Writing Sample #1 Food Security

K a r e n M i n g s t P a t t e r s o n S c h o o l o f D i p l o m a c y a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m m e r c e
Food Security Implications of Land
Laws and Safety Net Policies in Ethiopia
and Zimbabwe
Curtis Rogers
Fall
14

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Introduction
The importance of food in the relationship between governments and the governed is by no
means novel. Juvenal, a Roman satirist, famously quipped of “bread and circuses” noting the
superficial way in which the people could be won over and made to forget about larger
issues as long as they were entertained and well fed. Food security is often taken for granted
while food insecurity has the ability to topple governments, instigate wars, and create mass
casualties. It is no coincidence that autocrats and democrats alike have been known to
heavily subsidize food in capital cities in order to placate the masses in a modern day
version of “bread and circuses.” The advent of globalization now means that states are
increasingly reliant upon, not only their own policies, but also those of other states, non-state
actors, and international organizations, for the security of their food supply. This reality was
laid bare in the 2008 spike in global food prices, the result of a multitude of factors
including the rising price of oil, droughts in several grain-producing regions of the world,
and the increased use of farmland for the production of biofuels. Governments can no longer
ignore the many facets of food security both within and outside their borders.
This paper will provide a comparative analysis of the ways in which the governments of
Zimbabwe and Ethiopia have addressed issues of food security. The trajectories that these
two states have taken in recent years to arrive at their current status of food security are
diametrically opposed. Zimbabwe has experienced a precipitous decline over the past two
decades following a disastrous policy of land reform and economic missteps. Ethiopia, on
the other hand, was once synonymous with famine, and though by no means food secure,
has made marked improvements as illustrated in its resilience to more recent shocks that
would have crippled it in previous decades. This paper will attempt to address these
trajectories in four sections. The first section will lay the groundwork by first briefly
defining food security and how it is measured within the literature on the topic. Sections two
and three will present the major issues facing Ethiopia’s and Zimbabwe’s current status,
describe the major actors impacting food security, and then review food security efforts in
relation to policies of land tenure and safety net programs. The fourth and final section of
the paper will offer conclusions based on the two country’s efforts and suggest that the

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differing trajectories in food security can be attributed to policies of inclusion, equitable
distribution of land, and what Alex de Waal calls “anti-famine political contracts.”1
Section One: Famine and Food Security Defined and Measured
Though the focus here is on more recent policies in Africa, the problem of food insecurity
and famine is neither new nor Africa-specific. Reasons for famine vary and significant work
has been dedicated to the underlying causes and triggers for famine events. Though it may
be reductionist to list a single reason as the cause of a famine, many people have pointed to
political decisions, natural events, and conflict as specific events that precipitate famines.
Both the Russian famine of the early 1930s and the Chinese famine following “The Great
Leap Forward” of the late 1960s were directly the result of governments that encouraged the
collectivization of farming and heavily emphasized industrialization all while ignoring the
obvious result of these disastrous policies. Ethiopia in the 1980s, Ireland in the 1840s, and
India’s state of Bengal in 1943, all suffered famine in large part because of natural disasters,
drought, crop infestation, and major flooding respectively, crippling the ability to produce
food. Conflict has spurred famine in Russia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Ethiopia among
others by sapping countries of able-bodied farmers, requiring citizens to produce food for
armies only, and blocking important trade routes and partnerships used to deliver staples.
Suggested and implemented responses to famine and food insecurity have been equally
varied and largely into three categories. The first of these can be labeled as the technical
response. Perhaps the most important advance in combatting famine was in what is now
known as “The Green Revolution” in which Norman Borlaug, who would later earn the
Nobel Prize for his work, led the development of high yielding grain seeds, and increased
modernization of agricultural practices and inputs, mainly in Asia. Hazell notes that the
impact of The Green Revolution can be typified in the growth of global yields in English
wheat, which saw an increase from half to two tons per hectare in the 1000 years prior to the
movement, and an increase of seven tons per hectare during the twentieth century alone.2
1 de Waal, Alex 1997
2 Hazell 2009, 1

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The second type of response to famine and food insecurity can be labeled as social transfers.
This category is best seen in the rise of aid, through both official government channels, and
through NGOs as well. The development of the aid regime and NGOs during and in the
wake of World War II has been widely documented and many of these same organizations
and government programs still exist today. The third category of response to food insecurity
is typified in the approach by Amartya Sen and could be termed the increased freedom
response. The increased freedom response is based upon the thought that food insecurity and
famine are reduced when people are given more freedom and the economic, political, and
social structures in their society are liberalized. Because of this these responses are often
focused on land rights, democracy, and market failures. Both Zimbabwe and Ethiopia have
faced, and continue to face, issues of food security. However, of the two, Ethiopia is the
only one to encounter actual famine, and has done so multiple times at that. Before delving
further into the countries and their response to food insecurity and famine, it is first
important to understand a few general trends in how the international community has viewed
food security, and the ways in which it is typically measured.
In 1996, the World Food Summit produced the Rome Declaration on World Food Security
and the World Food Summit Plan of Action. In the Plan of Action, food security was defined
as a situation in which, “all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to
sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an
active and healthy life.” 3 Prior to 1996, definitions of food security focused almost solely on
the availability of food at a national level, ignoring potential barriers to access. In these
definitions, as long as food was available, a country could not possibly be suffering from
food insecurity. Since then, as illustrated in the Rome Declaration, emphasis has been placed
on individual access to food. In 2001, the FAO’s annual, The State of Food Insecurity In The
World added “social access” to the definition previously put forward by the Rome
Declaration, placing even more emphasis on the importance of access for the individual.4
The shift of focus from availability to access has been widely accepted and even canonized
in the development literature by authors such as Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen, who has
3 FAO 1996
4 FAO 2013

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written extensively about the relationship between food availability, governance, and the
existence of famines. Sen writes, “Starvation is the characteristic of some people not having
enough food to eat. It is not the characteristic of there being not enough food to eat. While
the latter can be a cause of the former, it is but one of many possible causes.”5
While the definition of food security is largely agreed upon, methodologies for measurement
have varied greatly. Hartwig de Haen et al. suggest three main approaches that are most
commonly undertaken by the development community to assess food insecurity. The first is
the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) indicator of undernourishment.6 This
method is utilized at the national level and examines three indicators, the mean calories
available for consumption in a country, the inequality of access to those calories, and the
average minimum amount of calories required by the population. Though this method of
measurement is useful for cross country comparisons, if offers little insight to the actual
quality or dietary makeup of the calories available to a population and so neglects the
importance of food quality specifically mentioned in the 1996 Rome statement.7
Additionally, because the FAO measurement examines averages across populations, it has
little to offer in terms of the evaluation of individual experiences. Alex de Waal illustrates
this in his description of the 1984 famine in the Tigray region of Ethiopia suggesting that,
“As late as early 1984, no nationwide survey could have predicted severe or widespread
famine” and in fact average grain production for the year had been above average.8 In short,
measurements of food security such as this model by the FAO, may offer little in the ways
of evaluating household and individual experiences and the distribution of access to food
across more nuanced groups within populations.
5 Sen 1981, 1
6 It should be mentioned at this point that this is one of several methods the FAO uses to
measure hunger. This method has been adopted by other organizations but has maintained
the FAO name as one of its early innovators. A review of the FAO methods page shows that
household surveys are also used, and that more micro-focused evaluations have been
emphasized in reforms since 2014. http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-fs/en/
7 de Haen et al. 2011, 761
8 de Waal, 1997, 112

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The second method of measurement de Haen describes is the household food consumption
survey. These surveys take various forms but the general notion is that households are asked
to recall expenditures on food over a generally short (seven to thirty day) span. The World
Bank uses such surveys of consumption for various statistical databases on poverty, and
similar methods have been used by Save the Children in Ethiopia9 and are widely used by
the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). While consumption surveys do
provide a more localized evaluation of food security in a region, they still offer little in terms
of the evaluation of the dietary makeup of the food that is consumed. Additionally, the
surveys often, though not always, leave out important figures such as food consumed outside
of the home, food that is not actually purchased but acquired in some other way, and the
distribution of food within the household, specifically the amount the mother and children
receive. Despite the advantages of being able to map food security more efficiently, de Haen
notes that the investment in statistical offices and research required for such surveys is
insufficient in most developing countries and so at the moment household surveys can only
be seen as supplemental to other datasets, as opposed to a stand alone measurement.10 The
use of household surveys are a key feature of Zimbabwe’s Harmonized Social Cash Transfer
(HSCT) program and will be examined in more detail in section three.
The third way in which food security is measured is by individual anthropometric
measurements, commonly used by the World Health Organization (WHO) and NGOs
working on the local level. These measurements most often involve calculating a score
based on height to weight to age ratio and comparing it to a predetermined standard.
Anthropometric measures can prove useful in examining how food is distributed throughout
a household, for example if children are receiving comparable food and nutrition as the
adults in the house are. Anthropometric measurements have mainly focused on childhood
nutrition and have traditionally ignored other age groups. Additionally, anthropometric
measurements may not accurately reflect the prevalence of disease or the changing makeup
of food in which a person may gain weight by eating food with little to no nutritional value.
This method of measuring food security is also extremely labor intensive and involves a
9 White 2005, 94
10 de Haen et al 2011, 764

