25. 1
MOBILITY 2030 FROM A COMMERCIAL PERSPECTIVE Simon Craven
KPMG / Knowledge Transport Hub seminar “Transport Investment Under Uncertainty”,
Tuesday 12 December, 2017
15 Canada Square, Canary Wharf, London E14 5GL, 0845 – 1200
Go-Ahead: 30 years old.
Largest bus operator in London for TfL, several commercial bus operations in England, and a
big commuter rail operator. Expanding outside UK in Singapore, Germany and Ireland so far.
Me: Rather more than 30 years old.
12 years in mobility, previously a decade in telecoms during the broadband revolution.
Explaining to investors how we’re using their money, sometimes how and why it’s gone
wrong, and finding good reasons for them to put in new money. Especially for businesses
where new technology and politics are influential.
The question is a commercial perspective on mobility in 2030, with particular regard to
investment.
I’ll take an opening economic point from James Gleave, of Transport Futures. Speaking on
Mobility as a Service, but more widely applicable
26. 2
“How on Earth will anyone make any money out of it?
“…it is very difficult to make any money out of transport..
“…a high cost industry, with a lot of money tied up in vehicles and infrastructure.”
That “lot of money” is capital investment. It matters, because in the end, if you can’t make
a sustainable return on capital, you can’t continue to invest. And at some stage that means
you go out of business. And the mobility stops.
Politicians and state bodies often use the word investment loosely. For some the definition
appears to be “any money the state spends”.
But from a commercial perspective –
27. 3
If it doesn’t have a reasonable prospect of bringing in a return, based on its profitable use in
a well run business, then it’s not an investment. It’s something else.
At best, a speculation. A gamble.
Sometimes the private sector too uses very loose definitions of investment. Especially in the
recent time of zero real interest rates. But that era is coming to an end.
Today I’m talking about investment for the long term, where the long term is beyond my
working life. I have no interest in a mobility vision for 2030 that falls over in 2038 and
leaves everyone stranded.
If you intend to be around for the long term you have to be able to reward your investors in
ways they can predict.
Mobility industries are massive capital investors. Infrastructure, fleet, facilities. More will be
needed as cities attempt larger-scale agglomeration, as new technology arrives and as we
have to clean up the environment.
Yet even before the next wave of investment, it’s not easy to make returns which
consistently beat the cost of capital.
You have to be very good at unglamorous activities over the long term.
If we want Mobility 2030 to be secure, so that our cities and their residents can depend on it
being around, its assets need to generate returns over realistic economic lives. Lives like
these:
Airfields are an interesting post-war example. Most of UK’s hard-surface runways were built
during WW2, and are now lost to transport in favour of more profitable uses. Unlike in the
USA. So transport infrastructure can and does go away. Some of the Beeching track beds are
another example.
When we invest shareholder money, or public funds, in an asset, we’re failing in our duty if
we don’t manage the risk of it being stranded – becoming economically unviable.
So we need to manage our business and our stakeholder relationships so that the
commercial use of these assets is likely to be defensible for their economic lifespans.
28. 4
We talk a lot about environmental sustainability nowadays but less about economic. But if
we believe in the social necessity of mobility systems, we need three kinds of sustainability
for our business assets and plans.
1. Environmental sustainability
Many stakeholders are rightly focused on CO2, particulates, NOx. Some are rightly
concerned with energy security. This isn’t just being green and cuddly. This is about serious
impacts on health, on the value you create or destroy in a community, and your ability to
continue in business long term. If you’re buying a 14 year asset like a bus you have to think
hard about where it will be able to operate not just now but in 10 years’ time.
2. Political / social sustainability
This is not yet getting the focus it needs.
For example, the practical politics associated with getting people to vote for things that we
probably all need in the future, like more road charging or constrained access
On a social level there are big questions, especially in the post GDPR world where there are
real questions about the monetisation of passenger mobility data. In a robot car world you’ll
be riding around in what amounts to a mobile online surveillance platform, constantly
harvesting data, not just about the passengers but also about other things it sees on its
travels. Is there social permission for that in Europe?
Economic sustainability
This being glossed over in many discussions of MaaS.
No-one wants to tell consumers they can’t depend on commercial services which can’t
generate at least the cost of capital, and pay minimum wage for the workers.
29. 5
And some people don’t really talk about the extent to which new types of MaaS are only
being proved to work with big subsidies – from the taxpayer, from investors or in some
cases from gig-economy workers who aren’t really making the numbers add up.
Whatever systems we build, they will ultimately let down our communities if they are not
built on honest, sustainable economics.
If you’re a company which wants to embed itself in the heart and lungs of a living city, then
you’d better have a great deal of confidence about your ability and willingness to be there in
the long term.
