Estereotipos

1. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
1994, Vol. 66, No. 1, 37-47
Copyright 1994 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
Stereotypes as Energy-Saving Devices:
A Peek Inside the Cognitive Toolbox
C. Neil Macrae, Alan B. Milne, and Galen V. Bodenhausen
By use of a dual-task paradigm, 3 studies investigated the contention that stereotypes function as
resource-preserving devices in mental life. In Study 1, Ss formed impressions of targets while simul-
taneously monitoring a prose passage. The results demonstrated a significant enhancement in Ss'
prose-monitoring performance when stereotype labels were present on the impression-formation
task. To investigate the intentionality of this effect, in Study 2, the procedures used in Study 1 were
repeated using a subliminal priming procedure to activate stereotypes. Subliminal activation of
stereotypes produced the same resource-preserving effects as supraliminal activation did. This effect,
moreover, was replicated in Study 3 when a probe reaction task was used to measure resource pres-
ervation. These findings, which generalized across a range of social stereotypes, are discussed in
terms oftheir implications for contemporary models of stereotyping and social inference.
Human adaptation to the challenging and complex environ-
ment has often taken the form of developing tools that facilitate
the execution of mundane but necessary tasks, leaving more
time and energy available for other, perhaps more interesting or
rewarding activities. It is reasonable to suppose, as some con-
temporary psychologists have, that the development of physical
tools, such as plows or printing presses, has been paralleled by
the development of cognitive "tools," or routine strategies of
inference and evaluation (cf. Tooby & Cosmides, 1990) that per-
mit a sufficiently effective analysis of the social environment to
be accomplished in an efficient fashion. The benefit of such
mental tools presumably lies in the fact that they free up limited
cognitive resources for the performance of other necessary or
desirable mental activities.
Social psychologists have frequently characterized stereo-
types as energy-saving devices that serve the important cognitive
function of simplifying information processing and response
generation (e.g., Allport, 1954; Andersen, Klatzky, & Murray,
1990; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Brewer, 1988; Fiske
& Neuberg, 1990; Tajfel, 1969). Building on this tradition, Gil-
bert and Hixon (1991) aptly characterized stereotypes as "tools
thatjump out" ofa metaphorical cognitive toolbox "when there
is a job to be done" (p. 510). Anyone who has ever succumbed
to the temptation to evaluate others in terms of their social
group membership would doubtlessly recognize the power of
this contention. Individuation, in its many guises, is a rather
C. Neil Macrae and Alan B. Milne, 37 School of Psychology, Univer-
sity of Wales College of Cardiff, Cardiff, Wales; Galen V. Bodenhausen,
Department of Psychology, Michigan State University.
We thank John Bargh, Dan Gilbert, Chick Judd, Herbert Bless,
Chuck Stangor, and an anonymous reviewer for their insightful com-
ments on earlier versions of this article. Thanks are also extended to
Riana Griffiths for collecting the data in Studies 2 and 3.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to C.
Neil Macrae, School of Psychology, University of Wales College of
Cardiff, Cardiff, CF1 3YG, United Kingdom. Electronic mail may be
addressed to macrae@taff.cardiff.ac.uk.
time consuming and effortful affair (Brewer, 1988; Fiske &
Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986). Stereotyping, in con-
trast, relies only on the execution of some rather rudimentary
skills: most notably, the ability to assign people to meaningful
social categories (see Hamilton, 1979; Hamilton & Sherman, in
press; Hamilton, Sherman, & Ruvolo, 1990; Hamilton & Tro-
lier, 1986). Once achieved, this categorization provides perceiv-
ers with a veritable wealth of stereotypic information.
The metaphorical view of humans as cognitive misers has at-
tained a zenith of popularity among contemporary social cog-
nition researchers (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Higgins & Bargh,
1987; Sherman, Judd, & Park, 1989), but the notion of stereo-
types as simplifying mental devices has its origins in much ear-
lier times. Lippman (1922), for example, argued that reality is
too complex for any person to represent accurately. Stereotypes,
accordingly, serve to simplify perception, judgment, and action.
As energy-saving devices, they spare perceivers the ordeal of re-
sponding to an almost incomprehensibly complex social world.
Seventy years later, these sentiments are characteristic features
of cognitive writings on the topic. As Fiske and Neuberg (1990,
p. 14) remarked, "we are exposed to so much information that
we must in some manner simplify our social environment. . .
for reasons of cognitive economy, we categorize others as mem-
bers of particular groups—groups about which we often have a
great deal ofgeneralized, or stereotypic, knowledge."
Stereotypes and Resource Preservation
The view of the social perceiver evident in the writings of
Lippman as well as the contemporary social cognition research-
ers is that ofan information processorconfronted by limitations
that necessitate compromises and shortcuts. The evidence to
support this basic contention comes primarily from research
demonstrating an increased reliance on stereotypes when social
perception occurs under taxing or resource-depleting condi-
tions. The idea that people will fall back on their stereotypic
preconceptions whenever they lack the ability or motivation to
think more deeply about members of stereotyped groups has
37
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2. 38 N. MACRAE, A. MILNE, AND G. BODENHAUSEN
been emphasized in a number of studies (e.g., Bodenhausen,
1990, 1993; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen,
Sheppard, & Kramer, in press; Kim & Baron, 1988; Kruglanski
& Freund, 1983; Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993; Pratto
& Bargh, 1991; Rothbart, Fulero, Jensen, Howard, & Birrell,
1978; Stangor & Duan, 1991). The message emerging from this
research is a fairly consistent one: When the processing envi-
ronment reaches a sufficient level of difficulty, and perceivers'
resources are correspondingly depleted, stereotypes are likely to
be activated and applied in judgmental tasks (but see Gilbert &
Hixon, 1991).
Although compelling and providing impressive evidence for
the heuristic utility of stereotype application, these studies tell
only part of the story. In particular, through their emphasis on,
and assessment of, perceivers' judgmental and memorial out-
comes in demanding task environments, they potentially ob-
scure some ofthe more covert benefits the information-process-
ing system may accrue as a consequence of stereotype applica-
tion. The basic assertion driving research in this domain is, after
all, that stereotypes function as energy-saving or resource-pre-
serving mental devices (Allport, 1954; Lippman, 1922; Tajfel,
1969). As such, one might reasonably expect to find a range of
studies directly demonstrating this effect. For instance, infor-
mation processing should be easier, and cognitive resources pre-
served, when stereotypes are present, rather than absent, in
judgmental tasks.
