This document provides an overview of Brazil's Bolsa Familia conditional cash transfer program. It discusses how Bolsa Familia was launched in 2003 under President Lula da Silva to help reduce poverty and inequality in Brazil by providing monthly cash payments to low-income families conditional on children's school attendance and health care visits. The program reached about a quarter of Brazil's population and is credited with more than halving extreme poverty and significantly reducing income inequality in the country. While some were initially skeptical of the program, most analyses now see it as playing a key role in Brazil's improvements in socioeconomic conditions over the last decade.
In the current stage of development of capitalism in Brazil, governance is only ensured if its rulers ensure the continuity of the process of capitalist accumulation for the benefit of the bourgeoisie and if increasing income redistribution in favor of classes subaltern (petty bourgeoisie, urban and rural proletariat and lumpen proletariat). For these reasons, the ungovernability, which is the domain of disorder is inevitable in Dilma Rousseff government because she will not be able to ensure continuity of the process of capitalist accumulation and redistribution of income in favor of the lower classes. The ungovernability tends to generate political and institutional instability with unpredictable consequences in a divided country like Brazil. This is the price that the Brazilian people decided to pay electing Dilma Rousseff as president of Republic.
The pt workers´party governments are not progress forces in brazilFernando Alcoforado
Governments of the PT cannot be considered forces of progress because the balance of 13 years of Lula and Dilma Rousseff governments is the denial of the great struggles of the Brazilian people carried on in the twentieth century, a historical inconsistency traitor. Inconsistency in the economic sphere is manifested in the fact that both PT governments have given continuity to the neoliberal and anti-national policy of the Fernando Collor, Itamar Franco and Fernando Henrique Cardoso governments following what established the Washington Consensus in the 1990s. One of the great expectations that are created with the electoral victory of the PT governments from 2002 was that it would be continued Brazilian economic and social development process and national emancipation triggered by the presidents Getúlio Vargas and João Goulart to overcome the dependence on Brazil to foreign capital and the strengthening of production belonging to Brazilian sectors. Rather, what we found was the increased financial and technological dependence of Brazil in relation to the outside and the denationalization of the Brazilian economy.
Dilma rousseff government is factor of political and institutional instabilit...Fernando Alcoforado
The governability of a country is only achieved when the government has the support of the vast majority of the population and its different social classes, in addition to having parliamentary majority to implement its policies. To have governance, the government must meet the demands of different social classes to get the support of civil society and should have the support of political parties in Parliament for the approval of their legislative proposals. In short, governance relates to government policy capacity to decide, enabling the execution of public policies. Dilma Rousseff does not meet any of these conditions to govern the Brazilian nation.
It will be inevitable the impeachment of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff not only due to fiscal responsibility crimes that she has committed, but also by all the devastating work on the Brazilian economy that she and Lula held that and Lula held it in 13 years of PT governments. The balance of 13 years of PT governments indicates the lack of commitment of both governments to the great struggles of the Brazilian people carried on the past 50 years, a historical inconsistency traitor. This inconsistency has occurred, especially in the economic and moral planes. Inconsistency in the economic sphere is manifested in the fact that both governments have given continuity to the neoliberal and anti-national policy of the Fernando Collor, Itamar Franco and Fernando Henrique Cardoso following what established the Washington Consensus in the 1990s. On the moral sphere, it was institutionalized systemic corruption in the PT governments that contributed to pushing Petrobras and the country to bankruptcy.
Neoliberalism and aggravation of social problems in brazilFernando Alcoforado
The neoliberal economic model implemented in 1990 is largely responsible for worsening Brazil's social problems today. Social devastation has been the main result of the neoliberal economic model in Brazil inaugurated by President Fernando Collor in 1990 and maintained by Presidents Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula da Silva, Dilma Roussef, Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro. The current economic recession, social inequality, mass unemployment and the extreme poverty of the country demonstrate the infeasibility of the neoliberal model implemented in Brazil. The social devastation suffered by Brazil with social inequality, mass unemployment and extreme poverty is demonstrated through indicators of concentration of income, unemployment, social inequality and extreme poverty.
The governability of a country is only achieved when the government has a parliamentary majority to implement its policies and has the support of the vast majority of the population and the various social classes. Dilma Rousseff government seems no longer have the necessary conditions to rule Brazil, not only because they do not have the support of the parliamentary majority in Congress, but also because no longer have the nation's most support that enabled her win the last presidential elections.
The Brazilian Economy is one of the oldest publications for expert economic analysis of both the Brazilian and international economies. Through this publication, FGV’s Brazilian Institute of Economics and Finance (FGV/IBRE) compares different periods of the economy, assessing both macroeconomic considerations and scenarios related to finance, administration, marketing, management, insurance, statistics, and price indices.
For more information, and Brazilian economic index results, visit: http://bit.ly/1EA1Loz
Brazil facing internal economic problems and the ruin of the world economyFernando Alcoforado
Brazil faces two major obstacles to its development: 1) the neoliberalism that has been devastating the country since 1990; and 2) the process of ruining the world economy. The economic model. It is urgent that the Brazilian State take the reins of the national economy by abandoning the failed neoliberal economic model to reactivate the Brazilian economy and full employment. Brazil should fight in international fora for the establishment of a stable international financial system not subordinated to financial capital and the establishment of a democratic world government that, in addition to promoting economic ordering on a world scale, should create the conditions to meet the great challenges of the world. humanity in the 21st century.
In the current stage of development of capitalism in Brazil, governance is only ensured if its rulers ensure the continuity of the process of capitalist accumulation for the benefit of the bourgeoisie and if increasing income redistribution in favor of classes subaltern (petty bourgeoisie, urban and rural proletariat and lumpen proletariat). For these reasons, the ungovernability, which is the domain of disorder is inevitable in Dilma Rousseff government because she will not be able to ensure continuity of the process of capitalist accumulation and redistribution of income in favor of the lower classes. The ungovernability tends to generate political and institutional instability with unpredictable consequences in a divided country like Brazil. This is the price that the Brazilian people decided to pay electing Dilma Rousseff as president of Republic.
