by an
expert witness as
the cause of the
shooting in question.

y7
"Thus, a city is deliberately
indifferent if 1) its training pro-
gram is inadequate and 2) the
city deliberately or recklessly
made the choice to ignore its
deficiencies.'"" In this case, the
court concluded that the testi-
mony underscored the obvious-
ness of the deficiency of the
existing training program. The
district attorney's letter ex-
pressly recommended that the
police department institute
expanded training in the areas
of "strategic skills development;
how to analyze situations,
develop options, and select the
option that minimizes the like-
lihood of a violent confronta-
tion" and "periodic target
course 'shoot-don't-shoot' live
training under street condi-
tions."39 Because the police
department presented no evi-
dence of any attempt to address
the deficiencies of its training
program, the court found that
the evidence was sufficient to
permit ajury to reasonably infer
that the city's failure to imple-
ment some form of periodic
live training constituted delib-
erate indifference to the con-

stitutional rights of the city's
citizens.4
A finding of deliberate
indifference requires that the
government has disregarded a
known or obvious risk of harm
caused by its failure to develop
an adequate training program.
However, a showing of specific
incidents that establish a pattern
of constitutional violations is
not necessary to put a munici-
pality on notice that its training
program is inadequate. A single
violation of constitutional rights
combined with a failure to train
officers to handle that situation
is sufficient to trigger municipal
liability if the situation was
likely to occur and presented an
obvious potential for a constitu-
tional violation."
In Young v. City of Provi-
dence, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals recently addressed the
issue of municipal liability in a
Section 1983 action in which
there was no evidence of a prior
similar constitutional viola-

tion. 42 Young involved a wrong-
ful death action alleging exces-
sive force after the victim, who
was an off-duty officer respond-
ing to an incident under the
city's always armed/always on-
duty policy, was shot by two
other officers who were re-
sponding to the same incident.
The city had a use-of-force
training program in place that
included judgmental shooting.
This training consisted of inter-
active video simulation and live
range exercises that included
don't-shoot scenarios. However,
the city did not provide training
that specifically addressed
identification of officers re-
sponding under its' always
armed/always on-duty policy
and had no protocols in place
governing off-duty officer
response situations.43
Although there was no
evidence of a past friendly fire
shooting, the court concluded
that a jury could find deliberate
indifference because "the de-
partment knew that there was a
high risk that absent particular-
ized training on avoiding off-
duty misidentifications, and
given the department's always
armed/always on-duty policy,

friendly fire shootings were
likely to occur.'
Young illustrates a number
of factors that are considered
when imputing government
knowledge of an obvious risk
of harm as required to show
deliberate indifference. Even
when there have been no prior
violations, where a policy or
practice of a police department
creates an obvious risk of harm,
where training would tend to
reduce that specific type of
harm, and where the wrong
decision of an untrained officer
will likely result in flagrant
violations of constitutional
rights, a municipality may be
deemed deliberately indifferent
if it does not afford some train-
ing that specifically addresses
the particular potential for harm.
In Young, there was evidence
presented that the always
armed/always on-duty policy
was inherently dangerous
because without specific train-
ing, it was likely that off-duty
officers would intervene un-
wisely and that on-duty officers
may mistake them for suspects.
Indeed, the city also changed its

always-armed/always on-duty
policy after the friendly fire
incident such that officers were
not required to carry firearms
while off duty and provided a
specific protocol for any off-
duty action that was taken.45
Although there had been
no prior friendly fire incidents,
there was evidence presented
that the city was aware that such
incidents were predicable based
on numerous reports from
police officers of past mis-
identifications of off-duty
personnel that did not end with
tragic results. The city was,
therefore, deemed to be on
notice that interactions between
off-duty and on-duty officers
were probable (a "usual and
recurring situation with which
its officers were required to
deal").46 Further, interactions
between on-duty and off-duty
officers are typically high stress
situations. In such incidents,
officers tend to fall back on
training. That being the case,
specific training would likely
reduce the inherent dangerous-
ness posed by intervening
armed, off-duty officers. The
severity of the consequences

