1. MSc International Relations (LSE) 2014
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements of the degree
Candidate Number: 30390
Number of Words: 9967
From Wealth to Power: Xi Jinping’s New State and the
South China Sea

2. Contents
1. Introduction………………………………………………………......1
2. The Weakness of the Black Box and the Return of the State……5
2.1 Classical Realism……………………………………………5
2.2 Neorealism…………………………………………………….8
2.3 Neoclassical Realism………………………………………12
3. Chinese State Power……………………………………………...18
3.1 China and the International System………………………..18
3.2 Chinese Historical State Power……………………………20
3.3 Xi Jinping: Supreme Leader……………………………….24
4. China and the South China Sea………………………………….28
4.1 China’s Claims in the South China Sea……………………29
4.2 The Decision to Move HYSY 981 into Disputed Waters….31
5. Conclusion……………………………………………………….......35
5.1 Future Implications………………………………………...37
Bibliography

3. 1
1. Introduction
On the 2nd
of May 2014 the Maritime Safety Administration of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) released a statement on its website that read as, ‘琼航警
14033 南海 5 月 2 日至 8 月 15 日，“海洋石油 981”船在以 15-29.58N/111-12.06E
点为圆心，1 海里为半径范围内进行钻井作业，禁止驶入。 HN0033 SOUTH
CHINA SEA DRILLING WORK BY M/V "HAI YANG SHI YOU 981" IN AREA
WITHIN 1 MILES RADIUS OF 15-29.58N/111-12.06E FROM 02 MAY TO 15 AUG
ENTERING PRIHIBITED HAINAN MSA CHINA’ (Maritime Safety Administration,
www.msa.gov.cn). This short, and slightly misspelt, bilingual press release informed
the world that an oilrig, owned by the Chinese oil company China National Offshore
Oil Company (CNOOC), had been moved into disputed waters in the South China Sea
(SCS), which are claimed by both China and Vietnam.
The decision by the Chinese Government to move the oil platform, with a
flotilla of approximately 80 to 120 vessels (including a number of military vessels), into
disputed waters further exacerbated the tensions in the region, which were already
rather strained due to China’s territorial claim of almost 90% of the SCS and its
increasing assertive behaviour vis-à-vis these claims (Bower and Poling, 7 May 2014;
Vu and Nguyen, 24 June 2014; Pejsova, 2014: 1; Johnson, 2013: 7). Even before the
latest escalation in the region, moving HYSY 981 into disputed waters, it had reached
conventional wisdom status in the media that China had become increasingly assertive

4. 2
on a global scale since the 2008-9 global financial crisis.1
Alastair Iain Johnston (2013)
concludes that China had only become newly assertive in relation to the SCS and not
globally in 2010. M. Taylor Fravel (2011) surmises that that any escalation from the
Chinese side would be caused by one, or a combination, of reasons. The scenarios he
thought could create further increases in tensions included: if the bargaining power, or
position, of China declined; if there was an increase in the perceived value of the
disputed territory; or if a stronger China decided to use force, just because it could. It is
from such works that the inspiration for this subject blossomed. Subsequent events
between claimants in the SCS led to the author’s interest gaining a focal point to
investigate the questions; why did the Chinese Government decide to escalate things
further in May 2014? And, why has it chosen to become more assertive in the SCS?
International relations offers two theoretical mainstays as possible explanations
for the questions above – classical and neo- realism.2
Both argue that anarchy, the
absence of a central authority, in the international system presents risks and
opportunities to states, but they differ in fundamental assumptions. Classical realism
assumes that a nation’s relative power determines its national interests. Thus, nations
expand when they can in a rational manner. Proponents of the theory argue that all
states seek control over territory, other states’ conduct, and the global economy; the
difference is that only rich and powerful states have the ability to alter the status quo
(Gilpin, 1981: 23-25). Therefore, classical realists would argue that China moved the
oilrig into disputed waters because it could. Whereas neorealism suggests that the
international system pressures states to seek security maximisation. Neorealists are split
1
For examples of this type of commentary, see Swaine (Summer 2010: 10).
2
Main books that use these theories to explain China’s rise are Mearsheimer (2001), Goldstein (2005),
Shirk (2007), and Nathan and Scobell (2012).

5. 3
into two competing camps over why states expand: defensive and offensive realists.
Defensive realists posit that states only expand when threatened. Thus, expansion is a
matter of necessity and not choice. On the recent intensification of the SCS territorial
disputes, defensive realists would argue that the situation was down to a systemic
incentive to react to a threat to their maritime claims and, thus their national interests.
Contradictory to the defensive realist interpretation, offensive realists view the system
in quite Hobbesian terms and believe that security maximisation means power
maximisation. This gives states an impetus to strive for global hegemony or become
the sole regional hegemon. Offensive realists would attribute China’s rationale to the
inevitable conflict narrative, whereby, a rising China is challenging the status quo of the
international order by first opposing the regional hierarchical structure, before
attempting to overall the global order.
However, neither classical nor the two strands of neorealism can completely
explain a state’s foreign policy, instead they more accurately represent two starting
points for a theory of foreign policy. To create a better understanding of state behaviour
one should test hypothesises through a more holistic approach. A school of thought that
does such work is neoclassical realism, or postclassical realism. Fareed Zakaria is one
of the most prominent scholars to advance the neoclassical cause with his branch of the
theory labelled state-centric realism. State-centric realism attempts to put the state back
into realism in conjunction with systemic pressures and decision-makers perceptions.
This essay, in utilising Zakaria’s (1999) theory, argues that it is not China’s relative
national power, but its relative state power that matters when considering its foreign and
security policy decisions.

6. 4
Therefore, this article will first prove that state-centric realism is the theory best placed
to answer the questions stated above. It will demonstrate that state-centric realism is
better than the other aforementioned theories by comparing their differing
interpretations of China’s decision to move HYSY 981 into disputed waters. Secondly,
this study will examine why the Chinese’s state’s capacity to use the massively
increased national power of China has ebbed and flowed, since ‘Reform and Opening’
in 1978. Furthermore, section three will explain why China has been able to focus more
of the nation’s actual power on its regional and global interests, since Xi Jinping
became the head of the tripartite of the Chinese state.3
Thirdly, we will look at the
combination of favourable factors – political motivation, strategic opportunity, and
superior state power – that prompted China to renew its efforts to enforce its territorial
claims in the SCS under its new policy of ‘peripheral diplomacy.’ Finally, we will end
with possible practical and academic implications emanating from this piece of work.
3
Xi is the first Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping to simultaneously hold the positions of General
Secretary of the Communist Party of China, the President of the PRC, and the Chairman of the Central
Military Commission, in addition to chairing the newly created National Security Commission and the
new body deciding on China’s latest economic reforms – Central Leading Group for Comprehensively
Deepening Reforms.

