The document discusses the shaping forces of Chinese foreign policy. It argues that China's core state interests in maintaining stability and economic development, as well as its historical memory of humiliation during the Century of Humiliation, most influence its foreign policy. China pursues peaceful development and international cooperation but remains suspicious of foreign influence due to its past experiences. The document suggests that U.S.-China relations will improve if the U.S. recognizes Chinese interests and avoids threatening them.

1. ShiranShen
Swarthmore College

2. Presentation Objectives
• To debunk the “China Threat Theory”
• To flesh out the true shaping forces of
Chinese foreign policy
• To identify the implications for US-China
relations

3. Problem with Contemporary
Scholarship on Chinese Foreign Policy
• Misuse of classical international relations
theories
– The Hegemonic War Theory
– The China Threat Theory
• Misinterpretation of Chinese political thinking
due to inappropriate historical comparisons
– Middle Kingdom tribute system
– Rise of Wilhelmine Germany

4. The Shaping Forces of Chinese
Foreign Policy
• Core state interests (primary)
• Historical memory of the “Century of
Humiliation” (near primary)
• Chinese nationalism (factored in only
occasionally)

5. Core Chinese State Interests
Goals:
• To maintain social stability
– The most fundamental among all state interests
• To promote economic development
– Global hunt for natural resources (traditional path,
economic rather than strategic, Chinese separation
of economic and political interests)
• To safeguard the Chinese Communist Party
political system

6. Core Chinese State Interests
Dictum:
• Peaceful development (和平发展)
Strategies:
• Maintain a low profile and achieve something (
韬光养晦，有所作为)
• “Enter the world” (入世) and socialize
internationally

7. Historical Memory of the “Century
of Humiliation” (百年国耻)
• For the Chinese, the Middle
Kingdom is a nation of extraordinary
eminence that lasted for thousands
of years until its defeat in the Opium
War in 1840.
• China is returning to its deserved
niche or “normal status” in the
international system.
• China is suspicious of international
institutions, but feels the need to
join them.
Carving up China (瓜分中国)

8. Let the Alarm Bell Ring Long (警钟长鸣)
With history as a mirror, one can understand the rise and fall of a nation.
-- Emperor Taizong of Tang Dynasty (599-649)
• Japan is more intimidating than
any other military powers.
• Taiwan is regarded as the last
unrecovered part of the Chinese
nationalist body and is believed
to be kept from China by the
U.S.
• The historical memory of
humiliation will likely remain
with several future generations.

9. Looking into the Future
• National interests and historical lessons are still likely
to play significant roles.
• China is likely to be more involved and take on
leadership roles in international discourses and
cooperation (e.g. sanctioning rogue states).
• China will likely claim a more active role in the Asia-
Pacific region, but will not be capable of replacing U.S.
leadership any time soon.
• China is likely to continue to expand its international
presence in the years to come (state-sponsored news
agencies abroad, Confucius Institutes).

10. Implications for US-China Relations
• In ordernot to make China a threat, the U.S.
should not view and treat China as a threat.
• The U.S. should actively seek common ground
with China and avoid actions that may be
interpreted by China as threatening to its core
state interests (e.g. Taiwan).
• The U.S. should make constant efforts to
enhance mutual understanding and improve
mutual perception.

11. Conclusions
• China’s global engagement stands in line with the priorities of the
CCP and Chinese national interests and is largely informed by the
country’s haunting memory of the “Century of Humiliation.”
• Nationalism is sometimes factored into the making of Chinese
foreign policy, but does not override vital national interests.
• China will be more willing to accept international leadership in the
decades to come.
• Agrowing sense of insecurity in terms of political stability that
accompanies increasing national confidence might put confines on
China’s foreign policymaking in favor of considerations for national
interests and historical lessons.
• By all means, the U.S. and China should and can avoid a Hunger
Game-like scenario.