The pt workers´party governments are not progress forces in brazilFernando Alcoforado
Governments of the PT cannot be considered forces of progress because the balance of 13 years of Lula and Dilma Rousseff governments is the denial of the great struggles of the Brazilian people carried on in the twentieth century, a historical inconsistency traitor. Inconsistency in the economic sphere is manifested in the fact that both PT governments have given continuity to the neoliberal and anti-national policy of the Fernando Collor, Itamar Franco and Fernando Henrique Cardoso governments following what established the Washington Consensus in the 1990s. One of the great expectations that are created with the electoral victory of the PT governments from 2002 was that it would be continued Brazilian economic and social development process and national emancipation triggered by the presidents Getúlio Vargas and João Goulart to overcome the dependence on Brazil to foreign capital and the strengthening of production belonging to Brazilian sectors. Rather, what we found was the increased financial and technological dependence of Brazil in relation to the outside and the denationalization of the Brazilian economy.
Dilma rousseff government is factor of political and institutional instabilit...Fernando Alcoforado
The governability of a country is only achieved when the government has the support of the vast majority of the population and its different social classes, in addition to having parliamentary majority to implement its policies. To have governance, the government must meet the demands of different social classes to get the support of civil society and should have the support of political parties in Parliament for the approval of their legislative proposals. In short, governance relates to government policy capacity to decide, enabling the execution of public policies. Dilma Rousseff does not meet any of these conditions to govern the Brazilian nation.
It will be inevitable the impeachment of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff not only due to fiscal responsibility crimes that she has committed, but also by all the devastating work on the Brazilian economy that she and Lula held that and Lula held it in 13 years of PT governments. The balance of 13 years of PT governments indicates the lack of commitment of both governments to the great struggles of the Brazilian people carried on the past 50 years, a historical inconsistency traitor. This inconsistency has occurred, especially in the economic and moral planes. Inconsistency in the economic sphere is manifested in the fact that both governments have given continuity to the neoliberal and anti-national policy of the Fernando Collor, Itamar Franco and Fernando Henrique Cardoso following what established the Washington Consensus in the 1990s. On the moral sphere, it was institutionalized systemic corruption in the PT governments that contributed to pushing Petrobras and the country to bankruptcy.
Neoliberalism and aggravation of social problems in brazilFernando Alcoforado
The neoliberal economic model implemented in 1990 is largely responsible for worsening Brazil's social problems today. Social devastation has been the main result of the neoliberal economic model in Brazil inaugurated by President Fernando Collor in 1990 and maintained by Presidents Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula da Silva, Dilma Roussef, Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro. The current economic recession, social inequality, mass unemployment and the extreme poverty of the country demonstrate the infeasibility of the neoliberal model implemented in Brazil. The social devastation suffered by Brazil with social inequality, mass unemployment and extreme poverty is demonstrated through indicators of concentration of income, unemployment, social inequality and extreme poverty.
The governability of a country is only achieved when the government has a parliamentary majority to implement its policies and has the support of the vast majority of the population and the various social classes. Dilma Rousseff government seems no longer have the necessary conditions to rule Brazil, not only because they do not have the support of the parliamentary majority in Congress, but also because no longer have the nation's most support that enabled her win the last presidential elections.
The Brazilian Economy is one of the oldest publications for expert economic analysis of both the Brazilian and international economies. Through this publication, FGV’s Brazilian Institute of Economics and Finance (FGV/IBRE) compares different periods of the economy, assessing both macroeconomic considerations and scenarios related to finance, administration, marketing, management, insurance, statistics, and price indices.
For more information, and Brazilian economic index results, visit: http://bit.ly/1EA1Loz
Brazil facing internal economic problems and the ruin of the world economyFernando Alcoforado
Brazil faces two major obstacles to its development: 1) the neoliberalism that has been devastating the country since 1990; and 2) the process of ruining the world economy. The economic model. It is urgent that the Brazilian State take the reins of the national economy by abandoning the failed neoliberal economic model to reactivate the Brazilian economy and full employment. Brazil should fight in international fora for the establishment of a stable international financial system not subordinated to financial capital and the establishment of a democratic world government that, in addition to promoting economic ordering on a world scale, should create the conditions to meet the great challenges of the world. humanity in the 21st century.
Today, Brazil is a country divided between PT (Worker Party) and anti PT which resulted in the last presidential elections. Based on the results of the presidential elections in its second round, it appears that the supporters of PT represent 40% (Dilma Rousseff voters). The difference (60%) is the placement of the PT opponents who do not accept the policy pursued by that party and its leaders in the conduction of the nation's destiny. The existence of a divided and radicalized country that registers today becomes difficult to Dilma Rousseff to perform her task to rule Brazil. The permanence of the PT in power with the victory of Dilma Rousseff in the second round of elections constitutes an institutional political instability factor because without the support of the vast majority of the nation she has lost her condition to govern Brazil. Dilma Rousseff became a copy of Nicolas Maduro, president of Venezuela, facing serious problems of governance in their deeply divided country. The governance of a country by a ruler's legitimacy depends not only of the victory in the presidential elections, but fundamentally in the active support of the vast majority of the nation.
President Lula said in his inaugural speech in 2003 he won the election because hope (of the people) won fear (of change). However, when taking office, President Lula and his team have shown that the fear of facing the real causes of national problems overlapped on the hope of the people to carry out the changes required to promote economic and social progress of Brazil because it kept neoliberal economic policy of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government.
Instead of mobilizing civil society to together with the government to develop and implement a national development plan capable of breaking the barriers to economic and social progress of Brazil that correspond to the true interests of the majority of the Brazilian people, governments of PT (Worker Party) of Lula and Dilma Rousseff decided to maintain the neoliberal economic model opened in the Fernando Collor government which resulted in increased dependence of the country on foreign capital and low economic growth.
Jamestown Latin America Trends + Views Urbanization Trends in Latin AmericaFerhat Guven
Our latest “Trends and Views” piece addresses the concept of urbanization in Latin America,
and its potential impact on the region’s real estate market.