of a friendly fire incident were
obvious and the need to train
to avoid such an occurence was
acknowledged by testimony
of police personnel responsible
for training.47
Deliberate indifference
will not be imputed to a city or
county government based on
October 2005 / 29
its failure to afford specific
training to better handle un-
precedented occurrences. An
example is afforded by the
Fifth Circuit case Cozzo v.
Tangipahoa Parish Council,
48
which involved alleged viola-
tions of Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights stemming
from a clearly unlawful eviction
following a police captain's
allegedly erroneous interpreta-
tion of the requirements of a
temporary restraining order in a
domestic case. Although the
plaintiff was able to establish
that there was a failure to set
any specific rules or guidance

regarding the actions allowed
when enforcing restraining
orders in domestic cases and
that there was a direct causal
connection between the lack of
training and the alleged viola-
tion, the court found that there
was no basis for municipal
liability due to the unprec-
edented nature of the incident. 9
An unlawful eviction pursuant
to a captain's interpretation of
a restraining order had never
before occurred in more than 20
years of documented sheriff's
department history.5 0 There was
no deliberate indifference given
the lack of prior similar consti-
tutional violations and no
evidence to support a finding
that constitutional violations
were a predictable consequence
of a failure to afford specific
training in the interpretation
of temporary retraining orders.
Conclusion
Liability for failure to train
will be imposed when it can be
demonstrated that a municipal
policymaker knew or should
have known that inadequate
training was so likely to result
in the violation of constitutional

rights that the policy maker can
reasonably be said to have been
deliberately indifferent to the
need. The inadequacy of the
training program must be
obvious and likely to result
in a constitutional violation.
a municipality may
be deemed
deliberately indifferent
if it does not afford
some training that
specifically addresses
the particular
potential for harm.
Although deliberate indif-
ference is most often found in
cases that involve inaction in
the face of a pattern of prior
similar constitutional violations,
a failure to act that results in a
single unprecedented incident
can support a finding of delib-
erate indifference where the
constitutional violation was a
highly predictable consequence
of a failure to train. +
Endnotes
STitle 42, U.S.C., § 1983 provides in

pertinent part: "Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation
or custom or usage of any State...subjects
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person...to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges and
immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws shall be liable to the party injured
in any action at law...."
2 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed. 2d 412
(1989).
1 See Board of County Commission of
Bryan County Oklahoma v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed. 2d
626 (1997).
4 Id. at 407-408
I ld. at 409.
6 Id.
7 See Palmnquist v. Selv'ik, 111 F.3d
1332,1345 (7th cir. 1997) (Where town
gave police some training on handling
suspects exhibiting abnormal behavior,
argument that even more training should
have been given failed.).
' See Canton 489 U.S. at 391; Young ex
rel. Estate of Young v. City of Providence,
404 F.3d 4, 27 (2005); Grazier v. Ciy, of
Philidelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 125 (3rd Cir.

2003).
9 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S. Ct. 2018,
2035-36, 56 L.Ed. 2d 611 (1978) (In
Monell, the Supreme Court held that
municipalities and other local govern-
mental bodies are "persons" within the
meaning of § 1983 and, therefore, are
subject to liability based on their actions
or policies that subjected a person to a
deprivation of a constitutional right but
that they are not liable merely because they
employed the person who actually inflicted
the deprivation.).
.0 Id. at 689.
1 Id. at 691, 694.
"2 See Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120, 112 S. Ct.
1061, 117 L.Ed. 2d 261 (1992) (It should
be …
Supreme Court Debates, a Pro & Con® Monthly | February 2010
(Vol. 13, No. 2)
Prosecutorial Immunity
© 2010 Congressional Digest Corp. | Page 11
Kiyemba v. Obama — This case was granted certiorari on
October 20, 2009, and is scheduled to
be argued on March 23, 2010. At issue is whether a Federal
district court judge has the power to
order the release of Guantánamo Bay detainees into the United

States.
Renico v. Lett — This case was granted certiorari on November
30, 2009, and is scheduled to be
argued on March 29, 2010. Before the Court is whether retrying
an individual on the same
charges after a jury was unable to reach a verdict in the first
trial violates the defendant’s
constitutional protection against double jeopardy.
Certiorari Granted
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez — This case was granted
certiorari on December 7, 2009,
and has yet to be scheduled for argument. To be decided is
whether a public university law
school may deny school funding and other benefits to a
religious student organization because
the group requires its officers and voting members to agree with
its core religious viewpoints.
City of Ontario v. Quon — This case was granted certiorari on
December 14, 2009, and has yet
to be scheduled for argument. At issue is whether the Fourth
Amendment protects the privacy of
text messages sent by a government employee on a government-
issued electronic device.
Doe v. Reed — This case was granted certiorari on January 15,
2010, and has yet to be scheduled
for argument. To be decided is whether the Washington State
Public Records Act, which allows
for the release of names on ballot-measure petitions, is
constitutional.

