Hydropower, Anti-politics and the opening of new political spaces in the Eastern Himalayas

Hydropower, Anti-Politics, and the Opening of New Political Spaces
in the Eastern Himalayas
AMELIE HUBER a,b
and DEEPA JOSHI c,*
a
Universitat Auto`noma de Barcelona, Spain
b
Bogˇ aziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey
c
Wageningen University, The Netherlands
Summary. — Hydropower has lately been advocated by a multi-scalar public–private policy nexus for marrying objectives of green
growth and climate mitigation. Such discursive constructions are reminiscent of a consensual development politics, which contradicts
and overlooks long-standing socio-environmental controversies surrounding large dams. Here we argue that anti-political hydropower
governance also risks fueling inherent societal antagonisms, with unexpected outcomes. Drawing on qualitative empirical research in
Sikkim, Northeast India, we illustrate how attempts by state and private actors to restrict contestation of hydropower projects were
countered with unprecedented voice and agency of affected communities, indicating nascent processes of politicization and democrati-
zation “from below”.
Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Key words — large dams, water conflicts, environmental governance, depoliticization, India, Asia
1. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary processes of environmental governance
exemplify the narrow techno-economic rationality that has
long shaped development policy and practice (Escobar, 1999;
Goldman, 2001; Harriss, 2002; Li, 2007). The neoliberal ide-
ologies that often drive environmental governance deliberately
sideline questions of complex, context-specific human–envi-
ronment interactions through depoliticized and consensual
governing and policy-making (Bu¨scher, 2010). The discursive
construction of hydropower development as a green growth
strategy (World Bank, 2014), and the subsequent come-back
of large dams in developing and newly dominant economies
(Cole, Elliott, & Strobl, 2014; Pittock, 2010) are particularly
characteristic of such consensual politics of development.
In 2000, the World Commission on Dams’ (WCD, 2000)
critical appraisal of “large-dams-as-usual” as being environ-
mentally unsustainable and socially unethical, marked a
low-point for the global dam industry (McCully, 2001,
p. xvi). The World Bank had already substantially
reduced its lending for dam construction during the 1990s.
Intense North–South civil society advocacy on the socio-
environmental costs of large dams had pressured the world’s
foremost traditional financier of mega-water-infrastructure
to withdraw from controversial dam projects such as the Sar-
dar Sarovar Project in the Indian Narmada valley (Khagram,
2004), or Arun III in Nepal (Rest, 2012). Yet, within the past
decade, controversial dam projects have again featured promi-
nently in development planning, including on the World
Bank’s funding agenda (Cole et al., 2014; Pittock, 2010).
According to Rachel Kyte, the bank’s vice president for sus-
tainable development, “the earlier move out of hydro ‘was
the wrong message.. . . That was then. This is now. We are
back’” (Schneider, 2013).
This global hydropower boom is facilitated by a broad
multi-scalar policy consensus among donors, national and
regional governments, dam-builders and large green groups,
bringing together interests of green growth, private capital
accumulation, and climate mitigation (Ahlers et al., 2015;
Pittock, 2010). The dominant discourse legitimizes large hydro
as clean, reliable and affordable (Cole et al., 2014) and posi-
tions dam development as the only “moral alternative to fossil
fuel-based electricity” (Fletcher, 2010, p. 5). This consensus is
institutionalized in climate finance arrangements such as the
Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),
which enable polluting Northern parties to meet their climate
commitments (EC, 2004; Haya & Parekh, 2011), and provide
economic and political incentives – a clean image – to private
investors (Newell, Phillips, & Purohit, 2011). By 2013, hydro-
power made up 26% of CDM-registered projects, 1
even
though evidence on whether, and at what scale hydropower
projects actually off-set carbon emissions is scarce (Erlewein
& Nu¨sser, 2011; Haya & Parekh, 2011; Pottinger, 2008).
Both newly dominant economies like China, India, Turkey,
or Brazil, as well as developing countries with hydropower
potential, such as Nepal, Ethiopia, or Laos equate hydro-
power development with energy security, stable growth rates
and modernization, and have liberalized their national energy
sectors to enable private capital to boost the rate and speed of
dam construction (Matthews, 2012; Moore, Dore, & Gyawali,
2010). The fact that most of the proposed sites for new dams
are located in isolated, economically marginal, and poorly
developed frontier regions, enables state governments to addi-
tionally position hydropower as a main source of revenue to
mitigate regional development discrepancies.
* The authors would like to thank all the respondents in Sikkim and India
for their time and contribution, as well as Alex Bolding, Begu¨m
O¨ zkaynak, Birgit Daiber, Christos Zografos, Daniella Blake, Diego
Andreucci, Ethemcan Turhan, Federico Demaria, Fikret Adaman,
Giorgos Kallis, Marta Conde, Panagiota Kotsila, Rita Calvario,
Rhodante Ahlers, and Viviana Asara for their constructive comments
on earlier versions of this paper. Writing of this paper has received funding
from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research,
technological development and demonstration (Marie Curie Actions)
under grant agreement no. 289374 (ENTITLE). The views expressed in
this paper are of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
European Commission. Final revision accepted: June 6, 2015.
World Development Vol. 76, pp. 13–25, 2015
0305-750X/Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.06.006
13

However, on the ground today’s large hydro projects are
no less controversial and contentious than those of previous
decades. Many proposed dam sites are concentrated in eco-
logically and culturally diverse regions such as the Amazon,
the Nile, the Mekong River, or the Himalayas, and fre-
quently in indigenous territories (Coelho & Favaretto,
2008; Cole et al., 2014; Grumbine & Pandit, 2013; Orr,
Pittock, Chapagain, & Dumaresq, 2012). These riverscapes
are climate vulnerable ecosystems, where dam construction
is likely to exacerbate climate-related variability in water
flows and biodiversity, as well as vulnerability to
hydro-climatic disasters (Shah, 2013; Vagholikar & Das,
2010). As a result, accelerated hydropower development
has led to a multiplication of social conflicts over diverse
issues such as cost–benefit distribution, hazard risks, and
indigenous sovereignty among others (Baruah, 2012;
Finley-Brook & Thomas, 2011; Matthews, 2012;
McCormick, 2010; Sneddon & Fox, 2008).
This “manufacture” (Herman & Chomsky, 1994) of domi-
nant green narratives about hydropower evokes earlier discur-
sive constructions that served to legitimize controversial dam
projects in the interest of powerful actors, for example their
framing as a panacea for water scarcity (Mehta, 2001). It is
also reminiscent of the shortcomings of consensual develop-
ment politics in other extractive industries. Larsen and
Mamosso (2014, p. 62), for example, show how in Niger’s min-
ing sector development cooperation “has ignored grievances
on grave environmental impacts and rampant institutional
failures while a crisis discourse on desertification and food
insecurity diverts attention from geopolitical interests in min-
eral wealth”.
