NKR conflict before 1988

1. AUTHOR: TIGRAN TOROSYAN
THE ORIGIN OF THE NAGORNO KARABAKH CONFLICT
AND ITS ESCALATION INTO WAR
Indeed, the study of a conflict cannot be exhaustive without a review of the historical
developments preceding it. The present chapter treats the problems relating to the original causes
and resumption of the Karabakh conflict in 1988 without touching upon its earlier history, which
is widely treated in a large number of works.1
The following lines by G. Starovoitova summarise the information conveyed by the majority
of these works, “Without going too far into the region’s ancient and medieval history, it should
nevertheless be noted that the Armenian side can produce an impressive number of objective
sources suggesting that it has dominated the region for over a millennium. The Karabakh
khanate, incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1813, brought a Turkic population to the region
no earlier than the beginning of the eighteenth century, eventually establishing its rule over the
Armenian majority. As in tsarist Russia, administrative boundaries were not drawn along ethnic
lines during this period in the region’s history.”2
A. Yamskov, who touched upon this problem in relation with another issue, reaches the same
conclusion: “As far as the Armenians are concerned, the problem is easy to resolve. The
Armenian population has been permanently living within the borders of Nagorno Karabakh for at
least two thousand years. It is also very well-known3 that in the 1920s, the Armenians constituted
about 94 per cent of the permanent residents of the autonomous region.”4
In view of the fact that the Azerbaijanians led a nomadic life and historically Nagorno
Karabakh served them as a transit zone towards Alpine pastures, Yamskov considers that this
right of the Azerbaijanian nomads should be reckoned with during the resolution of the conflict.
The Origin of the Karabakh Conflict
The first quarter of the 20th century was marked with certain historical events well-
documented in an abundance of works5 and bearing direct or indirect relation to the conflict of
Karabakh.
This part of our work, however, does not thoroughly deal with that period: it will represent an
analysis of the events that were to prove decisive from the standpoint of the subsequent
developments and are still of great importance for the understanding of the logic and motivation
of the contemporary processes. With this respect, of special significance are two issues, namely
the emergence of the state of ‘Azerbaijan’ and the roots of the Karabakh conflict.
After the October Revolution of 1917, the newly-established Soviet Russian authorities faced
the task of consolidating their position not only in the capital, but also in the central parts of the
former Russian Empire. The period following the Revolution was marked with great instability
in the remote regions of the Empire although the Bolsheviks made every possible endeavour to
keep the situation under control. In Transcaucasia this state of unsteadiness was especially
flagrantly manifested in Baku, where reins of power shifted to the Baku Soviet Commune early
in November (this body, however, had a very unstable rule). The instability that reigned in the
remote regions of the Russian Empire during the first six months following its fall often grew
into anarchy thus creating quite favourable conditions for various forms of mutiny and armed
clashes.
Unprecedented as it was, great activity was observed within national parties. On 30 March
1918, the Musavat Party of Caucasian Tatars rose in rebellion against the Commune of Baku.
Two months later, three newly-established states were proclaimed in Transcaucasia: the
Republic of Armenia, the Democratic Republic of Georgia and the Democratic Republic of

2. Azerbaijan. Indeed, the restoration of Armenian and Georgian statehoods after the collapse of the
Russian Empire was only natural. As for the establishment of the Democratic Republic of
Azerbaijan, which had advanced claims to the Provinces of Baku and Yelisavetpol as well as to
Nakhijevan, it can be explained in no other way but as the re-emergence of the Turkish factor in
the region as possessing quite a new quality. The territorial claims of the Democratic Republic of
Azerbaijan also pursued a definite objective, namely connection with Turkey via the route
Nagorno-Karabakh-Zangezur-Nakhijevan.
Of great interest are the assessments of this newly-emerged state offered by some
contemporary figures. One of them, B. Baikov, who held membership of the Russian National
Council of Baku between 1918 and 1919, wrote the following, “To have a clear understanding of
those standing behind the idea of that new state and of the goals it pursued, one should imagine
what that newly-established republic was like in the light of history. Those two provinces (Baku
and Yelisavetpol) have never constituted a joint political entity. They have never had a common
name, let alone ‘Azerbaijan.’ This name is used with reference to one of the northern provinces
of present-day Persia. The new state appropriated a geographical name which pertains to a part
of another state.”6
The word ‘Azerbaijanian,’ as denoting the people living in this state and the language used by
them, was to come into being only years later, viz. as a result of the establishment of the state of
Azerbaijan. This is a rare example in universal history: the state founded entailed the emergence
of a people and a language whose names derive from the name of that state. Those who
assumed the ethnonym ‘Azerbaijanian’ or ‘Azerbaijani’ in 19367 did not even have a recognised
common name: they were referred to as Tatars,8 Mussulmans9 or Turkis10 and spoke the Turkish
language.
