SlideShare a Scribd company logo
www.intersec.co.uk30
echnical surveillance countermeasure (TSCM)
training can broadly be divided into two distinct
areas – training specifically on the operation of TSCM
equipment, and training on the procedural elements
of the search itself. Both are essential, but both are
dramatically undersubscribed. There is the tendency
among many operators to consider themselves totally
prepared for the job at hand after undergoing just
the basic equipment orientation (normally one day)
and nothing else ever after. In truth, you can teach a
ten-year-old child to physically operate TSCM equipment,
but that doesn’t qualify them to go out into the technical
wilderness and competently carry out what is a difficult
and demanding job. The carrying out of TSCM searches is
a constant learning process. To keep sharp, disciplined and
up to date, you need to train.
Most modern TSCM RF search equipment is multi-
functional, with high speed receivers able to detect
sophisticated surveillance transmitters over wide
bandwidths and provide retrospective reference data.
They have multiple display options and all the tools you
need to investigate the entire radio spectrum. Digital
Spread Spectrum Packet Data transmitters can be
detected in almost real time – in theory. I say “in theory”
because someone needs to have shown you such a device
as detected on TSCM equipment. If you don’t know what
the signal looks like or where it lives on the frequency
band, how do you know that what you are seeing on
your equipment is a bugging device or not? You can’t
demodulate it and you can’t listen to it; and there are
plenty of legitimate spread spectrum and packet data
transmissions out there.
Trawling through the frequency band with your
headphones on may uncover the odd analogue bug
once in a while, but no serious surveillance attack
would involve that type of device. The serious end of
audio surveillance requires a serious approach to TSCM
searches. Knowledge is king here, and knowledge
comes from training. TSCM RF search equipment will
detect illicit signals, but if one cannot accurately interpret
the received data, you are effectively blindfolded.
Companies providing TSCM training services need to
have an inventory of audio transmitters that represent
the current and credible modern audio attack in order
to demonstrate both their capability and method of
detection. This requires a considerable investment with
packet data burst transmitters costing upwards of
4,000 for one transmitter type alone. If you are carrying
out TSCM searches and you’ve never been instructed
Dean La-Vey outlines the various types of counter-surveillance training available, and argues that
every TSCM operator should engage in constant re-training to stay ahead of the threats
T
TSCM TRAINING
–WHO NEEDS IT!?
on the detection of this type of device using the real
thing, you’ll never know what it is by trying to listen
to it! A competent TSCM training body will have such
devices and instruct on how to detect them. Please
note, however, that a one-day training course on a
modern TSCM receiver will not show you everything the
equipment can do. It requires on-going training.
Non-linear junction detector (NLJD) training requires
firstly a modern NLJD and a basic understanding of its
principle of operation. It also requires an understanding
of the practical search limitations of NLJDs. This author
has lost count of the number of enquiries as to why
someone’s NLJD is not detecting anything housed
within a metal door frame, or why a 900MHz NLJD is
reacting positively to “thin air”! Even basic instruction
“On-going training is
absolutely essential to
carry out TSCM efficiently”
©DeanLa-Vey
www.intersec.co.uk 31
©QCCInterscan
FEATURE
should cover these types of fundamental basic issues
and queries. NLJDs won’t detect anything when used
on certain types of materials, even when a device is
secreted within the material itself. Many just assume that
no reaction on the NLJD means no detected electronic
device. Not true! Credible training would explain clearly
the areas of search where NLJDs can and cannot be used.
You won’t learn it from reading the manual.
If there is one area where TSCM training is lacking by
the bucket load, it is in the field of telephone TSCM. As
with RF training, the equipment available is advanced
and competent, but operator knowledge and data
interpretation is miniscule to say the least. No greater
example of this can be found than that of voice over
Internet protocol (VOIP) telephone system searches.
Let’s first consider the equipment. Arguably the best
dedicated telephone TSCM equipment in production
is the REI TALAN. It contains within its multi-function
facilities a VOIP analyser which captures VOIP packet data
for analysis. How many TSCM operators know what the
captured data actually means? VOIP has no relationship
whatsoever to conventional telephony, so having such
knowledge doesn’t qualify you to interpret VOIP data
for illicit interception equipment. You need training!
What happens to the system voltages if you add four
extra microphones to a Polycom conference telephone?
