reflections on British Indian Army recruitment as discussed by family eldersAgha A
reflections on British Indian Army recruitment as discussed by family elders
July 2020
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.21931.26408
Project: MILITARY HISTORY
Agha H Amin
reflections on British Indian Army recruitment as discussed by family eldersAgha A
reflections on British Indian Army recruitment as discussed by family elders
July 2020
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.21931.26408
Project: MILITARY HISTORY
Agha H Amin
sepoy perceptions about military effectiveness of english east india companyAgha A
Sepoy Perceptions about EEIC Military Effectiveness
The Bengal Army was the brain child of Lord Clive's military genius. The Bengal sepoys related to each other by blood relationship and caste bonds had served the EEIC for some 100 years when they rebelled in 1857. These men had a very close contact with the British and had observed them from very close quarters. Any neutral and unbiased account of the events of 1857 clearly proves that the Britisher as an officer was never disliked by the sepoys. As an officer who served in Pakistan Army I can state with conviction that the British provided excellent leadership to the Indians. They definitely knew how to lead and inspire the Indian, leading them from the forefront which I am afraid few of at least our native post 1947. Generals did either in Burma or in 1965 or in 1971. The sepoy admired and revered the British officer. In 1857 he was rebelling against the system instituted by the EEIC. Against policies formulated by men constituting a board of directors in far off England. The greasing of cartridges with pig or cow fat similarly was also an administrative decision. The sepoy perceived the British officer as a fair and brave leader and many British officers reciprocated these feelings. One of the British commanding officer committed suicide when his native infantry regiment was disbanded. Many others resisted disbandment of their units. One troop of 3rd Light Cavalry the most crucial unit of Bengal Army Sepoys as a matter of fact loyally fought for the British in 1857.
Martial races theory and its consequences myths and misconceptions of indo p...Agha A
The theory was based on “Punjab and Frontier” loyalty factor of 1857. Its most serious proponent was Lord Roberts563 the British
C-in-C in India. When I joined the army in 1981 I observed that many of the officers and soldiers serving in Pakistan Army were convinced that the races or castes living in the area between Chenab and Indus Rivers were martial. Some Pathans originating from the NWFP were also regarded as junior partners of these martial races!
A cursory glance at the history of Indo-Pak subcontinent is enough for even a layman to understand that most of the invasions of India took place originating from areas north of Khyber Pass or west of Quetta i.e. Persia etc. The Mughals after 1526 recruited from Hindu Rajputs, Muslim Pathans, Muslim Rajputs, some Muslim Punjabis and Muslim Baloch, but the preference was given to trans-Indus races, mostly Pathans or Persian speaking, or to Hindu Rajputs.
The EEIC since it made its entry from the east had no choice but to recruit from Oudh parts of Bihar North West Provinces Madras Bombay Central India etc. In the earlier part of this work we have seen that using a predominantly Hindu army recruited from the Gangetic plain and led by British officers the pre-1857 Bengal Army defeated all races of India, Pakistan, Nepal, Afghanistan etc. The Bombay Army of Hindu Mahrattas quickly made Persia behave! A couple of Bengal Army Regiments reinforced by an odd European regiment successfully defended Kandahar and Jallalabad against vastly superior forces.
The rebellion of 1857 changed British perceptions and keeping in view the political reliability as well as the administrative convenience factor the British decided to recruit mostly from the north west i.e. Punjab and Frontier provinces of India and the Gurkhas from Nepal. This change started from 1857 but became significant only around 1895.
Even reliability was not the only factor. Because the Madras and Bombay Armies had also stayed loyal. Still based on personal bias felt by Lord Roberts and under his influence by some other British senior officers the recruitment policy was changed. In general following 1857 the British adopted the policy of non-reliance on any particular race and even the Punjabi Muslims and the Pathans who had remained stand were mixed with other castes and religious communities only the Gurkhas were grouped together or certain Muzhbi Sikh Regiments. An experiment of having pure Muslim or pure Hindu Rajput regiments from 1893 but abandoned by 1919, keeping in view the mutinies of 5th Light Infantry and 15 Lancers at Singapore /Mesopotamia.
