Gidley Futures Studies and Climate Change 2016

World Future Review
2016, Vol. 8(1) 24–38
© The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/1946756715627369
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Article
Introduction
Throughout the last half-century, a large num-
ber of futures scholars have produced signifi-
cant bodies of work.1
In spite of this substantial
body of work, misconceptions about the futures
studies field are common in academic, profes-
sional, and policy circles, and even more so in
the popular media. Misconceptions range from
the belief that futures studies is primarily about
“prediction” and “forecasting” to the idea that
futures studies can be nothing more than
“ungrounded speculation,” because the future is
inherently unknowable. Although some who
call themselves futurists may rely almost solely
on so-called predictive methods and populists
may engage in ill-considered speculative fan-
tasy, this is far from the whole picture. Between
these extremes, we find the serious academic
field of futures studies, proponents of which
recognize that there is a huge amount at stake in
learning how to approach futures concepts and
methods to create more equitable, durable, and
thus desirable futures. Although the accelera-
tion of change has prompted an increasing use
of the term “future” in academic and policy dis-
courses, the vast body of material produced by
futures researchers has been largely ignored in
academia and misrepresented by the media. As
a consequence, futures and foresight literature
has not had the visibility or appreciation that it
deserves.
What is generally unknown about futures
studies is that in addition to empirical trend anal-
ysis, technological forecasting, scenario plan-
ning, and the increasingly popular trendspotting,
there are several lesser-known approaches to
futures understanding, research, and cocreation.
This article explores the breadth of the futures
627369WFRXXX10.1177/1946756715627369World Future ReviewGidley
research-article2016
1
World Futures Studies Federation, Carlton, VIC,
Australia
Corresponding Author:
Jennifer M. Gidley, World Futures Studies Federation,
P.O. Box 1425, Carlton, 3053, Victoria, Australia.
Email: jennifer@jennifergidley.com
Understanding the Breadth
of Futures Studies through a
Dialogue with Climate Change
Jennifer M. Gidley1
Abstract
This article explores the breadth of the futures studies field by creating a dialogue with some
prominent approaches to climate change. The first half of the article takes an evolutionary
perspective on the development of the futures studies field. I show how developments in the
field parallel the broader epistemological shift from the centrality of positivism to a plurality
of postpositivist approaches particularly in the social sciences. Second, I explore the current
scientific research on climate change including issues related to mitigation, adaptation, and
coevolution. Finally, I apply my futures typology that includes five paradigmatic approaches to
undertake a dialogue between futures studies and climate change.
Keywords
anthropogenic climate change, megatrends of the mind, positivism, postpositivism, integral,
prospective, evolution of consciousness
by guest on March 30, 2016wfr.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Gidley 25
studies field by creating a dialogue with some
prominent approaches to climate change.
With respect to climate change, I acknowl-
edge that the notion of anthropogenic climate
change is not universally agreed and that
although the science is clear the politics is not. I
recognize that even those who agree with it do
not universally see it as a negative issue. Some
with an entrepreneurial spirit may see climate
change as providing opportunities: for example,
to settle on the poles, or even mine them; to
extend agriculture into previously barren
regions; and to live in closer relationship with
the sea or in floating cities. Notwithstanding
these examples of “climate optimism,” I wish to
be transparent about my own bias at the outset.
In this article, I take the critical view that the
planetary climate is changing in ways that
increase risk for large swathes of the global
population and that this is potentially irrevers-
ible. I accept the science that argues this change
is anthropogenic, that is, caused by our industri-
alized human lifestyle over the last century. I am
deeply concerned that the kind of changes that
appear likely will have potentially devastating
effects on global human society in the foresee-
able future in terms of melting polar glaciers,
leading to rising sea levels, in turn leading to
flooding of Pacific islands and inundation of
low-lying countries and a large number of large
coastal megacities, driving mass migration on a
scale not seen for ten thousand years. My moti-
vation for this article is to draw wider attention
to how futures studies perspectives may assist in
broadening the climate dialogue and the meth-
ods used to mitigate, prepare, and coadapt.
Understanding Futures
Studies: A Broadening of
Approaches
Futures studies is a transdisciplinary, transna-
tional, and multisectorial field that includes
thousands of academics and practitioners,
many of whom operate globally. There are
many possible ways to frame the recent history
of futures studies. My approach is to trace the
evolution of futures studies, as it parallels the
epistemological development across the wider
academic domain.