The anti-globalization movement had its coming-out party in Seattle in 1999, when thousands of activists and trade union members protested against a new round of trade negotiations in the World Trade Organisation. Millions were drawn to these protests because of a preceding anti-WTO statement that was circulated on the internet, and signed by about 1 500 different groups, from churches to militant communists.
Causes of and Strategies out of poverty in Brazil. Econometric analysis of the 2012 Brazilian National Sample Survey (PNAD) and continuation of David Lam and Deborah Levison's analysis from their 1992 paper: Age, Experience, and Schooling: Decomposing Earnings Inequality in the United States and Brazil, and Lorene Yap's 1976 paper: Internal Migration and Economic Development in Brazil.
Political instability has assumed large proportions in recent times with the denunciation of investigated for corruption that commits not only the country's political class, but mainly the executive and legislative branches of government that are totally demoralized and contribute to become unviable the efforts of Michel Temer government to recover extremely deteriorated Brazilian economy. This situation adds to the fact that Michel Temer be rejected as Dilma Rousseff by the population, making it unable to demand sacrifices of the population to adopt the necessary measures to overcome the economic crisis that will affect the interests, particularly the middle class and urban and rural proletariat that tend to rebel making Brazil ungovernable. For these reasons, the ungovernability, which is the domain of the disorder, will be inevitable in Michel Temer government. This tends to generate social unrest and political and institutional instability with unpredictable consequences that require the convening of a National Constituent Assembly Exclusive to reorder the national life before the collapse of the political system in force in Brazil.
Brazil's future depends on a new constituent and retaking of developmentFernando Alcoforado
The path that can lead to economic and social progress in Brazil requires the overcoming of political and economic crises that threaten the future of the country. Overcoming the political crisis requires the convening of an Exclusive National Constituent Assembly to reorder the national life before the bankruptcy of political system in force in Brazil. Overcoming the economic crisis requires the restructuring of the Brazilian economy on new foundations radically different from the current model.
The progressive forces of the nation that wish to end corruption, the resumption of economic growth, the development of Brazil on a new basis and the defense of national sovereignty should unite with efforts to choose a candidate for the presidency of the Republic committed to the proposals presented in this article and defeat the retrograde forces that wish to maintain the status quo. It is urgent, therefore, to launch a candidate for the presidency of the Republic who undertakes to break with neoliberalism and put into practice the strategies suggested in this article.
Lessons from conditional cash transfer programmes: Bolsa Familia and Other Ex...UNDP Policy Centre
IPC’s Research Coordinator, Fábio Veras, joined the seminar and panel discussion as part of the “Les Rencontres du Devéloppement”, on 13th March, in Paris. He shared some of the Brazilian experience with Bolsa Família and other programmes.
The panel was jointly organized by Research and Development Division of France’s Agency for Development (AFD) and by the Delegation for European and International Affairs (DAEI) of the French Minister of Social Affairs and Employment.
Today, Brazil is a country divided between PT (Worker Party) and anti PT which resulted in the last presidential elections. Based on the results of the presidential elections in its second round, it appears that the supporters of PT represent 40% (Dilma Rousseff voters). The difference (60%) is the placement of the PT opponents who do not accept the policy pursued by that party and its leaders in the conduction of the nation's destiny. The existence of a divided and radicalized country that registers today becomes difficult to Dilma Rousseff to perform her task to rule Brazil. The permanence of the PT in power with the victory of Dilma Rousseff in the second round of elections constitutes an institutional political instability factor because without the support of the vast majority of the nation she has lost her condition to govern Brazil. Dilma Rousseff became a copy of Nicolas Maduro, president of Venezuela, facing serious problems of governance in their deeply divided country. The governance of a country by a ruler's legitimacy depends not only of the victory in the presidential elections, but fundamentally in the active support of the vast majority of the nation.
President Lula said in his inaugural speech in 2003 he won the election because hope (of the people) won fear (of change). However, when taking office, President Lula and his team have shown that the fear of facing the real causes of national problems overlapped on the hope of the people to carry out the changes required to promote economic and social progress of Brazil because it kept neoliberal economic policy of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government.
Instead of mobilizing civil society to together with the government to develop and implement a national development plan capable of breaking the barriers to economic and social progress of Brazil that correspond to the true interests of the majority of the Brazilian people, governments of PT (Worker Party) of Lula and Dilma Rousseff decided to maintain the neoliberal economic model opened in the Fernando Collor government which resulted in increased dependence of the country on foreign capital and low economic growth.
Jamestown Latin America Trends + Views Urbanization Trends in Latin AmericaFerhat Guven
Our latest “Trends and Views” piece addresses the concept of urbanization in Latin America,
and its potential impact on the region’s real estate market.
The anti-globalization movement had its coming-out party in Seattle in 1999, when thousands of activists and trade union members protested against a new round of trade negotiations in the World Trade Organisation. Millions were drawn to these protests because of a preceding anti-WTO statement that was circulated on the internet, and signed by about 1 500 different groups, from churches to militant communists.
Causes of and Strategies out of poverty in Brazil. Econometric analysis of the 2012 Brazilian National Sample Survey (PNAD) and continuation of David Lam and Deborah Levison's analysis from their 1992 paper: Age, Experience, and Schooling: Decomposing Earnings Inequality in the United States and Brazil, and Lorene Yap's 1976 paper: Internal Migration and Economic Development in Brazil.
Political instability has assumed large proportions in recent times with the denunciation of investigated for corruption that commits not only the country's political class, but mainly the executive and legislative branches of government that are totally demoralized and contribute to become unviable the efforts of Michel Temer government to recover extremely deteriorated Brazilian economy. This situation adds to the fact that Michel Temer be rejected as Dilma Rousseff by the population, making it unable to demand sacrifices of the population to adopt the necessary measures to overcome the economic crisis that will affect the interests, particularly the middle class and urban and rural proletariat that tend to rebel making Brazil ungovernable. For these reasons, the ungovernability, which is the domain of the disorder, will be inevitable in Michel Temer government. This tends to generate social unrest and political and institutional instability with unpredictable consequences that require the convening of a National Constituent Assembly Exclusive to reorder the national life before the collapse of the political system in force in Brazil.
