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The Losic of Social ResearchJ
Ru/irzg )ut Riual I{ypotlaeded
SCIENCEAS SYSTEMATIC DOUBTING
SkepticismandIntcgrity
How Do We Cometo Know?
Can We DiscoverCausalLaws?
The Strategyof Research
USESOF SOCIAL RESEARCHAND RIVAL EXPLANATIONS
PersonalUseof Research
ProfessionalUseof Research
PoliticalUseof Research
SUMMARY
EXERCISES
KEY TERMS

2. The Logic of Social Rcscarch
SCIENCEAS SYSTEMATICDOUBTING
Skepticism and Integrity
Lead and Intelligence, Healthalertsaboutleadin drinking waterand its threat
to childrenhaveappearedwith risingurgency.In 199l, rhe U.S. Centersfor Disease
Control (CDC) reducedthe in(ervcntionlevel for leadcxposureto 25 microgramsper
deciliterof blood(Fgldl),the third suchreductionsince1970.This actionresultedfrom
researchconnectingblood levelsof as little as l0 pgldl to intelligencedeficitsin chil-
dren.Basedin parton thesameresearch,the EnvironmentalProteclionAgency(EPA)
in 199I adoptednew n:les for leadlevelsin communitywater sys(ems.Dr. Herben
Needleman,one of the leadingscholarsin rhis field, hasreceivedmuch of the credit
for raisingconcernaboutleadin theenvironment("ls thereleadin your warcr?",1993).
For example,he foundlower IQ scoresin childrenwirh higher levelsof leadas mea-
sured from their baby teeth(Needleman,Gunnoe,Leviton,Reed, Peresie,Maher, &
Barrctr,I979).
In the sameyear that the CDC and EPA were basingpolicy in pan on Needle-
man's work, a third federalagency,the NationalInstitutesof Health(NIH). received
complaintsabout his work. By April 1992, Needlemanfaced an open hearing on
chargesthathe hadengagedin scicntificmisconductin the 1979study.Dr. Clsc Ern-
hartandDr. SandraScarrhadraiseddoubtsabouthis conductand reportof thatearlier
research.They testifiedagainsthim as pan of his university'sinquiry,an inquiry
Promptedby the Office of ScientificInregriryof NIH (Ernhart,Scan, & Ceneson,
1993).This episodeteachessomeimportantlessonsaboutsocialresearch.
TheNeedlem,anCase, The storybeginsin 1975whenNeedleman'steambegan
colleclingbabyteethfrom 3329 flrst-andsecond-gradechildrenand lhenmeasuringthe
leadcon(entof theseteeü.While tn'insto identifvchildrenwith hiehandlow leadlev-
els.the teaä collecredinrelligencer.Jrur., *oÄ ZtOof rhesubjeJtsmosrlikely to be
highor low in leadcontent.However,theresearchersexcludedsomeof thosetestedand
comparedjust 58 childrenwith high-leadlevelswith I00 childrenwith low levelsin thc
paperpublishedin 1979.Needlemanwent on ro conductotherstudiestharpointedro
lead'sadverseeffectson humanintelligence.Recognizedas an expenand concerned
aboutprotectingchildrenagainstthedangersof lead,he hada majorimpacton public
policy.
In 1990.the Departmentof JusticeaskedNeedlemanto assistin a suit brought
undertheSuperfundAct. Superfundbills rhecosrof cleaningup toxic wasreto rhose
who causedthe pollution,and it ofrcnhasto wagelegalbattlesto extractthesepay-
ments.In thiscase,theJusticeDcpanmentwantedto forcethecleanupof leadtailings
from a minein M_idvale,Utah.The defensehiredErnhanandScarraswitnesses.Know-
ing that Needleman'stestimonyfor the governmenrwould rely in part or his 1979
study,ErnhanandScan soughtacccssto his originaldata.To preparefor thetrial,they
sPenttwo daysin his lab checkinehis work. Beforethetrialcouldbegin,the litigants
settledthecasewirh 563 millionobrainedfor cleanirgup rhemine sire.

3. The Logic of Social Rcscarch
Ernhartand Scarr'sbrief view of Needleman'sdata raisedguestionsabouthis
1979repon.They wrote a complaintto the NiH Office of ScientificIntegrity(OSI,
sincerenamedtheOffice of ResearchIntegrityor ORI andmovedto the PublicHealth
Service).Of theirseveralconcerns,onehad to do with the way Needlemanchoseonly
someof the testedchildrenfor analysis.They suspectedthathe pickedjust the subjects
whosepattcrnof lead levelsand IQ scoresfit his belief.The OSI instructedthe Uni-
versityof Pittsburgh,Needleman'shomeinstitution,to explorethe chargesin October
t o o l
Thc resultinghearingstook on thc bitternessof a legaltrial complete*'ith pub-
lishedrebuttalsand chargesaboutselfishmotives.Needlemanlikenedthe hearingto
witch trials(1992).He castErnhartandScarras paid defendersof a leadindustrythat
wantedto protectits profitsby castingdoubton his work (1993a,1993b).For theirpart,
hiscriticsdeniedservingtheleadindustryand told of the humanandprofessionalcosts
of servingas honestwhistle-blowers(Ernhartet al., 1993;Scarr& Ernhart,1993).
This Pittsburghinquiryresultedin a final repon in May 1992(NeedlemanHear-
ing Board,1992).This reportabsolvedNeedlemanof scientificmisconduct,findingno
evidencethathe intentlonall;'biasedhis dataor methods.However,the hearingboard
did find that"Needlemandeliberatelymisreprescntedhis procedures"in the I979 study
(Taylor,1992,p.44). The repon said that"misrepresentationsmay havebeendoneto
male.. .thcproceduresappearmore rigorousthanthey were,perhapsto ensurepubli-
ca(ion"(Taylor,_1992,p. 44).The hearingboardjudged that this behaviordid not fit
thedefrnitionsof misconductthatfocuson fakingdataandplagiarism.But otherswon-
deredwhy suchmisreponingdid not fall within anotherrulethatforbidsseriousäevi-
ationsfrom commonlyacceptedresearchpractices.