On closer inspection, however, this effect remains a largely
untested theoretical premise in much of the work in this do-
main. It seems clear that people do use stereotypes to a greater
extent when they are operating under taxing conditions, but it is
difficult to draw any definitive conclusions from existing re-
search about why this might be so. It may be that people are
often simply lazy and are unwilling to think very deeply about
the world around them, especially when there is any cognitive
challenge in effect in the concurrent environment. On this view,
the cognitive miser is essentially a lazy slob who is prone to ste-
reotype whenever the going gets tough, cognitively speaking.
The more charitable view that we have been outlining charac-
terizes the cognitive miser instead as someone who stereotypes
not as a way of simply avoiding cognitive work, but rather as a
means to free up resources for use in other tasks. Which char-
acterization is most accurate? It is hard to say on the basis of the
available evidence. Clearly, existing studies fail to provide direct
evidence of the possible information-processing advantages re-
sulting from stereotype application. In an attempt to provide
insight into this issue, in the reported research we investigate
the widely held belief that stereotypes operate as resource-pre-
serving devices in mental life (Allport, 1954; Lippman, 1922).
Assuming that stereotype application does in fact promote
resource preservation, the puzzle remains as to exactly how this
benefit arises. A potential answer, however, can be found in the
schematic principles that seemingly govern the encoding and
representation of stereotype-based information in memory
(Cantor & Mischel, 1977; Hastie, 1981; Stangor & McMillan,
1992; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Schema theories typically assert
that expectancy-congruent information should be preferen-
tially encoded into memory because it is easier to assimilate or
integrate within existing knowledge structures than ex-
pectancy-incongruent information (Neisser, 1976; Taylor &
Crocker, 1981). Empirical support for this contention comes
primarily from research demonstrating that stereotypes, as
guiding themes or organizing structures, favor the encoding and
representation of congruent rather than incongruent informa-
tion in long-term memory (Bodenhausen, 1988; Bodenhausen
& Wyer, 1985). This congruency bias, moreover, is exacerbated
when perceivers encounter the stereotype-relevant information
in cognitively demanding settings (Bodenhausen & Lich-
tenstein, 1987; Hastie, 1980; Macrae et al., 1993; Srull & Wyer,
1989; Stangor & Duan, 1991). Taken together, these findings
suggest that stereotypes simplify processing (hence, they pro-
mote resource preservation) through the provision of a mental
framework on which perceivers can readily deposit or organize
information. In the absence of such a framework, the encoding
and representation of information in memory involves a more
effortful, resource-dependent process (Srull & Wyer, 1989).
With only finite cognitive resources available, perceivers (or
their inferential systems) need to derive economical strategies
for the allocation of these resources to the tasks encountered in
everyday interaction (see Gilbert, 1989). This executive func-
tion, in addition, probably plays a prominent part in the reso-
lution of life's daily puzzles. Allocate too many resources to a
single task and one will likely be able to perform little else. Ex-
pend too few, and one's chances of task success will rapidly di-
minish. In this vein, stereotype application is, arguably, one tac-
tic an inferential system can successfully use to expedite the
allocation of resources to competing tasks or activities and the
intricacies of mental life.
To assess the relative distribution of resources between com-
peting mental activities, researchers have traditionally relied on
measures derived from dual-task experimental paradigms (see
Kahneman, 1973; Navon & Gopher, 1979; Wickens, 1980). In
these studies, subjects are typically required to perform two
concurrent tasks under different performance instructions. For
example, they may be asked to track the movement of an object
on a computer screen, while simultaneously responding to in-
formation presented in the auditory domain (Wickens, 1976).
Through systematic patterns of interference in performance,
researchers are able to estimate both the difficulty and the re-
source dependence of the competing tasks. According to their
specific characteristics (e.g., difficulty), tasks impose differential
demands on perceivers' processing resources. For their success-
ful execution and completion, some tasks demand more re-
sources than others. By introducing a secondary task, research-
ers are able to estimate the residual resources or capacity not
used in the primary task (e.g., Ogden, Levine, & Eisner, 1979;
Rolfe, 1973). In other words, the secondary task mops up per-
ceivers' spare capacity or free cognitive resources. So, when con-
current tasks are deemed to interfere with each other (i.e., they
call on common cognitive resources), secondary-task performa-
nce is routinely used as an index of processing capacity not ex-
pended in the execution of the primary task (Wickens, 1984).
Dual-task techniques have already been used with some suc-
cess in the investigation of the resource-preserving properties of
schema application. Bargh (1982), for example, demonstrated
subjects' enhanced performance on a secondary task (i.e., probe
reaction task) when self-relevant, rather than neutral, informa-
tion was shadowed on a primary, dichotic listening task. The
automaticity involved in the processing of self-relevant infor-
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3. STEREOTYPES AS ENERGY-SAVING DEVICES 39
mation freed subjects' attentional resources, thereby enhancing
their secondary-task performance. In the present research, we
expected stereotype application to produce similar effects. If,
as suggested, stereotypes simplify processing and save valuable
cognitive resources, then this should be reflected in perceivers'
performance on a concurrent mental task. That is, the presence,
rather than absence, of stereotypical information on a primary
task should result in a simplification of this task. This simplifi-
cation should save processing resources, which in turn, should
enhance perceivers' secondary-task performance. In this article,
we report the results of a series of studies investigating the gen-
eral question of whether using stereotypes really does produce
any efficiency-related gains on other cognitive tasks.
Table 1
Stereotype Labels and Personality Traitsfor Impression-
Formation Task
Study 1
Method
Overview. Subjects performed two tasks concurrently. While forming
impressions of targets using the computer-based presentation of trait
descriptors (i.e., Task 1), subjects simultaneously monitored informa-
tion from a tape-recorded source (i.e., Task 2). To manipulate the
difficulty of the impression-formation task, stereotype-based informa-
tion, describing each of the targets, was either present or absent. It was
anticipated that, when present, this information would simplify the im-
pression-formation task, thereby saving processing resources and en-
hancing performance on the prose-monitoring task. A cued recall task
and a multiple-choice questionnaire were utilized respectively to mea-
sure performance on the two tasks.
Subjects and design. Twenty-four female undergraduate students at
the University of Wales College ofCardiff were paid £2 for their partici-
pation in the experiment. The study had a single-factor (stereotype:
present or absent) between-subjects design.
Procedure andstimulus materials. Subjects arrived at the laboratory
individually, were randomly assigned to one of the experimental condi-
tions, and were seated facing the screen of an Apple Macintosh micro-
computer (Mac Ilvi). The experimenter then explained that the study
involved an investigation of people's ability to perform tasks simulta-
neously. In particular, in the course of the study, subjects would be re-
quired to form impressions ofa number oftargets while simultaneously
monitoring information from an auditory source elsewhere in the labo-
ratory. The impression-formation task (i.e., Task 1) was undertaken on
the computer. Subjects observed on the computerscreen a target's name
(e.g., John) and a number of descriptive personality traits (e.g., aggres-
sive). The target's name appeared above, and the trait descriptors below,
the fixation point in the center of the screen. Each trait appeared, in
turn, beneath the target's name until all the relevant information had
been presented (i.e., only one trait was on the screen at any given time).