Myths and misconceptions of indo pak history part 8Agha A
Yet in 1857 the Indians or at least a part of them both Hindus and Muslims combined and made one very desperate yet valiant effort to oust the British. Till this time the Hindus acknowledged the Muslim political supremacy since we see the Bengal Army which was predominantly Hindu, fighting for Muslim sovereigns at Delhi and in Oudh!
But when this great rebellion failed there was the parting of the ways! The Muslims of the post-1857 had no choice but to please the British to avoid Hindu domination!
The Hindu’s problems had completely ended!
All they had to do was to play a waiting game.
They knew that one day the British will have to go and then they, the ones who had been ruled and subjugated by a minority from the 12th century till almost the 18th century would dominate the Indo-Pak sub- continent, just like they were about to do around 1799 and till 1803 when the EEIC challenged the Hindu Mahratta rule!
The Muslim post-1857 problems were more complex, they had to escape Hindu domination and they also had to face the British.
The policy they adopted after 1857 was “Loyalty to the British”.
Brown bess and enfield rifle in 1857 myths and miconceptions of indian histor...Agha A
The Enfield Rifle played a decisive role in defeating the rebellion of 1857. Much more than the British officers of that time or most British historians since 1947 want anyone to know. This tendency is understandable because it deflates the deliberately cultivated myth of "White Man's Superiority" in the post 1857 sociopolitical scenario. There is no doubt that the British soldier was brave, that their younger officer lot was resolute and that their higher commanders were by and large an assorted bunch of incompetent old men.
S.S. Thorbum was one of those very few Britons who admitted the superiority of the Enfield Rifle and the decisive part it played in the Sepoy defeat in 1857. In the Appendix of Thorburn's book which few people read, Thorburn made a very profound observation, he said, "Had the sepoys accepted the Enfield and mutinied afterwards, our difficulties in suppressing their revolt would have been enormously increased453.
A very simple gauge of this fact is the high proportion of EEIC's Bengal Army casualties in the First and Second Sikh Wars. This happened because the EEIC forces till 1849 were still equipped with the old Brown Bess Musket and the Sikhs were armed with a similar weapon. Thus the British suffered a very high proportion of casualties, in the Sikh wars as compared to the battles of 1857
While valour, operational strategic insight receive great attention, financial aspects, drab albeit extremely significant, are mostly ignored by students of military history. This article aims at highlighting the financial aspect of war with a view to show that there is a great deal of truth in Napoleons saying why bigger battalions, other factors being relatively similar, are more likely to emerge as victorious!
In ancient and medieval history size of armies was relatively small, munitions and armaments were rudimentary and armies lived off the land! As the size of armies increased and warfare became more civilised financial aspects of war became far more complicated.
The period 1550-1650 was a watershed in military history. During this period size of armies radically increased. Around 1631 Gustavus Adolphus commanded armies which were in excess of 100,000. It became difficult to sustain such large armies. The total strength of the Mughal Army of Emperor Akbar was estimated around 38,77,557 matchlockmen and infantry (including militia and zamindars retainers) while the cavalry was estimated to be around 384,758 men.1 In Aurangzeb’s time the strength varied from 240,000 to 300,000 cavalry and around 600,000 infantry.2 In Aurangzeb’s reign Aurangzeb’s Maratha War laid the foundation of financial decline of Mughal Empire. The magnitude of the expenses may be imagined from the fact that Aurangzeb’s military budget was double of Shahjahan’s military budget!3 This expense had serious maritime implications. Because of pre-occupation with the Maratha guerrillas Aurangzeb failed to capture the strategic ports of Bombay and Madras.4 Thus by late 1690s and 1700 Bombay was a prosperous and strongly fortified port and had surpassed Mughal Surat as a port! During this period Mughal land revenue declined due to revolts and civil wars and foreign trade which could have compensated for the shortfall was almost zero, which may be gauged from the fact that custom revenue “yielded less than one percent of the total revenue of the state”.5
British exaggerations myths of indo pak history part 6Agha A
Was The Rebellion Inevitable
The rebellion was not inevitable but was the result of a series of administrative and policy decisions made in a period of two decades.
