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CVSS

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Delivered at the RMSIG of aisa.org.au on July 2007 and at RUXCON 2K6

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CVSS

  1. 1. Common Vulnerability Scoring System Christian Heinrich ASIA RMSIG July 2007
  2. 2. cmlhCurrently Security Researcher – Defeating Network Intrusion Detection/Prevention and Forensics – Presented at RUXCON 2K5 and RUXCON 2K6Former Security Manager – News Limited – DSD Gateway Certified Service Provider – Federal Government Endorsed BusinessPublic Profile on LinkedIn - http://www.linkedin.com/in/ChristianHeinrich
  3. 3. Agenda1. History from the VDF to CVSS v22. CVSS v2 from the End User’s Perspective3. Caveats, Politics and other Traps :)
  4. 4. Vulnerability Disclosure FrameworkNational Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) Vulnerability Disclosure Working Group (VDWG) – 13 Jan 2004Findings with Existing Methodologies from Microsoft, CERT, etc – Specific to Vendor x Product y not Vendor z Product y – No consideration to • Environment of End User • Time Line of Vulnerability
  5. 5. CVSS to CVSS v212 October 2004 - Vulnerability Scoring Working Sub Group of VDWGFebruary 2005 - Presented at RSA by Mike Schiffman (Cisco)11 May 2005- NAIC Appointed Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST)- FIRST formed Special Interest Group (CVSS-SIG)20 June 2007 – CVSS v2
  6. 6. CVSS v2
  7. 7. Base MetricsIntrinsic to any given vulnerability that do not change over or in different environments1. Access from Local Console or Remote Network via Bluetooth -> Internet2. “Technical” Likelihood3. Authentication“Technical” Impact to 4. Confidentiality, 5. Integrity and 6. Availability
  8. 8. Temporal MetricsCharacteristics of the vulnerability which evolve over the lifetime of the vulnerability1. Maturity of the Exploit i.e. Proof of Concept, Worm, etc?2. Is a Patch and/or Workaround, Available?3. Confidence in the Report?
  9. 9. Environmental MetricsContain those characteristics of vulnerability which are tied to a specific implementation of the end user1. Potential Collateral Damage to Critical Infrastructure?2. Total number of Targets?“Business” Impact to 3. Confidentiality, 4. Integrity and 5. Availability
  10. 10. ScoringCalculators published via the “Scores and Calculators” Page at http://www.first.org/cvssPresentation of Base Metrics AV:[L,A,N]/AC:[H,M,L]/Au:[M,S,N]/C:[N,P,C]/I:[N,P,C]/A:[N,P,C]Presentation of Temporal Metrics E:[U,POC,F,H,ND]/RL:[OF,TF,W,U,ND]/RC:[UC,UR,C,ND]Presentation of Environmental Metrics CDP:[N,L,LM,MH,H,ND]/TD:[N,L,M,H,ND]/CR:[L,M,H,ND]/IR:[L,M,H,ND]/AR:[L,M,H,ND]Presentation of Base Metrics Example: AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:C
  11. 11. Caveats, Politics and other Traps :)Base MetricsVendor’s “subjective” interpretation of Base Metrics “Independent” NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD)Vendor publishes Base Score but withholds Base Metrics Derive Possible Base Metrics from Base Score with FuzzerAttack Vector – Metric with Highest Numerical Value, not most common Some attacks e.g. XSS only considers Web Server, not BrowserAuthentication – Can be “reduced” due to certain implementations e.g. Token, S/KEYConsiderations towards End User’s Environment – Probability of Deriving Authentication Credential – Range of Wireless Network? What if High Gain Antenna? What if Faraday Cage?
  12. 12. Caveats, Politics and other Traps :)Temporal Metrics“Will this affect my network range?”- No feed, real-time or otherwise, is providedDoesn’t Consider reduction in time due to “Binary Diff” and/or “Fuzzing”Environmental MetricsTarget Distribution - Map “Connectivity” with Active and Passive DiscoveryDoesn’t Consider: - Cost to Implement Patch and/or Workaround - Technical Knowledge Required for Attack Complexity
  13. 13. Caveats, Politics and other Traps :)ScoringDeveloping “Fuzzer” to Derive All Scores by Calculating All Numerical Values Rounding to “Reduce” Score. Substitution – Different Metric Yet Same Score Derive Possible Metrics from ScoreBased on CVSS v1 FuzzerExpect an Announcement from Jeff Jones (Microsoft)Come to the Security Interchange meeting later this year
  14. 14. Caveats, Politics and other Traps :)Lack of Representation: – No invitation to End Users and little from Security Researchers (e.g. Schiffman) – No lesson learnt by CERTThe Horse has Bolted – First Impressions Last: – Optional Scores – Resistance from Initial Supporters such as Microsoft – CVE still in process of reclassifying vulnerabilities to updated schemaAdvocate to Vendor as it provides YOU with Advantages in removing Subjectivity from: – Priorities Remediation regardless of Vendor and/or Product and/or Technology – Objective Vulnerability Distribution Studies
  15. 15. ThanksJohn GreavesDavid Palmer & WestpacChris Wood & PatchlinkDavid ReinholdJohn DaleJohn Frisken

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