When all the traits for a particular target had been presented, the screen
cleared, a new name appeared, and the process was repeated. In addi-
tion to the target's name, half ofthe subjects were also given a stereotype
label (e.g., John—skinhead). This was located in the center ofthe screen
on thefixationpoint (i.e., between the name and the trait). It was antic-
ipated that, for these subjects, this information would simplify the im-
pression-formation task by providing them with a theme to guide or
organize their impressions of each target (Bodenhausen, 1988; Hamil-
ton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980). This stereotypical information, together
with the target's name, remained on the screen until all the traits had
been presented. In total, subjects were given 10 traits for each of four
targets (see Table 1). In the stereotype-present condition, 5 of the traits
describing each target had previously been established to be stereotype-
consistent with respect to the label provided. It was expected that these
traits would be the focus of stimulus simplification in this condition.
Nigel:
doctor
Caring
Honest
Reliable
Upstanding
Responsible
Unlucky
Forgetful
Passive
Clumsy
Enthusiastic
Julian:
artist
Creative
Temperamental
Unconventional
Sensitive
Individualistic
Fearless
Active
Cordial
Progressive
Generous
John:
skinhead
Rebellious
Aggressive
Dishonest
Untrustworthy
Dangerous
Lucky
Observant
Modest
Optimistic
Curious
Graham:
estate agent
Pushy
Talkative
Arrogant
Confident
Unscrupulous
Musical
Pessimistic
Humorless
Alert
Spirited
Note. Stereotypic words are italicized.
The other 5 traits attributed to each target were neutral with respect to
the category label provided. All the stimulus materials were selected
from an earlier pilot study in which subjects were required to rate the
extent to which a large number of traits were characteristic of a range
of social categories. Presentation of the targets and the order of traits
attributed to each target were randomized for each subject by the com-
puter.
While forming impressions of the targets, subjects were simulta-
neously required to monitor information played on a tape recorder (i.e.,
Task 2). Before performing the tasks, subjects were informed that, on
their completion, they would be probed about the impressions they had
formed and the information they had heard. Thus, each task was given
equal priority in the experimental instructions. To eradicate the effects
of prior knowledge on the prose-monitoring task, a passage describing
the basic geography and economy of Indonesia was constructed. Earlier
pilot testing had established that undergraduate students have little
knowledge of this topic. The passage lasted for 2 min and contained a
number of facts woven into a meaningful narrative. To synchronize
both tasks, the stimulus presentation rate on the impression-formation
task was manipulated to occupy 2 min. This resulted in each personality
trait remaining on the computer screen for approximately 3 s. For each
subject, then, both experimental tasks ran contemporaneously.
Dependent measures. Performance on the impression-formation task
was assessed by measuring subjects' memory for the presented trait in-
formation. A cued recall task was used whereby subjects were given a
sheet of paper with each target's name written at the top of the sheet.
Their task was simply to recall as many of the traits as possible and
correctly attribute them to the appropriate target. To measure prose-
monitoring performance, a multiple-choice questionnaire was con-
structed. This consisted of 20 questions, with four optional responses
per question, to tap subjects' knowledge of the passage (e.g., "What is
the country's official religion?" "Jakarta is found on which coast of
Java?"). After they completed the dependent measures, subjects were
debriefed, paid, and dismissed.
Results and Discussion
Cued recall. It was expected that having an applicable stereo-
typic label available would facilitate learning of the personality
descriptor information, as reflected in cued recall performance.
Mean cued recall of both the stereotype-consistent and the neu-
tral trait descriptors are shown in Table 2, as a function of
whether a stereotypic label was provided. In line with our pre-
dictions, subjects for whom a stereotypic label had been made
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4. 40 N. MACRAE, A. MILNE, AND G. BODENHAUSEN
Table 2
Subjects'Mean Task Performance:
Task
Trait recall
Consistent
Neutral
Multiple-choice questionnaire
Study 1
Stereotype
Present
4.42
1.83
8.75
Absent
2.08
1.33
6.66
an impression, or do they spring from the toolbox of their own
accord, streamlining social information processing without
conscious consent? The present results fail to distinguish be-
tween these two possibilities. In Study 2, accordingly, we set out
to address this issue. The question motivating our inquiry was
as follows: Are processing resources liberated in a task context
in which perceivers have no knowledge or awareness of stereo-
type activation? If indeed they are, this would confirm the intu-
ition that stereotypes economize cognition without perceivers'
awareness or conscious consent.
available were in fact able to recall more than twice as many
personality descriptors than those for whom no label had been
provided. The number of stereotype-consistent and neutral
traits recalled and attributed to the correct target were submit-
ted to a 2 (stereotype: present or absent) X 2 (trait type: consis-
tent or neutral) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with repeated measures on the second factor. This revealed
main effects of both stereotype, F(l, 22) = 5.85, p < .03, and
trait type, F( 1, 22) = 17.64, p < .004, on subjects' memory for
the presented information. These effects were qualified, how-
ever, by a Stereotype X Trait Type interaction, F(l, 22) = 5.33,
p < .03. Simple effects analysis revealed an effect of stereotype
activation for the consistent, F(l, 39) = 10.87, p < .002, but not
the neutral traits recalled, F(l,39)<l,ns (see Table 2).
Multiple choice. If stereotypes represent a useful means for
economizing cognition, then those subjects for whom a stereo-
type had been activated should have more resources available
for the prose-monitoring task. It was therefore hypothesized
that subjects who had been given a stereotypic label would show
superior learning of the material in the prose passage, as dem-
onstrated in a multiple choice test on the passage. The relevant
means (see Table 2) clearly fall in the predicted pattern. A t
test confirmed that subjects in the stereotypic label condition
correctly answered a significantly greater number of test ques-
tions, t(22) = 2.32, p < .04.
As predicted, the provision of stereotype labels during the
impression-formation task reduced the demands imposed on
subjects' processing resources, resulting in enhanced performa-
nce on the prose-monitoring task. Evidence for simplification
of the impression-formation task (hence, preservation of atten-
tional capacity) can be gleaned from subjects' memorial perfor-
mance. The provision of stereotype labels increased the mem-
orability ofthe presented information, with thiseffect most pro-
nounced for the consistent traits. This largely confirms the view
that stereotypes, in demanding processing contexts, function as
simplifying themes in long-term memory, facilitating the repre-
sentation ofschema-consistent information (e.g., Bodenhausen,
1988; Macrae et al., 1993; Stangor & Duan, 1991).