Brazil's future depends on a new constituent and retaking of developmentFernando Alcoforado
The path that can lead to economic and social progress in Brazil requires the overcoming of political and economic crises that threaten the future of the country. Overcoming the political crisis requires the convening of an Exclusive National Constituent Assembly to reorder the national life before the bankruptcy of political system in force in Brazil. Overcoming the economic crisis requires the restructuring of the Brazilian economy on new foundations radically different from the current model.
The progressive forces of the nation that wish to end corruption, the resumption of economic growth, the development of Brazil on a new basis and the defense of national sovereignty should unite with efforts to choose a candidate for the presidency of the Republic committed to the proposals presented in this article and defeat the retrograde forces that wish to maintain the status quo. It is urgent, therefore, to launch a candidate for the presidency of the Republic who undertakes to break with neoliberalism and put into practice the strategies suggested in this article.
Lessons from conditional cash transfer programmes: Bolsa Familia and Other Ex...UNDP Policy Centre
IPC’s Research Coordinator, Fábio Veras, joined the seminar and panel discussion as part of the “Les Rencontres du Devéloppement”, on 13th March, in Paris. He shared some of the Brazilian experience with Bolsa Família and other programmes.
The panel was jointly organized by Research and Development Division of France’s Agency for Development (AFD) and by the Delegation for European and International Affairs (DAEI) of the French Minister of Social Affairs and Employment.
Luis Henrique Paiva, Associate Researcher at the IPC-IG, Researcher at Ipea and, former National Secretary of the Bolsa Familia Programme (2012-2015), gave a presentation on "The Bolsa Família Programme" at the Delhi Economics Conclave, 2015, in New Delhi, India on 6 November. Mr Paiva spoke at Plenary Session 1 about the Brazilian experience with conditional cash transfers. Organised by the Ministry of Finance of the Government of India, this year's theme for the conference was "Realising India's JAM Vision". It was policy-oriented and covered topical economic issues affecting India as well as the world at large.
Because everyone matters.
IBM Health and Social Programs Summit October 2014
Read the Health and Social Programs presentations by:
Tiago Cordeiro Oliveira
Business and Customer Manager
Bolsa Familia
Caixa
Tim Burch
Director
Department of Social Services
Clark County, Nevada
Ambrogina Canobbio
IT Projects Manager
Human Resource Administration
NYC Access
This presentation explains the main features of the largest cash transfer programme in the world, Brazil's Bolsa Família, which currently serves over 50 million people in the country.
BRAZIL NEEDS A PRESIDENT ABLE TO STOP ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REGRESSION IN T...Faga1939
This article aims to demonstrate the imperative need to halt the economic and social regression in Brazil, which has been accentuated since 1980 and which has worsened since then and which has had a negative impact on Brazilian society.
Poverty, Inequality and Social Policies in Brazil: 1995-2009 UNDP Policy Centre
Since the mid-1990s, Brazil has undergone extensive reforms that have finally reversed the dismaying economic performance of the 1980s. In particular, poverty and inequality indicators have improved dramatically, especially since the late-2000s. This new paper published by the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG) provides an overview of such recent trends and discusses the role played by four major government interventions: public education, the minimum wage law, Social Security pensions and Social Assistance transfers. Additionally, available data sets and methods for policy evaluation are also discussed. Check out more IPC-IG papers on social protection in the developing and emerging countries here: http://www.ipc-undp.org/CctNew.do?language=1&active=3
Political scenarios of brazil after dilma rousseff governmentFernando Alcoforado
Before the deep economic crisis that leads to Brazil's economy to stagflation, the policy and managerial inability of the federal government to manage the destinies of the nation and the widespread corruption that dominates the country is being put on the agenda the possibility of impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff's. Currently, there is a national clamor for the removal of Dilma Rousseff of the Presidency either through impeachment or a military intervention.
Brazil is a country that has its economic system in a terminal stage due to the vertiginous wave of mass unemployment and the widespread bankruptcy of companies aggravated by government measures that restrict economic activity to prevent the spread of the coronavirus that contribute to lead Brazil to depression economic which can cause a social upheaval unprecedented in the history of the country. This social upheaval will result from the worsening economic situation of the vast majority of the Brazilian population, especially the poorest. Hunger, which is present in the majority of the Brazilian population, tends to increase with the vertiginous retraction of economic activity resulting from the measures adopted by governments at all levels to combat the coronavirus.
The most important historical events in Brazil found an answer that was configured on the explicit intention of keeping outside of decisions, classes and social strata "from low" to "conciliation by the high" as with the Independence and the Abolition of Slavery or the realization of coups d´état, when the "conciliation by the high" has become impossible as occurred in the Proclamation of the Republic, in the 1930 revolution and the deployment of the military dictatorship in 1964. It can be said that the changes occurred in the history of Brazil not was the result of authentic revolutions, movements from the bottom to up, involving the whole population, but always made their way through a compromise between the representatives of the economically dominant groups or conducting coups d´état when conciliation was not possible. The "conciliation by the high" is consequence, therefore, fundamentally from fragile role of the Brazilian people which results, on the one hand, by the absence of political parties and reliable leaders with proposals capable of galvanizing the vast majority of the population and, on the other, the policy alienation of the population. Without the leadership of the Brazilian people in defining the direction of the Brazilian society, Brazil will not turn into a developed country.
Electronic media and technological convergenceJoana Andrade
This essay has a proposal to evaluate the role of the electronic media within the history of a developing country such as Brazil, addressing its social, political and economic impact and considering the contemporary convergence of new media technologies.
Similarities between the crisis of 1930 and 2015 in brazilFernando Alcoforado
The political and economic crises that shake Brazil at the moment have some similarities to those that occurred in 1930 and led to the deposition of President of Republic, Washington Luis. The political crisis in 1930 was the product of exhaustion of the oligarchic regime inaugurated in 1889 with the proclamation of the Republic and the economic crisis was a consequence of economic infeasibility of the existing agro-export model in Brazil since the colonial period that suffered heavy blow to the global economic crisis of 1929. In turn, the 2015 political crisis in Brazil is the product of exhaustion of the social contract established with the 1988 Constitution and the current economic crisis is a result of the exhaustion of the neoliberal economic model dependent on the outside in place since 1990 and it is also suffering the consequences of the 2008 economic crisis that erupted in the United States and spilled over the world.