In this article we look at public–private hydropower devel-
opment in the Eastern Himalayan state of Sikkim, Northeast
India, where since 2000 the state government has proactively
enabled private developers to implement a dozen large
hydropower projects. To maximize the speed of dam con-
struction, public participation in project-related
decision-making has been undermined by hydro proponents
through a mix of strategies we refer to as anti-politics. As
a consequence, local resistance to hydropower development
has been either conspicuously absent or unprecedentedly out-
spoken, calling for a nuanced analysis of such diverse expres-
sions of popular political agency. The aim of this paper is to
explore how high-handed anti-political maneuvering “from
above” clashes with the articulation of “political voices from
below”. Our case study shows how the use of depoliticizing
and coercive strategies to stifle dissent and to maximize the
speed of dam construction served to aggravate intrinsic
social antagonisms. In the absence of legitimate channels
of expression this set in motion radical grassroots political
processes.
The paper is structured as follows. We first give an overview
of theoretical debates about anti-politics, depoliticization, and
“the political” at the interface of development studies and
political ecology. This is followed by an introduction to Sik-
kim’s hydropower mission and the uneven pattern of conflict
it has produced, illustrated against the backdrop of the state’s
political-economic history. The remaining three sections pro-
vide detailed empirical accounts of the different anti-political
tactics used to pre-empt popular opposition to state-led hydro-
power development; new forms of politicization and popular
political action that have emerged; and a theoretical discussion
of how these relate to one another. The final section concludes
with policy implications.
2. ANTI-POLITICS, DEPOLITICIZATION, AND ‘‘THE
POLITICAL’’
Ferguson (1990) coined the term “anti-politics machine” to
describe the international donor-driven “development appara-
tus” in Lesotho, Southern Africa, which tended to
re-implement development projects despite their failure. He
illustrated how development planners, their discourses, and
interventions overlooked complex political and structural
causes of poverty, class, inefficiency and corruption, and in
doing so ended up segregating development practice from dee-
ply entrenched politics within and outside the state. Such
rationalizing processes in development policy and practice
allow casting political dimensions of poverty, inequity, or
unemployment as “technical problems” to be addressed
through interventions by “politically neutral”, technical
experts (Ferguson, 1990, p. 66).
Ferguson was cognizant of the “politics” of presenting
development planning as an apolitical process. However, as
such, he saw no deep-rooted “conspiracy” in the anti-politics
machine, whose outcomes he noted to be largely unintended,
and yet welcome and useful to the act of rationalization. First,
because by suspending “politics” from development planning,
extremely sensitive political operations could be performed,
thereby extending the powers of the state administration
“under cover of a neutral, technical mission to which no one
can object” (Ferguson, 1990, p. 270). Second, because by
depoliticizing both poverty and the state, planned develop-
ment could effectively undermine any possible political chal-
lenges to the system.
Our research findings complement the work of Ferguson but
also draw parallels with research conducted by several other
scholars, who have challenged Ferguson’s assumption about
the (lack of) intentionality behind anti-politics effects – espe-
cially considering that failed interventions are readily repeated
(Bending, 2003). Based on his review of conservation and
development projects in Southern Africa, Bu¨scher (2010,
p. 33), for example, argued for the need to recognize the struc-
tural relations in which anti-politics as an “essential political
strategy [and] intrinsic element of the wider political economy
of neoliberalism” operates. Li (2007, p. 9), who analyzed the
rationale and effects of rural improvement schemes in Indone-
sia, proposed that by “rendering technical,” development
planning serves to meet particular development expectations,
with a deliberate objective: containing a challenge, e.g.,
through public mobilization, to the status quo – the domi-
nance of particular classes or groups.
Another theoretical debate, which is relevant for the case of
Sikkim, questions the unidirectional, top-down, hegemonic
operation of the anti-politics machine (Nustad, 2001), point-
ing to its flip-side, and the need to understand how communi-
ties affected by development interventions may challenge or
become complicit in anti-political maneuvers (Bending, 2003;
Li, 2007). Thus anti-political processes can work in multiple
directions, with different stakeholder groups using different
anti-political strategies to legitimize their own interpretations
of any given development project (Bu¨scher, 2010).
On the one hand, as Robins (1998) reminds us, development
is not necessarily perceived by its intended beneficiaries as an
anti-democratic, capitalist, and imperialist agenda, as some
post-development scholars may suggest. Their concerns are
often “far more contextual and contingent and grounded
within the more immediate and mundane contexts of their
everyday lives” (Robins, 1998, p. 1679). Li (2007, p. 11) on
14 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

the other hand emphasizes the counter-hegemonic moment,
when the “targets of expert schemes” come up with their
own critical analysis of development problems, thereby punc-
turing expert discourse with “a challenge it cannot contain”.
She calls this “the practice of politics . . . which often starts
out as a refusal of the way things are”, and which opens a
“front of struggle” in the process (Li, 2007).
However, whether and how anti-politics strategies result in a
closing down of political spaces, or inadvertently provoke a
political challenge, depends on situated geographical and eco-
nomic factors (Li, 2007), as well as political and institutional
configurations (Chhotray, 2007). Chhotray’s research in India,
for example, noted how, rather than reproducing failed devel-
opment projects, “the [Indian] state has more direct ways of
establishing its power” (Chhotray, 2007, p. 1039). Chhotray
also suggested that not all actors and agencies engage in the
same way, and with the same intentionality in development
politics, i.e., there is not one anti-political project.
Similar concerns over anti-politics in environmental man-
agement and governance processes have been expressed by
political ecologists, who criticize the depoliticizing tendencies
in contemporary debates “over what to do with natures”
(Swyngedouw, 2007, p. 23). Political ecology perspectives
challenge alleged “win–win” approaches to environmental
governance and the concomitant “consensualism in policing
public affairs” (Swyngedouw, 2011b, p. 2). They do so by
pointing to the political and economic roots and consequences
of environmental transformation processes, and by emphasiz-
ing the underlying, unequal power relations between the actors
involved (see for example Blaikie, 1999; Escobar, 1999; Mehta,
2001; Peet & Watts, 1996; Robbins, 2004).
The techno-managerial literature on “sustainable develop-
ment”, for instance, clearly reflects this absence of politics,
blurring “who formulates and implements these strategies,
and in whose interest” (Bryant, 1991, p. 164). Deliberations
over “what kind of natures we wish to inhabit . . . preserve,
to make . . . and how to get there” are hardly encouraged in
discussions over socio-environmental futures (Swyngedouw,
2007, p. 23). This is particularly evident in contemporary sci-
entific and policy discourses relating to water scarcity
(Mehta, 2001) or climate change (Swyngedouw, 2011a), where
popular, broad-brush arguments emphasize apocalyptic uni-
versal threats to a singular imagining of a desirable “environ-
ment”. As Swyngedouw (2011a) argued, images and concepts,
such as climate change and sustainability are so carefully pre-
sented as apolitical global humanitarian causes that they
become impossible to disagree with. Yet, this obscures that
all natures are socio-ecologically co-produced, heterogeneous,
and thus by definition antagonistic political constructs.