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large number of data collectors in order to achieve anything close to full coverage in any
country.
All three measurements have their usefulness, though none is sufficient as a stand-alone
method. In reality an accurate depiction of a state’s food security status would involve all
three measurements, with particular emphasis on the latter two in order to gain an accurate
depiction of food distribution and access across a population. This paper will attempt to
address responses to food security issues in both Ethiopia and Zimbabwe while keeping in
mind these methods of measurement, some of which are specifically mentioned in within the
respective policies. There appears to be important parallels in the failures of these methods
of measurement and in policy options themselves, as those that focus only on increased
production or the availability of food as a whole will fail to address more localized issues of
access, and smaller interventions that cannot be scaled up will also lack nationwide impact.
Specifically, evaluations of the responses by Ethiopia and Zimbabwe will address the way in
which all portions of a population, especially women, have access to land, safety net
programs, and other interventions instituted to reduce food insecurity. Additionally,
following de Waal, this paper will attempt to avoid the pitfall of making “solely technical
recommendations” as has been the tendency in the development literature.11 Instead,
responses to food security will be evaluated in the larger political, social, and economic
context.
Section Two: Ethiopia: Background, Actors, and Policies
2.1 Major Issues
Perhaps the most tragic aspect of Ethiopia’s current food security position is that, in
relatively recent history, the country was a major food producer and admired by the rest of
the world. McCann quotes Portuguese Jesuit, Francisco Alvares in the 1520s as saying “It
seems to me in all the world there is not so populous a country, and so abundant in corn, and
herds of innumerable cattle.”12 Over three hundred years later, Henry Salt recounted the
agricultural production of the Ethiopian highlands saying that it was, “so rich in water and
11 de Waal 1997, 54
12 McCann 1995, 3

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pasturage that Europeans could scarcely imagine its beauty.”13 The northern highlands were
noted in many historical accounts as being particularly productive because of lower
temperatures, higher rainfall, and volcanic soil. McCann also attributes the hundreds of
years of high agricultural production the early adoption of the plow in Ethiopia. To this day,
the highlands continue to be the most productive regions in the country, as can be seen by
comparing the maps showing rainfall, food security, and elevation in figures one and two.
However, the historical accounts of food production in Ethiopia are not limited to the
Northern highlands, as the list of historical superlatives in regard to food production is
almost equally long for all regions. Yet as preeminent in agriculture as Ethiopia once was, it
became equally infamous for its lack of food, becoming essentially synonymous with famine
less than two hundred years after the above quote by Salt.
Even with its role as an important regional breadbasket, records of famine in Ethiopia exist
as far back as 250 BC.14 War, environmental degradation, poor governance, and
susceptibility to drought have all been significant causes of food shortages throughout
Ethiopian history. In modern times a famine in the early 1970s is thought to have taken the
lives of between forty and eighty thousand people and was responsible for the eventual
toppling of Emperor Haile Selassie by the Marxist Derg movement.15 In 1975 the Derg, a
council of military leaders, declared that all land in Ethiopia belonged to the state and
redistributed land for use based on the size of families and their ability to cultivate.16
Disastrous economic and agricultural policy by the Derg alongside a drought in the northern
Tigray region of the country, led to yet another devastating famine in the early 1980s. A
period of civil war followed with the eventual removal of the Derg and the formation of a
more market friendly government. Following the Eritrean war of the early 1990s a number
of reforms were made allowing for regional and local variations in land laws, with even
more reforms being instituted in the late 1990s and early 2000s, discussed at length below.
13 Ibid
14 van der Veen et al 2011
15 de Waal 1997, 107
16 Holden et al 2011, 33

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Today, Ethiopia has reduced the rate of undernourishment prevalence to 35% from 74.8% in
1992. While this rate is still certainly too high, the improvement is substantial nonetheless.
Additionally, using the household measure mentioned above, average daily kilocalorie
intake has increased from 2,211 in 1999 to 2,455 across the country.17 Finally, production of
cereals and pulses during the main growing season has nearly doubled since 2004 from
11,330 to 22,401 (measured in 1000 tons).18 Though these indicators are certainly
impressive, and many efforts from the government and foreign donors should be applauded,
Ethiopia remains one of the most food insecure countries in the world, as seen in The
Economist’s Global Food Security Index in which Ethiopia ranks 89th out of 109 countries
studied (Zimbabwe was not among the countries studied). Even considering the progress,
from an admittedly low base, several major obstacles remain. The following represents what
are thought to be the most significant of these obstacles.
One of the most pressing issues challenging Ethiopia’s food security is demographics. The
CIA World Factbook estimates that the current population of Ethiopia is 96,633,458, making
it the fourteenth most populous country in the world, and the most populous landlocked
country on earth. The difficulties of feeding such a large population are further compounded
by the intractable poverty that most of the country experiences. According to the World
Bank, GNI per capita in Ethiopia was 470 USD in 2013, which is desperately low yet
markedly better than the 2004 figure of 130 USD. The massive population of Ethiopia, and
the continued growth rate of almost three percent annually, underlays and exacerbates many
of the other issues mentioned below, leaving the country more vulnerable than most to
various types of shocks including price hikes, drought, and conflict. Figure two shows a
comparison of population density and food security across the country. Two realities are
quickly apparent from this figure. First, food insecurity is an issue in areas of the densest
population. Second, however, is the fact that the most severe cases of food insecurity are in
areas with the lowest population densities in the country. This suggests that while population
is certainly a factor, there are other variables at play, otherwise one would expect low
population areas to be more food secure. Comparing rainfall, shown in figure one, with areas
17 WFP CFSV 2014
18 FAOSTAT Suite of Food Security Indicators

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suffering from food insecurity in figure two, shows that drought is partially responsible for
this difference.
Climate change will continue to have a major impact on the ability of Ethiopia to achieve a
more food secure future. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) estimates
that agriculture makes up 41% of Ethiopia’s GDP, and 80% of exports (mainly coffee and
livestock), as well as 80% of the labor force.19 Additionally, Van der Veen suggests that the
majority of Ethiopian agriculture is overly reliant upon rain, lacking any significant form of
irrigation. The increasing risk of both drought and flooding in the area means that
agriculture, the most important means of feeding and producing an income for the populace,
is facing significant risk. The relationship between climate change and food security has
already shown to be true as the many of the areas of the country that are facing food security
crises are also the same regions most prone to drought. A report from the Famine Early
Warning System Network (FEWSNET) in association with the US Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the US Geological Survey (USGS) suggests that between the
years 1970 and 2000 rainfall decreased by fifteen to twenty percent across some regions of
southern Ethiopia. The report also claims that rising temperatures could soon make growing
coffee impossible in some regions and could eventually have major implications for food
producing crops in highly productive areas as well.20 Keeping in mind the shift in defining
food security mentioned above, from availability to access, it is important to give near equal
value to the potential loss of non-food crops such as coffee, cotton, and livestock for the
purpose of leather, because of their income generating capacity and thus the ability to
purchase food that the income from such crops provides.
Conflicts, both inside and outside Ethiopia have caused significant distortions in food
production and food security. Recounting all of Ethiopia’s conflicts and their impacts upon
food security merits an entire paper of its own, yet several themes can be drawn from the
history of conflict in the country and wider region. First, conflict has caused major
disruptions in the production of food and agriculture as a whole. White notes that the 1998-
19 You 2011, 1
20 FEWSNET 2012

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2000 iteration of the Ethiopian Eritrean war began at a period in which Ethiopia was
beginning to experience a severe downturn in agricultural production after nearly a decade
of record harvests. The war started shortly after planting season, and since many of the
farmers in the path of the conflict were forced to flee, crops were left untended and wasted,
resulting in “true famine conditions” in some areas of the country by the year 2000.21 The
second major implication for food security as a result of conflict can be seen in the
migration of people. Ethiopia’s civil conflicts as well as external conflicts with Eritrea and
Somalia have resulted in population buildups in some areas while others experience flight.
Additionally, Ethiopia’s location in what Collier calls a “bad neighborhood” has resulted in
refugees from South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea taking up residence in Ethiopia.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) counts over 500,000
refugees currently living in Ethiopia, a number that has varied greatly over the last decades
as conflict has come and gone. While these numbers of refugees are small in comparison to
total population, their location, in already food insecure areas, and environmental
degradation in highly concentrated groups have both been concerns of the UNHCR and
other groups. Furthermore, when comparing the location of refugee camps, denoted by red
triangles in figure three, to the areas of low rainfall and food insecurity in figures one and
two, it quickly becomes apparent that Ethiopia’s border regions are among the least
inhabited, most food insecure, and conflict prone parts of the country.
While all of the above issues have significant impact on Ethiopian food security, it does not
appear that any single one of them alone can be labeled as solely responsible for nationwide
food insecurity. Rather the confluence of several, and in some cases all, of the events in
roughly the eastern half of the country have caused food insecurity and have been
responsible for many of the famines that have taken place throughout Ethiopia’s history.
This seems to give credence to the “availability” approach to food security mentioned
above. While the Western half of the country is fertile, wetter, and more isolated from
conflict making agriculture more productive, the surrounding regions could suffer from
famine, as de Waal notes was the case in the 1980s in Tigray. Additionally, the above
factors are by no means an exhaustive list of the causes of food insecurity in Ethiopia. As
21 White 2005, 96-97