Stereotypes, then, do appear to function as resource-preserv-
ing devices in mental life. Notwithstanding the demonstration
of this effect, however, an important theoretical question
emerges from Study 1. Whereas the results document resource
savings accruing to those perceivers who are able to use a ste-
reotype as an organizing theme in the impression-formation
task, it is unclear whether this efficiency-producing strategy is
intentionally deployed by the social perceiver. Are stereotypes
tools that must be consciously applied in the process of building
Study 2
To investigate the automaticity of stereotype activation, re-
searchers have typically used modified semantic priming tech-
niques. Central to the successful execution of this approach is
the presentation of a priming stimulus outside of subjects' con-
scious awareness (i.e., subjects have no conscious knowledge of
the presentation of the prime). This effect is typically achieved
by presenting the prime for a very brief duration and then ob-
scuring it with either another word or a masking stimulus. The
surprising finding to emerge from research of this kind is that
despite subjects' inability to consciously report the nature or
identity of the prime, it is consistently shown to facilitate their
responses to semantically related material presented immedi-
ately afterward. That is, priming effects prevail even when the
primes are presented below perceivers' threshold of stimulus
identification.
Several researchers have successfully applied this technique
to issues in stereotyping and person perception (Bargh, 1982;
Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986; Bargh & Pietromonaco,
1982; Devine, 1989; Erdley & D'Agostino, 1988; Perdue,
Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990;
Smith, Spence, & Klein, 1958; see Bargh, 1989, 1992, for re-
views). Perdue and Gurtman (1990), for instance, demon-
strated that subjects respond faster to negative traits when sub-
liminally primed with the word oldrather than youngand faster
to positive traits when primed with the word young rather than
old. There are, of course, compelling advantages inherent in the
use ofsubliminal priming techniques in the investigation ofste-
reotyping (Perdue et al., 1990; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990). First,
the technique minimizes reactivity, particularly the impact of
demand characteristics and social desirability biases. Second, it
provides a tool for researchers to decompose perceivers' cogni-
tive processes and identify the automatic and controlled com-
ponents of the phenomenon (e.g., Devine, 1989). If the effects
observed in Study 1 can be replicated in a situation in which
subjects are unaware of the presence of the stereotype labels in
the impression-formation task, this will support the contention
that stereotype application simplifies processing and promotes
resource preservation without perceivers' awareness or con-
scious consent.
Method
Overview. Study 1 was replicated, but with one important difference.
While performing the impression-formation task, half of the subjects
were provided with stereotype labels presented outside their conscious
awareness. It was anticipated that ifstereotypes simplify processing and
preserve valuable mental energy without perceivers' conscious intent.
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5. STEREOTYPES AS ENERGY-SAVING DEVICES 41
then the present effects should replicate those obtained in Study 1. That
is, the provision (albeit subliminal) of stereotype labels should simplify
the impression-formation task, thereby saving processing resources and
enhancing performance on the prose-monitoring task.
Subjects and design. Thirty-two female undergraduate students at
the University of Wales College of Cardiff were paid £2 for their partici-
pation in the experiment. The study had a single-factor (stereotype:
present-but-subliminal or absent) between-subjects design.
Procedure and stimulus materials. This experiment was identical to
Study 1, but with a subliminal presentation of the stereotype labels on
the impression-formation task. The experimental stimuli were black
and presented on a white background with stimulus timings controlled
by the Apple Macintosh's Vertical Blank Manager. Words were drawn
in 14-point Geneva type, a proportionally spaced typeface with a maxi-
mum cell size of 0.5 cm X 0.5 cm. The target's name was positioned
such that its baseline was 1 cm above thefixationpoint in the center of
the screen. The priming words (i.e., category labels) were located with
their baseline on the center of the screen, and the trait words were posi-
tioned such that the maximum distance between the top pixel of the
priming stimulus and the bottom pixel ofthe trait words was 2 cm. The
standard viewing distance (i.e., eye tocenter ofscreen) was 55 cm. Thus,
the prime and trait words subtended a maximum visual angle of 0.5"
and were separated by 1°. These settings ensured that the stimulus ma-
terials fell within each subject's foveal visual field. In the center of the
computer screen, immediately below each target's name and above the
location where the trait descriptives appear, a row of Xs (i.e.,
XXXXXXXX) was displayed (i.e., masking stimulus). For subjects in
the primingcondition, immediately before the presentation ofeach trait
descriptive, the mask disappeared and the relevant stereotype label was
presented in its place for 30 ms before being overwritten by the mask.
Consequently, for each target in the impression-formation task, the
priming stimulus appeared on 10 separate occasions. The procedure
was identical for subjects in the nonprinting (i.e., no-stereotype) condi-
tion; however, rather than a stereotype label appearing behind the mask,
subjects simply observed, for each target, ten 30-ms segments of blank
computer screen. The brevity of the exposure was intended to prevent
subjects' conscious recognition of the priming stimuli, thereby satis-
fying the critical criterion for the establishment of automatic effects in
information processing (Bargh, 1984; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Marcel,
1983). While subliminal priming effects have been demonstrated with
longer exposure durations (e.g., 100 ms), these studies have typically
relied on the parafoveal presentation of the priming stimuli (e.g., Bargh
& Pietromonaco, 1982;Devine, 1989). The experiment was controlled
by a program running on the Apple Macintosh microcomputer. Stimuli
were presented on an Apple 13-in. (33-cm) color monitor, which has a
refresh rate of 66.67 Hz, giving a frame duration of 15 ms. Person
names and traits were drawn on-screen using standard Macintosh li-
brary routines. Prime words were drawn into a small off-screen buffer
during the interstimulus interval using the same graphics routines. On
each trial, the program waited until it received a vertical blank signal
(indicating that the raster scan was about to return to the top of the
screen) and copied the buffer directly into the appropriate screen mem-
ory location before the raster scan reached that location. A similar pro-
cedure was used to erase the prime after exposure. Thus, the prime
display was always synchronized with and preceded screen updating.
This procedure ensured that the presentation duration of each priming
stimulus was exactly 30 ms.
A number of steps were taken to verify that subjects did indeed pro-
cess the primes in an unconscious manner (see Cheesman & Merikle,
1986; Greenwald, Klinger, & Liu, 1989; Perdue et al., 1990). These were
primarily instigated during each subject's debriefing session. First, on
completion of the study, subjects were asked to write down the experi-
mental procedure and list as many of the words that appeared on the
computer screen as they could remember. Importantly, none ofthe sub-
Table 3
Subjects' Mean Task Performance: Study 2
Task
Trait recall
Consistent
Neutral
Multiple-choice questionnaire
Subliminal stereotype
Present
3.26
1.75
8.19
Absent
2.00
1.00
6.62
jects listed any of the priming stimuli when performing this task. Sec-
ond, subjects were then informed that during the study certain words
had appeared very quickly in the area ofthe screen occupied by the row
of Xs; their task was simply to guess what these words might have been.