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
Federal Efforts to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code was
originally enacted by Congress as
Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871. Its
purpose was to enforce the provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Act is also known as the
Civil Rights Act of 1871. Section 1983 states in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. …
Section 1983’s primary objective was to provide a means to
enforce the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Proponents of the bill argued that the
States had no process by which
persons could obtain redress for violations of constitutionally
guaranteed rights and that Federal
legislation was the means by which these rights could be
enforced. Although the activities of the
Ku Klux Klan were the primary evil that the bill was designed
to remedy, the bill was not

directed solely against the Klan and its members, but also
against those persons who, in
(Vol. 13, No. 2)
representing a State, were unable or unwilling to enforce a State
law. Thus the bill was intended
to protect not only the rights of African Americans who had
recently been freed from slavery,
but also the rights of all citizens against State-sponsored
infringement of constitutional rights.
For many years after its passage, few lawsuits were filed under
Section 1983. However,
beginning in the 1960s, Section 1983 was frequently relied upon
to redress a number of issues.
Basis of Liability Under Section 1983
In Monroe v. Pape (1961), the United States Supreme Court
ruled that officials of a
governmental body may be sued under Section 1983. In Monroe,
the police searched the wrong
house without a search warrant. Even though narcotics were
found in the house, the search was
deemed to be improper and the individuals arrested in the house
were released. The individuals
then brought suit in Federal court pursuant to Section 1983
alleging that the City of Chicago and
the individual police officers had violated their rights against
unreasonable search and seizure

under the Fourth Amendment. The lower courts dismissed the
suit. The United States Supreme
Court reversed. The court went on to hold that the phrase
“under color of” included acts of an
official acting under color of State authority.
To successfully prevail in an action under Section 1983, the
courts have held that
plaintiffs must allege and prove two essential elements. First,
plaintiffs must show that the
alleged conduct occurred under color of State law. Second,
plaintiffs must show that the conduct
deprived plaintiffs of rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the United States Constitution
or a Federal statute.
In Monell v. Department of Social Services (1978), the United
States Supreme Court held
that a city is a person for purposes of Section 1983. However, a
State is not a “person” for
purposes of Section 1983. In addition, State officials sued in
their official capacities for damages
or other retroactive relief are not persons for purposes of
Section 1983. However, the court noted
that a plaintiff may sue a State official for injunctive relief
because that is prospective relief.
While a State official may not be sued in their official capacity,
the United States Supreme Court
has held that State officials and local officials may be sued in
their “personal” capacity where the
suit seeks to impose individual, personal liability on the
government officer for actions taken
under color of State law with the badge of State authority.
A plaintiff who brings an action under Section 1983 for
violation of rights secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment must establish that the violation
resulted from State action and, thus,
meets the statutory requirement of under “color of State law.”

Independent contractors and other
individuals who willfully participate in a joint activity with a
State or a local agency may meet
the requirements of acting under color of State law.
Under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the challenged
acts occurred under a
governmental policy, custom, or usage. In Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co. (1970), the United States
Supreme Court held that custom, for purposes of Section 1983,
must have the force of law by
virtue of the persistent practices of State officials. A political
subdivision of the State may have a
custom with force of law, even if that custom is not applied
statewide.
Plaintiffs may bring an action under Section 1983 if their rights
privileges or immunities
secured by Federal statutory law were violated. In Maine v.
Thiboutot (1980), the plaintiffs
claimed that the State of Maine had deprived them of welfare
benefits to which they were
entitled under the Federal Social Security Act. The Supreme
Court rejected Maine’s argument
that the phrase secured by the Constitution and laws in Section
1983 was limited to civil rights or
(Vol. 13, No. 2)
equal protection laws. The Supreme Court held that the Section
1983 broadly included violations
of Federal statutory law as well as Federal constitutional law.