The Moral of the Story. Researchersoftgndisagreeaboutresults,but they'sel-
dom taliesuchdifferencesbeforehearingboards.More often,the scientistsarguewith
eacho(herin publishedaniclesand let otherresearchersdecidefor thcmselves.Some-
times,a schola-rwill sharethechallengeddatawith critics for additionalanalysis,per-
hapsevenworkingwith th-emto producea joint findin!. In Needleman'scase,thesci-
entistshada historyof distrustbasedon theirconllictasexpenwitnessesin civil trials
aboutleadexposureand toxic wastecleanup.Becausethe 1979studyhad becomea
weaponin thesedisputes,theresearcherschosenot to work togetherto resolvethcirdif-
ferences.Insteadone side turnedto the researchintegrity office of the government,
whichin turnhandedthe problemto a university.Chargedwith fightingresearchfraud,
theseofficeshadlittle experiencewith a caseborderingon methoddifferences.Thepro-
ceduresof this casepleasedneithersidc.Needlemansuedthe federalgovernmcntand
tlreUniversityof Pittsburgh.chargingthatthey haddeniedhim due process.Scarrand
Ernhanhopedadditionalinformationwould leadto a moreseverejudgmenton laterre-
view.Whateverthefinal outcomeof thisdispute,we candrawsomeimponantconclu-
sionsfrom it.
First,socialresearcherscanaddressvery imponanrmatters.In thiscasethestales
involvedthementalhealthof thenation'schildren,theeconomicwell-beingof a major
industry,crucialfederalpolicieson the environmen(,lawsuitsfor mone(arydamages,
andthereputationsof prominentscholars.

4. TheLogicof SocialRcscarch
Second,thiscaseshowshow scienccworksthroughthe adversarialproccss.Re-
searchersshoulddoubttheir own findingsandthoseof o]f,erscholars.As consumersof
research,we shouldnot believeeverythingwe rcad.Instead,we shouldassumea doubt-
ful posturein the face of rescarchclaims.Wc call this postureskepticism.This term
docsnot meanunyieldingdisbeliefbut ratherthehabitof checkingthe evidence.Skep-
ticism reguircsus lo distinguishpoor research,unworthyof our belief,from good re-
search,whichdeservesat lcastprovisionalacceptance.Thc disputeaboutNeedleman's
findings,althoughunusualin its form, represcntsa norrnäland acceptedapproachto
gettingat lhe truth.This episodehighlightsthc importanceof researchmcthodsas the
focusfor scientificdebateand as the contentof this text.
Third, thisdisputeforcesus to view our researchpracticcasan ethicaldury.Sci-
entific integrity consistsof
a kindof uttcrhoncsty-akindof lcaningovcrbackwards.Forcxamplc,if you'redoing
ancxpcrimcnt,youshouldrcponcverythingthatyouthinkmighrmakcir invalid-notonly
whatyouthinkis rightaboutit. . . . Youm.ustdothebcstyoucan-if youknowanything
at allwrong,or possiblywrong-to cxplainit. If youmalca thcory,for examplc.andad-
vcniscit, or putit ou!.thenyoumusralsoputdownall thefactsthatdisagreewirhit. as
wellaslhoscthatagreewithit. (Feynman,1985.p.34l, adaptcdfromhiscommcnccmcnt
addressatthcCaliforniaInstitutcof Tcchnologyin l9?4).
This view of integritychallengesus to help our worstcriticsattackour mostcherished
conclusions,We will needa delachmen(from our theoriesif we arc to valucthe cred-
ibility of our resultsmorethanvictoryin our dispures.
Finally, does lead affect IQ? Improvedanalysesof Needleman'soriginaldata
gaveevidencein supportof his lead-IQ link thatwas evenstrongerthanthat_reponed
in his 1979article(Taylor, 1992,citing the-NeedlemanHearingBoard's FinatReport,
1992).Howevcr,thcseresultscome from only one small sample,and otherresearch
hndings havegiven mixed results.The currentEPA and CDC positionsasrecwith
Needleman'sconclusion,but theycouldchangeshould_newdaraappear.
How Do We Come to Know?
Assertion,Authority,and Evidence. Socialresearchproducesclaimsaboutcau-
sationfor cxample,thatÄ causesB. However,somecausalclaimsappearwithoutevi-
dence.Anyonecanassena causalrelation,but we neednot acceptit withoutsupport.
If the causalclaimhasno evidence,why shouldanyonebelieveit or preferit to a rival
view thathassupporr?
Sometimesclaimsdraw theirsupponno( from evidencebut ratherfrom the au-
thority,expenise,or rank of the source.If rhe aurhorityrefersto evidence,we expect
to seethedatain orderto makeour ownjudgment.We oftenhearassenionsthatsome
new trealmenlcancurea terribledisordersuchasschizophrenia,cancer,or heroinad-
diction.Perhapsa few patientstestifyto the successof the new cure.Recruitingdes-
perate,payingclientsrvith the promiseof a miracledrug may morivatesuchclaims.
However, neitherthefamenor theacademicdegreeof thesourcewill substirutefor ev-
idcnce.

5. The Logic of SocialResearch
Someauthoritiesbasetheirassenionsentirelyon fairhu,irhno claimsro scientif'ic
foundation.Clashesbetu,eenclaims basedon faith and thosebasedon evidencehave
madefor somedramaticmoments.Oneof the mostfamouscameto a headin Galileo's
heresl'trial.The Copemicanmodcl of thesolars),stemheldthatthc eanhmovedaround
the sun ratherthanthe sun aroundthe eanh.In 1616a churchcourtcondemnedthis
view asbeingcontraryto thc Bible. In 1632GalileopublishedhisDiologueon llte Tv'o
PrincipalWorld SS'stenrs,which seemedto favor the Copemicanvierv.The Inquisition
summonedhim to Romefor trial in 1633,forcedhim to recant.andprohibitedhis book.
