The document summarizes two court cases involving the administration of estates: 1) Matute vs. Court of Appeals - The probate court removed a co-administrator without allowing him to present evidence, which was a grave abuse of discretion. The court should have followed proper procedure and ruled on the demurrer to evidence first. 2) Baluyut vs. Pano - The probate court improperly appointed a surviving spouse as administratrix without a full hearing on her competence. Being named executor in a will does not automatically grant letters, and those questioning competence must have a chance to be heard. The court ordered a new hearing.

1. Spec Pro
1. Matute vs. Court of Appeals
26 SCRA 768
G.R. No. L-26751, G.R. No. L-26085, G.R. No. L-26106
January 31, 1969
(L-26751)
Facts:
On August 20, 1965 when Carlos S. Matute, one of the Matute heirs and a full-blood brother of
both the petitionerandthe hereinrespondentMatiasS. Matute, filedinSpecial Proceeding(settlement
of the Matute estate) a petition praying for the removal of Matias as co-administrator and his
appointment in such capacity.
Carlos alleged that for a period of more than two years from the date of his appointment,said
Matias S.Matute has neglectedtorenderatrue,justandcompleteaccountof hisadministrationandthat
he isnotonlyincompetentbut alsonegligentinhismanagementof the estate underhischarge consisting
of five haciendas.
The respondent Matias opposed the allegation that it is completely without basis and false.
Recordsshowthathe made anaccountingandthe same wassubmittedtothe court. Thathiscompetence
to act as administrator has been established to the satisfaction of the court.
It appearsthatduringthe receptionof evidence conductedonDecember29,1965 bythe probate
court, CarlosS. Matute and the other heirssubmittedtheirrespective listsof exhibitsinsupportof their
motion to ousts Matias. On January 8, 1966 Matias filed a written objection to the admission of the
movants’ exhibits on the ground that the same were hearsay, self-serving, irrelevant and/or mere
photostatic copies of supposed originals which never properly identified nor shown in court. four days
later,the Counsel forMatiasfiledwithleaveof Courta“Motionto Dismissand/orDemurrertoEvidence”
which avers that there is no sufficient evidence on record to justify and support the motions for the
removal of the herein co-administrator Matias S. Matute.
The probate court issued an order removing Matias S. Matute as co-administrator. Hence, the
certiorari. The respondentcontendsthatthe disputedorderremovinghimasco-administratorisapatent
nullity.Uponthe otherhand, the petitioneradvancesthe reasoninsupportof the orderof removal that
the probate judge accorded the respondent all the opportunity to adduce his evidence but the latter
resorted to dilatory tactics such as filing a motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence.
Issue: Whether or not Rule 33 regarding judgment on demurrer to evidence
is applicable to special proceedings such that its’ disregard by the
probate court amounts to grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
Yes.Section2,Rule 72 of the Rulesof Courtprovidesthatinthe absenceof specialprovisions,the
rulesprovidedforinordinarycivilactionsshallbe,asfaras practicable,applicable inspecial proceedings.
The application of the above cited Rule in special proceedings, like the case at bar, is authorized by the
Rules. Instead of resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued the controverted order
removing the respondent as co-administrator without giving him the opportunity to adduce his own
evidence despitehisexplicitreservationthathe be affordedthechance tointroduce evidence inhisbehalf
in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to evidence. The Court view that the
above actuationof the probate judge constitutedgrave abuse of discretionwhichdoomshisimprovident
order as nullity.
2. Baluyut v. Pano (1976)

2. Facts:
- Sotero Baluyut died, leaving an estate allegedly valued at not less than P2M. A few weeks later, his
nephew, Alfredo, filed in CFI Quezon City a verified petition for letters of administration, alleging that
hiswidow,Encarnacion,wasmentallyincapableof actingasadministratrix.He hadsurmisedthatSotero
hadexecutedawill,andprayedthathe be appointedregularadministratorbutinthemeantime,special
administrator. CFI appointed his special administrator with P100k bond.
