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VM 2015fall final presentation
VM applications
B00902069 傅 蕎
B00902070 沈雯萱
Reference Papers
● “Terra: a virtual machine-based platform for trusted
computing”, Tal Garfinkel, et. al., Proceedings of the
nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems
principles, SOSP’03, 2003
● “ReVirt: enabling intrusion analysis through virtual-
machine logging and replay”, G. Dunlap, et. al., ACM
SIGOPS Operating Systems Review - OSDI '02:
Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating
systems design and implementation, 2002
● “SubVirt: implementing malware with virtual machines”,
S.T King, P. Chen, 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, 2006.
● “Cider: Native Execution of iOS Apps on Android”,
Jeremy Andrus, et. al., ASPLOS 2
Outline
● Why apply VM
● Four applications
 Motivation
 Technical Highlight
 Major Experience Result
 Main Contribution
● Our own idea
● Comparison
● Conclusion
3
Why apply VM?
● Allows programs to run cross platforms.
● Enable innovation in security.
● Failure isolation.
4
Four applications
● Terra, SOSP’ 03, 2003
● ReVirt, ACM SIGOPS OSR – OSDI’ 02
● RubVirt, IEEE SSP, 2006
● Cider, ASPLOS 2014
5
Terra:
a virtual machine-based
platform for trusted
computing
6
Motivation
● Commodity systems impose “fundamental
limitations” on security
● Opened-box systems
 General purpose, rich functionality
● Closed-box systems
 Greater security, maybe including tamper-resistance
7
Technical Highlight
● TVMM: Partitions a single tamper-resistant,
general-purpose platform into multiple
isolated virtual machines
 TVMM runs at the highest privilege level and is
secure against tampering by administrator (root
secure)
 Management VM
 Formulates all platform access control and resource
management policies
8
Experience Result
● Quake – multi-player online game vulnerable
to client cheating
 Terra provides:
 Security communication
 Client integrity
 Server integrity
 Isolation
 Terra can’t prevent:
 DoS attacks
9
Main Contribution
● Make closed-box VMs equivalent to dedicated
hardware and software of closed-box platforms
● The TVMM mechanisms allow Terra to partition
the platform into multiple, isolated VMs.
10
Revirt:
Enabling intrusion
analysis through virtual-
machine logging and
replay
Motivation
 Post-attack analysis
 Understand the attack
 Fix the vulnerability
 Repair any damage
● Current system logger
 Need integrity of the OS being logged
 No sufficient information for non-deterministic events
● Revirt
12
Revirt
● Encapsulate target(OS+app) inside VM
● Log below the VM
● Replay executions before, during, after
an intruder compromises the system
● Replay instruction-by-instruction
● Non-deterministic attack or execution
 Time
 External input
● Long-term to several months
13
Technical highlight
● UMLinux
 Virtual machine is a user process on host
(OS-on-OS)
 Guest app -> Guest kernel -> Host kernel
 Logging in OS-on-OS is safer
● Logging
 Record all non-deterministic event affecting VM
 PC, number of branches, signals, interrupts, traps
● Replaying
 Prevent new interrupt
14
Experience
● 5 workloads
● Virtualization overhead
● Validating correctness
 Add extensive error to alert
● Logging and replaying overhead
 Space & Time
15
Main contribution
● Enable a system administrator to replay the
long-term, instruction-by-instruction
execution of a computer system
16
Subvirt:
implementing malware
with virtual machines
Motivation
● Attacker V.S. Defender
 Control of lower layer system
 To monitor, perturb execution, modify state, etc.
 To avoid detector
● Current rootkit
 No clear advantage over detection system
 Tradeoff between functionality and invisibility
● Virtual Machine Based Rootkit(VMBR)
18
VMBR
● Run beneath the OS
hoist the target OS into a virtual machine
● No visible state or event
● Easy to develop malicious services
19
Technical highlight
● Loads before target OS/applications
 Use VMM to boot
● 3 kinds of malicious services
 No interact with target
 Observe information about target
 Intentionally perturb execution of target
● Maintain control
 Only lose after power up before VMBR start
 Lose when power off, keep low-power mode
20
Experience
● 2 proof-of-concept VMBR
to subvert Windows XP & Linux targets
● 4 example malicious services
 Evaluation
 Disk place
 Time to install VMBR
 Effect on time of booting target
 User view
 Memory space
21
Defend VMBR
● Security software below VMBR
 Not go through VMBR layer!!
