1. Strategic action, self-mastery and emergence
The prime function of the classical scientific tradition, to formulate ‘immutable, general laws’1
based on the model of verifiable experimentation has resulted in the dominant
conceptualisation of time as flat. Classical mechanics denies temporality, treating all
processes as time-reversible and deterministic, predictable in both the past and future. Yet as
science turns to the study of complex systems and thermodynamics, this simple, linear idea
of time and causality begins to fall apart. Prigogine’s discovery of dissipative structures in non-
equilibrium thermodynamic systems has breathed new life into the study of emergence – that
which is spontaneously ordered, irreducible to its constituent parts and non-hierarchically
organised.
As science moves towards an understanding of the ‘the multiple, the temporal and the
complex’2
, it sits at a point of convergence with continental philosophy, which, due to its
epistemological focus on historicity, holds temporality as a central object of analysis.
Conceptualising time as an emergent phenomenon strips it of the teleology often forced upon
it in public and academic discourse and instead affirms a world of becoming, an open political
system susceptible to rifts and ruptures. Attempts to understand this political ecosystem must
be constructed along new lines which employ a concept of distributive agency that engages
all of the actants – whether organic or inorganic – that make up the social assemblage. An
awareness of emergent time and this micropolitical ecoassemblage can encourage actants to
express their full freedom and enter into agonistic, affirmative relationships with other self-
experimenting actants to bring about political change. Only in a micropolitical ecoassemblage
founded upon the virtues of self-mastery and interconnectedness can science, politics and
philosophy co-develop at mutually-beneficial convergences.
1
Roger Hausheer in Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current ed. H. Hardy (New York: The Viking
Press, 1980), xxvi.
2
Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature
(Glasgow: Flamingo, 1985), 2.

2. Linear causality, predictive explanation and control
The focus on reason at the heart of Enlightenment ideals has led to a distinct focus in
contemporary society on linear causality and the dominance of discourses which affirm it –
most notably, the empirical experimental scientific method, the nation state and neoliberal
capitalism. In his analysis of the ‘rift in time’ in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Connolly notes
Nietzsche’s view that the postulation of linear causality in classical science is nothing more
than it ‘feeding off the remains of a theology [it] purport[s] to transcend’3
, invoking the idea that
classical science was a conscious (though failed) attempt to move beyond the assumption of
God as the efficient cause of all natural phenomena. The classical scientific method can be
seen as a direct inheritor to the legacy of natural theology, implicitly acknowledging its
underlying assumption that observable phenomena in the world are ‘orderly and
comprehensible’4
and ultimately reducible to explanation. In Opticks, Newton claims that the
end of science is ‘to argue from phenomena without feigning hypotheses and to deduce
causes from effects’5
, a method he followed himself in Principia, the text in which the theory
of gravitation and a great deal of the classical scientific method are developed. The only
function of science is the explanation and prediction of matter’s action in a given circumstance;
any reach beyond this focus is too speculative for Newton’s attachment to ‘the ideal of
certainty’6
. This focus on predictive explanation was a significant factor in the development of
new post-Enlightenment technologies (such as the steam engine) that changed human
relations with nature from one of co-dependence to one of control and subjugation, a
‘monologue’ in which the human acts and the world apparently remains silent7
.
3
Willliam E. Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2002), 145.
4
Hugh G Gauch, Scientific Method in Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
154.
5
Isaac Newton, Opticks (New York: Dover, 1952), 369.
6
Ernan McMullin, “The Impact of Newton's Principia on the Philosophy of Science”, Philosophy
of Science 68.3 (2001), 295.
7
Prigogine and Stengers, Order Out of Chaos, 5 – 6.