Hc remaincdundcrhouscarresrfor rhc last eighryearsof his life (Hummel, 1986).
Contraryto the popularview, rhis trial did not derivefrom a simple conflict of
sciencevcrsusreligion.The ma(ter involved complex personaljcalousiesand power
struggles.Redondi(1983/1987)evensuggeststhatGalileo'strialstemmedfrom theo-
logicaldisputesorherrhanhis supporrof Copernicanism.
Althoughwe maynevcrknow thefull storyof therrial,Galileogavean eloquent
defenseof science"l do not fccl obligedto believethat the samcGod who has en-
dowedus with sense,reason.and intellecthas intendedus to for-qotheir usc" (guoted
by Durant& Durant,1961,p.607). The centurieshavevindicaredGalileo.In 1757rhc
Churchtook booksteachingthe mobiliryof rheeanhoff rheIndexof ProhibiredBooks.
In 1979,PopeJohnPaulII calledfor a reexaminationof theGalileocase.Thineenyears
later,theChurchbund him nor guihy (Monralbano,1992).The Varicanhaspublished
its sccrctarchiveson the Galileo caseand admirredthar the judges were wrong
(Poupard,I983).
Oneironyof thisepisodeis thatCalileo-hadmanyfriendsin rheChurch(includ-
ing thePopc).Theyadvisedhim not to claim proof for his rheoryin orderto avoidcon-
frontingthe Church.As it tumedout, Galileoshouldnot haveclaimedthathis theorl'
wasprovedsincehc hadmadesomemistakes(for example,in his theoryof tides).This
episodeshowsthatasserlionsbasedon good evidenceprevailover thoscbasedon au-
thorityand,in thei+tum, yield to betteronesbasedon betterevidence.In the long run.
the more truthfulandusefulexolanationshouldemerpefrom this comDetitionbetween
rival ideas.
Philosophyof Science. Our skcpticismaboutsocialresearchgoesbeyondrare
casesof datafraudor commondisputesaboutmethods.Philosophersof knou,ledgehave
longwonderedhow andevenwhetherwe can know abourour world.The phrasc"Lnou,
aboutour world" impliesthat cenain "facts" exist that we can learn.Sciencepursues
thesefactsby empirical methods,that is, methodsbasedoh experienccof thc world.
But philosophersdisagreeabouthow far we can trustour observations(for morc on this
debate,seeGuba,1990;Hughes,1990:Lirrle,l99l: Rorh,1987).
In thesocialsciences,cmpiricismsometimesgoesby thenamepositivism.Posi-
tivism rejectsspeculationand insteademphasizespositivefacts.ln this regard.social
sciencesharesa unityof methodwith thenaturalsciences.Thatis.we can testtheories
by seeinghow well they fit the facts that we observe.Alrhoughno consensushas
formedaroundan alremateview, tradirionalposirivismhasmanycritics.
What we usuallymeanby the norionof obsen,arionis that we feel sensations
withinus thatwe attributeto extemalcauses.When I sav"l see-atree."] reallvmean

6. TheLogicof SocialRcsearch
thatI havean innervisualsensationconsistentwith what I havelearnedis calleda trec.
But how can you or I be suretha(a treereallyexis(s?PerhapsI am hallucinatingand
my innersensationscomenot from a ree at all but rathersomemalfunctionof my ner-
vous system.We "know" the world only indirectly:"We do not acruallyscephysical
objects,any morelhanwc hearelectromagneticwaveswhen wc listento the wirelcss"
(Russell,1948,p. 3l l). In short,thepositivedatathatwc hadhopedto anchorour the-
oriesseemlike constructions.Our scientiFrcfactsresemblecollectivejudgmentssubject
to disagreemcntandrevision.
To speakof facts suggeststhat we can say what does or does not exist in thc
world. The branchof philosophycalledontologydealswith this problemof the ulti-
matenalureof things.Do externalthingsreally cxist out thereto seryeas sourcesof
our sensations?Belief that thereare such real sourcesis called realism. We canno(
demonstraterealism.We can neverprovethe realityof an externalsourccwith suspect
perceptions.Mosr scientisuand laypeopleact andtalk mostof the time as thoughthey
believedin realism.Nevenheless,somephilospheghavearguedfor anotherview called
fctionalism or inslrumentalrsrn,This latterview rcgardsthe supposcdexternalsources
of our perceptionsas fictionsdependenton our observinginstruments.
Supposingthat real facts exist.we still have the problem of showing how we
know them.Thc term epistemologyappliesto this concernwith the relationbetw.ccn
knowerandknown.Claimingthatyou know somcrhingimpliesthatyou candefendthe
methodsby whichyou got your knowledge.The everpresentrival to your claim is that
you havemisperccived
SelectivePerceptions. Much evidencesuggeststhatour observationsare selec-
tive andsubjectto error.Accordingto ThomasKuhn (1970),normalscienceconsis(sin
solvingpuzzleswithina frameworkof widelyacceptedbeliefs,values,assump(ions,and
techniques.Scientistsworking on a problemsharecertainbasic assumptionsand re-
searchtoolsthatshapetheir observationof realitS Kuhn calledthis sharedframework
a paradigm and considcredit a lensthroughwhich we seethe world.