- Encarnacion alleged,inherverifiedopposition,thatshe was unaware that Soteroexecuteda will.She
said the allegation that she was mentally incapacitated was libelous, and wanted to be appointed
administratrix. CFI cancelled Alfredo’s appointment, and after asking a series of questions to
Encarnacion while she was on the witness stand, found her “healthy and mentally qualified.”
- Alfredo filed a motion for reconsideration, and the CFI appointed him and Jose Espino as special
administrators. Espino was former governor of Nueva Vizcaya and an alleged acknowledged natural
child of Sotero.
- EncarnacionwantedEspinoto be appointedadministratorshouldshe notbe appointedadministratrix,
but she filed an urgent motion to be appointed administratrix. She said that Alfredo had no more
interest in the estate because as a mere collateral relative, he was excluded by Espino and other
supposed descendants. Alfredo opposed, saying that Espino had other parents, and that Encarnacion
was declaredincompetentbythe Juvenile andDomesticRelationsCourtof QC in a special proceeding
for guardianship.
- At the hearingof Encarnacion’surgentmotion,nooral and documentaryevidence waspresented.She
was merelyaskedquestions,whichshe wasable to answer.She was appointedregularadministratrix,
the court convincedof her capacity and that her “sufficientunderstanding”justifiedherappointment.
She was issued letters of administration.
- Alfredo filed a certiorari case, and the court issued a restraining order enjoining Encarnacion and the
Espino spouses and Jude Pano from enforcing the order and disposing of the funds or assets of the
estate.Encarnacionsaid that Alfredoonlyinstitutedthe administrationproceedingafterhe had failed
to getfromhera checkforP500k belongingtoSotero’sestate,andthathe grosslymisrepresentedthat
she was mentally incompetent; the findings of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court were issued
ina blitzkriegmannerbecause itwasbasedonthe reportof a Dr. Lapuz,filedone daybefore the order
was issued; and besides, it’s not the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court which should decide her
competency to act as administratrix.
Issue: Was Encarnacion’s appointment as administratrix proper? NO.
Held:
While the lower court was correct in assuming that she, as the surviving spouse, enjoyed preference in
the granting of letters of administration, it does not follow that she should be named administratrix
without conducting a full-dress hearing on her competency to discharge that trust.
A hearing has to be held in order to ascertain fitness to act as executor, even if a person has been
designated as the executor in a will. Such designation is not binding on the court and does not
automaticallyentitle himtothe issuanceof letterstestamentary.He mighthave beenfittoactasexecutor
when the will was executed but supervening circumstances might have rendered him unfit for that
position.
In thiscase,the court merelyinterrogatedherinordertosatisfyitself onhermentalcapacity.Itdidnot
give Alfredo a chance to contest her qualifications. He was the one who had raised the issue as to her

3. competency.The probate courthadwronglyassumedthathe had no interestinthe estate as,ithasnow
turned out, he is one of the legatees named in the will.
The proceedinginthe lowercourt must be convertedintoa testamentaryproceeding.Afterthe will is
probated,the priorlettersof administrationshouldbe revokedandproceedingsforthe issuanceof letters
testamentaryor of administrationunderthe will shouldbe conducted.Itis imperative thata hearingbe
held to determine Encarnacion’s fitness to act as executrix or administratrix. Persons questioning her
capacity should be given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.
The lower court departed from the usual course of probate procedure in summarily appointing Mrs.
Baluyut as administratrix on the assumption that Alfredo was not an interested party.
Doctrine/s: Being named executor in a will does not automatically grant letters testamentary or of
administrationtosuchpersonsassuchisnotbindingonthe court.A hearingmustbe heldto determine
the competence of the administrator/administratrixorexecutor/executrix toperformtheirduties,and
those whooppose suchmustbe givenadequateopportunitytobe heardandtopresenttheirevidence.
Other courts’ findings on persons’ competence is also not binding on the probate court.
Dispositive:OrderappointingEncarnacionasadministratrix isSETASIDE,lettersofadministrationissued
to her are CANCELLED, and the probate court is directed to conduct further proceedings
3. Vda. De Gabriel v. CA
G.R. No. 103883 November 14, 1996
Vitug, J.