In the 1960s, when futures studies was emerg-
ing as an academic field, major changes were
taking place in the way that scientific research
per se was conceived and practiced. There were
disruptive developments in thinking and knowl-
edge systems that could be seen to mark a para-
digm shift from industrial worldviews associated
with positivism, modernism, specialization, and
formal reasoning, to postindustrial worldviews
associated with postpositivism, postmodernism,
integration, and postformal reasoning. These
developments are referred to elsewhere as “meg-
atrends of the mind”2
and “global mindset
change” within the context of the evolution of
consciousness.3
Epistemological pluralism was introduced
at the paradigmatic level last century through
the emergence of the historical philosophy of
science championed by Thomas Kuhn and
Paul Feyerabend. This marked the shift from
positivism/empiricism as the only way of
knowing leading to the emergence of “post-
positivism,” which seeded a plethora of
research methodologies arguably better suited
to social science research than the reductionist
forms of empiricism.
During the 1970s, German philosopher
Jürgen Habermas was a pioneer in highlighting
the significance of postpositivist methods. He
introduced the three notions of technical inter-
ests (through positivist methods for obtaining
instrumental knowledge), practical interests
(through interpretive/hermeneutic methods for
obtaining practical knowledge), and emanci-
patory interests (through critical methods for
obtaining emancipatory knowledge).4
In the 1980s, Norwegian peace researcher
and early president of the World Futures
Studies Federation (WFSF) Johan Galtung and
others involved in the futures studies field
began to apply these pluralistic, postpositivist
perspectives to perceptions of the future.5
Galtung was one of the earliest futurists to
write about different kinds of futures. I have
expanded on his original terms as follows:
•• Probable future—relates to trend
extrapolation, so-called prediction, and
often bringing up fears, despair, and
pessimism among young people;

26 World Future Review 8(1)
•• Possible futures—relates to imagina-
tion, interpretation, and utopian and
dystopian images—science fiction is a
good stimulus;
•• Preferred futures—relates to and
includes normative values so that cri-
tique of the status quo is often inherent
in this perspective.
Building on Galtung’s work, Swedish futur-
ist, Ake Bjerstedt identified a fourth orienta-
tion or goal in preparing for the future, which
he called “prospective” futures capacity relat-
ing to “preparedness to act.”6
•• Prospective futures—relating to readi-
ness to act, in spite of feared images of
the “probable” future and building on
the original French prospective.7
In the late 1990s, my master’s research on
youth futures drew together the influential criti-
cal philosophical work of Habermas and the
futures work of Galtung, Bjerstedt, and
Inayatullah to develop a four-level futures typol-
ogy making the following links:
•• Probable future with positivist/empirical
•• Possible futures with constructivist/
interpretive
•• Preferred futures with critical/normative
•• Prospective futures with empowerment/
participatory8
In subsequent years, I built on this typology,
integrating the approaches of Eleonora Masini,
Wendell Bell, and Richard Slaughter. The typol-
ogy below builds on earlier typologies—most of
which propose three or four different futures
paradigms.9
Several other futures researchers
have developed ways to describe the different
futures approaches and how they have emerged,
but it is beyond the scope of this article to explore
them all.10
In 2004, I proposed a five-paradigm
futures studies typology,11
which I have contin-
ued to refine. My current model begins with a
single bifurcation between positivist and post-
positivist, with the postpositivist approaches
diverging into a plurality of well-known and oft-
cited futures approaches12
(see Figure 1).
These approaches are not mutually exclu-
sive, nor are they a definitive statement about
all possible futures paradigms. They are all
suitable pathways to futures research depend-
ing on the context. Nor should this conceptual-
ization imply a linear developmental model.
Each approach represents different epistemo-
logical underpinnings, which parallel similar
developments in other fields (see Table 1). As
indicated below, each of these approaches has
strengths and limitations as does the futures
studies field as a whole.
Positivist Approaches to “the Future”
Positivism is a theory of knowledge following or
building on the work of the Vienna Circle of the
Figure 1. Paradigmatic bifurcation of futures studies approaches.13

Gidley 27
1920s and 1930s associated with such people as
Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath
. . . It prominently features the work of Karl R.