Again, none of the subjects correctly guessed any of the primes. This
corroborates the results ofearlier pilot research, which we undertook to
establish an optimal exposure duration for inclusion in the experiment
proper. In a variant ofthe present study, 12 subjects were presented with
a number of words (i.e., a total of 40), which were then masked by a
row of Xs. Each word remained on the screen for 30 ms. Before the
presentation phase, subjects were instructed that a number of words
would appear, albeit very quickly, in the center of the computer screen.
Their task was simply to identify and report each word. If they were
unable to identify the word, subjects were forced by the experimenter to
make a guess, even a blind guess if necessary (Bargh & Pietromonaco,
1982; Devine, 1989). Ofthe 480 responses, subjects correctly identified
the words on 16 occasions, a hit rate ofonly 3.33%. It would seem, then,
that the present paradigm satisfies the preconditions necessary for the
establishment of automatic effects on social information processing. As
in Study 1, the two experimental tasks (impression formation and prose
monitoring) ran contemporaneously.
Dependent measures. Performance on the tasks was again assessed
with a cued recall task and multiple-choice questionnaire. After they
completed the experiment, subjects were debriefed, paid, and dis-
missed.
Results and Discussion
Cued recall. If stereotypes are automatically used to organize
person representations, then effects similar to those of Study 1
might occur even when the stereotype is activated outside the
bounds of conscious awareness. To evaluate this possibility, the
number of stereotype-consistent and neutral traits recalled and
attributed to the correct target (see Table 3) were submitted to a
2 (stereotype: present-but-subliminal or absent) X 2 (trait type:
consistent or neutral) mixed-model ANOVA with repeated
measures on the second factor. This analysis revealed main
effects of both stereotype, F(l, 30) = 6.66, p < .02, and trait
type, F(l, 30) = 17.04, p < .0003, on subjects' memory for the
presented information. A greater number of traits was recalled
when stereotypes were present rather than absent (respective Ms
= 2.50 vs. 1.50), and subjects displayed enhanced recall for con-
sistent rather than neutral traits (respective Ms = 2.63 vs. 1.37).
Unlike in Study 1, the Stereotype X Trait Type interaction failed
to reach statistical significance, F( 1, 30) < 1, ns.
Multiple choice. Automatic activation of stereotypes should
also produce cognitive savings in the impression-formation
task, allowing for better performance on the prose-monitoring
task. The means relevant to this prediction are displayed in Ta-
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6. 42 N. MACRAE, A. MILNE, AND G. BODENHAUSEN
ble 3. Consistent with the view that stereotypes are tools that
automatically and effortlessly economize information process-
ing, prose-monitoring performance was clearly enhanced by the
subliminal activation of a stereotype, ?(30) = 2.04, p < .05.
As in Study 1, then, the provision of stereotype labels on the
impression-formation task reduced the demands imposed on
subjects' processing resources, resulting in an enhancement in
their performance on the prose-monitoring task. As before, re-
call performance was facilitated when stereotype labels were
present rather than absent in the impression-formation task. In
each of the reported experiments, therefore, we observed a gen-
eral resource-preserving effect, with stereotype application en-
hancing the memorability of both confirmatory and neutral
traits. In Study 1, however, this facilitatory effect was somewhat
stronger for the consistent traits; in Study 2 it was equivalent for
both trait types.
Notwithstanding the demonstration of these effects across
Studies 1 and 2, some limitations ofthe present research should
be noted. In particular, two main areas of concern can be iden-
tified: (a) the experimental manipulation of subliminality in
Study 2 and (b) the use of a prose-monitoring task to estimate
subjects' residual attentional capacity in Studies 1 and 2. With
regard to the subliminal presentation of stereotype labels, two
weaknesses limit our earlier study. First, 30-ms stimulus pre-
sentations to the fovea are certainly long enough for at least
some subjects to identify consciously the priming stimulus.
When piloting our experimental manipulation, after all, sub-
jects (N = 12) correctly identifed the target word on 16 occa-
sions (i.e., a hit rate of more than one correct identification per
subject). Given that it may only take one overt identification per
subject to consciously rather than nonconsciously activate the
stereotype, we could reasonably question whether subliminal
priming was successfully accomplished in Study 2. This diffi-
culty was compounded by the use of a suboptimal masking
stimulus (i.e., XXXXXXXX) in the experiment. In retrospect,
a central pattern mask would have been the more appropriate
choice (Turvey, 1973). This type of mask, which consists of a
series of letter patterns (e.g., ZBKWPLSR), is structurally sim-
ilar to the preceding word stimulus (i.e., masked stimulus). Cen-
tral pattern masking is appropriate because although it in-
terferes with a prime's path to consciousness, it does not affect
its automatic registration by perceivers (Marcel, 1983).
Second, potential difficulties also arise in the interpretation
of the data from our prose-monitoring task. In each of the re-
ported studies, we used a technique in which subjects were pre-
sented with two concurrent tasks (i.e., impression formation
and prose monitoring) and each was given equal priority in the
experimental instructions. Unfortunately, these instructions
may actively encourage subjects to switch attention between the
tasks. Secondary-task performance can provide an indication of
capacity usage in the primary task only if subjects devote their
attention first and foremost to the primary task (i.e., maximize
primary-task performance). If attention switches between the
tasks, which is conceivable when they are given equal priority
in the experimental instructions, it is difficult to draw any firm
conclusions about how much attentional capacity each task re-
quires (Kantowitz, 1974).
In our third experiment, we introduced a number of meth-
odological and procedural refinements in an attempt to address
these limitations. To strengthen our manipulation of sublimi-
nality, we used a shorter stimulus presentation duration (i.e., 15
ms) and an improved pattern mask. In addition, we also carried
out extensive pilot testing of our subliminal manipulation be-
fore the experiment proper. Finally, we used a probe reaction
task to investigate the resource-preserving properties of stereo-
type application (Bargh, 1982; Brown, 1964; Gollwitzer, 1993;
Johnston, 1978; Johnston & Heinz, 1978; Posner & Boies,
1971). With this technique, subjects are instructed to optimize
performance on a primary task and to use their remaining at-
tentional capacity to respond to a subsidiary probe stimulus,
such as turning off a randomly illuminated light bulb. The rea-
soning behind this technique is straightforward. As the atten-
tional requirement of the primary task increases, performance
on the secondary, probe task decreases (i.e., subjects offer slower
responses to the probe—see Bargh, 1982; Kahneman, 1973;
Logan, 1979).