Whole gencrationsof researchersmay cngagein normalsciencewithin a para-
digm beforeenoughconflictingdata forcea paradigm shift. Such paradigmshiftsor
revolutionsoccurwhenexisringtheoriescanno longeradjustto handlediscrepantfind-
ings.Paradigmshiftsresemblegestaltperceptualshifts.Kuhn illustratesthis by a psy-
chologyexperimentin which subjectsviewedcardsfrom a deck.This deck had some
peculiarcards,suchasblackheartsandredspades,but thesubjectswere not told about
them in advance.Most subjectsneededrepeatcdviewingsbefore noticing theseodd
cards.Seemingly,thesubjectslookedar blackheansand"saw" red heartsbecausethey
believedthatonly rcd heansexisted.Whentheygraspedtheideathatblackheanscould
exist,it was as rhoughsomeonethrewa switchin their minds.Suddenlytheycould
"see"(hecardsastheye.ristedra(herthanasimagined.We needto reflecton theframe-
work in which we think and do research.Would we noticethe black heartsand red
spadesif rheyappearedin our data?
Anothermajorcritiqueof scientificobservationcamefrom Karl Marx who chal-
lengedits neutralityandcompleteness.For Marx, sensa(ionimpliedan acrivenoticing
basedon motivationfor someaction(Russell,1945).We only perceivea few ourof rhe

7. The Logic of SocialRcsearch
universeof possiblesrimuli.We selecrfor attentionthosethataffectour interestsand
disregardthosethatdo nor.Marx rhuslocatessciencein thecontextof politicsandeco-
nomics,driven b;, the self-inrerestof the researcherswho themselvesbelon_gto eco-
nomic classes.
Can We Discover Causal Laws?
Foith of Science. We face orherproblemsbeyondperceivingthc world accu-
rately.Positivismholdsrharrhemissionof scienceis to discoverthetimelesslarr'sgov-
emingtheworld.This notionimpliesu,hatBenrandRussell(1948)calledlhe"faith of
science"(p.314).By thisphrasehc meantthatwe assumethatregularitiesexistin the
connectionof eventsandthattheseregularitiesor "laws" havea continuityover time
and space.We cannotprovethis coveringlaw. but we must believeit if we cxpectlo
find stableregularitieswith our scicncc.The greatsuccessof the physicalsciencesin
the pasttwo centurieslendscredcnceto this faith. For example,our lunar astroLauts
confirmedthatphysicalrelationshipsdiscoveredon earthhold on the moon as rvell.
Howcver,the ovenhrowof Ncwtonianphysicsby Einsteinearly in this century
shooktheconfidencein our capacilyto discovertimelessphysicallaws(Stovc.1982).
Socialscientistshavclongdoubtedtheirchanccsof matchingthcsuccessof thenatural
sciences-In the socialdomain,somescientistsreject the existcnceof objectivclaws
knowableby observation.Rather,thesecriticshold, our understandingof the rvorld is
a socialconstructiondependenton the "historicallysituatedinterchangesamongpeo-
_ ple" (Gergen,1985,p.261).
Fallibilism. Supposephysicalor socialeven(sdo follow lawsindependentof the
sociallyconstructed.perccprionof them.Philosopheisof sciencewarn us that such
causalconnectionswill resistdiscoveD'.One problemhasto do with induction,find-
ing an ideaamongobservcdevcntsthatmight explainother,not yet observedeve_nls.
Hume,writingin the 1700s,madea srrongcaseagainstsuchan inductiveleap(Stove,
1982).Repeatedinstancesof an observation.no matterhow many,cannotguaranteeits
futurerepetition.However,mostpeoplewouldsaythatsuchrepetitiondoesincreasethc
chancesof its occurringagain.Nevenheless,we musl remindourselvesthatwe run the
risk of makinginductivemistakes-tharis, wc are falliblein this regard.Fallibilism
refersto thepostureof suspectingour o'n inductions.
In sum.the toolsof our knowing,boththeproceduresof measurementandthe in-
ductionof lawful patterns.comefrom humanexperienceandrisk humanerror.We can
asscrta causalconnection.But wc do so only underwarrantof (thatis, limitedby and
no morevalidthan)our merhodsfor perceivingsuchrelations.This limitcd and cau-
tiousapproachto researchprovidesa continuingtopicof debatcaboutthe philosophi-
cal foundationsof socialscience(Cholson& Barker,I985;Manicas& Secord.I983).
The Strategy of Besearch
Theoryas TeslableExplanation. Socialresearchtriesto explainhumanevents.
Whatcausespeopleto abusetheirchildren,to becomedepressed,to remainhomeless,

8. TheLogicof SocialResearch
to fail to learnto readand write,to commitcrimes?Besidesour naturalcuriosityabout
how thingswork, we havea strongpracticalmotiveto e,rplain.predict,andshapecer-
tainhumanconditions.
Socialresearchincludesa greatmanyactivities,eachfallingin oneof threcmain
clusters:tentativeexplaining.observin-g,and testingrival views againstdata.We need
all threetb do socialresearch.If all we did was imaginedifferentcxplanations,we
would neverhavea basisfor choosingamongthem.On the otherhand.proposingten-
lativeexplanationshelpsmakesenseout of diverseobservationsandguidesus in mak-
ing still betterobservations.Suchtenrativeexplanationsconstitutetheory.
We can usuallythink of two or moredifferenttheoriesto explainmanyevents.
Collectingdata helpsus decidcwhich theorybestfits reality.In order to hclp us un-
derstandcausation,our datamustcomeintocontactwith theory.For example,we may
observeanddescribethe incidcnceof deathby choleraor suicide.But merelycounting
andsoningdeaths,whatwe call descriptiveresearch,doesnot explainthem.
However, observingwith a theoryin mind becomescausalresearchby joining a
causeto an effect.For example,JohnSnowsuspcctedthatfouledwatercausedcholera.
In the periodfrom 1848ro 1854,hc linl<edthe differentratesof choleradeathsto the
differentcompaniessupplyingLondonhouseswith water(Lilienteld.1976.pp.24-25).
In thesameway,EmileDurkheimlinkedchcngesovertime in the rateof suicidewith
chan-eingeconomicconditions(Durkheim,1897/195l). Thesemen couldhavclooked
at an enorrnousnumberof social-andphysicalfactorsaspossiblecausesof death.Their
theorieshelpedthemto narrowtheirfocusto watersupplyandeconomicconditions.