 Use secure hardware
 Boot from safe medium
 Physically unplug the machine
 Secure VMM
● Security software above VMBR
 CPU overhead cause timing difference
 Extra memory and disk place
 Change in I/O devices
 Imperfect virtualization then
22
Main contribution
● A non-traditional malware can gain a clear
advantage over intrusion detection systems
running in a target OS
23
Cider:
native Execution of iOS
Apps on Android
24
Motivation
● Users who wants to run iOS games are
stuck with the smaller screen sizes.
● Users who prefer larger selection of
hardware are stuck with the poor quality and
selection of Android games.
● Cider: an OS compatibility architecture that
can run apps of different platforms
simultaneously.
25
Technical Highlight
● Persona: Distinguish iOS and Linux threads
 Mach-O Loader: supporting XNU syscall interface
and facilitating proper signal delivery.
● Duct Tapes: Translate foreign APIs to
domestic APIs
 Compile-time code adaption layer
● Diplomats: iOS apps using Adroid libraries
 Android ELF loader
 Kernal-level persona management
 Mediates foreign function calls into domestic library
26
Experience Results
● PassMark benchmark application
27
Main Contribution
● Direct execution of unmodified iOS apps
● Reuse existing libraries
● iOS apps can use Android libraries
28
Let’s summarize.
29
We think...
● VM has many great features which standard
OS doesn't.
● Making an operating system which has no
host system but all virtual machines.
30
Comparison
● Destination
 Terra: secuity
 Revirt: security
 Subvirt: security
 Cider: OS compatibility
● System layer
 Terra: VMM
 Revirt: VMM
 Subvirt: VMM
 Cider: ABI
31
Conclusion
● VM is good!
● VM can be applied on
 security
 running/developing cross platforms program
 isolating OS
32
Team Work
● We partition the four paper into two part.
● After read our own part, we summarize our
part to each other.
● Discuss the rest part of the report together.
33
Q&A??
34
THANK YOU!!:D
35

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Vm final

  • 1. VM 2015fall final presentation VM applications B00902069 傅 蕎 B00902070 沈雯萱
  • 2. Reference Papers ● “Terra: a virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing”, Tal Garfinkel, et. al., Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles, SOSP’03, 2003 ● “ReVirt: enabling intrusion analysis through virtual- machine logging and replay”, G. Dunlap, et. al., ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review - OSDI '02: Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementation, 2002 ● “SubVirt: implementing malware with virtual machines”, S.T King, P. Chen, 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2006. ● “Cider: Native Execution of iOS Apps on Android”, Jeremy Andrus, et. al., ASPLOS 2
  • 3. Outline ● Why apply VM ● Four applications  Motivation  Technical Highlight  Major Experience Result  Main Contribution ● Our own idea ● Comparison ● Conclusion 3
  • 4. Why apply VM? ● Allows programs to run cross platforms. ● Enable innovation in security. ● Failure isolation. 4
  • 5. Four applications ● Terra, SOSP’ 03, 2003 ● ReVirt, ACM SIGOPS OSR – OSDI’ 02 ● RubVirt, IEEE SSP, 2006 ● Cider, ASPLOS 2014 5
  • 6. Terra: a virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing 6
  • 7. Motivation ● Commodity systems impose “fundamental limitations” on security ● Opened-box systems  General purpose, rich functionality ● Closed-box systems  Greater security, maybe including tamper-resistance 7
  • 8. Technical Highlight ● TVMM: Partitions a single tamper-resistant, general-purpose platform into multiple isolated virtual machines  TVMM runs at the highest privilege level and is secure against tampering by administrator (root secure)  Management VM  Formulates all platform access control and resource management policies 8
  • 9. Experience Result ● Quake – multi-player online game vulnerable to client cheating  Terra provides:  Security communication  Client integrity  Server integrity  Isolation  Terra can’t prevent:  DoS attacks 9