Study 3
Method
Overview. While forming impressions of targets using the computer-
based presentation oftrait descriptors (i.e., primary task), subjects sim-
ultaneously performed a probe reaction task whereby they were re-
quired to switch off, by means of a key press, a randomly presented
auditory stimulus (i.e., secondary task). To manipulate the difficulty of
the impression-formation task, stereotypic information, describing
each of the targets, was either available or unavailable. When available,
this information was presented either supra- or subliminally. Primary-
task performance was assessed, as before, with a cued recall task. Probe
reaction times served as our measure of secondary-task performance.
Subjects and design. Thirty-six female undergraduate students at the
University of Wales College of Cardiff were paid £2 for their participa-
tion in the experiment. The study had a single-factor (stereotype: pres-
ent or present-but-subliminal or absent) between-subjects design.
Procedure andstimulus materials. This experiment, in essence, was a
combination ofthe previous two studies. That is, supra- and subliminal
priming conditions were included, with a no-prime condition, in a sin-
gle experiment. Subjects arrived at the laboratory individually, were
randomly assigned to one of the treatment conditions, and were seated
facing the screen of an Apple Macintosh microcomputer (Mac Hvi).
The experimenter then explained, as before, that the study involved an
investigation of people's ability to perform tasks simultaneously (i.e.,
impression-formation and probe-reaction tasks). In the impression-for-
mation task, subjects in all conditions were presented with the four
targets and the relevant trait descriptors. As before, these appeared, re-
spectively, above and below thefixationpoint in the center ofthe screen.
In all conditions, the target's name remained on the screen continuously
and each trait word appeared for 2,400 ms. The interstimulus interval
between successive trait presentations was 500 ms. In the supraliminal
priming condition, each prime (i.e., stereotype label) appeared contin-
uously, in the center of the screen, until all the target's trait descriptors
had been presented. The presentation sequence was then repeated for
the next target. For subjects in the subliminal condition, immediately
before the presentation of each trait descriptive, the prime appeared in
the center of the screen for 15 ms and was then masked by a string of
randomly selected consonants (e.g., SFPRMWLJ) for a further 135 ms.
Consequently, for each target in the impression-formation task, the
priming stimulus appeared on 10 separate occasions. The procedure
was identical for subjects in the nonprinting (i.e., no-stereotype) condi-
tion; however, rather than having a stereotype label appearing behind
the mask, subjects simply observed, for each target, ten 15-ms segments
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7. STEREOTYPES AS ENERGY-SAVING DEVICES 43
of blank computer screen. The experimental setup (i.e., size, composi-
tion, and location of stimuli) was identical to that in Study 2, thereby
ensuring that the stimulus materials again fell within each subject's fo-
veal visual field-
In a modification of Study 2, the stereotype labels in the subliminal
priming condition were presented for only 15 ms. This brevity of
exposure duration was intended to strengthen our manipulation ofsub-
liminality. Before the experiment proper, we also carried out a pilot
study to help achieve this end. In a computer-based word-identification
task, 14 subjects were presented with a number of words (i.e., 20 in
total), which were then masked by a random string of consonants. Each
word was presented for 15 ms before it was overwritten by the mask.
Before the presentation phase, subjects were instructed that a number
of words would appear in the center of the computer screen. Their task
was simply to identify and report each word to the experimenter. If un-
able to identify the word, subjects were forced by the experimenter to
make a guess. Of the 280 responses, subjects correctly identified the
words on 6 occasions, for a hit rate of only 2.14%. Before leaving the
laboratory, each subject performed an ostensibly unrelated lexical deci-
sion task. On the presentation of a letter string on the computer screen,
subjects had to respond, by means of a key press, whether it was a
"word" or "nonword." Included in the list of to-be-identified letter
strings were the 20 words presented earlier plus 20 matched distractors.
A single-factor (word: old or distractor) repeated measures ANOVA
confirmed that, despite subjects' earlier inability to identify the words,
they classified them more quickly than matched distractors in the lexi-
cal decision task, F(1, 13) = 5.79, p < .04 (respective Mi = 546 ms vs.
571 ms). This lexical priming effect then clearly reflects word activation
without awareness and suggests that an exposure duration of 15 ms sat-
isfies the preconditions necessary for the establishment of automatic
effects on information processing. As in Study 2, during each subject's
debriefing session, additional measures were taken to confirm that the
primes had indeed been processed in an automatic, unconscious man-
ner. As before, subjects demonstrated no awareness ofthe priming stim-
uli on any of these measures.
While forming impressions of the targets, subjects simultaneously
performed a secondary, probe-reaction task (e.g., Bargh, 1982). Before
the subjects performed the tasks, however, the experimenter stressed
that the impression-formation task was the more important of the two.
During the presentation of the target-related information (i.e., impres-
sion-formation task), the computer periodically emitted a bleeping
sound. The subjects' task was simply to turn off the sound, when it oc-
curred, by pressing the space bar on the keyboard. Unknown to the
subjects, the computer had been programmed to emit the sound four
times in the course of the experiment. Presentation ofthe probe stimuli
was randomized for each subject by the computer. Probe reaction times
(ms) were recorded by the computer and measured using the Macin-
tosh's Extended Time Manager.
Before the experiment proper, steps were taken to ensure that the
probe reaction task was a true measure of subjects' residual attentional
capacity. To serve this function, it must be established that the probe
task does not itself divert processing resources from the primary, im-
pression-formation task. To confirm this necessary precondition, 24 in-
dependent subjects performed a variant of the present experiment.
Twelve ofthese subjects performed both the impression-formation (i.e.,
no prime condition) and probe-reaction tasks. The others, in contrast,
performed only the impression-formation task. We reasoned that if the
probe task diverted resources away from the impression-formation task,
this would be reflected in differences in trait recall performance between
the probe and no-probe conditions. A single-factor (probe task: present
or absent) between-subjects ANOVA revealed no effect of the probe-
reaction task on subjects' memorial performance, F( 1,22) < 1, ns. This,
then, validates the use of the probe task as a measure of subjects' resid-
ual attentional capacity.
Table 4
Subjects' Mean Task Performance: Study 3
Task
Trait recall
Consistent
Neutral
Probe reaction times (ms)
Supraliminal
6.66a
3.42
582a
Stereotype
Subliminal
5.24
5.00
571b
Absent
4.00a
3.08
812^
Note. Means with a common subscript differ significantly: trait recall,
p < .005; probe reaction times, p < .05.
Dependent measures. Memory for the presented trait information
(i.e., cued recall) and probe reaction times (RTs) were taken as respective
indicators of subjects' primary- and secondary-task performance. On
completion of the experiment subjects were debriefed, paid, and dis-
missed.