Popper, perhaps its most central figure in recent
decades, despite his denials that he was a
positivist. [Its central feature being] . . . the
belief that science involves the idea of the unity
of science, that there is, underlying the various
scientific disciplines, basically one science about
one real world.15
The predictive-empirical tradition origi-
nated in the United States. It arose initially
from U.S. Defense Intelligence but was sup-
ported as a methodology with broader pur-
poses by the formation of the World Future
Society in the late 1960s. This research refers
to a one and only future that empirical trends
suggest and is often referred to as the (singu-
lar) “probable future.” This approach still
dominates the literature base and, particularly,
the popular media view of futures studies. One
of the strengths of this approach is its per-
ceived objectivity and values neutrality. Its
weaknesses may include narrowness in focus
and lack of contextual awareness. It also
implies that trends are inevitable and this can
be disempowering if the trends are negative.
The predictive-empirical approach to forecast-
ing was developed by men such as Herman
Kahn, Ted Gordon, and other U.S. researchers
from Rand Corporation and Institute for the
Future.
Postpositivist Approaches to
“Multiple Futures”
By the end of the 1960s, many writers on
epistemology were saying that positivism was
no longer a plausible theory of knowledge . . .
Postpositivists believe that science does not
constitute a unity. They disagree that less
Table 1. A Typology of Five Evolving Futures Approaches.14
Futures studies
approaches Key terms
Underlying theories
and/or paradigms Goals
Associated research
methods
Positivist approach to “the future”
Predictive/
empirical
“Probable future” Positivism
Empiricism
Trend analysis
Prediction and
control
Quantitative,
forecasting
Surveys, trend
scenarios
Technology
assessment
Plurality of postpositivist approaches to “multiple futures”
Critical/
postmodern
“Preferred
futures”
Critical theory
Deconstruction
Normativity
Emancipation
Text analysis, media
critique, cultural
educational
artifacts
Cultural/
interpretive
“Possible or
alternative
futures”
Constructivism
Hermeneutics
Alternatives
“Other” futures
Imagination,
creativity
Qualitative, dialogue
Ethnographic
research
Prospective/
participatory
“Prospective or
participatory
futures”
Action research
Hope theories
Empowerment
Transformation
Collaborative
visioning, action
research and
planning, activism
Integrative/holistic “Integral or
planetary
futures”
Integral theories
Planetary theories
Global justice
Planetary era
Complex, integral
mixed methods,
eclectic
Transdisciplinary,
bricolage

profound sciences can be reduced to more
profound ones, that for example, sociology is
reducible to psychology, psychology to biology,
biology to chemistry, and chemistry to physics.
Rather, science is viewed as being composed of
many different “knowledges” each relative to a
particular topic and community of scientists.16
The critiques of positivism and empiricism
came from scientists and social scientists, such
as Thomas Kuhn, the critical theorists of the
Frankfurt School, and Jürgen Habermas, to
name a few. In the above quote, Wendell Bell
expands on his claim that perhaps the most cen-
tral postpositivist feature is knowledge plural-
ism. In the following brief notes, I explore the
impact of this knowledge pluralism on the evo-
lution of approaches within futures studies.
The critical-postmodern tradition originat-
ing primarily in Europe, grew out of a critical
social theory tradition and became part of the
movement of the 1960s to rebuild Europe in
the aftermath of the Second World War. Critical
futurists sought to balance what was some-
times perceived as the overly empiricist
approach of many futurists in the United
States. This led to the foundation of Mankind
2000 in the late 1960s, which resulted, among
other initiatives, in the founding of the WFSF
in the early 1970s. This approach is normative
and is often referred to in the plural as “pre-
ferred futures.” A strength of this approach is
that it makes explicit the—often tacit—con-
textual and values dimensions and thus leads
to a questioning of “business as usual.” A
weakness is its perceived subjectivity, which
can sometimes lead to excessive relativism.
The work of many founders and former presi-
dents of the WFSF reflects the critical theory
approach to futures studies, for example,
Bertrand de Jouvenel, Johan Galtung, Eleonora
Masini, Richard Slaughter, and Jim Dator.
The cultural-interpretive tradition arose in
large measure from the work of those futures
researchers who sought to include non-West-
ern cultures and to invoke a deeper consider-
ation of civilizational futures. This approach
opens up the possibilities of alternative, par-
ticularly non-Western,17
feminist,18
and youth
futures19
and is a crucial part of the dimension
that may be referred to as “possible, or alterna-
tive, futures.” Strengths of this approach
include its creativity and engagement with
multiple perspectives. A weakness is that pro-
posed alternatives may lack feasibility or be
overpowered by the dominant empiricist
approach. Some of the key people who devel-
oped and who work from the cultural-interpre-
tive approach are Sohail Inayatullah, Eleonora
Masini, Ashis Nandy, and Ziauddin Sardar,
among others.
