This document discusses the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 from the perspective of analyzing Sepoy perceptions of the military effectiveness of the East India Company (EEIC). It argues that over time from 1804 to 1857, the Sepoys' absolute faith in the invincibility of the EEIC military began to change as they witnessed some key military defeats and retreats, such as against the Mahrattas in 1804, failure to capture the Bhurtpore fort in 1805, reversals in the Nepal War of 1814-16, and the retreat from Kabul in the first Afghan War in 1842. These events shook the Sepoys' confidence in the military prowess and leadership abilities of the British

1. Monday, February 3, 2014
DR HAMID HUSSAIN CORRECTS William Dalrymple's Distortions

2. Sunday, September 1, 2013
DR HAMID HUSSAIN CORRECTS William Dalrymple's Distortions
DR HAMID HUSSAIN CORRECTS William Dalrymple's Distortions
Agha H Amin

3. Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 Reinterpreted Paperback by Agha Humayun Amin (Author)
The rebellion of the Bengal Army in 1857 was a traumatic event in the history of British rule in
India. Even today it is difficult to describe it as a 'War of Independence', 'Revolution',
'Religious War' or a 'Mutiny'. The discussion is made more complicated because of the fact
that India is a jigsaw puzzle of races and ethnic groups made further complicated and
confusing by the presence of a variety of religions, castes etc. Thus Indo-Pak History has
always remained a far more confusing affair than lets say French or British History. Any event
in Indian History is hard to judge because of presence of various aspects like diversity of race,
religion etc. The Indo-Pak Sub-Continent has the unique distinction of being invaded,
colonised and ruled by a multiple number of actors motivated by racial, religious, economic or
commercial reasons. Thus whenever we pick any book on Indo-Pak History we come across
so many conflicting and confusing views like the Muslim view, the Hindu view, the British view
etc. Behind every happening in Indo-Pak history there is some 'Conspiracy Theory', some
ethnic or religious bias, some personal elements or grievances etc. One may think that this is
true for all types of history. However in our case it is felt that these biases are much more
pronounced because of the fact that we are still undergoing the historical processes through
which many other parts of the world underwent five hundred or a thousand years ago.
Perhaps all this is there because India and Pakistan even today are not cohesive integrated
states with a clearheaded Intelligentsia or Leadership in the real sense. Perhaps the Indo-Pak
Sub-Continent cannot be called a country or two or three countries in the real sense. One
may add that Bangladesh is less trouble or confusion free being a nation state in the real
sense despite its junior vintage in terms of length of years. We may state with conviction that

4. writing anything on any aspect of Indo-Pak History is a much more arduous task than writing
history of any other country. Coming precisely down to Indo-Pak History 1857 is particularly a
very challenging subject to write about. The major difficulty in writing stems from the fact that
little is available from the Indo-Pak side since most of the people who formed the core
elements of the rebels or freedom fighters or whatever anyone may choose to call them were
either hanged or blown off the mouths of guns or destroyed in the Terai Jungle by disease or
tigers. All those who were left were either living in British India and thus rendered unable to
state anything based on truth because of fear of life or forfeiture of liberty. Some were so
overwhelmed by disgust and grief that they thought it pointless to leave anything for posterity.
Some who managed to save their life by escaping were so much pressed by privation and
misery that they died premature deaths and were unable to leave for the future historians
anything which may have proved useful in arriving at a rational explanation of the design of
events and may have enabled historians to understand whether the outbreak was based on
deliberate planning or was a spontaneous outbreak. Thus we are left with three broad
categories of historical accounts i.e. the 'Original British Viewpoint', the 'Indian Viewpoint
while under Subjugation' and 'Modern Indo-Pak Reinterpretations'. Things are made yet more
complex by other schools of thought like the 'Religious', 'Ethnic' and the 'Class Warfare' etc.
Karl Marx called it the failure of the policy of divide and rule. Muslim revivalist historians call it
Jehad, Hindus have their own explanations, Modern Nationalist Historians have further made
it more colourful and glorious by liberally mixing myth with reality! The British are ever keen to
prove that it was a mutiny of troops.
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An Analysis
The Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59