How do we relate to the above analyses to gain an under-
standing of the everyday politics of hydropower on the
ground? Central to our understanding of anti-politics is the
distinction between “the political” as the antagonistic dimen-
sion constitutive of human society (Mouffe, 2005), and “poli-
tics” as “the power plays between political actors and the
everyday choreographies of policy making” (which includes
the practices of conventional democratic politics;
Swyngedouw, 2011b, p. 4). Anti-politics, as a government
practice, is driven by a belief in the possibility and desirability
of consensus. It therefore negates the importance of antago-
nism in democratic politics, removing “the political” from
debates about development and environmental interventions,
and from the management process itself. It aims to abolish
the social, deliberative process of democratic
decision-making that endorses discursive contests, especially
the contestation of political decisions and “hegemonic meta-
phoric language that disguises alternatives or constrains
choice” (Marden, 2003, p. 234). Making explicit this distinc-
tion is important in our research context, where popular imag-
ination tends to ascribe the terms “politics” and “political
(activity)” to the domain of mass politics and factionalism,
commonly associated with vested interests, power play, crimi-
nal activity, and corruption (Chhotray, 2011).
We carried out fieldwork investigations between January
and April 2011, mostly focusing on two project areas: the area
surrounding the 510 MW Teesta V hydroelectric project
(HEP) in Central Sikkim, operational since 2008; and the
upper reaches of the Rathong Chu River in West Sikkim,
where three dam projects (Lethang, Ting Ting and Tashiding)
with a combined capacity of 292 MW were being planned at
the time of our research. We conducted 52
informal/semi-structured interviews, five focus group discus-
sions, and on-site observations in 17 project-affected commu-
nities. Respondents were selected by snowball sampling,
drawing from the group identified as “directly
project-affected” (those who sold land to the project) and
those indirectly affected (e.g., through ecological impacts).
Attention was also paid to heterogeneity in the sample with
regard to physical location vis-a`-vis the project infrastructure,
political and economic status, and ethnicity.
The rationale behind individual and collective responses to
hydropower development in its planning and implementation
phases was central to the discussions, as were relationships
between affected communities, state actors, and project devel-
opers. Interviews were also conducted with activists (nine),
journalists (two), government officials (four), NGO staff
(four), company representatives/employees (two), and aca-
demics (five) familiar with hydropower politics. Further infor-
mation was derived from local and national newspapers,
(academic) journals as well as social media (Facebook)
groups.
3. HYDROPOWER AND CONFLICT IN SIKKIM – A
BRIEF HISTORY
(a) The political economy of hydropower in Sikkim
Sikkim, an independent kingdom until 1975, is India’s sec-
ond smallest (7,096 km2
) and least populated (610,577) state
(Census, 2011), located in the Eastern Himalayan borderland
between Nepal, Tibet/China, Bhutan, and India. The state is
endowed with an entirely mountainous topography, and the
rivers of the Teesta basin with a steep flow gradient, which
hydropower proponents have translated into a potential
capacity of 8,000 megawatts (MW) at peak times – Northeast
India’s second largest (GOS, 2009b).
Sikkim’s rugged and isolated geography has permitted little
industrial development so far, and is used to justify invest-
ments in hydropower as an important opportunity for
increased revenue generation, growth, and financial indepen-
dence. Since its annexation to India in 1975, Sikkim’s predom-
inantly rural economy relies almost entirely on development
assistance from the Government of India for infrastructure
development, health, education, and poverty alleviation, plus
a temporary non-taxation privilege (Arora, 2009).
Hydropower in Sikkim has become a national development
priority to the extent that it may alleviate recurring energy
shortages in the country, and fuel economic growth. The
“mission” to generate 5,000 MW in Sikkim by 2015 is part
of the Government of India’s 50,000 MW “Hydro Initiative”,
launched in 2003 (Dharmadikary, 2008). The majority of the
HYDROPOWER, ANTI-POLITICS, AND THE OPENING OF NEW POLITICAL SPACES IN THE EASTERN HIMALAYAS 15

new hydropower projects (more than 200) are planned for the
Northeast region of which Sikkim is administratively a part.
Offering more than 63,257 MW largely untapped hydropower
potential (Vagholikar & Das, 2010), the Northeast is nowa-
days known as the country’s “future powerhouse” (Menon,
Vagholikar, Kohli, & Fernandes, 2003, p. 3). That this periph-
eral part of the country currently lies largely outside the ambit
of Indian economic development allows national as well as
local politicians and policy-makers to position hydropower
as a vehicle for development integration.
Liberalization of the national energy sector in 2003 triggered
a veritable “hydro rush” in the Northeast, as private power
producers poured into this new resource frontier, attracted
by investment-friendly policies at the state level and by enor-
mous returns from the sale of electricity in the open market
– mostly to urban-industrial centers of mainland India
(Dharmadikary, 2008). The state governments of Sikkim and
Arunachal Pradesh signed numerous Memoranda of Under-
standing (MoU) with private companies, many of which
lacked prior experience in the energy sector (Vagholikar &
Das, 2010). By 2011, the Government of Sikkim had awarded
more than 30 hydroelectric projects 2
(for geographic distribu-
tion see Figure 1) to over 20 public and private Indian firms.
Currently three of these projects have been completed, while
nine are under construction and ten in various stages of plan-
ning. 3
The “run-of-the-river” (R-o-R) technology proposed for
most of these projects is promoted as socially and environmen-
tally “benign”, due to reduced submergence and no permanent
withdrawal of water from the system. In reality, the economic
and environmental sustainability of this project design is ques-
tionable, considering the socio-ecological particularities of the
Eastern Himalayas. Most projects comprise large dam struc-
tures to store water for daily peaking power generation, in
addition to underground tunnels of up to 18-km length for
water diversion. Although the water is then fed back into
the riverbed, much of the river flow deviates for long stretches
from its original course (Vagholikar & Das, 2010). The cumu-
lative installation of 20 R-o-R projects is expected to severely
fragment riverine ecosystems, thereby threatening to reduce
environmental flows below the prescribed minimum (Shah,
2013).
Furthermore, tunnel construction by blasting has created
immediate, visible and possibly lasting impacts on the sur-
rounding mountain slopes. Affected people across the state
report an increased occurrence of landslides, drying of springs
and rivulets for domestic water supply, the degradation of
land and property, as well as concerns over safety (Interviews,
February–April 2011; see also Bhutia, 2012). High geological
and seismological instability, in combination with extreme
weather events (expected to increase under the influence of cli-
mate change), pose hazard risks to the projects and down-
stream areas (Vagholikar & Das, 2010).
Moreover, planning and construction activities have
occurred at an excessively rapid pace, based on improper envi-
ronmental impact assessments and in defiance of scientific
warnings and environmental legislation (Kohli, 2011), disal-
lowing time to monitor, evaluate, and improve project imple-
mentation and performance. Communities surrounding the
Teesta V HEP, operational since 2008, also lamented that
while economic opportunities increased at first, they could
not be sustained after project completion, and that scope for
long-term employment and skills development is minimal, as
most labor is sourced from outside the state (Interviews,
February–April 2011). In summary, the adverse consequences
of hydropower development have become rapidly visible in
various project locations, leading to growing public malcon-
tent.
(b) Conflict and non-conflict over hydropower in Sikkim
Despite the controversial experience with the first hydro-
power projects, local responses to hydropower development
have been mixed. In many of the proposed project areas there
has been markedly little consolidated resistance or civil society
advocacy challenging the state’s hydropower plans. The signif-
icant presence of pro-hydro actors within many affected com-
munities is one important factor accounting for divergent
popular responses (McDuie-Ra, 2011, 2013). The fact that
some stand to gain from the project – by selling land, or by
way of temporary employment – undermines effective commu-
nity activism in favor of more equitable project management.