Excerpted from the June 2003 Orange County Department of
Education Report, Liability Under
Section 1983. See
http://www.ocde.k12.ca.us/downloads/legal/LIABILITY_SECT_
1983.pdf.
Accessed January 22, 2010.
Lower Court Holding
Decision of the Eighth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals
In 1978, Curtis W. McGhee, Jr. and Terry Harrington were
convicted of murdering John
Schweer, a retired police department captain who was working
as a security guard. McGhee and
Harrington were each sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2002,
the Iowa Supreme Court reversed
Harrington’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding
the prosecutor committed a Brady
v. Maryland (1963) violation by failing to disclose evidence of
an alternative suspect. The
current prosecutor, Matthew Wilber, concluded it would be
impossible to retry Harrington and
also agreed to move to vacate McGhee’s conviction. McGhee
agreed to enter a plea to second-
degree murder in exchange for a sentence of time served. With
the agreements, McGhee was
released.
McGhee and Harrington both brought civil rights actions
against Pottawattamie County,
Iowa, and the former prosecutors and officers involved in the
initial investigation and
prosecution, arguing they used perjured and fabricated
testimony and withheld evidence in
violation of McGhee’s and Harrington’s constitutional rights.

McGhee and Harrington also
alleged Wilber defamed them. Defendants moved for summary
judgment based on qualified and
absolute immunity. The district court found some defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity
on certain claims and denied qualified immunity and absolute
immunity on the remaining claims.
Defendants Joseph Hrvol and David Richter filed a
consolidated interlocutory appeal
from the denial of qualified, absolute, and sovereign immunity,
arguing the district court: (1)
used an improper standard for determining probable cause in the
absolute immunity analysis; (2)
erred in waiving sovereign immunity for the prosecutors; and
(3) erred in concluding McGhee
and Harrington alleged a constitutional violation when the
district court denied qualified
immunity to Hrvol and Richter. We affirm in part and reverse in
part.
Sovereign Immunity
Defendants assert the district court erred when it waived
sovereign immunity for Hrvol, Richter,
and Wilber, arguing they are shielded by the Iowa Tort Claims
Act (ITCA) and/or the Iowa
Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA). Under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, a tort claim
against a State employee, acting within the scope of his office
or employment with the State,
must be brought pursuant to the ITCA.
The State of Iowa possesses sovereign immunity. As such,
Iowa and its employees can
only be sued to the extent Iowa expressly waives its immunity.
The ITCA is a statutorily defined
waiver of sovereign immunity allowing certain claims to be

filed against Iowa that fit within the
ITCA’s specified reach, and which do not fall within explicit
exceptions where Iowa expressly
retained its sovereign immunity.
Copyright of Supreme Court Debates is the property of
Congressional Digest and its content may not be copied
or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the
copyright holder's express written permission.
However, users may print, download, or email articles for
individual use.
20 Are You Ready for Change?
Are You Ready for Change?
What The Community Expects from Its Police
By: Commander Mike Hallinan, Irvine Police Department
Commander Mike Hallinan currently serves as University Area
Commander with Irvine
Police Department. He has 27 years of experience and holds a
Bachelor of Art’s Degree
in sociology and a Master of Science in administration of
justice and security. He is a
graduate of the California POST’s Sherman Block Leadership
Institute, the LAPD WestPoint
Leadership Program, the International Association of Chiefs of

Police Law Enforcement
Business Fellowship, the Senior Management Institute of
Police, and the Commission on
Peace Officer Standards and Training Command College. He
has prior police experience
with the Los Angeles County Sheriff Department and the Los
Angeles Police Department.
Imagine having a job where every decision
you make is captured on high-definition video,
from multiple angles, and can be scrutinized in slow
motion over-and-over again by your supervisor and,
in some cases, by the public through the news media
and social media. What happens when mistakes are
made? Even with all the advances in technology
there is still room for human error. Humans make
mistakes every day. Mistakes can cause distrust and
resentment that last for years. When more mistakes
are made, the problem is compounded exponentially.
The phenomenon occurs in law enforcement.
Police work is subject to human error like any other job, but
mistakes
and even perceived mistakes in this profession can lead to
significant problems. It
does not matter if the mistake was made by a police officer in a
local department,
the neighboring police agency or one across the country. It is
interesting that as a
profession, we do not share each other’s successes, but are
judged together by our
failures and missteps. More than ever, the scrutiny the law
enforcement profession
faces is tremendous and can ripple across the entire country.
Together we must
work to restore confidence and trust, legitimacy, and fulfill
societies’ expectations