3. The subjugation of nature by science developed in parallel to the nation state, which
also sought to control through predictive explanation. Foucault tracks this process through the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when specific advancements in administrative practices
led to ‘the emergence of state apparatuses’ and ‘forms of knowledge… of the state’ that
became known as statistics8
. With the demographic expansion in the early eighteenth century
(an indirect product of mechanisation, itself a product of scientific control of nature), statistics
found a practical use, revealing a wealth of regularities such as levels of mortality, wealth and
labour9
. Just as the discovery of regularities in nature caused the classical scientific method
to develop, the discovery of demographic regularities developed into the government of
population, or biopower. The more that is known about a given phenomena, the more that it
can be predicted and controlled, and with biopower, this control takes the form of ‘techniques
… [to direct] the flow of population into certain regions or activities’10
. The central technique
employed by biopolitical governments is normalization, in which various behaviours (such as
good hygiene and ‘good manners’) are constructed as ideal and citizens are encouraged to
self-govern their way towards these, with fear of social repercussions preventing differential
action11
.
As an autocatalytic process, neoliberal capitalism exerts biopower on an
unprecedented scale. Believing that the preconditions of the free-market are extremely fragile,
neoliberals constantly attempt to engineer these conditions through the elimination of
difference and the maintenance of current political systems. Utilising techniques such as
legislation, discipline and discussion (or lack of any of these), neoliberal systems seek to
create a homogenous world ordered in the service of markets and eschewing both the
principles of liberal autonomy and liberal diversity, accounting neither for freedom nor
8
Michel Foucault, “Governmentality” in Power: The Essential Works of Foucault 1954 – 1984
Volume 3 ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (St Ives: Penguin, 2000), 212.
9
Ibid., 216.
10
Ibid., 217.
11
Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books,
1978), 89.

4. pluralism12
. By uses of biopower such as the restriction of labour organisation, the preservation
of the concentration of wealth and media ownership in the hands of an elite few, and ‘huge
military, police, and prison assemblages’ to discipline and direct action in certain directions,
neoliberal political systems seek to present stability in the face of a fragile world, rather than
affirm the reality of a world of becoming13
. In Connolly’s analysis of the totalising effect of
neoliberalism, he observes how, in times of hardship, it is easy to become attached to a ‘public
philosophy, spouted regularly… that economic life would regulate itself automatically’ were it
not for the ‘awkward, bureaucratic organizations’ of the state14
. The retreat to a reactive
worldview and comfort in the overly-inflated self-organizing power of the market15
is the
ultimate goal of neoliberalism. It seeks to control its citizens for its own profits and secure this
victory by ‘systematically lock[ing] in the corporate liberation project’16
everywhere. A static
world where linear causality and control through predictive explanation reign supreme could
never adequately address the problems that face the scientific, philosophical and political
spheres.
‘The multiple, the temporal and the complex’
In an attempt to escape this focus on linear causality, Henri Bergson abandoned the classical
scientific method in favour of something more epistemologically sufficient to understanding
complexity – intuition. Far from the weak, everyday understanding of intuition, Bergsonian
intuition is focused on deep analysis and ‘concentrated attention’ on a subject, so as to move
away from the vices of predictive explanation that arise out of an intent ‘to dominate matter’17
.
Bergson’s point of departure with classical science is its lack of understanding of duration
(durée or lived time), the actual time that constitutes lived existence. Bergson’s concept of
12
John William Tate, “’We Cannot Give One Millimetre’? Liberalism, Enlightenment and
Diversity”, Political Studies 61.4 (2013), 819.
13
William E. Connolly, The Fragility of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 21.
14
Ibid., 24.
15
Ibid., 31.
16
Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs the Climate (St Ives: Penguin Books,
2014), 34.
17
Prigogine and Stengers, Order Out of Chaos, 91.