Someone needs to show you. What happens if you
disconnect a VOIP telephone and it won’t re-boot and
requires an administrator re-set? You won’t guess the
solution; you need to be trained. Even when searching
for devices on conventional POTS or digital systems, there
is great confusion as to what is normal and what is an
anomaly. Someone well-versed on telephone systems
has to show you and train you to confidently search
telephone systems.
Knowing how to operate TSCM equipment is one
thing, but knowing how to conduct the search itself is a
completely different discipline. A search can be completely
compromised if the search team steams on in with all guns
blazing. All search areas are different, and the search itself
may need to be procedurally modified to avoid such an
occurrence. Competently trained TSCM personnel will check
for covert CCTV transmissions before they even enter, will
have an alternative reason for being there (checking IT, WiFi,
or space planning etc), and have as much information on
the search area itself in advance of the search. Training may
cover areas which are not obvious to many, but which are
extremely relevant to TSCM searches.
Health and safety requirements also have to be
considered. Is the environment safe to work in, and has
Hard target: successful
TSCM operators must
be trained in far
more than just basic
equipment operation
www.intersec.co.uk32
©QCCInterscan
TSCM TRAINING – WHO NEEDS IT!?
Dean La-Vey is a
security consultant
specialising
in electronic
countermeasures,
specialised products
and techniques for
both the government
and private sectors
on a worldwide
basis. He is a founder
member of the
Technical Surveillance
Countermeasures
Institute (TSCMi), a
body of excellence
within the TSCM
industry.
careful thought been given to areas of risk including
asbestos? If you pop open a suspended ceiling or dry
riser and the pipes are clad, can you recognise whether
the material is safe? In many – and I really do mean
many – buildings, it can be asbestos. TSCM teams need
to be trained to be ‘asbestos aware’ and have a working
contingency for it when discovered.
Procedural training will also include DNA preservation
of evidence techniques should a device be found during
the search. If the situation becomes a legal issue, how
you examined and stored the device itself can greatly
affect the outcome. If your physical search personnel
don’t receive this type of training, your entire forensic
programme will go out of the window. Let’s put things
into perspective. This author has 28 years of experience
in TSCM, but I still attend comprehensive training courses
on the above subjects and others relating to TSCM
procedures. It keeps you up to date and ultimately makes
you more proficient at the job. No one should assume
they know everything. TSCM is a constant learning
process. Of course, the order in which particular parts of
the search (RF, passive, etc.) are carried out is a matter of
personal choice.
Specialised searches, such as those carried out on
corporate aircraft, for example, require specific training
courses before you can even step onto an aircraft. This
isn’t a choice – it’s a mandatory requirement, and the
legislation can change every year. In 2015, the European
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) brought in two additional
training courses for those carrying out work on corporate
aircraft. If you haven’t done the training, you won’t
legally be able to carry out TSCM on aircraft in the EU.
The Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) in the United States
is also set to bring in the same legislation. It’s all part of
the aviation certification process. There are enormous
consequences if untrained personnel clamber aboard a
corporate jet and set about searching it without receiving
training in regard to what they can and cannot do. Get it
wrong and the aircraft itself will need re-certification. In
simple terms, it may not fly for up to six weeks. Not ideal if
the owner expects to fly out on his jet the following day.
TSCM training is something many operators do once
when they purchase equipment. There are, of course, the
inevitable know-it-alls who have a genuine unwillingness
to learn or feel they don’t need to be told how to do their
job. It should be stated, however, that on-going training
is absolutely essential to carry out TSCM efficiently.
Knowing how to operate the basic elements of TSCM
equipment is minor in terms of what else you need to
learn to be proficient. Some training, such as the asbestos
awareness training, is not TSCM specific but it is highly
relevant to TSCM searches.
My concluding comment is this: serious electronic
eavesdroppers aren’t successful by accident. They train
at their job. Some known to this author attend acting
schools to learn how to appear credible in whatever
guise they decide to use. They attend electrician courses,
telephone courses, IT courses and locksmith courses to
name a few. In this regard those engaged in TSCM have
to up their game in regard to on-going training.
Investment in training
should be seen as
equally important as
investment in the latest
TSCM equipment

