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Session ID:
Session Classification:
James Christiansen
Sands Corporation
TECH-W21
Advanced
Incident Response:
How To GiveThe Advantage
ToThe Hackers
Paul Underwood
Emagined Security
Focus Of Our Presentation
Giving The Advantage To The Hackers
Due To:
ONE : The inability to distinguish what activities are
normal for your infrastructure
TWO : Not having all your incident response ducks lined
up in a row
THREE : Over reliance on untested resources
FOUR : Running out of energy before the bad guys do
FIVE : A lack of appreciation for how really difficult it is
to stop an ongoing hack attack completely
SIX :
Giving HackersThe Advantage
PROBLEM ONE
The inability to distinguish what activities
are normal for your infrastructure
Giving HackersThe Advantage
We are prettysure that'snormal traffic,at
least it lookssomewhatfamiliar
THE FIX
THE GOTCHA FACTOR
THE
SCENARIO
Giving HackersThe Advantage
We are prettysure that'snormal traffic,at
least it lookssomewhatfamiliar
THE FIX
Old systemlogsare not availablewhich
would help figuring
withinyour infrastructure
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
Giving HackersThe Advantage
We are prettysure that'snormal traffic,at
least it lookssomewhatfamiliar
Don't be in arush todisposeofyour old
systemlogs
Old systemlogsare not availablewhich
withinyour infrastructure
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
THE
FIX
Giving HackersThe Advantage
So, whatshould we do next? Isthisan
anomalythatisworth investigating?
THE FIX
THE GOTCHA FACTOR
THE
SCENARIO
Giving HackersThe Advantage
So, whatshould we do next? Isthisan
anomalythatisworth investigating?
THE FIX
Strange thingsare happeningbut youare
unable toprioritizeyour incidentresponse
team'sactivity
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
Giving HackersThe Advantage
So, whatshould we do next? Isthisan
anomalythatisworth investigating?
Know what'snormal in your infrastructure
soanomalousactivitiesstandout
Strange thingsare happeningbut youare
unable toprioritizeyour incidentresponse
team'sactivity
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
THE
FIX
Giving HackersThe Advantage
PROBLEM TWO
Not having all your incident response ducks
lined up in a row
Giving HackersThe Advantage
We needaspecialfirewallrule written
NOW! Get the vendor'sexperton the line!
THE FIX
THE GOTCHA FACTOR
THE
SCENARIO
Giving HackersThe Advantage
We needaspecialfirewallrule written
NOW! Get the vendor'sexperton the line!
THE FIX
You are unable tofind thesupport phone
numberfor thevendor'sexpert,no one
else hasit either
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
Giving HackersThe Advantage
We needaspecialfirewallrule written
NOW! Get the vendor'sexperton the line!
Have these "emergency"phonenumbers
printedout.Treat thesefolksbetterthan
your best friends!
You are unable tofind thesupport phone
numberfor thevendor's expert,no one
else hasit either.
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
THE
FIX
Giving HackersThe Advantage
You have evidencethatAdminlevel
passwordshave been hacked
THE FIX
THE GOTCHA FACTOR
THE
SCENARIO
Giving HackersThe Advantage
You have evidencethatAdminlevel
passwordshave been hacked
THE FIX
The sameAdminpasswordis used on
numerouscritical systems,but no one
knows exactlywhich ones
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
Giving HackersThe Advantage
You have evidencethatAdminlevel
passwordshave been hacked
Be preparedtochangeall Adminlevel
passwordsat a noticeusing a
testedprocess
The sameAdminpasswordis used on
numerouscritical systems,but no one
knows exactlywhich ones
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
THE
FIX
Giving HackersThe Advantage
You needtoisolateanetworksegment,
but Marketingsaysthatwould kill a
pendingnew product launch
THE FIX
THE GOTCHA FACTOR
THE
SCENARIO
Giving HackersThe Advantage
You needtoisolateanetworksegment,
but Marketingsaysthatwould kill a
pendingnew product launch
THE FIX
The inabilitytoisolatesegmentsofthe
network,only further complicatesa
complexproject
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
Giving HackersThe Advantage
You needtoisolateanetworksegment,
but Marketingsaysthatwould kill a
pendingnew product launch
Have a CEO supportedplan forsuspending
ongoingprojects while the incident
responseeffortis underway
The inabilitytoisolatesegmentsofthe
network, only further complicatesa
complexproject
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
THE
FIX
Giving HackersThe Advantage
The IRTeamisasking youfora decision.