5. duration builds upon his theory of multiplicities - continuous multiplicities, which are qualitative,
intensive and subjective, are ‘susceptible to measurement only by varying [their] metrical
principle at each stage of the division’18
.
Duration is one such multiplicity, whose size changes depending upon the moment at
which it is measured. In Creative Evolution Bergson describes duration most succinctly as ‘the
continuous progression of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it
advances’19
. Time is not a succession of instants, as classical science claims, but a
succession of changes, of convergences of past experiences and future expectations.
Identities persist through change because of the accumulation of those events in life we deem
significant which are brought into the point of action with us. This point of action – a
fundamentally temporal phenomenon – occurs spatially in the body, the ‘point of passage’
between lived reality and consciousness, ‘between the things which act upon me and the
things upon which I act’20
. At a given point of action, sensori-motor activity makes a call to
pure memory; based on the context, certain memories – those deemed useful or significant –
are unearthed and brought to the forefront of conscious thought21
. All else fades to
insignificance due to the cloaking power of perception. These constant, imperfect calls to pure
memory mean that no two points of action can be the same: not only is the world in a state of
becoming, but so too are our perceptions of the world. As a result, each lived moment is ‘not
only something new, but something unforeseeable’22
. Emergent time is born.
Bergson’s distaste for ‘totalising philosophies’ and their lack of ability ‘to account for
contrary views’23
inform his abandonment of the classical scientific methodology. Yet Bergson
confuses classical science with a universal science – his critiques only apply to a science
18
Giles Deleuze, Bergsonism trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone
Books, 1988), 40.
19
Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Random House, 1944),
6 – 7.
20
Henri Bersgon, Matter and Memory trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (New
York: Dover, 2004), 196.
21
Ibid., 194 – 198.
22
Bergson, Creative Evolution, 8.
23
John Mullarkey, ed. The New Bergson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 10.

6. founded upon determinism and linear causality24
. With the rise of ‘systems thinking’, science
can be rehabilitated and brought into more beneficial convergences between philosophy and
politics. Capra traces the rise of systems thinking throughout the twentieth century, following
its development across biology and quantum mechanics. Finding the reductionist model of
classical science insufficient to explain the complexities of cell development and
differentiation, organismic biologists highlighted the potential role of ‘organizing relations’ in
cell make-up25
. Systems theorists postulate that essential properties are emergent from
relationships between parts in the larger whole, and at each level of complexity, new properties
emerge26
. Life is postulated as one such property, which ‘crystallizes’ from a multitude of
complex chemical interactions27
, particularly in the Santiago theory of cognition, which posits
living systems as cognitive, capable of adapting in a self-organizing capacity28
. As emergence
translated into quantum mechanics, phenomena which had been problematic as a part of the
classical scientific paradigm became clear. Subatomic particles, for example, are not things in
themselves, but rather ‘interconnections between things’29
, a discovery which helped to solve
the problem of wave-particle duality. In all of these systems, ‘nonequilibrium is the source of
order’, forming self-organizing dissipative structures30
. The new sciences of complexity,
systems and indeterminacy are fundamentally opposed to the classical scientific model of
linear causality and thus its convergences with philosophy and politics can be more
meaningful.
The key ideas of complexity and systems thinking – emergent crystallization, self-
organization and dissipative structures – can also be applied to our conceptions of political
society. In this model, society is a self-organizing ecosystem of autonomous individuals that
24
Prigogine and Stengers, Order Out of Chaos, 93.
25
Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life: A New Synthesis of Mind and Matter (London: Flamingo, 1997),
24-5.
26
Ibid., 27 – 8.
27
Stuart Kauffman, At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and
Complexity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 45.
28
Fritjof Capra, “The Systems View of Life: A Unifying Conception of Mind, Matter and Life”,
Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 11.2 (2015), 245.
29
Capra, The Web of Life, 30.
30
Prigogine and Stengers, Order Out of Chaos, 286.