Dalhousie’s basic policy was sound. He was administratively annexing regions which had been politically and militarily conquered and defeated long ago.
But Dalhousie’s pace of annexation was fast. His modus operandi of routine administration and dealing with the Indian native princes as well as the British officials was rash. His treatment of the CinC Charles Napier was unjust. His perceptions regarding Oudh were by and large correct but the manner in which he dealt with Oudh was not correct.
Being the man on the spot he should have actively decided that immediate annexation was not the answer. But he suggested to the Directors of EEIC a number of options including annexation which they selected.
Thus he made the Directors take a decision about which they had little first hand knowledge. Sleeman had prophetically warned Dalhousie that annexation of Oudh would have a very negative effect on the sepoys who were almost 50 to 60% part of the Bengal Infantry.
Despite all this we must not forget that the foundation of an educated and aware Indian middle class was laid essentially by Macaulay and Dalhousie rather than by any Indian Hindu or Muslim.
The three universities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras were foundations of an Indian educated middle class. The British had resolved to introduce western education in India before 1857 and both Hindus and Muslims were to acquire if, even if Sayyid Ahmad Khan had died fighting for the rebel cause at Bijnor!
war of independence : 1857
the revolt was the first independence war but the British said This is the rebellion, mutiny.this war is between the Indian soldiers and British Indian army .
Causes of failure: The war of independence 1857Arifa
Causes of failure of the war of independence PROCLAMATION/DECLARATION OF 1857
The rulers of different states of Indo-Pakistan
The British succeeded
Bahadur Shah Zafar, the Indian King, had no experience of fighting a war
British army was highly organized, trained, disciplined and experienced
sepoy perceptions about military effectiveness of english east india companyAgha A
Sepoy Perceptions about EEIC Military Effectiveness
The Bengal Army was the brain child of Lord Clive's military genius. The Bengal sepoys related to each other by blood relationship and caste bonds had served the EEIC for some 100 years when they rebelled in 1857. These men had a very close contact with the British and had observed them from very close quarters. Any neutral and unbiased account of the events of 1857 clearly proves that the Britisher as an officer was never disliked by the sepoys. As an officer who served in Pakistan Army I can state with conviction that the British provided excellent leadership to the Indians. They definitely knew how to lead and inspire the Indian, leading them from the forefront which I am afraid few of at least our native post 1947. Generals did either in Burma or in 1965 or in 1971. The sepoy admired and revered the British officer. In 1857 he was rebelling against the system instituted by the EEIC. Against policies formulated by men constituting a board of directors in far off England. The greasing of cartridges with pig or cow fat similarly was also an administrative decision. The sepoy perceived the British officer as a fair and brave leader and many British officers reciprocated these feelings. One of the British commanding officer committed suicide when his native infantry regiment was disbanded. Many others resisted disbandment of their units. One troop of 3rd Light Cavalry the most crucial unit of Bengal Army Sepoys as a matter of fact loyally fought for the British in 1857.
Martial races theory and its consequences myths and misconceptions of indo p...Agha A
The theory was based on “Punjab and Frontier” loyalty factor of 1857. Its most serious proponent was Lord Roberts563 the British
C-in-C in India. When I joined the army in 1981 I observed that many of the officers and soldiers serving in Pakistan Army were convinced that the races or castes living in the area between Chenab and Indus Rivers were martial. Some Pathans originating from the NWFP were also regarded as junior partners of these martial races!
A cursory glance at the history of Indo-Pak subcontinent is enough for even a layman to understand that most of the invasions of India took place originating from areas north of Khyber Pass or west of Quetta i.e. Persia etc. The Mughals after 1526 recruited from Hindu Rajputs, Muslim Pathans, Muslim Rajputs, some Muslim Punjabis and Muslim Baloch, but the preference was given to trans-Indus races, mostly Pathans or Persian speaking, or to Hindu Rajputs.