7. 5
2. The Weakness of the Black Box and the Return of the State
The central dilemma of international relations, according to E. H. Carr (1939:
208-223), is ‘scarcity’ and the ‘problem of peaceful change’ between the ‘haves and the
have-nots.’ Carr’s observation is potent because of the present transitional epoch that
we find ourselves in: the weakening of the unipolar system (Waltz, 1993; Layne, 1993;
Kupchan, 1998; Mearsheimer, 2001; Posen, 2006; Buzan, March 2011). Linked closely
to the changing composition of the international political structure is China’s re-
emergence as a great power, which provokes a considerable amount of worry among so
many, especially its neighbours, because it appears to be taking a staunchly traditional
course that many former ‘rising’ states have taken; simultaneously expanding its
interests with its growing power. Thus, assertiveness is just the sort of behaviour one
would expect from ‘a thoroughly traditional great power’ (Zakaria, 1996: 36). History
has shown that in the long run, states that get richer will have more regional, and by
extension global, influence. Different schools of thought have conflicting notions as to
why this occurs. This section of the article will compare two bastions of international
relations – classical realism and neorealism (defensive and offensive realism) – with the
ever-evolving neoclassical realism.
2.1 Classical Realism
Classical realists assert that a nation defines its interests ‘in terms of power.’
Meaning the amount of existing material resources that the nation holds, which could be
used, if needed, to increase its military strength for its own ends (Morgenthau, 1978: 5).

8. 6
According to the theory, the nature of man and the anarchic environment that he resides
in compels the nation to extend its power as far as it can to maximise its control over its
external environment. Based on the rationale that ‘the strong do what they can and the
weak suffer what they must’ (Thucydides, 1972: 402). As proponents of classical
realism believe that all foreign policy originates from domestic sources, the state has
much agency. But, ultimately, the state is a power-maximiser, which leads to the
central hypothesis of the theory; nations expand their political interests abroad when
their decision-makers perceive that a favourable power shift has occurred. Thus, why
statesmen have forever obsessed about who holds the balance of power.
Classical realists think that states are naturally aggressive, which leads to them
being portrayed as pessimists. However, the theory says that states measure risks and
opportunities, in terms of cost-benefits; when the statesman thinks that the benefits
outweigh the costs the state attempts to expand. Conversely, if the costs dwarf the
benefits then a state aims to maintain its relative position. Classical realists predict that
as a nation’s power increases, there is a corresponding reduction in the costs of
expansion and a rise in the value of rewards (Gilpin 1981). The implication for
contemporary China, or any rising state, is that no matter how much it professes to be
‘non-interventionist’ and that it will be a ‘a new type of superpower,’ it is battling
against a resolute presumption: ‘a growing state tends to expand its activities and
interests outward – colliding with the spheres of influence of other states – and finds
itself embroiled in international conflicts, crises, and wars…the more a state grows, and
thus the greater its capabilities, the more likely it is to follow such a tendency’ (Hu,
2011: 15; Choucri and North, 1975: 1).

9. 7
Consequently, classical realists would view China’s decision to manoeuvre
against Vietnam, as being provoked by a sense of opportunity among the Chinese
leaders that its capabilities had increased to such an extent that would allow it to have
success. This assumption correlates with the ‘China rise’ narrative because it has
expanded its international interests in correspondence with its growth in wealth and
material capability.4
However, this notion has a discrepancy associated with it; not all
rising states in history have expanded in line with their growth. Classical realists refute
such anomalies with Hans J. Morgenthau (1978: 53; 239) caveat of moral relativism –
‘the restraining influence of moral consensus…that kept in check the limitless desire for
power.’ Morgenthau (1978: 240) believes that the national interest is not simply the
maximisation of the state’s international influence, but as ‘the rational pursuit, within
certain moral limitations, of the power objectives of the state.’ Thus, Morgenthau
assigns the policy maker as the ultimate agent that decides on the state’s moral contours.
Furthermore, he argues that when states pursue their national interest in a rational
manner they form a moral consensus with one another, which maintains the status quo.
States that disregard the morality of their actions are seen to be revisionist.
It is difficult to describe China’s actions as outright revisionist. It may want to
revise the regional security architecture, but it is hardly taking irrevocable unilateral
action to change the power dynamics of the SCS by moving an oilrig into disputed
waters. The problem is that it is only possible to recognise an increase in a state’s
national interest in correlation with an increase in its capabilities, and the identification
4
A book that gives the best overview of the ‘China rise’ narrative is David Shambaugh (2013).

10. 8
of status quo and revisionist powers in hindsight. Furthermore, states’ actions cannot
simply be explained by the claim that they are naturally aggressive; even a
revolutionary and hostile state will only instigate hostilities when certain conditions are
present (Waltz, 1979). Hence, as Morgenthau’s relative moralism alludes to, states’
actions cannot be explained by a single country’s characteristics, instead it results from
the interaction of many states within the international framework.
2.2 Neorealism
Neorealists (or structural realists) disagree with classical realists about what are
the causal factors of a state’s foreign policy: classical realism is part of the Innenpolitik
School, meaning that it assumes that foreign policy emanates from domestic sources,
whereas, neorealists view the intervening variables of the domestic as not as important
as the independent variables of the international system. Proponents of neorealism see
Innenpolitik theories as problematic when explaining state’s foreign policies because
evidence shows that states with similar domestic structures often act differently:
democracies, and other regime types, differ in their level of foreign policy activeness.
To structural realists the system is the most important level of analysis because all states
are confined by the constraints of the international order (Waltz, 1979). The key
assumption in the theory is anarchy, meaning the lack of central authority at the
international level, which forces states to pursue a self-help foreign policy as they
cannot rely on a higher authority to look out for their interests. The theory assigns
survival as the universal national goal. Thus, it differs from classical realism because it
believes that states expand because they must and not because they can, which creates a

11. 9
dichotomy between neorealism and classical realism of necessity and want (Waltz,
1979).
Kenneth N. Waltz (1979: 74-77) argues that the international system affects
states in two ways through ‘socialisation’ and ‘competition and selection.’ He believes
that socialisation of states makes them more alike, which corroborates structural
realism’s assertion that the system is composed of unitary, rational states that are
motivated by the need for security (Waltz, 1979). That implies that intervening
variables, like the domestic structure, are not of great explanatory importance to
international politics. However, this does not explain why it was only after Xi had
reformed the state structure that China was able to take advantage of the strategic
opportunity that had, arguably, been present since the mid-to-late 2000s.
According to Waltz (1979), the competition and selection element of neorealism
creates a hierarchical order, which leads to balance of powers emerging. However, his
idea of the balance of power differs from the classical realist’s because he sees
balancing behaviour emerging automatically, without the statesmen’s input. It is the
system’s competitive imperative that splits the neorealist school into two camps over
how to best secure the survival of the state. On the one hand, there are those that
believe that states should pursue a minimalistic foreign policy and only expand when
threatened. They are called the defensive realists. On the other hand, there are those
who believe that if a state does not attempt to maximise its influence, then another will
seize the opportunity in its place. They are aptly labelled the offensive realists.