5. AH AMIN
Sepoy Perceptionsabout EEIC Military

6. Effectiveness
The Bengal Army was the brain child of Lord
Clive's military genius. The Bengal sepoys related
to each other by blood relationship and caste
bonds had served the EEIC for some 100 years
when they rebelled in 1857. These men had a
very close contact with the British and had
observed them from very close quarters. Any
neutral and unbiased account of the events of
1857 clearly proves that the Britisher as an
officer was never disliked by the sepoys. As an
officer who served in Pakistan Army I can state
with conviction that the British provided
excellent leadership to the Indians. They
definitely knew how to lead and inspire the
Indian, leading them from the forefront which I
am afraid few of at least our native post 1947.
Generals did either in Burma or in 1965 or in
1971. The sepoy admired and revered the British
officer. In 1857 he was rebelling against the
system instituted by the EEIC. Against policies
formulated by men constituting a board of
directors in far off England. The greasing of
cartridges with pig or cow fat similarly was also
an administrative decision. The sepoy perceived
the British officer as a fair and brave leader and
many British officers reciprocated these feelings.
One of the British commanding officer
committed suicide when his native infantry
regiment was disbanded. Many others resisted
disbandment of their units. One troop of 3rd
Light Cavalry the most crucial unit of Bengal
Army Sepoys as a matter of fact loyally fought

7. for the British in 1857.
It appears, however, that sepoy perceptions
about EEIC military effectiveness changed from
absolute faith in the invincibility of the EEIC as a
military machine to skepticism from 1804 to
1857. Before we proceed further we must state
that the first major reverse or defeat which the
EEIC suffered in India was in 1780 at the hands of
Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan who were heading
forces whose fighting Hector Munro and Baillie
in 1780 were defeated in a manner which was
described by Fortes Cue the official historian of
the British army in the following words, "The
blunders had been flagrant and from a military
point of view, Munro must be held solely
responsible for one of the greatest calamities
that has ever befallen the British arms"469.But
this happened with the Madras Army. The
Bengal Army sepoy realized for the first time in
1804 that the that EEIC was not invincible. This
happened while dealing with the Mahrattas and
not the Afghans who came much later. In 1804
five battalions of sepoys and about 3000
irregular horse left by the C in C Bengal Army
Lord Lake to keep the Mahratta Holkar in check
under the command of Colonel Monsoon were
forced to make a disastrous retreat from Central
India to Agra470. The results of this reverse were
short term since Lord Lake immediately assumed
personal command and defeated the Mahrattas.
However, the harm had been done and the myth
of invincibility of the EEIC as far as the Bengal
Army was concerned was challenged for the first

8. time. Monsoon's retreat was followed by a much
more serious reverse which for many years
shattered the EEIC myth of invincibility. This
happened at Bhurtpore, the Hindu Jat fortress
which is the only fort in British Indian history
which a British army in India failed in a siege to
capture. Leading the EEIC army in this case was a
man of no less a stature than Lord Lake who had
previously captured Delhi and destroyed
Mahratta power in North India in battle of
Laswari. (It must be remembered that Panipat -
1761 checked the Mahrattas,but this was
temporary since within few years they
recaptured Delhi. It was at Laswari on 01 Nov.
1803 that one European infantry regiment and a
couple of Bengal Army Regiments composed of
roughly 3/4 Hindu soldiers and 1/4 Hindustani
Muslims destroyed the Mahratta Army) 471. In
1805 Lake failed to capture Bhurtpore. He made
a first assault in January 1805 but failed to
capture the fort. The British troops became so
demoralised that the three European regiments
i.e. HM 75 Foot, HM 76 Foot and the 1st Bengal
Europeans refused orders to attack and
withdrew 472! Almost a thousand casualties
were suffered but repeated British assaults were
repulsed. At last on 24 February Lord Lake
withdrew his army from Bhurtpore.
Subsequently, the Hindu Jat Raja sued for peace
in 1805 due to reasons of political expediency;
but the fact remained that militarily this Hindu
Jat Raja had not been defeated! The EEIC never
forgot this defeat and later on they did capture