If you’re an official responsible to a city for good long term outcomes, you need to ensure
resilience and economic sustainability of the commercial ecology you oversee and
participate in.
You need these to sustain delivery of your objectives for accessibility, consumer
affordability, safety, and efficient use of public goods like road space and air quality.
A long term and dependable flow of investment from the private sector therefore needs
long term thinking from commissioners. And well-run, efficient service providers whose
economics and working practices are clearly focused on long term viability.
The challenge is to think about 2030. No-one has a crystal ball, but we have to take well-
informed views and continually update them with reality as it emerges.
We can’t think about the future without absorbing lessons from the past. So let’s take a
quick look back at comparative history in two industries.
From today to 2030 is 13 years. So I’m going to start by looking back 13 years, to 2004, for
Silicon Valley and online -based industries
As they start to muscle into real-world physical services there’s a distinctive commercial
culture coming with them. e see a very fast rate of change in many parts of technology,
society and popular culture.
Back in 2004 --
the most popular brand on the web was Microsoft's MSN
Google was the fifth below Yahoo and AOL. Some people even still used Lycos
MySpace hoped to become the dominant social network – and even did, briefly
Friendster, launched in 2002, hoped to be the same – and didn’t make it.
Amazon was mostly a bookshop. But that year it invented its most important
business, the one behind the scenes – AWS.
So in the investment world of Silicon Valley, in this timescale many fortunes have been
made and lost. Many of the big players have gone away or pivoted into something else.
The themes are disruption, breaking things, revolutionary thinking and not being afraid to
lose lots of money.
Back in the physical world, the main mobility providers have developed far more
incrementally.
30. 6
A couple of years ago I used this slide in a lot of presentations:
I used this at the time to show how transport systems have had a long benign period of
incremental progress. And that the more revolutionary times now upon this industry are
bringing about a real change of mindset. Substantial change is underway from
electrification, software platforms to match demand to journey opportunities, and various
kinds of automation.
These are opportunities mobility needs to embrace.
If you imagine two sets of management thinking – one rooted in the tech industry
experience of what commercial investment looks like –
And one rooted in the mobility industry experience of what commercial investment looks
like –
… Then you see a cultural risk of us talking past each other, failing to understand each other,
and failing to achieve win-win solutions. Which would be pretty serious.
Because mobility in 2030 has to be good for our customers, for the cities and market towns
and rural areas we HAVE to serve, in their totality. Or this whole thing is not worth doing.
We have to find win-win solutions which work commercially. End to end value chains where
every layer can at least wash its face if it’s well run. Pay the workforce something they can
actually live on, and meet cost of capital as well as operating costs for the fleet.
Maybe that’s a reality that some recent entrants into mobility need to embrace.
Just as more traditional mobility providers need to keep up with the times.
31. 7
In the 20th
century the people running a mode tended to think of their operations in
isolation. Bus people doing bus. Rail people doing rail. Car people over here. Airline people
there. Vertical silos of thinking based on the type of vehicle.
But in terms of how we think about the future of the industry, the model I find most useful
now is horizontal rather than vertical:
I’m putting fleet into Infrastructure, because economically that’s how it behaves.
Within this kind of structure no-one knows where power will end up being concentrated –
which is why everyone’s hedging their bets with cross-holdings and backing multiple horses.
Can car-makers capture platform businesses and own their own mobility customers? Can
platforms capture car-makers? Time will tell.
But whoever wins, consolidation takes place increasingly on a grand global scale and across
previously separate industries.
32. 8
Mobility has long been a consolidation story. In European countries, mobility services post
WW2 were mostly carried out by small family business and one-city companies, sometimes
private, sometimes municipal.
In the late years, the 1990s, consolidation was happening on a national scale.
In the early years of C21st
, consolidation was happening on a continental scale.
What’s emerging now is consolidation on a global scale, and across previously separate
modes. Because of:
The move of car makers away from the owner-driver model into mobility services
The move of knowledge-based platforms into physical-world services
cross-holdings between car-makers and digital players and service providers
Whatever configurations emerge, they will only deliver for the city if each party seeks win-
win relationships with the others.
It’s easy to see commercial competition for the retail layer, and of course the state plays in
this space too In 2030 there are multiple contenders who could be in a credible position to
compete for the position of selling journeys
But whoever owns the retail layer, they won’t have anything to sell unless the operations
and the infrastructure are economically viable.
Which involves a lot of capital being attracted, invested and remunerated.
Mobility today is labour intensive AND capital-intensive – it’s just a case of where that
capital shows up in the value chain. Sometimes it’s visible on balance sheets, sometimes it’s
hidden in the state, sometimes it’s hiding in the supply chain.