7. integrate into a whole and which as wholes, integrate with other wholes31
. Attempting a
transformation of both science and philosophy (in pursuit of ‘an extension of [Bergson’s]
project today’32
) Deleuze posits an emergent, open world, ‘full of divergent processes yielding
novel and unexpected entities’33
. Refining Bergson’s multiplicities, Deleuze constructs the
assemblage, the coming together of disparate elements on a ‘plane of consistency’34
. When
one speaks of the Labour Party, for example, they are not speaking of any essential thing, but
rather the assemblage of all of the elements involved in the Labour Party, whether real or
virtual. Referring to the Labour Party necessarily refers to its MPs, its supporters, ideologies,
the buildings associated with it, the marks it makes on society and a whole host more; yet we
understand ‘the Labour Party’ as a plane of consistency, a tying together of these things. It is
important to note that assemblages are not unified wholes or totalities: because of their
rhizomatic nature35
, they are constituted by relations of exteriority, in which ‘a component
part… may be detached… and plugged into a different assemblage in which its interactions
are different’36
. Plugging a supporter of the Labour Party into a different assemblage – for
example, their local town – will produce different relationships, but still maintains the
relationships the supporter has with the Labour Party. Components are both autonomous and
multiple; capable of asserting their freedom, yet fundamentally a part of their assemblages. In
DeLanda’s use of Deleuze to construct the ‘social assemblage’37
, political society is an
assemblage of nested assemblages, a complex, interconnected system with the possibility of
emergent behaviour, self-organization and in particular, amplificatory interactions. Regardless
of the subject position of a given component in the social assemblage, their affects can stretch
31
Capra, The Web of Life, 34.
32
Giles Deleuze, Afterword to Bergsonism, 115.
33
Manuel DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (Wiltshire: Continuum Books,
2004), 7.
34
Giles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia
(Wiltshire: Continuum Books, 2009), 4.
35
Ibid., 7.
36
Manuel DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity
(London: Continuum Books, 2011), 10.
37
Ibid., 24.

8. well beyond their normal reach. The ultimate conclusion of emergent time is that we must
become affirmative actants who try to form novel, amplificatory interactions around our wills.
Affirmative actants and ‘the new nobility’
In an open world of emergent time, we can begin to reformulate the political ecosystem by
enlisting Connolly’s representation of Nietzsche, which seeks to explore the potential of a ‘new
nobility’ within democracy – one that draws on ideas of self-experimentation and artistry to
‘establish… relations of agonistic respect between carriers of… alternative faiths’38
.
Democratising Nietzsche’s ideas merely requires doing away with the idea that this nobility
should be for a select few; if, as democrats, we can engage the apparatuses of the state to
create a society of self-experimenting affirmative actants, we should.
The central ideas of Thus Spoke Zarathustra are that of eternal recurrence, the
Übermensch and the will to power. The aim of these ideas is the prevention of existential
nihilism, which is constantly anxious about the lack of meaning in the world. In “Of the Vision
and the Riddle”, Zarathustra meets a dwarf who embodies the spirit of gravity. As they come
to a gateway called ‘Moment’, he questions the dwarf as to whether the eternal paths that
meet at the gateway are a contradiction. The dwarf replies that ‘all that is straight lies… time
itself is a circle’39
. In the dwarf’s rendering, ‘the dissonant conjunction of the moment’ returns
eternally40
. Similar to Bergson’s point of action, every moment is the potential for a rift in time,
where the past and the present press together and emergent time forms. Nietzsche invites us
to question whether, if we had to live a given moment again and again eternally, we would
regret the path we have taken. This version of emergent time lends moral weight to novelty
and creativity – if we do not act constructively, we potentially doom ourselves to resentment.
Zarathustra is fundamentally about the Übermensch – what Nietzsche would render
the new nobility - and the rift in time (the eternal return of the moment) is what makes the
38
Connolly, Neuropolitics, 171.
39
Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra trans. (St Ives: Penguin Books, 2003), 178.
40
Connolly, Neuropolitics, 145.