This was established in a decree on the Nationalisation (Azerification) of the State Institutions
of the Azerbaijanian SSR issued by the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan on 31 July
1923: “From the moment of the establishment of Soviet rule in Azerbaijan, the Turkish
language, i.e. the majority language [in the country], was proclaimed as official language.
“The language of communication with the Autonomous Oblast [Region] of Karabakh is
Armenian.”11
The available indisputable facts come to attest to the truthfulness of the words of Professor of
Massachusetts University Alstadt stating that the Azerbaijanian identity originated in the Soviet
period, for the Azeries, just like the Uzbek and the Kazakh, merely represented semi-nomadic
Turkic tribes before the establishment of Russian rule in the region. Alstadt continues that for
them, clannish and family connections were the marginal elements of social organisation.12
During this period of immense significance to the future of the whole region of Transcaucasia,
Turkey did not hide its interest in the events unfolding there and strove hard to secure its
presence in Baku, at the same time also settling the problem of the Armenians’ extermination.
Although Turkey was not living through its best times, it was able to predict the inevitability of
the emergence of new states and could not keep aloof from the ongoing events that were of
pivotal significance to it, given its far-reaching goals. Several days before the proclamation of
the ADR, on 23 May 1918, Ambassador of Germany to the Ottoman Empire Bernsdorf wrote in
a telegraph addressed to the German Foreign Office, that the Turks took control over the
Provinces of Yelisavetpol and Baku with the support of the local Tatar population. He also adds
in the same telegraph that the Turkish army kept on plundering the Armenian towns and
slaughtering their inhabitants, being always accompanied by Kurdish and Tatar volunteers.13
Even after the declaration of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan, when the Musavat Party
took the reins of power in Baku, Turkey did not give up its plans for securing its military
presence there, another fact proving that it did pursue far-reaching objectives. Moreover, when
the first congress of the accredited representatives of the people of Nagorno Karabakh, held
between 22 and 26 July, renounced Musavatist Azerbaijan’s claims to Nagorno Karabakh and
established a people’s government, this made Nagorno Karabakh another important target for
Turkey. In a report dated Tiflis, 4 August 1918, General Kres von Kresenchtein, the Head of the

3. German Mission in Caucasia, wrote to Germany’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Turks had
attempted to invade the purely Armenian Province of Karabakh and disarm the local
population. He warned that if they did not take any measures to prevent it, the mountaineers of
Karabakh who were able to defend themselves would inevitably struggle against the Muslims.14
On 15 September, the Turkish troops took Baku and what they did there first of all was to
perpetrate a massacre among the Armenians living in the city, as evidenced by an eye-witness,
B. Baikov: “The mass slaughter of the Armenians [launched] by the dregs from the very first
days of the conquest of Baku was not prevented at all. It was stopped only after the local foreign
consuls as well as the Russian and Jewish public figures had made a number of speeches [against
it].”15
According to Officer of the German Secret Service East of Constantinople Wilhelm Litten,
30,000 Armenians fell victim to the carnage in Baku.16
However, this was only the tip of the iceberg. The very existence of the Armenian-populated
region of Karabakh posed a major obstacle for the realisation of the Turko-Tatar plans and due to
this fact, ten days later, on 24 September, the Turkish army units, led by Nuri Pasha, entered
Karabakh from the side of Aghdam and invaded Shushi, their ultimate goal being the subjugation
of Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan. The Armenians of the region were able to organise their
self-defence quite rapidly, and on 17 October, the large units of the Turkish occupation army
were defeated at Msmna. Nor was Turkey victorious on the other fronts so that a short time later
it was obliged to admit its defeat by the Entente. In accordance with the Peace Treaty of Mudros
signed on 30 October, the Turkish troops were pulled back from Transcaucasia. Within a short
time (on 17 November), English troops were deployed in Baku, but this did not change the
situation of Karabakh Armenians for the better. On the contrary, the British Military Mission
stationed in Shushi did not make the slightest attempt to settle the problems facing these people
and appointed Sultanov as Governor General early in May 1919. This designation aroused a
storm of protest both by the Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh and the authorities of the Republic
of Armenia, for it exposed an apparently biassed attitude towards one of the disputant parties
claiming possession of the region in that atmosphere of ethnic tension. In addition, that
assignment was a rude challenge to the Armenians as Sultanov was notorious for his flagrant
hatred for Armenians. Truly, the consequences of his appointment in that position soon revealed
themselves: within a month, i.e. on 4 June, the slaughter of the Armenian inhabitants of the
villages adjacent to Shushi was perpetrated under Sultanov’s poorly-veiled command and the
passiveness of the British Military Mission.17
In order to appease the situation in view of the consideration that “...the fate of Nagorno
Karabakh is to be determined at the Peace Conference and clashes are disastrous for the
population of Karabakh,”18 on 26 August, the National Council of Nagorno Karabakh signed an
interim agreement with Azerbaijan under which Nagorno Karabakh (the Districts of Shushi,
Jevanshir and Jebrail) was provisionally put within the borders of Azerbaijan until the Peace
Conference of Paris.
