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B R A N D O N S H E R M A N
• Master of Information Security, Policy, and Management
• Carnegie Mellon University, December 2014
• Thesis topic: Cloud Forensics
• Presented at MirCon, October 2015 on Cloud Forensics
• Has broken many things in AWS 😈
TA K E A S E L F I E
J U S T T RY T O R E S I S T
A G E N D A
• What makes Cloud Forensics hard?
• Why do we care about forensics?
• Introduce Selfie
• Workflow
W H Y D O W E N E E D C L O U D F O R E N S I C S ?
• You can’t touch your hardware 🙉
• You don’t even know where your hardware is 🙈
• Storage is software-defined 📦
• Evidence of an incident needs to be preserved! %
R E W I N D A S T E P
⏮
W H Y D O W E N E E D F O R E N S I C S ?
• Answer questions
• What happened?
• How did it happen?
• Preserve answers 🗄
W H AT I S T H E O U T C O M E O F F O R E N S I C S ?
• A chain of events that can be logged and audited 📝
• Protect evidence from modification 🔏
• As automatic as possible ⚙
T L ; D R : T H E C L O U D
• Amazon Web Services
• EC2: Elastic Cloud Compute
• EBS: Elastic Block Storage
• S3: Simple Storage Service
• IAM: Identity & Access Management
E B S
• EBS annual failure rate is .1%~.4%
• Consumer drive AFR is ~4%
• The blocks must be duplicated in a redundant fashion to achieve a 10%
reduction in failure rates
• But… what happens to unallocated/overwritten blocks?
E B S
• EBS Snapshots create block-for-block copies in S3
• Spoiler alert: This includes deleted files 🚮🗃
• Spoiler alert: Just your files
R E A L TA L K : S E C U R I T Y I N C I D E N T S
• Let’s face it; 💩 happens
• Hopefully it was your Red Team 🚩
• 🔇
W H O Y O U G U N N A C A L L PA G E ? 👻
• We need a means to forensically preserve data on the host
• Inspection 👀
• Use in a legal environment 🕴
$ selfie
--region us-west-2
--target-account 123456789012
--target-role Security/selfie
--target-instance-list i-DEADBEEF
--ir 098765432911
--control-account 543216789643
--control-role Security/incident-responder
--username bsherman
—-ticket-id “INC-001”
S E L F I E 📸
• Let computers do what computers are best at
• Perform a series of tasks the same way every time
• If you groan when your boss assigns you a task, it’s a prime candidate for
automation
$ git clone https://github.com/devsecops/selfie.git
$ cd selfie
$ gem build selfie.gemspec
$ gem install selfie-1.0.0.gem
$ selfie
--region us-west-2
--target-account 123456789012
--target-role Security/selfie
--target-instance-list i-DEADBEEF
--ir 098765432911
--control-account 543216789643
--control-role Security/incident-responder
--username bsherman
—-ticket-id “INC-001”
$ selfie
--region us-west-2
--target-account 123456789012
--target-role Security/selfie
--target-instance-list i-DEADBEEF
--ir 098765432911
--control-account 543216789643
--control-role Security/incident-responder
--username bsherman
—-ticket-id “INC-001”
$ selfie
--region us-west-2
--target-account 123456789012
--target-role Security/selfie
--target-instance-list i-DEADBEEF
--ir 098765432911
--control-account 543216789643
--control-role Security/incident-responder
--username bsherman
—-ticket-id “INC-001”
$ selfie
--region us-west-2
--target-account 123456789012
--target-role Security/selfie
--target-instance-list i-DEADBEEF
--ir 098765432911
--control-account 543216789643
--control-role Security/incident-responder
--username bsherman
—-ticket-id “INC-001”
$ selfie
--region us-west-2
--target-account 123456789012
--target-role Security/selfie