Another factor is the culture of party-based political clien-
telism (Das, 2015) that is pervasive in Sikkim. Since annexa-
tion to India, successive state governments, in their function
as distributor of resources and central government develop-
ment assistance, have built patron–client dependencies with
individuals and communities (Chettri, 2013). Patronage in
the form of free “hand-outs” of building materials, seeds, live-
stock, food rations, water supply and sanitation facilities, or
even entire model brick-homes, is awarded under the banner
of rural poverty alleviation schemes to “conforming”, politi-
cally loyal households and communities (Chettri, 2013). The
same goes for access to government jobs, business contracts,
and professional licenses, the Government of Sikkim being
the largest employer in a state where youth unemployment is
rampant (Gergan, 2014). This has perpetuated widespread
economic dependence on government favoritism, especially
in rural areas, and has allowed the ruling party to build a solid
support base, by employing a divide and rule strategy in which
dissidence becomes economically and socially unviable
(Schaefer, 1995). As a result, the rooting of political agency
and democratic ethos among sections of Sikkimese 4
society
and its political establishment has been markedly slowed.
Given the near absence of any history and culture of civil
society activism in Sikkim, it is all the more remarkable, there-
fore, that hydropower development has also given rise to a
number of anti-dam struggles – unprecedented expressions
of subaltern political agency. The first anti-dam movement,
Concerned Citizens of Sikkim (CCS), emerged in the 1990s
in response to the construction of the 30 MW Rathong Chu
project in West Sikkim. It brought together environmentalists
and devout Buddhists concerned about the destruction of Sik-
kim’s most “sacred” river and the adjoining Khangchend-
zonga Biosphere Reserve. In 1997, after several public
protests, which brought monks from monasteries around the
state to the state capital Gangtok, as well as a case fought in
the Supreme Court, the then newly elected Chief Minister
Pawan Chamling canceled the project, in order “to honor
the sentiments, religion and culture of the people of Sikkim”
(cited in Menon, 2003, p. 33). The movement disbanded
shortly after.
Another noteworthy movement – the “Affected Citizens of
Teesta” (ACT) – emerged in 2004, mobilizing large numbers
of youth activists from the Lepcha ethnic community to stage
Sikkim’s most fervent anti-dam struggle to date. In an
unprecedented act of civil disobedience, ACT held several
rounds of hunger strikes (up to 915 days), street protests, peti-
tions, and litigation against six projects planned in the tribal
“reserve” Dzongu (North Sikkim; Arora, 2009). Considered
the sacred homeland of “vanishing” Lepcha culture, and his-
torically shielded from the intrusion of outsiders by law

(Bentley, 2007), the government’s turn-around from protec-
tion to capitalization of the Dzongu reserve became a driving
force for the struggle, supported by regional, national, and
international civil society groups (Little, 2010). As with the
previous anti-dam protest, concerns centered on the
large-scale influx of non-Sikkimese laborers, related economic
and health issues, cultural erosion, and destruction of Sikkim’s
cultural-spiritual-ecological heritage. Although ACT signifi-
cantly downsized after successfully pressuring the administra-
tion to scrap four of the six projects in 2008, they continue to
actively contest hydropower development in the state
(McDuie-Ra, 2011).
Both movements represent a significant departure from
common-place political practice in Sikkim. Arguably, the
mobilizing power of identity has been a crucial determinant
for their strength and success, with activism centered on issues
of religion and ethnic-cultural sovereignty (Arora, 2013;
McDuie-Ra, 2013; Schaefer, 1995). Disproportionate preoccu-
pation with ethnicity and “indigenous/insider” identity has
historically been characteristic for politics and governance in
Figure 1. Map of run-of-the-river projects proposed for the Teesta river basin (as per 2008). Source: SANDRP (http://sandrp.in/basin_maps/Teesta%
20150411.jpg).

Sikkim and defines who has how much access to political rep-
resentation and to the state’s economic resources (Chettri,
2013). 5
Identity-based governance goes back to the 19th cen-
tury, when the introduction of a large Nepali labor force by
the British colonial administration unhinged the demographic
equilibrium between the various “tribal” communities in Sik-
kim (Schaefer, 1995).
The political-economic dynamics which followed annexa-
tion and financial dependency on the Indian state, and which
transferred on the state administration the responsibility of
allocating central government welfare, further aggravated con-
cerns over cultural erosion (Bentley, 2007) and political recog-
nition of specific ethnic groups (Chettri, 2013). Ethnic
associations became and continue to be the most common
and legitimate medium through which to access and contest
the state and its resources (Chettri, 2013). Consequently, a col-
lective civil society engaging with questions of development,
and operating across ethnic divides never developed in Sikkim.
As we discuss below, this situated political-economic context
enables anti-political maneuvering by providing the channels
through which the hydropower anti-politics machine operates,
and makes the political activism triggered by hydropower
development significant. The following two sections illustrate
the extent to which anti-political governance of hydropower
development has shaped conflict dynamics around dam pro-
jects in Sikkim, both restraining and fueling resistance.
4. THE ANTI-POLITICS OF HYDROPOWER GOVER-
NANCE
The rationale behind a strategic, top-down approach against
popular opposition to hydropower is not surprising, consider-
ing the important role civil society advocacy and resistance
played in delaying or stopping large dam projects worldwide
in the past, and in the overall decline of donor funding in
the 1990s (Bosshard, 2010). Since then, gaining public accep-
tance of large dams, through free, prior, and informed consent
of affected communities, has been defined by international pol-
icy efforts as a key criterion for ethical dam-building practice
(Skinner & Haas, 2014). However, from a distributional jus-
tice perspective, dams are complicated structures, character-
ized by inherent contentions and uncertainties, and adhering
to these criteria can considerably prolong the planning process
and affect profitability of individual projects. This explains
why hydro proponents in Sikkim sought to circumvent debate
over the need for, and particularities of, the hydropower mis-
sion. They did this by reproducing particular discourses about
hydropower and its merits; by selectively presenting and/or
withholding project-related information; and by denigrating
dam opponents and penalizing dissent. The following section
provides detailed empirical accounts for each of these
anti-politics tactics.
(a) Discursive regimes of representation
The common discourse by the state government positions
hydropower development as an inevitable, moral obligation,
not only for the benefit of the nation, but also for the develop-
ment of Sikkim and the Sikkimese. Instead of allowing the
untapped wealth of the state to be “washed away” (govern-
ment officer cited in interview with NGO worker, February
2011) or “let flow to waste” (Sikkim Express, 2009), Chief
Minister Chamling proposed that “utilized with wisdom, these
rivers and streams could be converted into [. . .] white gold.”
(Little, 2008). A similar, yet more pressing narrative describes
hydropower as the only “sensible” and “viable” development
strategy for Sikkim:
The State has very limited scope to raise the revenue and the [hy-
dropower] sector is the best avenue to achieve it. (GOS in The
Sikkim Times, 2007b).