of the police.
The following pages will examine several factors associated
with the
growing distrust of police officers by the public, and how the
law enforcement
community can reverse and regain trust and legitimacy. Ziad K.
Abdelmour,
president of Blackhawk Partners, Inc., a New York private
equity firm said that
“trust is earned, respect is given, and loyalty is demonstrated
and betrayal of any
one of those is to lose all three.” In this same vein, the police
need to understand
that trust, respect and loyalty have eroded and simply
evaporated similar to the
proverbial frog in a pot of boiling water. However, all is not
lost; there is good news
in efforts to rebuild trust in the police. Law enforcement leaders
are beginning to
embrace new police training models. They are also reinvesting
in the principles of
The Journal of California Law Enforcement 21
Community Oriented Policing, but not by merely stenciling
patrol vehicles with
the motto “In Partnership with the Community.”
A Profession in Crisis
The evening news is plagued with stories portraying distrust of
the police,
racial inequalities, excessive police force and community
divide. A recent Harvard
University study showed that half of the youth in the United

States and 80 percent
of African Americans distrust the police (Martin, 2015).
Technology has played a significant role to rapidly change all
phases of
law enforcement. Much like instant replay in sports, cell phone
video of police
interactions is uploaded to the Internet and dissected in the
media, in forums, and
on social media. Social media’s speed of information can have a
major impact on
the perception of police and shift public support in a moment.
This phenomenon
must be understood and addressed to ensure public trust does
not deteriorate.
Transforming police to be effective in their communities
requires
significant effort and collaboration. This transformation will
require committed
leaders who foster a collaborative approach. When
organizational factors are
considered (such as motivational levels, department culture,
community support,
demographics, economics, political factors, labor issues and the
availability of
resources), community support stands out as the biggest
challenge. The division
between the police and the public can take significant amounts
of effort to bridge;
especially in communities where significant police incidents
have occurred.
The difficulty is that many of the social problems of America
have been
relegated to the police, who are now forced to finding creative
methods to handle
the massive disinvestments in mental health care, social
services for the homeless

and disadvantaged, and substances abusers. The Washington
Post recently released
an analysis of 462 police shooting deaths in the United States
that occurred in the
first six months of 2015. More than one-fourth of those deaths
involved individuals
distraught and in emotional or mental crisis (Lowery, et al.
2015). The nature and
frequency of these lethal encounters is one area ripe for change.
On average, police in the United States kill 920 individuals per
year
(Martin, 2015). More than half of police agencies nationally
involved in deadly
encounters this year have not provided officers training in
dealing with the mentally
ill. An analysis of police tactics used revealed officers made
volatile situations even
more dangerous (Lowery, et al. 2015). When law enforcement
fails to understand
they are dealing with an individual in crisis, the outcome might
be a deadly use of
force that is legally and morally ethical. However, deadly use of
force could be avoided
by utilizing alternative tactics. “Words instead of guns,
questions instead of orders,
patience instead of immediate action.” (Police Executive
Research Forum, 2012).
Implications on the Future of Policing
Law enforcement has developed over time to reflect the ever
changing
environment, the social values and expectations of a
community, and technological
and other advances (Gascon and Manheimer, 2013). From the
time Sir Robert