12. 10
Defensive Realism
John Herz (1959) surmises that nations expand their political interests when they
become increasingly insecure. Often defensive realism has been summarised with the
tagline of ‘the search for security’ (Nathan and Scobell, 2012). It is because of these
assumptions that proponents of the theory opine that declining states tend to be more
aggressive; much like a cornered rattlesnake, they will strike when threatened. The
theory looks more favourably on the system and attributes anarchy with having more
security than others believe. Because of their faith in the international order’s ability to
constrain aggressive behaviour – antagonistic conduct would result in other states
balancing, either internally (e.g. increasing its military capacity) or externally (e.g.
forming alliances), to counter such policies – they advocate minimalist foreign policies
to avoid security dilemmas arising. Such an approach should avoid spheres of
influences overlapping and consequent competing national interests arising.
There are real difficulties in proving defensive realist explanations wrong, as the
theory depends on the subjective and often self-serving evidence from decision-makers
to compile its analysis, any action could be construed as defensive for their own ends
(Mearsheimer, 2011). Thus, its objective applicability is impaired because of its
inherent misunderstanding of the international system and its affects on states’
behaviour. Consequently, the theory would explain China’s decision to move the oilrig
into the disputed waters by stating that it was responding to a threat to their national
interest. However, the Chinese Government has never publicly described the SCS as a
‘core interest’ (Swaine, Winter 2011). Therefore, it is hard to argue that China was
reacting to a direct threat to its national interest, which led it to enforce its territorial

13. 11
claims. Moreover, this directly impacts the point about the state’s default foreign policy
being moderate in scope, by undermining the theory’s parsimony because its
explanation of states that deviate from the norm. Defensive realism explains anomalies
as being ‘unnatural’ and therefore incorporates domestic factors to explain its systemic
model (Rose, October 1998: 149). It then leaves it up to other theories to explain why
such states change into pathological units. Thus, defensive realism, rather than being a
pedigree explanative model, should belong in the normative category of international
relations theory – it misinterprets state’s actual behaviour for what they should do in
response to the signals sent by the international system. Further weakening its
suitability to answer this essay’s questions.
Offensive Realism
John J. Mearsheimer (2001) accepts Waltz’s (1979) basic premise that
international anarchy forced states to behave in a certain manner, although he believes
that instead of a minimalistic foreign policy, it pushed states to pursue an inflated
foreign policy. Thus, to secure security-maximisation all states should aim for global
hegemony, but it’s obvious that not all states can attain this. So, the goal, according to
Mearsheimer (2001) is to become the only regional hegemon in the world. To preserve
such status, dominant states must prevent other states from reaching the same standing
to maintain their level of security. Consequently, they must contain other states to
prevent them from attaining a preponderant role in their region. Evidently, if true, this
leads to inevitable conflict between dominant and challenging states (Organski, 1958;
Gilpin, Spring 1988). A. F. K. Organski (1958) posits that the dominant state may
initiate a conflict to prevent the challenger becoming too powerful to stop their

14. 12
accession to the dominant position. Another possibility is that the rising state may start
a war to hasten its overtaking of the hegemon. However, this theory provides catch-22s
for both the rising and dominant powers (Chan, 2008). If the hegemon decides to
launch a preventative war against the rising state to avert its demise as the number one
global power, then it could, in the eyes of the world, become an illegitimate power,
which could undermine the whole value system that underpins its position in the world.
Also, for the rising state to start a war to quicken its coronation as the dominant power it
risks losing a war and potentially reversing its progress.
Offensive realists would claim that the positioning of the Chinese oilrig is a
stepping-stone to an inevitable conflict with the US and its allies. However, the
decision to move an oilrig into the area is more of a hostile state-corporate takeover
rather than an outright aggressive and militaristic territorial grab. This shows that the
Chinese deliberately chose a method that would not lead to an increased likelihood of
further external conflict. Moreover, all those involved, directly and indirectly, have
shown great restraint in trying to reduce tensions through diplomatic dialogue (Li, July
2014). As a result, pure structural theories cannot account for the events of May 2014.
Hence, we need to augment systemic with domestic approaches to come to a
satisfactory rationalisation of China’s aforementioned actions.
2.3 Neoclassical Realism
As mentioned in the introduction, this article will use neoclassical realism as
analytical framework for its investigation of the recent decision of the Chinese

15. 13
Government to escalate the situation in the SCS. The aim is to improve on the easy-to-
access explanations that correlate with the China rise narrative by incorporating
domestic factors with international ones. To do this one must accept a trade-off
between neorealism’s parsimony and neoclassical’s explanatory power (Sørensen, 2013:
368). It is important to note that the term neoclassical realism covers a range of realist
studies and there is no single neoclassical theory. The common thread for scholars in
the neoclassical school is their preoccupation with state-society interactions and how
they impact on a state’s foreign policy. This is a direct challenge to the regressive
dichotomy between system-centred and society-centred approaches to international
relations that ignore the state’s capacity to act independently of social and systemic
factors (Ikenberry, Lake, Mastanduno, 1989: 1). On top of this, scholars have often
disregarded the statesman’s perceptions of power and the state-societal dynamics that
feed into it (Wohlforth, April 1987). Not all threats to a state’s goals, or to decision-
makers’ authoritative survival, are external. This is why such variables must be taken
into consideration to gain a better understanding of political decisions and the
circumstances that they were made.
Neoclassical realism departs from neorealist thinking at the ‘billiard ball model
in which foreign policy positions are seen as being primarily determined by the
interplay of international forces’ (Hill and Light, 1985: 157). The school accepts that
states may, on face value, resemble identical entities as they are afforded the same
rights under international law and are exposed to the same systemic pressures, but they
will react in different ways to such forces. Therefore, it is more accurate to describe the
international system as a game of pool in a rundown bar: some balls are bigger than