--target-instance-list i-DEADBEEF
--ir 098765432911
--control-account 543216789643
--control-role Security/incident-responder
--username bsherman
—-ticket-id “INC-001”
$ selfie
--region us-west-2
--target-account 123456789012
--target-role Security/selfie
--target-instance-list i-DEADBEEF
--ir 098765432911
--control-account 543216789643
--control-role Security/incident-responder
--username bsherman
—-ticket-id “INC-001”
$ selfie
--region us-west-2
--target-account 123456789012
--target-role Security/selfie
--target-instance-list i-DEADBEEF
--ir 098765432911
--control-account 543216789643
--control-role Security/incident-responder
--username bsherman
—-ticket-id “INC-001”
S E L F I E 📸
L E T ’ S TA K E A
S E L F I E W O R K F L O W
S T E P 0 : I D E N T I F Y I N S TA N C E S
S E L F I E W O R K F L O W
S T E P 0 : I D E N T I F Y I N S TA N C E S
⌖
I D E N T I F Y E C 2 I N S TA N C E ( S )
• ${INFORMATION_SOURCE} | ${ALERT_MECHANISM} | ${SELFIE}
• ⌖ ⇢🔔⇢📸
S E L F I E W O R K F L O W
S T E P 1 : R U N S E L F I E
⌖
S E L F I E W O R K F L O W
S T E P 2 : T R I G G E R S N A P S H O T S
⌖ /dev/sda
/dev/sdb
/dev/sdc
T R I G G E R S N A P S H O T S
• All EBS volumes need to be copied
• If you aren’t using EBS-backed root volumes… you should
• Ephemeral storage will be lost
• You can capture it with on-host tools
• If you still have control over the host
S E L F I E W O R K F L O W
S T E P 2 : T R I G G E R S N A P S H O T S
⌖ /dev/sda
/dev/sdb
/dev/sdc
S E L F I E W O R K F L O W
S T E P 3 : S H A R E S N A P S H O T S
⌖ /dev/sda
/dev/sdb
/dev/sdc
/dev/sda
/dev/sdb
/dev/sdc
S H A R E S N A P S H O T S
• AWS Accounts form a blast radius 💥
• Keeping your forensic snapshots in the same account that held a
compromised instance is not a good idea 🤔
• Did that instance hold API keys? Did it have an instance profile? 😓
S E L F I E W O R K F L O W
S T E P 3 : S H A R E S N A P S H O T S
⌖ /dev/sda
/dev/sdb
/dev/sdc
/dev/sda
/dev/sdb
/dev/sdc
S E L F I E W O R K F L O W
S T E P 4 : C O P Y S N A P S H O T S
⌖ /dev/sda
/dev/sdb
/dev/sdc
/dev/sda
/dev/sdb
/dev/sdc
/dev/sda
/dev/sdb
/dev/sdc
S E L F I E W O R K F L O W
S T E P 5 : C L E A N U P S N A P S H O T S
⌖ /dev/sda
/dev/sdb
/dev/sdc
/dev/sda
/dev/sdb
/dev/sdc
/dev/sda
/dev/sdb
/dev/sdc
S E L F I E W O R K F L O W
S T E P 5 : C L E A N U P S N A P S H O T S
⌖ /dev/sda
/dev/sdb
/dev/sdc
/dev/sda
/dev/sdb
/dev/sdc
S E L F I E W O R K F L O W
S T E P 5 : C L E A N U P S N A P S H O T S
⌖ /dev/sda
/dev/sdb
/dev/sdc
C O P Y S N A P S H O T S
• A shared snapshot doesn’t help if the original is still at risk
• Trigger a copy of the shared snapshot into your forensics account
C L E A N U P
• EBS volumes and snapshots can be deleted out of the original account 🚮
• Or keep them around if you like burning money 🔥💵
S E L F I E W O R K F L O W
S T E P 6 : I N V E S T I G AT E
☠ /dev/sda
/dev/sdb
/dev/sdc
S E L F I E W O R K F L O W
1. Identify EC2 instance(s)
2. Trigger snapshots of all EBS volumes attached to those instances
3. Share snapshots with a forensics-only AWS account
4. Trigger copies within the forensics account
5. Clean up snapshots
6. Inspect!
O P E N S O U R C E !
• Contributions welcome— Help
everyone take better selfies!
• https://github.com/devsecops/
selfie
Taking a Selfie - Just Try to Resist! Doing Forensics the DevSecOps Way

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Taking a Selfie - Just Try to Resist! Doing Forensics the DevSecOps Way

  • 1.