More Related Content

What's hot

2015 ERII-CCISM
2015 ERII-CCISM2015 ERII-CCISM
Lenro Company Profile 2016.1 (1)
Lenro Company Profile 2016.1 (1)Lenro Company Profile 2016.1 (1)
Lenro Company Profile 2016.1 (1)
Xerxes Oosthuizen
 
Irm 5-malicious networkbehaviour
Irm 5-malicious networkbehaviourIrm 5-malicious networkbehaviour
Irm 5-malicious networkbehaviour
Kasper de Waard
 
Homeland Security Solutions
Homeland Security SolutionsHomeland Security Solutions
Homeland Security Solutions
Dimitris Chalambalis
 
Bpg arc flash
Bpg arc flash Bpg arc flash
Bpg arc flash
Deal Point
 
santoskumaarResume - updated
santoskumaarResume - updatedsantoskumaarResume - updated
santoskumaarResume - updated
Santos Kumaar.S
 
Ccdc 2012 Wireless Data Exfiltration - building and using low cost signal int...
Ccdc 2012 Wireless Data Exfiltration - building and using low cost signal int...Ccdc 2012 Wireless Data Exfiltration - building and using low cost signal int...
Ccdc 2012 Wireless Data Exfiltration - building and using low cost signal int...
warezjoe
 
Maritime Cyber Security Education
Maritime Cyber Security EducationMaritime Cyber Security Education
Maritime Cyber Security Education
Valentin Bañaco
 
Aviation Security and the Active Shooter
Aviation Security and the Active ShooterAviation Security and the Active Shooter
Aviation Security and the Active Shooter
Erin Planting
 
Maritime Cyber Security
Maritime Cyber SecurityMaritime Cyber Security
Maritime Cyber Security
Dimitris Chalambalis
 
Advanced persistent threats(APT)
Advanced persistent threats(APT)Advanced persistent threats(APT)
Advanced persistent threats(APT)
Network Intelligence India
 
CV - Kamal Al-Sukhun new
CV - Kamal Al-Sukhun newCV - Kamal Al-Sukhun new
CV - Kamal Al-Sukhun new
Kamal Alsukhun
 
DRONES THE NEW WEAPON OF CHOICE - ALSO FOR HACKERS
DRONES THE NEW WEAPON OF CHOICE - ALSO FOR HACKERSDRONES THE NEW WEAPON OF CHOICE - ALSO FOR HACKERS
DRONES THE NEW WEAPON OF CHOICE - ALSO FOR HACKERS
Reputelligence
 
Minder Product Demo
Minder Product DemoMinder Product Demo
Minder Product Demo
Derek Cassidy
 
Security Intelligence: Advanced Persistent Threats
Security Intelligence: Advanced Persistent ThreatsSecurity Intelligence: Advanced Persistent Threats
Security Intelligence: Advanced Persistent Threats
Peter Wood
 
Using a Cognitive Analytic Approach to Enhance Cybersecurity on Oil and Gas O...
Using a Cognitive Analytic Approach to Enhance Cybersecurity on Oil and Gas O...Using a Cognitive Analytic Approach to Enhance Cybersecurity on Oil and Gas O...
Using a Cognitive Analytic Approach to Enhance Cybersecurity on Oil and Gas O...
SparkCognition
 