Its development is vitally important because it will have twofold effects
on the economy of the state. With the easy availability of electricity,
the socio-economic condition of the people of Sikkim would favorably
rise on the one hand while on the other hand revenue from the export
of power will help the state to strengthen its revenue base. Thus, the
sector has to be speedily developed to cater to the demand within
and outside the state.
[(GOS, 2010, p. 3)]
The imperative of financial autonomy for the state in the
event of future termination of preferential Central Government
funding is another argument often made, with little evidence of
whether and when this will happen. Given Sikkim’s strategic
geo-political position bordering China, it is doubtful whether
the tag and benefits of a “special state” will change any time
soon. On another note, hydropower development tends to be
portrayed as a fait accompli, through claims that projects are
already in place and being implemented. In reality, only three
projects have been completed to date and nine are under con-
struction. 6
According to the Chairperson of the Sikkim Pollu-
tion Control Board, during the 2006 public hearing for the
1200 MW Teesta III HEP, hydropower development is
non-negotiable since it has been imposed from a higher scale:
You should reap the benefit – because no one can stop this project, no
matter which political party comes to power tomorrow. No one can
stop this as the Government of India has given the orders. These pro-
jects are not meant to harm or bring tension to anyone.
[(Save Dzongu, 2013)]
Such TINA (“there-is-no-alternative”) narratives are sup-
ported by colored representations of the cost–benefit equation
of hydropower development, which tend to overestimate
pay-offs (e.g., low variable costs of generation, employment,
electrification, rural infrastructure, plentiful revenues) and
underreport on potential negative consequences. According
to the Government of Sikkim, 15 billion Indian rupees will
accrue annually over a total of 35 years (GOS, 2010), amount-
ing to yearly per capita earnings of around 405 US$ – over a
quarter of India’s GDP per capita. 7
This would make Sikkim
“one of the richest states in the country” (Resneck, 2010).
Pledging to reinvest these royalties into the key state develop-
ment objectives – infrastructure, education, employment, and
poverty eradication – the Government of Sikkim expects that
by 2015, Sikkim will be a prosperous, poverty-free “land of
opportunities with zero unemployment” (GOS, 2009a, p. 12).
Moreover, given its global appeal as a clean development
solution, hydropower also fits with the carefully nurtured
image of Sikkim as a “green state” (Resneck, 2010). The cur-
rent ruling party prides itself on having won several national
awards for investments in environmental protection, for exam-
ple through afforestation programs, the imposition of fines on
indiscriminate refuse dumping, or a state-wide ban on plastics
and agro-chemicals (Down To Earth, 1999; GOS, 2013).
Hydropower development is aligned with this green agenda:
The state Government’s policy has been to synchronize development
imperatives with environmental sustainability as our green mantra
remaining extra conscious while implementing [hydropower] projects.
[(Chamling in GOS, 2010)]
In spite of Government of India’s preference for multi-purpose large
dam storage [. . .] projects, the State Government has stuck to run of
the river [. . .] projects. The world over, run of the river project is con-
sidered the cleanliest and the most environment friendly source of

energy. It is because of the apprehensions related to geology that the
State Government has taken a stand that all the projects shall be
run of the river type and no big dam shall be constructed. [. . .] all pos-
sible risks have been sufficiently addressed.
[(GOS in The Sikkim Times, 2007b)]
The Energy and Power Department, in its 2008–09 annual
report, even stated that none of the R-o-R schemes would
have a dam or major reservoir for rated power generation dur-
ing the lean season (GOS, 2009b) – a claim, which is not con-
firmed by various project reports. Further, the significance of
environmentally disruptive impacts is downplayed, by empha-
sizing priorities of development and economic growth:
Impact on the environment is mostly temporary in nature and as such,
[hydropower] remains the cheapest green power available to the man-
kind today. [. . .] avoiding development of [hydropower] is not the an-
swer to the environmental issues.
[(Chamling in GOS, 2010)]
Aside from the fact that such discourses depoliticize the
intervention by omitting important realities such as negative
impacts, distributional issues, potential alternatives, etc., they
also represent the only information mechanism about hydro-
power at the state level. Thus except for project-specific public
hearings, there are no public briefings and discussion fora to
inform and consult the general population about the overall
hydropower mission.
(b) The anti-politics of hydro-planning
In the planning and execution phases too, questions about
the desirability and modalities of particular projects were dis-
abled. The responsibility of planning, construction, and oper-
ation was shifted to non-state actors, such as private
developers and environmental consultancies, creating the illu-
sion that state bureaucrats and local authorities are to a large
extent absolved from any real responsibility, and cannot be
held accountable. During interviews with affected communi-
ties and NGO workers in West Sikkim, where a cascade of
three projects (Lethang, Ting Ting, and Tashiding) with a
combined capacity of 292 MW was in planning at the time
of our research, 8
we were told that the project developers
had a free hand in surveying the area and making
pre-construction arrangements, including negotiations over
land acquisition with local communities.
Several villagers reported that information about the dams
first reached them around 2008–09, when the company’s tech-
nical experts, without prior notice, entered their private land
for initial surveying. Project plans had not been shared or dis-
cussed with the communities until then. Discussions were ini-
tially confined to landholders whose land was to be acquired,
even though project implementation would affect the commu-
nity as a whole. Until the public hearing in June 2009, other
community members had to rely on word-of-mouth for pro-
ject information (Interviews with project-affected villagers,
March–April 2011).
As for the advertising language employed by the planners,
mandatory compensation entitlements as defined by national
rehabilitation and resettlement policy 9
were presented locally
as advantageous individual gains. The concept of benefit shar-
ing was used to link the provision of basic development ser-
vices to hydropower development (Interviews with
project-affected villagers, March–April 2011), even though
these are public entitlements, which accrue to local communi-
ties with or without a hydropower project. Such arrangements,
which allow private developers to take on the state’s responsi-
bility of developing rural infrastructure (including water sup-
ply, roads, community halls, sanitation, and waste facilities)
have also been institutionalized through the state govern-
ment’s hydropower policy, as cited in a local newspaper:
The far flung areas around the project sites mostly located in the re-
mote corner of the state will benefit by way of development activities
like road connectivity, schools, and primary health centers. [. . .] The
developer [sic] of the larger projects are required to adopt one or
two villages in the vicinity of the project sites. These villages will be
developed by the developer by providing all civic facilities required
as per the concept of a model village.
[(The Sikkim Times, 2007b)]
However, transforming the logistical and financial challenge
of servicing more remote areas of the state into a corporate
social responsibility also has implications for accountability
– while clearly a convenient arrangement for the
image-oriented ruling party. The fact that this amalgamation
of project benefits and public welfare liabilities has not trig-
gered much criticism locally may be a result of long-standing
clientelism, where rural development provision is presented
as ruling party largesse and only a few citizens question how
welfare is provided and by whom.
What is more, several instances of “bribery”, through which
power developers allegedly sought to win the goodwill of local
communities and convince project-affected households to sell
their land, were reported. To obfuscate the rather unethical
nature of this practice, companies took advantage of tradi-
tions used by vote-seeking political parties, including distribut-
ing gifts, organizing picnics, and participating in community
events, weddings, funerals, etc. (Interviews with
project-affected villagers, April 2011). In one instance, as
recounted by a local activist, even the public hearing, which
according to law must be organized by the State Pollution
Control Board (SPCB) and without other government inter-
ference, was manipulated by the power developers: “It was
the private companies that organized and controlled the pro-
grams. Even the government officials came to the hearings in
cars arranged by them [. . .] there was large-scale arrangement
of food and entertainment” (Basu, 2010).