The EEIC since it made its entry from the east had no choice but to recruit from Oudh parts of Bihar North West Provinces Madras Bombay Central India etc. In the earlier part of this work we have seen that using a predominantly Hindu army recruited from the Gangetic plain and led by British officers the pre-1857 Bengal Army defeated all races of India, Pakistan, Nepal, Afghanistan etc. The Bombay Army of Hindu Mahrattas quickly made Persia behave! A couple of Bengal Army Regiments reinforced by an odd European regiment successfully defended Kandahar and Jallalabad against vastly superior forces.
The rebellion of 1857 changed British perceptions and keeping in view the political reliability as well as the administrative convenience factor the British decided to recruit mostly from the north west i.e. Punjab and Frontier provinces of India and the Gurkhas from Nepal. This change started from 1857 but became significant only around 1895.
Even reliability was not the only factor. Because the Madras and Bombay Armies had also stayed loyal. Still based on personal bias felt by Lord Roberts and under his influence by some other British senior officers the recruitment policy was changed. In general following 1857 the British adopted the policy of non-reliance on any particular race and even the Punjabi Muslims and the Pathans who had remained stand were mixed with other castes and religious communities only the Gurkhas were grouped together or certain Muzhbi Sikh Regiments. An experiment of having pure Muslim or pure Hindu Rajput regiments from 1893 but abandoned by 1919, keeping in view the mutinies of 5th Light Infantry and 15 Lancers at Singapore /Mesopotamia.
Myths and misconceptions of indo pak history part 8Agha A
Yet in 1857 the Indians or at least a part of them both Hindus and Muslims combined and made one very desperate yet valiant effort to oust the British. Till this time the Hindus acknowledged the Muslim political supremacy since we see the Bengal Army which was predominantly Hindu, fighting for Muslim sovereigns at Delhi and in Oudh!
But when this great rebellion failed there was the parting of the ways! The Muslims of the post-1857 had no choice but to please the British to avoid Hindu domination!
The Hindu’s problems had completely ended!
All they had to do was to play a waiting game.
They knew that one day the British will have to go and then they, the ones who had been ruled and subjugated by a minority from the 12th century till almost the 18th century would dominate the Indo-Pak sub- continent, just like they were about to do around 1799 and till 1803 when the EEIC challenged the Hindu Mahratta rule!
The Muslim post-1857 problems were more complex, they had to escape Hindu domination and they also had to face the British.
The policy they adopted after 1857 was “Loyalty to the British”.
Brown bess and enfield rifle in 1857 myths and miconceptions of indian histor...Agha A
The Enfield Rifle played a decisive role in defeating the rebellion of 1857. Much more than the British officers of that time or most British historians since 1947 want anyone to know. This tendency is understandable because it deflates the deliberately cultivated myth of "White Man's Superiority" in the post 1857 sociopolitical scenario. There is no doubt that the British soldier was brave, that their younger officer lot was resolute and that their higher commanders were by and large an assorted bunch of incompetent old men.
S.S. Thorbum was one of those very few Britons who admitted the superiority of the Enfield Rifle and the decisive part it played in the Sepoy defeat in 1857. In the Appendix of Thorburn's book which few people read, Thorburn made a very profound observation, he said, "Had the sepoys accepted the Enfield and mutinied afterwards, our difficulties in suppressing their revolt would have been enormously increased453.
A very simple gauge of this fact is the high proportion of EEIC's Bengal Army casualties in the First and Second Sikh Wars. This happened because the EEIC forces till 1849 were still equipped with the old Brown Bess Musket and the Sikhs were armed with a similar weapon. Thus the British suffered a very high proportion of casualties, in the Sikh wars as compared to the battles of 1857
While valour, operational strategic insight receive great attention, financial aspects, drab albeit extremely significant, are mostly ignored by students of military history. This article aims at highlighting the financial aspect of war with a view to show that there is a great deal of truth in Napoleons saying why bigger battalions, other factors being relatively similar, are more likely to emerge as victorious!