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will be seen below, a number of actors and government policies concerning land and social
safety nets also play an important role.
2.2 Actors
A state’s ability to achieve food security is not merely a domestic issue. Trade, diplomacy,
conflict, and foreign aid all play important roles in any state’s capacity to provide an
adequate food supply for its citizens. The advent of what many have termed “hyper-
globalization” has resulted the rise of influence of NGOs, multinational corporations
(MNCs) and other non-state actors within the food security arena. Major donor countries
and IGOs also continue to play large roles in the food security of Ethiopia and other
developing countries. A brief overview of the actors most relevant to Ethiopia is found
below.
Foreign Donors and IGOs
Ethiopia has been a long time recipient of foreign aid. However, the amount of aid that the
country has received has risen exponentially over the past decade. The amounts are
staggering, with Ethiopia the third largest recipient of British Official Development
Assistance (ODA) according to The Department for International Development (DFID) at
over 522 million US Dollars (USD) in 2013.22 Ethiopia ranked fourth among American aid
recipients with 733 million USD in ODA in fiscal year 2012.23 According to Global
Humanitarian Assistance, Ethiopia received nearly 5.5 billion dollars in ODA between 2000
and 2010 from countries within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). The multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, along with the United Nations, have also allocated significant
resources to Ethiopia as have a number of large NGOs. Entire papers could be devoted
simply to recounting all of the states, non-state actors and other organizations and the
amounts that they have given, but suffice it to say that the result of being what many articles
have referred to as “the darling of the development community” has resulted in massive
amounts of aid flowing into the country.
22 DFID 2014, 5
23 USAID 2012

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Ethiopia is not only a recipient of large amounts of ODA, but it is also among the top
recipients of food aid in the world. The two most significant actors in the food aid regime in
Ethiopia are the United States, and the World Food Programme (WFP) with the former
making up 44% of the latter’s contributions.24 Since the 1960s, the major trend in food aid
donations has been the shifting away from project and program food aid and towards that of
emergency aid. Project food aid is that which is specifically earmarked for projects such as
school lunches, child nutrition, and food for work programs. Program food aid, is food given
towards the goals of general development in a country and is least common both in Ethiopia
and in the world. Emergency food aid, as the name suggests, is given in times of great need
such as natural disasters, humanitarian crises, and economic downturns. It is this emergency
food aid that has proven critical in Ethiopia’s ability to weather some of the most recent
shocks that have come in the form of drought and food price hikes.
Emergency food aid is by far the most common type of food aid flow and made up 76% of
all food aid to Ethiopia in 2009.25 The WFP reports that in 2014, 2.7 million people in
Ethiopia will require food aid because of severe drought and short-term shocks alone, stats
that reflect the fine line the country walks in its food supply balance. Additionally, the WFP
plans to supply food and other services to nearly 6.5 million people in 2014 as well as an
additional 550,000 refugees from South Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia. Making up over 16% of
all WFP food aid in 2012, Ethiopia was the top recipient of WFP emergency food aid, with
677,000 metric tons, and the second largest recipient of project food aid, with 136,000
metric tons. 26 Similar trends can be found in US food aid policy, which isn’t surprising, as
much of US food aid is channeled through the WFP, and Ethiopia receives both more US
Emergency food aid, 177,580 metric tons, and project aid, 97,170 metric tons, than any
other country in the world.27 Additionally, USAID specifically mentions Ethiopia’s
Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), which will be discussed further below, as a target
for food aid. A focus of the USAID strategy for food aid to Ethiopia’s PSNP is to decrease
24 WFP Food Aid flows 2012
25 Clapp 2012, 31
26 WFP Food Aid Flows 2012
27 USAID Food Assistance Fact Sheet

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the rate at which households sell off assets during times of food crisis, which is also a goal
of the PSNP as a whole.28
China
Since the mid 1990s, China has become a major economic and diplomatic partner of
Ethiopia. Though the West may dismiss Chinese investment as simply white elephants, seen
in the likes of the decadent glass tower of the African Union (AU) offices in Addis Ababa,
in actuality there are legitimate economic ties between the two states. The rising cost of
Chinese labor and the availability of raw materials, particularly leather goods, have resulted
in an increase of Chinese FDI in Ethiopia of 250% between 2012 and 2013.29 Similarly,
trade between the nations has increased exponentially with bilateral trade increasing from
100 million USD in 2002, to 1.467 billion USD in 2009.30 Additionally, the Ethiopian
decision to ban the export of unfinished skins has resulted in many foreign companies,
particularly Chinese shoe and clothing manufacturers, building factories in Ethiopia.31 As in
many other African nations, China has also invested heavily in Ethiopian infrastructure most
notably in rail links to Ethiopia’s main port in Djibouti and the financing of the
infrastructure associated with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.32
China’s investment in Ethiopia has at least three major impacts on Ethiopian food security.
First, though many are low paying, Chinese companies are providing jobs and allowing
many Ethiopians to attain a higher level of economic stability than is provided in subsistence
farming. Second, organizations like The Oakland Institute, a think tank, have detailed at
length the instances in which foreign investment and modernization have resulted in forcing
local people off of the land on which they live and grow crops. The impacts of such land
policies will be discussed below. Lastly, China has participated in the recent trend of foreign
firms purchasing land, not only for industrial firms, but for the purpose of growing food for
export as well.
28 Ibid
29 Hamlin et al 2014
30 Cabestan 2012, 57
31 Ibid
32 Hamlin et al 2014

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Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
The massive size of Ethiopia and its proximity to both the Middle East and Asia have made
it a popular target for MNCs. As mentioned above, China has shown particular interest in
the region, both because of political ties and because of cheap labor and abundant resources.
However, Chinese companies are not the only ones that have invested in Ethiopia and play a
role in the economy and particularly food security. Egyptian, American, Turkish,
Djiboutian, and Indian companies have all made major investments, with India being the
largest, in land. The Oakland institute, a think tank, claims that over 3.6 million hectares of
land have been transferred to investors as of 2011.33 Foreign investment in agricultural land
in Ethiopia is led by India and Saudi Arabia, with China further behind though catching up
rapidly. Between 2006 and 2007, some of the first land deals in Ethiopia, western countries
and Israel were amongst the leading purchasers of land in Ethiopia for the purpose of
biofuels.34 Belgium and the Netherlands have also recently sought land in Ethiopia for the
burgeoning floriculture market.35 Ethiopian food security is not only threatened by the
leasing of agricultural lands to foreign firms, but also by the encroachment of cities and
industrial complexes onto land that was traditionally under tenure of local farmers and the
subsistent farming poor.36
2.3 Policies
Despite the plethora of actors and other influences that impact Ethiopia’s food security, the
majority of the focus must be pointed to the government itself. While both Ethiopia and
Zimbabwe have done much to impact food security both positively and negatively, the
emphasis here will be placed on two issues, land tenure and reform, and social safety net
programs, in Ethiopia known as the Productive Safety Net Program.
Land Tenure Policies
33 Home, 2011, 1
34 Abbink 2011, 517
35 Cabestan 2012, 60
36 Smith 2014

16
Perhaps no other government policy in Ethiopia has historically impacted issues of food
security more than property rights. Property rights have remained in the hands of the
Ethiopian government since the Derg took power in 1974. Thus, for most of Ethiopia’s
citizens, land rights are usufructuary, meaning that they are given the right to use and profit
from production on the land yet not sell it to another person, as it is owned by the state.
However, since then significant reforms have been made toward a more market-based
approach, yet serious flaws remain. Four policy actions have been particularly important and
will be discussed below, resettlement and villagization, redistributions, the decentralization
of land tenure laws, and the land certification efforts of the past two decades.
The initial distribution of land in Ethiopia was based upon family sizes and their ability to
cultivate. This supposed egalitarian distribution of land, and the ideology behind it,
inherently required that at some point redistributions occur in order to maintain parity. In
1976, only a few years after Derg takeover, families with over ten hectares of land had their
land taken in one of the first rounds of government led redistribution.37 Land redistribution
was relatively common from the late 1970s up until the mid 1990s, with some instances
noted as late as 1997 in the region of Amhara.38 The 1995 land reform laws, mentioned
below, gave greater authority in land laws to regional bodies and some, as in the case of the
Tigray region, banned redistribution.39 Several studies have noted that the looming
possibility of further redistribution has been a significant disincentive for farmers to invest
in their property. While the redistributions have been praised for their egalitarian nature,
there are certainly negative consequences as well, and better results have come from the
certification processes of the late 1990s and beyond.
Resettlement and “villagization,” essentially the forced resettling into fabricated
communities, are two more policies dealing with land tenure that have been utilized in the
past in Ethiopia. These two policies have largely been used as a response to drought and
famine, and also in attempts to collectivize farmers in the villagization schemes resulting in
37 Horne 2011, 11
38 Deininger et al 2008, 1789
39 Holden et al 2011, 33

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approximately 13 million people having been resettled by 1989.40 The most recent
resettlement plan commenced in 2003 and was instigated by drought in the northern region
of Tigray and the southern lowlands. The plan called for the resettlement of over 2 million
people, a goal that was halfway achieved by 2008.41 More recently, resettlement has been
the government’s response to increased industrial activity and metropolitan growth, as
several news sources and NGOs have taken up the cause of Ethiopians displaced from their
homes or kicked off of their farmlands by the government. Ethiopian resettlement plans
have always drawn the attention of the international community, as many have questioned
the level to which the moves are indeed voluntary.
In 1995, a new constitution initiated the largest reforms in land tenure since 1975 when land
was nationalized. Article forty of the new constitution guaranteed that the people of Ethiopia
would have rights to the land but also stated that, “Land is a common property of the people
of Ethiopia. Land is a common property of the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of
Ethiopia and shall not be subject to sale or to other means of exchange.”42 The constitution
also stated that the Ethiopian government could remove people from the land that they
occupy, providing only compensation for the move. While the document gave citizens rights
to access the land (for both agriculture and pastoralism) in writing, it did so only under the
umbrella of unquestionable government ownership.
Reforms continued in 1997 when the Rural Land Administration Proclamation of the
Federal Government of Ethiopia gave authority to the regions to enact their own land laws
as long as they did not conflict with the federal laws.43 The region of Tigray was amongst
the first to capitalize on the new liberty to enact laws, passing legislation that land
redistributions would not happen again, and allowed people the right to rent their land for
short periods of time. Tigray also pioneered the movement to provide citizens with land
certificates in 1998 and Holden suggests that nearly 85% of the population in the region
received certificates before the program was stopped during the war with Eritrea (again
40 Adugna 2011, 72
41 Ibid 73
42 Article 40(3)
43 Section two article 5(2)