QLD EILS Seminar: Emerging Issues in Workplace Privacy
QLD EILS Seminar: Emerging Issues in Workplace PrivacyQLD EILS Seminar: Emerging Issues in Workplace Privacy
QLD EILS Seminar: Emerging Issues in Workplace Privacy
Maurice Blackburn Lawyers
 
DBAD16_Magazine_LR
DBAD16_Magazine_LRDBAD16_Magazine_LR
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...
Security B-Sides
 
The Digital Telecom. Security Services
The Digital Telecom. Security ServicesThe Digital Telecom. Security Services
The Digital Telecom. Security Services
Parviz Iskhakov, PhD
 

What's hot (20)

2015 ERII-CCISM
2015 ERII-CCISM2015 ERII-CCISM
2015 ERII-CCISM
 
Lenro Company Profile 2016.1 (1)
Lenro Company Profile 2016.1 (1)Lenro Company Profile 2016.1 (1)
Lenro Company Profile 2016.1 (1)
 
Irm 5-malicious networkbehaviour
Irm 5-malicious networkbehaviourIrm 5-malicious networkbehaviour
Irm 5-malicious networkbehaviour
 
Homeland Security Solutions
Homeland Security SolutionsHomeland Security Solutions
Homeland Security Solutions
 
Bpg arc flash
Bpg arc flash Bpg arc flash
Bpg arc flash
 
santoskumaarResume - updated
santoskumaarResume - updatedsantoskumaarResume - updated
santoskumaarResume - updated
 
Ccdc 2012 Wireless Data Exfiltration - building and using low cost signal int...
Ccdc 2012 Wireless Data Exfiltration - building and using low cost signal int...Ccdc 2012 Wireless Data Exfiltration - building and using low cost signal int...
Ccdc 2012 Wireless Data Exfiltration - building and using low cost signal int...
 
Maritime Cyber Security Education
Maritime Cyber Security EducationMaritime Cyber Security Education
Maritime Cyber Security Education
 
Aviation Security and the Active Shooter
Aviation Security and the Active ShooterAviation Security and the Active Shooter
Aviation Security and the Active Shooter
 
Maritime Cyber Security
Maritime Cyber SecurityMaritime Cyber Security
Maritime Cyber Security
 
Advanced persistent threats(APT)
Advanced persistent threats(APT)Advanced persistent threats(APT)
Advanced persistent threats(APT)
 
CV - Kamal Al-Sukhun new
CV - Kamal Al-Sukhun newCV - Kamal Al-Sukhun new
CV - Kamal Al-Sukhun new
 
DRONES THE NEW WEAPON OF CHOICE - ALSO FOR HACKERS
DRONES THE NEW WEAPON OF CHOICE - ALSO FOR HACKERSDRONES THE NEW WEAPON OF CHOICE - ALSO FOR HACKERS
DRONES THE NEW WEAPON OF CHOICE - ALSO FOR HACKERS
 
Minder Product Demo
Minder Product DemoMinder Product Demo
Minder Product Demo
 
Security Intelligence: Advanced Persistent Threats
Security Intelligence: Advanced Persistent ThreatsSecurity Intelligence: Advanced Persistent Threats
Security Intelligence: Advanced Persistent Threats
 
Using a Cognitive Analytic Approach to Enhance Cybersecurity on Oil and Gas O...
Using a Cognitive Analytic Approach to Enhance Cybersecurity on Oil and Gas O...Using a Cognitive Analytic Approach to Enhance Cybersecurity on Oil and Gas O...
Using a Cognitive Analytic Approach to Enhance Cybersecurity on Oil and Gas O...
 
QLD EILS Seminar: Emerging Issues in Workplace Privacy
QLD EILS Seminar: Emerging Issues in Workplace PrivacyQLD EILS Seminar: Emerging Issues in Workplace Privacy
QLD EILS Seminar: Emerging Issues in Workplace Privacy
 
DBAD16_Magazine_LR
DBAD16_Magazine_LRDBAD16_Magazine_LR
DBAD16_Magazine_LR
 
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...
 