Of special interest is the fact that by signing this agreement, the Democratic Republic of
Azerbaijan actually recognised—despite its territorial claims—the National Council of Nagorno
Karabakh as an equal legal entity and a legitimate body entitled to defend the interests of
Nagorno Karabakh. Nevertheless, even this agreement did not put an end to the intrigues and
violations committed by Azerbaijan. The climax of all this was the invasion of the multi-ethnic
city of Shushi by Tatar troops on 23 March 1920, followed by plunder, conflagration and
massacre amidst the local Armenian population. In the aftermath of this carnage, Shushi turned
into a Tatar (later Azerbaijani - T. T.) citadel.19
Dwelling on these events in a report of the Caucasian Bureau of the Communist Party of
Russia submitted at the first conference of the Communist Parties of Transcaucasia, G.
Orjonikidze said, “In the Dashnaks’ times, the City of Shushi was devastated, with its Armenian
part being totally wiped out.”20

4. The 9th conference of the peasantry of Nagorno Karabakh, held between 23 and 29 April,
annulled the interim agreement signed by the 7th conference and subsequently “...violated by the
Azerbaijani Government as the Azerbaijani troops have launched attacks against the peaceful
civilian population of Karabakh and have slaughtered the inhabitants of Shushi and the
neighbouring villages.”21
The conference also made a declaration about Nagorno Karabakh’s incorporation into
Armenia.
The resolution of the conference was further reinforced with the Bolsheviks’ coming to power
in Azerbaijan on 28 April 1920. The new authorities of Azerbaijan did not recognise the
legitimacy of their predecessors and therefore, they did not acknowledge Soviet Azerbaijan as a
legal successor of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan.
Anyway, the Sovietisation of Azerbaijan was to rapidly become a serious factor in the
settlement process of the problem of Nagorno Karabakh, a factor that ran absolutely counter to
the interests of Nagorno Karabakh. Two months later, J. Stalin wrote the following to G.
Orjonikidze in a telegram dated 8 July, “To my mind, it is impossible to endlessly manoeuvre
between the parties and we should definitely take sides with one of them; in this case, indeed, it
is Azerbaijan with Turkey. I have already spoken to Lenin: he does not mind this.”22
In May the Bolsheviks took power in Karabakh as well, but it did not prove of any essential
impact on the general situation. It was the orientation of the foreign politics of the Republic of
Armenia and not that of Nagorno Karabakh that mattered most to Russia.
After the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, Armenia had to direct its struggling forces not only
against the Turkish and Azerbaijani troops, but also the 11th Red Army. In fact, Russia was
engaged in war against Armenia. In August the Republic of Armenia and the Soviet Socialist
Federative Republic of Russia signed an agreement on cessation of arms. 23 Nevertheless, the
11th Red Army remained as the most important tool for the implementation of the Russian
policy in Transcaucasia, since the issue of the Sovietisation of the region comprised a core point,
i.e. the question of the belonging of Nakhijevan, Zangezur and Karabakh that was of fatal
significance to Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Not only did the 11th Red Army attempt to
keep these three disputed territories under control and impede the actions of the Armenian troops
there, but it also often supported the Turkish and Azerbaijani army units in their movements.
