Analyzing a Government's Financial Condition for Investors

You are a broker at a brokerage firm. You are expected to
prepare a financial analysis of a stateor municipal government
and present in front of prospective investors including foreign
central banks and foreign private investors. Prospective
investors expect you to make recommendations on their
investing decision. The objective of this project is to let you
have an opportunity to analyze a Comprehensive Annual
Financial Report (CAFR) and create your own assessment of the
government’s financial condition. You can complete this
project by having access to a CAFR of your government. A
supplementary chapter is posted along with the project
description for your guidance to prepare for this project. The
use of other supplementary resources is upon your choice.
1. Paper
Contents
Your final work product should include an introduction, an
analysis of each of the three components of financial
performance discussed in the supplementary text
(Environmental, Organizational, and Financial) and a
conclusion about the overall financial condition of the state
government. Other than what’s required above, you can be
creative with the contents of your paper so long as your paper
analyzes where the government stands financially and can make
suggestions for investing decision. Please read the
supplementary text before you begin your group work so that
you have basic knowledge with which you can analyze the
financial condition of the government you are assigned. MD&A
section of CAFR is useful for future outlook but you should be
skeptical on what is written in there. Statistical section of
CAFR contains some financial ratios. You can choose to
calculate your own ratios using financial statements based on

lists of financial ratios in the supplementary text or you can use
ratios from CAFR to infer your conclusion.
Format
The final report prepared by each group should be typed, double
spaced (Times New Roman, 12 point font, one inch margin in
all four sides), 10 pages in length, with references (but
reference page is not counted toward the 10 pages for the
content). No late submission will be accepted.
2. Presentation
Contents
As with the paper, you can be as creative as you wish.
However, your presentation should include the gist of your
paper. You can make your slides first and develop your paper
from there or you can write your paper first and then make a
summary for your power point slides. Either way, your paper
and presentation should tell a consistent story. In addition,
since you are an expert of the government you are presenting,
you are expected to include an executive summary of your
government in the beginning of your presentation. For this,
demographic and economic information along with operating
information in the statistical section will be useful.
Presentation in Government Accounting class does not need to
be boring! Be as creative as possible in delivering your
message to your potential investors!!!
Format
How you present your work in front of others is as important
(sometimes even more important) as your written report. Every
member of a group is required to participate in presentation
equally. The presentation needs to be 10 minute long and there
will be a 5 minute Q&A session afterwards. Do not spend more
than two minutes on one slide. People can’t concentrate! In
general, putting too many words on one slide is not a good idea.

Reading the notes throughout your presentation is not
acceptable. I understand that you will get a little nervous in
front of others but don’t forget to talk slowly!!! Remember that
you are a broker who presents in front of prospective investors.
Be professional. Grading form is attached.
·
Introduction
1.Environmental factors:
· Rosemead Community & the Governmental Resources
There are five Environmental factors affect the governmental
services demand for those who live in the city of Rosemead.
To begin with the first factors, which is the most influential,
community needs, and resources. Population, Median age,
employment rate, and average income are important elements.
According to the data of suburban states, the median age of
both genders is thirty- eight years old. The population is one of
the key elements due to professional measure some of the
community performance level based on the “employment base”.
The average age of the city has a direct relationship with the

economic level. Employment rate and business level have
related relation. The improvement of the employment rate
within the community could lead to the improvement of the
community business activity. In addition, personal income and
national unemployment rate are including in the measurement.
The improvement of employment leads to increasing personal
income, therefore, the community now have a better economic
ability. The local government sector could provide better
services to residents. The Chart below shows the change of
Rosemead within ten years. People could clearly see that while
the unemployment rate decrease, the personal income increase.
The city has spent most of the revenue on the public safety
area.
Restriction of the revenue & Expense: pg.33
Secondly, intergovernmental constraints, The city of Rosemead
is primarily supported by tax and intergovernmental revenues
from other function to cover the fees for the use of business-
types activities, and Rosemead does not have business-types
activities. In addition According to the Rosemead city’s policy,
the restricted fund is going to apply first and apply the
unrestricted fund if they need more resources to support the
project. By following the policy people need to reduce the
amounts that have been assigned from the restricted revenue
then figure out the other expenditures. People need to follow the
policy to classific the amount and figure out which unrestricted
balance accounts qualify for use. The city classific the fund
balance into non-spendable, restricted, committed, assigned and
unassigned. People need to identify the type of expenditure or
expense before record it.
To continue with Rosemead emergency programs. Residents
could find out the information on the government website.
Besides spending money and resource to set up those programs,
they have purchased insurance pollution legal liability insurance

plans and property insurance to avoid unexpecting emergency or
natural disasters. The city also encourages their residents
attended those program for better knowledge.
Political culture (Taxes, political process)
Furthermore, Rosemead’s revenue heavily relies on tax
collection. Majority of the revenue comes from the property tax.
Due to the optimistic performance of overall economic, sales
tax increased $564 thousand. Other than sales taxes the TOT
increased$114 thousand due to the grand opening of the
Hartford Hotel. Rosemead has changed the light to LED and
receives $276 thousand of reimbursement that provides by CA
Edison.
· External economic conditions
According to the NSCL, the national unemployment rate for the
years 2018 are within the rage of 3.7% to 4.1%. However,
Rosemead has a higher unemployment rate which is 4.3% due to
the median age is thirty-eight years old in Rosemead. There is a
large portion of people who live in Rosemead are over sixty or
under eighteen, and it directly decrease the labor force. It could
be one of the factors that increase the unemployment rate in
Rosemead.
· http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/national-
employment-monthly-update.aspx
· Population demographics: growth, density, composition
· Median age
· Percentage of household below the poverty level
· Capacity to provide services:
· Personal income per capita (is this high or low?)
· Property values
· Employment (is the unemployment rate high or low? show
and analyze the trend during a period, compare with the national
unemployment rate
· Level of business activity
2. Organizational factor is one of the three factors affect

financial condition. Organizational factors act as the
intermediate tool to influence how environmental factors affect
the outcome of financial factors. The successful government
can invest their slack resources to improve the environmental
practices and benefit the organizational performance. Mostly
the environmental factors such as community needs and
resources, intergovernmental constraints, disaster risk, political
culture and external economic conditions will impact on the
organizational performance. The ability of manages to make the
decision can prevent the crisis in the operation, even in the face
of adverse environmental factors.
In City of Rosemead’ s homepage, <Budget Message for 2018-
2019 fiscal year> illustrate the focus of the budget is to
“maintain our commitment to provide quality programs, events,
and services, and to also maintain a quality infrastructure for
our residents, businesses and visitors”. In addition, in its
updated Strategic Plan Action Item 51. “Improve transparency
and communication with the public regarding continuous
monitoring and internal controls of City finances.”
In City of Rosemead’s strategic plan, there are three key
organization goals.
· Ensure the City’s continued financial viability by actively
pursuing quality economic development.
Due to the improving economy, the margin of surplus is 1%,
and City of Rosemead will apply this to the reserve, and the
Fund balance in the General Fund will aim at $18 million at
2018/2019 fiscal year. In addition, In the Comprehensive
Annual Financial Report fiscal year ended June 30,2018, the
management discussion and analysis section showed the total
governmental activities net position which including investment
in capital asset, restricted and unrestricted has an increase
trend.
From City of Rosemead’s CAFR report, in 2012, the total

amount is increase over 28 million compared to 2011. In the
summer of 2016, the city council adopted an updated two-year
strategic plan which server as “roadmap” to navigate the
community goals to June 2018. From the above date, the
expenditure went up from 68 million to 72 million and 74
million.
· Enhance public safety and quality of life.
For the public safety service, the city was provided by the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and the Los Angeles
County Fire Department. As a result, the city’s organizational
workforce will continue to operate with only 57 full-time and
143 part-time and seasonal positions.
Through the lean staffing level, the City “contract” certain
services outside which have better management to enhance the
public safety and quality of life, and this is also called
“Rosemead Model”.
· Beautify residential neighborhoods and commercial corridors.
The City of Rosemead is utilizing Measure R and Measure M
funds for capital improvement project. An aggressive capital
improvement program (CIP) administered by the Public Works
Department includes, funding for improvements to various
roadways, sidewalks and traffic signal upgrades, parks and
stormwater improvements. In addition, the City encourages and
facilitates the citizen volunteerism to improve the appeal of the
community .
3. Financial Factors:
Financial factors focus on six parts of the information on the
statements, which are Revenue, Expenditures, Operating
Position, Debt Structure, Unfunded Liabilities, and Condition of
Capital Plants. Three main financial statements will be
discussed in this report, they are Government-wide Financial
Statements, Fund Financial Statements, and Government Funds.