FACTS:
MarcelinoGabriel wasemployedbyEmeraldConstruction& DevelopmentCorporation(Emerald
Construction for brevity) at its construction project in Iraq. He was covered by a personal accident
insurance inthe amountof P100,000.00 undera group policyprocuredfromFortune Insurance & Surety
Company (Fortune Insurance for brevity) by EmeraldConstruction for its overseas workers. The insured
riskwasforbodilyinjurycausedbyviolentaccidental externalandvisiblemeanswhichinjurywouldsolely
and independently of any other cause result in death or disability.
On 22 May 1982, within the life of the policy, Gabriel died in Iraq. On 12 July 1983, Emerald
Construction reported Gabriel’s death to Fortune Insurance by telephone. Among the documents
thereaftersubmittedtoFortune Insurance were a copy of the death certificate issuedbythe Ministryof
Healthof the Republicof Iraqwhichstatedthatanautopsyreportbythe NationalBureauof Investigation
wasconductedtothe effectthatduetoadvancedstateof postmortemdecomposition, the cause ofdeath
of Gabriel could not be determined (emphasis added).
Because of this development Fortune Insurance ultimately denied the claim of Emerald
Constructiononthe groundof prescription.Gabriel’swidow,Jacqueline Jimenez,wenttothe tothe lower
court. In her complaint against Emerald Construction and Fortune Insurance, she averred that her
husband died of electrocution while in the performance of his work.
Fortune Insurance alleged that since both the death certificate issued by the Iraqi Ministry of
Healthand the autopsyreportof the NBI failedtodisclose the cause of Gabriel’sdeath,itdeniedliability
underthe policy.Inaddition,private respondentraisedthe defense of prescription,invokingSection384
of the Insurance Code.

4. ISSUE:
WON Jacqueline Jimenez vda. de Gabriel’sclaim against Fortune Insurance shouldbe denied on
the ground of prescription
HELD:
Yes. Section 384 of the Insurance Code provides:
Sec. 384. Any person having any claim upon the policy issued pursuant to this
chaptershall,withoutanyunnecessarydelay,presenttothe insurance company
concernedawrittennotice of claimsettingforththe nature,extentandduration
of the injuriessustainedascertifiedbya dulylicensedphysician.Notice of claim
must be filed within six monthsfrom date of the accident, otherwise, the claim
shall be deemed waived.Action or suit for recovery of damage due to loss or
injury must be brought, in proper cases, with the Commissioner or the Courts
withinone yearfromdenial of the claim, otherwise,the claimantsrightof action
shall prescribe.
The notice of deathwasgiventoFortuneInsurance,concededly,more thanayearafterthe death
of vda. de Gabriel’s husband. Fortune Insurance, in invoking prescription, was not referring to the one-
year periodfromthe denial of the claimwithinwhichtofile anactionagainstan insurerbut obviouslyto
the written notice of claim that had to be submitted within six months from the time of the accident.
Vda.de Gabriel arguesthat Fortune Insurance mustbe deemedtohave waiveditsrightto show
that the cause of death is an excepted peril,by failing to have its answers duly verified. It is true that a
matter of which a written request for admission is made shall be deemed impliedly admitted unless,
within a period designated in the request,which shall not be less than 10 days after service thereof,or
withinsuchfurthertime as the court may allow onmotionand notice,the party to whomthe requestis
directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically
the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot
truthfullyeitheradmitordenythosematters;however,the verification,likeinmostcasesrequiredbythe
rules of procedure, is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, and mainly intended to secure an
assurance that matters whichare allegedare done ingood faithor are true and correct and not of mere
speculation. When circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the correction of unverified
pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may
thereby be served. In the case of answers to written requests for admission particularly, the court can
allowthe partymakingthe admission,whethermade expresslyordeemedtohave beenmade impliedly,
to withdraw or amend it upon such terms as may be just.