9. Bhurtpore but this was much later i.e. on 18
January 1826. The force used at Bhurtpore this
time was larger than the one the EEIC used to
recapture Kabul in September 1842473in the
first Afghan War. Another reverse which the EEIC
suffered was in the Nepal war of 1814-16.Here
their initial advance into Nepal was repulsed.
Nepal was subsequently defeated using the
Bengal Sepoys but again the harm had been
done. The sepoy's confidence in the British
officer was a little shaken. The EEIC retreat from
Kabul to Jalalabad in the first Afghan war was
not a big disaster keeping in view the numbers
involved. There were only 700 Europeans in
some 5000 troops in the weak and Stan brigade
which withdrew from Kabul in January 1842 and
which was destroyed by an overwhelming force
of some 30,000 Afghans taking advantage of
harsh weather and shortage of food in this EEIC
force. The EEIC troops largely composed of
Bengal sepoys did subsequently recapture Kabul
in September 1842. But the human mind is not a
computer and the net significant impression
produced on the sepoy was that the EEIC had
been forced to retreat. The extremely tough
resistance of the valiant Sikhs in the First and
Second Sikh wars again produced a strong
impression on the mind of the Bengal Army
Sepoy. At Mudki the main British army survived
just because the Sikh general Taj Singh did not
attack them,474aotherwise their destruction
was certain. This was a battle fought on
absolutely plain land, unlike Afghanistan where

10. the Afghans bravery had a deep connection with
adverse mountainous terrain. The impressions of
the Sikh wars were the deepest in convincing the
sepoys that the British were not invincible. In
Afghanistan the mountains, the adverse weather
and the small numbers were an excuse; but at
Chillianwala everything favoured the British and
yet they failed!
All these disasters from 1804 till 1849 certainly
had an influence on the mind of the Bengal
sepoy and reinforced his decision to rebel in
1857. The sepoys felt in 1857 that they could
meet the Europeans on the battlefield as an
equal. Their perceptions were however
erroneous in one area. This was about realising
that the principals force multiplier of sepoy
efficiency was superior leadership of the British
officer. Without British leadership the military
effectiveness of the sepoy reduced by some
75%. Since the British suppressed the initial
rebellions in Punjab they were able to use
Punjab and Frontier's manpower to create new
regiments or in using comparatively new
regiments raised in 1846-49which were used
with as much effect at Delhi as the Bengal sepoy
units at Kabul or Ghazni or at Gujrat. The British
officer of 1857 was the greatest force multiplier
of military effectiveness by virtue of leadership
which was far superior to be "Rebel" leadership
in terms of "Resolution" "TacticalEfficiency"
reinforced by an iron frame administrative
organisation created by the EEIC during its 100
year rule in India and its eight year old rule in the

11. Punjab.
This was in response to many questions asked about First Anglo-Afghan War, British players
& related questions about Indian army. I just tried to put all in book review as they are
related although I had to do it in hurry therefore a bit disjointed.
Hamid
Book Review: WilliamDalrymple. Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan 1839-42
Hamid Hussain
William Dalrymple's latest work Return of a King is a fascinating account of First Anglo-Afghan War of
1939-42. Dalrymple is a well known historian of India and his previous works City of Djins, White
Mughals and The Last Mughal are based on his extensive research spanning several years while living
in India. One crucial factor that differentiates Dalrymple from other English language historians is his
use of local sources mainly in Urdu and Persian. In telling the story of the First Anglo-Afghan War, he
also used Afghan sources that are now available to English language readers for the first
time. However, all Afghan and Indian sources used by Dalrymple are not reliable and some are
polemics that freely mix fantasywith facts. Dalrymple sheds some light on two fascinating characters;
Mohan Lal and Shahamat Ali. These two natives were first students of English at Delhi College and in
an all British cast, the two played a very important role as native political assistants to British.
In summary, by 1839,Dost Muhammad Khan had established himself as ruler of Afghanistan after
annihilating other contenders. A former ruler, Shah Shuja was living in a comfortable exile in
Ludhiana as British pensioner and Maharaja Ranjit Singh was ruling Punjab that included Peshawar;
the former winter capital of Afghan rulers. British fearful of Russian drive cobbled a plan involving
British, Shah Shuja and Ranjit Singh. British will help Shah Shuja to regain his throne with the help of
Ranjit. Shuja will get his throne, British will get a friendly ruler who will keep Russians out and Ranjit
will keep Peshawar as Shuja will renounce his claim over the territory conquered by Sikhs. This was
the genesis of First Anglo-Afghan War. Wily ruler of Lahore was the shrewdest of the three players
not allowing the army to take the shortest route that will go through his own territory. Instead, army
had to go through the desolate areas of Sindh, Baluchistan and over treacherous Bolan Pass to
southern Afghanistan. The journey alone and not any battle devastated the army. Shah Shuja was
easily installed at Kabul by British and Indian bayonets and Dost Muhammad changed place with Shah
Shuja and lived in same quarters in Ludhiana as pensioner with his slaves and concubines. After a