The Digital Telecom. Security Services
The Digital Telecom. Security ServicesThe Digital Telecom. Security Services
The Digital Telecom. Security Services
 

Similar to TSCM-June15

Crime Scene Investigations
Crime Scene InvestigationsCrime Scene Investigations
Crime Scene Investigations
CTIN
 
Detecting anomalies in security cameras with 3D-convolutional neural network ...
Detecting anomalies in security cameras with 3D-convolutional neural network ...Detecting anomalies in security cameras with 3D-convolutional neural network ...
Detecting anomalies in security cameras with 3D-convolutional neural network ...
IJECEIAES
 
DTS Solution - Penetration Testing Services v1.0
DTS Solution - Penetration Testing Services v1.0DTS Solution - Penetration Testing Services v1.0
DTS Solution - Penetration Testing Services v1.0
Shah Sheikh
 
Advanced Certificate in Live Streaming & Tracking 07 - 09 Nov 2017 Dubai, UAE
Advanced Certificate in Live Streaming & Tracking 07 - 09 Nov 2017 Dubai, UAEAdvanced Certificate in Live Streaming & Tracking 07 - 09 Nov 2017 Dubai, UAE
Advanced Certificate in Live Streaming & Tracking 07 - 09 Nov 2017 Dubai, UAE
360 BSI
 
Concepts and Methodology in Mobile Devices Digital Forensics Education and Tr...
Concepts and Methodology in Mobile Devices Digital Forensics Education and Tr...Concepts and Methodology in Mobile Devices Digital Forensics Education and Tr...
Concepts and Methodology in Mobile Devices Digital Forensics Education and Tr...
Damir Delija
 
Transport Technology to the Rescue
Transport Technology to the RescueTransport Technology to the Rescue
Transport Technology to the Rescue
Kgabo Badimo
 
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?
Antenna Manufacturer Coco
 
2016_Security_System_Monitoring_in_Healthcare_Facilities
2016_Security_System_Monitoring_in_Healthcare_Facilities2016_Security_System_Monitoring_in_Healthcare_Facilities
2016_Security_System_Monitoring_in_Healthcare_Facilities
Erin Gorman
 
Criminal Investigative Team
Criminal Investigative TeamCriminal Investigative Team
Criminal Investigative Team
CTIN
 
Developing technology
Developing technologyDeveloping technology
Developing technology
OrderCustomEssay
 
demo ppt final edition
demo ppt final editiondemo ppt final edition
demo ppt final edition
Hao Liang
 
Raidprep
RaidprepRaidprep
Raidprep
CTIN
 
Daniel Lance - What "You've Got Mail" Taught Me About Cyber Security
Daniel Lance - What "You've Got Mail" Taught Me About Cyber SecurityDaniel Lance - What "You've Got Mail" Taught Me About Cyber Security
Daniel Lance - What "You've Got Mail" Taught Me About Cyber Security
EnergySec
 
Key Features of an Effective Permit to Work System
Key Features of an Effective Permit to Work SystemKey Features of an Effective Permit to Work System
Key Features of an Effective Permit to Work System
Harry George
 
Key Features of an Effective Permit to Work.pdf
Key Features of an Effective Permit to Work.pdfKey Features of an Effective Permit to Work.pdf
Key Features of an Effective Permit to Work.pdf
Harry George
 
The tops for collecting network based evidenceyou think that your.pdf
The tops for collecting network based evidenceyou think that your.pdfThe tops for collecting network based evidenceyou think that your.pdf
The tops for collecting network based evidenceyou think that your.pdf
noelbuddy
 
Some Rules for Successful Data Center Operations
Some Rules for Successful Data Center OperationsSome Rules for Successful Data Center Operations
Some Rules for Successful Data Center Operations
Thomas Goulding
 
Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator Course Details and Course Brochure | E...
Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator Course Details and Course Brochure | E...Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator Course Details and Course Brochure | E...
Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator Course Details and Course Brochure | E...
CRAW CYBER SECURITY PVT LTD
 
