The document discusses key issues facing the next President of the Philippines in foreign policy and regional affairs. These include: (1) ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea, with the PCA expected to rule against China in 2016; (2) balancing national interests and regional cooperation as ASEAN chair in 2017, including tensions between ASEAN states and China; and (3) ensuring continued economic integration among diverse ASEAN members under the ASEAN Economic Community. The next President will play a pivotal role in shaping the Philippines' approach to these important challenges.

1. I. Philippines-Korea Relations
Bilateral relations between the two countries started on 3 March 1949 when the Philippines
became the fifth country to recognize the Republic of Korea, which was inaugurated on 15
August 1948. The friendship was cemented by the Philippine deployment of the Philippine
Expeditionary Force to Korea (PEFTOK) during the Korean War in the 1950s to help South
Korea defend itself from the invasion of the North.
After the Armistice, the ROK sent H.E. Kim Yong-Ki as its first Ambassador to the
Philippines on 19 January 1954. In 1958, the Philippines opened an Embassy in Seoul under
Ambassador Eduardo Quintero. The relationship blossomed in the course of the decades
through cooperation in both bilateral and multilateral fronts. (Philembassy-seoul.com, n.d.)
Koreans comprise the most number of tourists in the country, with almost 1.20 million
arriving yearly whereas Around 4 million Filipinos travelled to South Korea in 2013, a 20-
percent increase from 2012, according to the embassy in Manila. According to Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration records, as of March 2014, there were already around
36,000 Filipino workers deployed in the Republic of Korea. South Korea is also one of the
country’s largest sources of foreign direct investments in the Philippines, $3.80 billion, in
2013. Major Korean companies doing business in the country include Korean Electric Power
Corp., Phoenix Semi-Conductor, Hanjin Shipbuilding Co., Samsung, Hyundai and LG.
In terms of official development assistance (ODA), Korean aid has also been increasing
during the past years. According to National Economic and Development Authority statistics,
South Korea has a total ODA of $608.72 million in 2013, comprising of $524.76 million in
loans and $83.96 million in grants. (Aldaba, 2015)
II. The 2016 Philippine Elections
Under the leadership of President Benigno Acquino III, the Philippines’ mental picture has
had a big change. Manila has promoted better ties with Washington, signing the Enhanced
Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) by proving Philippine military base with American
troops with air and naval assets. In the contrary, the Philippines filed a case against China
through a UN-backed court to invalidate the infamous nine-dashed line map in the South
China Sea, while simultaneously internationalizing the disputes, connecting them to wider
international concerns such as freedom of navigation and access to global commons.
Meanwhile, the Philippines has embarked on a modest military modernization program that, if

2. realized, will give its armed forces submarines and other assets required for the military’s
envisioned “minimum credible defence” capabilities by 2020.
However, come May 2016, the country’s economic, security, and foreign policies will all
enter a state of flux, as the Philippines gears up to hold its fifth presidential election since
returning to democracy in 1986. The ruling Liberal Party has yet to decide on its presidential
ticket for the 2016 election, but Aquino has already indicated that Manuel “Mar” Roxas II, the
current secretary of Interior and Local Government and a losing vice-presidential candidate in
2010. In fact, Roxas was supposed to run for president in 2010, when he was at his prime in
terms of name recognition and popularity, but gave way to Aquino whose own mass appeal
and corruption-free image were catapulted by the sudden death of his mother, democracy icon
and former President Cory Aquino in 2009. However, Roxas has not been performing well in
recent opinion polls. Currently leading the pack is Vice President Jejomar Binay of the
opposition party, United Nationalist Alliance, who has some positive views about China.
Binay’s populist platform, which focuses on social welfare programs for the poor, seems to be
resonating. However, the vice-president is hounded by allegations of massive corruption
during his long stint as mayor of the country’s financial district, Makati.
Because the Philippines has a weak, multi-party system, the ruling party is also reportedly
eyeing neophyte Senator Grace Poe, an independent, as its alternative standard-bearer, if not
as the vice-presidential partner of the less popular Roxas. Grace is the daughter of Fernando
Poe, the losing opponent of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the 2004 election,
an election Arroyo critics say was largely rigged. Should the ruling party play it safe, Poe will
be its presidential candidate. Should she win, she will be the third woman to rule the
Philippines.
If the Liberal Party’s candidate wins, either Roxas or Poe, a continuity of policy, for at least
six more years, is likely. It would signal consistency in the Philippines’ relations with the U.S.,
which has recently stepped up its South China Sea engagements in a bid to delegitimize
China’s land reclamation in disputed areas. It would also be good news for Japan, which has
been calling for greater rule of law in East Asia, a call echoed by Aquino’s decision to pursue
a court case against Beijing. As the standard-bearer of the ruling party, Roxas is expected to
largely continue Aquino’s foreign policy direction. (Jeffrey, 2015)