In the laststepof the researchc;-clewe compareour causalideawith our obser-
-vations.Doesour theoryfit? Doesanorhertheoryfit better?Scienceconsistsof seeing-
-whether
dataconflrmor disconfirmour explanations,Popper(1987)ar-quedthatwe
shouldnot simplylook for confirmations.Rather.he said,any "_eenuinetestof a the-
.ory is an attemptto falsifyit, or refurcit. Tesrabiliryis falsifiability"(p. 14l).As an
:exampleof pseudoscience,he offeredastrology"with its stupendousmassof empirical
evidencebasedon observation---onhoroscopesand on biographies"(p. 139)but with-
out Ihequalityof refutability.
' Rttleso! Et'idence. In orderto judge our theory'sfit. we rely on standarddeci-
sionnrles.Our researchreponsmakepublicboththeoriesanddata.so thatanyonecan
look over our shoulderand second-_guessus usingthesesameguidelines.Researchers
u.suallydemandthatwe meetthreecrireriabeforeclaiminga causallink: (l) covaria-
tion: (2) causepriorto effect:and(3) abscnceof plausiblerival h.vpothesisor expla-
nation.
The firstcriterionseemssimpleenough.If Ä causes8. theyshouldmovetosether
or co:vary.If pollutedwiltercausescholera.we e,pectto tlnd morecholeracasesin
housessuppliedwith bad waterand fervercasesin onesrvittr-pure water.lf rapidly
ch:rngingecononricconditionscausesuicide.u,eshouldcountmoresuicidesin chang-
ing economictimesandtewer in stableones.Knorvingthattwo thingsdo notco-vary.
on the otherhand.castsdoubron the rheörythattheyhavea causallink. However.as-
socialionalonedoesnot tell us the tvpeof causallink berweenA andB.

9. Thc Logic of SocialRcscarch
The philosopherHume warnedus of our habitof mind thattendsto seecausarion
in theassociationof events.When two cventscoincideagainandagain,we cometo cx-
Pcctonewhenwe noticethe other.We ofrenu,ronglytreatthis "prediction"as"causa-
tion." Howevcr,we musaseparatethesetrvonotionsin our minds.Russell(1948)itlus.
tratesthisproblemwith the story of "Geulinex'stwo clocks."Theseperfecttimcpieces
alwaysmove-togethersuch that when onepointsto the hour, the otherchimes.They
co'varyandallow us to makc good predictionsfrom the handsof one to the chimcsof
the other.But wc would not make a causalclaim. No one supposesthat one clock
causesthe otherto chime.In fact, a prior evenrcausesboth,namelythe work of the
clockmaker.Thus we needmorecrireriabcyondsimpleassociationto judge causation.
The secondrequirementdealsonly in parrwirh thisproblemof tellingcovariarion
from causation.A causeshouldprecedcis effect.Economicchangecannotcausesui-
cide if the uptum in suicideratescomcsbeforethe changein the cconomy.Knowing
thescquenceof cventscanhelp us rulc out onc causaldirection.But knowing that rwo
cventsarecorrelatedandthatone comesbeforetheotherstill doesnot settlethc qucs-
tion.RecallGeulincx'stwo clocks,andsupposethatoneclock is setonc secondbefore
theotherso thatitschimesalwayssoundbeforethcothcr.Would we arguethatthe for-
mcr clock causesthc la(ter'schimesjusr becauseit occursfirsr?Of course,we would
Dot.
Thc thirdrulefor causationalsodcalswith theproblemof Ceulinex'stwo clocks.
It saysthatwe muslbe ableto rule out uly rivalexplanationasnöi plausible.By plau-
siblewe meanreasonableor believablc.This testof causationcanprove hard to pass.
A rival cxplanationthatseemsunlikely to one rcscarchermay laterappearquirc likcly
- to o(hcrs.AnythingthatcancausEtwo cven(sto appearlinkedservesasa plausiblcrival
explanation.
Much of what socialresearchersdo helpsguardagainslsuchrival cxplanations.
We gradcsocialresearchlargelaon i(s successin ruling out rival cxplanations.Some-
onemay üinli of a ncw and plausiblc-rivalyearsaftera studyis published.Thus, thc
socialrcsearchcrmustdcsignsrudicsin waysrharminimize,as much as possiblc,prc-
senland futurecompetingcxplanations.To the cxtenlthata researchershowscovaria-
tionandtemporalprccedenceand.castsdoubton opposingrationales,we will accepthis
or her causalclaim.
The threatof competinginferenccsshapesalmostcvery aspectof datacollection
and researchdesign.Whethcras a consumeror producerof socialrcsearch,you musr
lcarn to judge rcsearchon the basisof how well it limits and rejectsrival interpreta-
tions.This lexl coversthe major typesof researchthrcats.One threatariseswhen we
collectmeasures.Wc cannotclaim thar,4 causesI if our measuresfail to reflectboth
A andB (a problcmexplorcdin Chaprcr5). Anotherthreathasto do with the fact that
much of socialresearchcomesfrom iarnple5.We must take carenot to claim that a
finding holdstruefor a whole popularionwhen it occursonly in a small groupdrawn
from that population(a ropic dealr wirh in Chaprer8). A rhird problemconcemsthe
manydifferenlwayswe candesignour studies.Designsdiffer in theircontrolof third
variablesthat mightcauseÄ and I ro appearlinkcd (rherhemeof Chaprer9). Finally,
we mustguardagainstthetemptationro generalizefindingsto people,places,or times

10. t0 TheLo-Eicof SocialResearch
not actuallyrepresentedin our study (a dangerraisedin ChapterlO). You must con-
sidernotjust one of thesethreatsin readingresearch,but ratherremainalen to all of
them.For a previewof all of theseresearchhazards,you shouldscan the first part of
Chapter14.