(c) Managing popular resistance
As multiple dam projects reached their construction and
completion phases, with the impacts and dubious governance
arrangements becoming more visible, more individuals and
civil society groups started viewing the state-led hydropower
agenda critically. In response, the state government resorted
to authoritarian and coercive ways of undermining popular
resistance. Those openly opposing the ruling party and its
agenda were victimized 10
or threatened to be victimized, both
discursively through a distinct anti-protest narrative, and
materially by withholding patronage. In his 2007 Indepen-
dence Day speech, for instance, the Chief Minister made pub-
lic accusations against the ACT activists as being “marginal,
anti-national and anti-Sikkimese” and “politically misguided
by outside interests wanting to destabilize all development in
Sikkim” (Arora, 2010, p. 138). Similarly, during the public
hearing for Teesta III, the Chairperson of the SPCB warned
the affected citizens of the area:
Anyone who disturbs this project is not a Sikkimese. He might be born
in Sikkim but is a useless person if he opposes such a good project.
Such people are your opposition and anti-social elements. [. . .] Because
you are in the opposition you are opposing the Government. Since you
are opposing the Government of India you are an anti-national.
[(Save Dzongu, 2013)]
The influence of such discursive pressure carried far, as
reflected in this villager’s personal account:

The majority is against the project but no one will be openly opposing.
A knowledgeable person said we should not complain.
Who says these things?
Village leaders, members of the political party. . . Also one month ago
the Chief Minister came here to give a speech. He said that project con-
struction will start and we should let it go ahead.
[(Interview, March 2011)]
The material consequences of victimization include being
cut off from free government hand-outs, losing eligibility for
jobs, business contracts, and licenses, or – in the case of public
employees – being transferred to another job or placement
location. ACT activists reported having to fear ineligibility
for future employment in the state, and in some cases even
their family and relatives in government service were forcibly
relocated to remote work placements (Interviews, February–
April 2011). A village leader explained that political victimiza-
tion can also affect entire communities by depriving them of
basic development assistance, if they take a unitary stand
against the government or align with the opposition:
The community is against the project, most people will be opposing.
The Panchayat should listen to the political leaders, but I am with
the community. We know that we will get lots of problems. They will
likely stop providing some basic services”.
[(Interview, April 2011)]
When ACT protesters staged hunger strikes in the capital
Gangtok, the government discouraged the display of solidarity
by stoking fears that any supporters – even visitors – would be
victimized (Little, 2009). There were also attempts to “buy
out” the movement, by rewarding activists who withdrew their
support with employment contracts, occasionally in the
hydropower sector itself (Interviews with ACT activists,
February–April 2011).
In an effort to uproot and block any kind of popular mobi-
lization in the state, and to reinforce its power vis-a`-vis the cit-
izenry, the government even went as far as placing restrictions
on basic democratic rights and freedoms. Thus in 2008, when
ACT activists had organized a peaceful protest rally that was
joined by Lepchas from neighboring West Bengal, the
Government of Sikkim invoked a British colonial emergency
law, Section 144, that restricts free assembly, justifying it as
a means to pre-empt “a law and order situation” (Little,
2010). Likewise, in 2011 the state administration attempted
to pass a “Sikkim Prevention and Control of Disturbance of
Public Order Bill” (popularly termed “black bill”), intended
to ban processions, hunger strikes, squatting, sloganeering,
and other forms of public protest and agitation (The
Telegraph, 2011).
5. AN OPENING OF NEW POLITICAL SPACES?
(a) Relative silence around hydropower dams
What effects have depoliticization, disinformation, bribery,
and other coercive practices had on citizen responses to hydro-
power, and on state–society relations more generally? How
well did the attempt to mask the political as “technical” and
“morally imperative” hold in the contentious mission to divert
the state’s rivers through a network of hidden-away tunnels?
Local silence around several proposed projects and the
absence of broad-based, state-wide resistance indicate that
the anti-politics strategy has been effective in limiting popular
opposition in many respects. First, in the planning stage, pri-
vate power developers were allowed to independently negoti-
ate their “own” terms of reference with the locals. The
absence of state agencies’ regulatory authority in these negoti-
ations added to the logic of a fait accompli intervention, while
obscuring the actual locus of decision-making and account-
ability. It created confusion and undermined scope for contes-
tation. Debate was reduced to the issue of compensation,
relevant only to those “officially project-affected”, i.e., those
with land to sell.
Uncertainty as a result of disinformation became another
obstacle to opposition. For those who had never seen a com-
pleted hydropower project a lot was unclear, given especially
the partly “invisible” R-o-R design of the projects: where
and how project infrastructure would be located; which areas
would be affected and how; what benefits would eventually
accrue and to whom, when the project would be completed,
etc. In the absence of specific details, and considering the
attractive gains promised, affected communities were initially
hesitant to contest these developments.
Finally, victimization of dissenters, an established practice
in Sikkim’s patronage system, helped to “enforce” consensus
and curb organized resistance. A persistent victimization “fear
psychosis”, which can be traced back to the 15-year rule of
autocratic Chief Minister Bhandari (1979–94; Schaefer,
1995), seems to enduringly afflict citizens across the board.
Even under the current Chief Minister (in power since 1994),
citizens are required to consent to the government’s decisions.
Since the state is small and the likelihood of being watched or
overheard significant, political pressure can easily be exerted
through relatively short chains of politicians, bureaucrats,
middlemen, party-associates, and village leaders. Fears of
abuse of power are particularly pervasive among more vulner-
able households who rely on basic livelihood assistance, or
among government employees, grassroots politicians, teach-
ers, and retirees, who directly derive their income from the
government. As one teacher bemoaned:
At the public hearing I opposed the project and spoke out but what to
do for the simple public? We don’t have any opportunity. I protested
three times, but there was no response to my plea. The last time I final-
ly agreed, because of political pressure. Many people here are em-
ployed by the government and exist only through its benevolence.
[(Interview, March 2011)]
The restrictions placed on freedom of speech and political
alignment are so engrained in popular imagination that for
many adopting a critical stance is beyond consideration. A vil-
lager, when asked whether he will protest, explained to us:
How can I protest? The public of this area cannot protest the govern-
ment. [. . .] People are afraid of the government; they are totally depen-
dent upon the government. If the people protest then they can’t get the
benefits the government is giving out”.
[(Interview, February 2011)]
ACT members reported that victimization was one of the
biggest obstacles to their mobilization, and majorly impacted
the group’s cohesion and effectiveness, by creating rifts within
families and communities. This deterred some of the most
determined activists from further supporting the protest, even-
tually contributing to the partial breakup and isolation of the
movement (Interviews with ACT activists, February–April
2011).
In sum, the prevailing democratic deficit and the ethnic divi-
sions in Sikkimese society helped prevent a large-scale escala-
tion of anti-hydro protests. Even ACT, despite its adamant
campaign and success in having four projects scrapped, did
not upscale its activities to a state-wide anti-hydro movement.