Technology and Safety
Technology and SafetyTechnology and Safety
Technology and Safety
Keith Haley
 
Picture Exchange Communication System
Picture Exchange Communication SystemPicture Exchange Communication System
Picture Exchange Communication System
Ashley Thomas
 

Similar to TSCM-June15 (20)

Crime Scene Investigations
Crime Scene InvestigationsCrime Scene Investigations
Crime Scene Investigations
 
Detecting anomalies in security cameras with 3D-convolutional neural network ...
Detecting anomalies in security cameras with 3D-convolutional neural network ...Detecting anomalies in security cameras with 3D-convolutional neural network ...
Detecting anomalies in security cameras with 3D-convolutional neural network ...
 
DTS Solution - Penetration Testing Services v1.0
DTS Solution - Penetration Testing Services v1.0DTS Solution - Penetration Testing Services v1.0
DTS Solution - Penetration Testing Services v1.0
 
Advanced Certificate in Live Streaming & Tracking 07 - 09 Nov 2017 Dubai, UAE
Advanced Certificate in Live Streaming & Tracking 07 - 09 Nov 2017 Dubai, UAEAdvanced Certificate in Live Streaming & Tracking 07 - 09 Nov 2017 Dubai, UAE
Advanced Certificate in Live Streaming & Tracking 07 - 09 Nov 2017 Dubai, UAE
 
Concepts and Methodology in Mobile Devices Digital Forensics Education and Tr...
Concepts and Methodology in Mobile Devices Digital Forensics Education and Tr...Concepts and Methodology in Mobile Devices Digital Forensics Education and Tr...
Concepts and Methodology in Mobile Devices Digital Forensics Education and Tr...
 
Transport Technology to the Rescue
Transport Technology to the RescueTransport Technology to the Rescue
Transport Technology to the Rescue
 
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?
 
2016_Security_System_Monitoring_in_Healthcare_Facilities
2016_Security_System_Monitoring_in_Healthcare_Facilities2016_Security_System_Monitoring_in_Healthcare_Facilities
2016_Security_System_Monitoring_in_Healthcare_Facilities
 
Criminal Investigative Team
Criminal Investigative TeamCriminal Investigative Team
Criminal Investigative Team
 
Developing technology
Developing technologyDeveloping technology
Developing technology
 
demo ppt final edition
demo ppt final editiondemo ppt final edition
demo ppt final edition
 
Raidprep
RaidprepRaidprep
Raidprep
 
Daniel Lance - What "You've Got Mail" Taught Me About Cyber Security
Daniel Lance - What "You've Got Mail" Taught Me About Cyber SecurityDaniel Lance - What "You've Got Mail" Taught Me About Cyber Security
Daniel Lance - What "You've Got Mail" Taught Me About Cyber Security
 
Key Features of an Effective Permit to Work System
Key Features of an Effective Permit to Work SystemKey Features of an Effective Permit to Work System
Key Features of an Effective Permit to Work System
 
Key Features of an Effective Permit to Work.pdf
Key Features of an Effective Permit to Work.pdfKey Features of an Effective Permit to Work.pdf
Key Features of an Effective Permit to Work.pdf
 
The tops for collecting network based evidenceyou think that your.pdf
The tops for collecting network based evidenceyou think that your.pdfThe tops for collecting network based evidenceyou think that your.pdf
The tops for collecting network based evidenceyou think that your.pdf
 
Some Rules for Successful Data Center Operations
Some Rules for Successful Data Center OperationsSome Rules for Successful Data Center Operations
Some Rules for Successful Data Center Operations
 
Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator Course Details and Course Brochure | E...
Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator Course Details and Course Brochure | E...Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator Course Details and Course Brochure | E...
Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator Course Details and Course Brochure | E...
 
