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Secure software development in
the Russian IT Security
Certification Scheme
Alexander Barabanov, Alexey Markov, Valentin Tsirlov
Agenda
2
 Brief overview
 Current status of the Russian IT Security
Certification Scheme
 Steps Toward Common Criteria Approach
and Secure Software Development
 Final Remarks
Brief overview:
Historical Perspective
3
1995
Establishment of
Russian IT Security
Certification Scheme
1997
Mandatory
requirements for
firewall and access
control systems
1999 2003
Guidance based
on CC v.2.1
Mandatory
requirements for
IPS/IDS
(based on CC)
Mandatory
requirements for
antiviruses
(based on CC)
Mandatory
requirements for
source code
analysis
2012 2013 2014
Mandatory
requirements for
trusted boot loader
(based on CC)
Mandatory
requirements for
removable storage
protection tools
(based on CC)
Brief overview:
who takes part in the certification process?
4
Brief overview: typical timeline
5
Obtaining FSTEC ID
Normally 1 month
Evaluation provided by Laboratory
3-4 months
Certification by Certification Body
1 month and more
Obtaining a certificate
from FSTEC of Russia
Normally 1 month
Brief overview:
Accredited Evaluation Laboratories
6
Brief overview:
Accredited Certification Bodies
7
Brief overview:
Classical Major Approaches to Evaluation
8
Evaluation of the security functionality
• Black box testing to ensure that TOE works as it should
Evaluation for the absence of non-declared
functions
• Testing of source code for the absence of software
vulnerabilities
Current status of the Russian Scheme:
Products Evaluations
9
Current status of the Russian Scheme:
Certified Products by Types
10
2011-2014
Evaluation
Timeline
Current status of the Russian Scheme:
Russian vs. Non-Russian Developers
11
Current status of the Russian Scheme:
Non-Russian Developers (2)
12
2011-2014 Evaluation
Timeline
Current status of the Russian Scheme:
Russian Developers
13
2011-2014 Evaluation
Timeline
Steps Toward Common Criteria Approach:
Step #1 (1)
14
Steps Toward Common Criteria Approach:
Step #1 (2)
15
Steps Toward Common Criteria Approach:
Step #1 (3)
16
2004-2014 Evaluation
Timeline
Steps Toward Common Criteria Approach:
Step #2 (1)
17
Steps Toward Common Criteria Approach:
Step #2 (2)
18
Steps Toward Common Criteria Approach:
Step #2 (3)
19
FSTEC of Russia Approved Protection Profiles
• PP for IPS/IDS
• PP for Antiviruses
• PP for Trusted Boot Loaders
• PP for Removable Storage Protection
Protection Profiles in Development
• PP for Firewalls
• PP for Operating System
• PP for DBMS
Steps Toward Common Criteria Approach:
Step #2 (4)
20
http://fstec.ru
Certifications against new FSTEC of Russia
requirements: projects summary
21
Summary:
 TOE Types: IDS/IPS,
Antivirus, Trusted boot
loader
 Vendors: HP, McAfee,
ESET, Trend Micro,
PineApp, Kaspersky
Lab, Cisco, Echelon,
Altx-Soft, Secure
Code
 Number of active
labs: 4
Number of certifications
Certifications against new FSTEC of Russia
requirements: Russian vs. non-Russian TOE
22
Steps Toward Secure Software Development
23
 information security threats
modeling
 source code static/dynamic
analysis
 source code review
 penetration testing
 ...
Russian standard
«Information protection. Secure Software
Development. General requirements» (draft)
Proposed Secure Software
Development Controls:
Final Remarks
24
1. First certifications according to the new requirements
were provided for non-Russian products.
2. More and more leading non-Russian developers provide
the Russian Evaluations Laboratories with access to their
source code, and this tendency shall be observed in the
future.
3. Efficiency in detection of vulnerabilities in software
submitted for certification will advance.
4. Russian developers will pay more for certification.
5. The number of actively working Evaluations Laboratories
will degrade.
Contact Information
25
 Alexander Barabanov, Ph.D., CISSP, CSSLP
NPO Echelon
ab@cnpo.ru
 Alexey Markov, Dr.Sc., CISSP, Member of IEEE
NPO Echelon
am@cnpo.ru
 Valentin Tsirlov, Ph.D., CISSP, CISM
NPO Echelon
z@cnpo.ru
26
Thank you for your attention!