The Armenian Revolutionary Committee, established in Azerbaijan on 29 November,
declared Armenia as a Soviet Socialist Republic. On 2 December, this Committee seized power
in Yerevan assisted by the 11th Red Army. Now the entire region of Transcaucasia was under
the Bolshevik rule and the settlement of all problems, including the so-called “disputed
territories” (Nagorno Karabakh, Zangezur, Nakhijevan) was dictated from Moscow. B. Legran,
the accredited representative of SSFR in Armenia, was actively engaged in conducting
negotiations and kept daily contact with People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs G. Chicherin.
However, it was Stalin and Orjonikidze that had a most decisive influence on the subsequent
development of events. On 2 December, G. Orjonikidze, who held membership of the Caucasian
Bureau of the Russian Communist Party and of the Revolutionary Military Council of the
Caucasian front, sent a telegram to Lenin and Stalin: “Convey to Comrades Lenin and Stalin the
following: we have just received an announcement from Yerevan stating that Soviet rule has
already been proclaimed there [and] the former authorities have been overthrown... Yesterday
Azerbaijan made a declaration about shifting Nakhijevan, Zangezur and Nagorno Karabakh to
Soviet Armenia.”24
The declaration of the Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan, adopted on 30 November and
published in the Communist newspaper of Baku on 2 December, read slightly different from the
aforementioned lines: “The territories of the Districts of Zangezur and Nakhijevan constitute
inseparable parts of Soviet Armenia and the working peasantry of Nagorno Karabakh are granted
with a full right to self-determination.”25
Two days later, on 4 December, the Pravda newspaper published an article in which Stalin
declared that the Soviet authorities had found a solution to the Armenian question, namely,

5. Azerbaijan had voluntarily annulled all its claims to the disputed territories and placed
Nakhijevan, Zangezur and Nagorno Karabakh into the possession of Soviet Armenia.26
The following day the authorities of Russia declared that “upon getting the news of the
revolution made in Armenia and the establishment of Soviet rule there, the Soviet Russian
Government immediately made a decision to place the disputed territories of Zangezur, Nagorno
Karabakh and Nakhijevan within [the borders of] Soviet Armenia.”27
Nevertheless, this period was to last but a very short time. Fully realising the danger the
change of the situation was fraught with, Turkey turned to drastic measures threatening Russia
with establishing alliance with its former enemy, the Entente.
In February 1921, anti-Bolshevik revolts broke out in a number of settlements in Armenia and
the Bolsheviks lost the reins of power. Under these circumstances, the issue of the “disputed
territories” again became a subject of fervent discussions and multi-step, complicated
combinations. First and foremost, the question of Nakhijevan was “cut off” from the general
problem of the “disputed territories.” Russia’s stance concerning it was well-expressed and
irreversible: “…as far as Nakhijevan is concerned, the final word remains with the representative
of Azerbaijan.”28 This is what Stalin wrote to People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the
RSSFR Chicherin on 6 March 1921. Within a short time, this decision was firmly established in
the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Moscow signed on 16 March. As a bilateral treaty which also
incorporates solutions to problems directly relating to another two countries, i.e. Armenia and
Azerbaijan, this document is extremely untenable, as assessed within the framework of
international law. The subsequent course of history, however, was not favourable for having it
reconsidered. Practically, this was especially impossible given the fact that six months after the
conclusion of the Treaty of Moscow, i.e. on 13 October, Turkey and the Soviet Socialist
Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed the Treaty of Kars, with Russia playing a
most influential role in its conclusion. Formal as it was, this treaty represented an amendment to
the juridical flaws of the previous agreement.
As of the spring of 1921, there did not exist the same clarity with regard to the Nagorno
Karabakh problem, but the clock of history had already begun turning back. The telegram G.
Orjonikidze and S. Kirov addressed to the Chairman of Soviet Azerbaijan’s Council of Peoples’
Commissars on 26 June still reflected some hopes of reaching a settlement acceptable for the
people of Karabakh: “For the purpose of establishing truly friendly relations, it is necessary to be
guided by the following principle while seeking a solution to the problem of Karabakh: no
Armenian-inhabited village should be incorporated into Azerbaijan and in the same way, no
Muslim-populated village should be incorporated into Armenia.”29
However, Azerbaijan, that had strengthened its positions and succeeded in removing the
question of Nakhijevan from the agenda, was not slow in giving a resolute answer. The joint
session of the Political Bureau of Azerbaijan’s Central Committee and the Bureau for
Organisational Matters that was convened the following day, i.e. on 27 June, decided “… to
consider the separation of Armenian- and Turkish-inhabited settlements for the purpose of
shifting them to Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively as unacceptable from the standpoint of
administrative and economic expediency.”30
By mid-April, the Armenian Bolsheviks had already suppressed the revolt with the support of
the Russian Red Army and restored their power, but those two months were enough for Turkey
and Azerbaijan to settle all the problems they were interested in, although not so “easily” as that
of Nakhijevan. Of fatal significance proved two decisions adopted by the Caucasian Bureau of
the Central Committee of the Communist (Workers’) Party of Russia. Two variants of resolving
the problem of Karabakh were put under consideration at the session held on 4 July, viz. to leave
Karabakh within the borders of Azerbaijan or to incorporate the mountainous part of Karabakh
into Armenia. The session decided “… c) to incorporate the mountainous part of Karabakh into
Armenia [and] to hold a referendum in the mountainous part of Karabakh, with Orjonikidze,
Myasnikov, Figatner [and] Kirov voting for it.