By comparing the date and ratios in these three statements, the
current and future situation of Rosemead will obviously show
how dies the city government is work.
· Government-wide Financial Statements.
The government-wide financial statements are designed to
provide readers with a broad overview of the City of
Rosemead’s finances, in a manner similar to private-sector
business.
· Fund Financial Statements
A fund is a grouping of related accounts that is used to maintain
control over resources that have been segregated for specific
activities or objectives.
The City of Rosemead uses fund accounting to ensure and
demonstrate compliance with finance-related legal
requirements.
All of the funds of the City of Rosemead can be divided into
three categories:
1. governmental funds
2. internal service funds
3. fiduciary funds.
· Governmental Funds
Governmental fund financial statements focus on near-term
inflows and outflows of spendable resources, as well as on
balances of spendable resources available at the end of the
fiscal year.
Six indicators to identify the data on the statements:
Revenue, Expenditures, Operating Position, Debt Structure,
Unfunded Liabilities, and Condition of Capital Plants
*Unfunded Liability Measure is only useful when…….
*According to 2018 CAFR City of Rosemead, the City of
Rosemead include general government, public safety, public
works, community development, and parks and recreation.
· General Fund fund balance at the end of Fiscal Year 2017/18

increased $1.45 million.
· Based on the date and charts show above, the there financial
factors give an outstanding on how City of Rosemead works in
the 2017/18.
Conclusion:
Recognizing the Power of Nonviolent Action
Stephen Zunes
March 31, 2005
You probably didn’t notice, but February 20 was Nonviolent
Resistance Day. One might think
this would be cause for celebration by an administration
committed to expanding freedom and
democracy. But there weren’t any special ceremonies at the
White House or resolutions in
Congress. For despite all the rhetoric lauding freedom and
democracy, the U.S. government has
rarely supported, and has often opposed, nonviolent movements
working for democratic change.
Nonviolent action campaigns have been a part of political life
for millennia, challenging abuses

by authorities, spearheading social reforms, and protesting
militarism and discrimination. In
recent years, however, there has been an increase in movements
that have not only led to
significant political and social reforms advancing the cause of
human rights but have even
toppled repressive regimes from power and forced leaders to
change the very nature of their
governance. In more recent decades, nonviolence has become a
more deliberate tool for social
change, evolving from an ad hoc strategy associated with
religious or ethical principles into a
reflective, even institutionalized, method of struggle.
Indeed, the past 20 years have witnessed a remarkable upsurge
in nonviolent insurrections
against autocratic rulers. Primarily nonviolent “people power”
movements have overthrown
authoritarian regimes in nearly two dozen countries over the
past two and a half decades, have
forced substantial reforms in even more countries, and have
seriously challenged other despots.
In contrast to armed struggles, these nonviolent insurrections
are movements of organized

popular resistance to government authority, and they—either
consciously or by necessity—
eschew the use of weapons of modern warfare. Unlike
conventional political movements,
nonviolent campaigns usually employ tactics outside the
mainstream political processes of
electioneering and lobbying. Tactics may include strikes,
boycotts, mass demonstrations, the
popular contestation of public space, tax refusal, destruction of
symbols of government authority
(such as official identification cards), refusal to obey official
orders (such as curfew restrictions),
and the creation of alternative institutions for political
legitimacy and social organization.
Why Nonviolence Works
Not all nonviolent pro-democracy movements have been
successful, of course; several have been
suppressed, as in Burma and China. What is surprising is not
that some of them have failed—as
have many violent insurgencies around the world—but that so
many of them have succeeded.

The world is certainly no less conflictual than in past years.
Yet, there have been dramatic
improvements in civil and political rights over the past two
decades, and nonviolent action has
played a crucial role in this transition, including the downfall of
dictatorships in Eastern Europe,
Latin America, Africa, and Asia. There are several reasons why
insurgents have turned away
from armed struggle to embrace nonviolent action.
One reason is a growing awareness of the increasing costs of
insurgency warfare. In a mirror
image of Western national security managers, who insisted
during the 1960s and 1970s that
guerrilla warfare could easily be defeated (even in such cases as
Algeria and Vietnam), many on
the left and in the Third World created a counter-myth of the
invincibility of such movements.
However, technology has given status quo powers an increasing
advantage in recent years. Even
when an armed insurgency is victorious, large segments of the
population are displaced, farms
and villages are destroyed, cities and much of the nation’s

infrastructure are severely damaged,
the economy is wrecked, and there is widespread environmental
devastation. The net result is an
increasing realization that the benefits of waging an armed
insurrection may not be worth the
costs.
Another factor endorsing nonviolence is the tendency, once in
power, for victorious armed
movements against dictatorships to fail in establishing
pluralistic, democratic, and independent
political systems capable of supporting social and economic
development and promoting human
rights. Often these shortcomings result in part from counter-
revolution, natural disasters, foreign
intervention, trade embargoes, and other circumstances beyond
a victorious popular movement’s
control. However, the choice of armed struggle as a means of
securing power tends to exacerbate
these problems and creates troubles of its own. For one, armed
struggle often promotes the ethos
of a secret elite vanguard, downplaying democracy and showing
less tolerance for pluralism.
Often disagreements that could be resolved peaceably in

nonmilitarized institutions lead to
bloody factional fighting. Some countries, like Algeria and
Guinea-Bissau, experienced military
coups not long after armed revolutionary movements ousted
colonialists. Others, like Angola and
Mozambique, endured bloody civil wars.
Still another drawback of armed revolt is that maintaining a
strong military generally requires
greater dependence on outside benefactors for weapons. In the
past this led several revolutionary
governments to become reliant on the Soviet Union, which—
like any major power—traditionally
tied strings to its aid. Even a relatively low level of assistance
during the course of an armed
struggle starts a dependent relationship that is hard to break.
This association can, in turn, induce
elements of the old dictatorship to ally with rival major powers
in an effort to overthrow the new
government.
For example, having ousted the Somoza dictatorship through

armed force, the popular but
heavily militarized Sandinista Front—despite largely avoiding
the Cuban revolution’s pitfall of
sliding into a communist dictatorship—was still faced with
U.S.-organized attacks by armed
mercenaries. U.S. support for the Contras was justified by
American policymakers on the
(largely fabricated) grounds that the Sandinista military had
aggressive designs on neighboring
countries. In turn, the national security threat from the United
States reinforced the military wing
of the Sandinistas, robbing precious funds from desperately
needed domestic programs and
leading eventually to military conscription and
counterinsurgency efforts that alienated some
important segments of the population. The result of the Contra
War was widespread destruction,
the collapse of the Nicaraguan economy, and the Sandinistas’
eventual electoral defeat.
The poverty and injustices afflicting many Third World
countries are so extensive that a
successful armed movement against an authoritarian regime—
even if it has strong organization,

proven mobilization skills, and a coherent ideology—is not
sufficient to address the pressing
concerns facing a country in transition after the devastation of
the revolution. As a result, there
has been a growing interest in tactics that minimize the degree
of dislocation in a country and
maximize the chances that segments of the population can
become contributing members of a
post-authoritarian political order to help build a new society
respectful of human rights.
The growing awareness of the power of nonviolent action stems
from several phenomena. First,
insurgents are increasingly convinced that armed resistance
tends to upset undecided elements of
the population, who then seek security in the government. When
facing a violent insurgency, a
government can easily justify its repression. But force used
against unarmed resistance
movements usually creates greater sympathy for the
government’s opponents, a phenomenon
that former Harvard sociologist Gene Sharp has referred to as
“political jiu jitsu,” whereby an
opposition movement leverages state repression to advance the
movement’s ends. Second,

unarmed campaigns involve far more participants, taking
advantage of a popular movement’s
majority support. Unarmed resistance also encourages the
creation of alternative institutions,
which further undermine the repressive status quo and form the
basis for a new independent and
democratic order.
Armed resistance often backfires by legitimizing the use of
repressive tactics. Violence from the
opposition is often welcomed by authoritarian governments and
even encouraged through the use
of agents provocateurs, because it then justifies state repression.
But state violence unleashed on
unarmed dissidents often triggers a turning point in nonviolent
struggles. A government attack
against peaceful demonstrators can be the spark that transforms
periodic protests into a full-scale
insurrection.
Unarmed resistance movements also tend to sow divisions
within pro-government circles for a

number of reasons. First, disagreements surface internally
regarding how to effectively deal with
the resistance, since few governments are as prepared to deal
with unarmed revolts as they are to
quash armed ones. Violent repression of a peaceful movement
can often alter popular and elite
perceptions of the legitimacy of power, which is why state
officials usually use less repression
against nonviolent movements. Second, some pro-government
elements become less concerned
about the consequences of a compromise with insurgents if their
resistance is nonviolent.
Unarmed movements increase the likelihood of defections and
noncooperation by unmotivated
police and military personnel, whereas armed revolts legitimize
the role of the government’s
coercive apparatus, enhancing its self-perception as the
protector of civil society. The moral
power of nonviolence is crucial in the ability of an opposition
movement to reframe the
perceptions of key parties: the public, political elites, and the
military, most of whom have no
difficulty supporting the use of violence against violent
insurrections.

The efficacy of nonviolent resistance in dividing supporters of
the status quo is apparent not just
in rendering government troops less effective but also in
challenging the attitudes of an entire
nation and even foreign actors, as in the South African struggle
against apartheid. Pictures of
peaceful protesters—including whites, members of the clergy,
and other “upstanding citizens”—
broadcast on television worldwide lent legitimacy to anti-
apartheid forces and undermined the
South African government in a way that the armed rebellion was
unable to do. As nonviolent
resistance within the country escalated, external pressure in the
form of economic sanctions and
other solidarity tactics by the international community raised
the costs of maintaining the
apartheid system.
Due to increased global interdependence, the non-local audience
for a conflict may be just as
important as the immediate community. Just as Gandhi played
to British citizens in Manchester

and London, organizers of the civil rights movement in the U.S.
South were communicating to
the entire nation and especially to the Kennedy administration.
Insurgency against the Soviet
bloc was disseminated by television broadcasts that spread the
news from country to country,
legitimating local protests that no longer seemed like isolated
events organized by unstable
dissidents. The prominent role of the global media during the
anti-Marcos “people power”
movement in 1986 was instrumental in forcing the U.S.
government to scale back its support of
the Philippine dictator. Israeli repression of nonviolent protests
by Palestinians during the 1980s
had a similar effect on Americans, whose perception is
significant given the role of both private
citizens and the U.S. government in sustaining Israel’s military
and economic infrastructure. As
Rashid Khalidi observed, the Palestinians had “succeeded at last
in conveying the reality of their
victimization to world public opinion.”
As the pro-active ingredient in nonviolent resistance, the
creation of alternative structures