Technology and Safety
Technology and SafetyTechnology and Safety
Technology and Safety
 
Picture Exchange Communication System
Picture Exchange Communication SystemPicture Exchange Communication System
Picture Exchange Communication System
 

TSCM-June15

  • 1. www.intersec.co.uk30 echnical surveillance countermeasure (TSCM) training can broadly be divided into two distinct areas – training specifically on the operation of TSCM equipment, and training on the procedural elements of the search itself. Both are essential, but both are dramatically undersubscribed. There is the tendency among many operators to consider themselves totally prepared for the job at hand after undergoing just the basic equipment orientation (normally one day) and nothing else ever after. In truth, you can teach a ten-year-old child to physically operate TSCM equipment, but that doesn’t qualify them to go out into the technical wilderness and competently carry out what is a difficult and demanding job. The carrying out of TSCM searches is a constant learning process. To keep sharp, disciplined and up to date, you need to train. Most modern TSCM RF search equipment is multi- functional, with high speed receivers able to detect sophisticated surveillance transmitters over wide bandwidths and provide retrospective reference data. They have multiple display options and all the tools you need to investigate the entire radio spectrum. Digital Spread Spectrum Packet Data transmitters can be detected in almost real time – in theory. I say “in theory” because someone needs to have shown you such a device as detected on TSCM equipment. If you don’t know what the signal looks like or where it lives on the frequency band, how do you know that what you are seeing on your equipment is a bugging device or not? You can’t demodulate it and you can’t listen to it; and there are plenty of legitimate spread spectrum and packet data transmissions out there. Trawling through the frequency band with your headphones on may uncover the odd analogue bug once in a while, but no serious surveillance attack would involve that type of device. The serious end of audio surveillance requires a serious approach to TSCM searches. Knowledge is king here, and knowledge comes from training. TSCM RF search equipment will detect illicit signals, but if one cannot accurately interpret the received data, you are effectively blindfolded. Companies providing TSCM training services need to have an inventory of audio transmitters that represent the current and credible modern audio attack in order to demonstrate both their capability and method of detection. This requires a considerable investment with packet data burst transmitters costing upwards of 4,000 for one transmitter type alone. If you are carrying out TSCM searches and you’ve never been instructed Dean La-Vey outlines the various types of counter-surveillance training available, and argues that every TSCM operator should engage in constant re-training to stay ahead of the threats T TSCM TRAINING –WHO NEEDS IT!? on the detection of this type of device using the real thing, you’ll never know what it is by trying to listen to it! A competent TSCM training body will have such devices and instruct on how to detect them. Please note, however, that a one-day training course on a modern TSCM receiver will not show you everything the equipment can do. It requires on-going training. Non-linear junction detector (NLJD) training requires firstly a modern NLJD and a basic understanding of its principle of operation. It also requires an understanding of the practical search limitations of NLJDs. This author has lost count of the number of enquiries as to why someone’s NLJD is not detecting anything housed within a metal door frame, or why a 900MHz NLJD is reacting positively to “thin air”! Even basic instruction “On-going training is absolutely essential to carry out TSCM efficiently” ©DeanLa-Vey
  • 2. www.intersec.co.uk 31 ©QCCInterscan FEATURE should cover these types of fundamental basic issues and queries. NLJDs won’t detect anything when used on certain types of materials, even when a device is secreted within the material itself. Many just assume that no reaction on the NLJD means no detected electronic device. Not true! Credible training would explain clearly the areas of search where NLJDs can and cannot be used. You won’t learn it from reading the manual. If there is one area where TSCM training is lacking by the bucket load, it is in the field of telephone TSCM. As with RF training, the equipment available is advanced and competent, but operator knowledge and data interpretation is miniscule to say the least. No greater example of this can be found than that of voice over Internet protocol (VOIP) telephone system searches. Let’s first consider the equipment. Arguably the best dedicated telephone TSCM equipment in production is the REI TALAN. It contains within its multi-function facilities a VOIP analyser which captures VOIP packet data for analysis. How many TSCM operators know what the captured data actually means? VOIP has no relationship whatsoever to conventional telephony, so having such knowledge doesn’t qualify you to interpret VOIP data for illicit interception equipment. You need