6. “On Narimanov’s suggestion it was decided to leave the final settlement of the issue for the
Central Committee of the Communist (Workers’) Party of Russia.”31
The voters for the reversed variant stipulating that Karabakh should remain within the borders
of Azerbaijan were Nazaretian, Narimanov and Makharadze.
The following day (5 July), on Orjonikidze’s and Nazaretian’s demand the issue was
reconsidered in favour of leaving Nagorno Karabakh within the frontiers of Azerbaijan “out of
the need for peace between the Moslems and the Armenians.”32
The final decision concerning the fate of Karabakh was not only unacceptable for the
Armenian side, but also illegal, for the party-affiliated body of a third country had adopted a
decision on the territorial problems concerning two other states and there was no bilateral
agreement signed. Perhaps, it is not incidental that the minutes of this decision omit the results of
voting.
These drastic turns that seem rather strange at first sight actually have quite a simple
explanation: the point is that this problem as well as all the subsequent issues were resolved in
Moscow where no conventions were reckoned with and every resolution made was motivated by
the objectives of the Bolshevik leadership.
In compliance with a decision made by the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan, on 7
July 1923, the Autonomous Oblast (Region) of Karabakh was established, and a mixed
committee of the representatives of the authorities of Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan was
charged with ascertaining its borders within a month. The borders of the newly-established
autonomous region were drawn absolutely arbitrarily so that its territory left out considerable
portions of Nagorno Karabakh from the west, north and south. In several years’ time, some other
major settlements of Northern Artsakh, 10 in number, were placed within the territory of
Shamkhor District. In the 1930s, Azerbaijan finally succeeded in stripping Nagorno Karabakh of
a common border with Armenia.
The Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh who enjoyed an overwhelming majority there
repeatedly applied to the Soviet authorities with a petition to reconsider the issue of the
belonging of Nagorno Karabakh. There exists an abundance of factual material proving that the
Armenian inhabitants of the region were constantly subjected to discrimination and pressure. Let
us mention just a few examples to show this.
The Soviet Union had eight autonomous regions. During the period between their
establishment and the year 1986, in each of these regions the population initially grew by 60 per
cent and then became four times larger. The same, however, cannot be said about Nagorno
Karabakh, where the population increased by only 12 per cent, which runs counter to the birth
rate registered in the region in those years. In addition, in the same years, the populations of
Armenia and Azerbaijan grew several times larger.
In an interview given in 2002 Azerbaijan’s former president H. Aliyev did not even attempt to
veil the state policy of discrimination that Azerbaijan implemented against Nagorno Karabakh:
“That problem [i.e. the problem of Nagorno Karabakh - T. T.] has existed since the early 20th
century. The Soviet period did not pass without difficulties either, but we kept the situation in
Nagorno Karabakh under control. How did we do that?
“First of all, the Soviet regime was of great help to us. Besides, I made a great contribution to
the development of Nagorno Karabakh—I mean during the period when I was First Secretary. In
the meantime, I tried to change the demography [of the region]. Nagorno Karabakh raised the
issue of opening an Institute there. I decided to do so, but on condition that it should have three
departments: Armenian, Russian and Azerbaijani. It was there and not to Baku that we sent the
Azerbaijanis coming from the adjacent districts. We opened a large shoe factory in Stepanakert,
but it did not have workforce, so we sent Azerbaijanis there from the neighbouring districts of
the region. By using this and other means I attempted to make the number of Azerbaijanis in
Nagorno Karabakh larger and reduce the number of the Armenians.”33
This policy was typical of not only Aliyev, but also all the other leaders of Azerbaijan. For
more than fifty years the Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh did not manifest any

7. growth: it was only in 1979 that their number became equal to the figures registered as of 1921,
although the birth rate in the region was higher than the average in Transcaucasia. In addition,
the correlation of the Azerbaijanis unfailingly increased as contrasted with that of the
Armenians: thus, in 1921 the latter constituted 94.6 per cent of the region’s population; in 1979
they formed 75.9 per cent, whereas during the same period, the former grew from 5 to 22.9 per
cent.