16. 14
others; they are a mix of colours and patterns; some may have little chips that make
them run differently from the others; and, the cloth is imperfect and therefore produces
unforeseen wildcards in the form of ‘kicks.’ In addition to this we need to take into
consideration the participants in the game; what rules they choose to abide by, their
choice of shot, and their ability to make that shot. Though the balls may react
differently to each shot and the players to changing rules, the game is still played on the
same table. Thus, systemic factors are most important in explaining long-term
international developments. However, it is important to analyse state-societal effects on
the foreign and security policies of states.
This article uses Fareed Zakaria’s (1999) variation of neoclassical realism, state-
centric realism, as an analytical framework for its starting point. Zakaria (1999)
expertly sets out his argument in his Doctoral thesis titled From Wealth to Power: the
unusual origins of America’s world role. In it he successfully reintroduces the state to
realism by recognising that statesmen not only feel pressure from the international
system but also experience constraints on their reactions to it from the state structure.
Zakaria’s (1999) argument follows on from Alfred Marshall’s remark that “the state is
the most precious of human possessions and no care can be too great to be spent on
enabling it to do its work in the best way” (Micklethwait and Woolridge, Jul/Aug 2014:
118). Inline with Marshall’s logic, he identifies the amount of national power that the
state can convert into actual power as being the primary measure of a state’s relative
position in the world. He labels this measure the ‘state power’ (Zakaria, 1999: 38). The
theory maintains the classical realist central assertion, albeit with a slight alteration
(replacing national power with state power), that states try to expand their political

17. 15
interest abroad when their top leaders perceive there to have been a relative state power
increase (Zakaria, 1999). This observation is very convincing because as Gideon Rose
(October 1998: 146-7) points out there is no immediate ‘transmission belt linking
material capabilities to foreign policy behaviour.’
The resulting question from state-centric realism’s basic hypothesis is, how to
measure a country’s state power? Zakaria (1999: 38-39) says that it is imperative that
his definition of the variable must be measured along several axes. The first is the
state’s scope: how broadly does the state define its responsibility? For example, a
minimalist state is confined to preserving internal stability, ensuring border security,
and maintaining its basic infrastructure. Conversely a maximalist state interprets its role
to include settling civil disputes, redistribution of wealth, and developing extensive
infrastructure networks (Desch, 1996: 241). In addition to the criteria above, the theory
combines state autonomy and state scope together to constitute a set of important
questions about state objectives. Thus, one must ask, is the state autonomous or does
the creation and pursuit of its goals mirror that of its’ society’s interests (Skocpol, 1985:
9-15)?
The second concerns the central policy-making apparatus: does the state have
enough capacity and is it sufficiently coherent to implement its decisions? A state with
a strong decision-making structure is built upon the foundations of sovereignty,
stability, and a committed and talented bureaucracy. In addition to these basic
underpinnings there are two other factors that demand attention: the state’s ability to
extract wealth and the extent to which the decision-making power is centralised within

18. 16
it (Zakaria, 1999). On the former, Theda Skocpol (1985: 16-17) claims that ‘a state’s
means of raising and deploying financial resources’ informs interested parties more than
any other feature of its actual, and latent, ability to ‘create or strengthen state
organisations, to employ personnel, to co-opt political support, to subsidise the
economy, and to fund social programmes.’ The latter relates to the bureaucratic politics
of a state, which determines the internal balance of power between different organs and
levels of the state. Subsequently, for a state to become a great power it has to have
substantial authority over the national resources, which can then be utilised through a
highly centralised decision-making administration.
It may seem rational that state-societal relations should work in tandem to obtain
the best state architecture to maximise its relative power in the world. However, there is
often great resistance to the sort of institutional reforms that would deliver these gains
(Ikenberry, Lake, Mastanduno, 1989). It is generally only after shocks and crises
(internally and externally) that there is the appetite to launch structural reforms that
would allow the state to extract more of the national power for its own ends. Therefore,
such change is episodic rather than an incremental process (Rose, October 1998).
One may think that this theory is apt for the US or any other democracy but not
an authoritarian regime like China. This is not true. Authoritarian regimes like the
Communist Party of China (CPC) are seen to be all-powerful, but the level of control
that the Government has ebbs and flows over time. Feng Huiyun (2012) saw that
different Chinese leaders hold varying levels of authoritative agency in their political
actions: Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping had more authority because the state structure

19. 17
was built around them, whereas Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao both resided in a weaker
and more decentralised state than their revolutionary predecessors. Jiang and Hu both
had to seek a consensus to implement their aims for China, whereas both Mao and Deng
created the consensus by dispersing with anyone who dared to stand in the way of the
realisation of their plans (Feng, 2012). However, it is only lately, under Xi, that China’s
state is becoming robust enough to move from wealth to power.

20. 18
3. Chinese State Power
As Zakaria (Summer 1992: 482) explains ‘a good theory of foreign policy
should first ask what effect the international system has on international behaviour,
because the most powerful generalizable characteristic of a state in international
relations is its relative position in the international system.’ Therefore, an evaluation of
China’s relative state power should begin with the environment in which it currently
finds itself before investigating the state structure under Xi Jinping. Thereafter the
analysis will then focus on the impacts of these factors on Chinese foreign and security
policy decision-making, which will lead onto the subject of the recent decision to move
HYSY 981 into disputed waters.
3.1 China and the International System
The present structure of the international system is currently a hot debate in
international relations. The system appears to be in transition from being dominated by
a single pole to ‘something else.’ Presently, the system resembles that of Samuel
Huntington’s (March/April 1999: 36) assertion of a uni-multipolar world – one
superpower (United States) and several major powers (China, Russia, Brazil, India,
France, Germany, UK, and Japan). Thus, we are in a uni-multipolar epoch, which may
prove to be a ‘moment’ in line with the similar ‘unipolar moment,’ which may act as a
precursor to ‘something else’ (Krauthammer, 1990/1991; Smith, August 2002).

21. 19
Joseph Nye (2002: 23-5) argued that the new power dynamics would be played
on three-dimensional chessboards: military capabilities, economic size, and
transnational relations. On the first board (military) Nye saw a big lead for the US with
it having the largest defence expenditure in the world. The second board (economic)
was more multipolar than the latter. Nye thought the last board (transnational relations)
was much more dispersed. Since Nye wrote his book, 11 years has passed and with
them the balance of power on these boards has shifted. The US still leads on the
military board but it is no longer such an asymmetric comparison between the US and
China. The two countries are the only two that for the foreseeable future could spend
over $100bn annually on defence (Friedberg, 2011). Furthermore, China has since
improved the technological capabilities of its military; its first aircraft carrier was put
into service this year and the People’s Liberation Army has a range of other 21st
century
weaponry at their disposal (The Guardian, 2 January 2014). It is predicted that within
the next two decades that its military will be on a par with that of the US, in East Asia
(Christensen, Spring 2001). China is set to become the number one economy by the
end of this year (Giles, 30 April 2014).5
This does not surmount to Chinese economic
domination, but it is a very important event in modern history and provides further
proof of China’s increased national power. China has also become more active
diplomatically bilaterally and multilaterally and has cultivated a lot of strategic
partnerships, which has simultaneously increased its overall influence with other
international actors (Feng and Huang, June 2014).
5
Calculated by GDP PPP.