The prospective-participatory approach
seeks to facilitate empowerment and transfor-
mation through engagement and participation.
It was initially developed by Austrian, French,
and, later, Swedish and Australian futurists.20
This could be referred to as “prospective” or
“participatory futures,” depending on context.
The most obvious strength of this approach is
that it engages participants in action research
projects, empowering them to question and act
on alternatives to “business as usual.” A weak-
ness is that if it does not also take account of
relevant empirical research, it may lack legiti-
macy in positivist scientific circles. Some of the
key futures researchers to use this empowering
and participatory approach, initially by way of
workshops, were Elise Boulding and Robert
Jungk. Others include Gaston Berger, Ake
Bjerstedt, Jennifer Gidley, Frank Hutchison,
and Jose Ramos.
The integrative-holistic approach is poten-
tially the broadest and deepest approach to
futures as it can integrate multiple aspects.21
Because it is grounded in complex, integrative,
and transversal epistemologies, it maximizes
potential for facilitating normative “planetary
futures.” Its strength is its breadth of scope,
which may enable the integration of different
methods in different contexts.22
However, too
much breadth may also be perceived as a
weakness reflecting lack of depth. There is
also an ideological trap, which can lead to con-
tested claims about integrality of approaches.
Some of the key people who developed and
work from the integral approach are Richard
Slaughter, Joseph Voros, and Jennifer Gidley.
But there were forerunners who took an inte-
grative approach, such as John and Magda
McHale.

Gidley 29
Understanding Climate
Change: Mitigation,
Adaptation, Coevolution
Human influence on the climate system is clear,
and recent anthropogenic emissions of green-
house gases are the highest in history. Recent
climate changes have had widespread impacts
on human and natural systems . . . Warming of
the climate system is unequivocal, and since the
1950s, many of the observed changes are
unprecedented over decades to millennia. The
atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the
amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and
sea level has risen.23
It is now widely accepted among scientific
and other research circles that the complex
issue of anthropogenic climate change endan-
gers our entire civilizational futures as it tracks
a path to radical, rapid, and potentially irre-
versible changes in the global ecosystem in the
relatively near-term future—within a century.
The most recent Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC)24
Fifth Assessment
Report (2014) quoted above is far less equivo-
cal than any previous reports to date. Professor
Spencer Weart, director of the Center for
History of Physics at the American Institute of
Physics, points to the moment in recent history
when the world’s scientists got the first inkling
of the possibility of what he terms “rapid [or
abrupt] climate change.”25
Weart states,
How abrupt was the discovery of abrupt climate
change? Many climate experts would put their
finger on one moment: the day they read the
1993 report of the analysis of Greenland ice
cores. Before that, almost nobody confidently
believed that the climate could change massively
within a decade or two; after the report, almost
nobody felt sure that it could not.26
It is worth noting that even prior to the release
of this crucial report, there was already sufficient
concern around the planet that at the Earth
Summit in Rio in 1992, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC)27
was agreed on and signed. In this
agreement, it was formally acknowledged by
thirty-six signatory countries that anthropogenic
climate change was already well underway. In an
extract from the agreement, it was stated,
The Parties to [the UNFCCC] Convention,
acknowledging that change in the Earth’s climate
and its adverse effects are a common concern of
humankind, concerned that human activities
have been substantially increasing the
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases,
that these increases enhance the natural
greenhouse effect, and that this will result on
average in an additional warming of the Earth’s
surface and atmosphere and may adversely
affect natural ecosystems and humankind . . .
have agreed that . . . “Climate change” means a
change of climate which is attributed directly or
indirectly to human activity that alters the
composition of the global atmosphere and which
is in addition to natural climate variability
observed over comparable time periods
(emphasis added).
In his opening speech at the international
meeting of the UNFCCC held in Poznow,
Poland28
in December 2008, IPCC Chair,
Rajendra K. Pachauri, deplored the lack of
adequate attention and action that has occurred
despite the 1992 agreement, noting that green-
house gas (GHG) emissions have increased by
a startling 70 percent between 1970 and 2004.
Referring to the Fourth Assessment Report of
the IPCC,29
he drew attention to the extreme
seriousness of the current situation, highlight-
ing several serious global impacts that would
be likely to result from continued inaction.