THE MODEL OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT BRAZIL NEEDSFernando Alcoforado
This article aims to demonstrate the need for the Brazilian people to reject, in the next elections, all candidates for the Presidency of the Republic, the State governments and the state and national parliament who seek to maintain the neoliberal economic model that, since 1990, has been compromising the economic and social development of the country, given that he is the main responsible for leading Brazil to economic bankruptcy and social devastation today. Neoliberal economic globalization began in the 1990s when the neoliberal economic model was imposed on the world and largely benefited big capital, imposed restrictive limits on the action of the national state, sacrificed local production in favor of imported products, privatized assets of the public sector that were sold at degrading prices and decimated labor rights. In Brazil, the neoliberal economic model was adopted as an alternative to the national developmentalist economic model inaugurated with the 1930 Revolution by the Getúlio Vargas government, which came to a melancholy end in the Ernesto Geisel government in 1979 with the bankruptcy of the Brazilian State and the stagnation of the Brazilian economy in the 1980s. The neoliberal economic model implemented in the 1990s further worsened Brazil's economic and social outlook by contributing to the weakening of the state's role in the economy and providing greater opening of the national market to foreign capital. The events that took place from 1930 to the present show that the national developmentalist model failed in Brazil because its development process was not sustainable, but the neoliberalism that replaced it failed even more by dismantling the Brazilian economy from 1990 to the present, making it extremely dependent on foreigners capital and contribute to producing the greatest social devastation ever recorded in the country.
This paper explores some of the factors linking income growth, income distribution and poverty, historically observed in LACs, with particular reference to the recent experiences in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela. Given that the LACs have historically shown a high level of income concentration by all measures along with a high level of poverty which has invited a multitude of interpretations, this paper tries to analytically explore some myths on Latin American income distribution that are ingrained in the conventional literature.
This article aims to present what would be necessary in terms of a government plan to be put into practice immediately by the future ruler of Brazil, that is, by the future President of the Republic. The government plan necessary for Brazil now should have as its primary objective the elimination of unemployment, poverty, violence and inflation that profoundly affect Brazilian society. The government plan should consider these priorities because they constitute the biggest scourges faced by the Brazilian population whose solution cannot be postponed, that is, it has to happen immediately. Unemployment reached record levels in Brazilian history. The number of Brazilians in extreme poverty increases dramatically in the same way as the unemployment rate. Brazil is the country with the highest rate of firearm deaths per inhabitant. Inflation erodes the income of all Brazilians, but it is crueler to those with less income. The government plan of the future ruler of Brazil should therefore prioritize the elimination of unemployment, poverty, violence and inflation in the country.
Brazilian people´s inferiority complex in football and in political fightFernando Alcoforado
The Brazilian inferiority complex is reinforced by the fact that Brazil would never have had its scientific output recognized by a Nobel Prize, while other Latin American countries have won 19, as is the case of Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela. The Brazilian inferiority complex is further enhanced by the fact that we live in a country that holds the immense natural resources and we have not been able to achieve the status of a developed country equating with the great nations of the planet. Successive corruption scandals in which the Brazilian government and the political class have experienced in recent decades and remain involved mean that there is a discredit to our ability to transform Brazil into a serious country. This Brazilian inferiority complex is also enhanced by the flagrant failure of the Brazilian people to play a protagonist role throughout the history of the country.
A lack of brazilian people´s protagonism in brazil historyFernando Alcoforado
Throughout the history of Brazil is flagrant the failure of the Brazilian people to play a protagonism role in the structural changes necessary for economic and social progress of the country. Generally, in times of political and economic crisis ever occurred agreements between the dominant economic classes and holders of political power that allowed maintain the "status quo". The critical political, economic and social situation in Brazil at the time may have to reconcile "by the high" among holders of economic and political power to keep the Dilma Rousseff government in power if the majority of the Brazilian people remains passive in regarding political, economic and social devastation in progress. This is the trump card of the incompetent and corrupt holders of Brazil's political power who do not fear of the people of Brazil that is primarily responsible for the rise them to power.
Brazil is clearly in a recession that was engendered by a series of economic policy mistakes made by the neoliberal governments that followed from 1990 up to the present moment, and also by the passive attitude of the incompetent Michel Temer government that does not adopt any effective measure that is Capable of avoiding Brazil's journey towards economic depression.
Final project about how Brazilians entrepreneurs not only chose Somerville to launch their businesses but how the city has played a role in their development and growth. Additionally, the author explores how the Brazilian population in Somerville serves as a network for business owners and how they use its various channels to expand revenue and patronage
Similar to THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF BOLSA FAMILIA (19)
1. 1 | P a g e
THE VALUE OF BOLSA FAMILIA: ANOTHER BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC MIRACLE?
By Alison Moses
Abstract
The purpose of this short article is to highlight the general contours of a socio-economic program
implemented in Brazil, known as Bolsa Família Program (BFP), a conditional cash transfer program (CCT). Our goal is
to ponder the “miraculous” nature of this Program. While it is not a silver bullet to solve all of Brazil’s internal
problems, as vast and far-reaching as the size of the country itself, it is worth noting that in comparison to what
seems to be a distant past in Brazil, Bolsa Família has made miraculous inroads in a country whose reputation was
sullied with the worst deep-seated income inequalities in the world while wearing the face of persistent urban and
rural poverty across the land.
Reflecting widespread beliefs about society’s “debt to the poor”, the concept of CCTs first emerged in policy
debates in Brazil in the late 1980s and early 1990s. There were two lines of thought. The first, involved the concept
of providing minimum income to the poor; the second involved the realization that poverty reduction strategies had
to go beyond the visible surface symptoms and address the bedrock underlying the structural sources of poverty.