22
Peel created the London Metropolitan Police force, the
principles of policing
have remained constant. The environment in which the police
operate, though,
is constantly changing and can experience dramatic shifts from
a single incident.
Protecting life and property, maintaining order, and enforcing
the law are now
challenged by ever-changing social expectations, technology,
the increased
sophistication of crime, the economy, and severe budget cuts
that funded many
social programs. Modern policing is far more complex than
responding to radio
calls for service and making arrests. Understanding the changes
that can affect the
services provided in the future is vital to the service provided
by law enforcement
today (Accenture, 2013).
The most important changes likely to affect law enforcement
organizations
are improving police functions and being able to meet the
demanding social
expectations. Police agencies are expected to be more proactive
rather than
reactive; getting involved in the substance of policing by
improving relationships
with the community. Today, most police agencies implement
some type of
community oriented and problem oriented policing program
(Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2014). However, the traditional approaches must be

delivered differently.
It means ensuring police officers understand this mission and
have a plan when
they go in service each shift.
Examining the ways in which law enforcement officers are
providing
service to the community is required to meet future challenges.
Law enforcement
organizations must constantly look for new ways of doing
business, utilizing
innovative ideas and being resourceful. Understandably, what
works in one
community might not be appropriate in another.
Garnering and maintaining public trust, promoting
transparency, and
working in partnership with the community to solve mutual
problems is more than
a tagline – it is the keystone of contemporary policing.
Successful organizations
understand these priorities and understand the pivotal role
community caretaking
has in achieving these goals. We cannot build trust, if we are
not willing to realize
the importance in non-traditional police activities. Law
enforcement organizations
must ensure their officers understand these priorities and adopt
this as a
foundation to their policing plan. In part, rebuilding a
foundation of trust begins
with training recruits and in-service police officers with a
Creative Problem-Solving
Model developed by Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)
and embracing the
“Six Pillars” of policing.
On December 18, 2014, President Barack Obama established
the

President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. President
Obama charged the
Task Force “with identifying best practices and offering
recommendations on how
policing practices can promote effective crime reduction while
building public
trust.” It’s not by mistake that “Building Trust and Legitimacy”
is the first of the
Six Pillars of the Task Force. “Promoting trust and ensuring
legitimacy through
procedural justice transparency, accountability, and honest
recognition of past
and present obstacles.” (United States Department of Justice,
2015). With this
in mind, the community expects and deserves competence,
patience, respect,
responsiveness and creative problem-solving delivered with care
and compassion.
Police and Sheriff’s departments should adopt procedural
justice as the guiding
principle for internal and external policies and practices to
guide their interactions
with the citizens they serve (United States Department of
Justice, 2015). Police
legitimacy and procedural justice involves:
• Treating people with dignity and respect
• Making decisions fairly, based on facts, not illegitimate
factors such as race
• Giving people a “voice,” a chance to tell their side of the story

• Explaining your actions
• Acting in a manner that encourages community members to
believe that they
will be treated with goodwill in the future
For law enforcement to meet future challenges, the police must
be able
to connect to the community and fulfill their expectations; even
when those
expectations are in providing non-traditional police services.
Law enforcement
must embrace social, operational, cultural, technological and
organizational
change. Studies have shown that citizen expectations are rising
around crime
reporting, emergency response effectiveness, citizen care, and
public safety and
public involvement in policing (Accenture, 2013).
New Police Training Models for Both In-Service and Academy
Recruits
Law enforcement officers are trained to rush into an event and
become
immediate problem solvers, sometimes creating their own
emergency by failing to
properly evaluate the situation. The Police Executive Research
Forum conducted
extensive research on the De-Escalation and Minimizing Use of
Force Incidents.
Many of their outcomes can be adopted and incorporated into a
creative problem-
solving model. Adopting this model will provide officers with
alternative options
when responding to force situations rather than rushing into the
scene. Scenario
training is the key and will allow officers to work through

issues before facing them
in the field during a real situation. The main points from
PERF’s study are:
• Slowing the situation down and getting a supervisor to the
scene can reduce
the chances of violence.
• Establishing crisis intervention teams and partnerships with
mental health
officials can result in more effective handling of encounters
with individuals
in crisis.
• Proactive work to identify “frequent customers” and provide
early intervention
to help avoid crisis situations.
• Hands on law enforcement training so officers recognize real
threats posed
by individuals with mental illness to elevate the anxiety officers
feel about
the situation.
• Avoiding overreliance on weapons, such as the Taser, as
opposed to hands-on
tactics and verbal skills.
• Training officers in “tactical disengagement.”
• Placing the mentally ill into a custody environment does not
solve the problem
and only exacerbates the problem. It burdens the jail and court
systems, places
23