Unfortunately,the decisionrequiresthat
youmakea LOT ofassumptions.
THE FIX
THE GOTCHA FACTOR
THE
SCENARIO
Giving HackersThe Advantage
The IRTeamisasking youfora decision.
Unfortunately,the decisionrequiresthat
youmakea LOT ofassumptions.
THE FIX
Being forcedintoa positionwhere you
have tostart guessing meansyou
have control ofthe situation.
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
Giving HackersThe Advantage
The IRTeamis asking youfora decision.
Unfortunately,the decisionrequiresthat
youmakea LOT ofassumptions.
Run legitimatehacks againstyour
infrastructure tounderstandwhat
happens,do thisbefore-the-fact.
Being forcedintoa positionwhere you
have tostart guessing meansyou
have control ofthe situation.
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
THE
FIX
Giving HackersThe Advantage
The hackersown your system. The
Webmasteristrying toget "pornlinks"off
THE FIX
THE GOTCHA FACTOR
THE
SCENARIO
Giving HackersThe Advantage
The hackersown your system. The
Webmasteristrying toget "porn links"off
THE FIX
The situationisgetting a lot worse. Your
only optionleft istothrow in the towel
and declarea disaster.
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
Giving HackersThe Advantage
The hackersown your system. The
Webmasteristrying toget "pornlinks"off
homepage.
Restoringyour systemstoa known good
stateand having a testedcustomer
notificationplan readytogo.
The situationisgetting a lot worse. Your
only optionleft istothrow in the towel
and declarea disaster.
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
THE
FIX
Giving HackersThe Advantage
PROBLEM THREE
Over reliance on untested resources
Giving HackersThe Advantage
Critical evidenceismistakenlydeleted,
attemptsat recoveringit have failed.
THE FIX
THE GOTCHA FACTOR
THE
SCENARIO
Giving HackersThe Advantage
Critical evidenceismistakenlydeleted,
attemptsat recoveringit have failed.
THE FIX
Not beingpreparedfor the fact thatserious
blunders will occur at somepointin the
response.
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
Giving HackersThe Advantage
Critical evidenceismistakenlydeleted,
attemptsat recoveringit have failed.
Aboveall else, rememberthatthisisa
learningprocessand not an exercisein
findingsomeonetoblame.
Not beingpreparedfor the fact thatserious
blunders will occur at somepointin the
response.
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
THE
FIX
Giving HackersThe Advantage
PROBLEM FOUR
Running out of energy beforethe bad guys do
Giving HackersThe Advantage
The initialincidentresponseisenteringits
3rd daywith no end in sight
THE FIX
THE GOTCHA FACTOR
THE
SCENARIO
Giving HackersThe Advantage
The initialincidentresponseisenteringits
3rd daywith no end in sight
THE FIX
Without enough sleepyou becomepart of
the problem
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
Giving HackersThe Advantage
The initialincidentresponseisenteringits
3rd daywith no end in sight
Cut a dealwith a nearbyhotel for
temporaryrooms -- make4 hr. sleep
breaksmandatoryevery 18 hours
Without enough sleepyou becomepart of
the problem
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
THE
FIX
Giving HackersThe Advantage
PROBLEM FIVE
A lack of appreciation for how really difficult it is
to stop an ongoing hack attack completely
Giving HackersThe Advantage
The hackersmayhave compromisedyour
VM farm.
THE FIX
THE GOTCHA FACTOR
THE
SCENARIO
Giving HackersThe Advantage
The hackersmayhave compromisedyour
VM farm.
THE FIX
The IncidentResponseteamisn't fluent in
VM speak,nor isit up on all theVM tools.
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
Giving HackersThe Advantage
The hackersmayhave compromisedyour
VM farm.
AvoidusingVM formission criticalsystems
asthey are hardertoanalyzefroma
forensicperspective.
The IncidentResponseteamisn't fluent in
VM speak,nor isit up on all theVM tools.
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
THE
FIX
Giving HackersThe Advantage
PROBLEM SIX
Giving HackersThe Advantage
During the incidentresponseyour CEO is
clearly not happywith thecontinuedflow
ofbad news.