In ancient and medieval history size of armies was relatively small, munitions and armaments were rudimentary and armies lived off the land! As the size of armies increased and warfare became more civilised financial aspects of war became far more complicated.
The period 1550-1650 was a watershed in military history. During this period size of armies radically increased. Around 1631 Gustavus Adolphus commanded armies which were in excess of 100,000. It became difficult to sustain such large armies. The total strength of the Mughal Army of Emperor Akbar was estimated around 38,77,557 matchlockmen and infantry (including militia and zamindars retainers) while the cavalry was estimated to be around 384,758 men.1 In Aurangzeb’s time the strength varied from 240,000 to 300,000 cavalry and around 600,000 infantry.2 In Aurangzeb’s reign Aurangzeb’s Maratha War laid the foundation of financial decline of Mughal Empire. The magnitude of the expenses may be imagined from the fact that Aurangzeb’s military budget was double of Shahjahan’s military budget!3 This expense had serious maritime implications. Because of pre-occupation with the Maratha guerrillas Aurangzeb failed to capture the strategic ports of Bombay and Madras.4 Thus by late 1690s and 1700 Bombay was a prosperous and strongly fortified port and had surpassed Mughal Surat as a port! During this period Mughal land revenue declined due to revolts and civil wars and foreign trade which could have compensated for the shortfall was almost zero, which may be gauged from the fact that custom revenue “yielded less than one percent of the total revenue of the state”.5
British exaggerations myths of indo pak history part 6Agha A
Was The Rebellion Inevitable
The rebellion was not inevitable but was the result of a series of administrative and policy decisions made in a period of two decades.
Dalhousie’s basic policy was sound. He was administratively annexing regions which had been politically and militarily conquered and defeated long ago.
But Dalhousie’s pace of annexation was fast. His modus operandi of routine administration and dealing with the Indian native princes as well as the British officials was rash. His treatment of the CinC Charles Napier was unjust. His perceptions regarding Oudh were by and large correct but the manner in which he dealt with Oudh was not correct.
Being the man on the spot he should have actively decided that immediate annexation was not the answer. But he suggested to the Directors of EEIC a number of options including annexation which they selected.
Thus he made the Directors take a decision about which they had little first hand knowledge. Sleeman had prophetically warned Dalhousie that annexation of Oudh would have a very negative effect on the sepoys who were almost 50 to 60% part of the Bengal Infantry.
Despite all this we must not forget that the foundation of an educated and aware Indian middle class was laid essentially by Macaulay and Dalhousie rather than by any Indian Hindu or Muslim.
The three universities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras were foundations of an Indian educated middle class. The British had resolved to introduce western education in India before 1857 and both Hindus and Muslims were to acquire if, even if Sayyid Ahmad Khan had died fighting for the rebel cause at Bijnor!
war of independence : 1857
the revolt was the first independence war but the British said This is the rebellion, mutiny.this war is between the Indian soldiers and British Indian army .
Causes of failure: The war of independence 1857Arifa
Causes of failure of the war of independence PROCLAMATION/DECLARATION OF 1857
The rulers of different states of Indo-Pakistan
The British succeeded
Bahadur Shah Zafar, the Indian King, had no experience of fighting a war
British army was highly organized, trained, disciplined and experienced
Battle of Gangiri-Heavy Price paid by HM 6 Dragoon Guards for Gallantry Agha A
Battle of Gangiri-Heavy Price paid by HM 6 Dragoon Guards for Gallantry https://www.academia.edu/52632772/Battle_of_Gangiri_Heavy_Price_paid_by_HM_6_Dragoon_Guards_for_Gallantry via @academia
WHY PAKISTAN ARMY OR INDIAN ARMY CAN NEVER PRODUCE A MUSTAFA KAMAL- SOMETHING...Agha A
WHY PAKISTAN ARMY OR INDIAN ARMY CAN NEVER PRODUCE A MUSTAFA KAMAL- SOMETHING SERIOUSLY WRONG IN THE GENES
April 2020
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.20723.27689
Project: MILITARY HISTORY
Agha H Amin
Adjusting primitives for graph : SHORT REPORT / NOTESSubhajit Sahu
Graph algorithms, like PageRank Compressed Sparse Row (CSR) is an adjacency-list based graph representation that is
Multiply with different modes (map)