33. 9
Even when – or if - we get mass-market self-driving vehicles there’s still a human role in
reassuring people and helping them. In cleaning, maintenance, repair, and dealing with
problems. As for driving, many think in 2030 we’ll have significantly more automation of the
driving task. Opinions vary. I’m more sceptical than some about a complete replacement of
human rivers in that timescale.
But if we do get the full robocab utopia, what does that do to balance sheets? And whose
balance sheets? That’s when the capital-intensive nature of this industry really starts to
show.
For context, first let’s look at some chunky investments we all anticipate for future mobility.
These are just a few of the big-ticket items blipping away on the radar.
We all know HS2 will cost a lot of money. Perhaps £50 billion?
We all know that creating a truly national network of electric vehicle fast-charging points for
every car needed in the UK , and generating capacity to feed it, would cost another fortune.
Generating capacity is running at £20 billion a go for something like Hinkley C.
Now let’s look at something less visible. The future robot cars we may use for elements of
MaaS.
We have about 26 million cars running in the UK today.
34. 10
Let’s say that with full driver automation, new cars become incredibly productive. So let’s
say that one tenth of that number can satisfy the whole UK market for car journeys.
That’s 2.6 million cars. Call it three million for easy reckoning.
By coincidence I’m told Uber currently has something about three million cars delivering
services across the world. Of course it hopes to scale up from there… And it’s been
legendarily successful at raising cash from investors.
Famously, it doesn’t own cars, it leaves that problem to workers who won’t exist in a
robocab world. So who will own the fleet and how will they pay for it?
How much does a robocab cost? Call it £50K a go. These are cars vastly more capable than
today’s, and if I’m a car-maker I’m not going to accept a 90% reduction in volumes unless I
charge a lot of money per unit.
Three million by £50K is £150 billion, just for the UK. To date how much cash has Uber been
able to raise? Maybe $11.5 billion? 10 billion sterling?
You can see the scale of the investment challenge. And why, to raise it, you have to show
investors a much more serious and credible path to sustainable long term returns.
What if the car-makers themselves end up being the ride-hailing business?
It’s still a stretch. That £150 billion is roughly the whole market capitalisation of the world’s
far-and-away most valuable carmaker, Toyota. And I stress, that’s not the capital you need
to reach 2030 across the developed world. That’s for Uber today, or for the UK alone in
2030.
That kind of sum is not venture finance. It’s serious money.
Individual car buyers today buy cars for many non-financial reasons. Investors in car fleets
for MaaS purposes will require sustainable financial returns, like today’s investors in
commercial bus fleets.
35. 11
I talked earlier about consolidation. Whatever configurations emerge from the next phase of
consolidation across sectors and territories, they will only deliver their full potential for the
city and for the traveller if each party seeks win-win relationships with the others.
So for me, regardless of what technologies predominate, a good looking investment
scenario for Mobility 2030 is one where partnership thinking predominates.
A mindset where whatever investment and effort you bring to your part of a complex
system, you recognise that you can’t reach your own objectives in the long term unless the
whole system thrives.
For one part of this ecology to predate upon another undermines the viability of the whole
proposition, and will discourage investment in all its parts.
To round off, a couple of wild cards.
There are a couple of ideas in circulation which potentially undermine the whole question of
whether mobility will be an industry in the future
One risk is deprofessionalisation, in which providing mobility services ceases to be a job and
becomes an amateur pursuit, a hobby, possibly with partial cost recovery.
Check out BlaBlaCar. Inter-urban rides based on car journeys that were already happening.
Not something with a career structure at which you can plan to make a reliable living, or
invest in fleet. Because the price the passengers pay is capped at a level way below even the
full operating cost of the vehicle. And nothing for the driver’s labour at all.
It has its place as an idea. It potentially increases productivity of a given car’s use of the road
on an inter-urban journey that’s happening anyway. But you can’t build public policy on the
assumption of intermittent volunteer labour providing core mobility capacity.
36. 12
Another possible wild card is the public sector. Can the state do everything?
No it can’t, not effectively, and nor should it try. But it has a massive role to play in investing
in infrastructure and in creating rules for markets.
Mobility and logistics have been political subjects of interest for more than 100 years in
Europe and that’s not going to stop now.
Mobility and logistics services depend on public goods. Road space, track beds and the air
we breathe.
We can’t afford a tragedy of the commons. The customers of the future are also the
residents of the cities and the voters. For every voter who resents the control of cars in
London there are more who want something done about air quality.
