Taking Sides: Clashing Views in Science, Technology, and Society Thomas Easton McGraw-Hill Education Unit 1 1.3 Can Science Be Trusted Without Government Regulation? Page 63 Critical Thinking and Reflection 3. Does publishing the full methods and results of the Fouchier and Kawaoka H5N1 studies seem likely to increase our ability to protect public health from future H5N1 pandemic? http://www.nature.com/news/the-risks-and-benefits-of-publishing-mutant-flu-studies-1.10138 nature International weekly journal of science The risks and benefits of publishing mutant flu studies Research describing two mutant strains of H5N1 avian influenza that spread between mammals is likely to be published in its entirety. Nature examines the controversial decision. Ed Yong March 2, 2012 Two teams of scientists, led by Ron Fouchier of Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, have created mutant strains of H5N1 avian influenza. These laboratory strains could be passed between mammals more easily than wild strains of the virus. MEDICAL RF.COM/SCIENCE PHOTO LIBRARY Research into mutant strains of avian influenza (white) aims to reveal more about flu transmission mechanisms. News of the research sparked an intense debate about whether the two teams' work should be published in full to aid pandemic preparedness or redacted to prevent misuse by terrorists. A meeting convened by the World Health Organization two weeks ago in Geneva, Switzerland, concluded that the papers should be published in full, despite recommendations to the contrary from a US government advisory board. Nature takes a look at the debate and the science. http://news.wisc.edu/influenza-researcher-yoshihiro-kawaoka-wins-breakthrough-award/ University of Wisconsin Madison Influenza researcher Yoshihiro Kawaoka wins Breakthrough Award October 7, 2014 Kelly April Tyrrell The University of Wisconsin–Madison’s Yoshihiro Kawaoka has been recognized as a 2014 Popular Mechanics Breakthrough Award recipient for his efforts to understand and prevent pandemic influenza. In recent years, Kawaoka has found himself at the center of controversy surrounding research on highly pathogenic influenza and other sensitive pathogens known as select agents. His studies to understand, monitor, treat and potentially prevent pandemic influenza have often been misrepresented and misunderstood. However, according to Popular Mechanics — a science and technology-focused magazine published by Hearst Magazines — Kawaoka was chosen despite the controversy because his work studying mutations in viruses that are currently found in nature and carry pandemic potential could “help protect humanity.” - See more at: http://news.wisc.edu/influenza-researcher-yoshihiro-kawaoka-wins-breakthrough-award/#sthash.D2VHfogO.dpuf http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/health/a12897/the-man-who-could-destroy-the-world-breakthrough-awards-2014/ Popular Mec.

1. Taking Sides: Clashing Views in Science, Technology, and
Society Thomas Easton McGraw-Hill Education Unit 1 1.3 Can
Science Be Trusted Without Government Regulation? Page 63
Critical Thinking and Reflection 3. Does publishing the full
methods and results of the Fouchier and Kawaoka H5N1 studies
seem likely to increase our ability to protect public health from
future H5N1 pandemic?
http://www.nature.com/news/the-risks-and-benefits-of-
publishing-mutant-flu-studies-1.10138
nature International weekly journal of science
The risks and benefits of publishing mutant flu studies
Research describing two mutant strains of H5N1 avian influenza
that spread between mammals is likely to be published in its
entirety. Nature examines the controversial decision.
Ed Yong
March 2, 2012
Two teams of scientists, led by Ron Fouchier of Erasmus
Medical Center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and Yoshihiro
Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, have created
mutant strains of H5N1 avian influenza. These laboratory
strains could be passed between mammals more easily than wild
strains of the virus.
MEDICAL RF.COM/SCIENCE PHOTO LIBRARY
Research into mutant strains of avian influenza (white) aims to