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WednesdayBarabanovSecureSoftwareDevelopmentInTheRussianITSecurityCertificationScheme

  • 1. Secure software development in the Russian IT Security Certification Scheme Alexander Barabanov, Alexey Markov, Valentin Tsirlov
  • 2. Agenda 2  Brief overview  Current status of the Russian IT Security Certification Scheme  Steps Toward Common Criteria Approach and Secure Software Development  Final Remarks
  • 3. Brief overview: Historical Perspective 3 1995 Establishment of Russian IT Security Certification Scheme 1997 Mandatory requirements for firewall and access control systems 1999 2003 Guidance based on CC v.2.1 Mandatory requirements for IPS/IDS (based on CC) Mandatory requirements for antiviruses (based on CC) Mandatory requirements for source code analysis 2012 2013 2014 Mandatory requirements for trusted boot loader (based on CC) Mandatory requirements for removable storage protection tools (based on CC)
  • 4. Brief overview: who takes part in the certification process? 4
  • 5. Brief overview: typical timeline 5 Obtaining FSTEC ID Normally 1 month Evaluation provided by Laboratory 3-4 months Certification by Certification Body 1 month and more Obtaining a certificate from FSTEC of Russia Normally 1 month
  • 8. Brief overview: Classical Major Approaches to Evaluation 8 Evaluation of the security functionality • Black box testing to ensure that TOE works as it should Evaluation for the absence of non-declared functions • Testing of source code for the absence of software vulnerabilities
  • 9. Current status of the Russian Scheme: Products Evaluations 9
  • 10. Current status of the Russian Scheme: Certified Products by Types 10 2011-2014 Evaluation Timeline
  • 11. Current status of the Russian Scheme: Russian vs. Non-Russian Developers 11
  • 12. Current status of the Russian Scheme: Non-Russian Developers (2) 12 2011-2014 Evaluation Timeline
  • 13. Current status of the Russian Scheme: Russian Developers 13 2011-2014 Evaluation Timeline
  • 14. Steps Toward Common Criteria Approach: Step #1 (1) 14
  • 15. Steps Toward Common Criteria Approach: Step #1 (2) 15
  • 16. Steps Toward Common Criteria Approach: Step #1 (3) 16 2004-2014 Evaluation Timeline
  • 17. Steps Toward Common Criteria Approach: Step #2 (1) 17
  • 18. Steps Toward Common Criteria Approach: Step #2 (2) 18
  • 19. Steps Toward Common Criteria Approach: Step #2 (3) 19 FSTEC of Russia Approved Protection Profiles • PP for IPS/IDS • PP for Antiviruses • PP for Trusted Boot Loaders • PP for Removable Storage Protection Protection Profiles in Development • PP for Firewalls • PP for Operating System • PP for DBMS
  • 20. Steps Toward Common Criteria Approach: Step #2 (4) 20 http://fstec.ru
  • 21. Certifications against new FSTEC of Russia requirements: projects summary 21 Summary:  TOE Types: IDS/IPS, Antivirus, Trusted boot loader  Vendors: HP, McAfee, ESET, Trend Micro, PineApp, Kaspersky Lab, Cisco, Echelon, Altx-Soft, Secure Code  Number of active labs: 4 Number of certifications
  • 22. Certifications against new FSTEC of Russia requirements: Russian vs. non-Russian TOE 22
  • 23. Steps Toward Secure Software Development 23  information security threats modeling  source code static/dynamic analysis  source code review  penetration testing  ... Russian standard «Information protection. Secure Software Development. General requirements» (draft) Proposed Secure Software Development Controls:
  • 24. Final Remarks 24 1. First certifications according to the new requirements were provided for non-Russian products. 2. More and more leading non-Russian developers provide the Russian Evaluations Laboratories with access to their source code, and this tendency shall be observed in the future. 3. Efficiency in detection of vulnerabilities in software submitted for certification will advance. 4. Russian developers will pay more for certification. 5. The number of actively working Evaluations Laboratories will degrade.
  • 25. Contact Information 25  Alexander Barabanov, Ph.D., CISSP, CSSLP NPO Echelon ab@cnpo.ru  Alexey Markov, Dr.Sc., CISSP, Member of IEEE NPO Echelon am@cnpo.ru  Valentin Tsirlov, Ph.D., CISSP, CISM NPO Echelon z@cnpo.ru
  • 26. 26 Thank you for your attention!