As construction in many project sites is advancing, follow-up
discussions with activists, journalists, and academics in 2013
revealed a general sense that the fate of the state’s rivers had
been decided.

(b) The emergence of popular political voice
Yet in closely scrutinizing the multiple small-scale contesta-
tions of both hydropower and state power that have developed
following the ACT protests, one sees a gradual process of
politicization in Sikkim. Anti-hydro advocacy may still be
localized and largely confined within ethnic boundaries.
Nevertheless, it is also evident that ACT’s visible and auda-
cious resistance worked as a grassroots political precedent,
breaking the myth of an unchallengeable state and enabling
a new culture of speaking out. For example, in two neighbor-
ing valleys near the Tibetan Plateau of North Sikkim, the
Lachen and Lachung communities have built up a consoli-
dated resistance against hydropower. Being a popular tourist
destination, this pristine alpine landscape constitutes the peo-
ples’ livelihood base. Anticipating that hydropower construc-
tion would damage the local economy, these
semi-autonomous Bhutia communities have adopted a hostile
stance against dams, denying even a cup of tea to any visitor
approaching them with hydropower proposals. In an open let-
ter to the contracted power company, Lachen community
leaders warned of potentially “explosive” consequences for
peace and security in Sikkim,
. . . if the otherwise peace loving, simple and god fearing people of
Lachen are pushed too far to the extent of losing their patience. [. . .]
Let us not create another Kashmir or Nagaland by forcible implemen-
tation of the project which has not been accepted by the local people.
We have not signed the MoU pertaining to the Project and as such we
should not be held responsible for any untoward incident resulting
from [its] implementation. . .
[(The Sikkim Times, 2007a)]
Unwilling to confront this adamant posture, the administra-
tion has temporarily shelved the proposed projects, and the
conflict has been contained since then.
In West Sikkim, the earlier mentioned cascade development
on the Rathong Chu River has been fiercely contested for sev-
eral years by Buddhist monks and the ethnic-religious interest
groups SIBLAC (Sikkimese Bhutia Lepcha Apex Committee)
and NASBO (National Sikkimese Bhutia Organization), who
argue these plans will destroy a sacred landscape. The
Khangchendzonga Conservation Committee (a local environ-
mental group) and several project-affected villagers filed peti-
tions against the two upper projects, to be located in close
proximity to Sikkim’s largest national park, the Khangchend-
zonga Biosphere Reserve.
Start of construction in 2011 on the 97 MW Tashiding HEP,
the lowest of the three projects, prompted acts of protest by
local residents, who claimed to have signed their “No Objec-
tion Certificates”, “thinking it to be a developmental project”,
and not realizing the “far reaching consequences” and “disas-
ter that such manmade projects could bring upon them”. The
alleged eye-opener was the destruction caused in the area dur-
ing the 6.9 magnitude earthquake of 2011 (Sikkim Now!,
2011a). The quake, which had its epicenter in North Sikkim,
made visible the risks associated with dam building in such a
seismologically active region, as it provoked a particularly
large concentration of landslides in the vicinity of hydropower
tunnels 11
(Kohli, 2011). It momentarily brought hydropower
to the forefront of popular debate, including in the local news
and social media (Mazumdar, 2011).
The Tashiding controversy also saw the first manifestation
of a more broad-based anti-hydro movement, with several
advocacy groups, including ACT joining forces in the “Com-
mon Platform for Joint Action against Hydropower Projects”
(Sikkim Now!, 2011b). In January 2012, their lobbying efforts
effected cancelation of the upper two Rathong Chu dams,
while the Tashiding HEP was put under review.
These recent mobilizations are thus not entirely disparate,
issue-based, and/or ethnically fragmented, but signify an
emerging collective action against an entrenched state autoc-
racy and for more popular voice in environmental and politi-
cal decision making. Two developments are particularly
noteworthy. First, growing popular resistance against dams
has impacted hydropower governance. At least 16 projects
have either been canceled or experience significant delays in
planning/construction, due to apprehensions and (in some
cases) legal action by local communities and civil society
groups. For Teesta III, in response to growing public pressure,
the administration has instituted a monitoring committee with
involvement of civil society representatives, to oversee project
implementation. This is a small but significant step toward
more participatory hydropower governance.
Second, hydropower protests have widened the space for
dissent against government high-handedness, not only in
dam construction, but also in other realms of governance
and politics. For example, in 2011 when the ruling party pro-
posed the earlier mentioned “black bill”, the initiative caused
uproar among the general public and the opposition, who
without formal representation in the Legislative Assembly,
were unable to vote against it. This backlash eventually
prompted a recall of the proposed law (The Telegraph,
2011). Rising popular demand for change was also reflected
in the growing support for the “Sikkim Revolutionary Front”
(SKM) a political party founded in 2013, which garnered
40.8% of votes in the 2014 Legislative Assembly elections,
wresting ten seats from the ruling Sikkim Democratic Front
(SDF), and ending a decade of single-party rule.
Was this emergence of popular political agency successful in
changing the political status quo? It may be too early to make
such a stark claim. While the strong support for the new oppo-
sition party was unprecedented under the current regime, it
was not sufficient to topple the hegemony of Chief Minister
Chamling and his SDF party, particularly in rural areas. Iden-
tity politics and money power are likely to determine votes and
political allegiances “from above” for some time to come. The
chances for a victory by any opposition party in turn depend
on the extent to which it can present concrete and viable alter-
natives – also an alternative political culture. Most impor-
tantly, political change will have to be initiated “from
below” and in the mindsets of the populace.
In this regard much depends on the younger generations and
the extent to which they can (afford to) detach from clientelis-
tic practices. While open debate over issues concerning state
politics and development is still difficult in the public sphere,
some evidence of rupture with top-down restrictions of free
speech is now emerging from the social media. For example,
online discussion forums such as Facebook groups have
become preferred platforms for expressing popular and polit-
ical opinions, especially among younger generations.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Nine hydropower projects are currently under construction
in Sikkim. Nevertheless, as our findings show, the anti-politics
machine has neither been successful in ensuring a smooth,
unquestioned progression of the hydropower mission, nor in
fully reproducing the hegemony of dominant actors – the
administration and ruling party. Instead, hydropower has
served to catalyze a politicization of environmental and

political decision-making, a counter-hegemonic mo(ve)ment,
which exposed a long-standing democracy deficit. This hap-
pened for several, inter-related reasons.
First, unlike with certain rural improvement schemes
(Ferguson, 1990; Li, 2007), the controversial consequences
of dam building were patently visible, even to the untrained
eye. Thus, although a depoliticized hydropower discourse
may retain credibility in the (inter)national policy domain,
the politics attached to dam building are difficult to obscure
locally. This explains why even CDM-certified projects have
generated conflicts in the Himalayas and the Northeast
(Erlewein & Nu¨sser, 2011; Yumnam, 2012). In Sikkim, not
just the visible impacts of the dams, but the disjuncture
between what was promised and what unfolded on the ground
fueled growing malcontent among sections of the population.