1. Performance of sequential execution based vs OpenMP based vector multiply.
2. Comparing various launch configs for CUDA based vector multiply.
Sum with different storage types (reduce)
1. Performance of vector element sum using float vs bfloat16 as the storage type.
Sum with different modes (reduce)
1. Performance of sequential execution based vs OpenMP based vector element sum.
2. Performance of memcpy vs in-place based CUDA based vector element sum.
3. Comparing various launch configs for CUDA based vector element sum (memcpy).
4. Comparing various launch configs for CUDA based vector element sum (in-place).
Sum with in-place strategies of CUDA mode (reduce)
1. Comparing various launch configs for CUDA based vector element sum (in-place).
Show drafts
volume_up
Empowering the Data Analytics Ecosystem: A Laser Focus on Value
The data analytics ecosystem thrives when every component functions at its peak, unlocking the true potential of data. Here's a laser focus on key areas for an empowered ecosystem:
1. Democratize Access, Not Data:
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Data Catalogs: Implement robust data catalogs for easy discovery and understanding of available data sources.
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AI-powered Automation: Automate repetitive tasks like data cleaning and feature engineering, freeing up data talent for higher-level analysis.
Right-Tool Selection: Strategically choose the most effective advanced analytics techniques (e.g., AI, ML) based on specific business problems.
4. Prioritize Data Quality with Automation:
Automated Data Validation: Implement automated data quality checks to identify and rectify errors at the source, minimizing downstream issues.
Data Lineage Tracking: Track the flow of data throughout the ecosystem, ensuring transparency and facilitating root cause analysis for errors.
5. Cultivate a Data-Driven Mindset:
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Data Storytelling Workshops: Equip stakeholders with the skills to translate complex data findings into compelling narratives that drive action.
Benefits of a Precise Ecosystem:
Sharpened Focus: Precise access and clear roles ensure everyone works with the most relevant data, maximizing efficiency.
Actionable Insights: Strategic analytics and automated quality checks lead to more reliable and actionable data insights.
Continuous Improvement: Data-driven performance management fosters a culture of learning and continuous improvement.
Sustainable Growth: Empowered by data, organizations can make informed decisions to drive sustainable growth and innovation.
By focusing on these precise actions, organizations can create an empowered data analytics ecosystem that delivers real value by driving data-driven decisions and maximizing the return on their data investment.
Opendatabay - Open Data Marketplace.pptxOpendatabay
Opendatabay.com unlocks the power of data for everyone. Open Data Marketplace fosters a collaborative hub for data enthusiasts to explore, share, and contribute to a vast collection of datasets.
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Leverage these privacy-preserving datasets for training and testing AI models without compromising sensitive information. Opendatabay prioritizes transparency by providing detailed metadata, provenance information, and usage guidelines for each dataset, ensuring users have a comprehensive understanding of the data they're working with. By leveraging a powerful combination of distributed ledger technology and rigorous third-party audits Opendatabay ensures the authenticity and reliability of every dataset. Security is at the core of Opendatabay. Marketplace implements stringent security measures, including encryption, access controls, and regular vulnerability assessments, to safeguard your data and protect your privacy.
Explore our comprehensive data analysis project presentation on predicting product ad campaign performance. Learn how data-driven insights can optimize your marketing strategies and enhance campaign effectiveness. Perfect for professionals and students looking to understand the power of data analysis in advertising. for more details visit: https://bostoninstituteofanalytics.org/data-science-and-artificial-intelligence/
Why Sikhs were not awarded any Victoria Cross in WW 1 despite being in highest number in fighting arms
1.