2. reveal more about flu transmission mechanisms.
News of the research sparked an intense debate about whether
the two teams' work should be published in full to aid pandemic
preparedness or redacted to prevent misuse by terrorists. A
meeting convened by the World Health Organization two weeks
ago in Geneva, Switzerland, concluded that the papers should be
published in full, despite recommendations to the contrary from
a US government advisory board. Nature takes a look at the
debate and the science.
http://news.wisc.edu/influenza-researcher-yoshihiro-kawaoka-
wins-breakthrough-award/
University of Wisconsin Madison
Influenza researcher Yoshihiro Kawaoka wins Breakthrough
Award
October 7, 2014
Kelly April Tyrrell
The University of Wisconsin–Madison’s Yoshihiro Kawaoka
has been recognized as a 2014 Popular Mechanics Breakthrough
Award recipient for his efforts to understand and prevent
pandemic influenza.
In recent years, Kawaoka has found himself at the center of
controversy surrounding research on highly pathogenic
influenza and other sensitive pathogens known as select agents.
His studies to understand, monitor, treat and potentially prevent
pandemic influenza have often been misrepresented and
misunderstood.
However, according to Popular Mechanics — a science and

3. technology-focused magazine published by Hearst Magazines —
Kawaoka was chosen despite the controversy because his work
studying mutations in viruses that are currently found in nature
and carry pandemic potential could “help protect humanity.”
- See more at: http://news.wisc.edu/influenza-researcher-
yoshihiro-kawaoka-wins-breakthrough-
award/#sthash.D2VHfogO.dpuf
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/health/a12897/the-
man-who-could-destroy-the-world-breakthrough-awards-2014/
Popular Mechanics
Mike Magnuson
October 7, 2014
BREAKTHROUGH
WHO Yoshihiro Kawaoka University of Wisconsin–Madison
FIELD Virology
ACHIEVEMENT Flu pandemic prevention research.
The virus sits in 2-milliliter vials inside a freezer kept at minus
80 degrees Celsius. At that temperature, in that deep of a deep
freeze, the virus is preserved as if in amber, lying in wait.
Under a microscope it looks something like a medieval battle
weapon, a spherical object stabbed with dozens of little spikes,
like the actual virus it was engineered to replicate: the 1918
strain of H1N1, otherwise known as the Spanish flu, a pandemic
estimated to have killed more than 40 million people.
The freezer is locked and sealed inside a room made of concrete

4. walls set within a lab surrounded by another set of walls—those
outer walls made of 18 inches of concrete, every inch of it
reinforced by steel rebar. A box within a box, as it's known in
the research world. Entry is through a series of rooms starting
with air-locked, submarine-type doors, and the place is rigged
with extensive alarms—more than 500 of them in all, spread
throughout the building and attached to various pieces of
equipment, ready to alert safety personnel and the campus
police who monitor the facility around the clock if someone
who doesn't belong there tries to get in.
The freezers, the air-locked doors, the alarms—they must all
operate perfectly, because perfection is the minimum
requirement at the $12.5-million Influenza Research Institute.
The facility sits on the outskirts of the University of Wisconsin-
Madison, home of the Badgers, whose basketball team went to
the Final Four this year. But the building seems a thousand
miles from all that.
Assuming they pass the FBI background check necessary even
for the administrative assistants who work there, employees
entering the lab are required to remove all their street clothes,
including undergarments. Once they put on dedicated scrubs,
with shoe covers both inside and outside a pair of dedicated
garden clogs, they access an anteroom outside the lab. To go
into the laboratory, they need a different pair of clogs and shoe
covers specific to that space, and must pull on a Tyvek
jumpsuit, a hooded respirator outfitted with an air filter, and
two pairs of disposable Tyvek gloves. Upon leaving, they take
all that off in a specific order, then take a 5-minute shower with
soap and water during which they are required to wash all
orifices and blow their noses.
The suite that houses the virus is a BSL-3-Ag facility—
essentially the most secure building of its kind in existence,
give or take one or two features. (The building also houses