22. 20
2014 looks increasingly like it will be a seminal year in the global balance of
power, as China’s national power grows ever closer to that of the US, with some already
thinking that China is the world’s most powerful state.6
Because of the changing
composition of global power it looks as if China’s long-held policy of ‘peaceful
development’ is coming to an end (Sørensen, July-September 2013). With power
becoming more diffuse, and the perceived increase in insecurity with it, the applicability
of ‘peaceful development’ is therefore reduced. Thus, giving validity to Avery
Goldstein’s (2005: 38-39) argument that ‘peaceful development’ was always intended
to be a transitional strategy with an ‘expiration date.’ The new strategic doctrine of the
PRC looks to be called ‘peripheral diplomacy.’ On the 24th
and 25th of October 2013,
the whole Standing Committee of the Politburo, several organs of the Central
Committee, State Counsellors, the Central Leading Small Group for foreign affairs, and
Chinese ambassadors to strategic countries attended a conference devoted to ‘periphery
diplomacy.’ It was convened to ‘conclude lessons, study, and judge the current
situation, unify thoughts, exploit the future, determine strategic objectives, basic
guideline and overall layout in future five to fifteen years and specify the working
roadmaps and schemes for solving major peripheral diplomacy problems’ (China
Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED), 30
October 2013). The language from the high-level policy advisory board’s website is
intriguing because it indicates that ‘peripheral diplomacy’ is to be peaceful development
whilst making ‘the best use of strategic opportunities’ (Mu, 26 October 2013,
news.xinhuanet.com). Thus, it seems as China’s leaders are finally answering Zhu
Liqun’s (European Union Institute for Security Studies, September 2010: 49-52), and
6
49% of a global Pew (14 July 2014) survey respondents thought that “China will eventually or has
replaced U.S.” as the world superpower.

23. 21
many others,’ calls for China to move from a ‘tide-surfing’ to a ‘tide-making’ role in
international politics.7
What is clear is that China benefitted massively from the unipolar system
(Goldstein, 2005; Ikenberry, May/June 2011). It allowed China to have a free ride by
utilising the minimalist policy of peaceful development to reap the rewards of the liberal
structure protected by American dominance: China’s GDP growth per year since 1978
has averaged approximately 9.9% and over 500 million Chinese citizens have been
lifted out of poverty (World Bank Database; World Bank). However, this free ride
seems to be coming to an end and with it the suitability of ‘peaceful development,’ due
to the gradual weakening of unipolarity.
To summarise, China has closed in on, and in some areas about to overtake, the
US across all of Nye’s chessboards. However, as this study alluded to earlier, it is the
relative increase in state power that matters more than growth in national power. That
is not to say that national power does not matter, it does. But it follows the logic of,
what is the point in owning an Aston Martin if you don’t know how to drive it properly.
For a state to meet its end goals, it is imperative that it can exploit its national assets in
an effective manner.
7
For a good understanding of the debate on China’s global personality, see Shambaugh (2013: 13-44).

24. 22
3.2 Chinese Historical State Power
Despite China being ruled by an authoritarian regime, the state’s power has
ebbed and flowed over time. As Susan Shirk (2007) reminded us, China is a not a
highly centralised state propped up by an all-powerful Communist party, but in fact is
quite a de-centralised and ‘fragile’ entity; a far cry from being a modern-day
superpower. However, under Mao and Deng the state generally had more capacity to
use the nation’s power for implementing their policy decisions, than during Jiang’s and
Hu’s tenures as leaders. Under Jiang and Hu, China seemed to be suffering from a bout
of the Dutch Disease – 18th
Century Netherlands had much wealth but no great
influence on international affairs, as a result it was said to suffer from a sickness, which
prevented it from expanding its interest abroad – during which the gap between national
and state power remained large enough to affect foreign policy decisions and
implementation (Brewer, 1989: xv). It is not until recently, under Xi’s leadership, that
the state has been able to shrink the gap between national and state power to such a
degree, which it can enjoy China’s increase in national power unleashed by Deng’s
‘Reform and Opening’ policy.
Feng Huiyun (2012) noted the two leaders that followed Deng, Jiang and Hu,
were more prone to continue on the path laid out by their predecessors; primarily
because, according to the leaders’ perceptions, the international system’s configuration
remained suitable for the ‘peace and development’ policy to continue (Ikenberry, 2011).
Furthermore, Jiang and Hu had no personal involvement in the Chinese revolution and,
therefore, lacked the founding authority that Mao and Deng exemplified throughout

25. 23
their reign. To legitimise their leaderships, Jiang and Hu had to link their efforts with
the country’s revolutionary past by continuing Mao and Deng’s policies, in addition to
replacing the ideological foundations of communism with nationalism (Li, 2012).
The state under Jiang and Hu became increasingly inept at extracting the
nation’s resources for its own ends. This was a direct result of the Deng’s reforms as it
opened up the state to become more ‘omi-directional’ in its power dynamics; power no-
longer emanated completely from the top-down (Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), September 2010: 43). This forced Jiang and Hu to seek a
consensus among the Politburo members to implement their decisions and support from
the wider society. This represented a de-centralisation that fundamentally weakened the
state’s ability to make quick decisions and take opportunities in the most favourable of
conditions (SIPRI, September 2010). Moreover, power was further diluted with the
power of the provinces in impacting the foreign policy of the Chinese state (SIPRI,
September 2010). For example, the devolved authority of the Coast Guard led to units
competing with one another to demonstrate their nationalistic credentials, which led to
diplomatic difficulties with maritime neighbours (International Crisis Group, 23 April
2012). The consensual and de-centralised nature of power in the Chinese state under
Jiang and Hu was the embodiment of the PRC’s inability to use the relative increase in
national power to meet its ends. Thus, for a short period China showed all the
symptoms of suffering from the Dutch Disease. This further demonstrates state-centric
realism’s suitability for explaining China’s decision to tow the oilrig into disputed
waters.