Prominent Russian sociologist Zdravomislov provides a summary of reasons substantiating
the petition of the Council of the People’s Deputies of the Autonomous Region of Nagorno
Karabakh for seceding from Soviet Azerbaijan and incorporating into Soviet Armenia. Although
far from being exhaustive, his list of reasons is, nevertheless, impressive: “Those who form an
idea about the evolution of the conflict with the help of a map can consider that decision quite
natural: Nagorno Karabakh is separated from Armenia by a narrow strip of land. Most of the
population of the autonomous region were the Armenians who had long been suffering all the
hardships of being granted autonomy only formally. There existed some problems connected
with the teaching of the Armenian language at schools. Direct communication between Armenia
and the Autonomous Region of Nagorno Karabakh was very difficult to maintain as it was held
via Baku and was controlled by the Azerbaijani authorities. Manpower policy in the region was
conducted to the advantage of the Azerbaijanis.”34
During this period, Nagorno Karabakh was slowly living through exactly what had taken place in
Nakhijevan: Azerbaijan was consistently changing the demographic composition of the region
by violence, pressure and discrimination. Those in Nagorno Karabakh fully realised that as soon
as the correlation of the Armenians and Azerbaijanis approached the limit of 50/50, that process
would drastically grow swifter, and the fate of Nakhijevan would become real for them as well:
in 1988 the very last Armenian-inhabited village was forced into deportation in Nakhijevan and
today it is totally stripped of its Armenian population.

8. REFERENCES
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Donabedian P., Mutafian C. The Caucasian Knot. The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh. London & New Jersey, 1994.
2
Starovoitova G. Sovereignty after Empire. Self-Determination Movements in the Former Soviet Union. Institute of Peace (USA), 1996.
http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks19/chap3_19.html
3 Àçåðáàéäæàíñêàÿ ñåëüñêîõîçÿéñòâåííàÿ ïåðåïèñü 1921 ãîäà: Èòîãè. Áàêó, 1924, ò. 3, âûï. 17 (Agricultural Census of Azerbaijan (1921):
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4 ßìñêîâ À. Òðàäèöèîííîå çåìëåèñïîëüçîâàíèå êî÷åâíèêîâ èñòîðè÷åñêîãî Êàðàáàõà è ñîâðåìåííûé àðìÿíî-àçåðáàéäæàíñêèé ýòíîòåððèòîðèàëüíûé
êîíôëèêò. Ôàêòîð ýòíîêîíôåññèîíàëüíîé ñàìîáûòíîñòè â ïîñòñîâåòñêîì îáùåñòâå. Ðåä.: Îëêîòò Ì., Ìàëàøåíêî À., Ìîñêâà, 1998, ñ. 171 (Yamskov, A. The
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Ethnography of Azerbaijan. Baku, 1960, p. 71).
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9 Äîêëàäíàÿ çàïèñêà ïîëíîìî÷íîãî ïðåäñòàâèòåëÿ ÀçÑÑÐ â ÐÑÔÑÐ Á. Øàõòàõòèíñêîãî Ïðåäñåäàòåëþ Ñîâíàðêîìà Â. Ëåíèíó. ÏÀÀÔ ÈÌË, ô.
1022, îï. 5, ä. 56, ë. 1 (The Report of the Accredited Representative of Soviet Azerbaijan in the Soviet Socialist Federal Republic of Russia, B.
Shakhtakhtinski, to Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars V. Lenin. Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism and Leninism: Fund
of Azerbaijan, fund 1022, list 5, file 56, p. 1).
10 Ïðîòîêîë ñîâìåñòíîãî çàñåäàíèÿ Ïîëèòáþðî è Îðãáþðî ÖÊ ÀçÊÏ. ÖÏÀ ÈÌË, ô. 64, îï. 2, ä. 117, ë. 41-42 (Minutes of the Joint Sitting of the
Politburo and Buraeu for Organisational Affairs of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party. Central Party Archives of the
Institute of Marxism and Leninism, fund 64, list 2, file 117, pp. 41-42).