5. research on the Ebola virus.) Not one particle of anything is
allowed to escape.
The institute was built in 2008 largely to advance the efforts of
one man, Yoshihiro Kawaoka, a professor of virology who
several months ago published a study detailing his successful
bid to build the virus—a strain of influenza that's almost
identical to the Spanish flu—from contemporary flu genes. For
the study he infected ferrets with the virus and mutated the
strain to make it more easily transmissible through respiratory
droplets—in other words, from sneezing mammal to sneezing
mammal.
Outside the concentric, secure rings of his research facility
, and outside the comforts of Madison—the university, and
officials in the state of Wisconsin itself, have been unwavering
in their support of Kawaoka, to the point of constructing the
$12.5 million building in order to fight off other suitors—that
question has been debated by hordes of people with varying
degrees of credibility.
His study of the H5N1 virus, because it detailed so precisely his
methods for rebuilding the virus, was so controversial that a
National Institutes of Health advisory panel recommended parts
of the research be kept from the public when it was scheduled to
appear in 2012 in the journal Nature.
http://www.nature.com/news/mutant-flu-paper-published-
1.10551
nature International weekly journal of science
Mutant-flu paper published
Controversial study shows how dangerous forms of avian
influenza could evolve in the wild.

6. Ed Yong
May 2, 2012
The first hints of Kawaoka’s work emerged last year, along with
details of similar experiments led by Ron Fouchier at the
Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. The
news sparked intense discussion about whether the benefits of
knowing about these potentially dangerous mutations
outweighed the risks of publishing them openly. The US
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) —
an independent government advisory board — recommended in
December 2011 that both papers should be censored before
publication, citing concerns that the strains could be used by
bioterrorists, or that untrammelled proliferation of the work
would raise the risk of an accidental release from a lab.
But after a meeting that included international flu experts and
health-agency representatives, the NSABB decided in March
that revised versions of the two papers should be published in
full (see
http://www.nature.com/news/us-biosecurity-board-revises-
stance-on-mutant-flu-studies-1.10369
). The board was swayed by plans to tighten the oversight of
such work, as well as by fresh information about the potential
benefits to surveillance. It also acknowledged the difficulties in
restricting access to the research. Fouchier has just received an
export licence from the Dutch government, which has allowed
him to submit his paper to Science (see
http://www.nature.com/news/mutant-flu-researcher-backs-down-
on-plan-to-publish-without-permission-1.10514
).
A mutant flu virus became more transmissible as it passed

7. between lab ferrets, raising fears that mutations in the wild
could create a human pandemic strain.
http://www.nature.com/news/second-mutant-flu-paper-
published-1.10875
nature International weekly journal of science
Second mutant-flu paper published
Just five mutations allow H5N1 to spread between ferrets.
Ed Yong
June 21, 2012
The H5N1 ‘bird flu’ virus could evolve to spread through the air
between ferrets by picking up as few as five mutations,
according to a long-awaited study from Ron Fouchier from the
Erasmus Medical Centre in Rotterdam, the Netherlands1. The
paper is published today in Science after months of debate
about whether the benefits of publishing the research
outweighed the risks.
H5N1 can cause lethal infections in humans but it cannot spread
effectively from person to person. Fouchier’s paper is the
second of two publications describing how the virus could
evolve this ability. The first, from Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the
University of Wisconsin–Madison, involved a hybrid virus with
genes from both H5N1 and the H1N1 strain behind the 2009
pandemic2 (see
http://www.nature.com/news/mutant-flu-paper-published-
1.10551
). Fouchier’s mutant contains only H5N1 genes.
RE: Can Science Be Trusted Without Government Regulaltion?
Collapse