training! What happens to the system voltages if you add four extra microphones to a Polycom conference telephone? Someone needs to show you. What happens if you disconnect a VOIP telephone and it won’t re-boot and requires an administrator re-set? You won’t guess the solution; you need to be trained. Even when searching for devices on conventional POTS or digital systems, there is great confusion as to what is normal and what is an anomaly. Someone well-versed on telephone systems has to show you and train you to confidently search telephone systems. Knowing how to operate TSCM equipment is one thing, but knowing how to conduct the search itself is a completely different discipline. A search can be completely compromised if the search team steams on in with all guns blazing. All search areas are different, and the search itself may need to be procedurally modified to avoid such an occurrence. Competently trained TSCM personnel will check for covert CCTV transmissions before they even enter, will have an alternative reason for being there (checking IT, WiFi, or space planning etc), and have as much information on the search area itself in advance of the search. Training may cover areas which are not obvious to many, but which are extremely relevant to TSCM searches. Health and safety requirements also have to be considered. Is the environment safe to work in, and has Hard target: successful TSCM operators must be trained in far more than just basic equipment operation
  • 3. www.intersec.co.uk32 ©QCCInterscan TSCM TRAINING – WHO NEEDS IT!? Dean La-Vey is a security consultant specialising in electronic countermeasures, specialised products and techniques for both the government and private sectors on a worldwide basis. He is a founder member of the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Institute (TSCMi), a body of excellence within the TSCM industry. careful thought been given to areas of risk including asbestos? If you pop open a suspended ceiling or dry riser and the pipes are clad, can you recognise whether the material is safe? In many – and I really do mean many – buildings, it can be asbestos. TSCM teams need to be trained to be ‘asbestos aware’ and have a working contingency for it when discovered. Procedural training will also include DNA preservation of evidence techniques should a device be found during the search. If the situation becomes a legal issue, how you examined and stored the device itself can greatly affect the outcome. If your physical search personnel don’t receive this type of training, your entire forensic programme will go out of the window. Let’s put things into perspective. This author has 28 years of experience in TSCM, but I still attend comprehensive training courses on the above subjects and others relating to TSCM procedures. It keeps you up to date and ultimately makes you more proficient at the job. No one should assume they know everything. TSCM is a constant learning process. Of course, the order in which particular parts of the search (RF, passive, etc.) are carried out is a matter of personal choice. Specialised searches, such as those carried out on corporate aircraft, for example, require specific training courses before you can even step onto an aircraft. This isn’t a choice – it’s a mandatory requirement, and the legislation can change every year. In 2015, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) brought in two additional training courses for those carrying out work on corporate aircraft. If you haven’t done the training, you won’t legally be able to carry out TSCM on aircraft in the EU. The Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) in the United States is also set to bring in the same legislation. It’s all part of the aviation certification process. There are enormous consequences if untrained personnel clamber aboard a corporate jet and set about searching it without receiving training in regard to what they can and cannot do. Get it wrong and the aircraft itself will need re-certification. In simple terms, it may not fly for up to six weeks. Not ideal if the owner expects to fly out on his jet the following day. TSCM training is something many operators do once when they purchase equipment. There are, of course, the inevitable know-it-alls who have a genuine unwillingness to learn or feel they don’t need to be told how to do their job. It should be stated, however, that on-going training is absolutely essential to carry out TSCM efficiently. Knowing how to operate the basic elements of TSCM equipment is minor in terms of what else you need to learn to be proficient. Some training, such as the asbestos awareness training, is not TSCM specific but it is highly relevant to TSCM searches. My concluding comment is this: serious electronic eavesdroppers aren’t successful by accident. They train at their job. Some known to this author attend acting schools to learn how to appear credible in whatever guise they decide to use. They attend electrician courses, telephone courses, IT courses and locksmith courses to name a few. In this regard those engaged in TSCM have to up their game in regard to on-going training. Investment in training should be seen as equally important as investment in the latest TSCM equipment