11 Äåêðåò ÀçÖÈÊà î íàöèîíàëèçàöèè (àçåðáàéäæàíèçàöèè) ãîñóäàðñòâåííûõ ó÷ðåæäåíèé â Àçåð. ÑÑÐ. Ñîáðàíèå óçàêîíåíèé è ðàñïîðÿæåíèé
Ðàáî÷å-Êðåñòÿíñêîãî Ïðàâèòåëüñòâà ÀÑÑÐ â 1923 ã., ñ. 399. “Áàêèíñêèé ðàáî÷èé,” 1 àâãóñòà 1923 ã. (The Decree of the Central Executive
Committee of Azerbaijan on the Nationalisation (Azerification) of State Institutions in the Azerbaijani SSR. In: Collection of Statutes & Decrees
of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Government of the Azerbaijani SSR in 1923, p. 399. Bakinski Rabochi, 1 August 1923).
12
Alstadt A. The Azerbaijani Turks. Stanford. 1992, pp. 8-9.
13
The Armenian Genocide during the First World War/W. and S. Gust (ed.) in Cooperation with Taner Akcam: Documents from German
State Archives. [A-2187.DE/PA-AA/R14100.DuA Dok. 395 (re). 1918-05-23-DE-001].
14
The Armenian Genocide during the First World War/W. and Sigrid Gust (ed.) in Cooperation with Taner Akcam: Documents from
German State Archives. [A-34415.DE/PA-AA/R14104.DuA Dok. 424 (re.gk). 1918-08-15-DE-001].
15 Áàéêîâ Á. Ë. Âîñïîìèíàíèÿ î ðåâîëþöèè â Çàêàâêàçüå (1918-1920 ãã.). Îïóáë. â ñáîðíèêå “Àðõèâ ðóññêîé ðåâîëþöèè,” ò. IX, Áåðëèí, 1923
(Baikov, B. L. Memoirs about the Revolution in Transcaucasia (1918 to 1920). Archives of the Russian Revolution, vol. 9, Berlin, 1923).
16
Hopkirk P. On Secret Service East of Constantinople. London: John Murray, 1994.
17 Äîíåñåíèå ïðåäñòàâèòåëÿ áðèòàíñêîé âîåííîé ìèññèè â Øóøå ïðàâèòåëüñòâó Àçåðáàéäæàíà î ðåçíå àðìÿí è ïîãðîìàõ â ã. Øóøå, ïðèëåãàþùèõ ê
ãîðîäó ñåëåíèÿõ è ïîòâîðñòâå ýòîìó øóøèíñêîãî ãåíåðàë-ãóáåðíàòîðà. Íàöèîíàëüíûé àðõèâ Àðìåíèè (ÍÀÀ), ô. 200, îï. 1, ä. 309, ë. 165. Çàâåðåííàÿ
êîïèÿ (The Dispatch of the Representative of the British Military Mission in Shushi to the Government of Azerbaijan on the Slaughter and
Pogrom of the Armenians in the City of Shushi, and in the Villages Adjacent to it, and on the Connivance of the Governor General of Shushi at
all that. In: National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 309, p. 165. Attested Copy).
18 ÍÀÀ, ô. 57, îï. 5, ä. 202, ë. 3-4 è îá. Çàâåðåííàÿ êîïèÿ. Ìàøèíîïèñü (National Archives of Armenia, fund 57, list 5, file 202, pp. 3-4; Attested
Copy. Typescript).
19 See Gore, P. W. ‘Tis Some Poor Fellow’s Skull. Post-Soviet Warfare in the Southern Caucasus. Lincoln, 2008.
20 Ïîëèòè÷åñêèé îò÷åò Êàâáþðî ÖÊ ÐÊÏ(á), ñäåëàííûé Ã. Îðäæîíèêèäçå íà ñúåçäå êîììóíèñòè÷åñêèõ îðãàíèçàöèé Çàêàâêàçüÿ. “Áàêèíñêèé
ðàáî÷èé,” 1922 ã., 24 ôåâðàëÿ (The Political Report of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist (Bolsheviks’) Party of
Russia, Made by G. Orjonikidze at the Congress of the Communistic Organisations of Transcaucasia/. In: Bakinski Rabochi, 1922, 24 February).