  • 10. Main Contribution ● Make closed-box VMs equivalent to dedicated hardware and software of closed-box platforms ● The TVMM mechanisms allow Terra to partition the platform into multiple, isolated VMs. 10
  • 11. Revirt: Enabling intrusion analysis through virtual- machine logging and replay
  • 12. Motivation  Post-attack analysis  Understand the attack  Fix the vulnerability  Repair any damage ● Current system logger  Need integrity of the OS being logged  No sufficient information for non-deterministic events ● Revirt 12
  • 13. Revirt ● Encapsulate target(OS+app) inside VM ● Log below the VM ● Replay executions before, during, after an intruder compromises the system ● Replay instruction-by-instruction ● Non-deterministic attack or execution  Time  External input ● Long-term to several months 13
  • 14. Technical highlight ● UMLinux  Virtual machine is a user process on host (OS-on-OS)  Guest app -> Guest kernel -> Host kernel  Logging in OS-on-OS is safer ● Logging  Record all non-deterministic event affecting VM  PC, number of branches, signals, interrupts, traps ● Replaying  Prevent new interrupt 14
  • 15. Experience ● 5 workloads ● Virtualization overhead ● Validating correctness  Add extensive error to alert ● Logging and replaying overhead  Space & Time 15
  • 16. Main contribution ● Enable a system administrator to replay the long-term, instruction-by-instruction execution of a computer system 16
  • 18. Motivation ● Attacker V.S. Defender  Control of lower layer system  To monitor, perturb execution, modify state, etc.  To avoid detector ● Current rootkit  No clear advantage over detection system  Tradeoff between functionality and invisibility ● Virtual Machine Based Rootkit(VMBR) 18
  • 19. VMBR ● Run beneath the OS hoist the target OS into a virtual machine ● No visible state or event ● Easy to develop malicious services 19
  • 20. Technical highlight ● Loads before target OS/applications  Use VMM to boot ● 3 kinds of malicious services  No interact with target  Observe information about target  Intentionally perturb execution of target ● Maintain control  Only lose after power up before VMBR start  Lose when power off, keep low-power mode 20
  • 21. Experience ● 2 proof-of-concept VMBR to subvert Windows XP & Linux targets ● 4 example malicious services  Evaluation  Disk place  Time to install VMBR  Effect on time of booting target  User view  Memory space 21
  • 22. Defend VMBR ● Security software below VMBR  Not go through VMBR layer!!  Use secure hardware  Boot from safe medium  Physically unplug the machine  Secure VMM ● Security software above VMBR  CPU overhead cause timing difference  Extra memory and disk place  Change in I/O devices  Imperfect virtualization then 22
  • 23. Main contribution ● A non-traditional malware can gain a clear advantage over intrusion detection systems running in a target OS 23
  • 24. Cider: native Execution of iOS Apps on Android 24
  • 25. Motivation ● Users who wants to run iOS games are stuck with the smaller screen sizes. ● Users who prefer larger selection of hardware are stuck with the poor quality and selection of Android games. ● Cider: an OS compatibility architecture that can run apps of different platforms simultaneously. 25
  • 26. Technical Highlight ● Persona: Distinguish iOS and Linux threads  Mach-O Loader: supporting XNU syscall interface and facilitating proper signal delivery. ● Duct Tapes: Translate foreign APIs to domestic APIs  Compile-time code adaption layer ● Diplomats: iOS apps using Adroid libraries  Android ELF loader  Kernal-level persona management  Mediates foreign function calls into domestic library 26
  • 27. Experience Results ● PassMark benchmark application 27
  • 28. Main Contribution ● Direct execution of unmodified iOS apps ● Reuse existing libraries ● iOS apps can use Android libraries 28
  • 30. We think... ● VM has many great features which standard OS doesn't. ● Making an operating system which has no host system but all virtual machines. 30