Results and Discussion
Cued recall. To investigate the effects of stereotype activation
on the memorability of person descriptors, we submitted the
number of stereotype-consistent and neutral traits recalled and
attributed to the correct target to a 3 (stereotype: present or
present-but-subliminal or absent) X 2 (trait type: consistent or
neutral) mixed-model ANOVA with repeated measures on the
second factor. As anticipated, the presence of stereotype labels
in the impression-formation task facilitated the memorability
of the personality descriptor information, F(2, 33) = 5.14, p <
.02. Post hoc Tukey tests showed that subjects in each of the
stereotype-present conditions (i.e., supraliminal and sublimi-
nal) recalled significantly more traits than subjects for whom
stereotypes had been absent during the impression-formation
task (respective Ms = 5.04, 5.12, and 3.54; significant ps < .05).
Also, subjects recalled more consistent than neutral traits, F( 1,
33) = 14.03, p < .001 (respective Ms = 5.30 vs. 3.83). These
main effects were qualified by a Stereotype X Trait Type interac-
tion, F(2, 33) = 3.40, p < .05 (see Table 4). Simple effects anal-
ysis confirmed an effect of stereotype for the consistent, F(2,66)
= 6.47, p < .003, but not the neutral traits recalled, F(2,66) =
1.79, ns. Post hoc Tukey tests showed that subjects recalled
more consistent traits when the stereotype was presented supra-
liminally than when it was absent (respective Ms = 6.66 vs.
4.00). Simple effects analysis also revealed an effect of trait type
for the supraliminal priming condition, F(l, 33) = 18.39, p <
.0001. This effect was not apparent, however, in either the sub-
liminal priming, F(l, 33) < 1, ns, or stereotype-absent condi-
tion, F(l, 33) = 1.36, ns.
Probe latencies. After Studies 1 and 2, it was anticipated that
when stereotypes were activated in the impression-formation
task, subjects would have more attentional resources available
for the execution of the probe-reaction task. Accordingly, they
should offer faster responses to the probe stimulus than subjects
for whom stereotypes had not previously been activated. A sin-
gle-factor (stereotype: present or present-but-subliminal or ab-
sent) between-subjects ANOVA on subjects' mean probe reac-
tion times confirmed this prediction, F(2, 33) = 3.177, p < .05
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8. 44 N. MACRAE, A. MILNE, AND G. BODENHAUSEN
(see Table 4). Subjects in the no-prime condition exhibited sig-
nificantly slower responses to the probe stimulus than subjects
in either of the priming conditions (ps < .05).
With an improved dual-task methodology, the present results
replicated the effects observed in Studies 1 and 2. The provision
of stereotype labels during the impression-formation task re-
duced the demands imposed on subjects' attentional resources,
resulting in enhanced performance on the probe-reaction task.
This eifect, moreover, was apparent whether the priming stimu-
lus was presented supraliminally or subliminally. This suggests,
then, that awareness of the priming categorical stimulus is not
a necessary precondition for the resource-preserving properties
of stereotype application. The effect occurs in the absence of
perceivers' awareness or conscious consent (see Bargh, 1989).
Whereas the provision of stereotype labels facilitated the mem-
orability of both consistent and neutral traits, as in Study 1 the
effect was greatest for the consistent items.
Additional analyses. Whereas stereotypes clearly economize
information processing, an important theoretical question
emerges from the present research. Specifically, does stereotype
application economize cognition in a general (i.e., stereotype-
consistent as well as neutral traits) or more specific (i.e., stereo-
type-consistent traits only) manner? Across the three studies,
the recall data are suggestive of a general resource-preserving
effect—although it does appear that this effect may be stronger
for the consistent traits. To investigate this possibility, we con-
ducted additional statistical tests to determine whether stereo-
type presence (vs. absence) facilitated the recall of both consis-
tent and neutral traits across the three studies. In this pursuit,
we used meta-analytic procedures that enabled us to combine
results across studies and to compare the resultant effect sizes
(Rosenthal, 1978; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1979). This analysis
demonstrated that across the three studies, a reliable effect of
stereotype presence was apparent for both consistent traits
(weighted average Z = 3.61, p< .0001, average effect size = .66)
and neutral traits (weighted average Z = 2.39, p < .008, average
effect size = .42). The facilitatory effect of stereotype presence,
moreover, was not reliably greater for the consistent than the
neutral traits, x2
( 1, N = 92) = .741, p < .40.
Taken together, then, the results ofthe three experiments sug-
gest that stereotypes economize cognition through the provision
ofa mental framework on which both confirmatory and neutral
information can be located (Bodenhausen, 1988; Bodenhausen
& Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Macrae et
al, 1993; Stangor & Duan, 1991; Srull & Wyer, 1989). Perhaps
only when perceivers are confronted with disconfirmatory in-
formation may stereotypes lose their power to preserve mental
capacity. Charged with the task of reconciling discrepant infor-
mation with preexisting stereotypic beliefs, perceivers must en-
gage in effortful processes of inconsistency resolution (Macrae
et al., 1993; Srull & Wyer, 1989; Stangor & Duan, 1991). Under
these conditions, as such, stereotype application is unlikely to
liberate attentional resources for the execution of other mental
activities.
General Discussion
Stereotypes and Judgment Processes
The essence of the cognitive approach is that stereotyping is
a functional, adaptive process that plays a central role in human
social cognition. As Fiske (1989, p. 253) described, "stereotyp-
ers categorize because it requires too much mental effort to in-
dividuate." It was unclear from previous research whether this
tendency simply reflects the mental sloth of social perceivers
or their adaptive deployment of a sufficiently effective shortcut
strategy. As Sherman and Corty (1984) emphasized, the many
heuristic strategies of the social perceiver are likely to persist
only insofar as they permit greater efficiency at acceptable levels
of incurred costs. Most writings on the subject of stereotyping
have understandably been focused on the costs incurred by the
targets of social stereotyping, rather than the costs accruing to
the stereotyping perceiver. It is likely that such costs are mini-
mal under common, everyday conditions. Although there are
clearly cases in which those who stereotype do pay a penalty
(e.g., failing to hire the bestjob applicant because ofgender ste-
reotypes), the act of stereotyping may typically produce errors
that are more costly to others than to the perceiver him- or her-
self. The present research has documented the benefits that per-
ceivers may gain by the process of stereotyping—benefits that
may often outweigh perceivers' own costs.
Within the spirit ofthe stereotypes-as-mental-tools metaphor
(Gilbert & Hixon, 1991), we anticipated that stereotype appli-
cation would promote the preservation of processing resources.
This prediction follows from related research by Bargh (1982)
demonstrating the efficiency of schematic thinking. In all three
studies, our speculations were supported. Moreover, the preser-
vation of attentional capacity was not contingent on perceivers'
strategic deployment of stereotypical thinking. Resources were
liberated in a task context in which perceivers were completely
unaware of prior stereotype activation. This effect, as such, sat-
isfies two ofthe criteria commonly associated with an automatic
mental process: (a) it is unintentional and (b) it occurs without
perceivers' awareness (see Bargh, 1989).