3. The 2016 presidential election in the Philippines may yet to be the most challenging in the
country’s electoral history. Apart from varied domestic concerns and problems, divisive
regional issues await the next president of the Philippines.
On 29 October 2015, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled that it has jurisdiction
to hear some territorial claims the Philippines has filed against China. China’s response that
the ruling was null and void with no binding legal effect simply echoes China’s earlier
pronouncements in relation to the disputed areas in the South China Sea. Neither will China
recognize the Philippine arbitration case filed against it and participate in the UN’s arbitration
proceedings nor will it accept any decision by the international tribunal.
On 30 November 2015, the PCA concluded its week-long hearing on the merits and
remaining issues of jurisdiction and admissibility in the arbitration initiated by the Philippines
against China. It intends to issue its decision in 2016. A widely anticipated scenario is that
the tribunal will rule in favour of the Philippines, but China will continue to refuse to be
legally bound by the Court’s ruling or jurisdiction.
How will the next president of the Philippines deal with such a deadlock? What will be the
government’s approach to negotiate or end the deadlock? (Mendoza, 2015)
III. Philippine Chairmanship of ASEAN 2017
The agenda of the next Philippine president is the country’s assumption of leadership as Chair
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2017. It will be doubly
challenging for the next president because 2017 is the ASEAN’s fiftieth year anniversary. It
will be the fourth time for the Philippines to chair the ASEAN but definitely its first under the
present circumstances. Territorial and maritime disputes over the South China Sea have
increasingly become the flashpoint in the ASEAN region, with the Philippines “in the eye of
the storm” being the first and only ASEAN country that has legally contested China’s nine-
dash claim in the South China Sea.
In 2017, the next Philippine president faces the huge challenge of balancing its own national
interest in the South China Sea disputes with the national and regional interests in the ASEAN.
Article 32 of the ASEAN Charter requires the Chair of the ASEAN to actively promote and
enhance the interests and well-being of ASEAN. The Chair of the ASEAN is also expected to
ensure the centrality of ASEAN. How will the next president balance national and regional
interests in the ASEAN?

4. ASEAN member states need China to promote their economic development. But ASEAN
member states’ political relationship with China has been rather uneasy and tense as the latter
continues to ignore ASEAN leaders’ vocal calls for a peaceful, legal settlement of the South
China Sea disputes. Political tensions have intensified because China has repeatedly used
provocative measures in securing its interests in the disputed waters in the South China Sea.
Will the next president of the Philippines provide the strong leadership that is wanting in the
ASEAN, the kind of leadership that can steer the ASEAN towards a united approach or policy
on China’s aggression and intransigence in the South China Sea? Will the new president
unify or further divide the ASEAN? (Mendoza, 2015)
IV. ASEAN Community Updated Article
The agreement on the creation of an ASEAN Economic Community signed on November 22
in Kuala Lumpur by the leading nations of Southeast Asia finally entered into force with
much fanfare on December 31, heralding the “awakening” of what could be defined as a new
Asian power bloc.
With the AEC, the 48-year-old ASEAN finds itself at a critical juncture, yet sobriety should
drive any analysis. The reasons for skepticism center on two questions. First, can ASEAN
effectively pursue coherent economic integration on the sole basis of voluntary commitments
– especially given the extreme diversity of the region? Second, if so, which objectives it should
pursue next to build on the AEC?
The challenge of diversity is formidable enough: Politically, the somewhat cacophonous,
unstable democracies of Indonesia and the Philippines cohabit with the Communist
dictatorship of Vietnam and the military junta of Thailand; economically, high-developed
states and top ranking economies stand along with some of the poorest countries in the world;
culturally, the plurality of religions, languages, ethnicities, and ways of living is difficult to
describe. To cite only one example, Malaysia and Indonesia’s Muslim populations co-exist
with peoples who are mostly Buddhist (as in Myanmar), alongside the predominantly Roman
Catholic Philippines. Against this kaleidoscopic backdrop, it is surely reasonable to question
the ability of the AEC to deliver on its promise of a seamless economic bloc.
The numbers speak for themselves: Although 95 per cent of tariff lines are at zero, non-tariff
barriers on goods and services render cross-border trade particularly painful. Consumer laws,
intellectual property rights, land codes, and investment rules have yet to be harmonized at the
regional level, while the lack of common, integrated banking structures, alongside the absence
of an agreement on common and acceptable currencies, are likely to hinder market access for
regional small and medium-sized enterprises. Also still unresolved is the question of the free
movement of labor, including in the so-called “high-skilled sector,” with many ASEAN
countries imposing heavy requirements on firms wanting to employ foreigners. Meanwhile, in
the shadow of the regional debate on skilled labor migration, millions of marginalized

