4. Historical background
Study of specific constitutions in
Aristotle’s Politics
Politics as constitutional law: Bryce’s
American Commonwealth,
Ostrogorski on political parties
Object: detailed description of explicit
rules in organisation, typically
nation-states
4 / 36
5. What’s wrong with ‘old’
institutionalism (1)
Distinction between de jure and de
facto
Description = explanation
Can (almost) be carried out w/o
reference to human beings, their
motivation, or any mechanisms
(Thus the behaviouralist reaction. . . )
5 / 36
6. What’s wrong with ‘old’
institutionalism (2)
Impoverished idea of what counts as
an institution
Mae West...
6 / 36
8. Marriage is a wonderful institution. . .
[but] I’m not ready for an institution yet
8 / 36
9. Marriage is a wonderful institution. . .
[but] I’m not ready for an institution yet
• Why is this a pun?
• What are the rules of marriage?
• If no rules, can anything be an
institution?
9 / 36
10. One answer
Does it have (possibly unwritten) rules
which constitute the practice?
Does it generate recognised status?
Does this status depend on
recognition of the institution?
Does status within an institution carry
with it permissions and
responsibilities?
If the answer to all these questions is yes,
you have an institution (Searle, 2005). 10 / 36
13. Can rat. choice
accommodate institutions?
Think about the Prisoner’s Dilemma
it had permissible moves, and different
(high-, low-status?) outcomes
Think about the paradox of voting
the electoral system has permissible
moves, and rules which affect the
pay-offs
13 / 36
14. A second attempt at
definition
An institution is a
set of rules which determines
permissible actions within a game
or choice situation and which
influences or determines the
pay-offs available to the rational
actors situated therein
14 / 36
15. An example (1)
#2
Cooperate Silent
Cooperate -3,-3 0,-6
#1
Silent -6,0 -1,-1
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16. An example (2)
The broad class of institution: wage
mechanisms
The different institutions: hourly rate,
piece rate, performance-related pay
Permissible actions: complete n
pieces of work
Pay-offs: hourly rate, per piece rate,
some combination of the above
Assumptions about utility functions
still required 16 / 36
17. The right way to view
institutions?
Some action is routine (yes, but. . . )
Some action is not motivated by
pay-offs (yes, but. . . )
Designing institutions in this way
yields errant predictions
Childcare example (Frey and Jegen,
2001)
17 / 36
19. Sociological institutionalism
Emphasises change of question
RCT asks, what action will procure me
the best consequences?
That is, it follows a logic of
consequences
Soc. inst. asks, what action is most
appropriate given my role?
(A logic of appropriateness)
19 / 36
20. • Who am I?
• What is my role?
• What actions are
consistent with this
role?
20 / 36
21. Mechanisms
Individuals preferences either
Unimportant, since trumped by role
considerations
Internal to the theory, since people
internalize roles
Institutions ‘explain’ action because
they carry roles, and roles cause action
Role descriptions may have formal
basis or may not
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22. Examples
Is there a doctor on the plane?
Action clearly not ‘utility-maximizing’
What would a doctor do?
More realistic examples:
Elliot Richardson and the Saturday Night
Massacre
career versus political appointments in
State Dept.
22 / 36
23. Historical institutionalism
Slightly different approach
Institutions still worthy of lengthy
description
Key question becomes, not
‘what do I want?’ (rational choice theory)
nor ‘who am I?’ (sociological
institutionalism)
rather, ‘how did we get here?’
23 / 36
24. Path dependence
Betamax in Europe
Arguably a superior technology to VHS
US and Europe had diverged over TV
technology before (PAL/NSTC)
Choice depended on what went
before: US installed base of VHS large
Similar stories for Qwerty (versus
Dvorak)
24 / 36
25. Mechanisms?
Little in the way of mechanisms
explaining individual action
Nothing predicting outcomes
Could we look to evolution for
another non-predictive approach with
path dependence?
25 / 36
27. The problem
So far, we have used institutions to
explain human action.
Where do the institutions come from?
Don’t they also come from human
action?
27 / 36
28. The Goldilocks solution
Institutions need to be rigid enough to
structure human action
. . . but not so rigid they never change,
or change radically
Historical institutionalists have
thought about this a lot
They have institutional change
processes
28 / 36
29. Varieties of institutional
change
1. Displacement: role of investment banking in many big
banks
2. Layering: grafting additional components on; will
academies/free schools change the broader school
system?
3. Drift: drive towards supra-nationalism in EC/EU,
untended by MS
4. Conversion: disability benefits repurposed to reduce
unemployment rates
5. Exhaustion: runaway cash-for-clunkers schemes
(generally, expansion beyond limits) 29 / 36
31. Stephen Lawrence Inquiry
Stephen Lawrence murdered 22nd
April 1993
Suspects arrested, never convicted
Inquiry into investigation, 1997-9
Report concluded that “the [police]
investigation was marred by a
combination of professional
incompetence, institutional racism
and a failure of leadership by senior
officers’ 31 / 36
32. A rational choice explanation
Incentives:
career incentives to ‘look the other
way’ (probability of detection)
weak punishment for detected racist
behaviour (sanctions)
Selection:
institutions get reputations for having
certain types of attitudes
recruitment bodies tend towards
homophily 32 / 36
33. A sociological institutionalist
explanation
The institution, not morals or society,
determines appropriate action
new members learn from others’
example and are rule-followers
Behaviours persist through informal
rules
Problem is more than a few bad apples
33 / 36
34. A historical institutionalist
approach
Institutions are slow to change
The Metropolitan Police is an elderly
organisation (1829)
Societal changes unlikely to translate
across
No key juncture where dramatic
change possible
34 / 36
35. Conclusions
Institutions might matter in ways RCT
can’t capture
Key insights about roles and
appropriate action seem plausible
Differences over ways in which
institutions are used
Questions about processes of
institutional change
35 / 36
36. References I
Frey, B. and Jegen, R. (2001). Motivation
crowding theory. Journal of economic
surveys, 15(5):589–611.
Searle, J. (2005). What is an institution?
Journal of Institutional Economics,
1(1):1–22.
36 / 36