8. Top of Form
https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Pages/InstitutionalOversight.as
px
United States Department of Health and Human Services
United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of
Life Sciences DURC
On September 24, 2014, the United States Government released
the
United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of
Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern
. The policy addresses institutional oversight of DURC, which
includes policies, practices, and procedures to ensure DURC is
identified and risk mitigation measures are implemented, where
applicable. Institutional oversight of DURC is the critical
component of a comprehensive oversight system because
institutions are most familiar with the life sciences research
conducted in their facilities and are in the best position to
promote and strengthen the responsible conduct and
communication
This Policy and the
March 2012 DURC Policy
are complementary and emphasize a culture of responsibility by
reminding all involved parties of the shared duty to uphold the
integrity of science and prevent its misuse. Like the March 2012
DURC Policy, the scope of this Policy is limited to a well-
defined subset of life sciences research that involves 15 agents
and toxins and seven categories of experiments. The U.S.
Government will solicit feedback on the experience of
institutions in implementing the Policy; evaluate the impact of
DURC oversight on the life sciences research enterprise; assess
the benefits and risks of expanding the scope of the Policy to
encompass additional agents and toxins and/or categories of
experiments; and update the Policy as warranted.
Research institutions are encouraged to be mindful that research
outside of the scope articulated in this Policy may also
constitute DURC. Institutions have the discretion to consider

9. other categories of research for DURC potential and may
expand their internal oversight to other types of life sciences
research as they deem appropriate, but such expansion would
not be subject to oversight as articulated in this Policy.
The
Federal Register Notice Response to Comments and Notice of
Final Action Regarding the United States Government Policy
for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research
of Concern
was published on September 25, 2014.
Bottom of Form
RE: Can Science Be Trusted Without Government Regulaltion?
Collapse
Top of Form
Close to home for those of us who live in southern Ohio, as
referenced by David R. Franz, from "The Dual Use Dilemma:
Crying Out for Leadership", Saint Louis University Journal of
Health Law & Policy (2013).
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/22/us/tests-indicate-seized-
material-is-nonlethal-form-of-anthrax.html
The New York Times
Tests Indicate Seized Material Is Nonlethal Form of Anthrax
Todd S. Purdum
February 22, 1998
But extensive tests at a military laboratory at Fort Detrick, Md.,
have determined that the substance in fact contained only
harmless traces of anthrax that could not be used to make a
biological weapon, Bobby Siller, the special agent in charge of
the Las Vegas office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
said today at a news conference there.
Mr. Siller said
Larry Wayne Harris
, one of the two men in Las Vegas who were charged with
possession of biological toxins for use as a weapon, would
remain in custody at the Clark County Detention Center in Las
Vegas pending further investigation and a hearing on Monday.

10. Mr. Harris
, a former member of the Aryan Nations white supremacist
group, is on probation from a Federal conviction last year on
charges of illegally obtaining bubonic plague bacteria from a
mail-order laboratory in 1995. One of the conditions of his
probation was that he not handle dangerous toxins.
Mr. Siller said he believed that testing on other material, seized
from
Mr. Harris's
houses in Ohio, had not been completed.
In fact, the Government's official complaint later made clear,
Mr. Harris
had boasted in the past about how easy such an attack would
be, though officials said they had no indication of any plans to
use the material.
In fact, officials had some reason to be worried.
Mr. Harris
, a freelance water tester and microbiologist from Lancaster,
Ohio, has published a book, ''Bacteriological Warfare: A Major
Threat to North America,'' that he describes as a guide for
surviving a germ attack, but that also details how such an attack
could be carried out.
Mr. Harris
has said he grew anthrax cultures from material taken from a
burial ground of cows that died in an outbreak in the 1950's,
and law-enforcement officials and experts on right-wing groups
say he has traveled the country addressing anti-Government
groups on the dangers of germ warfare, and inoculating people
against biological agents.
But Mr. Leavitt, of Logandale, Nev., had no criminal record,
and friends described him as a pillar of his local Mormon
church who owned a fire safety business and had a passion for
alternative medical research in a quest for cures for AIDS and
other diseases. His lawyers said he had asked
Mr. Harris
to help him test an electronic machine that he had been told