26. 24
3.3 Xi Jinping: Supreme Leader
Hu’s time as leader seemed to be more focussed on the idea of ‘peaceful
development’ as it became harder for China to effortlessly cajole others into accepting
their benign intentions (Kurlantzick, 2007). The need to constantly tell other states, and
their leaders, that they did not harbour revisionist ambitions with the rebranding of
‘peaceful development’ to a ‘harmonious world’ became harder as their relative power
and actions alluded to the opposite (Hu, 15 September 2005). As a result, Hu’s time as
leader should not be seen as the peak of ‘peaceful development,’ but as the time it began
to unravel. The timing of the unravelling comes at a transitional phase when the next
generation of leaders, most prominently Xi, were becoming more powerful in the
policy-making apparatus (Cabestan, 2009). In addition to this, China has been seen as
becoming more assertive on a myriad of issues, but most notably in the SCS (Johnston,
2013).
In the domestic sphere, there was a correlation with China’s assertive behaviour
with the belief that corruption was the biggest danger to the CPC’s legitimacy in a
wider atmosphere of pending doom (Holbig, 18 June 2014). These both come under the
banner of Xi’s ‘China Dream:’ his vision of the nation’s “great rejuvenation” is to rid
the country of the open wounds from the ‘Century of Humiliation’ by achieving the
‘Two Centuries’ objectives – to achieve a prosperous society by the centenary of the
foundation of the CPC in 2029 and returning China to its ‘rightful place’ by 2049, the
centenary of the PRC (BBC, 15 November 2012; Fabrizi, 18 June 2014; Holbig, 18

27. 25
June 2014).8
To achieve this he has needed to improve the state’s capacity to
implement its chosen policy to make China a 21st
century great power (Micklethwait
and Woolridge, Jul/Aug 2014). At the centre of China’s pioneering new state structure
is Xi himself. Heike Holbig (18 June 2014) has presented Xi as a 21st
century
‘paramount leader,’ who is very assertive internally as well as externally. In addition to
cleansing and re-legitimising the party, the ‘anti-corruption’ campaign has enhanced the
state’s power by centralising power through removing institutional and human obstacles
that Xi perceived as barriers to the full implementation of the ‘China Dream.’ Thus, the
end of ‘peaceful development’ spells the end of consensus decision-making.
Xi has removed institutional barriers by placing himself at the head of the
tripartite of the Chinese state – the Party; the State; and the Military. In addition to this,
Xi has placed himself as the chair of both the Central Leading Group for
Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (the central leading group for ‘comprehensively
deepening reform’) and the new National Security Commission (NSC) (Gore, 21 May
2014; CPC, 12 November 2013). Xi’s comments at the Third Plenum, which came a
mere two weeks after the conference on ‘peripheral diplomacy,’ implied that the NSC
would cover both internal and external security issues, to be comprehensive in scope
and to play an integral role in coordinating policy from a ‘top-level design’ (Buckley,
12 November 2014; Holbig, 18 June 2014). Reports from the first meeting talked about
a ‘comprehensive national security outlook’ and suggested that the NSC’s mandate
would cover ‘politics, territory (homeland security), military, economy, culture, society,
science and technology, information, ecology, natural resources and nuclear security’
8
The concept of the ‘Two Centuries’ was articulated in a presentation by Heike Holbig at the ECRAN
Annual Conference 2014 but not included in the online notes.

28. 26
(Zhu, 15 April 2014). The NSC seems to be the means by which the CPC will
implement and coordinate its ‘peripheral diplomacy.’
Xi has pursued powerful figures within the Party, whom, he considers to be
human obstacles to the state’s, and his personal power, through the guise of the anti-
corruption campaign (Chen, 06 August 2014, thediplomat.com). The more formidable
have been labelled as ‘Tigers,’ with the most prominent of these being the former
security chief, Zhou Yongkang (Wang, 29 July 2014). Zhou’s demise is crucial for a
number of reasons relating to the Chinese state as a whole, but also its SCS policy. In
addition to being the former head of the internal security apparatus and member of the
Standing Committee of the Politburo, he was the head of the CNOOC, and had deep ties
to Bo Xilai and the more leftist faction of the CPC (Holbig, 18 June 2014). Each
individual bureaucratic network that Xi weakens Zhou’s significant influence in, aids
Xi’s efforts to improve the state’s ability to use the national power for its own end.
Removing Zhou’s influence on national security increases the NSC’s authority over
such issues; eradicating his presence in oil has obvious ramifications for the state’s
ability to extract the national resources for its own ends, including the moving of
oilrigs; and quashing the weight that he gave to opposing internal Party factions
consolidates Xi’s grip on power. When you take into consideration all of Zhou’s
influence that has been removed from the state’s political organisation, then it becomes
apparent that there is huge political space for someone to move into. Because Xi is the
only one that has the capability to occupy such a vacuum, this assists his attempts to
relocate the locus of control in his hands.

29. 27
When viewing, the institutional reforms and the anti-corruption campaign
together, it is quite apparent how much the Chinese state has grown in stature under
President Xi. It has broadened its scope and increased its capabilities to such a degree
that it can now be acknowledged as an efficient extractor of national power for its own
ends. With the power he has accrued it in an atmosphere of crisis, it only helps him to
enact the reforms that are needed to meet his ambitious ‘China Dream’ foreign policy
goals of returning China to a dominant position regionally, and as a great power
globally.

30. 28
4. China and the South China Sea
The re-emergence of China as a great power and the weakening of US global
dominance has led to discussions about the new regional security architecture of East
Asia. The SCS has always been an important strategic point where states have
struggled over the balance of power in South East Asia, and Asia as a whole (Wang,
Spring 2006). Its location between the Indian and Pacific Oceans means that today it is
an economic nexus point between Asia, Africa, Europe, and Australia. Aaron Friedberg
(Winter 1993-1994: 7) described East Asia as the 21st
century’s ‘cockpit of great power
conflict,’ to which the SCS is the epicentre: it is the largest disputed area in the world,
with a host of great powers with significant stakes in it, it is the second busiest sea lane
in the world with over a quarter of the world’s crude oil and over half of the world’s
merchant ship tonnage travelling through its waters annually (Yan, 27 March 1998: 4).
Add the fact that the basin holds an abundance of natural resources – rich fishing
grounds and huge potential oil and natural gas deposits – then the area is ripe for
sovereignty disputes and geo-strategic posturing by all states involved.9
9
China has viewed the SCS as one of the three main areas (others being the Korean Peninsula and
Taiwan) that might trigger military regional conflicts for a long time (Yan, 27 March 1998: 4).