Perhaps some of the more significant are the
following:
•• The number of people living in severely
stressed river basins would go up from
1.4 to 1.6 billion in 1995 to 4.3 to 6.9
billion in 2050.
•• Roughly, 20–30 percent of species
assessed are likely to be at increasingly
high risk of extinction as global mean
temperatures exceed 2°–3° above prein-
dustrial levels. We are getting close to
that range.
•• Abrupt and irreversible changes are
possible, such as collapse of the
Greenland or West Antarctic ice sheets,

which can lead to sea level rise of sev-
eral meters. For Greenland, the temper-
ature threshold for breakdown is
estimated to be about 1.1°C –3.8°C
above today’s global average tempera-
ture. Again, we are close to that range
too.
•• By 2020, significant loss of biodiversity
is projected to occur in some ecologi-
cally rich sites including the Great
Barrier Reef in Australia.30
The situation is not improving as shown in the
recently released United Nations Global
Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction
(2015), that is reported as stating that floods,
storms, and other extreme weather events have
killed 606,000 people since 1995, “with an addi-
tional 4.1 billion people injured, left homeless or
in need of emergency assistance.” Similarly, the
head of the UN World Meteorological
Organization (WMO), Michel Jarraud, claimed
that “We are moving into uncharted territory at a
frightening speed,” when commenting on the
WMO’s annual report31
findings that “Earth-
warming greenhouse gases in the atmosphere . . .
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane and nitrous
oxide once again broke records last year [2014].”
However, as many of us know, in spite of the
weight of scientific evidence, the politics of cli-
mate change is not so clear. There are some in
political and business circles, not the least in the
United States and Australia, who deny that cli-
mate change is happening and many more who
accept the climate is changing but believe it is
part of the natural cycle as climate has always
been changing. In the domain of big oil and
coal, there are even more complex issues in
train. The recent publication of an email from
oil giant Exxon Mobil’s in-house climate expert,
Lenny Bernstein, revealed that Exxon both
knew about climate change and yet continued to
fund “climate change deniers” for more than
thirty years. It has also come to light that even
pressure from the original founders of Exxon,
the Rockefeller family, a decade ago, failed to
influence Exxon to reform its practices.
ExxonMobil, the world’s biggest oil company,
knew as early as 1981 of climate change—seven
years before it became a public issue, according
to a newly discovered email from one of the
firm’s own scientists. Despite this the firm spent
millions over the next 27 years to promote
climate denial.32
Mitigation and Adaptation
Adaptation and mitigation are complementary
strategies for reducing and managing the risks of
climate change. Substantial emissions reductions
over the next few decades can reduce climate
risks in the 21st century and beyond, increase
prospects for effective adaptation, reduce the
costs and challenges of mitigation in the longer
term and contribute to climate-resilient pathways
for sustainable development.33
There are two main strands of work being
undertaken in the broad area of climate futures:
climate mitigation, which is largely a global
issue, and climate adaptation, which is largely
a local issue. According to the IPCC, both mit-
igation and adaptation are necessary to avert
worsening global catastrophes. We will briefly
summarize some key components of mitiga-
tion, but of more interest to my research is
coevolutionary community adaptation through
social learning, which in turn does enable
some small-scale, bottom-up mitigation.
There are multiple mitigation pathways that are
likely to limit warming to below 2°C relative to
pre-industrial levels. These pathways would
require substantial emissions reductions over the
next few decades and near zero emissions of
CO2 and other long-lived greenhouse gases by
the end of the century. Implementing such
reductions poses substantial technological,
economic, social and institutional challenges,
which increase with delays in additional
mitigation and if key technologies are not
available.34
Climate change mitigation involves
research, design, and implementation of strate-
gies that will slow, and preferably reverse, the
current unsustainable climate trends, particu-
larly those associated with increased global
warming—catalyzed by hyperindustrializa-
tion. The seriousness with which mitigation
needs to be tackled on a global scale can be

Gidley 31
summed up in the following statement from
IPCC 2014. “Without additional mitigation
efforts beyond those in place today, and even
with adaptation, warming by the end of the
21st century will lead to high to very high risk
of severe, wide-spread and irreversible impacts
globally (high confidence).”35
It is generally
recognized by climate change experts that the
single most powerful strategy for mitigation is
the global reduction of GHG emissions, which
needs to be targeted across various sectors—
such as energy, transport, building, industry,
agriculture, forestry, and waste. Although
much of the effort to reduce GHG emissions
tends to focus on emissions from industry and
households, a recent UN Human Development
Report noted how changing land-use patterns
in the developing world “drives carbon flows
into the atmosphere.” The 2007–2008 UN
Development Programme (UNDP) Report
included a paper that focused on “tropical
deforestation as a major source of rising car-
bon emissions and wider human development
problems in the Brazilian Amazon—the larg-
est area of tropical forests in the world.”36
The 2007 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report
has itemized numerous key sectorial mitiga-
tion technologies, policies and measures, con-
straints, and opportunities.37
It also notes that
the five “reasons for concern” have strength-
ened as they were identified in its previous
Assessment Report, thus strengthening the
need for mitigation—and adaptation—efforts
to be stepped up. The five “reasons for con-
cern” can be summarized as follows:
•• Risks to unique and threatened sys-
tems, such as polar and high mountain
communities and coral reefs.