24
custody officers in predicaments when they do not have the
appropriate
training to deal with the mentally ill, and causes problems in
society when
they are released.
In sum, law enforcement officers must be provided the
necessary training
to develop the skills to handle these difficult situations.
Academy Training: Balance Curriculum to Teach Both
Guardian and Warrior
Models
Changing the culture and attitude of police work from the
beginning of a recruit’s
career from the traditional “Us vs. Them” to collaborative
partnerships. Changing
police culture must start from the beginning during academy
training and resonate
throughout the entire department. Recruits are conditioned early
on in the police
academy with saying like, “Prepare for the best, but expect the
worst.” It is the
“warrior vs. guardian” debate. During every scenario at the
police academy, recruits
nervously wait for something bad to happen so they can
immediately react with
force to defend themselves.
Instead, officers should be trained early on to ensure that every
contact
with the public is an opportunity for law enforcement to make a

lasting impression
through the delivery of stellar service. We must remember that
law enforcement
officers are public servants and should demonstrate genuine
care and compassion,
competence, patience, respect, responsiveness and creative
problem-solving with
every individual they have contact.
Being a “guardian” does not make a person weak. To the
contrary, a
guardian is a protector of the community and has earned the
level of trust, respect
and confidence in not only the individual officer, but the
officer’s organization and
profession. “In Plato’s vision of a perfect society — in a
republic that honors the
core of democracy — the greatest amount of power is given to
those called the
Guardians. Only those with the most impeccable character are
chosen to bear the
responsibility of protecting the democracy.” (Rahr and Rice,
2015)
Building Trust in a Community: A Policing Plan for 2016 and
Beyond
One of the principal challenges for a police department is
evaluating their
mission, vision, and values and determining if they are in line
with the expectations
of the community. This is a philosophical challenge. As the
expectations of the
community change, so might the mission of the police
department. Ensuring
officers understand and embrace the departments’ mission,
vision, and values
statements are at the very core of the policing plan. Next,

leaders should be
providing personnel with training, direction, support and
understanding, and
confirming they have a plan in place when they go out into the
community. When
they leave the station, do they turn right or left? And more
importantly, do they
know why? The policing plan involves the following:
• Responding to radio calls for service is a primary
responsibility. Officers
must understand they have a responsibility for a timely
response; which
is professional, caring, helpful, patient, understanding,
competent and
knowledgeable. Every action an officer takes will leave a
lasting impression,
regardless if it is positive or negative. It will impact not only
how you are
personally perceived, but also how the organization and the
profession you
represent are perceived (Hamel, 2014).
• Officers must have a patrol plan based on the understanding of
crime, traffic
and quality of life issues unique to the policing area they are
patrolling.
Providing up-to-date crime analytics and important information
each day

at briefing is critical to this step. This allows officers to
understand where
problems are and crime is occurring so they can focus their time
in effort in
those specific areas when they are not responding to radio calls.
• Community Oriented Policing (COP) is a policing philosophy
that incorporates
partnerships and problem-solving techniques to solve
community problems.
Officers must have a firm understanding of COP and integrate
this philosophy
into long-term collaborate problem solving. This cannot be
accomplished
unless officers know they have management support in their
decision making.
Each day, officers routinely respond to incidents involving
crisis and chaos
and community requests may seem unreasonable. Officers must
be able to
make problem-solving decision that, even if unorthodox or
unconventional,
are able to solve the problem.
• Spending five minutes each shift to deliberately and
purposefully engage
the community and build mutual trust is critical. Imagine how
mutual
trust and support can be compounded exponentially if every
officer
did this each shift. Supervision and management must also learn
what
their officers’ passion and goals are and then support their
personnel in
accomplishing them. We must earn the trust of the community
every day!