This demonstration has obvious implications for contempo-
rary treatments of social stereotyping. A characteristic feature
ofcognitive models of impression formation is the priority they
accord to category-based processes in person perception
(Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Perceivers seem at best
reluctant, and at worst incapable, of individuating others unless
a series ofcritical cognitive and motivational criteria (e.g., spare
attentional resources, self-involvement, outcome dependency,
and accountability) have been satisfied (Erber & Fiske, 1984;
Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock & Kim, 1987).
The primacy of these category-based effects is typically attrib-
uted to the utility or adaptability of social stereotyping. The
present findings provide direct empirical support for this
contention. Through stereotype application, perceivers can
economize cognition by managing the demands imposed on
their processing capacity. This executive function, moreover, is
not simply a reflection of deliberative, strategic processing. It
occurs in the absence of perceivers' explicit intention to insti-
gate stereotype-based modes of thought. In a dauntingly com-
plex social world, this is clearly an efficient way for a mental
system to operate (Bargh, 1989; Gilbert, 1989). The attentional
resources that are liberated through the operation of covert
mental processes (e.g., stereotype application) can be redirected
to assist in the execution of perceivers' conscious reasoning
strategies. The operation of stereotypes as economizing mental
devices does not imply, however, that social interactions must
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9. STEREOTYPES AS ENERGY-SAVING DEVICES 45
invariably unfold in a stereotype-based manner. As Fiske and
Taylor (1991) have recently argued, under certain circum-
stances, cognitive misers can change personae and become in-
stead motivated tacticians. This switch is characterized by a
preference for systematic information-processing strategies and
an awareness of the impact of goals, needs, and desires on judg-
mental outcomes (Showers & Cantor, 1985). The motivated tac-
tician, as such, surrenders the benefits of cognitive expedience
(i.e., resource preservation) for a more individuated, but effort-
ful, evaluation of others. These individuated impressions are
most likely driven by a host of affective or motivational factors
and the demands imposed on perceivers by specific task envi-
ronments (see Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske &
Pavelchak, 1986).
Evolution ofStereotypical Thinking
Assuming, if we may, that stereotypical thinking is a funda-
mental property of human inferential systems, then some chal-
lenging theoretical questions can be raised. The most basic of
these concerns the origins and maintenance of an inferential
system that actively sustains stereotype-based modes of
thought. Ifstereotypicjudgments are predominantly inaccurate
and irrational, why do we continue to make them? The present
results, together with related theorizing, provide insight into
this puzzle.
In a recent article, Gilbert (1989) outlined the development
and evolution of an inferential system that actively favors dis-
positional, thereby potentially inaccurate, modes ofthought. In
a two-stage process, this system first draws dispositional infer-
ences from human action; it then corrects or adjusts these infer-
ences when necessary (see Gilbert & Krull, 1988; Gilbert,
Krull, & Pelham, 1988; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Trope,
1986). On encountering the new departmental secretary, for in-
stance, we may conclude that he or she is rather sullen. This
inference may subsequently be tempered, however, when we
learn of his or her recent broken relationship. The crux of Gil-
bert's (1989) argument is that the inferential system draws the
initial characterological inference with rapidity and consum-
mate ease. Correction of this inference, in contrast, is a more
resource-consuming, effortful affair. Here, then, we have an ex-
plicit dissociation between the automatic and controlled com-
ponents of person perception (Bargh, 1989; Devine, 1989).
Through automatic, unconscious processes, the inferential sys-
tem furnishes perceivers with a dispositional explanation for
human action. Through more effortful, controlled processing
modes, it then adjusts or corrects these inferences in the light of
additional information. The evolutionary value of such a sys-
tem, according to Gilbert (1989), lies in its rapid, automatic,
and effortless provision of dispositional inferences. Viable or-
ganisms, after all, "produce the best inferences they can for the
least investment" (Gilbert, 1989, p. 207). More often than not,
our default dispositional characterizations of others are likely
to be perfectly adequate for the tasks we routinely face. They
can, of course, always be adjusted (albeit effortfully) when the
need arises.
The impetus for the evolution of the aforementioned inferen-
tial system is perceivers' need to invest cognitive resources in
life's daily chores as expeditiously as possible. The present find-
ings, as such,fitrather nicely within Gilbert's (1989) conception
of what characterizes an adaptive and viable inferential system.
Through stereotype application, perceivers possess an efficient
means of simplifying social interaction and preserving valuable
processing resources. Such a facility, moreover, makes sound
evolutionary sense. Expending resources as cheaply as possible,
on social interactions of minimal relevance, enables perceivers
to redirect their energy to more pressing environmental contin-
gencies. Given the trivial nature of most ofour interactions with
others, it is easy to see why stereotypical thinking tends to be
the rule rather than the exception (see Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).
In most social settings, complex impressions of others are quite
unnecessary. Through stereotype application, perceivers are
able to derive viable, although potentially erroneous, target-
based impressions at very little cognitive cost. Although more
accurate, individuated evaluations of others can be computed,
they may be generally unattractive to the inferential system un-
der many circumstances because ofthe cognitive resources they
consume. Accordingly, individuated impressions are only likely
to prevail when a series of affective or motivational precondi-
tions, such as high self-involvement or interdependence, have
been satisfied (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).
Stereotypical thinking is a ubiquitous feature ofeveryday life.
In the present work, we attempted to discern why this may be
so and investigated the popular belief that stereotypes function
as energy-saving devices in social cognition. Across three stud-
ies, this contention was confirmed. Through their application,
stereotypes were shown to simplify judgmental tasks and pre-
serve valuable processing resources. In a sense, then, Gilbert
and Hixon's (1991) characterization of stereotypes as tools re-
siding in a metaphorical mental toolbox is an appropriate one.
Through the deployment of social stereotypes, perceivers are
able to free up limited cognitive resources for the execution of
other necessary or desirable activities. This suggests then that
researchers should not be content in simply cataloging the neg-
ative consequences of social stereotyping. Instead, a more func-
tional perspective should be adopted (cf. Fox, 1992; Jackson,
1992). In our longjourney from the primordial soup to intellec-
tual hegemony, we seem to have evolved an inferential system
that actively sustains stereotype-based modes of thought. A
complete understanding of social stereotyping will certainly re-
quire a sobering appraisal of the many possible costs of stereo-
typic thinking, but it will also require a fuller appreciation of
the benefits inherent in such thinking.
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Received August 21,1992
Revision received August 6, 1993
Accepted August 11, 1993 •
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