Becauseof theselhreats,socialresearchdoesnot alwaysreachconclusionsagreed
upon by all. Ratherthanprovidinglaws of socialbehavior,it givcs cvidencefor and
againstpreliminary,would-bc laws. This evidenccrequiresintcrpretation.Almost
weekly,we hearof resultsthat,if believed,qould changeour behavior(for example,
rhatleadcausesintelligencelossin children)or raisefcarsin someof us ([or examplc,
rhatleft-handershavea shorterlife expectancy,Coren& Halpcrn,l99l). In the same
announcementswe may alsohearlhat theconclusionscouldchangcpcndingfunherre-
search,leavingus to decidehow much faith to placein the claims.
Constantlywcighingthe conflictingfindingsof scientistscan prove frustrating.
Why is it tha(researcherscannotdecidewhichscientistshavetheright answersandset-
rle suchdebatesonceand for all? This conflictbetwecnopposingresearchersbecomes
most urgcntin coun casesthat rely on the expen testimonyof scientists.When such
expertsgive conflictingviews,the couns must seckways to choosethe morecredible
scientist.Stateand federalcouns havc sometimesrcliedon the I923 Frye rule, which
allows"expertsintocoun only if theirtestimonywasfoundcdon lheories,methods,and
procedures'generallyaccepted'as valid amongotherscientistsin the samefield"
(Huber.199I, p.la). fl6wever,thisprincipleof ignoring"junk science"hascomeunder
fire by thoseplaintiffswhosecasesdependon the challengedexpens.The Supreme
Coun took up this qucstionin the caseof Daubert v. Merrell Dow, which involved
claimsrhatthe drug Bendectincausedbinh defects.Lower courts,following the Frye
rule,saidthattheplaintiff'scxpertscouldnot give theirviewsbecausetheirevidence
wasnot acceptedas reliableby-mostscientists.The SupremeCqgn, in its decisionof
June 28, 1993,reversedthe lower couns and relaxedthis nrle. The courtscan still
screenout unreliable"expcrts."However,judgesmustnow do so not on lhe basisof
the witnesses'acceptanceby otherscientistsbut ratheron thequdity of theirme(hods.
JusticeHarry Blackmunwrole that "Proposedtestimonymust be suppofledby appro-
priatevalidation-i.e.'good
grounds'..." (quotedby Houston,1993,p. Ala).
This decisioncomfonsthosescientistswho distrusta rule that imposescenainty
or publiclygradesresearchers.By freezingthe researchproccssa( some fixed "truth"
or annointinggoodand badresearchers,we might hinderfutureCalileoswho point to
new way_sof seeingthings.Laterresearchmay displacethecurrentlymost favoledthe-
ory. andit will do so morequicklyin a climatethattoleratesconflictingideas.Scien-
tistsdraw the line at fraudand have set up ethicalguidelinesagainstmakingup or
falselyreponingdara(seeChapter2). However,they worry aboutsciencecourtsthat
punishresearchersfor usingimpropcrresearchmethods(asillustratedin the leadand
IQ casecitedat thebeginningof thischapter).Instead.researcherscompe(ein themar-
ketplaceof ideas,hopingto eamresearchsupport,publications.andpromorionsby con-
vincingtheirpeersof theexcellenceof rheirmethods.In thisspirit.rheSupremeCoun's
decisionin Dauberrv. Merrell trustsjudgesandjuriesto sift good from badscience.
This textaimsto givc you the powerto judgefor yoursclfthe qualityof reserrchthat
will affectyour life.

11. Thc Logic of Social Rcscarch lI
USES OF SOCIAL FESEARCHAND RIVAL EXPLANATIONS
Personal Use of Besearch
Causalassenionssurroundus. We hearadviceon horvto spendmoneyon cars,
toothpaste,cigarettes,political candidares,healrhhabits,and a thousandother things
basedon brief referencesto data.For example,you may havehearda radio newsbrief
reportinga studyof runningandheanartacks.Perhapsit claimedthatrunninghglpsprc-
venthcartattacksbecauseof evidencethatmarathonrunnershavea lower thanexpected
iate of hean attacks.Alrhoughrunningmay help prevenlheartattacks,this evidencc
doesnot provcit. Followingour rulesof evidence,can we think of a plausiblerival ex-
planationof thcseobservations?
Assumethatmarathonrunnersdo havea betterrecordof heartattacksthannon-
_runners.Maybe marathonrunnersdiffer in someother respectsfrom most pcople.A
lhoto of a group of Olympic mara(honrunnerslined up for the stan of their event
showsus a relativelyyoun,s,lean,small-bonedgroup of people.Cenainly, we *'ould
not mistakea marathonninner for a sumowrestler.Maybemarathonrunnershavedif-
ferentbody typesfrom binh. Maybe theyhavestrongerhearrsor more efficientcircu-
latorysystemsthannonrunnersdo. Suchphysicaladvantagcswould help beginningrun-
-ners
succeedinitially,thusencouragingthemto becomedevotedlong-distancerunners.
In shon,the successfulrunnersmay havebeenselectedfor their healthyheartsandre-
Jistanceto heanattack(not_tomentiontheirlong strideandself-discipline).
Thc samcevidencecan suppontwo quitedifferentassertions:(l) Runningpre-
ventsheartattacks;(2) peopleresistantto heartattacksbecomenrnners.Suchdilemmas
occuroftenin soningout researchclaims.Frequently,theavailableevidencesuggests
onecausalassenionbu! cannotruleouta plausiblerival.Thinkingof rival explanations
ganprovevery usefulin a personalway becausewe mustmalieso many choicesbased
on evidence.Get in the habitof chcckingthc evidenceto seeif it permitsa plausible
rival explanation.If it does,we regardthe evidenceas wea-k.For importanldecisions,
you may waD(to look for moreconvincingevidence,basedon betterresearchmethods.