5. migrants deemed unskilled, from domestic workers to fishermen, illegally flit between
countries.
“Worsening poverty, inequalities of wealth, resources, power and opportunities between
countries, between the rich and the poor and between men and women,” the ASEAN Civil
Society Conference and ASEAN Peoples’ Forum reported.
Economic influence goes hand in hand with political influence, and economic integration will
be of little significance if it is not backed by sound political reforms. The evolution of the
security landscape in the Asia-Pacific region, together with the speed and scale of China’s
construction activities in the Spratly Islands, are likely to determine the future path of the
Association. In many aspects of ASEAN inter-state relations, it is still Beijing that calls the
tune, the latter capitalizing on the grouping’s divides and confusion.
These mounting challenges demonstrate that a certain relaxation of the principles of
consensus and non-interference, alongside greater emphasis on regional institution-building,
are currently needed to accommodate the ever-evolving economic and security landscape in
the Asia-Pacific region. if ASEAN is to realize what it purports to be – “politically cohesive,
economically integrated, socially responsible” and “truly people-oriented, people-centered
rules-based” concert of Southeast Asian nations, it will need more than just empty statements
to overcome the “say-do” chasm and address the pervasive issues of worsening poverty and
inequalities of wealth, resources, power and opportunities, let alone the questions of human
rights and democracy. Inevitably, a clear core message requires a certain amount of
consistency between words and deeds, between the official rhetoric and actual behavior. Over
the past few years, the language of ASEAN official documents, marked with strong
commitments to fundamental rights and the rule of law, has proven a hard sell for ASEAN
people at a time when Thailand’s military junta, led by General Prayuth Chan-o-cha, is
making draconian efforts to curb freedom of expression, while Vietnamese independent
writers, bloggers, and rights activists continue to face ruthless persecution by the Communist
Party, regardless of the outcry generated within the international community.
Ultimately, it is clear that the workings and developments of the AEC should not be seen
independently from, but rather as complementary to, the crafting of the political and security
and socio-cultural communities. As member states slowly absorb the externalities generated
by the AEC, ASEAN leaders may want to consider preparing the groundwork to build more
stable, secure societies, deepen ties with geographical neighbors and, eventually, develop a
shared sense of regional community and purpose. (Sellier, 2016)
Bibliographies
 Philembassy-seoul.com, (n.d.). Philippines-South Korea Relations. [online] Available
at: http://www.philembassy-seoul.com/rp_rk_relations.asp [Accessed 13 Jan. 2016].
 Aldaba, F. T. (2015). Enhancing the future of the Philippines-Republic of Korea
economic relations. [online] BusinessMirror. Available at:
http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/enhancing-the-future-of-the-philippines-republic-
of-korea-economic-relations/ [Accessed 14 Jan. 2016].

6.  Jeffrey, O. (2015). The Geopolitical Stakes of the 2016 Philippine Elections. [online]
The Diplomat. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/the-geopolitical-stakes-
of-the-2016-philippine-elections/ [Accessed 12 Jan. 2016]
 Mendoza, D. J. (2015). ASEAN issues await the next Philippine president - Blueboard
by Diana J Mendoza, PhD | Ateneo de Manila University. [online] Admu.edu.ph.
Available at: http://www.admu.edu.ph/news/research/asean-issues-await-next-
philippine-president-blueboard-diana-j-mendoza-phd [Accessed 12 Jan. 2016].
 Sellier, E. (2016). The ASEAN Economic Community: The Force Awakens? [online]
The Diplomat. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/the-asean-economic-
community-the-force-awakens/ [Accessed 13 Jan. 2016].