18
displaying the impact of conflict on food security).44 Since Tigray, several other regions
have also implemented programs of land certification including Amhara (2003) as well as
Oromia and the Southern Regions (2004).45 The process of certification only allows for
usufructuary rights, the ability to use and economically gain from the land, and does not give
explicit rights to private property. Overall, these two laws, and the resulting handoff of at
least some power to the regions to make their own laws, have had significant impacts on
both gender equality and agricultural production in Ethiopia.
The divesting of some authority to the regions has resulted in variations and de-
centralization in the certification process across Ethiopia. However, Deininger et al.46 note
several commonalities between regional processes that clarify the general certification
process. Upon the initial explanation of the certification program communities set up some
form of a Land Use and Administration Committee (LAC). Most committee members serve
between two and three years and by rule include at least one woman. Surveying is usually
done in a period in which agricultural activity is low in order to avoid interference with
more important work. Key stakeholders including the LAC the farmer seeking the
certificate, the neighboring farmers, and a number of possible technical experts travel
together to the plot in order to determine boundaries and register the property. At this stage,
the conclusions of the group are sometimes opened for public debate within the community.
The household then received a temporary registration certificate and is given a permanent
one once official records and the appropriate clerical work has been completed. Records of
land certification are kept, without exception, at the woreda (district) or kebele (roughly a
neighborhood) level.
Evaluation of Land Tenure Policies
Impacts of land tenure policies on food security in Ethiopia have varied because of regional
differences in climate, agriculture, and the policies themselves. Therefore, the majority of
evaluations and academic studies have tended to focus on a specific region, and then
44 Holden 2011, 34
45 Ibid
46 Deininger et al. 2011

19
extrapolate to offer suggestions for the rest of Ethiopia, and in some cases other African
countries in need of land reform policies. However, when considering these studies there are
several points that appear to be near universal and so applicable here.
Under new land tenure and certification laws in Ethiopia women have largely been given
greater rights to land as well as participation in land related processes. Historically, when a
male head of household in Ethiopia died, or deserted the family, the rights to use the land
were given to the oldest brother of the deceased/deserted. Additionally, traditional law
forbids women in Ethiopia to make use of oxen for plowing, which has limited female
agricultural production to agroforestry, and small, subsistence level plots. While women are
still not allowed to plough with oxen, the new, regional land policies have given them
increased claims to land that was traditionally viewed as being held only by men. Deininger
et al, in a study that included around 2,300 households across the four main regions of the
country, found that women had a high level of awareness of the certification process.47
Additionally, this study found that 71% of certificates were given in the name of the male
head of household only. Though this number appears to go against the assertion that the land
certification process was egalitarian, it should be noted that the region of Tigray’s local law
does not allow for the distribution of certificates to females, and that other regions such as
Amhara, boast female certificate rates of up to 58%.48 Similarly, Holden et al, in a study of
400 households concludes that women are more likely to rent out land than men and that the
certification process increases the amount of land that they rent to others. This is most likely
because of a position of increased land tenure security in a situation in which the women are
still not able to use oxen for plowing. Though limited in their ability to work the land, yet
somewhat liberated in their ability to deal with the land after the passing of a male head of
household, women are thus turning to renting parcels and increasing their income.49
Numerous studies suggest that the economic empowerment of women has the greater impact
on household food security, as they are more likely to spend money on food and other
47 Deininger et al 2008,1800
48 Ibid
49 Holden et al. 2011, 39

20
necessities for their children than are males. Thus any effort which improves the land tenure
security of a female will most likely have trickle-down effects for the rest of the family,
particularly children. Specific, regional land laws, as a result of the decentralization of land
policy from the federal government, have allowed for and even mandated the increased
presence and rights of women. Though the laws are by no means completely pro-female,
evidenced in the fact that women are still not allowed to plough with oxen in most areas of
the country and as noted before Tigray still does not allow for the certification of land in a
woman’s name, there have been major efforts to promote the cause of women. Such
attempts to include women are not only important for household food security but they are
also essential to the economic and social development of the country as a whole.
One of the more impressive aspects of Ethiopia’s land tenure policies has been in the lack of
bureaucracy and red tape along with relative efficiency. Most authority in the process of
issuing land certificates is done at the community level, and in the sight of other farmers and
community leaders to reduce corruption. This is not to suggest that the process is without
corrupt practices, but rather that the community based model of land certification and
administration has managed to be reproduced on such a large scale because of the low cost
and regionally diversified administration. Holden specifically mentions hand-written
records, the small amount of paperwork required to issue a certificate, and the presence of
multiple stakeholders during the process, as reasons for the success of the certification
program. Additionally, there is little doubt that the vested interest of farmers and their desire
to increase security of their land tenure rights, plays an important role in the effectiveness of
the program, with multiple surveys implying that many citizens have expressed willingness
to pay for initial certificates and continued upkeep of the system.
An increase in land tenure security, whether perceived or real, has been a direct result of the
issuing of land certificates. In one of multiple studies by Deininger et al, citizens in an area
that received certificates for their land reported a drop in the percentage of those that were
expecting to lose their land to future redistributions.50 The correlation between private
property and a person’s willingness to invest in that property, in this case purchase fertilizer,
50 Deninger et al 2008, 13

21
allow land to lay fallow, and other improvements, has been extensively discussed in the
literature on economic development. Similar trends are also evident in the surveys cited in
this paper, with statistically significant increases in land related investments in multiple
regions of the country. Finally, a large pool of data from varying regions throughout the
country also point to a positive correlation between the presence of land certificates and the
rate at which land is rented. When certificates are given and tenure become more secure, the
person with rights to the land is more likely to rent out sections of what they oversee. This
not only allows for a diversified income but also provides land to people who may otherwise
not have access to it.
The main question in relation to land rights and food security for Ethiopia thus becomes
whether or not the government should further liberalize land markets to allow for private
property. Hernando de Soto and others have argued that private property, which a person
can use as collateral for credit, allows for the awakening of “dead capital” and so such rights
are key in bringing economic development to those in poverty. However, in his book The
Origins of Political Order, Francis Fukuyama suggests that “it is perfectly possible to have
‘good enough’ property rights and contract enforcement that permit economic development
without the existence of a true rule of law in the sense of the law being the final
sovereign.”51 With this in mind, though the land certification process in Ethiopia is
impressive, and one of the largest and best run in Africa, further liberalization may prove
even more beneficial. Since it has become apparent that investment in land and production
increases along with the presence of certificates, there is reason to believe that this trend
would continue if Ethiopian citizens were given land outright. In a country suffering from
environmental degradation and relying almost exclusively upon rain fed agriculture it is not
out of the realm of possibility that such rights would continue to increase investments in
inputs such as fertilizer for degraded land and large-scale irrigation programs for
commercial agriculture.
Ethiopia’s policies of land certification and distribution have widely been hailed as some of
the most successful on the continent and are a contributing factor to Ethiopia as the “darling
51 Fukuyama 2011, 248

22
of the development community.” However, to suggest that the policies are completely
successful is to gloss over significant flaws. One such flaw is the low participation of
women in the LACs and other managing bodies of the program. Though the percentage of
women who received land certificates in their name or jointly with a male in the household
is significant, the percentage of females on LACs in a study by Deininger was only twenty
percent, despite the requirement of some LACs to include at least one woman52 Some may
be quick to champion Ethiopia as a government that promotes the rights of women, yet one
only needs to look as far as the fact that women are still not allowed to use plough animals
in most of the country as a counterargument. It is true that the efforts to include women as
recipients of land certificates is to be praised, but the regional and federal governments need
to increase their commitments by giving women greater rights at home and in the decision
making bodies when land is concerned.
Another reason to reserve judgment of Ethiopia’s certification process is that it is relatively
new. Some have already noted that there have been problems in creating new certificates, or
amending old ones, as needed when a new generation takes over the land. The older the first
round certificates become, the more likely this problem will increase. If there is not an
official process of the passing on of certificates from one generation to the next then there
will be reason to believe that the tenure security by the administration of certificates could
be diminished, as would the previously mentioned efficiency and effectiveness of the local
administrations.
Ethiopian land policy has also been consistently charged with corruption. Main forms of
corruption are seen in three broad levels. First, the government is routinely accused of
offering land as political patronage to supporters, as seen in the allocation of 90,000 hectares
to political partisans in 2009.53 As will be shown below in the case of Zimbabwe, this sort of
patronage is by no means unique to Ethiopia. The second way in which the land process is
seen as corrupt is in the government’s willingness to remove Ethiopians from land in favor
of foreign firms. The government has repeatedly sided with industry over individuals,
52 Deininger et al 2008, 1797
53 Abbink 2011, 518