The insurance policy expressly provided that to be compensable, the injury or death should be
causedbyviolentaccidental external andvisible means.Inattemptingtoprovethe causeof herhusband’s
death,all that vda.de Gabriel couldsubmitwere alettersentto herby her husband’sco-worker,stating
thatGabriel diedwhenhetriedtohaul wateroutof atankwhileitssubmergedmotorwasstillfunctioning,
and vda. de Gabriel’s sworn affidavit. The said affidavit, however,suffers from procedural infirmityas it
wasnot eventestifiedtooridentifiedbyvda.de Gabriel herself.Thisaffidavitthereforeisamere hearsay
under the law.

5. In like manner, the letter allegedly written by the deceased’s co-worker which was never
identified to in court by the supposed author, suffers from the same defect as the affidavit of vda. de
Gabriel.Notone of the otherdocumentssubmitted,towit,the POEA decision,the deathcertificateissued
by the Ministry of Health of Iraq and the NBI autopsy report, could give any probative value to vda. de
Gabriel’sclaim.The POEA decisiondidnotmake anycategorical holdingonthe specificcause of Gabriel’s
death.
In summary,evidence isutterlywantingtoestablishthatthe insuredsufferedfromanaccidental
death, the risk covered by the policy.
4. INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO BORROMEO-HERRERA,
petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCOP. BURGOS, Judge of the Court ofFirst
Instance of Cebu,Branch II, respondents.
G.R. No.L-41171 July23, 1987
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
VitoBorromeo,awidowerandpermanentresidentof CebuCity,diedonMarch13, 1952, inParanaque,
Rizal at the age of 88 years,withoutforcedheirsbutleavingextensivepropertiesinthe province of
Cebu.
On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquerafiledwiththe Courtof FirstInstance of Cebua petitionforthe probate
of a one page documentas the lastwill andtestamentleftbythe saiddeceased,devisingall his
propertiestoTomas,FortunatoandAmelia,all surnamedBorromeo,inequal andundividedshares,and
designatingJunqueraasexecutorthereof.
Afterdue trial,the probate court heldthatthe documentpresentedasthe will of the deceasedwasa
forgery.
The testate proceedingswasconvertedintoanintestateproceedings.
Afterdeterminingthe intestate heirsof the decedent,the courtorderedthatthe assetsof the intestate
estate of VitoBorromeoshall be dividedinto4/9and 5/9 groupsand distributedinequal andequitable
sharesamongthe 9 declaredintestate heirs.
On August25, 1972, respondentFortunatoBorromeo,whohadearlierclaimedasheirunderthe forged
will,filedamotionbefore the trial courtprayingthathe be declaredasone of the heirsof the deceased
VitoBorromeo,allegingthathe isan illegitimatesonof the deceasedandthatinthe declarationof heirs
made by the trial court, he was omitted,indisregardof the law makinghimaforcedheirentitledto
receive alegitimelikeall otherforcedheirs.Asanacknowledgedillegitimate child,he statedthathe was
entitledtoalegitime equalineverycase tofour-fifthsof the legitimeof anacknowledgednatural child.

6. Findingthatthe motionof FortunatoBorromeowasalreadybarredby the orderof the court datedApril
12, 1969 declaringthe personsnamedthereinasthe legal heirsof the deceasedVitoBorromeo,the
court dismissedthe motiononJune 25, 1973.
FortunatoBorromeofiledamotionforreconsideration.Inthe memorandumhe submittedtosupport
hismotionforreconsideration,Fortunatochangedthe basisforhisclaimtoa portionof the estate.He
assertedandincorporatedaWaiverof HereditaryRightsdatedJuly31,1967, supposedlysignedbyPilar
N.Borromeo,Maria B. Putong,Jose Borromeo,CanutoV.Borromeo,Jr.,SaludBorromeo,Patrocinio
Borromeo-Herrera,Marcial Borromeo,AsuncionBorromeo,FedericoV.Borromeo,ConsueloB.Morales,
RemediosAlfonsoandAmelindaB.TalamIn the waiver,five of the nine heirsrelinquishedtoFortunato
theirsharesinthe disputedestate.The motionwasopposedonthe groundthatthe trial court, actingas
a probate court, had nojurisdictiontotake cognizance of the claim;thatrespondentFortunato
Borromeoisestoppedfromassertingthe waiveragreement;thatthe waiveragreementisvoidasitwas
executedbefore the declarationof heirs;thatthe same isvoidhavingbeenexecutedbefore the
distributionof the estate andbefore the acceptance of the inheritance;andthatit isvoid ab initio and
inexistentforlackof subjectmatter.