  • 2.
  • 3. B R A N D O N S H E R M A N • Master of Information Security, Policy, and Management • Carnegie Mellon University, December 2014 • Thesis topic: Cloud Forensics • Presented at MirCon, October 2015 on Cloud Forensics • Has broken many things in AWS 😈
  • 4. TA K E A S E L F I E J U S T T RY T O R E S I S T
  • 5. A G E N D A • What makes Cloud Forensics hard? • Why do we care about forensics? • Introduce Selfie • Workflow
  • 6. W H Y D O W E N E E D C L O U D F O R E N S I C S ? • You can’t touch your hardware 🙉 • You don’t even know where your hardware is 🙈 • Storage is software-defined 📦 • Evidence of an incident needs to be preserved! %
  • 7. R E W I N D A S T E P ⏮
  • 8. W H Y D O W E N E E D F O R E N S I C S ? • Answer questions • What happened? • How did it happen? • Preserve answers 🗄
  • 9. W H AT I S T H E O U T C O M E O F F O R E N S I C S ? • A chain of events that can be logged and audited 📝 • Protect evidence from modification 🔏 • As automatic as possible ⚙
  • 10. T L ; D R : T H E C L O U D • Amazon Web Services • EC2: Elastic Cloud Compute • EBS: Elastic Block Storage • S3: Simple Storage Service • IAM: Identity & Access Management
  • 11. E B S • EBS annual failure rate is .1%~.4% • Consumer drive AFR is ~4% • The blocks must be duplicated in a redundant fashion to achieve a 10% reduction in failure rates • But… what happens to unallocated/overwritten blocks?
  • 12. E B S • EBS Snapshots create block-for-block copies in S3 • Spoiler alert: This includes deleted files 🚮🗃 • Spoiler alert: Just your files
  • 13. R E A L TA L K : S E C U R I T Y I N C I D E N T S • Let’s face it; 💩 happens • Hopefully it was your Red Team 🚩 • 🔇
  • 14. W H O Y O U G U N N A C A L L PA G E ? 👻 • We need a means to forensically preserve data on the host • Inspection 👀 • Use in a legal environment 🕴
  • 15. $ selfie --region us-west-2 --target-account 123456789012 --target-role Security/selfie --target-instance-list i-DEADBEEF --ir 098765432911 --control-account 543216789643 --control-role Security/incident-responder --username bsherman —-ticket-id “INC-001”
  • 16. S E L F I E 📸 • Let computers do what computers are best at • Perform a series of tasks the same way every time • If you groan when your boss assigns you a task, it’s a prime candidate for automation
  • 17. $ git clone https://github.com/devsecops/selfie.git $ cd selfie $ gem build selfie.gemspec $ gem install selfie-1.0.0.gem
  • 18. $ selfie --region us-west-2 --target-account 123456789012 --target-role Security/selfie --target-instance-list i-DEADBEEF --ir 098765432911 --control-account 543216789643 --control-role Security/incident-responder --username bsherman —-ticket-id “INC-001”
  • 19. $ selfie --region us-west-2 --target-account 123456789012 --target-role Security/selfie --target-instance-list i-DEADBEEF --ir 098765432911 --control-account 543216789643 --control-role Security/incident-responder --username bsherman —-ticket-id “INC-001”
  • 20. $ selfie --region us-west-2 --target-account 123456789012 --target-role Security/selfie --target-instance-list i-DEADBEEF --ir 098765432911 --control-account 543216789643 --control-role Security/incident-responder --username bsherman —-ticket-id “INC-001”
  • 21. $ selfie --region us-west-2 --target-account 123456789012 --target-role Security/selfie --target-instance-list i-DEADBEEF --ir 098765432911 --control-account 543216789643 --control-role Security/incident-responder --username bsherman —-ticket-id “INC-001”