“Increasing vulnerability of indigenous
communities in the Arctic and small
island communities to warming is pro-
jected . . .”
•• Risks of extreme weather events—
There is now higher confidence in the
projected increases in droughts, heat-
waves, and floods as well as their
adverse impacts.
•• Distribution of impacts and vulnera-
bilities—There are sharp differences
across regions and those in the weakest
economic position are often the most
vulnerable to climate change.
•• Aggregate impacts—The net costs of
impacts of increased warming are pro-
jected to increase over time.
•• Risks of large-scale singularities—
There is better understanding that the
risk of additional contributions to sea
level rise from both the Greenland and
possibly Antarctic ice sheets may be
larger than projected by ice sheet mod-
els and could occur on century time
scales.38
In contrast to mitigation, which must be
tackled on a cooperative global scale, because
of the global nature of anthropogenic climate
change, adaptation relates more to the local
effects of this global challenge. Feminist cli-
mate change activists Minu Hemmati and
Ulrike Röhr highlight the importance of engag-
ing women’s perspectives in the climate pro-
tection discourse, given the key role of women
in many of the sectors affected by climate
change:
Adaptation, which must be context-specific and
participatory, requires that all members of the
affected communities be part of a climate change
planning and governance process. If women are
not fully involved in planning and decision-
making . . . the quality of adaptive measures will
be limited and successful implementation will be
doubtful.39
In relation to the importance of adaptation
it is argued by the IPCC that
Adaptation can reduce the risks of climate
change impacts, but there are limits to its
effectiveness, especially with greater magnitudes
and rates of climate change. Taking a longer-
term perspective, in the context of sustainable
development, increases the likelihood that more
immediate adaptation actions will also enhance
future options and preparedness.40
Even if the best possible scenarios for
reduction and stabilization of GHGs, as rec-
ommended by the UNFCCC, were achieved,

projected climate change events would still
require significant adaptation. We can take
renewed hope as a result of the multinational
accord achieved at the Paris COP21, December
2015. The main purpose of encouraging adap-
tive responses in those regions or communi-
ties, which are most likely to be affected by the
projected climate changes, is to reduce their
vulnerability to major unplanned distress. The
kind of foresight and preparation that is valu-
able in these circumstances is referred to as
“adaptive capacity [which] is intimately con-
nected to social and economic development
but is unevenly distributed across and within
societies.”41
Adaptive capacity is a complex
and dynamic phenomenon, and although it is
generally assisted by the strength of a society’s
“productive base . . . capital assets” and so on,
even societies with “high adaptive capacity
remain vulnerable to climate change, variabil-
ity and extremes.”42
An interesting case in
point is the indigenous tribe in Indonesia that
escaped the major tsunami of 2006 because of
its deeply intuitive understanding and reading
of natural forces in contrast to the devastation
that occurred in New Orleans in spite of the
apparently superior adaptive capacity of the
United States. Such extreme climate events
have been increasing and are highly likely to
continue to increase unless there is much more
attention paid to both mitigation and adapta-
tion, globally and locally.
From Passive Adaptation to Active
Coevolution
As indicated by Ray Ison et al.,43
there are two
possible interpretations that can be made from
the etymology of the term “to adapt.”44
These
are “to fit” or to “make suitable.” The first
interpretation, which is also the most com-
monly used one, is to see adaptation as a pas-
sive “fitting into” predetermined conditions.
For example, if climate change projections
suggest that “x” is highly likely to happen,
then the communities affected by “x” will need
to adapt or “fit into” this outcome. As Ison et
al. suggest, this approach is deterministic, thus
allowing for little human agency on the part of
the community concerned. It is based on a for-
mal, positivist scientific worldview, classical
mechanistic metaphors, and simple linear
causal relationships.