23
making the country appear pro business and thus attracting FDI, but at the same time losing
favor with a growing number of citizens. The third level in which corruption is seen is
within the LACs themselves. Though this appears to be more rare than the previous two
instances, some have suggested that if a large enough faction is established within a woreda
or kebela, LACs can effectively be commandeered for the purposes of an elite few.
The Productive Safety Net Program
Recently, social safety net programs, particularly cash transfers, have garnered the attention
of development experts around the world as a unique way to help the poor after years of
traditional aid programs have seemingly failed. Ethiopia’s PSNP has been hailed by many as
a success, Guang Chen, World Bank Country Director for Ethiopia, once stated, “Since its
launch nearly a decade ago, the Productive Safety Net Program has made unparalleled
contributions not only to food security and Ethiopia's progress in meeting many of the MDG
goals, but to reversing land degradation.”54
In 2005, after over a decade of addressing annual food shortages and shocks on a case-by-
case basis, the Ethiopian government created the PNSP, “to provide transfers to the food
insecure population in chronically food insecure woredas (districts) in a way that prevents
asset depletion at the household level and creates assets at the community level.”55 More
specifically, the stated goal of the program was to bring five million people into a state of
food security by 2009.56 The PSNP is the largest and most ambitious program under the
government’s Food Security Policy (FSP), which also entails programs for emergency food
relief, voluntary resettlement from drought and famine plagued areas, and a number of much
smaller development interventions. By 2009 the PSNP gave support to nearly 7.6 million
people, reaching an estimated 10%57 of the population with a budget of $360 million
dollars.58
54 The World Bank 2014
55 Federal Government of Ethiopia 2004
56 Bishop et al 2010, 182
57 This percentage can differ based on population estimates.
58 Wisemen 2010, 18-19

24
The cornerstone of the PSNP is a system of predictable and consistent cash transfers to
households in over 300 woredas (number of woredas varies by year) spread, deemed to be
chronically food insecure. A household is categorized as chronically food insecure by
evaluation taken by a group of woreda leaders ostensibly familiar with the area and in
conversation with the community as a whole. Households are considered to be chronically
food insecure by the following criteria:59
 Having faced continuous food shortages of three months or more within the last three
years and have received food assistance in the past
 Increased vulnerability as a result of a severe loss of assets
 Lacking the support of family or other means of social protection
It should also be noted that the PSNP does not deal with emergency food aid or emergency
cash transfers, as the Ethiopian government has kept the program specifically for
development, and emergency relief is filtered through another government agency. As a
means of transparency, decisions about which households qualify for the program are
publicly posted for the community to see for at least a week.60 Participants in the program
fall into two further categories. Those unable to work, nursing mothers, the disabled, elderly
etc., are given direct cash transfers. Those capable of working are included in a food for
work program in which they are paid in either food or cash depending on the region, the
latter having increased over the years as food prices have also increased dramatically.61
Transfers of both food and cash are given once a month for six months, most often counter
cyclically with the harvest season of important staples, when food prices are often high.
Again, a focal point of the program is to reduce occurrences of households selling off assets
during periods of food insecurity, which explains the timing of PSNP payouts. By reducing
the number of assets a household has to sell, the PSNP aims to build wealth while also
increasing consumption. Transfers of food and cash are the same regardless if a person
59 Ibid 22
60 Bishop et al 2010 190
61 Hoddinott et al. 2012, 766

25
receives the direct support because of being unable to work, or if they participate in the work
program. Payments follow a scale of the prevailing wage and in 2009 food transfers were at
a rate of three kilograms of cereal per day. Both food and cash transfers take place in woreda
level offices, with cash normally distributed by local officials and food through NGOs and
the WFP.62
Oversight of cash transfers and food distribution within the PSNP has been achieved with
the direct management of the government with major support and technical assistance from
the WFP and NGOs. NGO and WFP involvement also tends to vary by woreda, as some
allow for the groups to administer the programs entirely on their own, while other woredas
choose to work hand in hand with them. The Ethiopian government has managed to
consolidate the PSNP into a relatively light bureaucratic process. The PSNP is governed by
a single document and falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development (MOARD) with the Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector
(DRMFSS) managing the logistical efforts on a lower level. When possible, the government
relies on NGOs and international organizations with expertise in distributing food aid, such
as the WFP to deliver the required goods and services in a timely manner. Kebede notes that
six NGOs were active in transfers in the early 2000s, Save the Children, World Vision, the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church, CARE, Feed the Hungry International, and the Relief Society
of Tigray.63 The combination of government control, local input from the woredas, and
reliance upon NGOs with certain expertise has most certainly made the PSNP more efficient
and inclusive, though criticisms are not absent and will be addressed in the analysis section
below.
Evaluation of the PSNP
Unsurprisingly, the amount of international aid directed to Ethiopia has resulted in a large
number of impact evaluations and econometric studies undertaken to measure the results of
the PSNP. A third party evaluation commissioned by The World Bank found that in 2009
households participating in the PSNP impacted by drought experienced a 30% higher calorie
62 Wiseman 2010, 24
63 Kebede 2006, 581

26
acquisition growth than those not in the PSNP.64 Additionally, the World Bank claims that
regular and predictable transfers through the PSNP also had a significant correlation with the
increase of caloric intake of 17% and a decrease in the amount of livestock sold as an
emergency response to supplement income. Positive impacts were not only seen in
household consumption levels but also in economic activities as a whole, with those who
participate in the PSNP and programs of agricultural support also provided by the
government being more likely to achieve food security, take out loans for productive
enterprise, to invest in agricultural technologies, and to engage in non-farm based economic
activities.65 A report from Debela et al. uses survey data of anthropometric measurement,
mentioned in the first section, between 2006 and 2010 in Northern Ethiopia and show that
the PSNP has a positive impact on “short-term nutritional benefits for children, especially in
those households that are able to leverage underemployed female labor.”66 Other positive
impacts of the PSNP mentioned in the literature are an increase in the number of livestock
holdings, growth of assets, increased access to funds for emergency situations, and
somewhat mixed results on increased crop yields. The significance of these impacts have
varied across woredas and household composition and have also varied depending on
whether beneficiaries were part of the direct transfer program or the public works program.
These positive impacts are amplified by the efficient and unified administration of the
PSNP. International donors comprise almost the entirety of the funding for the PSNP, a
problem discussed below, but all funds are channeled through the same program spread out
over two government ministries.67 Additionally, as seen from the explanation of the PSNP
above, regional governments and local groups play important roles in the administration of
the PSNP and in the distribution of its aid. The PSNP is a bureaucracy light endeavor,
especially in comparison to some of the equivalent programs across the continent. The
PSNP is implemented under the larger framework of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
along with a number of other programs, yet there is little duplication, few ministries
involved, and is meticulously laid out. Additionally, during the time period of one study
64 Wiseman 2010, 32
65 Monchuk 2013, 108-110
66 Debela 2014, 21
67 Bishop 2010, 189

27
(2005-2009) the PSNP was deemed to be relatively cost efficient compared to similar
programs in Africa, with 20% of funds going to administrative costs, and 80% towards
beneficiaries. While this number is low, especially for a large program, it is considerably
higher than Zimbabwe’s Harmonized Social Cash Transfer program.68
At least three criticisms of the PSNP are worth noting. The first is the program’s reliance
upon international donors for funding. In 2009 the PSNP was nearly one hundred percent
funded by donors, a percentage that is typical of the program thus far, with the
preponderance of both food and funding provided by the WFP, the World Bank, and a host
of national governments69.70 It is interesting that while the international community
continues to praise the PSNP, and for good reason because of efficiency and impact, the
program is completely unsustainable and will require years, if not decades of donor funding
before it could be handed over to the Ethiopian government. In short, it is obvious that
Ethiopia has managed to prove that it has sufficient institutions and state strength to
implement a project with the large scale of the PSNP, along with the land reform policies
and a number of other social programs, and so have been the recipients of a massive amount
of foreign aid. What is left now is for both donors and Ethiopia to prove that there is the
political will and the economic potential to create growth and development in a way that
would allow it to increase the amount of the financial burden of the social programs that it
shoulders.
The second major criticism of the PSNP is that it is not flexible enough when dealing with
remote areas and high food prices. Kebede notes that the PSNP may be of limited impact in
geographically and economically isolated locations. His data suggests that in instances of
isolation, food transfers are more beneficial than cash, though they are not always given
depending on how the household is categorized.71 Though cash transfers are cheaper than
transfers of food, Kebede suggests that the economic infrastructure and access to markets in
68 Wiseman 2010, 32
69 Canada, The United Kingdom, Ireland, the European Commission, The Netherlands,
Sweden, and the US are all among the major donors.
70 Monchuk 2013, 117
71 Kebede 2006, 597

