A summary and consideration of various papers on Indo-Asia-Pacific regional strategic dynamics. 2013.

1. Strategic Security Future for
Indo-Asia-Pacific Region
Australia; The European Tiger
Zorba Parer

2. Defining the Region
• A China centric view of the region is forming
around clear data indicating a growth in all
elements of Chinese national power
• Indo-Asia-Pacific as a hemispherical system
• Indo-Asia-Pacific maritime region
• The Indian Ocean maritime region
• The Pacific Ocean maritime region
• Mainland Asia

3. Sub-Regions
• Asia
– North, East, South, West
• Indian Ocean
– SLOC to Africa, Middle East, Mediterranean, Europe, Asia and
littoral regions
• Pacific Ocean
– SLOC to South America, North America, Siberia, Asia, and Pacific
Littoral States
• Oceania
– Passage between Indian and Pacific oceans.
– SLOC to Australian east coast and New Zealand
• This is a region dominated by maritime geography, and
transport economics.

4. Exceptionalism
• Quadrella of exceptional States
– USA; Global hegemonic power, balancing costs of
maintaining the Global Commons, with ability to
influence State to State relations.
– China; Communist Billion Citizen State, seeking to rise
pacifically.
– India; Most populous democracy, seeking to ensure
continued Indian Ocean dominance, and influence
within the Asia land mass.
– Japan; forced demilitarisation, economic power
projection, civil institutions with monopoly on use of
force within Japanese jurisdiction.

5. Articles Reviewed
• Cooperation from Strength The United States,
China and the South China Sea
– January 2012, Edited by Patrick M. Cronin
– Contributors, Patrick M Cronin, Peter A Dutton, M
Taylor Fravel, James R Holmes, Robert D Kaplan, Will
Rogers, and Ian Storey
• Power and Choice; Asian Security Futures
– Rory Medcalf
• International Relations of Asia (2008)
– Chapter 15 by Ralph A Cossa

6. International Relations of Asia
• No settled pattern of order in Asia. All the major
powers are in processes of transition.
• Rise of China as single most significant contributor to
regional change in Asian power structures.
• India rising, but not as quickly as China.
• Need for domestic structural reforms and uncertainties
about how best to assert a more active international
and regional role are evident in Japan.
• Russia trying to reassert its Asia presence.
• Continued reliance on US military dominance.

7. International Relations of Asia
• Growing Chinese pre-eminence
• Japan seeking to ‘normalise’ as a nation
• India looking east, seeking a more active role in Asia-Pacific
• ASEAN; increasingly institutionalised, driving regional
cooperation
• Near term security issues
– Korean Peninsula tensions
– China-Taiwan tensions
• Continued importance of existing USA-Bilateral security
arrangements
• Geopolitical Considerations
• Regional geographical considerations

8. International Relations of Asia
• Pathways to the Future; Two Scenarios
– Continuation of current order, moderated by USA
primacy
• Dependent on massive military commitments to the region
• At risk of a declining USA economy
• Increased US involvement in regional multilateralism
– Multipolar system, with sub-regional hegemens
dominating the Indo-Asia-Pacific region
• A weakening US
• Chinese band wagoning by US allied states
• Concert of powers possible (US, China, India, and Russia)
• Coalitions attempting to form a balance of powers.

9. Cooperation from Strength
Chapter I – Executive Summary
• Main thesis - Cooperative Primacy
– Increased US Naval presence, contingent upon a
healthy US Economy.
– A new web of US security partnerships
– Peace and security assurance in the South China
Sea
– Increased US economic engagement in the Region
– Increased focus on US-China relations, supporting
rules based system of cooperation and dispute
resolution

10. Cooperation from Strength
Chapter I – Executive Summary
• History as a record of Chinese geostrategic
centrality in Asia
• 150 Years of political upheaval after Millennia of
Chinese rule
• Chinese claims over South China Sea can be
understood as a Greater Caribbean moment
– Constructivism anyone?
• Leading Asian arms modernisation
• Hemispherical economic dependencies
– Could China survive without Japan?

11. Cooperation from Strength
Chapter I – Executive Summary
• Nations surrounding China, economically
engaged and hedging USA as an offshore
balancer
– US Chinese conflict not a favourable option for risk
averse minor nations: Australia, NZ, Papua, Indonesia.
Produces bias against any China-US conflict.
– [Z} Australian Defence Budget as an indicator
• Submarines as the ultimate maritime presence
• Aerial surveillance and the age drones
• Air lift and emergency response

12. Cooperation from Strength
Chapter I – Executive Summary
• China rebuffs attempts to move the South China Sea
disputes from regional to global forums
• Great power behaviour evident in Chinese moves to
bilateral agreements, versus multilateral engagement
– Does USA movement to multilateral engagement signal a
abdication of their Great Power status?
– Limits of Realism in an Institutionalised power structure?
• UNCLOS and other Customary International Laws tend
to limit Great Power influence.
– Theoretical tangent: Is this an example of a self destructive
tendency in Great Power behaviour? Self enforcing natural
laws?