THE FIX
THE GOTCHA FACTOR
THE
SCENARIO
Giving HackersThe Advantage
During the incidentresponseyour CEO is
clearly not happywith thecontinuedflow
ofbad news.
THE FIX
Incidentresponsemitigationsseldomhave
anygoodnews during first80% of the
effort.
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
Giving HackersThe Advantage
During the incidentresponseyour CEO is
clearly not happywith thecontinued flow
ofbad news.
Educate managementto expectlots ofbad
news.
Bad news meansthe teamunderstands
the issues.
Incidentresponsemitigationsseldomhave
anygoodnews during first80% of the
effort.
THE
SCENARIO
THE
GOTCHA
THE
FIX
► Within three months, you should:
► Review your incident response plan with the scenarios from this
presentation
► Update your contact lists, system inventories and skill assessments
► Beyond three months, you should:
► Obtain specific training for members of your incident response team
for areas of weakness you identified during your scenario testing
► Upgrade your staff with experts that can handle a major incident
within your organization
► Contract with a Business Recover Team (BRT) that can assist your
organization during a crisis
How to ApplyWhatYou Have Learned
►
for even the best plan
► How to give the advantage to the hackers:
►
► Not having current contact lists, technical resources or contracted
resources to help
► Not having a good relationship with the business so they have
confidence in your ability to manage the incident
► Burning out the staff so they make bad decisions
► Not having a trained staff in investigation tools and techniques
► Not being able to make decisions and staying calm
Summary
► CSIRT Resources (www.cert.org)
Handbook for Computer Security Incident Response Teams
http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/csirt-handbook.pdf
CSIRT Services
http://www.cert.org/csirts/services.html
Organizational Models for CSIRTs
http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/03hb001.pdf
State of the Practice for CSIRTs
http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/03tr001.pdf
► www.sans.org
Resources Available
Steps for Creating National CSIRTs
http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/NationalCSIRTs.pdf
Defining Incident Management Processes
http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/04tr015.pdf
StaffingYour CSIRT
http://www.cert.org/csirts/csirt-staffing.html
Q&A
ThatWraps Up OurTime,
ThankYou ForYours!

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Tech w21

  • 1. Session ID: Session Classification: James Christiansen Sands Corporation TECH-W21 Advanced Incident Response: How To GiveThe Advantage ToThe Hackers Paul Underwood Emagined Security
  • 2. Focus Of Our Presentation Giving The Advantage To The Hackers Due To: ONE : The inability to distinguish what activities are normal for your infrastructure TWO : Not having all your incident response ducks lined up in a row THREE : Over reliance on untested resources FOUR : Running out of energy before the bad guys do FIVE : A lack of appreciation for how really difficult it is to stop an ongoing hack attack completely SIX :
  • 3. Giving HackersThe Advantage PROBLEM ONE The inability to distinguish what activities are normal for your infrastructure
  • 4. Giving HackersThe Advantage We are prettysure that'snormal traffic,at least it lookssomewhatfamiliar THE FIX THE GOTCHA FACTOR THE SCENARIO
  • 5. Giving HackersThe Advantage We are prettysure that'snormal traffic,at least it lookssomewhatfamiliar THE FIX Old systemlogsare not availablewhich would help figuring withinyour infrastructure THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA
  • 6. Giving HackersThe Advantage We are prettysure that'snormal traffic,at least it lookssomewhatfamiliar Don't be in arush todisposeofyour old systemlogs Old systemlogsare not availablewhich withinyour infrastructure THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA THE FIX
  • 7. Giving HackersThe Advantage So, whatshould we do next? Isthisan anomalythatisworth investigating? THE FIX THE GOTCHA FACTOR THE SCENARIO
  • 8. Giving HackersThe Advantage So, whatshould we do next? Isthisan anomalythatisworth investigating? THE FIX Strange thingsare happeningbut youare unable toprioritizeyour incidentresponse team'sactivity THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA
  • 9. Giving HackersThe Advantage So, whatshould we do next? Isthisan anomalythatisworth investigating? Know what'snormal in your infrastructure soanomalousactivitiesstandout Strange thingsare happeningbut youare unable toprioritizeyour incidentresponse team'sactivity THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA THE FIX