28
a woreda be taken into consideration when designing programs so that the more beneficial
transfer will be administered. Additionally, Kebede and several others note that the PSNP
has had limited success, if any, at bringing down food prices, especially in more isolated
woredas which also negatively impacts cash transfers.
The last main criticism of the program is that the PSNP does not actually help those who
need assistance the most, with funds being redirected towards those in the middle class or
for the purposes of political patronage. This problem of targeting is seen in Uraguchi’s
survey that stated that thirty-six percent of households in Ethiopia said that they were
excluded from the PSNP and that thirty-one percent of households said that politics and
patronage played a role in households chosen to participate in the program.72 Lavers
expands upon this idea by suggesting that both the land certification process and the PSNP
are used by the Ethiopian government to exert control over the population’s ability to
migrate to urban areas, stating that it is unlikely that the PSNP could have enough impact to
create a situation of food security in the country without changes to the current land
ownership scheme.73 Numerous sources have accused the government of withholding
support in the form of aid or land certification in order to “encourage” citizens to relocate to
other areas of country. These practices have brought into question just how voluntary some
of the schemes for resettlement really are. While whether the truly poorest people are
receiving the attention they deserve remains a legitimate question, the fact is that many
people are receiving valuable assistance in a way that has been largely effective.
Section Three: Zimbabwe: Background, Actors, and Policies
3.1 Major Issues
At first glance, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe appear to be completely different, politically,
economically, historically, ethnically, and just about any other measure that one can
imagine. However, upon further study it becomes apparent that Zimbabwe is strikingly
similar to Ethiopia in at least two ways. The first is in the prominent role that land has
played in the economic, political, and social development and decay of the country. In fact
72 Uraguchi 2010, 495 and Moyo 2005, 191-192
73 Lavers 2013, 481

29
land ownership has not only played a prominent role in Zimbabwe, it has been the single
issue that has defined it, even prior to 1980 when independence was recognized. The second
similarity between Zimbabwe and Ethiopia is the enormous underdevelopment and
underutilization of agricultural land and potential. Both countries have enjoyed periods of
unrivaled agricultural production for their regions, both in staples and cash crops. In this
regard Zimbabwe holds the advantage, as one need not delve nearly as far back into the
history of the country to find the days of the agricultural boon, as required for Ethiopia.
Despite the similarities of these two countries, it would be shortsighted to assume that
problems of land and agricultural potential have been manifested in the same way in the two
countries and so further examination of major issues, actors, and policies is required. As was
the case with the major issues listed for Ethiopia, it should be noted here, that these
problems are highly intertwined in their root causes and impacts on each other and so none
can be adequately assessed on its own.
If land is the defining issue of Zimbabwe, it is mainly so because of the country’s experience
of colonialism under the British and the resulting inequalities. Fittingly, the most telling
statistics to relate the level of inequality following the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979
and the election of Robert Mugabe in 1980, are those dealing with land. At independence,
between 4,500 and 6,000 white commercial farmers owned half of all the land in Zimbabwe,
with some estimates as high as two thirds of the best agricultural land. Additionally, nearly
three quarters of the land that was allotted to peasants was located in area vulnerable to
drought.74 Whites dominated all aspects of commerce, government, security, and of course
agriculture up until independence and continued the dominance in many areas until well into
the economic collapse and land invasions of the early 2000s. The concentration of the
agricultural productivity, wealth, and knowledge in such a small group of commercial
farmers, as well as the livelihoods of nearly half a million employees estimated to have once
worked for the farmers, had disastrous impacts on both the economy and food security
following the unrest that began in the year 2000.
74 Mudege 2008, 456

30
Figure four shows the GDP volatility in Zimbabwe since 1993. The most obvious trend in
this data is the precipitous decline in GDP staring in the late 1990s. This decline coincides
with the invasion of commercial farms and the political violence and brain drain that also
occurred during the period. Economic decline is both a cause and s result of food insecurity.
Richardson notes that between 1999 and 2000, nearly five billion USD was lost solely in the
agricultural sector because of the lost capital in privately held land. This loss in value
resulted in the reduction in the value of collateral for loans making the titles that many banks
held worthless, triggering a financial collapse.75 Once the economic downturn commenced
and the banking sector was hit particularly hard, it became more difficult to acquire
agricultural inputs, seeds, and other equipment necessary to produce food on the commercial
level. The resulting lack of agricultural production, particularly in the cash crops of tobacco
and cotton, greatly reduced the amount of foreign exchange in Zimbabwe as the sector made
up 45% of the country’s total reserves76. In 2008 in an attempt to stymy inflation rates that
had reached 231,000,000% Zimbabwe decided to dollarize the economy. The number of
equally grim economic indicators could fill pages, yet what is important to note here is not
only the impact that the collapse had on average Zimbabweans ability to purchase food at
affordable prices, but also the steep decline in production of both staple and cash crops,
which perpetuated the decline.
Like Ethiopia, conflicts both physical and political have also played a role in creating food
insecurity in Zimbabwe, though in an admittedly broader sense. The years 2000 to 2003 saw
some of the most violent conflicts as a group known as the war veterans, discussed below,
forcibly removed white farmers from their lands and intimidated political opposition,
regardless of race, with beating, torture, and executions. Because of this, there were
extended periods of time in which farming was brought to a halt as a result of fear, inability
to leave properties to purchase supplies or undertake everyday business, and the general lack
of necessary supplies. Political conflicts resulted in numerous confrontations between
Mugabe and the Supreme Court and eventually led to a complete lack of the rule of law
within the country. With both the legal system and the police and security forces completely
75 Richardson 2005, 550
76 Ibid, 555

31
in the hands of Mugabe, few farmers thought it wise to invest in property and other
improvements in production because of the tenuous hold on property rights and even
personal security. The drop in GDP shown in figure four once again shows how steep this
decline was as a result of the economic and political decay in the country, as well as the
lasting impact that it has had, with only negligible gains having been made in the past five
years. Conflict and economic decline have not only evidenced themselves in statistics on
production and investment but also in a tremendous exodus of the educated and highly
skilled of all races. Once again, agriculture suffered inordinately as commercial farmers left
the country by the thousands, taking with them specialized knowledge of large-scale farming
and the technology that it requires.
Environmental degradation has also been both a result and a cause of reduced food
production and food security. Before the land invasions, 51% of the population lived on
42% percent of the total land area in the country.77 These lands, which came to be known as
communal lands, suffered greatly from erosion, overuse, and pollution from overcrowding.
Additionally, biologists have long decried the poaching of animals in both the communal
and state-owned lands. Tourism, once a booming industry in Zimbabwe suffered from the
unrest and poaching, particularly in national parks and contributed to the greater economic
collapse. Richardson notes that once the land invasions took place that the Mugabe
government essentially traded commercial farming for the tragedy of the commons as
communal farmers, without land titles, had little incentive to improve the condition of the
land through the purchasing of inputs or general care for the soil and production capacity.
The result was a decrease in the ratio of productivity between communally and
commercially farmed land which was 1:3.6 in the 1999-2000 growing season and 1:15 two
years later.78 Additionally, increased vulnerability to drought, especially in the areas of
smallholder farmland has further reduced the agricultural production at the household level.
Andersson, who suggests that droughts were actually the leading cause of the agricultural
collapse as opposed to the land reform, points to the expanding of maize production onto the
marginal communal lands, which were further marginalized during periods of drought. The
77 Boone 2014, 298
78 Richardson 2005, 553-554

32
result was a loss of nearly 60% of the maize production in the country.79 While Andersson’s
points are important, it is equally important to remember that the idea of food security as
access to the markets, and that even if drought had a bigger influence on the drop in
production than the land reform, it was the latter that led to the overall economic collapse
and the destruction of jobs and purchasing power for many citizens. Environmental issues,
including drought, certainly contributed to the reduced food security of Zimbabwe, along
with the other problems mentioned above, but the steep decline in production and economic
performance as seen in figure four seems to be directly correlated to the land reform acts.
Failed government policy and debilitating levels of corruption have also impacted food
security in Zimbabwe. Some of the more notable policies that have negatively impacted
food security include the 2014 banning of food imports of fruits and vegetables, banning of
major food aid NGOs in 2008 under accusations of supporting political opposition groups,
and repeatedly bowing to political pressure with hastily created programs and laws. The
result has been a public sector in complete disrepair, particularly land and agriculture,
discussed at length below, but also manifest in sectors such as health. The economic
collapse of Zimbabwe and the resulting brain drain (see figure ten for migration rates from
2000-2010) has led to the estimated number of doctors per 1,000 people of .06.80
Subsequently, the large proportion (14.7% prevalence rate) of people living with HIV/AIDS
does not receive the healthcare that it requires, cholera outbreaks have occurred throughout
the country, and the average life expectancy currently stands at just over fifty-five years at
birth. A lack of funding for social welfare projects, public utilizes, and services have been
the result of rampant corruption. Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-
Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) party have treated state money as their own and have also
allotted assets and benefits to party members. In their 2014 Corruption Perception Index,
transparency International ranked Zimbabwe 157 out of 175 countries in corruption. This
corruption has fueled policies that have sought to keep prices for staples high, redistribute
land to party cronies as opposed to the rural poor, and reduced the available funds for
important food security interventions. In short government corruption, especially on such a
79 Andersson 2007, 681
80 CIA World Factbook