Education was a pillar of the Program, the basic premise for linking school attendance to cash assistance. The
implementation of Bolsa Família Program has been credited with reducing poverty and slashing income
inequality in Brazil.
If a miracle is defined as “an extremely outstanding or unusual event, thing, or accomplishment”,
did Brazil experience another “miracle”?
Do you believe in Miracles?
s there a miraculous socio-economic policy in our world that can end poverty and its attendant
ills? As recently as in 2013, almost half the world — over three billion people — lived on less
than $2.50 a day and in which for the 1.9 billion children from the developing world, there
were 640 million without adequate shelter (1 in 3); 400 million with no access to safe water (1 in 5) and 270
million with no access to health services (1 in 7)1? Is there a solution that can rebalance the egregious
chasm in the fact that the poorest 40 percent of the world’s population accounts for 5 percent of global
income and the richest 20 percent accounts for three-quarters of world income?2
1 http://www.globalissues.org/article/26/poverty-facts-and-stats
2 http://www.globalissues.org/article/26/poverty-facts-and-stats; 2007 Human Development Report (HDR), United Nations
Development Program, November 27, 2007, p.25.
I
2. 2 | P a g e
For Brazil, the 6th largest economy of the world with a population of some 200 million people and
now classified as a middle-income emerging economy, its own levels of poverty and inequalities beg the
question as to whether there are any miracles happening since over the last decades the richest 10 percent
of people in Brazil have had access to over 40 percent of the country’s income and the poorest 10 percent
have received about 1 percent of the income. If extreme poverty in Brazil remains widespread in this South
American country so well known for its captivating sights, multicultural sounds, rainbow colors and intriguing
fragrances, one wonders if the social and economic policies introduced since the early days of Brazil’s
democracy in the late XX century are slowly paying off and reducing poverty and inequality. Is there a socio-
economic miracle afoot in Brazil that is impacting poverty levels, mitigating income inequalities and thus,
holds a beacon to ending poverty and attendant inequality in Brazil and maybe even in the rest of the world?
The economic coined phrases, the “milagre brasileiro” or the “milagre econômico brasileiro” or in
English, the Brazilian economic miracle, is a name given to a time of exceptional economic growth from the
late 1960's to the late 1970's when Brazil lived through military regimes. The so-called Brazilian ''miracle'' -
the spurt of growth - became the economist's model of the way to manage the country’s expansion from
agrarian stagnation to the Valhalla of a new industrial stage, with big projects such as government-owned
power utilities building enough plants - hydroelectric, nuclear and coal - to produce more power than Brazil
was expected to need well beyond the year 2000. The construction of a huge mineral development project
called Carajas, was supposed to make Brazil the world's leading producer of bauxite and aluminum in the
vision of economic development and growth.3
These "anos de chumbo", literally “years of lead”, heavy-handed in their political delivery of “government”,
saw Brazil’s technocrats, under the aegis of military leadership, engage in economic policy preferences
that favored emphasis on the free market. In the wisdom of the military leaders one of the first things they
did was to diversify Brazil’s exports, encourage foreign investment, and implement tax incentives and
currency devaluations to encourage overseas trade. In an effort to rake in more income, the military
government also began a push to raise tax collection, which resulted in an eye-catching increase in tax
revenue as a portion of the country’s gross domestic product.
Brazil’s economy seemed to take off during this 5-year period of miraculous growth between1968-
1973. A number of factors favored this burgeoning. By the middle of the 1960s, the post-1964 reforms and
other policies of the military government, together with the state of the world economy, created conditions
for very rapid growth. In that period, the average annual rate of growth of GDP jumped to 11.1%, led by
3
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/26/business/brazil-s-economic-miracle-and-its-collapse.html?pagewanted=all
3. 3 | P a g e
industry with a 13.1% average. Within industry, the leading sectors were consumer durables, transportation
equipment, and basic industries, such as steel, cement, and electricity generation.
As a result of the post-1964 policies, external trade expanded substantially faster than the economy
as a whole. There was a significant growth in exports, especially manufactured goods, but also
commodities. Yet, imports grew considerably faster, rapidly increasing the trade deficit. This did not present
a problem, however, because massive inflows of capital resulted in balance of payments surpluses.4
While reducing inflation and improving the balance of payments with trading partners earned some
accolades for Brazil, the fact remained that vast swathes of the population did not feel the benefits of these
“reforms” and indeed, suffered from uneven growth. In this regard, during this period, the wages of the
middle class and the rich rose faster than those of the lowest paid, widening an already broad gap in income
distribution. The years of “lead” appeared to only exacerbate the already heavy burden of economic
disaffection of the poor.
“Economists Lance Taylor and Edmar Bacha termed the economy in the aftermath of the 1960s
stabilization attempts “Belindia”—Belgium in India; a modicum of development alongside conjoined
twins of poverty and inequality. Brazil now had a top tier, 20 percent of its population or roughly 22
million, enjoying relatively high per capita income, while the rest, 85 million people, lived at or below
a subsistence level.”5
Over the course of the 1970s, the military government thought big, engaging in large-scale
development projects too. This “miraculous growth” of the Brazilian economy featured high rates of private
investment; infrastructural developments, the most massive and renowned of which was the Itaipu dam;
The economy enjoyed an absence of major upheavals. Such an approach continued throughout 1970s until
it hit rock bottom by the second oil shock in 1979. In the 1980s, recession hit the private sector, and the
government was the erstwhile engine of growth in the "boom" years. The impact on the poor was reflected
in the growing informality of the labor force with the proliferation of “camelôs” or street vendors alongside
negligible income growth at that time. Only after stark declines throughout the 1980s did economists call
that yester-year boom image into question, a truly miraculous time, since large swathes of Brazil’s
population in both urban and rural settings remained outside the spheres of full-fledged economic
participation. Disconnected from centers of political power and the infrastructural developments that had
been occurring, the favelados (urban slum-dwellers) remained economically marginalized and the rural
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_history_of_Brazil
5
https://library.brown.edu/fivecenturiesofchange/chapters/chapter-7/economic-miracle/
4. 4 | P a g e
poor in particular, continued to suffer illiteracy and health problems, with few economic or political means
of affecting change.