Every policing organization is different, but ensuring officers
have a
policing plan in place before they go out into the community is
critical.
In 2012, the Police Executive Research Forum conducted a
study on the
Future of Policing and identified numerous technological
advances in policing.
These included: engaging the community, predicting and
improving services
through analytics, enhancing collaboration with the entire
community (business,
schools, religious institutions, special groups, etc.), optimizing
ways of working
through technology, and empowering the line level officer
through education and
training (PERF, 2014).
Leveraging technology in all aspects of policing for efficiency,
transparency,
trust and competence is an opportunity for law enforcement
organizations to be
more effective and connect to the communities in which they
serve. Technology
is rapidly changing, which will change the manner in which
policing services are
delivered. Law enforcement personnel must continue to develop
so they can
efficiently and effectively provide a range of services to the
community.
Conclusion
It is going to take a collaborative approach and significant
effort to regain
public support and trust in many communities. This is
especially true in areas

25
The Journal of California Law Enforcement 26 26
that have experienced significant police incidents. Supporting
personnel, providing the
necessary training and equipment, and ensuring they have a
policing plan in place is
imperative. The community demands their police serve with
professionalism and legitimacy
in every encounter. Building and fostering trust within a
community requires competence,
patience, respect, responsiveness and creative problem-solving
delivered with care and
compassion.
References
Accenture. (2013). Preparing Police Services for the Future: Six
steps towards
transformation. Retrieved March 4, 2015 from
http://www.accenture.com/us-en/
landing-pages/Documents/13-1583/download/preparing-police-
services-for-
the-future.pdf
Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2014). Community Policing.
Retrieved February 28, 2015 from
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=81
Collins, Michael. (2015). The 5 Worst calls in NFL postseason
history. Fansided January 6.
Retrieved November 4, 2015 from:
http://www.aol.com/article/2015/01/06/
the-5-worst-calls-in-nfl-postseason-history/21125518/
Gascon, G., Manheimer, S., & O’Neill, R. (2013) “Report:

Organization of the Future I
(2012).” A paper of the BJA Executive Session on Police
Leadership. Washington,
DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice;
and St. Petersburg,
FL: Center for Public Safety Innovation, St. Petersburg
College.
Hamel, Mike. (2015). “Patrol Officers Duties”. Digital
Illustration. Irvine Police Department.
Used with permission.
Hamel, Mike. (2014). “Incident-Driven Customer Care.” Law
and Order: Hendon Publishing
Company. Retrieved October 19, 2015 from
http://www.hendonpub.com/
law_and_order/articles/2014/01/incident_driven_customer_care.
Lowery, Westley, Kimberly Kindy, and Keith L. Alexander.
(2015) “Distraught People, Deadly
Results.” The Washington Post, June 30. Retrieved October 20,
2015 from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/06/30/dis
traught-
people-deadly-results/.
Martin, Abby. (2015). “Harvard Study: Half of the Youth in the
US Distrust Police
Forces.” The World News Today, April 29. Retrieved October
15, 2015 from http://
www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Harvard-Survey-Half-of-
Youth-in-the-US-
Distrust-Police-Forces-20150429-0024.html.
Police Executive Research Forum. (2012). “An Integrated
Approach to De-Escalation and
Minimizing Use of Force.” August, pg. iii. Retrieved October
20, 2015 from

http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/a
n%20
integrated%20approach%20to%20de-
escalation%20and%20minimizing%20
use%20of%20force%202012.pdf.
Police Executive Research Forum. (2014). “Future Trends in
Policing.” Retrieved July
14, 2015 from
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_
Documents/Leadership/future%20trends%20in%20policing%202
014.pdf.
Rahr, Sue and Stephen K. Rice. (2015). “From Warriors to
Guardians: Recommitting
American Police Culture to Democratic Ideals.” Harvard
Kennedy School, National
Institute of Justice. Retrieved October 9, 2015 from
http://thecrimereport.
s3.amazonaws.com/2/54/5/2822/warriorstoguardians.pdf.
United States Department of Justice. (2015). “Draft Potential
Recommendations on
Building Trust and Legitimacy”. Retrieved February 26, 2015
from http://
www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=2778
United States Bureau of Justice Statistics website. (2013).
Retrieved October 15, 2015
from http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=71.
27

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without
permission.

Arthur_M._Langer_Information_Technology_and_Org.pdfInf.docx

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to Arthur_M._Langer_Information_Technology_and_Org.pdfInf.docx

Similar to Arthur_M._Langer_Information_Technology_and_Org.pdfInf.docx (20)

More from ssusera34210

More from ssusera34210 (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Arthur_M._Langer_Information_Technology_and_Org.pdfInf.docx