33
massive scale as is the case in Zimbabwe, diverts funds from all other aspects of the
government, such as healthcare, agricultural policy, and public services resulting in a
diminished workforce and less productivity on farms. The above list of causes for food
insecurity is not exhaustive, but provides a general context for the two policies discussed
below. However, before discussing land and the Harmonized Cash Transfer (HCT) program,
it is important to understand some of the actors involved in relation to food security in
Zimbabwe
3.2 Actors
War Veterans
The term war veteran has both a specific and more general definition in Zimbabwe. In the
strictest use of the term war veterans are members of the Zimbabwe National Liberation
War Veterans’ Association (ZNLWVA) as former members of one of the two Marxist
militias that fought for independence against the Rhodesian government. However, in the
broader use of the term, war veteran is used more generally for what all intents and purposes
is a ZANU PF militia regardless of service in the war. When writing of the first land
invasions by “war veterans” Meredith points out that many of the men in the group were
much too young to have been actual veterans of the war of independence.81 As Mugabe
became increasingly authoritarian and unpopular, the term war veteran continued to be used
in this broad since, most likely in an attempt to win approval by the populace for the actions
that were being taken. Throughout Zimbabwe’s history, war veterans have shown their
ability to mobilize quickly and assert pressure onto both citizens and Mugabe’s government.
When the war veteran pension plan was found looted by corrupt officials, the veterans
protested, sometimes violently, and also threatened to take land from white farmers. Under
pressure, Mugabe decided to reinstate the pension, which the government could not afford in
order to quell the uprising. The result to the economic impasse was that Mugabe instituted a
tax on the entire country in 1997 in order to pay the war veterans what they thought was due
to them. The war veterans have also been used to intimidate political opposition, particularly
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which represents a large portion of white
commercial farmers, the black middle class, and those opposed to Mugabe’s regime in
81 Meredith 2007, 167

34
general. Throughout the years 2000 to 2010, and up to this day, political opponents have
been threatened, beaten and even killed by the war veterans at the behest of the government,
and Zimbabweans have been told that if they vote for the MDC that they will be found out
and punished. Perhaps most importantly for the topic at hand, the war veterans were also the
spearhead of the farm invasions that took place in the early 2000s, once again as political
pressure mounted on Mugabe. War veterans were often rewarded for their loyalty to ZANU
PF with the gift of land, while peasants, especially those without ZANU PF connections,
were left out. The war veterans are undoubtedly a powerful force in Zimbabwean society
both in their ability to impose their will on the government, and also in their role as ZANU
PF enforcers. In fact McGregor suggests that the war veterans have allowed ZANU PF to
penetrate all levels of governance, giving the party a strong grip, even over local elections,
education and land.82
White Commercial Farmers
Like the war veterans, white commercial farmers are both a specific group and
representative of a larger political opposition. Literally, the white commercial farmers were
the roughly 6,000 Zimbabweans who owned the vast majority of the productive agricultural
land, were responsible for the majority of agricultural production, and employed hundreds of
thousands of people, mainly black Zimbabweans. While the white farmers were often the
face of the opposition and the concern of much of the developed world, they were merely
the most visible part of a larger opposition group that included many middle-class and
educated black Zimbabweans, farmers unions, and the political party of the MDC. By 2004
the number of farmers had decreased exponentially and, along with nearly three million
people equaling a quarter of the population, had fled Zimbabwe.83 As this group of people
fled, so did agricultural production and food security. Many of the invaders and resettled
peasants lacked the experience and knowledge, and received no help from the government,
to keep up with the production that the commercial farmers had established in both food
staples and cash crops. One of the more interesting stats that reflects both the lack of
investment in land following the commercial farmers departure and the inability to acquire
82 McGregor 2002, 9
83 Meredith 2007, 233

35
financial services is that prior to 1997 the average number of tractors sold across the country
was 1,600 per year, a number that fell to eight per year in 2002.84 As is the case with
virtually any country, when the largest portion of educated people, both formally and in
agricultural techniques, leave the country or are marginalized politically and economically,
there will be devastating results for the rest of the country.
Foreign Donors and IGOs
Zimbabwe has often found itself as a pariah to foreign donors and international
organizations. The Mugabe regime has run afoul of several governments and has on
occasion tweaked policies in order to continue receiving aid. This has been the case multiple
times as he sought to push illegal land reforms further, only to bring the processes to a halt
in order that much needed international funding continue to flow to his government.
Additionally, the US, EU, UK, and the UN, among others have at various times placed
sanctions upon Zimbabwe, making it illegal to undertake economic transactions with certain
politicians or to funnel aid through the government itself. While the US sanctions have
remained in place since 2001, the EU sanctions were lifted this year and aid is once again
flowing directly to the government after twelve years. With the denial of funds to the
government, multilateral organizations and NGOs have received the bulk of the funding.
Figure five shows the top ten “first-level” recipients of humanitarian aid for Zimbabwe in
2008, demonstrating further that multilaterals and large international NGOs receive the
majority of funding to the country. While these numbers have most likely changed since the
EU lifting of sanctions on funding the government earlier this years, the point is still clear,
most countries (figure six shows Zimbabwe’s top donors and the aid flows by sector
according to the OECD) have historically avoided funding Mugabe’s government directly.
International aid, and its withdrawal, has also played a role in the development of land
reform actions. The UK was among the first to pledge funds (75 million pounds) in order to
help Zimbabwe institute an organized program of land reform, which was more than enough
money to begin to fairly compensate those who lost portions of their property. Other donors
that pledged funds for the initiative included the US, the World Bank, and the European

36
Union.85 With the support of a host of donors, there appeared to be a real possibility that
structured land reform had both the political will and financial backing to actually take
place. However, donors were quickly scared off in the early 1990s as Mugabe began passing
laws and giving more credence to the idea that land may be taken without compensation or
legal consent. Masiiwa notes that Zimbabwe had only received 40% of the promised funds
from the British and that other governments failed to live up to their pledges as well, not
only in the first phase of land reforms but also in 1998 when the governments renewed the
call for funding of a second phase of acquisitions.86 Though donor scrutiny was certainly
warranted of the Mugabe government and its many violations of human rights and the legal
framework of the country, one cannot help but wonder if the proper funding under the
observation of international donors would have allowed for a more peaceful process of land
reform than what was to come only a year later.
Food aid, administered primarily through the WFP, has also been a contentious issue in
Zimbabwe. In the latest data from the WFP, Zimbabwe was not among the largest recipients
in any of the three categories of food aid, emergency, program or project.87 However, with
the recurrent periods of drought mentioned above, Zimbabwe has found itself in need of
large quantities of emergency food aid at several points in recent history. One such period
was during the 2002 food crisis in southern Africa, which encompassed sixteen countries
and had numerous causes. From what has already been discussed it is known that the major
factors causing the food crisis in Zimbabwe during this period were a combination of
conflict, economic decline and decrease in production as result of the land reform efforts, as
well as a drought that took a heavier toll on the marginal, communal lands which were most
utilized for corn production. When the WFP made the call to donor countries for support the
response was large with many donors complying with the specific request of funding as
opposed to in kind food donation in order to address the problem in a more efficient matter.
However, US policies required that donations be made in American grown food, in this case
85 Masiiwa 2005, 218
86 Ibid
87 WFP 2012 Food Aid Flows

37
corn, of which it gave 500,000 tons to the region.88 Donor countries were not made aware of
the fact that the donated food contained GMOs and several countries, including Zimbabwe
refused to take the food. The food became an international incident as heads of state publicly
decried or heralded the use of GMOs. The cause of concern for Zimbabwe and the other
southern African nations was twofold. First, the health impacts of GMO foods were still
relatively unknown and second the potential for GMO corn seeds to destroy the domestic
varieties of corn were very real and government wanted to protect their own crops as much
as possible. Though Mugabe and other African leaders were described as monsters by
western media outlets for rejecting food while their people starved. The African leaders
concerns were most certainly warranted and led to a larger debate within the aid community.
The incident was eventually resolved when African leaders demanded that the corn be
milled before entering their countries in order to prevent any possible contamination to their
own crops. Today, food aid delivery to Zimbabwe has normalized with approximately
twenty five million dollars given in the year 2014 and with the US (12.5 million USD)
multilateral organizations (10.2 million USD) and Switzerland (1.1 million USD) being the
largest donors. The WFP states that its current goals in Zimbabwe are to address emergency
relief needs and to transition people from relying on emergency relief food aid through its
Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation.89
3.3 Policies
Land Reform Policies
There were three main categories of land ownership in Zimbabwe prior to independence.
These divisions were created in 1930 with the Land Apportionment Act after European
settlers, failing to find gold, pushed the black population off of the best lands and declared
them their own. The first was land owned by white commercial farmers, which made up
approximately 40% of all the land in the country. The second type of land was what was
initially called “tribal territories” and later “communal lands.” Communal lands were areas
governed through indirect rule by the British and home to the majority of the population,
accounting for 42% of the total land. In these areas the colonial government approved
88 Clapp 2012, 97
89 WFP Zimbabwe Overview

38
leaders appointed by tribal groups who were then given the authority to distribute and make
decisions on land related issues. The last category was state owned land, which constituted
approximately five percent of the entire land in the county and consisted of parks and game
reserves. 90
In 1965, a group known as the Rhodesian Front, made up of mainly right wing, white
farmers, declared independence from Britain. After a series of sanctions on Rhodesia by the
British and ensuing multiparty negotiations, the white government of Rhodesia was prepared
to accept a deal with the British government that would have made it impossible for the
country to have majority black rule until 2035.91 Black nationalist groups rejected this
agreement and commenced a nearly decade long campaign of guerilla warfare, pitting the
Marxist ZANU and ZAPU militias against the white government of Ian Smith and later
Christopher Soames. As a prominent leader in the ZANU movement, Robert Mugabe often
decried the abuse by whites, especially the possession of the best land, saying that the in the
end all white land must be taken away. The Lancaster Agreements in 1979 ended the
fighting, and paved the way for independence and elections, which would eventually bring
Mugabe to power in 1980. However, much to Mugabe’s disappointment, the agreements
also made white owned land officially private property that could not be taken away without
consent of the seller. In a change of position from his pre-independence days, Mugabe
adopted a conciliatory attitude towards whites, bringing in several to important cabinet
positions and toning down the rhetoric of drastic land invasions and illegal reform. In fact,
Meredith claims that, “no other group received such favorable attention from Mugabe when
he gained power in 1980 as white farmers.”92
By 1990 three million hectares of white owned land (16% of all white land) was purchased
by the new government and given to 52,000 families.93 Though initially, funding was made
available by foreign donors, the program was largely criticized as being too small, falling
well below government targets for number of families resettled, and also for the lack of
90 Boone 2014, 111
91 Meredith 2007, 36
92 Ibid 111
93 Alexander 1994, 335