To those who want to see the state out of future mobility regulation, and to leave
everything to the market, I say we wouldn’t even have an internet without state
intervention, we wouldn’t have roads, and while private capital built Britain’s original rail
network, it did so on the basis of state legislation to secure the legal basis.
So the question is not whether states involve themselves, but how. Well-regulated markets
with stable rules and long term outlooks attract investment. Capricious or overtly doctrinal
regulatory regimes deter it.
To have the best 2030, we need a shared commercial and regulatory vision which goes well
beyond 2030.
We need market frameworks which create space for commercial risk in innovation. But
which are not themselves predicated on individual technologies, which may or may not be
ready for prime time, whether technically or economically.
Our large city-regions have their own economic cases for increasing density and creating
benefits of agglomeration. By enabling those cases, I’m confident that mobility providers
and city authorities together can identify investable opportunities that deliver in 2030 and
the decades beyond.
/END
38. Governance of Mobility
Professor Greg Marsden
Institute for Transport Studies
Tuesday 12th December
Institute for Transport Studies
FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENT
39. • We have always been planning for an uncertain
world
Institute for Transport Studies
FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENT
DfT (2015)
40. • The ‘mobility system’ uncertainties are now growing
• Some uncertainties are ignored or ‘too difficult’
Institute for Transport Studies
FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENT
There are things that get murmured around like automated
cars and deliveries, home deliveries, how is that going to
impact; but I don’t believe we’ve got anywhere near the
answers. It’s hard enough predicting normal stuff let alone
how home deliveries are going to affect your shopping
patterns.
41. • Some important contentions
• Smart(er) mobility is coming
• No amount of smart technology or big data will overcome the
need for good policy, planning & governance
• We need to plan proactively to try to ensure socially-desirable
outcomes from Smart Mobility
Institute for Transport Studies
FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENT
“The idea of the enabling state suggests that the role of the state is
confined to stimulating others to action and then letting them get on
with it. The ensuring state is an enabling state, but one that is
expected or obligated to make sure such processes achieve certain
defined outcomes”.
(Giddens, 2008: 9).
42. • The reasons we intervene seem robust
• Transport supports wider public policy
• Externalities exist
• Establish common rule sets
• Define allocation of space
• Conditions for a free market do not exist
• Provision of socially necessary service or access
• Funding and investment in infrastructure systems
• Accountability
Institute for Transport Studies
FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENT
43. • Mobility has always become smarter but the
problems still remain
Institute for Transport Studies
FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENT
https://therideshareguy.com/an-
airport-guide-for-uber-and-lyft-
drivers/
44. • So new mobility services might be an opportunity
Institute for Transport Studies
FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENT
45. • Why are new mobility actors interested?
• A $1.5 trillion per annum (by 2025) question…
• New actors want *more*, not less mobility
• Yet the transport policy orthodoxy on smart mobility is about
’efficiency’… this is, to put it politely, naive
• Control… over your time and choices
• Oligopolistic/monopolistic power
• High rents (that’s what dominant actors do)
Institute for Transport Studies
FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENT
46. • But this is coming so what changes?
• Gives voice to some USERS
• Massive shift in who knows what about mobility
• New network of actors (inc. peer to peer & aggregators)
• Business models of existing providers
• The relationship between the traveller – the provider – the state
• How transport is paid for
• Where ownership of assets lies?
Institute for Transport Studies
FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENT
47. Institute for Transport Studies
FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENT
Key areas to address
• Transport supports wider public policy
• Externalities exist
• Establish common rule sets
• Modes
• Access
• Define allocation of space
• Management of use of assets
• Conditions for a free market do not exist
• New systems but same issues
• Provision of socially necessary service or access
• Spatial inequalities
• Funding and investment in infrastructure systems
• What is needed? Who pays for what?
• Accountability
• Understand roles, actual and perceived responsibility
48. • Choices
Institute for Transport Studies
FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENT
‘Hands on’ vs. ‘Hands-off’
Capacity and will to exercise
range of tools of governance
(regulation, taxation,
coordination)
Social Acceptance vs.
Resistance
Acceptance of data sharing,
merged data services and
automation in various forms
50. Institute for Transport Studies
FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENT
• Effective and Extensive deployment can be accelerated by good
governance
• You can reduce the uncertainties in future planning by deciding
- What these new systems could help to achieve
- How you need to regulate their introduction to those ends
- Avoiding damaging spatial competition
- Sharing knowledge and planning adaptively
51. Institute for Transport Studies
FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENT
Contact Greg: tragrm@leeds.ac.uk
Twitter: @drgregmarsden
With thanks to Professor Iain Docherty and
Dr Louise Reardon
Open Access