12. year and a half of partying and affairs in Kabul, British cut subsidies to border tribes into half to
decrease expenses, the tribes closed passes, annihilated small force and large camp followers, British
sent an army of vengeance to spank Afghans and returned to India, Shah Shuja was murdered, Dost
Muhammad came back, repeated the previous act of chopping some rebellious heads and other body
parts to become the top dog again and the cycle was completed.
Dalrymple's story telling style providing extensive details may be boring to ordinary readers but for
those interested in history it is pure delight. DramatisPersonae segment alone runs seventeen
pages. If ordinary reader overcomes this hurdle then he will enjoy the five hundred page story of a
fascinating chapter of British Empire.
Afghans were not just bystanders but active participants in the game of intrigue to further their own
interests. Dalrymple provides some details of the Afghan side of the story. To understand the
complexities from Afghan perspective, correspondence of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan with three
powers in 1836 provides a window to modus operandi of Afghan power players (this is quoted by
Mohan Lal; a direct participant with first hand information). This is a classic example of these power
plays and how desperately Afghan rulers tried to maintain their independence in extremely difficult
situations by playing one power against the other. Dost wrote a letter to Governor General Lord
Auckland stating, "I hope your Lordship will consider me and my country as your own, and favor me
often with the receipt of your friendly letters. Whatever directions your Lordship may be pleased to
issue for the administration of this country, I will act accordingly". To Shah of Persia, Dost wrote, 'the
chiefs of my family were sincerely attached to the exalted and royal house of your Majesty, I too,
deem myself one of the devoted adherents of that royal race; and considering this country as
belonging to the kingdom of Persia'. At the same time, he sent a letter to Czar of Russia stating that
'since Mahomed Shah, the centre of the faith, had closely connected himself with his Imperial power,
desiring the advantage of such alliance, that he also being a Mahomedan, was desirous to follow his
example, and to attach himself to his Majesty'. In January 1857,Dost Muhammad signed a treaty with
British in Peshawar and said that if he had the power, he would fight the unbelievers but as he could
not do it therefore, 'I must cling to the British to save me from the cursed Persians'.
First Anglo-Afghan War was the result of several complex factors. Underlying fear was that
Afghanistan and Persia could become the staging ground for Russian efforts to undermine East India
Company's hold on India. This war was just one act of a much larger drama on the world stage what
was called 'Great Game' by British and 'Tournament of Shadows' by Russians.