On December24, 1974, afterdue hearing,the trial courtconcludingthatthe five declaredheirswho
signedthe waiveragreementassigningtheirhereditaryrightstoFortunatoBorromeohadlostthe same
rights,declaredthe latterasentitledto5/9 of the estate of VitoBorromeo.
It isarguedby the petitionerthatthe documententitled"waiverof HereditaryRights"executedonJuly
31, 1967, aside fromhavingbeencancelledandrevokedonJune 29, 1968, byTomas L. Borromeo,
FortunatoBorromeoandAmeliaBorromeo,iswithoutforce andeffectbecausethere canbe no
effectivewaiverof hereditaryrightsbefore therehasbeenavalidacceptance of the inheritance the
heirsintendtotransfer.PursuanttoArticle 1043 of the Civil Code,tomake acceptance orrepudiationof
inheritance valid,the personmustbe certainof the deathof the one from whomhe isto inheritandof
hisrightto the inheritance.Since the petitionerandherco-heirswere notcertainof theirrighttothe
inheritance untiltheywere declaredheirs,theirrights were,therefore,uncertain.Thisview,according
to the petitioner,isalsosupportedbyArticle 1057 of the same Code whichdirectsheirs,devicees,and
legateestosignifytheiracceptance orrepudiationwithinthirtydaysafterthe courthas issuedan order
for the distributionof the estate.
RespondentFortunatoBorromeoonthe otherhand,contendsthatunderArticle 1043 of the Civil Code
there isno needfora personto be firstdeclaredasheirbefore he can acceptor repudiate an
inheritance.Whatisrequiredisthathe mustfirstbe certainof the deathof the personfromwhomhe is
to inheritandthathe mustbe certainof hisrightto the inheritance.He pointsoutthatat the time of
the signingof the waiverdocumentonJuly31, 1967, the signatoriestothe waiverdocumentwere
certainthat VitoBorromeowasalreadydeadas well asof theirrightsto the inheritance asshowninthe
waiverdocumentitself.
ISSUE:

7. Whetheror notan acceptance or renunciationof inheritance,inordertobe valid,mustbe precededby
a court declarationthatthe personmakingthe acceptance or renunciationisindeedanheir.
RULING:
No.
The prevailingjurisprudence onwaiverof hereditaryrightsisthat"the propertiesincludedinanexisting
inheritance cannotbe consideredasbelongingtothirdpersonswithrespecttothe heirs,whobyfiction
of lawcontinue the personalityof the former.Nordosuchpropertieshave the characterof future
property,because the heirsacquire arightto successionfromthe momentof the deathof the
deceased,byprinciple establishedinarticle 657 and appliedbyarticle 661 of the Civil Code,accordingto
whichthe heirssucceedthe deceasedbythe mere factof death.More or less,time mayelapse fromthe
momentof the deathof the deceaseduntil the heirsenterintopossessionof the hereditaryproperty,
but the acceptance inany eventretroactstothe momentof the death,inaccordance witharticle 989 of
the Civil Code.The rightisvested,althoughconditioneduponthe adjudicationof the corresponding
hereditaryportion."The heirs,therefore,couldwaive theirhereditaryrightsin1967 evenif the orderto
partitionthe estate wasissuedonlyin1969.
In thiscase,however,the purported"Waiverof HereditaryRights"cannotbe consideredtobe effective.