31. 29
4.1 China’s Claims in the South China Sea
Figure 1. (China’s 9-dash line and HYSY 981’s position,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-28322355).
China’s historical claims to the SCS are shown through the PRC’s 9-dash line
(see Figure 1.), which are based on its territorial claims to Taiwan, the Spratly (Nansha)
Islands, and the Paracel (Xisha) Islands. The PRC declares Taiwan as part of Mainland
China’s territory because of the military defeat of the Nationalist Government in 1949
in the Chinese Civil War, which most states in the world see as legitimate through the
‘one-China policy’ (Fravel, 2008: 332). The Spratly Islands, unlike Taiwan and the
Paracels, have never been included in an international agreement, and are claimed
wholly, or partially, by China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei.
The PRC first claimed the Spratly Islands during peace treaty negotiations in 1951

32. 30
(Fravel, 2008: 333).10
The Paracels, which are the primary focus of this article, have a
longer and more contested history than the Spratlys. Before the PRC and Vietnam
publicly contested the islands in the 1950s, China, Japan, and France had claimed them
at various points previously (Fravel, 2008: 334). Such claims have been based upon
territorial administration and historical use – many ancient maps and obscure diaries of
fishermen have been presented in attempts to enhance claimants’ positions.
As mentioned above, both states have historical claims to the Paracels.
However, China currently has administrative control over them through occupation.
The PRC gained control of the islands after it had defeated the South Vietnamese in a
short naval conflict in 1974. The Chinese ostensibly decided to remain in possession of
the islands because of the North Vietnamese’s acknowledgment of PRC sovereignty
over the islands (Fravel, 2008). However, after reunification in 1976, the Government
of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam refuted such claims, therefore producing
conflicting claims. Thus, according to international law, and the 2002 Declaration on
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), both sides should resolve such
overlapping claims through negotiations in the spirit of good faith (UN, 1982; ASEAN,
2002). However, China refuses to acknowledge the Paracels as disputed territory
because of the combination of historical records, current administration, and the private
deal between the two governments.
10
Zhou Enlai claimed Chinese sovereignty over the Spratlys, Paracels, Taiwan, and coastal islands during
the peace negotiations (Han [ed.], 1988: 444).

33. 31
4.2 The Decision to Move HYSY 981 into Disputed Waters
The decision to move the oilrig into the disputed waters comes amidst the wider
context of the changing international order, an increasingly confident Chinese global
personality, and a change in Chinese regional policy (Summers, June 2014). This
directly affects the region’s political dynamics, which are predominantly competitive, as
China wants to exert more influence while other powers want to maintain the status quo.
All parties’ strategic postures and lack of strategic trust with one another can sometimes
lead to confrontations, such as the stand-off between China and Vietnam throughout the
months of May, June, and July 2014 over HYSY 981. Furthermore, it adds to the
likelihood of miscalculations leading to much more dangerous situations, which could
directly involve the US and the PRC.
Rose (October 1998) suggests that it is often only after single shocks to the
international system that state leaders become aware of the long-term incremental shifts
in power. It is impossible to determine what was the single event which led to the
Chinese leadership becoming conscience of the power shift, but it could have been a
number of things over the last 5 or 6 years; the 2008-9 financial crisis that still impairs
the West and its allies; the inability of the West to prevent Russian incursions in
Georgia and Ukraine; the initial lacklustre US pivot to Asia; Russian, and other states,
bandwagoning with China; or the global and regional weak response to China’s early
assertiveness in its immediate periphery, including the SCS. It is apparent that Xi has
responded to one, or a combination, of these indications to install the more forward
leaning strategic posture of the ‘peripheral diplomacy.’

34. 32
Xi’s public comments on ‘peripheral diplomacy’s’ purpose to “serve the cause
of national rejuvenation” make it difficult for anyone to argue that Chinese actions in
May 2014 were defensive (Mu, 26 October 2013). He said, “China must consolidate its
friendly relations with neighbouring countries and make the best use of strategic
opportunities China now has” and to direct its efforts “to socialize the region to accept
China’s view of its core interests and validated efforts to enforce PRC sovereignty and
territorial claims against rival disputants” (Mu, 26 October 2013; Swaine, Summer
2014: 2). The use of the phrase ‘strategic opportunities’ implies that China will expand
its interests and enforce its territorial claims when her leaders perceive such
advantageous moments. Thus, the decision to move HYSY 981 into disputed waters
seems to be one of these ‘strategic opportunities.’ Furthermore, the SCS plays a
significant role in China’s attempts to quell its insatiable appetite for influence over its
periphery and the natural resources within it. The CPC harbours ambitions to change
the countries energy mix from 3% to 10% natural gas by 2020 to fuel its ‘Two
Centuries’ objectives under the ‘China Dream’ (US Energy Information Administration,
4 February 2014). Under these goals, the SCS plays a crucial role because of the
substantial amounts of natural gas that are possibly deposited there. Thereby, creating a
strategic incentive to secure larger parts of the area for energy security.
Conclusively, the decision to move HYSY 981 into Vietnam’s claimed EEZ was
made because of a combination of Fravel’s (2011) three scenarios for possible Chinese
escalation. Firstly, the SCS has increased in value because of the natural resources
required to continue China’s realisation of its ‘national rejuvenation’ by the ‘Two

35. 33
Centuries’ deadline. Secondly, China’s neighbours have become increasingly
suspicious of their territorial ambitions in relation to their strategic and energy
objectives. Thus, they have become more open to America’s presence in the region as a
security guarantor (The BRICS Post, 21 June 2014). Such moves may have created the
perception that states may eventually pursue hard balancing policies, which would
cause China’s bargaining power to decline in the long run. Finally, and decisively,
China’s relative increase in state and national power has created a moment of
opportunity to capitalise on a regional flux in power. China’s southern periphery has
always been the most likely area for expansion because, to borrow a domestic metaphor,
there are less tigers than flies to the South of China. Ultimately, the two preceding
scenarios both require a strong China to have the ability to enforce its claims. Thus, as
argued throughout this article, this is the crucial variable to when considering why the
Chinese Government decided to escalate things further in May 2014? And, why did it
become more assertive in the SCS?
The decision also matches Xi’s conception of diplomacy to “understand the
trend of time, devise strategy, and plan carefully” (Mu, 26 October 2013). Xi’s remarks
refer to China’s “new situation” in the weakening of the regional and global order
[“trend of time”] for providing the need for the corresponding new ‘peripheral
diplomacy’ doctrine to realise the ‘China Dream’ by the ‘Two Centuries’ [“devise
strategy”], through the NSC’s implementation and coordination role [“plan carefully”]
(CCICED, 30 October 2013).11
It is evident that the NSC is the only body that Xi could
have implemented and coordinated such a sophisticated plan. The NSC’s remit
11
The first meeting of the NSC was 16 days before the oilrig reached its destination on 15 April 2014.

36. 34
(including territory, security, military, economy, and natural resources), in addition to
its participants, makes it the only institution in the Chinese state capable of coordinating
all the bodies (Chinese Ministries, PLAN, Coast Guard, CNOOC, and the fishing fleets)
involved.
Thus, China decided to escalate and enforce their claims to the waters off the
Paracels because they had the political motivation to do so, spurned on by the need to
right the wrongs perpetrated upon the Chinese during the ‘Century of Humiliation,’ in
addition to the strategic opportunity brought on by an increase in its relative state power
with those in the region.