13. Cooperation from Strength
Chapter II - Maritime Security in the South China Sea and the competition over Maritime Rights
• Multiple state claimants over territory is a feature
of geostrategic reality in the south China sea.
• US maritime predominance necessary.
• US Neutrality in Regional Dynamics
• Chinese Maritime realities
• ASEAN and Littoral Regions
• Conflict avoidance to balance policy for US
foreign diplomacy

14. Cooperation from Strength
Chapter III - Treaties
• History of Chinese sovereign claim.
• Chinese claims not supported by UNCLOS
• Maritime Resources
– Important fishing grounds
– Crude oil
– Natural Gas
• Sea Lane Security
• Chinese policy of reassurance, and bilateral
agreements between claimants
– Engagement through ASEAN in multilateral appeasement,
reversed after unpromising start

15. Cooperation from Strength
Chapter III - Treaties
• China insists on bilateral approach
– No substantive agreements have been reached via
bilateral approaches
• Other claimants prefer multilateral approach to
balance Chinese influence
• Failure of the 2002 DoC; further talks
• China will continue blocking moves for arbitration
and 3rd party intervention
• China will continue asserting effective control
over the South China Sea in pursuit of it’s
sovereign claims

16. Cooperation from Strength
Chapter IV -Cracks in the Global Foundation: International Law and Instability in the South China Sea
• China asserting interests in ways which threaten
the normative global maritime commons
• China seeking to Shape CIL through State
behaviour
• Challenges to established positions of UNCLOS
• Three pillars of Modern Globalisation
– Open, Market based access to resources and trade
– International Institutions fostering stability
– Stability in the Global Commons

17. Cooperation from Strength
Chapter IV -Cracks in the Global Foundation: International Law and Instability in the South China Sea
• Managing the Maritime commons
• Right of access to the high seas
– Enshrined in UN Charter
• Constabulary role of Navies
• Multiple forms of State maritime jurisdiction
• Chinese anti-access policy towards SCS
• Regional Baselines
– Boundaries at or near the shoreline between a coastal
state’s fully sovereign territory and the maritime
zones that extend seaward.

18. Cooperation from Strength
Chapter IV -Cracks in the Global Foundation: International Law and Instability in the South China Sea
• China is seeking to change the rules and
norms that define maritime rights
• US and allies should act against this change
• US should ratify UNCLOS
– Great power – multilateral dilemma?

19. Cooperation from Strength
Chapter V – The Role of Natural Resources in the South China Sea
• Natural Resources
– Energy
– Fisheries
– Minerals
• The Challenge of Climate Change
• Dynamic interaction between Land and Maritime
resources
• Promoting regional stability
– Alternative Fuels
– Adaptive technologies

20. Cooperation from Strength
Chapter VI – Rough Waters for Coalition Building
• US Maritime Strategy
– Good order at sea
– Three Principles:
• Preserving freedom of the Seas
• Ensuring uninterrupted flow of shipping
• Facilitating ready movement of goods and people access
across US frontiers
• Current Maritime cooperation in SCS
– US assistance programs
– CARAT and SEACAT
• Challenges to Maritime coalition building

21. Cooperation from Strength
Chapter VI – Rough Waters for Coalition Building
• 500 years with a global maritime hegemon
– Portugal – Holland – England – USA
• Multinational trusteeship (Multipolarity) would be a
new phenomenon
• Dual nature of Navies makes it difficult to distinguish
between Competitive and Cooperative State
behaviours
• The China Factor
– Chinese policy assertions of indisputable sovereignty over
SCS islands and waters
– Failure of DOC
– Reactions to CARAT

22. Cooperation from Strength
Chapter VI – Rough Waters for Coalition Building
• Globalised economy relies of free flow of
goods
• Southeast Asian states have territorial claims
at stake
• Beijing view of vital interest against coalitions
• Washing should work bilaterally to uphold
maritime security

23. Power and Choice
Futures
• Future 1: US Primacy
• Future 2: An Asian Balance of Powers
• Future 3: Concert of Powers
• Future 4: Chinese Primacy
• Shocks

24. Zorba’s Thoughts
• Commitments made under ASEAN agree to
pacific resolution of disputes.
– Arbitration offices provided.
– Disputes agreed through offsets in resolutions.
– Costs of providing courts as a common good.
– Dams as an example of transnational water disputes.
• Domestic constructivism
– Uncertainties arising from domestic politics
– Model Theories.
• Chinese Maritime presence
– http://www.marinetraffic.com/ais/

25. Zorba Thoughts
• Secondary Effects - Cooperative Primacy
– Answer to increased traffic through Chinese waters,
the enforcement agency grew.
– This has led China to effect control of East and South
China Seas.
• Nuclear capabilities on Hainan Island lead to a South China
Sea predominance.
• China continues to assert rights in these matters.
• Arbitration as an answer? Not likely, international laws
currently favour the Chinese opposition. China has a
negative bias in acceding to any international arbitration.
• Assertions of Exceptionalism.

26. Vietnam - Maritime Movements

27. Vietnam - Maritime Movements

28. Taiwan - Maritime Movements

29. Taiwan – 8hrs Later

30. East China Sea- Maritime Movements

31. Korean Peninsula

32. Japan – Maritime Movements

33. Japan – Maritime Movements

34. Dutch – Maritime Movements

35. Major Strategic Factors
• US military dominance
• Chinese resource demands
• Japanese economic power
• Indian resource demands
• Multiple minor to medium sized nations

36. Middle and Small states
• State Survival
• Maintaining Sovereignty
• Balancing Great Powers
• Engagement through Multilateralism