Bolsa FamÍlia: Latter day saints and economic miracles?
Given the faltering economy of the late 1970s and the less than rosy socio-economic picture of the
country in the early 1980s - when between 1981 and 1992, the GDP increased at an average annual rate
of only 2.9% and per capita income declined 6% - Brazilians saw fit to transition into a democracy with the
election of Tancredo Neves in 1985 and to craft a newly written Constitution, ratified in 1988. The new
Constitution reflected the country’s concerns about social injustice and economic malaise as it placed
emphasis on poverty reduction and the creation of a more just and equitable society as some of the pillars
of the “new Brazil”. In this regard, at the beginning of the document in article 3, indents I through IV, the
1988 Constitution states, “construir uma sociedade live, justa e solidária; garantir o desenvolvimento
nacional; eradicar a pobreza e a marginalização e reduzir as desigualdades sociais e regionais; promover
o bem de todos, sem preconceitos de origem, raça, sexo, cor, idade e quaisquer outras formas de
discriminação”6.
This is where Bolsa Família Program (BFP) or “Family Bonus Program” comes in. Simply put, the
Bolsa Família cash transfer program is similar to a government welfare program found in other countries.
Bearing in mind the objectives defined in Brazil’s Constitution, in 2003, the government of Luiz Ignacio Lula
da Silva launched a comprehensive program to address the economic and social ills that plagued Brazil for
decades. The idea of the Lula government was to stimulate growth and social progress. On the social side,
the cornerstone of the Bolsa Familia Program was an all-encompassing reform of Brazil’s social safety net
whose mechanisms integrated four cash transfer programs into a single program under the umbrella of a
new Ministry of Social Development. BFP’s formal objectives were to (a) alleviate current poverty and
inequality via direct monetary transfers to poor families; (b) break the inter-generational transmission of
poverty through incentives for investments in human capital; and (c) help empower beneficiary families by
linking them to complementary services.7 In sum, this meant a concerted attempt to reduce current poverty,
avoid future poverty-related problems and, quash inequity.
Economically speaking, the Bolsa Família Program is known as a CCT - conditional cash transfer
(CCT) program which typically transfers cash directly to recipients who pledge to fulfill certain criteria such
6
"Build a free, just and unified society to guarantee national development; eradicate poverty and marginalization and reduce social
and regional inequalities; promote the good of all, without prejudice as to origin, race, sex, color, age and any other forms of
discrimination”, translated informally by Alison Moses, author here.
7
file:///F:/BOLSA%20FAMILIA/WORLDBANK%20ANALYSIS.pdf
5. 5 | P a g e
as enrolling their children in school, finding regular medical care, vaccinations, and participating in other
programs. Families can use the program to escape their day-to-day survival mode which under dire
circumstances precludes making any significant investment in the future and stymies fulfilling family
dreams. Under the program in Brazil, low income families receive cash benefits of between R$15 to R$95
per month according to per capita income and the number of children of school age. In exchange, families
commit to keeping their children in school and following a basic health and vaccination program.8
At the time, naysayers met Bolsa Família with skepticism saying that the Lula government was
throwing good money after bad since Brazil traditionally was wont to spend 22 % of GDP spent on
education, health, social protection and social security but with a frustrating lack of visible results. In this
regard, in an article in the Rio Times online, published in 2012, it stated that according to the US Factbook,
estimates pointed to the “sixth largest economy in the world as having an average per capita GDP of
R$20,000 (US$11,600) in 2011, and ranking 100th in the world just ahead of Costa Rica and behind
countries like Iran, Romania and Venezuela. Even with a low unemployment rate of 6.1 percent, 26 percent
of the population lives below poverty line in Brazil. A glance at the figures from the IBGE (Brazil’s
government statistics bureau,) reveals that 16.2 million people (8.5 percent of the population,) still live on
less than R$70 per month – the equivalent of around US$1.30 per person per day – the limit set by President
Rousseff as the extreme poverty line. Of those 16.2 million people, 4.8 million survive on no income at all,
and the incomes of the remaining 11.4 million range between R$1 per month and R$70. Furthermore, the
minimum wage is just R$622 (US$361) per month, despite an increase of more than fourteen percent
decreed at the beginning of the year.”9
Despite skeptics, ten years after its inception and consolidation, by 2013, BFP appeared to be a
key in helping Brazil more than halve the country’s extreme poverty – from 9.7 to 4.3 percent of the
population. According to Deborah Wetzel for the World Bank, income inequality fell markedly to a Gini
coefficient10 of 0.527, an impressive 15 percent decrease. BFP now reached nearly 14 million households
– 50 million people or around a quarter of the population.11 Bolsa Família targeted households whose per
capita monthly income was less than 120 reais (a yearly income of $828 USD). According to Berk Özler, in
an online article entitled, Lessons From Brazil’s War on Poverty, “The government paid these households
between 20 to 182 reais per month (between $132 to $1,248 a year) if they met certain conditions: Children
under the age of 17 had to regularly attend school; pregnant women had to visit clinics for prenatal and
8 See more at: http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-business/brazil-strives-for-economic-equality/#sthash.tFpuLTVV.dpuf
9 http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-business/brazil-strives-for-economic-equality/#sthash.tFpuLTVV.dpuf
10
The most common measure of inequality. A Gini coefficient of 0 represents perfect equality where everyone earns the same income,
and 1 represents complete inequality where all the country’s income accrues to a single person. The Gini coefficient is useful in
describing changes in the distribution of incomes using a single number.