13. Many British characters in Dalrymple's account had long association with India and in many cases
several family members were involved in the expansion of the empire. One of the defenders of
Jalalabad garrison was a gunner Augustus Abbott. He survived the Afghan cauldron and rose to the
rank of Major General. His brother Frederick Abbott (later Major General) of Bengal Engineers was
chief engineer in the same campaign. Third brother Saunders Abbott also served in Bengal army,
fought in Anglo-Sikh wars and served under Henry Lawrence in Punjab. Fourth brother Keith Abbott
was on the diplomatic playing field of the Great Game and during the time of First Anglo-Afghan war
was consul at Tehran and later at Tabriz. However, the most famous was General James
Abbott. James was also a player in the Great Game and while his two brothers were in Afghanistan
and one in Persia, he was travelling in the Khanate of Khiva. Later, he became the young protégé of
Henry Lawrence, in charge of Hazara district where he earned the love and respect of local
population. The town of Abbottabad, where Osama bin Ladin was killed was founded by him.
Head of Shah Shuja's contingent Colonel (later General) Abraham Roberts spent fifty years in India
and his son General Frederick Roberts spent forty four years in India. Frederick followed his father's
footsteps and commanded Kurram Field Force of Indian and British troops in Second Anglo-Afghan
War of 1878-80. He became famous for his march from Kabul to Kandahar and later titled Baron
Roberts of Kandahar. Frederick won Victoria Cross (VC) in Indian Mutiny and his son also named
Frederick won a post-humous VC in Boer War.
Three Broadfoot brothers served in Afghanistan. Lieutenant William Broadfoot (Bengal European
Regiment) served in the forward post of Bamyan and improved many passes. He was Alexander
Burn's military secretary and killed along with Burns during attack on the residency. Lieutenant James
Broadfoot (Engineers) worked on preparation of advance of the Army of Indus and later wrote an
authoritative account of Ghilzai tribes. He travelled in disguise with a Lohani merchant caravan from
Ghazni to Dera Ismail Khan through Gomal pass and sketched the area. He was killed in action in
November 1840 at Parwan Darrah along with other officers when troopers of 2nd Bengal Light Cavalry
bolted. Third brother Captain (later Major) George Broadfoot (34th Madras Native Infantry) was
commander of the escort that brought Shah Shuja's family to Afghanistan. He later converted his
escort into sappers and commanded this diverse contingent consisting of Hindustanis, Gurkhas and
Afghans and was among the defenders of Jalalabad garrison. George was an excellent swordsman
and locals believed that the ghosts of his two slain brothers added extra power to George's sword
cuts. He was killed in action three years later in Second Anglo-Sikh war at Ferozshah.
Captain Robert Warburton's love affair and later marriage with Shah Jahan Begum is the romantic
chapter of the otherwise sanguine first Anglo-Afghan encounter. The child of this union was Robert

14. Warburton. Father was born in Ireland and buried in Peshawar while son was born in a Ghilzai fort in
Afghanistan when his mother was on the run and buried in Bromptom cemetery. Dalrymple
mistakenly writes that Warburton commanded Frontier Force. Punjab Irregular Frontier Force (nick
named PIFFERS) consisted of infantry and cavalry regiments and artillery batteries that kept internal
peace in newly acquired territories in Punjab. It was commanded by regular army
officers. ParamilitaryFrontier Scouts were raised to maintain peace in tribal territories. Warburton
raised Khyber Jejailchis (later Khyber Rifles) to maintain peace in Khyber tribal agency where he was
political agent.
Dalrymple asserts that those regiments that servedin Afghanistan mutiniedin 1857 because their
officers deserted soldiers. There is no evidence to support this assertion. In general, set back of
First Anglo-AfghanWar had an impact on Indian army as the myth of British invincibilitywas
shattered and affectedmorale of soldiers. However,mutiny occurred seventeenyears after the
Anglo-AfghanWar. Poor senior military leadershipwas responsible for many humiliating
encounters. In such circumstances,it is not unusual that morale of officers and men is a
casualty. There were cases of both British and Indian soldiers shying away from the battle and in
some cases behaviorof officers was also shameful. However, overall officers performed to the best
of their abilities. On the other hand, in many cases Indian soldiersbolted leaving their officers on
the field.
Large part of army of Indus had already left Afghanistanlong before the Afghans rose against
British and Shah Shuja. Disaster only struck the force that retreated from Kabul. This force
consistedof 44th Foot of British army, Ist Bengal European Infantry of Indian army, four infantry
regiments of Bengal native infantry (2nd, 27th, 37th, & 48th) and one Bengal Light Cavalry (2nd). Total
combatants included690 British, 2800 Indian soldiersand 12'000non-combatantcamp followers
includingwomen and children.
1857 mutiny was a general uprising of Bengal army while Bombay and Madras armies in general
remained loyal. Large number of Bengal army regimentsmutiniedregardless of their service in First
Anglo-AfghanWar. Of the ten Bengal cavalry regiments sevenmutiniedand three disarmed. Of
the seventy four infantry regiments of Bengal army, forty seven mutiniedand remainder twenty
seven either disarmed or disbanded. Among those regiments that were part of the Kabul garrison,
2nd Bengal Light Cavalry mutinied at Cawnpur, 2nd Benagl Native Infantry was disarmed at
Barrackpore, 27th was disarmed at Peshawar, only part of the 37th mutiniedat Benaras and similarly
only part of the 48th mutinied at Lucknow.
Major Agha Amin's encyclopedic work based on relevant material on 1857 mutiny providesmany
interesting details of the military aspect of the upheaval. 2nd Bengal Light Cavalry had an