provides both a moral and a practical underpinning for efforts
aimed at bringing about
fundamental social change. Parallel structures in civil society
may render state control
increasingly impotent, as they did throughout Eastern Europe
leading up to the events of 1989. In
the Philippines, Marcos lost power not through the defeat of his
troops and the storming of the
Malacañang Palace but from the withdrawal of sufficient
support for his authority, so the palace
became the only part of the country that his troops could
effectively control. On the same day
that Marcos was officially sworn in for another term as
president in a state ceremony, Corazon
Aquino was symbolically sworn in as the people’s president.
Given that most Filipinos saw
Marcos’ election as fraudulent, the vast majority offered its
allegiance to President Aquino rather
than President Marcos. The transfer of allegiance from one
source of authority and legitimacy to
another is a key element of a successful nonviolent uprising.
In the course of a successful nonviolent revolution, and with
adequate popular participation,

political authority may be wrested from the state and invested in
institutions of civil society, as
these parallel institutions grow in effectiveness and legitimacy.
The state may become
increasingly impotent and irrelevant, as parallel
nongovernmental institutions take over an
increasing portion of the tasks of governing a society, providing
services to the populace, and
creating functional equivalents to the institutions of the state.
Nonviolent Movements Against U.S.-backed Governments
The United States has often supported repressive leaders— such
as Numeiry in Sudan, Duvalier
in Haiti, Marcos in the Philippines, Chun in South Korea, and
Pinochet in Chile—who have
attempted to crush nonviolent pro-democracy movements. Each
of these U.S.-backed dictators
was overthrown through nonviolent movements, though, thanks
in part to a lack of U.S. support
for the new democratic governments, both Sudan and Haiti slid
back into authoritarian rule. And

despite 33 years of U.S. support through both Republican and
Democratic administrations,
Suharto of Indonesia—with even more blood on his hands than
Saddam Hussein—was toppled
in an unarmed insurrection in 1998.
In 1980-81 during both the Carter and Reagan administrations,
the Salvadoran government was
able to withstand a series of general strikes thanks to a
commitment from the United States to
finance 80% of San Salvador’s budget. Bolstered with outside
economic support, unpopular
governments can often survive the near total collapse of
domestic economic activity brought
about through such massive noncooperation. As a result, many
in the nonviolent Salvadoran
struggle joined the armed insurrection.
A particularly problematic version of this stonewalling
phenomenon is manifested by
governments—particularly those relying on foreign support—
that effectively suppress
nonviolent movements without undermining their legitimacy by
privatizing their repressive

apparatus. This occurs when military officers and top political
officials allow or encourage
private vigilantes—often with the direct support of elements of
the police and military—to
violently suppress nonviolent movements as a means of
terrorizing the general population into
submission. Despite approval by key sectors of the governing
apparatus, these death squads are
distinct enough from the official chain of command that the
government can plausibly deny
responsibility. Although most nonviolent activists still blame
the government, foreign supporters
and some neutral sectors of the population—critical players in
the success of pro-democracy
movements—may accept the portrayal of the government’s
leaders as moderates doing their best
to curb violence and extremism on all sides.
By privatizing its repressive apparatus, an unpopular
government can avoid full-scale warfare
and retain some measure of legitimacy by opting instead for
“low-intensity conflict (LIC),” a
counterinsurgency strategy advocated by U.S. military advisers
over the past few decades. This

concept evolved in the late 1970s and early 1980s in El
Salvador and has been utilized in
counterinsurgency situations in Guatemala, Colombia, and the
Philippines.
LIC advisers contend that shooting into crowds doesn’t work; it
merely strengthens the
opposition. Overkill can win battles but lose the war.
Acknowledging that overt government
repression of nonviolent, popular civilian movements is
counterproductive, LIC strategy
advocates other forms of neutralizing opposition forces, such as
economic development
programs, propaganda, and focused anti-guerrilla military
campaigns. An authoritarian
government is encouraged to combine repression with nominal
civilian control of its
administration to help convert the population to its cause.
Sanitizing and training local armed
forces is an integral part of restoring respectability to the
autocratic government. Eschewing a
shotgun approach, LIC strategy uses a scalpel to neutralize the

opposition: wipe out trade union,
academic, and religious leaders; identify and annihilate
grassroots supporters of the opposition;
limit and repress independent human rights groups. This
pinpoint focus is where death squads
have played an important role.
For example, while American military trainers teach responsible
crowd control methods, they
also encourage focused forms of violence. The now-famous
secret CIA report to the Nicaraguan
Contra forces advocates “the selective use of violence” by
paramilitary units instead of
“indiscriminate” repression as a means of “decapitating”
opposition leadership.
The privatization of the repressive apparatus of an unpopular
government often has a chilling
effect on the prospects of successful nonviolent insurrections.
One creative counter-measure
involves “nonviolent intervention” by teams of international
volunteers organized by Peace
Brigades International (PBI) and similar groups. Growing out of
the Gandhian tradition, PBI and

its sister organizations have sent teams to Guatemala, El
Salvador, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and the
Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip to accompany prominent
nonviolent activists as unarmed bodyguards, to stand between
soldiers and peaceful
demonstrators, to form blockades to protect homes from
destruction, and to engage in other
tactics. Political leaders are eager to avoid the diplomatic
fallout from international observers—
particularly North Americans or Europeans—witnessing or
becoming casualties of attacks by
their soldiers or death squads. Leveraging this concern, these
nonviolent intervention teams,
despite their small numbers, have become remarkably successful
deterrents to state repression.
The successes of such efforts are limited, however. For
example, despite the murder by Israeli
occupation forces of Rachel Corrie, a 23-year-old American
nonviolent activist protecting the
home of a Palestinian physician from destruction by Israeli
bulldozers in 2003, the Bush
administration has continued its unconditional support for
Israel’s repression in the occupied

Gaza Strip and West Bank. Indeed, within a month of her
killing, Congress voted to increase
U.S. aid to Israel by $1 billion. Adding insult to injury, the
Democratic senators in Corrie’s home
state of Washington—Patty Murray and Maria Cantwell—persist
as outspoken defenders of
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, have consistently defended human
rights abuses by Israeli
occupation forces, and have even denounced the International
Court of Justice for its ruling last
summer stating that Israel, like other nations, was required to
abide by international humanitarian
law.
Perhaps the greatest single challenge to the effectiveness of
nonviolent action in the cause of
human rights is the power of U.S.-backed transnational
institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund, which can essentially determine the economic
policies of newly democratic
countries and hold them responsible for debts accumulated by
previous dictatorships. Although

nonviolent movements may be victorious in enhancing civil and
political rights in a country,
such movements may be unable to improve people’s social and
economic rights.
For example, in the spring of 1997, when tens of thousands of
Nicaraguans engaged in a general
strike to protest President Arnoldo Aleman’s austerity
programs, former Sandinista soldiers and
former Contras left their guns at home and collaborated to set
up roadblocks and engage in street
protests adhering strictly to disciplined nonviolence. Faced with
massive nonviolent resistance,
the government relented, and the austerity measures were
withdrawn. However, the United
States, through the International Monetary Fund, forced the
Nicaraguan government to
implement the austerity plan anyway. As Alejandro Bendaña, a
leading Sandinista intellectual,
asked an American audience a few months later, “Will the
United States allow the people of
Latin America to succeed with nonviolence?”
For nonviolent action to be truly effective in the cause of
democracy and human rights, it must

be transnational, opposing not just the worst manifestations of
institutional violence and human
rights abuses but also their source, often lodged within
advanced industrialized countries like the
United States.
Nonviolent Movements Against Governments Opposed by the
United States
During the Cold War, U.S. support for right-wing dictatorships
was justified by claiming they
were an important bulwark against communism, which—as a
“totalitarian” system—was deemed
impossible to reform from within. It was felt that military
means, such as marshaling strategic
alliances like NATO and armed insurgencies like the Afghan
mujahedeen, were the only way
left-wing dictatorships could be challenged. And yet, nonviolent
movements eventually brought
down entrenched communist rulers in Poland, East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Mongolia. During that same period, the Baltic states of
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia broke free

from the Soviet Union, also largely through the use of
nonviolent resistance. With the partial
exception of the Solidarity movement in Poland, however, there
was little direct support from the
United States.
During the 1990s, the oppressed ethnic Albanian majority in
Kosovo waged a massive
nonviolent campaign against its Serbian oppressors using
strikes, boycotts, peaceful
demonstrations, and alternative institutions in one of the most
widespread, comprehensive, and
sustained nonviolent campaigns since Gandhi’s struggle for
Indian independence. Tragically, the
U.S. government and much of the rest of the world chose to
ignore the Kosovars’ nonviolent
movement. Only after a shadowy armed group known as the
Kosovo Liberation Army emerged
in 1998 did the world media, the Clinton administration, and
other Western governments finally
take notice. By waiting for the emergence of guerrilla warfare
before seeking a solution, the
West gave the Milosevic regime the opportunity to crack down
with an iron fist. Western

diplomatic efforts were too late and culminated in a NATO
bombing campaign that not only
killed over 500 civilians but led to a dramatic increase in
Serbian repression. State violence
inflamed the Kosovar movement, which became dominated by
armed ultranationalists who have
proven far less ready to compromise or to guarantee the rights
of the Serbian minority in an
autonomous Kosovo.
Less than a year later, however, the people of Serbia were able
to achieve nonviolently what 11
weeks of NATO bombing could not accomplish: the ouster of
their dictatorial leader, Slobodan
Milosevic. This was the third major nonviolent uprising against
Milosevic: the previous two
failed in large part due to the refusal of the United States and
other Western powers to support
the democratic forces. Indeed, during the 1996 uprising, U.S.
special envoy Richard Holbrooke
successfully argued that the Clinton administration should back
Milosevic—in recognition of his
role in the successful peace deal in Bosnia—and not risk the
instability that might result from a