  • 31. Comparison ● Destination  Terra: secuity  Revirt: security  Subvirt: security  Cider: OS compatibility ● System layer  Terra: VMM  Revirt: VMM  Subvirt: VMM  Cider: ABI 31
  • 32. Conclusion ● VM is good! ● VM can be applied on  security  running/developing cross platforms program  isolating OS 32
  • 33. Team Work ● We partition the four paper into two part. ● After read our own part, we summarize our part to each other. ● Discuss the rest part of the report together. 33

Editor's Notes

  1. 可能提一下作者之類的,老師上次好像有說會在意 順序和之後介紹順序一致,但還沒確定 //我上次的筆記 他是說寫在第一頁耶@@ //是標題頁嗎@@
  2. 1. Poor isolation between applications (processes) =>程式之間會互相影響 需要不同security 需求的程式不能同時運作 因為系統的security level 只會符合最脆弱那個app  Weak mechanisms to authentication applications to peers (distributed computing)   2. Open box就是我們現在用的像是win.linux這些系統,他可以符合很多種用途,但是在安全性的保證上就像前面提到的一樣,並沒有很好 3. Close box的平台通常是透過複雜的硬體與軟體設計來達成 像是ATM、手機、XBOX遊戲機 在安全性上 提供了遠端系統確認這個software是不是安全的或是可用的,如此一來developer對軟體的行為就會有正確的預期 因此Terra這個系統就是結合了openbox與closebox的優點,用軟體的方式做一個closebox的VM,而且可以運行在一般的系統上
  3. 1. TVMM除了有跟一般VMM一樣的特性之外(isolation , security, efficiency, …), 還包含三個性質 Root secure: 就算是root user還是不一定能有修改的權利 Attestation: 運行在closebox的app會告訴遠端的系統 他現在在跑什麼,有助於遠端系統認證,信任這個程式 提供trust path lack of hw 2. Grants access to peripherals, issues CPU and memory limits, etc. 同意對周邊設備的access, 像是CPU的使用或是記憶體限制等
  4. Quake 玩家可以在client端修改自己的數據,或是由於server與client的communication並不安全,玩家可以因而透過這樣去監控對手的情況 VM直接開機就是遊戲 Provide 1: 會一直跟遠端系統確認這個軟體的好壞 2. 玩家不能編輯VM裡面的檔案 3. Server也是某一個玩家
  5. 即使是最好的administrator還是要定時檢查非法入侵者 等attack發生之後再來分析就來不及了 分析攻擊方法是什麼 自己弱點是哪裡 想辦法修復 通常是用logging的方法分析 現在的logger有兩個問題 作logging的OS本身要夠正直 logger完全相信OS(把log file放file system之類) OS如果被洗腦就完了 沒有足夠的資訊讓他replay和分析attack 有non-deter的事件發生就解不出來 (例如time-of-use race condition)通常效果不會立即顯現 很難重現就對了
  6. log在VM下是為了保護被壞人洗腦OS/app 會把被洗腦後作的事全部記下來 fault-tolerance for primary-backup recovery external input:滑鼠 鍵盤 網卡...
  7. similar but not same host HW OSonOS VS direct on OS就是普通的VM(target app run on host OS) VMM會自己切換是guest kernel/user mode guest OS相信下層的程度->TCB trusted computing base log in OSonOS比較難攻擊 因為TCB比較小(被攻擊時不會影響到host) 雖然同樣都吃host OS值不值得信任(future work) 只需要記會影響VM process execution的non-deter就好了 其他很多都不用記(影響host process的) 分析attack時可以有幾個小工具: replay一半作點事的工具
  8. overhead都沒有很多 表現都接近1 正常使用都不會發現
  9. : implementing malware with virtual machines Iimplementing malware with virtual machines
  10. lower layer是實作upper layer用的abstraction的人 像是OS都看得見application rootkit: tools used to hdie malicious activities 現在的rootkit有兩個缺點: no clear advantage over detection 頂多和detect在同一層 還是沒有win
  11. VMM: 管理下層resource給上層很多個VM有abstraction guest(user mode)都不知道VMM在幹嘛(kernel mode) 正常的使用在VMM之上 VM services都是作在guest外面 以防擾亂guest software inside & outside看到的state/event不同 -> semantic gap VM introspection(VMI) 幫助VM services 了解或修改guest的state/event 然後可以invoke guest OS/app VM services可以protect他們自己by disallow external I/O VMBR把target搬到VM然後跑malware also isolate malware所以不會被發現 VMBR可以以VMM的角色修改target state/event 而且不會被發現
  12. must gain privilege to modify boot sequence save VMBR state in disk(most convenient) 下次就會boot VMBR (1)就是讓他在attack OS裡跑就可以 (2)偷偷作log by modify VMM,VMI可以隨時trap target OS/app (3)modify exe of target 可以改HWdata也可以透過VMI改data or exe of target first code system BIOS min power off的時間 handle reboot,restart virtual HW than reset physical HW simulate 關機 VMBR還是在跑
  13. 4個example包含了前面說的三種惡意軟體類型+detect countermeasure small fraction of disk virtual PC比較慢是因為他用了slower hardware和less memory few diff for user, little impact on target, use special driver within target OS small percentage of memory
  14. 很難detect 因為virtualize state and ideally no modify state in target target 看不到VM 就算看到了 VMBR也可以動手腳讓他以為沒事 那時候還有imperfect virtualization inst for x86 user可以detect in privilege level 隨著技術進步這點就不是問題了
  15. : Native Execution of iOS Apps on Android Native Execution of iOS Apps on Android
  16. passmark : 手機效能測試軟體 measuement: operations per sec 所以越高越好 cider android: android run on cider cider ios: ios run on cider