15. interesting history. Major General ShahidHamid in his work on Indian cavalry titled So They Rode
and Fought provides little known information that it was raised in 1787 as Kandahar Horse by
Nawab Wazir of Oudh from Kandaharis settledin Lucknow. In 1796, it became 2nd Bengal Light
Cavalry. In 1841, two squadrons of the regiment fled when confrontedby a small body of Afghan
horsemen at Parwan Darrah leaving their officers on the field. The exact cause was never
establishedbut Agha Amin's suggestionabout the origin of troopers of the regiment whichwere
mainly Afghans of Kandahar originis the most likely explanation. These Kandaharis who had
settled in Lucknowdid not want to confront their ethnic kin thoughseparated by a time span of
sixty years. The outraged commander disbandedthe whole regiment. A new 11th Light Cavalry was
raised and all officers of 2nd transferred to 11th Light Cavalry. In 1850, 11th Cavalry fought gallantly
in Multan and one of the old officers captured the Sikh standard. This performance was rewarded
by renaming 11th Cavalry to its old number of 2nd Light Cavalry.
Dalrymple connectspast with the present in his usual style. However,no two conflictsare same
and causes and consequencesof every conflictare unique. East India Company had no interest in a
project that didn't generate revenue and in 1839 First Anglo-AfghanWar was the result of
Russophobia. One of the key architectsof the policy Lord Palmerston declaredthat the purpose
was not to make Afghanistana British province but install a clientruler that could join hands with
British to keep Russiansat bay. The staggering cost of three million sterling pounds almost
bankrupt Indian treasury. Initial force consistedof 21'000 combatants and 38'000camp
followers. Large part of the military force was already withdrawn to India prior to uprising and at
the time of general revolt, in addition to a small garrison in Kandahar there were only 4500 combat
troops and 14'000 camp followers that retreated from Kabul. In fact, despite humiliating defeat of
this war, overall British objectiveswere securedfor the next one hundred years. The country
remained a buffer even long after British had gone from India. Amir Dost Muhammad had learned
his own lessonand in 1857 rebellionof Indian army when he could have easily recaptured his lost
territories includingthe prize of Peshawar, he didn'tventure beyondhis own borders. Foreign
relations of Afghanistan remained subservientto British for the next eighty years for a small
subsidy paid to Afghan rulers.
It is too simplistic to assume that somehow if world leaders read the history, they will avoid
blunders. U.S. involvement in Afghanistan was the direct result of September 11 attacks and
presence of Osama Bin Ladin in Afghanistan. If Bin Ladin was in Timbuktu, U.S. forces would be
heading there and not Afghanistan. Once started, each conflict evolves and after a while original
spark that started the fire becomes irrelevant.

16. Dalrymple is a master story teller and we owe him thanks for providing a masterpiece narrative of a
forgotten chapter of history. We hope that such works stimulate interest of local historians to utilize
rich research materials stacked at their doorsteps.
William Dalrymple. Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan 1839-42 (Alfred A. Knopf, 2013);
pages. 515