For a waivertoexist,three elementsare essential:(1) the existenceof aright;(2) the knowledge of the
existence thereof;and(3) an intentiontorelinquishsuchright.The intentiontowaive arightor
advantage mustbe shownclearlyandconvincingly,andwhenthe onlyproof of intentionrestsinwhata
party does,hisact shouldbe somanifestlyconsistentwith,andindicative of anintentto,voluntarily
relinquishthe particularrightoradvantage that nootherreasonable explanationof hisconductis
possible.
The circumstancesof thiscase showthat the signatoriestothe waiverdocumentdidnothave the clear
and convincingintentiontorelinquishtheirrights,Thus:(1) OnOctober27, 1967. Fortunato,Tomas,and
AmeliaBorromeofiledapleadingentitled"Compliance"whereintheysubmittedaproposal forthe
amicable settlementof the case.Inthat Compliance,theyproposedtoconcede toall the eight(8)
intestate heirsof VitoBorromeoall properties,personal andreal,includingall cashandsumsof money
inthe handsof the Special Administrator,asof October31, 1967, notcontestedorclaimedbythemin
any actionthenpendinginthe Courtof First Instance of Cebu.Inturn, the heirswouldwaive and
concede tothemall the 14 contestedlots.Inthisdocument,the respondentrecognizesandconcedes
that the petitioner,like the othersignatoriestothe waiverdocument,isanheirof the deceasedVito
Borromeo,entitledtoshare inthe estate.Thisshowsthatthe "Waiverof HereditaryRights"wasnever
meantto be what the respondentnowpurportsittobe.Had the intentbeenotherwise,there would
not be any reasonforFortunato,Tomas,and AmeliaBorromeotomentionthe heirsinthe offertosettle
the case amicably,andoffertoconcede to thempartsof the estate of the deceased;(2) OnApril 21 and
30, 1969, the majorityof the declaredheirsexecutedanAgreementonhow the estate theyinherited
shall be distributed.ThisAgreementof Partitionwasapprovedbythe trial courton August15, 1969; (3)
On June 29, 1968, the petitioner,amongothers,signedadocumententitledDeedof Assignment"

8. purportingtotransferand assigninfavorof the respondentandTomasand AmeliaBorromeoall her
(PatrocinioB.Herrera's) rights,interests,andparticipationasan intestate heirinthe estate of the
deceasedVitoBorromeo.The statedconsiderationforsaidassignmentwasP100,000.00; (4) On the
same date,June 29, 1968, the respondentTomas,andAmeliaBorromeo(assigneesinthe
aforementioneddeedof assignment) inturnexecuteda"Deedof Reconveyance"infavorof the heirs-
assignorsnamedinthe same deedof assignment.The statedconsiderationwasP50,000.00; (5) A
Cancellationof Deedof AssignmentandDeedof Reconveyance wassignedbyTomasBorromeoand
AmeliaBorromeoonOctober15, 1968, while FortunatoBorromeosignedthisdocumentonMarch 24,
1969.
5. Mendoza vs. Pacheco
FACTS:
Manuel Sorianowasformeradministratorof the estate of Cosme.Assuchadministrator,he filedabond
for P5,000 withJanuarioPachecoandRaymundoCorderoas sureties.Whenanaccountwas made,
Sorianowasindebtedtothe estate.Thus,the lowercourtorderedthe executionof hisbond.
Some time later,Sorianoand the newadministratrix enteredintoasettlementwherebySorianoceded
certainreal propertiestothe estate,therebyreducinghisindebtednesstoP5,000. The suretiesnow
questionthe jurisdictionof the courtto execute the bond.
ISSUE:
o Whetheror nota probate courthas the powerto orderthe executionof anadministrator'sbond
HELD:
To beginwith,itlieswithindiscretionof the court to selectan administratorof the estate of a deceased
person. Before an administrator, or an executor, enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters
testamentary or of administration are issued, the person to whom they are issued is required to give a
bondin suchreasonable sumasthe court directs,withone or more sufficientsureties,conditionedupon
the faithful performanceof histrust.The administratorisaccountableonhisbondalongwiththe sureties
for the performance of certain legal obligations.