victory by Serbian democrats. Through first appeasement and
then warfare, Washington allowed
Milosevic to remain in power far longer than necessary. As the
democratically elected Yugoslav
President Vojislav Kostunica put it: “The Americans assisted
Milosevic, not only when they
supported him but also when they attacked him. In a way,
Milosevic is an American creation.”
The success of nonviolent movements may be forcing
Washington to recognize the power of
peaceful resistance. Though less than European support, last
fall’s U.S. economic assistance to
pro-democracy groups in the Ukraine helped rectify an attempt
to steal the country’s presidential
election. U.S. support had a similar impact in the former Soviet
republic of Georgia in 2003.
In most other countries, however, the United States continues to
downplay internal pro-
democracy movements while threatening military intervention
in the name of democracy’s
defense. For example, in Iran, there has been a dramatic growth

in civil society institutions
challenging the Iranian government’s human rights abuses.
Leading Iranian pro-democracy
activists have recognized that any foreign military attack on
their country would have disastrous
consequences to their struggle. In the February 19 issue of the
British newspaper The
Independent, leading Iranian human rights activist and 2003
Nobel Peace Prize winner Shirin
Ebadi observed: “Respect for human rights in any country must
spring forth through the will of
the people and as part of a genuine democratic process. Such
respect can never be imposed by
foreign military might and coercion—an approach that abounds
in contradictions.” Instead,
Ebadi insists that “the most effective way to promote human
rights in Iran is to provide moral
support and international recognition to independent human
rights defenders.”
It is important, therefore, to recognize that because nonviolent
movements for human rights and
democracy are by their nature indigenous, home-grown
phenomena, they cannot be controlled by

the U.S. government. Political repression and the need for
democracy in countries like Iran and
Syria are quite real, but it would be naïve—particularly in light
of active U.S. support for other
dictatorships in the region—to believe that the Bush
administration really cares about promoting
freedom in the Middle East or anywhere else. As Ebadi noted,
“It is hard not to see America’s
focus on human rights in Iran as a cloak for its larger strategic
interests.” Behind their platitudes
and public pronouncements, U.S. officials recognize that the
power of nonviolent action must be
downplayed in order to justify massive U.S. military spending
to build “an arsenal for
democracy” and for U.S. military intervention overseas.
It is relatively easy to criticize U.S. military intervention as
well as the hypocrisy and double
standards of the Bush administration’s rhetoric championing
democracy. However, to effectively
support alternatives to U.S. policy, progressives should first
concede that there are repressive
rulers that indeed need to be challenged and should then insist
that the way to lasting regime

change is not by bombing and invasions but through the power
of nonviolent action.
http://www.fpif.info/fpiftxt/472
Tags: Nonviolent Action
Categories:
Nonviolent Action
AI Index: AFR 34/003/2005 Amnesty International September
2005
Contents
INTRODUCTION
.............................................................................................
1
AFTER THE PEACE AGREEMENT
................................................................ 2
Independent National Commission on Human Rights
......................................................................... 3

INCOMPLETE DEMOBILIZATION
.................................................................. 4
ETHNIC TENSIONS MANIPULATED
............................................................. 5
THE SLOW PACE OF REFORM
..................................................................... 7
Armed forces
...............................................................................................
........................................ 8
Police
...............................................................................................
.................................................... 9
The justice system
...............................................................................................
............................... 10
Prisons
...............................................................................................
................................................ 11
IMPUNITY PERSISTS
................................................................................... 11
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
..............................................................................................
11
No sign of war crime prosecutions
.................................................................................. .............
..... 12
Pressure to bring Charles Taylor to trial
............................................................................................
13
RECOMMENDATIONS TO ELECTION CANDIDATES
................................ 14

AI Index: AFR 34/003/2005 Amnesty International September
2005
Liberia
Violence, discrimination and impunity
Introduction
Sporadic outbreaks of violence continue to threaten the people
of Liberia and their prospects
of peace. Former rebel fighters who should have been disarmed
and demobilized following
the formal ending of internal conflict in 2003 have reacted with
violence when they have not
received their benefits. Voter registration centres were the
target of a series of attacks in May
2005 in which aid workers were attacked and beaten.
The peace remains fragile. Intercommunal discrimination and
rivalries have erupted into
violence and rioting, resulting in deaths and severe injuries.
Weapons still circulate illegally

throughout the country. Ex-combatants have been manipulated
by local politicians which has
contributed to incidences of violence.
During the period of transition that has followed the conflict,
insufficient funding and
resources for demobilization programmes have left former
combatants without effective
vocational training or jobs. Those responsible for gross human
rights violations during the
conflict have still not been held to account, and impunity
persists for the forces responsible
for continuing violence in Liberia.
The asylum granted by Nigeria to former Liberian President
Charles Taylor, despite a 17-
count indictment against him for war crimes and crimes against
humanity before the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, flouts Nigeria’s international legal
obligations. Charles Taylor is
accused of supporting armed rebels who committed massive
human rights abuses in Sierra
Leone throughout the 1990s. There is as yet no appropriate
international or national
mechanism for bringing to justice those responsible for the
massive human rights abuses that

took place during the conflict in Liberia.
As Liberia approaches presidential and legislative elections on
11 October 2005, and the
prospect of a new government from January 2006, candidates of
all political parties must
demonstrate that human rights are central to their vision for
Liberia.
1
Voters need to know
where candidates stand on critical human rights issues if they
are to hold the new government
to its promises. Candidates must show clear commitment to the
establishment of, and respect
for, the rule of law; to the promotion of human rights; and to an
end to impunity for human
rights abuses by all sides to the conflict.
The international community must give greater support to the
work of the UN Mission in
Liberia (UNMIL), whose mandate comes up for review by the
UN Security Council on 19
September 2005. More attention and resources are needed to
address the central human rights
issues of continuing violence, discrimination on ethnic grounds
and impunity, but also to

strengthen and reform the security forces and the justice system
in Liberia.
1
On election day, Liberians will vote in three separate ballots
for the President and Vice-President, for
64 members of the House of Representatives and for 30
members of the Senate.
2 Liberia: Violence, discrimination and impunity
Amnesty International September 2005 AI Index:
AFR34/003/2005
The peace agreement held out strong hopes for peace, for
renewal after the devastation of
war, and for an end to impunity for the appalling crimes
perpetrated during the conflict. The
last two years have seen great improvement in the security
situation, but much remains to be
done to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law.
2
After the peace agreement
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended the almost

continuous internal conflict in
Liberia between 1990 and 2003, was signed on 18 August 2003
by the then government; the
two main armed opposition groups, the Liberians United for
Reconciliation and Democracy
(LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia
(MODEL); and by all political parties.
A transitional government was installed in October 2003 to lead
the country into elections. A
76-member transitional legislative assembly was appointed by
the transitional government
from among members of the former government, LURD,
MODEL and civil society.
UNMIL was established by the UN Security Council in 2003 to
supervise the ceasefire, to
provide security, to demobilize and disarm the combatants, and
to assist the government in
preparing for elections.
3
By the time Amnesty International visited Liberia in May 2005,
UNMIL peacekeeping troops were at full strength and fully
deployed in all 15 counties
throughout Liberia. The civilian component of the mission
provides support to the

government, including on human rights, elections, the police,
judiciary and prisons, and on
reforms in the security forces and the administration of justice.
Its interventions have been
effective in increasing the accountability of officials at the local
level.
In May 2005, the UNMIL Human Rights and Protection Section
began formulating a five-
year National Human Rights Action Plan for Liberia in
collaboration with: the Liberian
Ministries of Justice, of Foreign Affairs, and of Gender and
Development; Liberian civil
society groups; the UN Development Programme (UNDP); and
the international donor
community. It is also beginning an audit of Liberian national
laws so that they can eventually
be brought into line with international human rights law and
standards. In late 2004 Liberia
ratified key international human rights treaties planned for
incorporation into domestic law.
4
2
For further information on progress since the 2003 peace
agreement, see Liberia: One year after

Accra – Immense human rights challenges remain, 18 August
2004 (AI Index: AFR 34/012/2004).
3
Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003), on establishment of
the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL),
UN Doc. S/RES/1509 (2003), 19 September 2003.
4
Liberia ratified the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR); the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the UN
Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(Convention against Torture); the Optional
Protocol to the Convention against Torture; and the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Liberia also signed, but has not yet ratified, the Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR; the Optional Protocol
to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women; the Optional
Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
involvement of children in armed
conflict; and the International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families.