If the second interpretation of “to adapt” is
taken, to “make suitable,” then a more active
two-way interaction becomes possible. This
allows for an alternative postformal, postposi-
tivist scientific worldview to come into play. In
the latter, arising from the new biological sci-
ences of chaos and complexity, organic meta-
phors enable causation to be viewed as complex,
nonlinear (including feedback loops), emergent
and self-regulating.45
An interesting metaphoric
example has been used by the environmental
scientists Kai Lee and Philip Shabecoff to
express the shift from formal to postformal
thinking: the shift from the compass to the gyro-
scope.46
From the perspective of this postformal
worldview, passive adaptation—or fitting
into—is transformed to active coevolution—or
cocreation. As Collins and Ison indicate in the
editorial introduction to a special issue of the
journal Environmental Policy and Governance
(2009) on climate change, the notion of coevo-
lution moves beyond the idea of a “separate
environment” in favor of “processes of mutual
interaction which in human social systems can
be seen as processes of learning and develop-
ment.”47
In this approach, adaptive capacity
becomes intimately linked to the concept of
social learning.48
This active cocreating adap-
tive capacity is aligned to concepts such as the
“double-loop learning” of Chris Argyris and
Donald Schön49
and the “learning organiza-
tions” and “learning societies” of Peter Senge
and Otto Scharmer.50
Futures Studies and Climate
Change: A Dialogue of
Approaches
Given the potential urgency of coming to terms
with climate crisis and its planetary signifi-
cance, one might expect the academic disci-
pline of futures studies to have something to
contribute. In the light of the typology of
futures approaches discussed above (see Table
1), it may be useful to consider which—if

Gidley 33
any—of these approaches are being utilized by
climate change researchers investigating
dimensions of climate futures. A scan of the
literature followed by a request to members of
the WFSF via their electronic discussion board
supported my proposition that despite the
pressing nature of the climate challenge, only a
limited range of futures approaches are cur-
rently being utilized by climate researchers.
Two of the most common futures studies meth-
ods that are being used in relation to climate
change are trend analysis/modeling and “top-
down” scenario mapping based on the trends/
models projected. These methods are heavily
weighted toward the empirical/predictive
approach and to a lesser degree toward the
critical approach. This suggests that although
the futures studies field has developed and
diversified its theories and methods consider-
ably over the past four decades, and has devel-
oped a substantial knowledge base,51
very little
of this knowledge base has so far been taken
up in the climate change discourse.
As limited direct knowledge transfer has
occurred between futures and climate change
approaches, I explore whether any parallels
can be found between the above futures typol-
ogy and current approaches to climate change.
Such a dialogue provides conceptual bridges
from which knowledge transfer could take
place between those approaches that are ideo-
logically aligned (see Table 2).
Clearly, the predictive/empirical approach
to climate change using trend analysis and
modeling are aligned to the predictive/empiri-
cal approach to futures studies. Empirical data
are usually the basis of the type of “top-down
scenarios” that are often used to evoke change
but which, in effect, may elicit little engage-
ment or motivation from local communities.
There may be some value in collaboration
between climate scientists and empirically ori-
ented futures researchers. Such collaboration
would center within the notion of the “proba-
ble future,” as indicated by trend analysis and
modeling. It implies passive adaptation.
The critical futures tradition questions the
empiricist notion of “trend as destiny” and
unpacks the narrowly constructed and singular
“probable future,” opening up such questions
as “whose future is being predicted?” “whose
science is being used to measure the trends?”
Table 2. Futures and Climate Change: A Dialogue of Approaches.
Futures studies Climate change
Approaches Key terms Approaches Key terms
Positivist approach: the future of climate change
Predictive/empirical “Probable future” Climate trends
“Top-down scenarios”
Trend is destiny
Mitigation
Passive adaptation
Postpositivist approaches: multiple futures of climate change
Critical/postmodern “Preferred futures” UNFCCC protocols
Emissions targets
2% warmer
Stabilization
Cultural/interpretive “Possible or alternative
futures”
Women, Youth,
Indigenous voices
Climate alliances
Futures for the climate
Vulnerable
Prospective/participatory “Prospective or
participatory futures”
Climate activism
“Bottom-up” scenarios
Active coevolution
Social learning
Cocreation
Integrative/holistic “Planetary or integral
futures”
UN protocols
Global collaboration
All of the above
Global climate
Justice
Note. UNFCCC = UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

and “who decides what is preferred?” This
normative approach to envisaging preferred
futures appears to have its parallels in UN cli-
mate protection initiatives such as the
UNFCCC agreement (1992), the Kyoto Protocol
(1995), and the annual COPs, all of which pro-
vide means both for critiquing existing climate
insensitive activities associated with hyperde-
velopment and collaboratively designing tar-
gets for reduction of GHG emission to enable
“preferred climate futures” for the global
population.