It is clear that the Court of First Instance, exercising probate jurisdiction, is empowered to require the
filingof the administrator'sbond,tofix the amountthereof,andtoholdit accountable forany breachof
the administrator's duty. Possessed,as it is, with an all-embracing power over the administrator's bond
and overadministrationproceedings,aCourt of First Instance ina probate proceedingcannotbe devoid
of legal authoritytoexecute andmake that bondanswerable forthe verypurpose for whichit wasfiled.
It istrue that the lawdoesnot sayexpresslyorinsomanywordstat such court has powertoexecute the
bondof an administrator,butby necessaryandlogical implication,the poweristhere as eloquentlyasif
it were phrased in unequivocal term.

9. 6. (In Re: Intestate Estate of Juliana Reyes)PaulinaSantosDe Parreño vs GregoriaAranzanso
G.R. No. L-27657 (August 30, 1992)
Abad Santos, J.:
Removal of administrator for causes stated in the rules.
FACTS: JulianaReyesdiedintestate.Hersubstantialestate isstillbeingsettledinSpecial Proceedings
No.34354 of the Courtof FirstInstance of Manila,Branch IV.The settlementhasspawnedanumberof
litigationwhichhasreachedthisCourtandincludesnotonlythe instantcase butalsoothercaseswith
the followingdocketnumbers:23828, 26940 and 27130.
The estate hadonlyspecial administratorsuntil GregoriaAranzansowhoclaimstobe a firstcousin
of the decedentaskedthatshe be appointedregularadministrator.Hermotionprovokedcounter
motions,oppositions,replies,rebuttal andrejoinderwhichtake up120 pagesof the printedrecordon
appeal andwhichdemonstrate the zeal of the variouscounsel inespousingtheirclientsclaimstothe
estate whichasaforesaidissubstantial.
PROCEDURAL BACKDROP:
CFI,Manila – OnJanuary 29, 1966, the Court issuedanorderappointingGregoriaAranzansoasregular
administratorandrelievingAraceli A.Pilapil asspecial administrator.
Motionsfor reconsiderationof the orderwere filedbutthe presidingjudge heldfirm"considering
that mostof the movantshave adverse interestsagainstthisintestate estate."(Orderof February
16,1966, pp- 140-141, Recordon Appeal.)
But the oppositionwaspersistent;itrefusedtogive in.Andsoon June 20, 1966, the court which
incidentallywaspresidedbyadifferentjudge issuedanorderdeclaringthatthe oppositorsGregoria
Aranzanso,DemetriaVentura,ConsueloPasionandPacitaPasionhave norightto intervene inthis
intestate estate proceedingandtoreturnto the estate the sumof P14,000.00 receivedbythemwiththe
authorityof thisCourt; Revokingthe appointmentof GregoriaAranzansoasregularadministratrix and
orderingherto renderanaccountingof heradministration;Appointingthe petitionerPaulinaR.Santos
de Parrenospecial administratrix of the intestateestate of herlate mother,JulianaReyesde Santos;and
reevokingthe previousorderof May9, 1966 allowingthe regularadministratrix tomake extensive
repairsonthe buildingbelongingtothe estate.
CA – The Court of First Instance decidedthe pointindispute,rulingthatthe validityof the adoptionin
questioncouldnotbe assailedcollaterallyinthe intestate proceedings(Sp.Proc.No.34354). The order
was appealedtothe Courtof Appeals.
The Courtof Appealsreversedthe appealedorder,findinginsteadthatthe adoptionwasnull and
voidab initio due to the absence of consenttheretobythe natural parentsof the minorchildren,which
it deemedajurisdictionaldefectstill opentocollateral attack.
Statingthat,"The principal issue on the merits in this appealis whetherrespondents-oppositors
Aranzanso and Ventura,could assailin the settlementproceedingstheadoption decreein favorof
Paulina and Aurora Santos," thisCourtgave anegative answer.
A motionforreconsiderationof the orderwasdeniedwhichpromptedGregoriaAranzansoto
appeal the orderto thisCourt.