Most of us do not havethe timeor desireto checkall causalclaims.Perhapsa
'
wrong decisioninvolving choicesabout goods,sen'ices,or personalbehaviorhas a
smallcost.For otherkinds of choices,the evidencemay provetoo complicatedfor us
to assess.In thesecases,we pay expensto checkthe researchand think aboutrival ex-
planationsfor us.We may aska physicianaboutthe safetyof a newjogging regimebe-
fore tryingj(. We trustthat this doctorhasbcenskepticalfor us. In the samel'ay,we
trustclinicalpsychologists,cducators,criminaljusticeworkers,andotherhumansen'ice
professionalsto gaugethe evidenccin their areasof expenise.One characteristicthat
identifiesprofessionalsis their ability to malie independentjudgmen(sof researchre-
ports.if you plana professionalsocialsen'iceor academiccareer,y'ouwill needto learn
how to makethe sortof evaluationsof researchevidencetreatedin this text.
Professional Use of Flesearch
Jus(asa laypersonchecksa causalclaiinby lookingfor plausiblerival explana-
tions,in the sameu'ay professionalschallengepublishedresearchin their 3rs35.Writ-

12. LZ Thc Logicof SocialRescarch
ing to a criticalandexpenreadership,professionalresearchersdcsigntheir rescarchto
rule out rival explanations.But the besteffortsof seriousresearchersmay not prcven!
alternativewaysof explainingrheirfrndings.A caseof suchconflictinginterpretations
comesflromthe mentaIhealrhfield.
Of thc variousmcntaldisorders,schizophreniaposesthegravestchallenge.It rep-
resentsa majordrainon the nation'shealthresourcesand wreckshavocin the livesof
both patientsandtheirfamilies.Every few yearsa newsreleaseraisesour hopesthata
researcherhasfoundthc chemicalkey to this disease.Sadly,suchclaims havealways
provedpremature.
The taleof one of these"breakthroughs"showshow datafrom professionalre-
searchcanbeexplainedin morethanoneway.SolomonSnyder(1974)relatesrhesroly
thatbeganwith a theoryby two psychiarists.OsmondandSmythies(1952)arguedthat
someloxic substanceproducedschizophrenicbehavior.They supposedthat thischem-
ical occunednaturallyin the bodtssof schizophrenicsbut not in the bodiesof normal
people.They assumedrhatthis unknowntoxic substancewould resemblechemicals
(suchasmescalinc)knownto producehallucinationsin normals.Theynoteda chcmist's
findingsthatadrenaline.whichnaturallyoccursin humanbodies,wasstructurallysim-
ilarto mescaline.Perhapssomebodilymalfunctionproducesa variantof adrenalinethat
could,in turn,producerhesymptomsof schizophrenia.
This theorygainedsupportfrom the researchof Hoffer. Osmond,and Smythies
(1954),who reponedtwo new piecesof evidence.First,they foundadrenochrome(a
breakdownproductof adrenaline)in the blood and urine of sthizophrenicsbut not in
mostnormalpeople.Second,whenadrcnochromewasgiven to normalpeople,thcyre-
porredpsychedelicexperiencesIike thoseof peopleunderthe influenceof LSD. As
Snydersays,"lt wouldseemtharthemilleniumof psychiatryhadanived"(197a,p.56).
Adrenochromeappeared(o causeschizophrenia.It remainedonly to find a controlfor
thischemicalbeforehundredsof thousandsof schizophrenicscouldleadnormallives.
As with prior breakthroughs,Hoffer's (rvogru.h1 findingsdid not reproducein
otherresearchers'labs.After manyfailuresof replication(thatis, an attemptto repro-
ducethestudieswith thesameresults),thesearchbeganto find otherwaysto explain
this evidence.Why did Hoffer find moreadrenochromein schizophrenicsthanin nor-
mal people?Adrenaline,whenexposcdto air,breaksdown intoadrenochrome.Synder
(1974)assumesthatHoffer'ssamplesfromschizophrenicsandnormalsstanedoutwith
the samelow levelsof adrenochrome.He believesthat the schizophrenics'samples
were left exposedto air longerbeforetcsringbccausethey hadto come to rhelab from
thementalhospital.As a result,theybroke-downIo a greaterextentintoadrenochrome.
Why did Hofferfind thatnormalpeoplegivenadrenochromereportedhallucina-
tions?Snyderexplainsthisobservationby suggestion.The normalsubjectsknervthat
they werereceivinga chemicalrhoughrro causehallucinationsand,in effect,obeyed
this"suggestion."Theeffectof subjectbeliefon behavioris well known in psychology
andrequiresspecialconrrols(discussedin Chaprerl0). Figurel-lcompares rherwo
causallinks of theOsmond-Smythiesthcorywirh Snyder'srival explanationsof Hof-
fer'sfindinss.
To choosebenveenthcsetwo rivaltheories,we neededmoreresearch.Lateistud-
ies that exposedbloodsamplesfrom schizophrenicsand normalsto air for the same

13. Osmond.
Smphias
lneory
SnydcrFival
erplanations
Biolooical
. . #
aonormalrlY
Thc Logic of SocialRcscarch l3
Schirophrenic-likc
hallucinations
Suggastion
RivalExplanations.
lncrcasedlevels
of adrenochromc
Diflcrent
exposurc of
samplcsto air
Figure1 Osmond-SmythiesTheoryand Synder
lengrhof rimefoundno adrenochromedifferences.Whensubjectsdid not know whethcr
lhey werercceivingadrenochromeor someneutralsubstance,adrenochromeproduced
no hallucinations.
Alrhoughmisleadingar llrsr, Hoffer'sresearchhad the usefulEffectof advancing
the search for the cause of schizophrenia.As Snyder summarizes,"After the
adrenochromefiasco,psychiarristsbecamedisillusionedandimmenselyskcpticalabout
the drug-inducedmodel psychosisapproachto schizophrenia"( 1914,p. 57). Re-
searchersrecheckedthe natureof schizophrenicsymptomsandconcludedthat the psy-
chedelicdrugsdid not acruallyproducethosesymptoms.Thesefindingsrevcaledthe
psychedelicdmg approachto schizophreniaas a dead end, and researchresources
movedto morepromisingmethods.The searchgoeson for a nerrrtoxic substanceor
neuraldefec(rha(might causeschizophrenicsymptoms.Improvedtheoriesresultcd
from thisepisodeandare,ironically,our legacyfrom Hoffer,Osmond,andSmythies.