2. DOI:
10.13140/RG.2.2.17086.51521
Why Sikhs were not awarded any Victoria Cross in First World war despite being highest
number in Infantry and Cavalry
July 2020
DOI:
10.13140/RG.2.2.17086.51521
Agha H Amin
Why Sikhs were not awarded any Victoria Cross in First
World war despite being highest number in Infantry and
Cavalry
3. THIS IS A PRIMER FOR RESEARCHERS AND NOT FOR
DISCUSSION —-VCs are themselves highly debatable - as
Sikhs being highest number in infantry in First World War
got NO VC in WW1 !
This has not been explored but as I researched in my book
after ww1 SIKHS were reduced from
Highest in infantry to third highest ! INTERESTINGLY
INDIAN ARMY GOT MORE VCS IN WW TWO WHICH
WAS MUCH LESS HARD FOUGHT for indian army than
ww1—and what about first indian VCs recommended by the
british company’s officers who were far less biased than
british army officers in 1857 over which British state SAT
FOR THREE YEARS AND AWARDED NONE ?
Political Consequences of First World
War on British Indian Armys Class
Composition and myths about class
composition ISBN: 9781091628472
https://www.amazon.com/dp/1091628475/ref=cm_sw_r_tw_awdb_t1_x_oJ4iFbGA5WB0W?fbclid=IwA
R0gx3vJ3Hame4y2OrKHl-LOUCaUsAW_rhGO1EVP6wKgyhas1KrseBWAMXQ
4. Product details
Paperback: 167 pages
Publisher: Independently published (December 5,
2019)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 1091628475
ISBN-13: 978-1091628472
Product Dimensions: 6 x 0.4 x 9 inches
Shipping Weight: 11 ounces
This short book deals with political consequences of soldiers
from various ethnicities on the recruitment policy of the
British in India.This scribe is of the view that political loyalty
was the ultimate factor in British recruitment policy in India
starting from 1858.This book deals with First World War in
particular.We will start by examining each infantry unit of the
British Army in 1914 and post first world war.Firstly there are
nonsense myths that have been repeated and persist.Major
General Fazal Muqeem Khan of Pakistan Army fallaciously
claimed that there were no all Muslim units in British Indian
Army.This was totally false. There were many all Muslim
units between 1890 and 1914 and some till 1947.What
Fazal Muqeem was trying to imply was that Muslims were
regarded as most dangerous and untrustworthy by the
British.Interestingly the opposite is true. For example Sikhs
5. dominated fighting arms like infantry as late as end of first
world war but were reduced after 1918 as they exhibited
politically defiant anti British behavior in some units in first
world war.On the other hand Punjabi Muslim were most
loyal in first world war and thus Punjabi Muslims quota in
infantry was increased and exceeded Sikh quota only after
first world war ended.This was not due to any fighting
qualities but pure political loyalty.Such was British mistrust
of Sikhs that all Sikh units were mixed with Punjabi Muslim
companies.Two Pakistani origin authors are in lead in
holding Guinness book records of making false claims .Thus
Major General Shaukat Riza on page-101 of Pakistan Army-
1947-1949 published in 1989 makes an absolutely false and
unsubstantiated claim that “In 1939 about 70 % of the rank
and file of Indian Army was from Muslim tribes” . Shuja
Nawaz on page-3 of his book “Crossed Swords” falsely
claims that Punjabi Muslims dominated British Indian
Army.Thus makes the factually false claim that “Punjabi
Mussulmans dominated recruitment during British
period”.The correct position was from 1757 till 1885 the
British Indian Army was Hindustani majority.From 1885 till
1921 Sikhs were in the highest numbers in infantry , the
main fighting arm of the British Indian Army.Kaushik Roy in
an article in Journal of Military History of USA makes a false
and unsubstantiated assertion that Muslims were 45 % of
the Bengal Army that rebelled in 1857.