Liberia: Violence, discrimination and impunity 3
Amnesty International September, 2005 AI Index: AFR
34/003/2005
Civil society organizations have played a critically important
role throughout the transition
process, particularly in keeping the peace agreement on track,
monitoring government
reforms and persistently highlighting pervasive corruption.
They have raised concerns with
the transitional government through peaceful actions and legal
channels, and worked closely
with the international community. During her July 2005 visit to
Liberia, Louise Arbour, the
UN High Commissioner for Human Right, credited “recent
achievements...to ECOWAS,
UNMIL, and for the most part to the Liberians themselves, who
have demonstrated enormous
resilience in their determination to live in peace”.
5
The peace agreement provided for the establishment of
institutions to address issues of

accountability for human rights violations and of reconciliation
– the Independent National
Commission on Human Rights and the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.
6
The Independent National Commission on Human Rights was
set up to “monitor
compliance with the basic rights guaranteed in the present Peace
Agreement as well as
promote human rights education throughout the various sectors
of Liberian society, including
schools, the media, the police and the military”.
7
On 23 March 2005 the transitional government Chairman,
Gyude Bryant, signed into law
an act establishing the Commission.
8
The UNMIL Human Rights and Protection Section had
assisted in drafting it. The Act gives the Commission general
competence to protect and
promote human rights in Liberia and important powers to
subpoena witnesses. Some of the
key functions include :(Article IV sec. 6, 7, 8, 12, and 14):

violations in any part of the
country and make proposals for initiatives to put an end to such
situations and, where
necessary to express an opinion on the actions of the
government in response to such
violations.
legislation, regulations and
practices with the international human rights instruments to
which the Republic of
Liberia is a State party, and their effective implementation.
Republic of Liberia has not
yet ratified, or accession to those instruments, and to promote
their implementation by
the Government.
5
UNMIL Press release, “Institutional and attitudinal change key
to Liberia’s development, says UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights, 13 July 2005.
6
See Impunity chapter below for further information about the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
7

Article XII, Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
8
An Act to repeal the act of 1997 creating the Liberian
Commission on Human Rights and to create the
Independent National Commission on Human Rights of Liberia,
March 2005. For further information
on the establishment of the Commission, see Liberia: One year
after Accra – Immense human rights
challenges remain (AI Index: AFR 34/012/2004), p. 18.
AFR34/003/2005
discrimination, in
particular ethnic discrimination, by increasing public
awareness, especially through
the dissemination of information and education and by making
use of state and public
media organs.
awareness and respect for human
rights and international humanitarian laws, treaties, and

protocols to which Liberia is
a party.
So far, the Commission has not been able to operate to its full
potential. Despite efforts by
some of its leaders, it has not received financial support from
the international community and
relies on a small budget allocated by government that covers
only basic operating costs.
Continued support from the UN in the form of technical
expertise and training is needed to
make the Commission a more viable institution.
Incomplete demobilization
There have been regular outbreaks of violence and rioting in
Monrovia and other parts of
Liberia during the transition period. Often the violence has
arisen from repeated failures to
provide reintegration benefits to fighters demobilized from
armed groups.
In one instance, former fighters launched missiles and disrupted
voter registration in Ganta,
Nimba County, on 12 May 2005 when their reintegration and
resettlement benefits were not
provided on time. Their benefits included vouchers for skills
training and school fees. The

former fighters, chanting anti-government slogans, ransacked
voter registration centres and
carried away electoral materials. They attacked and beat aid
workers and UNMIL staff
members, and smashed humanitarian agency vehicles. This was
the third outbreak of violence
in a month in Nimba County by former combatants protesting at
not receiving benefits.
The violence is linked to a variety of factors. These include an
unfinished process of
disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement
(DDRR) that has neither
completely broken the command structures of the warring
factions nor adequately provided
viable long-term employment or reintegration opportunities.
Illegal arms trading continues to
take place in Monrovia and in border areas of the country,
feeding the continuing conflict. In
addition, the transitional government has not adequately
addressed the economic governance
and security issues that threaten human rights and hinder full
implementation of the peace
agreement.

In June 2005 the UN Secretary-General reported that the most
serious threat to the elections
and the safety of UNMIL personnel came from former
combatants who were “open to
exploitation by manipulative political elements”.
9
His report also referred to “organized
9
Seventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to
Security Council resolution 1579 (2004)
regarding Liberia, 16 June 2005, UN Doc. S/2005/391 sec.19:
“The most serious threat to stability
came from ex-combatants awaiting reintegration opportunities.
Many of these ex-combatants held
violent demonstrations to demand reintegration benefits and
opportunities. They also threatened to
disrupt the elections and to attack UNMIL personnel. Continued
delays in providing these idle ex-
34/003/2005
groups of ex-combatants with links to influential members of

the former factions…illegally
occupying the Guthrie rubber plantation”, highlighting the
involvement of ex-combatants in
illegal mining and exploitation of natural resources. After UN
peacekeepers conducted
searches for armed former fighters in Liberia, on 6 August 2005
the police announced that 23
people in Monrovia had been arrested for possession of illegal
weapons. All 23 were reported
to be former members of the previous government’s militia.
Figures made public by the UN in February 2005 estimated the
total number of fighters
who had been disarmed at close to 101,000, of whom 65,000
had not entered reintegration
programmes.
10
The 101,000 included members of the former government’s
forces, and of
LURD and MODEL. The demobilization of members of the
present government’s armed
forces started in July 2005 as a precursor to a restructuring of
the whole force later in the year.
A figure as high as 101,000 had not been anticipated in the
budget, and there was practically

no money available for rehabilitation and reintegration by the
time disarmament and
demobilization had been concluded. An estimated US$39
million more is needed to ensure
successful rehabilitation and reintegration, including through
the provision of meaningful
educational and vocational training. However, funds pledged by
the USA, the European
Commission and Sweden have not yet been received.
Ethnic tensions manipulated
During the internal armed conflict, the leaders of the various
warring factions manipulated
ethnicity as a means to recruit fighters. The inter-ethnic hatreds
that were nurtured during the
war have had a lasting impact, leading to large-scale violence
that the authorities have had
difficulty in controlling. Few attempts have been made in the
transitional period to address
this issue at its core. Amnesty International believes that the
government must tackle it as a
priority, and that it should be a central focus of the work of the
Independent National
Commission on Human Rights Commission – one of whose
functions is to address

discrimination – and of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.
In one instance of intercommunal violence in late 2004,
violence broke out in Paynesville, a
suburb of Monrovia. A long-standing land dispute between two
individual members of the
Mandingo and Lorma ethnic groups sparked four days of
rioting. Between 28 October and 4
November 2004 at least 20 people were killed, 200 were
injured, and numerous girls and
women were raped. Churches, mosques, homes and official
buildings were damaged in
Monrovia and in neighbouring counties including Margibi and
Grand Bassa. A national
emergency was declared and a curfew imposed. There were
significant delays before the
authorities responded to the violence, which was eventually
quelled by the police with the
support of the International Police Service of the UN Civilian
Police (CIVPOL). At least 157
combatants with reintegration opportunities leave them open to
exploitation by manipulative political
elements, particularly during the electoral process.”

10
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council
resolution 1579 (2004) regarding
Liberia, 7 June 2005, UN Doc. S/2005/376, Sections 31 and 32:
The numbers included 68,162 men,
22,370 women, 8,523 boys, and 2,440 girls; and 612 foreign
nationals including 308 Guineans, 242
Sierra Leoneans, 50 Ivorians, seven Nigerians, four Malians,
and one Ghanaian.
AFR34/003/2005
people were arrested. Of these, six were subsequently charged
with setting fire to the home of
the Minister of Justice, and were later released to await trial;
the rest of the detainees were
released without charge.
There is widespread belief among local people in Paynesville in
allegations that individuals
at the highest levels of the transitional government were
personally involved in arming former

soldiers during a series of meetings just before the violence
broke out. If true, such actions
would have been clearly illegal and in violation of the ceasefire
and a UN arms embargo.
Local people told Amnesty International in May 2005 that “hate
speech” was circulated
through mobile phone text messages and on the radio, inciting
tensions and fomenting
violence as people in Margibi County heard what was taking
place in Monrovia.
In January 2005 the transitional government appointed a
commission of inquiry, made up
of 15 members of civil society, to look into the causes of the
rioting. The commission
presented its findings to the government in June 2005. While it
reported no evidence of
planning, it did identify ethnic discrimination against the
Mandingo ethnic group as the most
significant cause of the violence. The report stated:
“Of all the causes, both immediate and remote, the single most
important cause of the
October rioting was the negative attitude of many Liberians
against Mandingo…

Violence manifested itself through these tensions which played
out through attacks on
individuals, hate speech, rioting, the burning and destruction of
mosques and churches
and violence in communities.”
The findings of investigations into the cause of the rioting by
the International Police
Service have not been made public. In a report of June 2005 the
UN Secretary-General
acknowledged that ethnic clashes posed a threat to security, and
cited instances of violence
between the Gio and Krahn ethnic groups and between the
Lorma and Mandingo
communities over land.
11
Discrimination against the Mandingo community is rife,
members of the community told
Amnesty International in meetings in May 2005 with civil
society organizations in Bong and
Montserrado counties. They complained of being subjected to
discrimination during the
registration of voters for the October elections because of their
names, appearance, speech or

clothes. They said they had to produce more evidence that they
were of Liberian nationality
than other ethnic groups in Liberia. Voter registration
guidelines require two people already
registered to vote to vouch that the applicant is Liberian and a
member of the community.
Members of the Mandingo community told Amnesty
International that they had asked for a
meeting with officials of the National Elections Commission but
had received no response.
Some local media organizations and non-governmental
organizations reported similar
allegations. However, government officials – including from the
National Elections
Commission – and some UN staff told Amnesty International
that there had been only
11
Seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the UN
mission in Liberia, UN Doc.
S/2005/391, 16 June 2005, Para.23.