ISSUE/s: WONTHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REMOVING THE APPELLANTASREGULAR
ADMINISTRATRIXOFTHE INTESTATEESTATE OF THE LATE JULIANA REYES ANDTHE REVOCATION OF
HER APPOINTMENTISCONTRARYTO LAW.

10. HELD: Yes.There is meritinthe appeal,As indicatedinthe lone assignmentof error,the onlyissue in
thisappeal,iswhetherornotthe lowercourtwasjustifiedinrevokingthe appointmentof Gregoria
Aranzansoas the administratorof the intestate estate of JulianaReyes.Alientothe issue is the question
of preference— whetheritshouldbe GregoriaAranzansowhoisa firstcousinof the decedentor
PaulinaSantosde Parreñowhoisan adoptedchildof the decedent — inreceivinglettersof
administration.
It standsto reasonthat the appellanthavingbeenappointedregularadministratorof the intestate
estate of JulianaReyesmaybe removedfromheroffice butonlyfora cause or causesprovidedbylaw.
What isthe lawon removal?ItisfoundinRule 82, Section2,of the Rulesof Court whichreadsas
follows:
Sec.2. Courtmay remove oraccept resignationof executororadministrator.
Proceedingsupondeath,resignation,orremoval.— If anexecutororadministrator
neglectstorenderhisaccountand settle the estate accordingtolaw,or to performan
orderor judgmentof the court, or a duty expresslyprovidedbythese rules,orabsconds
or becomesinsane,orotherwiseincapable orunsuitable todischarge the trust,the
court may remove him,or,initsdiscretion,maypermithimto resign.Whenanexecutor
or administratordies,resigns,orisremovedthe remainingexecutororadministrator
may administerthe trustalone,unlessthe courtgrantsletterstosomeone toact with
him.If there isno remainingexecutororadministrator, administrationmaybe granted
to any suitable person.
It is obviousthatthe decisionof thisCourt,citedinthe appealedorder,thatGregoriaAranzanso,
amongother persons,iswithoutrighttointervene asheirinthe settlementof the estate inquestionis
not one of the groundsprovidedbythe Rulesof Court.
Let itbe recalledthatinG.R. No.L-23828, PaulinaSantos,etal.vs.GregoriaAranzanso,etal.,123
Phil.160 (1966), a collateral attackonthe adoptionof the twogirlswasnot allowedunderthe following
facts:
WhenJulianaReyesdiedintestate,SimplicioSantosfiledinthe Courtof FirstInstance of
Manilaa petitionforthe settlementof herestate.Insaidpetitionhe statedamong
otherthingsthat the survivingheirs of the deceasedare:he,assurvivingspouse,
PaulinaSantosandAurora Santos,27 and17 yearsof age,respectively.Inthe same
petition,he askedthathe be appointedadministratorof the estate.
GregoriaAranzanso,allegingthatshe isfirstcousinto the deceased,filedanopposition
to the petitionforappointmentof administrator.Forhergroundsshe assertedthat
SimplicioSantos'marriage tothe late JulianaReyeswasbigamousandthusvoid;and
that the adoptionof PaulinaSantosandAuroraSantos waslikewisevoid ab initio for
wantof the writtenconsentof theirparentswhowere thenlivingandhadnot
abandonedthem.
The decisiondeniedtoGregoriaAranzansothe rightto intervene inthe settlementproceedingsas
an heirof JulianaReyes.Butan administratordoesnothave tobe an heir.He can be a stranger to the
deceased.Infact,inone of hermotionsPaulinaSantosde Parrenoproposedthe appointmentof the
Philippine NationalBankasspecial administrator.(RecordonAppeal,pp. 144-146.) We holdthatthe
interventionof GregoriaAranzansointhe settlementproceedingsisnotinthe capacityof heiralthough
she mightbe one if herdirectattack on the adoptionof the twogirlsshouldsucceed.We have
authorizedsuchdirectattackin G.R. No.L-26940.
Final Ruling: the orderof June 20, 1966, removing GregoriaAranzanso as administrator is herebyset
aside and she is reinstatedas administrator of the intestate estate of JulianaReyes. Costagainst the
appelle.

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