  • 22. $ selfie --region us-west-2 --target-account 123456789012 --target-role Security/selfie --target-instance-list i-DEADBEEF --ir 098765432911 --control-account 543216789643 --control-role Security/incident-responder --username bsherman —-ticket-id “INC-001”
  • 23. $ selfie --region us-west-2 --target-account 123456789012 --target-role Security/selfie --target-instance-list i-DEADBEEF --ir 098765432911 --control-account 543216789643 --control-role Security/incident-responder --username bsherman —-ticket-id “INC-001”
  • 24. $ selfie --region us-west-2 --target-account 123456789012 --target-role Security/selfie --target-instance-list i-DEADBEEF --ir 098765432911 --control-account 543216789643 --control-role Security/incident-responder --username bsherman —-ticket-id “INC-001”
  • 25. S E L F I E 📸 L E T ’ S TA K E A
  • 26. S E L F I E W O R K F L O W S T E P 0 : I D E N T I F Y I N S TA N C E S
  • 27. S E L F I E W O R K F L O W S T E P 0 : I D E N T I F Y I N S TA N C E S ⌖
  • 28. I D E N T I F Y E C 2 I N S TA N C E ( S ) • ${INFORMATION_SOURCE} | ${ALERT_MECHANISM} | ${SELFIE} • ⌖ ⇢🔔⇢📸
  • 29. S E L F I E W O R K F L O W S T E P 1 : R U N S E L F I E ⌖
  • 30. S E L F I E W O R K F L O W S T E P 2 : T R I G G E R S N A P S H O T S ⌖ /dev/sda /dev/sdb /dev/sdc
  • 31. T R I G G E R S N A P S H O T S • All EBS volumes need to be copied • If you aren’t using EBS-backed root volumes… you should • Ephemeral storage will be lost • You can capture it with on-host tools • If you still have control over the host
  • 32. S E L F I E W O R K F L O W S T E P 2 : T R I G G E R S N A P S H O T S ⌖ /dev/sda /dev/sdb /dev/sdc
  • 33. S E L F I E W O R K F L O W S T E P 3 : S H A R E S N A P S H O T S ⌖ /dev/sda /dev/sdb /dev/sdc /dev/sda /dev/sdb /dev/sdc
  • 34. S H A R E S N A P S H O T S • AWS Accounts form a blast radius 💥 • Keeping your forensic snapshots in the same account that held a compromised instance is not a good idea 🤔 • Did that instance hold API keys? Did it have an instance profile? 😓
  • 35. S E L F I E W O R K F L O W S T E P 3 : S H A R E S N A P S H O T S ⌖ /dev/sda /dev/sdb /dev/sdc /dev/sda /dev/sdb /dev/sdc
  • 36. S E L F I E W O R K F L O W S T E P 4 : C O P Y S N A P S H O T S ⌖ /dev/sda /dev/sdb /dev/sdc /dev/sda /dev/sdb /dev/sdc /dev/sda /dev/sdb /dev/sdc
  • 37. S E L F I E W O R K F L O W S T E P 5 : C L E A N U P S N A P S H O T S ⌖ /dev/sda /dev/sdb /dev/sdc /dev/sda /dev/sdb /dev/sdc /dev/sda /dev/sdb /dev/sdc
  • 38. S E L F I E W O R K F L O W S T E P 5 : C L E A N U P S N A P S H O T S ⌖ /dev/sda /dev/sdb /dev/sdc /dev/sda /dev/sdb /dev/sdc
  • 39. S E L F I E W O R K F L O W S T E P 5 : C L E A N U P S N A P S H O T S ⌖ /dev/sda /dev/sdb /dev/sdc
  • 40. C O P Y S N A P S H O T S • A shared snapshot doesn’t help if the original is still at risk • Trigger a copy of the shared snapshot into your forensics account C L E A N U P • EBS volumes and snapshots can be deleted out of the original account 🚮 • Or keep them around if you like burning money 🔥💵
  • 41. S E L F I E W O R K F L O W S T E P 6 : I N V E S T I G AT E ☠ /dev/sda /dev/sdb /dev/sdc
  • 42. S E L F I E W O R K F L O W 1. Identify EC2 instance(s) 2. Trigger snapshots of all EBS volumes attached to those instances 3. Share snapshots with a forensics-only AWS account 4. Trigger copies within the forensics account 5. Clean up snapshots 6. Inspect!
  • 43. O P E N S O U R C E ! • Contributions welcome— Help everyone take better selfies! • https://github.com/devsecops/ selfie