  • 10. Giving HackersThe Advantage PROBLEM TWO Not having all your incident response ducks lined up in a row
  • 11. Giving HackersThe Advantage We needaspecialfirewallrule written NOW! Get the vendor'sexperton the line! THE FIX THE GOTCHA FACTOR THE SCENARIO
  • 12. Giving HackersThe Advantage We needaspecialfirewallrule written NOW! Get the vendor'sexperton the line! THE FIX You are unable tofind thesupport phone numberfor thevendor'sexpert,no one else hasit either THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA
  • 13. Giving HackersThe Advantage We needaspecialfirewallrule written NOW! Get the vendor'sexperton the line! Have these "emergency"phonenumbers printedout.Treat thesefolksbetterthan your best friends! You are unable tofind thesupport phone numberfor thevendor's expert,no one else hasit either. THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA THE FIX
  • 14. Giving HackersThe Advantage You have evidencethatAdminlevel passwordshave been hacked THE FIX THE GOTCHA FACTOR THE SCENARIO
  • 15. Giving HackersThe Advantage You have evidencethatAdminlevel passwordshave been hacked THE FIX The sameAdminpasswordis used on numerouscritical systems,but no one knows exactlywhich ones THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA
  • 16. Giving HackersThe Advantage You have evidencethatAdminlevel passwordshave been hacked Be preparedtochangeall Adminlevel passwordsat a noticeusing a testedprocess The sameAdminpasswordis used on numerouscritical systems,but no one knows exactlywhich ones THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA THE FIX
  • 17. Giving HackersThe Advantage You needtoisolateanetworksegment, but Marketingsaysthatwould kill a pendingnew product launch THE FIX THE GOTCHA FACTOR THE SCENARIO
  • 18. Giving HackersThe Advantage You needtoisolateanetworksegment, but Marketingsaysthatwould kill a pendingnew product launch THE FIX The inabilitytoisolatesegmentsofthe network,only further complicatesa complexproject THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA
  • 19. Giving HackersThe Advantage You needtoisolateanetworksegment, but Marketingsaysthatwould kill a pendingnew product launch Have a CEO supportedplan forsuspending ongoingprojects while the incident responseeffortis underway The inabilitytoisolatesegmentsofthe network, only further complicatesa complexproject THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA THE FIX
  • 20. Giving HackersThe Advantage The IRTeamisasking youfora decision. Unfortunately,the decisionrequiresthat youmakea LOT ofassumptions. THE FIX THE GOTCHA FACTOR THE SCENARIO
  • 21. Giving HackersThe Advantage The IRTeamisasking youfora decision. Unfortunately,the decisionrequiresthat youmakea LOT ofassumptions. THE FIX Being forcedintoa positionwhere you have tostart guessing meansyou have control ofthe situation. THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA
  • 22. Giving HackersThe Advantage The IRTeamis asking youfora decision. Unfortunately,the decisionrequiresthat youmakea LOT ofassumptions. Run legitimatehacks againstyour infrastructure tounderstandwhat happens,do thisbefore-the-fact. Being forcedintoa positionwhere you have tostart guessing meansyou have control ofthe situation. THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA THE FIX
  • 23. Giving HackersThe Advantage The hackersown your system. The Webmasteristrying toget "pornlinks"off THE FIX THE GOTCHA FACTOR THE SCENARIO
  • 24. Giving HackersThe Advantage The hackersown your system. The Webmasteristrying toget "porn links"off THE FIX The situationisgetting a lot worse. Your only optionleft istothrow in the towel and declarea disaster. THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA
  • 25. Giving HackersThe Advantage The hackersown your system. The Webmasteristrying toget "pornlinks"off homepage. Restoringyour systemstoa known good stateand having a testedcustomer notificationplan readytogo. The situationisgetting a lot worse. Your only optionleft istothrow in the towel and declarea disaster. THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA THE FIX
  • 26. Giving HackersThe Advantage PROBLEM THREE Over reliance on untested resources
  • 27. Giving HackersThe Advantage Critical evidenceismistakenlydeleted, attemptsat recoveringit have failed. THE FIX THE GOTCHA FACTOR THE SCENARIO
  • 28. Giving HackersThe Advantage Critical evidenceismistakenlydeleted, attemptsat recoveringit have failed. THE FIX Not beingpreparedfor the fact thatserious blunders will occur at somepointin the response. THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA
  • 29. Giving HackersThe Advantage Critical evidenceismistakenlydeleted, attemptsat recoveringit have failed. Aboveall else, rememberthatthisisa learningprocessand not an exercisein findingsomeonetoblame. Not beingpreparedfor the fact thatserious blunders will occur at somepointin the response. THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA THE FIX
  • 30. Giving HackersThe Advantage PROBLEM FOUR Running out of energy beforethe bad guys do
  • 31. Giving HackersThe Advantage The initialincidentresponseisenteringits 3rd daywith no end in sight THE FIX THE GOTCHA FACTOR THE SCENARIO
  • 32. Giving HackersThe Advantage The initialincidentresponseisenteringits 3rd daywith no end in sight THE FIX Without enough sleepyou becomepart of the problem THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA
  • 33. Giving HackersThe Advantage The initialincidentresponseisenteringits 3rd daywith no end in sight Cut a dealwith a nearbyhotel for temporaryrooms -- make4 hr. sleep breaksmandatoryevery 18 hours Without enough sleepyou becomepart of the problem THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA THE FIX
  • 34. Giving HackersThe Advantage PROBLEM FIVE A lack of appreciation for how really difficult it is to stop an ongoing hack attack completely
  • 35. Giving HackersThe Advantage The hackersmayhave compromisedyour VM farm. THE FIX THE GOTCHA FACTOR THE SCENARIO
  • 36. Giving HackersThe Advantage The hackersmayhave compromisedyour VM farm. THE FIX The IncidentResponseteamisn't fluent in VM speak,nor isit up on all theVM tools. THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA
  • 37. Giving HackersThe Advantage The hackersmayhave compromisedyour VM farm. AvoidusingVM formission criticalsystems asthey are hardertoanalyzefroma forensicperspective. The IncidentResponseteamisn't fluent in VM speak,nor isit up on all theVM tools. THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA THE FIX
  • 39. Giving HackersThe Advantage During the incidentresponseyour CEO is clearly not happywith thecontinuedflow ofbad news. THE FIX THE GOTCHA FACTOR THE SCENARIO
  • 40. Giving HackersThe Advantage During the incidentresponseyour CEO is clearly not happywith thecontinuedflow ofbad news. THE FIX Incidentresponsemitigationsseldomhave anygoodnews during first80% of the effort. THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA
  • 41. Giving HackersThe Advantage During the incidentresponseyour CEO is clearly not happywith thecontinued flow ofbad news. Educate managementto expectlots ofbad news. Bad news meansthe teamunderstands the issues. Incidentresponsemitigationsseldomhave anygoodnews during first80% of the effort. THE SCENARIO THE GOTCHA THE FIX
  • 42. ► Within three months, you should: ► Review your incident response plan with the scenarios from this presentation ► Update your contact lists, system inventories and skill assessments ► Beyond three months, you should: ► Obtain specific training for members of your incident response team for areas of weakness you identified during your scenario testing ► Upgrade your staff with experts that can handle a major incident within your organization ► Contract with a Business Recover Team (BRT) that can assist your organization during a crisis How to ApplyWhatYou Have Learned
  • 43. ► for even the best plan ► How to give the advantage to the hackers: ► ► Not having current contact lists, technical resources or contracted resources to help ► Not having a good relationship with the business so they have confidence in your ability to manage the incident ► Burning out the staff so they make bad decisions ► Not having a trained staff in investigation tools and techniques ► Not being able to make decisions and staying calm Summary
  • 44. ► CSIRT Resources (www.cert.org) Handbook for Computer Security Incident Response Teams http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/csirt-handbook.pdf CSIRT Services http://www.cert.org/csirts/services.html Organizational Models for CSIRTs http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/03hb001.pdf State of the Practice for CSIRTs http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/03tr001.pdf ► www.sans.org Resources Available Steps for Creating National CSIRTs http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/NationalCSIRTs.pdf Defining Incident Management Processes http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/04tr015.pdf StaffingYour CSIRT http://www.cert.org/csirts/csirt-staffing.html