Second, through an unprecedented public display of politi-
cal voice and indignation, the young ACT activists exposed
Sikkim’s democracy façade. The high-handed, coercive tactics
employed to undermine ACT’s resistance exposed the contra-
dictions between government discourse – “In Sikkim, demo-
cratic decorum prevails uninterrupted” (Sikkim Now!, 2012)
– and what was practiced – for example the suspension of
democratic rights to non-violent protest. This ruptured the
state’s fragile democratic sutures, enabling antagonisms sur-
rounding hydropower and state power to emerge.
Our findings reflect what scholars of post-politics (e.g.,
Mouffe, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2011b) have argued: that “the
political” cannot be suppressed. It may be latent, but eventu-
ally re-emerges, often triggered by excesses of coercion. By
denying recognition to inherent societal antagonisms and
claims for egalitarian political spaces, anti-politics tactics exac-
erbate the latter’s’ tendency to resurface in diverse, often
insurgent and/or violent ways.
It is evident then, that anti-politics is not a one-way affair,
an absolute form of ideological domination penetrating all
layers of (rural) society, as Ferguson’s (1990) analysis had sug-
gested. The anti-politics machine never operates in a vacuum.
It is either co-opted by “intervention subjects” for their own
purposes (Bending, 2003), or more or less vehemently resisted
(Li, 2007; Scott, 1985). It thus constitutes a continuous, never
straightforwardly unidirectional struggle (Bu¨scher, 2010). The
political agency of those confronted with the anti-politics
machine – here those affected by hydropower and state power
– is no less important. In Sikkim, civil society groups and com-
munities subverted the “logical” consequences of anti-political
maneuvering, to defend their role in decisions over
ecological-cultural commons and territorial sovereignty.
Our study aims to advance the debate on anti-politics in sev-
eral ways: first, by moving beyond the dominant conceptual-
ization of an “unintentional” anti-politics machine. Our case
study demonstrates how complex politically disabling strate-
gies serve vested interests at multiple levels: global carbon
trading, national energy security, local revenues and private
capital accumulation. Second, our findings emphasize that
large infrastructure projects, based on the exploitation of
natural resources for development elsewhere, are necessarily
contentious, and visibly so. Masking and/or legitimizing such
projects is more difficult than with many other rural improve-
ment schemes. Third, our research shows the state, rather than
other development actors, as a major development broker and
protagonist of the anti-politics machine. Finally, we have pro-
posed a reading of anti-politics that goes beyond the idea of
“depoliticization by rendering technical”, encompassing
instead a range of discursive and material practices that curb
contestation, including coercive, politically disabling, and fun-
damentally undemocratic strategies.
What do these analyses imply for the development of
hydropower dams and other large infrastructure projects
elsewhere? First, it is evident that anti-politics operates across
scales to facilitate the revival of large dams. Hydropower
projects currently receive enormous political and financial
support, as multiple actors with diverse interests hold high
stakes in their construction. In debates between governments,
donor agencies, private sector companies, and even large
green groups, such as during the recent World Water Week
2014 in Stockholm, the dominant focus has shifted from
dams as a problematic development solution to dams as
clean, favorable, and inevitable. That large hydro remains
socially and environmentally contentious, a reality flagged
by this paper, is hardly a subject of discussion in these policy
circles. The prevalent anti-political hydropower discourse dis-
allows and/or ignores the concerns, lived experiences and
alternative voices “from below”, which contradict and chal-
lenge popular imageries of dams as win–win development
solutions.
Ill-considered, rushed and shoddy planning of dam projects
appears to be a problem in many dam-building countries. Site
selection for dams is often “dominated by political and fiscal
considerations, lobbying, corruption, and compromise”
(Cole et al., 2014, p. 84). Another big area of concern is the
lack of consideration of climate change impacts in dam plan-
ning, even though predictions for an increase in extreme cli-
mate events and reduced precipitation in certain areas could
affect the viability of large hydro (Cole et al., 2014; Iimi,
2007; Pottinger, 2009).
But project-affected communities are not oblivious to the
complexities of hydropower development. Many of our
interviewees in Sikkim were of the opinion that hydropower
can be an engine for “development” and an important
source of revenue. Similar to what Robins (1998, p. 1680)
found in a case study on development politics in Zimbabwe,
“opposition to [development projects] was not the result of
peasant resistance to modernization, but was instead a
response to the social, cultural, economic, political and eco-
logical disruptions that the intervention unleashed”. There
was a strong sense in Sikkim that the problem lay in how
things were done, and that the government’s major preoccu-
pation was with fast-tracking hydropower development,
instead of adhering to consultative processes and ethical
procedures.
A relevant question therefore is whether we have not learnt
anything about how (not) to do dams? The WCD (2000)
guidelines – apart from sounding an ecological alarm bell –
clearly called for more ethical and sustainable processes of
dam development, emphasizing consultation with local com-
munities and the need to obtain their free, prior, and informed
consent to proposed projects. Yet, while some companies in
some projects attempt to adhere to some voluntary standards,
best practices in many cases are not even aimed at, in princi-
ple. Business continues as usual – with deficiencies recorded
even for dam projects certified under the CDM (Erlewein &
Nu¨sser, 2011; Yumnam, 2012).
Lastly and most importantly, our case study testifies to the
latent “political” which exists and can resurface, even in highly
coercive situations and among subjugated local communities,
suggesting that the outcomes of anti-political maneuvering in
contentious development projects are never quite as straight-
forward as they may have been assumed. It is high time there-
fore that environmental and development planners
acknowledge that the ecological is always political, and that
we cannot work toward and co-construct differently imagined
socio-ecological futures in top-down fashion.

NOTES
1. UNEP Risoe CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database, 31 May 2015
(http://cdmpipeline.org/).
2. Twelve projects had been planned and/or allotted but were subse-
quently canceled or withdrawn, “since the developers were not able to
adhere to the deadlines specified in the agreement due to resistance to the
development of the projects by the local people on religious/social/envir
onmental grounds” (GOS, 2012).
3. Numbers received from Energy and Power Department, Government
of Sikkim, 11.5.2015.
4. “Sikkimese” is used in this article to refer to all citizens of Sikkim, not
to an ethnic citizen category, which would be a more common usage of the
term.
5. See Chettri (2013) for an elaborate discussion of the role of ethnic
politics and identity in Sikkim’s democratic transition process.
6. Numbers received from Energy and Power Department, Government
of Sikkim, 11.5.2015.
7. GDP as per 2013 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.
PCAP.CD), exchange rate as per 9 September 2014.
8. In 2012, the Lethang and Ting Ting HEPs were eventually canceled.
At the time of writing, the final decision on implementation of the
Tashiding HEP, which is under construction, was pending with the
MoEF.
9. This includes monetary payments for leased/acquired land; one job
per fully project-affected household; 1% of the revenues generated for local
area development; project-related employment according to skills, etc.
(GOI, 2007).
10. The term victimization is used a lot in common parlance in Sikkim
and refers essentially to a scare tactic discouraging “non-aligned” behavior
through threats of political and economic discrimination.
11. A common assumption is that tunnel blasting prior to the quake had
destabilized mountain slopes to such an extent that it simply needed a
strong rattle to bring the bulk of boulders and debris rolling toward the
valley.
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