9. Übermensch possible. As ‘lightning’ and ‘madness’41
, the Übermensch is true rupture, the
actual embodiment of emergent time. Connolly highlights the three essential roles of the new
nobility: ‘to overcome existential resentment’, ‘to cultivate grace of self’, and to ‘enter into
affirmative relations with other types of nobility’42
. Emergent time has taken care of the first
role. A cultivation of the self requires a micropolitical re-examination of all that we hold as
significant. Returning to Bergson, we must attempt to undo the cloaking of perception and
examine that which acts ‘below the threshold of consciousness’43
. Because emotions are
‘sticky’ they can ‘saturate… [objects] with affect’; this leaves impressions, and due to the
cloaking of perception the original source of emotion may be forgotten44
. To cultivate the self,
we must begin to trace these impressions to their roots, and attempt to rationally interrogate
them. Only by interrogating our most reactive drives can we actively engage in the agonistic,
affirmative relations that Nietzsche and Connolly desire and that the accelerated pace of
modern democracy requires.
To enter into affirmative relations is to admit that we live as a part of an ecosystem that
includes other actants. Nietzsche constructs these affirmative relations to be only between the
select few members of the new nobility, but admitting the accelerated pace of modern
democracy requires us to be more inclusive of who – or what – we include in the social
assemblage. Jane Bennett uses Deleuze’s assemblages to construct a new, vital materialism,
that includes within it all of the interrelating elements – organic and inorganic – that make up
our world. Because of the porous border between the cultural and the natural, it makes ‘no
political sense… to try to withdraw from nature’45
. Instead, we must embrace the porousness
of assemblages and employ a concept of ‘distributive agency’, where agency extrudes from
multiple sites in varying intensities46
. In her analysis of a power blackout that hit the United
41
Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 43.
42
Connolly, Neuropolitics, 164 – 5.
43
Ibid., 155.
44
Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (London: Routledge, 2012), 11.
45
Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: a political ecology of things (Durham: Duke University Press,
2010), 116.
46
Ibid., 28.

10. States in 2003, Bennett utilises Merleau-Ponty’s enactivist, embodied theory of
phenomenology to show the lack of fundamental difference between the organic and
inorganic. Too much weight cannot be placed on human intentionality because intentionality
arises from a dynamic relationship between the environment and the mind47
. We must engage
the full ‘swarm of vitalities’ in the social assemblage – which now becomes a micropolitical
ecoassemblage - in order to attain self-mastery.
The final essential element of Zarathustra is the will to power, articulated best in “Of
Self-Overcoming”, where Zarathustra seems to style the will to power as a development of the
‘will to existence’ expressed in Spinoza as the conatus or in Bergson as the élan vital.
Zarathustra claims such a will does not exist because it is tautological: how could ‘that which
is in existence… still want to come into existence’?48
The will to power replaces this, as the
desire of all things to manifest their will. Only with an emergent understanding of time is this
possible, as ‘he who cannot obey himself will be commanded’, and to obey one’s self, one
must be a part of the new nobility, who have accepted the necessity of emergence in self-
mastery. Nietzsche’s location of the will to power in all living creatures even accords with a
distributive idea of agency49
. Abandoning some of the violence that Nietzsche advocates, the
will to power can still be useful in democratic systems as a guideline for how to form agonistic,
affirmative relations. Earlier in Zarathustra, in “Of War and Warriors”, Nietzsche advocates
‘love’ and ‘seek[ing]’ of one’s enemy in order to wage ‘a war for your opinions’50
. If defeated,
it shows that self-mastery is not complete; if successful, one’s perspective has been
strengthened, enriched. This is the true value of agonism – to abandon the ressentiment of
the ‘slave’s revolt in morality’51
and let different perspectives exist in positive relationships with
47
Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 29-30.
48
Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 138.
49
Ibid., 137.
50
Ibid., 74.
51
Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, trans. Carol
Diethe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 21.