37. 35
5. Conclusion
The decision to move the HYSY 981 oilrig into the disputed waters between the
Paracels and Vietnam’s coast is indicative of the change that the Chinese state has
undergone under Xi’s short time in the upper echelons of the Chinese Communist Party.
It now seems that an uncomfortable truth for the Chinese people is coming to light that
China is not a ‘new type of superpower,’ but it is acting similar to the ‘barbarians’ that
imposed the ‘Century of Humiliation’ upon the Chinese people. Its ever-growing
military and diplomatic apparatus, its extensive territorial claims, and its participation in
the renegotiation of the regional security architecture all point towards ambitions that
extend further than pure security interests, because it is strong enough to do so. China
is, therefore, currently not an exception to the rule of rising powers; they simultaneously
expand their interests inline with their growing state power.
Classical realism’s main fault over the placing of the oilrig on May 2nd
2014 is
that it doesn’t explain the lag between the increase in China’s national power and its
national interests. It doesn’t recognise that the state is not an autonomous actor; nations
don’t decide and implement foreign policy, governments do. The chief discrepancy
between defensive realism and the events in the SCS is that China’s relative strength in
the region, and globally, has been enhanced, which leads us to the conclusion that
China’s actions have been those of a thoroughly traditional rising power. The
accusation of the US being threatening because it’s camped on China’s periphery is
weak, as this article has demonstrated, China has only benefitted from America’s
dominance. The threat comes when China’s interests expand and clash against those of

38. 36
others. Offensive realists argue that such conditions are fraught with dangers, which
inevitably lead to conflict. However, China is not demonstrating a gung-ho revisionist
spirit, it is still willing to have constructive discussions with other states in how to best
manage its re-emergence as a great power.
As this article has shown, state-centric realism provides a more complete answer
to the question, compared with the three other theories explored, posed at the beginning
of this work: why did the Chinese Government decide to escalate things further in May
2014? And, why has it chosen to become more assertive in the SCS? The utilisation of
state-centric realism indicates that the current atmosphere of crisis within China has
produced the political motivation needed to allow Xi to implement internal and external
policies, which will, it hopes, achieve ‘national rejuvanation.’ Because of the
weakening of unipolarity, the new generation of leaders have been presented with a
unique opportunity to enforce claims on its periphery that were not dependent on US
security, in addition to expanding its interests further afield. Yet, to take advantage of
the national will and strategic opportunity, Xi has had to remove barriers to the state’s
ability to focus national resources to formulate, implement, and coordinate foreign
policy. Xi has done this by reforming the once omni-directional domestic power
structure under Jiang and Hu, into a centralised Chinese state that allows him to focus
its power omni-directionally abroad through the new foreign and security policy,
‘peripheral diplomacy.’

39. 37
5.1 Future Implications
It is important to remember that this article does not have the ambition to predict
future Chinese decisions. Though, it could prove a harbinger for explanations to
potential Chinese actions in its territorial and maritime claims, and possibly wider
actions. The decision to escalate the situation in the SCS further is nothing
revolutionary. However, the level of sophistication and confidence in the Chinese
state’s ability to implement its leaders decision could have further consequences for the
region.
Most worryingly, for all states that have an interest in the SCS, is that China’s
actions seems to confirm America’s belief that its 9-dash line claims all within the
border, instead of islands and their territorial waters. The main concern is that China
will use ‘anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)’ to withdraw the freedom of navigation in the
region and restrict access to the sea-lanes (RAND, 2007). The decision to use dozens of
vessels to prevent Vietnamese ships reaching the oilrig gives credence to many states’
anxiety over China’s ability and willingness to expand A2/AD as their state power
increases. This may give further impetus to America’s flagging pivot. China’s actions
have already caused Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea to sign (or re-
sign) military pacts with the US, Japan to amend its pacifist constitution, and Asian
states to pursue renewed economic ties with the US through the Trans-Pacific
Partnership and bilateral agreements (Thanh, 16 June 2014). Furthermore, there are
reports that Vietnam is reaching out to the US, and other partners, in an attempt to
reduce China’s advantage over them (The BRICS Post, 21 June 2014).

40. 38
Also, China could replicate its actions with HYSY 981. It is no secret that
China has oilrigs prepared off Hainan Island, so this action could provide a test case for
future unilateral exploration of oil and natural gas in the SCS (The Economist
Intelligence Unit, 4 July 2014). The fact that HYSY 981 had to return to port on the
16th
of July because of the monsoon season, suggests that this was indeed a test-balloon
for further action. If China had been met with a strong united response against its
actions then it could have used the climate as a pretext to save face. However, all those
involved in the region – mainly ASEAN, the US, and the EU – acted rather feebly to
China’s actions, and may have solidified Xi’s perception of China’s increased status in
the region. Thus, other regional actors may have failed the latest in a series of
credibility tests.
Furthermore, efforts to lessen the fallout from the May 2014 incident like the
proposed binding Code of Conduct and the American’s ‘freeze initiative’ are not
adequate enough to mitigate the underpinning problem with the regional security
architecture.12
A binding version of the 2002 DOC is not achievable for the same
reasons that it wasn’t achievable in 2002; China does not want to sign up to such a
document, which ties its hands in its endeavours to increase its influence in its region.
The American’s ‘freeze’ idea is, at best, a stopgap initiative, which could only prevent
similar escalations in the near future. However, the Chinese have irrevocably dismissed
it by pointing to the 2002 DOC as being sufficient enough to guide future relations in
the SCS (Nguyen, 26 August 2014). To achieve durable stability, the powers in the
12
US
proposed
a
freeze
on
provocative
acts
in
disputed
waters
in
the
SCS
(Nguyen,
26
August
2014).

41. 39
region must come to some sort of consensus on what is each other’s role in the peace
and security of the SCS. The question is whether this is achievable whilst everyone’s
interest, bar China’s, is to delay and maintain the status quo. Thus, it remains to be seen
if ‘peaceful change’ in the 21st
Century is possible.
The academic implications of this study are that it has shown that neoclassical
realism, specifically state-centric realism, is relevant to non-democratic regimes, their
foreign and security policy strategies, and tactical decisions. For scholars that focus on
China, this study’s hypothesis of the new Chinese state under Xi Jinping being strong
enough that it can implement its assertive foreign policy better, could lead to more
interesting work on China’s strategy to attain its rejuvenation. Yet, they will all need to
accept that China’s wealth has finally begot it the power it craves. Just like every other
traditional rising state in history.

42. 40
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