21 Ïîñòàíîâëåíèå IX ñúåçäà êðåñòüÿíñòâà Íàãîðíîãî Êàðàáàõà îá àííóëèðîâàíèè âðåìåííîãî ñîãëàøåíèÿ, çàêëþ÷åííîãî ðåøåíèåì VII ñúåçäà ñ
ïðàâèòåëüñòâîì Àçåðáàéäæàíà. ÍÀÀ, ô. 200, îï. 1, ä. 581, ë. 98 (The Resolution of the 9th Congress of the Peasantry of Nagorno Karabakh on the
Abrogation of the Interim Agreement Signed on Decision of the 7th Congress with the Government of Azerbaijan. National Archives of
Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 581, p. 98).
22 ÐÃÀÑÏÈ, ô. 558, îï. 1, ä. 4018, ë. 1. Òåëåãðàôíûé áëàíê (State Russian Archives of Social and Political History, fund 558, list 1, file 4018,
p. 1. Message Form).
23 ÍÀÀ, ô. 200, îï. 1, ä. 581, ë. 262 (National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 581, p. 262).
24 ÐÃÀÑÏÈ, ô. 558, îï. 1, ä. 3318, ë. 1-2. Ïîäëèííèê (State Russian Archives of Social and Political History, fund 558, list 1, file 3318, pp. 1-2.
Original).
25 Ãàçåòà “Êîììóíèñò,” Áàêó, 2 äåêàáðÿ 1920 ã. (Communist, Baku, 2 December 1920).
26 Ãàçåòà “Ïðàâäà,” No. 273, 4 äåêàáðÿ, 1920 ã. (Pravda, No. 273, 4 December 1920).
27 Ãàçåòà “Ñëîâî,” 7 äåêàáðÿ, 1920 ã. (Slovo, 7 December 1920).
28 ÐÃÀÑÏÈ, ô. 558, îï. 11, ä. 824, ë. 8. Ïîäëèííèê (State Russian Archives of Social and Political History, fund 558, list 11, file 824, p. 8.
Original).
29 ÐÃÀÑÏÈ, ô. 85, îï. 18, ä. 229, ë. 1-2 (State Russian Archives of Social and Political History, fund 85, list 18, file 229, pp. 1-2).
30 ÐÃÀÑÏÈ, ô. 64, îï. 2, ä. 117, ë. 41-42. Çàâåðåííàÿ êîïèÿ. Ìàøèíîïèñü (State Russian Archives of Social and Political History, fund 64, list 2,
file 117, pp. 41-42. Attested copy. Typescript).
31 Ïðîòîêîë çàñåäàíèÿ ïëåíóìà Êàâáþðî ÖÊ ÐÊÏ(á) è ïîñòàíîâëåíèå î âêëþ÷åíèè Íàãîðíîãî Êàðàáàõà â ñîñòàâ Ñîâåòñêîé Àðìåíèè è î ïåðåíåñåíèè
âîïðîñà íà îêîí÷àòåëüíîå ðåøåíèå â ÖÊ ÐÊÏ(á). ÖÏÀ ÈÌË, ô. 64, îï. 2, ä. 1, ë. 118, ô. 85, îï. 18, ä. 58, ë. 17. Êîïèÿ. Ìàøèíîïèñü (Minutes of the Plenary
Session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist (Bolsheviks) Party and Resolution on the Incorporation of Nagorno
Karabakh into Soviet Armenia and on Confining the Issue to the Final Decision of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist
(Bolsheviks) Party. Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism and Leninism, fund 64, list 2, file 1, p. 118; fund 85, list 18, file 58, p. 17.
Copy. Typescript).
32 ÐÃÀÑÏÈ, ô. 17, îï. 13, ä. 384, ë. 67, Çàâåðåííàÿ êîïèÿ; ô. 85, îï. 18, ä. 58, ë. 18. Ìàøèíîïèñü (State Russian Archives of Social and Political
History, fund 17, list 13, file 384, p. 67, attested copy; fund 85, list 18, file 58, p. 18. Typescript).

9. 33 “Áàêèíñêèé ðàáî÷èé,” 25 èþëÿ, 2002 ã., Nî. 139 (24318) /Bakinski Rabochi, 25 July 2002, No. 139 (24318); www.Zerkalo.az.24.07.2002/.
34 Çäðàâîìûñëîâ À. Ìåæíàöèîíàëüíûå êîíôëèêòû â ïîñòñîâåòñêîì ïðîñòðàíñòâå. Ì., 1999, ñ. 15 (Zdravomislov, A. Inter-Ethnic Conflicts in the
Post-Soviet Space. Moscow, 1999, p. 15).