11. each other, strengthening the valid, defeating the faulty, but always respecting the ‘autonomy
and difference’ of different components in the micropolitical ecoassemblage52
.
Towards a radical democracy
Without the convergence between complexity theory and philosophy, it would have been
significantly harder to frame a radical democracy. Deleuze’s support of ‘a return to Bergson’53
must be thought of as an insistence that science, philosophy and politics remain open to each
other. Perhaps by combining Bergson’s intuitive method of ‘concentrated attention’54
and his
insistence on the posing of legitimate questions with the empirical experimental method, we
can maintain lines of flight between science, philosophy and politics. These ‘channels of
communication’55
are needed more than ever as the forces of neoliberal capitalism and
globalization seek to ‘drift to homogeneity’56
, religious fundamentalists seek to deny the reality
of a world of becoming, and anthropogenic climate change threatens the planet’s ecosystems.
To combat these, we must engage the forces of an agonistic pluralism. Having seen that a
linear idea of causality is far too reductive, we must embrace complexity theory and all of its
implications – emergent time, nested assemblages, distributive agency, and a cultivation of
the self in particular.
Connolly’s democratized interpretation of Nietzsche’s new nobility can be our roadmap
towards a constructive radical democracy. Existential resentment can be overcome by the
creation of novel, creative responses to our ecoassemblages. By continually exposing
ourselves to the new, we have a wealth of experience to draw on when faced with situations
we hope to change. Undertaking regular micropolitical self-examinations – especially of that
which operates below the threshold of consciousness – can guide us towards the formation
of affirmative relationships other swarms of vitalities. As we make more relationships, the
52
David R. Howarth, “Ethos, Agonism and Populism: William Connolly and the Case for Radical
Democracy”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10.2 (2008): 187.
53
Deleuze, Afterword to Bergsonism, 115.
54
Deleuze, Bergsonism, 12.
55
Prigogine and Stengers, Order Out of Chaos, 22.
56
Kauffman, At Home in the Universe, 301.

12. number of interactions between ourselves and our ecoassemblages exponentially increases,
so that when we want to make political change, these interactions have the potential of
amplification and order can spontaneously form from chaos. This immanent theory of power
must be responsive to its ecoassemblages, and a dialogue must be had with the natural world
(if such a thing can be said to exist) rather than the anthropocentric monologue of linear
causality. Strategic micropolitical action from multiple subject positions that interact with their
local and global environments in various intensities is our best hope at social, cultural and
political change. With the prevalence of non-hierarchical technologies such as the Internet,
the plane of consistency for such action has become considerably larger.

13. Bibliography
Ahmed, Sara. The Cultural Politics of Emotion. London: Routledge, 2012.
Bennett, Jane. Vibrant Matter: a political ecology of things. Durham: Duke University Press,
2010.
Berlin, Isaiah. Against the Current. Edited by H. Hardy. New York: The Viking Press, 1980.
Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution. Translated by Arthur Mitchell. New York: Random House,
1944.
—— Matter and Memory. Translated by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer. New York:
Dover, 2004.
Capra, Fritjof. “The Systems View of Life: A Unifying Conception of Mind, Matter and Life”,
Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 11.2 (2015): 242
– 249.
—— The Web of Life: A New Synthesis of Mind and Matter. London: Flamingo, 1997.
Connolly, William E. The Fragility of Things. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013.
—— Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2002.
DeLanda, Mauel. A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity.
London: Continuum Books, 2011.
—— Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy. Wiltshire: Continuum Books, 2004.
Deleuze, Giles. Bergsonism. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New
York: Zone Books, 1988.
—— and Guattari, Félix. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Wiltshire:
Continuum Books, 2009.
Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Pantheon
Books, 1978.
—— Power: The Essential Works of Foucault 1954 – 1984 Volume 3. Edited by James D.
Faubion. Traslated by Robert Hurley et al. St Ives: Penguin, 2000.
Gauch, Hugh G. Scientific Method in Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Howarth, David R. “Ethos, Agonism and Populism: William Connolly and the Case for Radical
Democracy”. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10.2 (2008):
171 – 193.

14. Kauffman, Staurt. At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and
Complexity. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Klein, Naomi. This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs the Climate. St Ives: Penguin Books,
2014.
Mullarkey, John, ed. The New Bergson. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006.
McMullin, Ernan., “The Impact of Newton's Principia on the Philosophy of Science”,Philosophy
of Science 68.3 (2001): 279-310.
Newton, Isaac. Opticks. New York: Dover, 1952.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morality. Edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson.
Translated by Carol Diethe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
——Thus Spoke Zarathustra translated by R. J. Hollingdale. St Ives: Penguin Books, 2003.
Prigogine, Ilya and Stengers, Isabelle. Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature.
Glasgow: Flamingo, 1985.
Tate, John William. “’We Cannot Give One Millimetre’? Liberalism, Enlightenment and
Diversity”, Political Studies 61 (2013): 816-833.