39
quality land which was acquired from the white farmers. In 1992 pressures from groups like
the war veterans and those confined to living in the overcrowded communal lands, were
amplified by a severe drought. A squatter movement developed in which poor black
Zimbabweans began to invade all types of land. That same year the ZANU PF government
pass the Land Acquisition Act ushering in the most significant reforms to date including:94
 Increased state ability to obtain land even without a willing seller
 Removing the authority over land issues from the Ministry of Lands and Water and
giving it to the Central Committee of the ZANU PF led government
 Altering the constitution to allow for the state to acquire land without compensation
by the year 2000 and the institution of fast track land reform in the same year
 Removing citizen’s rights to appeal land decisions by 2005
These changes prompted the withdrawal of foreign funding from the British and other
international donors and for the majority of the remaining decade, the issue simmered.
In the late 1990s several factors came together to add immense pressure on the Mugabe
government for further land reform. Squatters had become ubiquitous throughout the
country and were calling for land of their own. Additionally, political opposition was taking
form in the creation of the MDC, which had the support of the white farmers, farm unions,
and the majority of city dwellers, regardless of race. Problems within the ZANU PF party
also came to the foreground as war veterans protested in order to receive pensions that they
had been promised at independence, but for which funding no longer existed. Lastly,
increases in food prices, which happened throughout the world, accelerated economic
decline, magnifying the existing problem of inflation. The pressure came to a head with a
vote on a referendum proposed by Mugabe that would allow for increased executive power
and more freedom to take land without compensation. When the opposition movement
successfully defeated the amendment at the polls, thanks in large part to the white farmers,
Mugabe instituted the long discussed “fast track” system of land reform. War veterans
occupied farms by the thousands, and continued their pre-election intimidation of people
94 Boone 2014, 300

40
suspected of being opposition members, including white farmers and their employees.
Following the referendum the parliament, with a ZANU PF majority, passed an amendment
that completely removed the responsibility of the government to pay for land taken for
resettlement.
By 2004, over 90% of white owned land had been taken or given to black Zimbabweans in
one of two resettlement schemes under the fast track program. The first was for the creation
of smallholder plots, ostensibly for the country’s poor, of which 20% was reserved for the
war veterans. The second scheme involved creating larger tracts of land to be used for the
creation of commercial farms to rebuild the agricultural economy.95 In 2001, under pressure
from foreign donors, Mugabe signed the Abuja Agreement, which promised to restore order
and initiate real land reform with the promise of funding. This agreement was quickly
ignored as land acquisitions, and violence spiked around elections, both in 2002 and 2008,
of which Mugabe won both amidst accusations of fraud and intimidation. Electoral
tampering, the refusal to have international observers, judicial restructuring, and continued
violence resulted in European and American sanctions which were amplified in 2008. Once
a power sharing agreement was settled upon, which would ultimately prove short lived,
some sanctions were lifted but by this time the MDC opposition, who’s leader, Morgan
Tsvangirai had become prime minister, accepted the fast track land reforms as a fait
accomplii. Four years later Mugabe abolished the position of prime minister and continued
his one party rule.
Evaluation of Zimbabwe’s Land Reform
There is no doubt that the fast track land reforms contributed to the economic collapse and
rise in food insecurity that Zimbabwe experienced in the first decade of the 21st century.
Figures four and seven show both the decline in GDP and staple food production over the
time period in which the fast rack reforms were implemented. However, evaluating the
specific role of land reforms in the economic collapse of Zimbabwe is actually a bit more
difficult than it may seem. For example, land reform’s share of the agricultural and
economic decline is difficult to delineate from the share of which drought, political violence,
95 Ibid 305

41
or poor governance may claim. Undoubtedly, there is a high degree of multicollinearity
amongst the variables, and all play an important role, but it at least appears that the land
issue is the one underlying aspect behind the decline.
At almost every step in the process, corruption marred what many claim could have been a
well funded, and internationally popular system of land reform. Philemon Matibe, a
prominent black farmer and MDC member who lost everything to the land invasions, aptly
described the land reform process when he stated that, “This is not about correcting a
colonial imbalance…This is about punishing your enemies and rewarding your friends. This
is about staying in power no matter what the damage is to your country or its democracy.”96
Matibe’s comments appear to be accurate as accounts of ZANU PF officials receiving the
choicest farms, sometimes at the expense of political rivals, are numerous and one
investigation suggesting that 40% of all land taken in the reforms went to Mugabe allies.97
The timing of the land reforms, mainly around elections or when significant political
pressure arose, shows that Mugabe used land as a way to intimidate his opponents and offer
patronage to his followers. In fact, when examining the history of post-independence
Zimbabwe, it becomes clear that the land reform policies, with legitimate prospects of
succeeding in the early eighties, quickly devolved into ad hoc responses to crises as they
arose, without any comprehensive policy planning at all.
Additionally, the lack of a proper amount of time for the transfer of knowledge and
sufficient training was a significant shortcoming of the fast track land reform process. With
many of the land recipients being chosen on basis of political linkages and patronage, there
was a large skills gap between the former and current owners of properties, particularly on
large commercial farms, which require significant technical experience to operate.
Additionally, though there was no shortage of sources available for technical assistance in
multilateral organizations, local experts, and foreign donors, the government of Zimbabwe
failed to consult experts on how to conduct the program. Not only did the government
largely ignore international experts, it also did not consult local farmers, government
96 Meredith 2007, 221
97 Smith 2010

42
agricultural specialists, or community and civil society groups.98 Most describe the process
as completely chaotic, without any foresight or implementation plans, most likely because of
the vindictive and patrimonial nature of the system. The fast track land reform program, as
the name suggests was undertaken much too quickly, and with an unrealistic scope and so
implementation and design lacked accordingly.
Throughout the land reform process the Zimbabwean government failed to adequately
support the smallholder farmers in any meaningful way. Most Zimbabweans who were
resettled onto commercial lands were not given any form of documentation or title for their
new land, and instead were forced to renew leases with the government every year.99 Tenure
security in such a situation is weak and provides little incentive for farmers to invest and
improve upon their land, especially in the early years after resettlement. No government
program existed to provide farmers with inputs such as seeds, fertilizer, or technical
assistance. As mentioned above, the inability to use property as collateral triggered a
banking crisis, which furthered the economic decline. Social programs for the newly
resettled were non-existent and the needs of many people were met through food aid from
groups working separately from the government and food imports, both of which rose
throughout the decade (see figure nine for an example of the increase in cereal imports).
Women, who are often relegated to subsistence farming across Africa, were almost
completely ignored in the process of resettlement. Figures for the percentage of households
headed by women that received land range from 6% to 18%, with the latter being in the
beginning stages of reform in the 1980s. These percentages also do not take into account the
women who received land based on party affiliation or some other form of patronage.100
Though the law allows for the protection women from discrimination, in practice their rights
were largely ignored.
More than a decade after the beginning of fast track land reform Zimbabwe has suffered
multiple food crises, including most recently in 2013. Figure eight shows areas of food crisis
98 Meredith 2007, 122
100 Pasura 2010, 451

43
for the year 2013 as well as projections for 2014 (projections which are now considered
inaccurate by some). However, according to the most recent monthly report from the FAO,
Zimbabwe is currently experiencing a 76% decrease in the number of people requiring food
assistance.101 Lower maize prices, both domestically and in South Africa which exports to
Zimbabwe, increased maize production, and favorable rains following a harsh period of
drought in 2013 are all listed as reasons behind this impressive reduction in food assistance.
The report also notes that the Zimbabwean government has increased access to agricultural
inputs for many farmers. Whether this constitutes the beginning of an agricultural
turnaround for the country is still unclear, especially when considering as noted above, that a
large portion of corn is grown in what were once called the communal lands, which are more
susceptible to drought and have experienced significant degradation. There are in fact signs
that some farmers are rapidly increasing their production capabilities, especially on smaller
farms, and some have pointed that land reforms can take years to bear fruit. Increased
productivity could certainly benefit millions of people, but as de Waal points out,
availability of food does not remove the possibility of famine in a society and with the
continuing economic collapse of Zimbabwe it is very possible that access to markets will
continue to be a problem, which is what programs like the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer
are supposed to address.
Zimbabwe’s Harmonized Social Cash Transfer
In 2011, Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Labor and Social Services (MLSS) initiated the HSCT.
The first transfer in the program took place in 2012 and by June 2013 the program covered
32,591 households and 152,016 people over thirteen districts.102 The target for the program
is to reach 250,000 households by 2015 and to cover all sixty-five districts in the country.103
The objective of the HSCT is to provide cash transfers to poor and labor restricted
households in order to raise their consumption level above the food poverty line. The cash
transfer scheme is also expected to improve health and education indicators for vulnerable
children by specifically targeting them within households. To this end, the government of
101 FAO 16 October 2014
102 FAO 2013
103 AIR 2013

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