34/003/2005
isolated instances of discrimination or denial of voter
registration to Mandingo people, and
that it was not a widespread problem.
Such differing perceptions are of concern. Amnesty
International believes that, if officials
are widely believed to have discriminated against a sector of the
population, the government
should make public its opposition to such discrimination on
ethnic grounds, and should take
action to investigate allegations of discrimination during voter
registration and to prevent it
during the October vote, for example by the deployment of
monitors at ballot stations.
The slow pace of reform
The transitional government’s lack of transparency and
accountability on economic
governance and security issues has threatened the transition
process, concluded the
governments and intergovernmental organizations at a donor
meeting in Copenhagen in May

2005. The meeting was attended by representatives of the
Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), and the International Contact Group
on Liberia, a grouping of
states formed in 2002. These governments and organizations
proposed an anti-corruption
plan largely aimed at limiting the powers of the transitional
government. It restricted the
government’s power to grant contracts and its control of key
sources of revenue; placed
international supervisors in key ministries; and required the
appointment of additional judges
to strengthen the judicial system. After negotiations with the
transitional government, an
Economic and Governance Assistance Program was presented
for the government’s approval
in August 2005 with the clear message that failure to accept it
might put future funding at risk.
Additional pressure on the transitional government came with
the renewal of international
sanctions on Liberia’s export of diamonds and timber by the UN
Security Council in June
2005.
12

The renewal of sanctions was largely linked to the Security
Council’s concern that
few of the reforms that have been imposed by the transitional
government have met
conditions sufficiently enough for proper resource management.
The Security Council also
noted serious concern about “the increase in unlicensed mining
and illegal exports of
diamonds and the National Transitional Government of
Liberia’s agreement to and lack of
transparency in, granting exclusive mining rights to a single
company “.
13
Liberian people have been strongly critical of the transition
process. They had hoped to see
faster improvement in their quality of life but have been
severely affected by the rising prices
of rice, fuel and cement. The late payment of salaries has
resulted in several demonstrations
and strikes. Vigilantism has increased because of the general
lack of faith in the police and in
response to the slow pace of reforms in the administration of
justice. Criminal suspects have
been assaulted or killed sometimes when there have been

suspicions that the police have not
fully investigated a case or courts have made unfair rulings or
have been influenced by
corruption. Civil society needs to play a greater role in reforms
of the police and justice
12
Resolution 1607 (2005) adopted on 21 June 2005, UN Doc. SC
Resolution 1607 (2005)
13
Ibid sec.1
AFR34/003/2005
system so as to discourage vigilantism, to encourage respect for
the rule of law, and to
increase public awareness of the need for an effective,
community-based police service.
The painfully slow pace of long-term reforms has impeded
progress in addressing the
threats of violence and impunity. The armed forces, police,

judiciary and prison services all
suffer from insufficient resources and training, lack of qualified
personnel, and low levels of
professionalism. Historically, the executive branch of
government has threatened to deny
these institutions independence from interference. More
attention needs to be dedicated to
their reform and restructuring so that they have the capacity,
resources and security to address
a deeply entrenched climate of impunity.
UNMIL has a mandate to focus on security reforms and support
for the peace process. It
works with the transitional government to monitor and
restructure the police and to
restructure the military. On the justice and prison systems,
UNMIL is authorized to assist in
developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions,
including a national legal
framework and judicial and correctional institutions.
In a June 2005 report, the UN Secretary-General acknowledged
that the transitional
government must be held accountable for the lack of attention
and support given to the

prisons, courts and the police. According to the report:
14
Many of the re-opened courts are not complying with legal
standards and are failing
to observe fair trial of victims and suspects. Prisoners are
detained in poor conditions,
including in overcrowded prisons, and the rights of prisoners to
due process, speedy trials
and legal counsel are undermined by the poor operation or non-
existence of courts. The
only operational juvenile court is in Monrovia. A large number
of cases are not tried,
resulting in impunity for offenders. A lack of accountability,
which is compounded by the
failure of the Government to provide adequate logistical support
to the courts and the
police, has encouraged corruption and hampered the state’s
capacity to uphold the rights
of victims and suspects.”
Armed forces
Under the peace agreement, UNMIL is in charge of the
country’s security while the armed
forces are restructured.

15
All irregular forces were to be disbanded, and the new
government
forces to have a new command structure. The new armed forces
were to be drawn from the
ranks of the former government forces, the LURD and MODEL
armed groups, as well as
civilians with appropriate experience. The UN, ECOWAS,
African Union and states in the
International Contact Group on Liberia were requested to
provide advisory staff, equipment,
logistics and experienced trainers.
The restructuring process was originally intended to start in
early 2005. The United States
who did the initial assessment of the new army, recommended
that the new army be 6,000
14
Seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the UN
mission in Liberia, UN Doc.
S/2005/391, 16 June 2005, Para 59.
15
Article VII, Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

34/003/2005
strong, and be selected after vetting of former soldiers and rebel
fighters. However, support
from the US government was dependent on the Liberian
government’s capacity to pay
salaries and other costs in the long term, and the number of
proposed troops was subsequently
reduced to 2,000.
Funding shortfalls continue to contribute to delays in the
restructuring. The peace
agreement did not provide for the demobilization and payment
of pensions to former
members of the transitional government’s armed forces, and the
government is having
difficulty in providing all the funding. It has been agreed that
the restructuring cannot start
until full demobilization has taken place. The restructuring is
scheduled to take two years in
its entirety, and will be overseen by the US Department of
Defense and carried out by private

training companies, Dyn Corps International and Pacific
Architects and Engineers. These
companies will be under contract to the US government and
therefore bound by US laws.
Police
Under the peace agreement, UNMIL assists the transitional
government in monitoring and
restructuring the police in a way that is consistent with
democratic policing; developing a
civilian police training programme; and assisting in police
training in cooperation with
ECOWAS, international organizations and interested states.
16
The deployment of an interim
police force, composed of former police officers, began in late
2003. However, it has been
unable to function effectively because of shortages of basic
equipment such as vehicles,
handcuffs and firearms. The International Police Service has
been providing support on
routine arrests, and UN Formed Police Units are rapid response
units which are equipped with
vehicles and firearms to provide backup in cases of large-scale

violence or rioting.
The training of new police officers began in 2004 at the police
academy. At the time of
Amnesty International’s visit to Liberia in May 2005, many of
the new recruits had completed
their theoretical training and were doing practical field work.
The strategy, supported by the
International Police Service, is for newly trained recruits to
form the new service and for the
interim police eventually to become redundant. Members of the
interim force can apply to go
through the vetting, recruitment and training process to join the
new service.
By May 2005 the police should have been fully deployed
throughout the country. However,
human rights groups reported that in some rural areas,
especially in the southeast, there was
no police presence at all. In Bong, Margibi, Montserrado and
Grand Bassa counties, Amnesty
International saw interim and new police officers still working
side by side. Visible tensions
between officers were attributed by observers to differences
over old and new ways of
operating.

The selection and the vetting of police recruits is being carried
out by the International
Police Service in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice and
with support from the UNMIL
Human Rights and Protection Section. The initial part of the
screening process is the
submission of names to the Ministry of Justice to determine if
there is any record of criminal
activity or internal disciplinary concerns. Secondly, checks are
made with the Special Court
16
Article VIII, Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
AFR34/003/2005
for Sierra Leone and others in the international community to
find out if there have been any
charges or accusations of war crimes or human rights violations.
Lastly, the Liberian public is

solicited for their input on each candidate, although many civil
society organizations seem
unaware of this opportunity of involvement in the vetting
process.
17
The justice system
UNMIL’s mandate includes assisting the transitional
government to develop, in cooperation
with judicial institutions, a strategy for consolidating a national
legal framework. The
objective is to develop and implement pragmatic solutions for
the problems and challenges
facing Liberia’s justice system – including re-establishment of
the Law School – with the
overall aim of restoring the rule of law. The Legal and Judicial
Division of UNMIL, present
since early 2004, has made assessments of the system, as have
other UN agencies, the US
Department of Justice, and international non governmental
organizations such as the Open
Society Justice Initiative. Despite the many assessments
undertaken so far only the Legal and
Judicial Division has provided support through technical
expertise.

The assessments highlight the lack of sufficiently qualified
personnel and a low level of
professionalism, resources and incentives for judges,
prosecutors, lawyers and others in the
judicial system. There has been little oversight of their work in
the past, contributing
substantially to the lack of capacity in this sector. Few people
in Liberia have access to the
justice system. Prisons and police detention facilities are
overcrowded, and most of the
inmates are detained without charge or trial. Hardly any
detainees and defendants can afford
lawyers, and there are not enough lawyers to provide free legal
counsel in such cases.
During her visit in July 2005, the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights stressed the
importance of an independent and professional judiciary, and
said the dysfunctional judicial
system was having a severe impact on the creation of a human
rights environment in Liberia.
In May 2005, local observers were concerned at the slow
progress in addressing the lack of
qualified personnel and that recruitment, vetting and training of
judicial personnel was not

taking place. On the 28 June the transitional government
commissioned eleven circuit court
judges and six specialized court judges. The judges will serve in
criminal and specialized
courts in Montserrado County and in circuit and specialized
courts in eight other counties.
Prior to the commissioning of these judges there had only been
11 circuit court judges in the
country yet there had been 21 posts to fill. At least 7 of them
had been of retirement age or in
17
According to the policy of the International Police Service
Commissioner, “The Public Contract
Office will be established to allow for any member of the public
to make written complaints or
objections on any person who is published in the local
newspaper as a potential candidate for the LNP
[Liberian National Police]. The PCO will forward any such
complaints or objections to the Vetting
Unit. If any complaints or objections are found such a candidate
will be disqualified immediately.”
UNMIL CIVPOL IPS Commissioner’s Policy, 2004
Registration, Vetting, Authorization and

Deactivation of officers with police powers in Liberia –
assessing eligibility, conduct and capacity of
individual officers in security agencies or security units in
Liberia. [July 2004]
34/003/2005
poor health.
18
Funding has been promised by the US Department of State,
although it is
unclear when it will be available.
Prisons
Prison conditions were severely affected by the war. Until the
end of 2004, the only
functioning prison was in Monrovia. Quick impact projects,
with funds made available by
UNMIL, have since rehabilitated more prisons. Overall,
however, all of the prisons are
categorized as uninhabitable, failing to meet UN standards such
as the Standard Minimum

Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the Basic Principles for
the Treatment of Prisoners, and
the Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their
Liberty.
So far 28 corrections officers have gone through a vetting and
training process, and have
been deployed throughout the country. The UN corrections team
is working with national
corrections officers to provide strategic advisory support. It
cooperates with the International
Committee of the Red Cross, the World Food Programme and
other partners to ensure
prisoners are provided with meals, blankets and mattresses. It
provides training of corrections
officers with the International Police Service, but independent
funding is still needed to
provide the infrastructure and resources that will enable staff to
work effectively.
Impunity persists
The impunity enjoyed by both the perpetrators of serious human
rights abuses during the war
and by those instigating large-scale acts of violence threatens
peace and human rights.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is a non-judicial

mechanism to address impunity
for past crimes. However, there has been little progress in
creating an adequate mechanism for
prosecution before the domestic courts of war crimes and crimes
against humanity. One of the
biggest challenges of the post-election period will be to find the
most appropriate mechanism
to bring those responsible to justice.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The peace agreement provided for the establishment of a Truth
and Reconciliation
Commission to “promote national peace, security, unity and
reconciliation”
19
The Commission is mandated to investigate gross human rights
violations, violations of
international humanitarian law and human rights abuses that
occurred between January 1979
and 14 October 2003. The violations that come under the
mandate of the Commission include,
but are not limited to, massacres, sexual violations, murder,
extrajudicial killings and
“economic crimes, such as the exploitation of natural or public

resources to perpetuate armed
conflict”.
20
18
|UN Press release: Rule of law extended in Liberia through the
Commissioning of 17 New Judges 05
July 2005
19
Article XIII, Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
20
Ibid
AFR34/003/2005
On 12 May 2005 the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act
was passed by the
transitional legislative assembly, after a long process of
consultation with civil society
organized by the UNMIL Human Rights and Protection Section,

the UNDP and the
Transitional Justice Working Group, a coalition of national non
governmental organizations
in Liberia. Under the Act, the Commission will be composed of
nine commissioners,
including at least four women, appointed by the Liberian head
of state. The Act provides for
commissioners already appointed by the transitional government
to be vetted by a selection
panel of seven national and international members (Sections 9
and 11). Vetting will be
conducted by a “process of public scrutiny based on individual
nominations and other
petitions from the general public, institutions, and
organisations”. If, as a result of this process,
any of the appointed commissioners are not confirmed in their
role, the selection panel will
shortlist 15 new vetted candidates from nominations by
remaining Commission members, to
be appointed by the head of state. After appointment, the
commissioners will be subject to
confirmation hearings before the legislative assembly.
Consultative meetings with members of civil society in Gbarnga
and Monrovia revealed

high levels of support for the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. The fear that perpetuates
a culture of silence remained a real impediment in addressing
impunity. One human rights
worker said “Everyone is afraid all the time – so we just keep
out mouth shut”, and this
sentiment was often repeated. Although people are interested in
justice in the long term and
recognize the importance of breaking the cycle of impunity,
many felt strongly that it would
take some time. They saw the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission as a first step towards
criminal prosecutions at a later date, when the country was more
settled.
No sign of war crime prosecutions
There has been little public discussion about addressing past
war crimes and crimes against
humanity. The national judicial system is unlikely to be
equipped to address international
crimes in the near future. Progress is further hampered because
many of the people suspected
of responsibility for human rights abuses are ministers in the
government or members of the

legislative assembly. The continued presence of these
individuals in powerful positions
contributes to a culture of silence and hinders the fight against
impunity.
The vetting process, to prevent those responsible for human
rights abuses from entering the
police, armed forces or prisons services, involves the provision
of information about suspect
individuals being passed to the major crimes unit of the
Liberian police. This unit was
established with the support of the International Police Service.
However, it is unclear how
the information on suspects passed to the police will be used in
the future.
Civil society groups told the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights in July 2005 that
Liberians expect a mechanism to be created to prosecute those
responsible for war crimes and
crimes against humanity during the war. This will need to be
addressed in the post-election
period if Liberia is to be successful in fighting impunity and
encouraging respect for the rule
of law.

34/003/2005
Pressure to bring Charles Taylor to trial
By 11 August 2005, former Liberian head of state Charles
Taylor had reached the second
anniversary of his asylum in Nigeria. Despite a 17-count
indictment for war crimes and
crimes against humanity before the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, he continues to be
sheltered from prosecution by the Nigerian government.
Nigeria has come under pressure from African civil society
organizations and governments,
the UN, the US Congress and the European Parliament to
surrender Charles Taylor to the
Special Court for Sierra Leone. On 30 June 2005, 300 civil
society organizations from
thirteen countries across Africa joined with international human
rights organizations in a
coalition – the Campaign against Impunity – to urge the African
Union to take the lead in
ensuring that Charles Taylor faces prosecution. In response,

Nigerian President Olusegun
Obasanjo, currently Chair of the African Union, reiterated that
he would not turn over Charles
Taylor to the Court but said that the matter would be brought
before the African Union and
ECOWAS.
Further pressure came from West African countries on 3 July
2005, when the Liberian
Minister of Justice, Kabineh Ja’neh, demanded that Nigeria
provide a copy of the agreement
under which Charles Taylor was allowed to leave Liberia and
seek asylum in Nigeria. On 28
July, the leadership of the Mano River Union countries (Guinea,
Liberia and Sierra Leone)
signed a communiqué in Freetown, Sierra Leone, stating that
some of Charles Taylor’s
activities in Nigeria were in breach of the terms of his asylum.
In February 2005 the European Parliament unanimously adopted
a resolution urging
Nigeria to hand Charles Taylor over to the Special Court. In
May 2005 the US Congress, in a
resolution introduced and adopted by the House of
Representatives and later endorsed by the

Senate, made the same appeal. The UN High Commissioner for
Human Right, while visiting
several West African countries in July 2005, publicly stated that
Charles Taylor should be
surrendered to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. However, the
UN Security Council failed
to agree a resolution on 24 May 2005 to compel Nigeria to take
this action.
AFR34/003/2005
Recommendations to election candidates
Amnesty International urges all candidates of all political
parties taking part in the October
2005 elections to make public commitments to:
Be an advocate for human rights
protect and fulfil the
political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights for all in
Liberia

development of a human rights
culture in Liberia
and funding of the
Commission so that it can
vigorously pursue human rights concerns, including ethnic
discrimination, and
facilitate bringing Liberian law in line with international human
rights law. In
particular, press for the UNMIL Human Rights and Protection
section to provide
technical expertise and training to the Commission
Protect civilians from continuing violence
exploitation by political
leaders in the continuing violence. Support work with the
international community to
ensure that reintegration of former combatants is appropriately
funded
have committed human
rights abuses to be brought to justice
demand a system of

policing and justice that will provide everyone in Liberia with
safety and security
ic
discrimination and intercommunal
violence. Advocate measures by the Independent National
Commission on Human
Rights Commission, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and within
communities to confront inter-ethnic hatred
illegal arm transfers, which violate the
ceasefire agreement and
the UN arms embargo, and to bring to justice those responsible
for them
Encourage the involvement of civil society
in the promotion of
human rights and the rule of law. Invite the electorate to
support you in your role of
monitoring all branches of government to ensure that they fulfil
their duties and act
for the benefit of all in Liberia

34/003/2005
public in debates about the
reform of the security forces and the justice system, to
encourage respect for the rule
of law and public support for effective police and judicial
services
Support the transitional reforms
-going reforms in the security sector
and the administration
of justice, in particular:
he vetting process for police, armed forces and prisons
personnel, and recognize
that institutions which perpetuated conflict or were responsible
for human rights
violations must be transformed to ensure their integrity and the
respect of the
electorate
vetting, recruitment and
human rights training
respects human rights and the
rule of law

vetting process of the
new police service
respect for the rule of law
and public support for effective policing
tion of a professional, independent and credible
judicial system through
rigorous vetting, recruitment and human rights training
facilities are held in conditions
and for periods of time that comply with the human rights
provisions of the Liberian
Constitution.
rights under the Constitution
are fulfilled.
End impunity
for Sierra Leone where he
faces a 17-count indictment for crimes against humanity and
war crimes against the
Sierra Leonean people
society and the
international community on a mechanism to prosecute those
suspected of war crimes

and crimes against humanity in Liberia that guarantees fair
trials and does not resort
to the death penalty
IntroductionAfter the peace agreementIndependent National
Commission on Human RightsIncomplete demobilizationEthnic
tensions manipulatedArmed forcesPoliceThe justice
systemPrisonsImpunity persistsTruth and Reconciliation
CommissionNo sign of war crime prosecutionsPressure to bring
Charles Taylor to trialRecommendations to election candidates
CANVAS CORE CURRICULUM:
2007
S T U D E N T S B O O K
by CANVAS printed and published in Serbia
A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE
2 3
Srdja Popovic, Slobodan Djinovic, Andrej Milivojevic, Hardy
Merriman
and Ivan Marovic
CANVAS Core Curriculum: A Guide to Effective Nonviolent
Struggle