If the climate change discourse took a lead
from the cultural/interpretive futures tradition,
it would go beyond a mere critique of the
empiricist approach and question the very
basis of the categories of knowledge on which
the Western worldview rests. Such an approach
would critique the Western development model
at its heart in line with the postcolonial and
postindustrial perspectives, arguing that the
rampant hyperdevelopment catalyzed by neo-
liberal globalization is not the only way for all
societies to “develop.” The cultural/interpre-
tive futures literature could evoke alternative
“possible climate futures” through questions
such as “what might climate futures look like if
more voices were heard from the ‘cultural
Other’ such as indigenous elders, women,
youth, future generations, or nonhuman sen-
tient beings?” Although not yet common, a
good example of climate protection aligned to
“possible or alternative futures” is the Climate
Alliance of European Cities with the
Indigenous Rainforest Peoples52
and the
Australian Youth Climate Coalition.53
Theprospective/participatoryfuturesapproach
in this typology involves both informed forward
thinking and active participation/engagement to
enable its empowering and transformative poten-
tial. Although climate change activism is clearly
both participatory and action-oriented, it needs to
be also well informed about the complexity of
climate issues to claim wider legitimacy. An
emergent climate change methodology, which is
utilizing the prospective/participatory futures
approach, involves community-based scenario
building.54
Such an approach could be more
widely used in climate-vulnerable communities
worldwide to increase the empowerment of
threatened communities and to enable the kind of
social learning that would assist with active coad-
aptation. It may even facilitate increased motiva-
tion toward those small household actions that
could mitigate climate change if they reached a
critical mass—enabling “participatory futures.”
What then might the integrative/holistic
futures approach have to offer in the climate
futures arena? Anthropogenic climate change is
a planetary issue of metaproportions and meta-
complexity. It will require global/planetary,
national, regional, and local collaboration. It
will also require holistic/integral/transversal
epistemologies and strategies if we as a species
are to turn around the current trends and also
find creative ways to coadapt to what is inevi-
table. It appears that many nations continue to
behave nationalistically—putting their concerns
for their economic competitiveness ahead of
their commitment to meeting the global targets
recommended by the IPCC. In this light,
increasing the visibility of the UNFCCC and
environmentally oriented international nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) is vital if the
health and well-being of the planet is to be val-
ued, ahead of nationalistic interests. At this
point in time, notions such as “integral futures”
and “planetary futures” are not yet sufficiently
embedded in either the futures field or the cli-
mate change field. However, the emergent inte-
gral futures approach clearly has something to
offer to climate futures, particularly by integrat-
ing multiple approaches.
Concluding Reflections
Because of the complexity of global climate cri-
sis, the available pertinent knowledge needs to be
brought together to bring maximum weight to the
challenges we face. The diversity of approaches
that have emerged within the futures studies field
over the last fifty years need to be better under-
stood by climate researchers. Also futurists need
to bring their knowledge base to bear on this
intractable challenge. This article is an attempt to
begin a dialogue in those directions. This article

Gidley 35
merely begins a conversation, and it is to be
hoped that others will respond with more detailed
engagement.
Acknowledgment
I want to acknowledge that some parts of this article
were drawn from conceptual research undertaken and
published in collaboration with Professor John Fien.55
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of
interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the
research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
Notes
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Author Biography
Jennifer M. Gidley, PhD, has been president of the
World Futures Studies Federation since 2009. Her
futures research builds on a long career as a regis-
tered psychologist (1979–) and innovative educator.
Jennifer has held academic positions within three
Australian universities (1995–2012) and now con-
sults in Europe and the Middle East. She serves on
several academic editorial boards, and has pub-
lished dozens of academic articles and two edited
books: The University in Transformation and Youth
Futures. Her published books include Postformal
Education: A Philosophy for Complex Futures,
Springer (2016) and The Future: A Very Short
Introduction, Oxford University Press (2016).

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