PoliticalUse of Research
Onerewardfor studyingsocialreseaJchwill comeasgreaterp-owerto analyzethe
claimsthataffecryour personaldecisions.Moreover,you mus(learnaboutresearchin
orderto entercenainprofessions.Besidespersonalandcareerreasons,you needto un-
dersrandsocialresearchin orderro join fully in thecivic process.Increasingly,signif-
icantsocialpolicydecisionsderivefrom causalclaimsthat dependon researchevi-
dence.Judges,membersof Congress,andheadsof health,education,andenvironmental
agenciesareall makingdecisionsbasedin pan on thc datasuppliedby researchers.As
a votingcitizen,youwill castyourballotbestonly if you canmakeyourownjudgment
of thesocialresearchthatinformspolicy debatcs.
A dramaricexampleof socialresearchaffectingpolicy comesfrom the Coleman
repon(Colemaner al.,1966).Colemanandhis colieaguessun'eyedtheeducationalop-
ponunitiesand achievementsof a greatmany Americanstuden(s.They concludcd,
amongorherthings,rhatblackstudentsdid betterin integratedthanin raciallyisolated
schools.The Colemanrepon seemedto supponthe causalclaim that dcsegregation
wouldhelpequalizeachievement.This evidencebecamethe mos(frequentlycitedsci.
entificsupponfor schoolintegrationby forcedbusing.
Jencksandhis colleagues(1912)reanalyzedthe samedatabut arrivedat a rival
explanationfor theconnectionof integrationand achievemen(.Cgleman'sstudycom-

14. 14 Thc Logicof SocialRcsearch
paredalreadyintegratedblackswirh segregatedblacks.Opponentsof busingcould
"argue that the high test scoresof blacks in naturallyintegratedschoolsreflect the
greatermotivationor resourcesof blackparentswho put theirchildrcn in desegregated
schools"(Jenckset al., 1972,p. 99).Thusthe Colemanevidencemay not applyto new
desegregationby publicpolicy.If leamingslemsmore from parentalmotivationthan
schoolinregrarion.busingwouldhavelirrleeffect.Jencksfoundthatbusingcanproduce
' smallachievementgainsor lossesdependingon thespecificconditionsof the integra-
rion.He emphasizeshow liule schoolconditionsaffectattainmentand how littleboth
schoolconditionsandachievementaffectlaterincomelevels.Justaswe arestill search-
ing for the causeof schizophrenia,so rvecontinueto ponderthe relationshipof cduca-
tion to socialjuslice.
This caseshowshow borhsidesof a majorpoliticalquestioncancite high-qual-
iry researchto suppontheirviews.You mayhaveto decidcat thepollswhichviewyou
favor,if not on thequestionof busing,thensomeo(herdivisiveissue.If you havc a
closedmind on thequestion.you mayfindsomesocialscientistwith evidencethatsup-
portsyour view.But if you rvantto supportthebestpossiblepolicy.you mustdo some
rvork.You will needto knowhorv(ojudgecompetingexplanationsof thedatafor your-
self'
S U M M A R Y
The battleouerrheeffectsof Ieadon inrelligenceshowsthcneedfor skepticismin using
socialresearch.Drawingcausalinferencesfrom socialresearchcan provedifFrcultand
uncenain.Philosophersof knowledgeevendisputethe degreeto which we can krow
therealworld.
Socialresearchproceedsby raisinetentativeexplanations,makingobservations.
and thenseeinghow well the proposedideasfit the data.The claim thatÄ causes8,
for example,requiresobservationsshorvinothat(l) A andB co-vary:(2) A occursbe-
foreB; and(3) no rivalexplanationfor theA-with-8associationremainsplausible.The
lastrulerequiresthalwe designresearchto preventall possiblealtemativewaysof ex-
plainingobservedlinkages.This textcoversthevarioustypesof threatsto researchcon-
cIusions.
With theserules,we can assesscausalclaimsin a publicway. Assertionsbased
- on suchevidencehaveprovenmoreconvincin-gthanclaimsbasedon faithor authority.
Socialresearchcanplayan imponantrolein makingpersonal,professional,-andpublic
decisions.For thesereasons,everyonecanbenefitby leamingto readresearchcritically.
E X E R C I S E S
l. Finda ne'spüperor popularmrsazineaniclethatclaimsa causalrelationship.
Checkto seervhether(hecausallink restson evidenceor on authorityor taith.Does
theevidenceshowan associationof therrvovariablesandthatrhecausecomesbefore

15. TheLogicof SocialRcscarch 15
theeffect?Finally,sceif you can rhink of a rival explanationfor this association.Re-
peatthisexerciseseveralrimesunril you cando it routinelyfor any causalclaimthat
you hear(for example,via televisionor from professors).
2. For a handycollecrionof causalclaimswith alternativeexplanations.seelhe
book Äiru/ Hl,pothesesby Huck and Sandler(1979).Someof their 100 problemsrely
on commonsenseand a creativeskepticism,and you can probablysolve themnow.
_Orhersassumeknowledgeof ropicsthatappearin thefollo*'ingchapters.Try your hand
at someof the problemsnow and againlaterafteryou havereadthis text.
KEYTERMS
Causal
Covariation
Descriptive
Empirical
Epistemology
Fallibilism
Falsifiabilit.v
Induction
Integrity
Ontology
Paradigm
Paradigmshift
Plausiblerival hypothesis
Positivism
Pseudoscience
Realism
Replication
Skepticism
Suggestion
Theory