Copyright 2007 by CANVAS. All rights reserved.
Published in Serbia, 2007.
ISBN 978-86-7596-087-4
Publisher: Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies
(CANVAS)
Masarikova 5/ XIII, Belgrade, Serbia, www.canvasopedia.org
Graphic design and illustrations: Ana Djordjevic
Photo on cover: Igor Jeremic
Produced and printed in Serbia by Centre for Applied
Nonviolent Action
and Strategies (CANVAS) in 2007.
Non-profit purpose statement: CANVAS and the authors
confirm that the
purpose of this project is educational and not for profit.
CANVAS Curriculum Introduction
Before you is a wealth of knowledge about the planning,
conduct, and
evaluation of strategic nonviolent conflict. This curriculum
guide will be a
valuable companion to new and experienced activists, as well as
to others
who wish to learn about this subject.
The authors combine classic insights about nonviolent conflict
with new
ideas based on recent experience. The result is a synthesis that
pushes the

limits of what we thought nonviolent strategies were capable of
achieving.
The material covered includes time-tested analyses of power,
different
methods of nonviolent action, and ways to create a strategic
plan for
developing and mobilizing a movement. In addition, the authors
include
new material about how to:
• chart a movement’s history and progress (Chapter 8)
• use marketing, branding, and effective communication
techniques in a
movement (Chapters 9 and 10)
• address the effects of fear on a movement’s members
(Chapter 13)
• develop security measures within a movement (Chapter
14)
• manage a movement’s material resources, human
resources, and time
(Advanced Chapters 2-4)
Throughout these topics, the authors emphasize pragmatic
learning and
draw on their own experience applying these ideas in their own
struggles.
The result is a versatile resource and an excellent training tool.
Activists using this resource will likely want to study and adapt
it in ways that
best serve the specific goals, needs, and opportunities of their
circumstances.
This is entirely appropriate. This impressive text should not be

seen as a
formula for how to wage nonviolent struggle, but rather a set of
ideas that
can help people think about and analyze nonviolent conflict.
Combining it
with other resources on this subject, or adapting parts of it
for one’s own
circumstances, will help to increase people’s capacity
for engaging in
nonviolent resistance even further.
We applaud this curriculum and recommend to all activists that
they explore
and apply it, as best suits their causes, organizations and
campaigns.
4 5
NAME COUNTRY AFFILIATION
Mubarak Awad Palestine Founder, Nonviolence International
Salka Barca Western
Sahara
Western Saharan activist and Outreach
Coordinator for the Sahara Fund
Kevin Clements Australia Professor and Director, Australian
Centre
for Peace and Conflict Studies
Owen Daka Zambia Director, Pacific Regional Governance Pro-
gram and Member of the United Nations

Treaty Bodies State Party, Reports Writing
Committee, Papua New Guinea
Alieu Darboe Gambia Governance Manager, ActionAid Interna-
tional, Gambia
Jargalsaikhan
Enkhsaikhan
Mongolia Director of Blue Banner
Ela Gandhi South
Africa
Founder, Gandhi Development Trust;
Founder, Centre for Nonviolence, Durban
University of Technology; Former mem-
ber, South African Parliament
Fatemeh
Haghighatjoo
Iran Professor and former Iranian legislative
(Majlis) member
Hauwa Ibrahim Nigeria Human rights lawyer, Yale University
Fellow
Rudy Jaafar Lebanon Co-founder of Nahwa al-Muwatiniya (a
political reform NGO in Beirut, Lebanon)
Mkhuseli Jack South
Africa
Businessman and former anti-apartheid
youth leader

NAME COUNTRY AFFILIATION
Douglas A. John-
son
USA Executive Director, Center for Victims of
Torture
Bernard Lafayette USA Civil Rights leader, professor, and
director,
Center for Nonviolence and Peace Stud-
ies, University of Rhode Island
Akanete Ta’ai Lauti Tonga Director, Friendly Islands Human
Rights &
Democracy Movement Inc.
François Marchand France Co-founder and President, Research
Institute on the Nonviolent Resolution of
Conflicts (IRNC)
Doug McAdam USA Professor of Sociology, Stanford Univer-
sity, and author of Freedom Summer
Lorenzo Nava Italy EU Commission Trainer of Youth in co-op-
eration with Eastern Europe and Caucasus
Luisa Ortiz Perez Mexico Founder, NOVA-Mexico (Non
Violence in
Action)
Levan Ramishvili Georgia Founder, Liberty Institute (Georgia)
Kurt Schock USA Associate Professor of Sociology & Global
Affairs, Rutgers University, Newark, and

author of Unarmed Insurrections: People
Power Movements in Nondemocracies
Jenni Williams Zimbabwe Founder, Women of Zimbabwe Arise
(WOZA)
Stephen Zunes USA Professor of Politics, University of San
Francisco and editor of Nonviolent Social
Movements
CANVAS CURRICULUM INTRODUCTION SIGNERS
6 7
I. Theory and its applications: The goal of these
lessons is to provide a concrete framework for people
to understand how nonviolent action works. First, all
movements start with the desire for change, so we offer
a methodology to help groups develop their vision for
what they want to achieve (Lesson 1). We then address
how nonviolent movements can gain the power to
achieve that vision. By emphasizing that political power
comes from people’s ongoing consent and obedience
to their society’s political, economic, and social systems,
it becomes clear that nonviolent movements can gain
power and create change by shifting people’s consent
and obedience patterns (Lesson 2). In order to do this,
nonviolent resisters must understand the roles that key
organizations and institutions (which we call “pillars of
support”) play in their society (Lesson 3), what people’s
motivations are for consent and obedience (Lesson 4),
how nonviolent movements produce change in society
(Lesson 5), and the tactics and methods that nonviolent
movements have at their disposal (Lesson 6).

II. Planning considerations: There is rarely victory
for nonviolent movements without a strategic plan.
Therefore, an understanding of basic strategic principles
(Lesson 7) as well as tools and techniques to analyze
their past and current situation (Lesson 8 and Lesson A1)
is important as movements develop their strategic plans.
An essential part of those plans will be communications.
How do movements effectively communicate what they
stand for? Developing effective messages and analyz-
ing audience segments (Lesson 9) and understanding
the tools and types of targeted communications (Lesson
10) are essential. Targeted communication is one of the
most important parts of any movement’s strategic plan.
III. Organizational and operational considerations:
Nonviolent movements are faced every day with stresses
in the areas of leadership (Lesson 11), fear-management
(Lesson 13), and avoiding contamination (Lesson 14), so
they need to be prepared. They also need to be tactically
innovative and choose issues and actions that put their
opponents in dilemmas (Lesson 12). Finally, management
of key resources (material resources, human resources,
time, and knowledge) are critical to operating a nonvio-
lent movement or campaign. The advanced campaign
management package (Lessons A2, A3, A4, and A5) ad-
dresses these issues.
10 11
I
T H E O R Y
AND ITS
APPLICATION

BASIC COURSE
II
PLANNING
CONSIDERATIONS
BASIC COURSE
128
III
O R G A N I Z AT I O N A L
A N D O P E R AT I O N A L
C O N S I D E R A T I O N S
BASIC COURSE
1. EXPLANATION OF CONTENT
This book is divided into 20 lessons. The content covers three
aspects of strategic non-
violent conflict:
PLANNING
CONSIDERATIONS
I
ADVANCED COURSE
II
ADVANCED COURSE
ORGANIZATIONAL
AND OPERATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS

explanation of content
2. THE BASIC AND ADVANCED COURSES
In order to meet the needs of diverse audiences, the content of
these lessons is divided
into “Basic” and “Advanced” courses.
I. Basic Course (3-5 days):
TARGET GROUP: People who are not deeply familiar with
theoretical and strategic thinking about nonviolent ac-
tion.
CONTENT: 15 lessons. A 5-day course usually will cover all
15, while a 3-day course may cover between 6-9 lessons,
depending on the experience level of the attendees and
the techniques of presentation employed.
II. Advanced Course (3-7 days):
TARGET GROUP: People who have already been exposed
to the basic course, and/or are interested in topics cov-
ered by the advanced course.
CONTENT: 5 time-consuming lessons, which emphasize
planning and organizational considerations, as well as
knowledge transfer processes.
8 9
ADVANCED COURSE:
I PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

A1 • Planning Methodologies: The Strategic Estimate 182
II ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
A2 • Managing a Movement: Material Resources 204
A3 • Managing a Movement: Human Resources 214
A4 • Managing a Movement: Time Management 226
A5 • Managing a Movement:
Transferring Nonviolent Skills and Knowledge 238
ANNEX 1
Methods of Nonviolent Action
250
ANNEX 1I
Overview of 10 Years of Nonviolent Conflict in Serbia
258
GLOSSARY
Of important terms in nonviolent struggle
270
BIBLIOGRAPHY
278
VISUAL RESOURCES
280
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
282

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
284
BASIC COURSE:
INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC NONVIOLENT CONFLICT
I THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION
1 • The First Step: The Vision of Tomorrow 12
2 • Power in Society: Models and Sources of Power 20
3 • Pillars of Support 30
4 • Obedience 44
5 • Activating Nonviolent Power:
Mechanisms of Change in Nonviolent Action 56
6 • Activating Nonviolent Power:
Methods of Nonviolent Action 66
II PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
7 • Strategy and Principles of Nonviolent Struggle 82
8 • Planning Methodologies: The Power Graph 96
9 • Impacting Audiences and Communicating Messages 108
10 • Communication Tools and the Types and Categories of
Targeted Communication
120
III ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
11 • Managing a Movement: Leadership 130
12 • Managing a Movement: Dilemma Actions 142

13 • Fear and Overcoming the Effects of Fear 152
14 • Contaminants to Nonviolent Struggle and Security
Culture 162
15 • Plan Format 174
10 11
I
T H E O R Y
AND ITS
APPLICATION
BASIC COURSE
12 13
The First Step
THE VISION OF
TOMORROW
14 15
THE FIRST STEP:
THE VISION OF TOMORROW
SPO1
THE VISION OF TOMORROW

Analyzing a Government's Financial Condition for Investors

Analyzing a Government's Financial Condition for Investors

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to Analyzing a Government's Financial Condition for Investors

Similar to Analyzing a Government's Financial Condition for Investors (16)

More from adampcarr67227

More from adampcarr67227 (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Analyzing a Government's Financial Condition for Investors