11. could kill bacteria.
Mr. Leavitt had been negotiating with Ronald G. Rockwell, a
local researcher who claimed to have developed such a machine,
but Mr. Leavitt's lawyers said the two could not agree on a
price. This week, when
Mr. Harris
and Mr. Leavitt told Mr. Rockwell that they had anthrax they
wanted tested, Mr. Rockwell had said ''it scared me so bad'' that
he called the authorities, who moved in to arrest the suspects as
they met Mr. Rockwell at a clinic in Henderson, Nev., on
Wednesday night.
In any event, Mr. Leavitt and Mr. Rockwell made no secret of
their testing plans, discussing them on a radio talk show on
KNXT-AM in Las Vegas just last week, and saying that
Mr. Harris
would help them.
''
Larry Harris
has been a consultant to our Government for some time, and he
will be participating in some very specific tests as far as to the
efficacy of the technology, in regard to some of the
bacteriologic agents,'' Mr. Leavitt told the radio host, according
to a transcript published today in The Las Vegas Review-
Journal/Las Vegas Sun.
In the past,
Mr. Harris
has claimed that he worked for the Central Intelligence Agency
in the 1980's. But a C.I.A. spokesman, Mark Mansfield, said
that
Mr. Harris
had never been employed by the agency.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/etc/scrip
t.html
FRONTLINE 1706 "Plague War"
Air date: October 13, 1998
Plague War

12. Produced by Peter Molloy, Jim Gilmore
Reported by Tom Mangold
Clive Syddal, Executive Producer
Written by Tom Mangold and Jim Gilmore
LARRY WAYNE HARRIS
: My view of the future is that we are facing now a biological
apocalypse. It is coming. The Bible says that it is coming.
NARRATOR:
Larry Wayne Harris
, a member of the white supremacist group Aryan Nation, has
been in constant trouble with the law for his attempts to obtain
plague bacteria and anthrax through the mail.
Harris
has written a manual for do-it-yourself biological warfare, and
he claims it is easy to acquire these deadly agents.
INTERVIEWER: How would you obtain samples of anthrax?
LARRY WAYNE HARRIS
: Anthrax? Go out where cows have died of anthrax. Dig down
to where the bodies are. Get a sample of the culture. Grow it up.
INTERVIEWER: How would you obtain a sample of plague?
LARRY WAYNE HARRIS
: The rats the plague usually inhabits- rats would like to be
above 5,000-foot altitude. Go out in California, get above the
5,000-foot mark. Catch you some rats, get some blood samples.
Bingo, you got your plague.
INTERVIEWER: Could you personally use biological organisms
offensively, if you had to?
LARRY WAYNE HARRIS
: Most definitely. I- I hope I never have- we never have to, but
most definitely.
INTERVIEWER: Do you believe, looking into the future, that
you may have to?
LARRY WAYNE HARRIS
: I hope and pray that I never have to.
INTERVIEWER: That's not the question,
Mr. Harris

13. .
LARRY WAYNE HARRIS
: Yes.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/0471686786.ebd016
8.pub2/abstract?systemMessage=WOL+Usage+report+download
+page+will+be+unavailable+on+Friday+27th+January+2017+at
+23%3A00+GMT%2F+18%3A00+EST%2F+07%3A00+SGT+%
28Saturday+28th+Jan+for+SGT%29++for+up+to+2+hours+due+
to+essential+server+maintenance.+Apologies+for+the+inconven
ience
.
Larry Wayne Harris
Lauren Harrison, Jacqueline E. Miller
Published Online: July 15, 2011
DOI: 10.1002/0471686786.ebd0168.pub2
Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Book Title
Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense
Abstract
Larry Wayne Harris
, a trained microbiological technician from Lancaster, Ohio has
been implicated in two cases of possession of biological
materials that are of particular concern in weapons. In 1995, he
was charged with misrepresenting himself while ordering three
vials of the causative agent of plague. He was also arrested on
suspected possession of the causative agent of anthrax. This
substance was later found to be a harmless veterinary strain. He
is thought to be a lone actor and not maintaining ties with any
terrorist groups or states. He did have, at one time, ties with
Aryan Nations and other neo-Nazi groups. He renounced his
racist views in mid-1990s.
Keywords:
Larry Wayne Harris
; anthrax; plague; motivation factors; legislation; CDC
clearance