11
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2013/11/04/bolsa-familia-Brazil-quiet-revolution
6. 6 | P a g e
antenatal care; and parents needed to make sure their children were fully immunized by age 5 and received
growth check-ups until age 6. It also provided a small allocation to extremely poor households with no
strings attached.”12
Not only did Bolsa Família reach a quarter of the overall population and 85% of the poor, the
payments made were able to double the income of destitute families. According to Teresa Campello, the
country’s minister of social development, in its first three years, the Program slashed extreme poverty by
15 percent, and by 2014, the percentage of Brazilians living in indigence was whittled down to less than 3
percent – a level the World Bank considers equivalent to eradication.13 As Lula himself explained when he
first introduced it, “When millions can go to the supermarket to buy milk, to buy bread, the economy will
work better. The miserable will become consumers.” Thus, by giving people money that they could spend
based on their own discretion, Lula created what welfare economist Lena Lavinas called a “pro-market
approach to combating poverty”.
Had the ultimate goal of the CCT program simply been poverty reduction, there would have been
no need for the creation of contrapartidas, or counterpart responsibilities, as this goal would have been be
achieved simply through cash transfers. True to its second formal objective, the Bolsa Família Program not
only aimed at immediately improving income levels, it also aimed at impacting overall family conditions by
developing (a) strategies to break the persistent health-education cycles that involve generations of poor
families and (b) strategies that invest in the human capital of the children of these families. By helping to
increase vaccination rates to 99 percent of the population, by decreasing malnutrition among children in
Brazil’s poorest regions by 16 percent, and by increasing the chances of having a healthy weight-to-age
ratio by 26 percent, intergenerational cycles of poverty can be stemmed over time. Similarly, Bolsa Família
is credited with improving school attendance by 14 percent in the country’s poorest regions and generally
discouraging dropping out of school.
What miraculous role did Bolsa Família play in the decline of poverty and inequality in Brazil? With
such a large transfer of money from taxpayers to Brazil’s poorest, you would imagine there must have been
some impact, but how much of one? While it is difficult for economists to try to understand changes in
income inequality by quantifying all the elements that affect the distribution of income, there are some
studies that will hold true the definition of another “miracle” in Brazil. In two separate studies, one a 2010
paper on Brazil by Ricardo Barros and co-authors from Brazil’s IPEA (the Institute of Applied Economic
Research) and another, a 2013 paper on a number of countries in Latin America including Brazil (by the
12 http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/lessons-from-brazils-war-on-poverty/
13
7. 7 | P a g e
World Bank’s João Pedro Azevedo and co-authors), they separately found “that government transfers
accounted for about 40 percent of the decline in inequality in Brazil, with expansions in pensions and Bolsa
Família (and a related program for people with disabilities) contributing roughly equally to the decline in
income inequality. Of these government transfers, Bolsa Família was by far the most important component
in raising the income levels of Brazil’s poorest households”.14
While there may be no miraculous silver bullet to eradicating poverty worldwide, in the absolute,
the literature suggests that Bolsa Família contributed about 15 to 20 percent of the decline in income
inequality in Brazil during the decade starting in 2000. These effects were most likely achieved by putting
money directly into the pockets of poor households and particularly in the hands of women in the
households. Advocates of the benefits of BFP hope that the cash transfers will not only reduce poverty but
also keep the next generation out of poverty as well, since the money is tied to parents’ investing more in
their children’s education and health. According to Paul Glewwe of the University of Minnesota and Ana
Lucia Kassouf of the University of São Paulo, they found in 2012, that “the program has led to
improvements in children’s school enrollment and advancement, which could translate into higher incomes
for them as adults and further reductions in poverty and inequality.”15
Can Bolsa Família eradicate poverty across the board in Brazil or if emulated, eliminate it in other
parts of the world? Probably not but such is the fascination and in that regard, the success of Bolsa Família,
that Brazil is now being consulted for advice on income transfer programs by countries across Africa
(Ghana, Angola, Mozambique), the Middle East (Egypt, Turkey) and Asia (including India). Even New York
City has implemented a version of the program.16
CONCLUSION
CCTs such as Bolsa Família have two main objectives: (i) alleviation of poverty today; and (ii)
higher investment in the human capital of poor children so as to increase their well-being tomorrow, when
they are adults. The first objective is met when poor families receive program payments. The second is
achieved by conditioning those payments on certain behaviors, mainly enrolling children in school. Bolsa
Família fulfilled these two objectives and is at the very least miraculous in that it has helped many of the
poor to get out of their precariousness. Bolsa Família is one of the largest existing instruments of income
transfer, having benefitted some 13.8 million families (almost 50 million people). It means that
approximately one in four Brazilians have received the benefit in a total population of approximately 200
14 http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/lessons-from-brazils-war-on-poverty/
15 Ibid
16
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/nov/05/bolsa-familia-brazil-cash-transfer-system
8. 8 | P a g e
million people over the course of at least ten years. Considering the scope of the program, it has had a
major impact on the Brazilian economy and on people's lives becaus the average citizen feels more
economically empowered and the conditionalities have set up future generations to be better off than their
parents.
Undoubtedly there are still numerous issues to tackle in Brazil such as the struggle to create a
society that has less dependency on social welfare in the first instance by creating real alternatives of
income generation and decent employment for all citizens; more equal access to social security and even
better access for students from lower classes to enter and complete university studies. That said, Bolsa
Família is touted as being one of the biggest changes in recent times in Brazil’s economic and social
structure for poor people and thus, for all of society.
Miracles, if they happen at all, do not happen overnight. For Francisco Menezes, a prominent
Brazilian researcher on Bolsa-Família and food security, who works for the Brazilian Institute for Social and
Economic Analyses, he points out: "Today, hunger is almost nonexistent in Brazil and many people have
left poverty. That is undeniable. But there are still many deprivations imposed on the poor. Bolsa-Familia
won't solve this. We need other social investments."17
If the Brazilian government will continue to commit to and then manage to further bridge the time-
worn gap between the bottom poor and the richer top, such steps and their subsequent policy measures
against poverty and inequity will be part of something far-reaching we might be dignified to call a “milagre
brasileiro”. Whether new or already established programs, everything depends on whether these programs
are well-implemented and their impact measured over time. What’s more, to boost their impact, they should
be coupled with a well-structured strategic plan to generate sustainable growth in the future with social and
economic inclusion fitting of miracles.
Alison Moses
soualison282@gmail.com
February 2016
17
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/nov/05/bolsa-familia-brazil-cash-transfer-system