Russian forces have been involved in Ukraine since 2014, first with the annexation of Crimea and then deploying troops along the border. While Crimea was annexed peacefully, Russian and Russian-backed rebel forces engaged in increasingly fierce fighting with Ukrainian government forces in eastern Ukraine. Over the course of the conflict, Russia has deployed a large number of troops and equipment from across its armed forces to support rebel forces. Though Russia claims its troops only have a support and advisory role, evidence shows Russian battalion tactical groups and combined formations have directly taken part in combat operations in Ukraine.
The facts of the presence of mercenaries, armament and military equipment of ...embassyofukraine
The document summarizes information from the Joint Operation Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine regarding Russian and illegal armed forces on Ukrainian territory. It estimates that there are over 41,000 Russian and illegal personnel, over 700 tanks, and over 1,200 armored vehicles present. It also details locations of heavy firing towards Ukrainian positions, with over 500 incidents in the last week. Finally, it provides updates on personnel and equipment losses among Ukrainian forces and other institutions since the start of the conflict.
The document summarizes the military situation in Ukraine and surrounding areas as of August 29, 2016. It notes an increase in Russian military forces near Ukraine's borders, serious violations of the Minsk ceasefire agreement by Russia, and large-scale military demonstrations by Russia. It also reports on the build-up of Russian forces in occupied Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Specific details are provided on personnel, equipment, and locations of Russian forces in the conflict areas.
Evidences of the Russia's responsibility in Mariupol shellingOleksii Pasichnyi
That's volunteer translation of the presentation from the Security Service of Ukraine
http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=136521&cat_id=39574
The document summarizes the military situation in southeast Ukraine and Russia's response to recent Ukrainian missile tests. It reports that Russia maintained forces near Ukraine but did not launch attacks. It observed winter training exercises in Russian-backed forces. Tensions increased as Russia monitored Ukrainian missile tests and increased naval presence in response. The document concludes the conflict shows signs of controlled escalation as Russia continues provoking Ukrainian forces.
Briefing on the situation in the south east of ukraineembassyofukraine
The Russian-backed forces intensified attacks along multiple fronts in eastern Ukraine and took measures to prepare for possible further combat actions. They used tanks, mortars, artillery, and missile launchers in attacks near Severodonetsk, Sloviansk, Donetsk, and Mariupol. Near Donetsk, the enemy enhanced forward positions, increased firing intensity, and unsuccessfully tried to assault Ukrainian positions. In Sloviansk, the enemy tightened movement controls and suggested locals evacuate. In Mariupol, the enemy intensified fire support and moved assault forces, restricting OSCE access. The Ukrainian military assessed that the situation remained under control but showed signs of further escalation and increased heavy weapons usage.
1) The document summarizes Russian Federation armed forces and illegal armed units activity in Ukraine, including personnel, equipment, and ceasefire violations along the border between June 1-5, 2016.
2) It notes that total enemy forces in Ukraine are estimated at 41,200 personnel with 702 tanks and up to 1,291 armored vehicles, based on Russian armed forces and illegal armed units dispositions.
3) Casualties since the beginning of the conflict are reported, with 368 Ukrainian forces personnel killed since the latest ceasefire on December 23, 2015.
Russian forces continue to amass along the Ukrainian border and occupy territories in eastern Ukraine. They consist of over 40,000 troops equipped with tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and missile systems. Fighting remains most intense in the Donetsk and Mariupol directions, where Russian forces are shelling Ukrainian positions with mortars and artillery. They are also conducting reconnaissance missions and rotating troops in an effort to escalate tensions and undermine Ukrainian defenses. The military situation is assessed as tending towards further escalation of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
The facts of the presence of mercenaries, armament and military equipment of ...embassyofukraine
The document summarizes information from the Joint Operation Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine regarding Russian and illegal armed forces on Ukrainian territory. It estimates that there are over 41,000 Russian and illegal personnel, over 700 tanks, and over 1,200 armored vehicles present. It also details locations of heavy firing towards Ukrainian positions, with over 500 incidents in the last week. Finally, it provides updates on personnel and equipment losses among Ukrainian forces and other institutions since the start of the conflict.
The document summarizes the military situation in Ukraine and surrounding areas as of August 29, 2016. It notes an increase in Russian military forces near Ukraine's borders, serious violations of the Minsk ceasefire agreement by Russia, and large-scale military demonstrations by Russia. It also reports on the build-up of Russian forces in occupied Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Specific details are provided on personnel, equipment, and locations of Russian forces in the conflict areas.
Evidences of the Russia's responsibility in Mariupol shellingOleksii Pasichnyi
That's volunteer translation of the presentation from the Security Service of Ukraine
http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=136521&cat_id=39574
The document summarizes the military situation in southeast Ukraine and Russia's response to recent Ukrainian missile tests. It reports that Russia maintained forces near Ukraine but did not launch attacks. It observed winter training exercises in Russian-backed forces. Tensions increased as Russia monitored Ukrainian missile tests and increased naval presence in response. The document concludes the conflict shows signs of controlled escalation as Russia continues provoking Ukrainian forces.
Briefing on the situation in the south east of ukraineembassyofukraine
The Russian-backed forces intensified attacks along multiple fronts in eastern Ukraine and took measures to prepare for possible further combat actions. They used tanks, mortars, artillery, and missile launchers in attacks near Severodonetsk, Sloviansk, Donetsk, and Mariupol. Near Donetsk, the enemy enhanced forward positions, increased firing intensity, and unsuccessfully tried to assault Ukrainian positions. In Sloviansk, the enemy tightened movement controls and suggested locals evacuate. In Mariupol, the enemy intensified fire support and moved assault forces, restricting OSCE access. The Ukrainian military assessed that the situation remained under control but showed signs of further escalation and increased heavy weapons usage.
1) The document summarizes Russian Federation armed forces and illegal armed units activity in Ukraine, including personnel, equipment, and ceasefire violations along the border between June 1-5, 2016.
2) It notes that total enemy forces in Ukraine are estimated at 41,200 personnel with 702 tanks and up to 1,291 armored vehicles, based on Russian armed forces and illegal armed units dispositions.
3) Casualties since the beginning of the conflict are reported, with 368 Ukrainian forces personnel killed since the latest ceasefire on December 23, 2015.
Russian forces continue to amass along the Ukrainian border and occupy territories in eastern Ukraine. They consist of over 40,000 troops equipped with tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and missile systems. Fighting remains most intense in the Donetsk and Mariupol directions, where Russian forces are shelling Ukrainian positions with mortars and artillery. They are also conducting reconnaissance missions and rotating troops in an effort to escalate tensions and undermine Ukrainian defenses. The military situation is assessed as tending towards further escalation of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
The document summarizes information from the Joint Operation Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine regarding Russian and illegal armed forces on Ukrainian territory. It notes the presence of over 41,000 Russian and illegal armed personnel, over 1,300 armored vehicles, and 734 artillery assets in Ukraine. It also details locations of heavy firing along the border, illegal border crossings by Russia, and personnel and equipment losses over time. The situation in conflict zones remains tense, with escalations along the Artiomovsk, Avdeyevka, and Volnovakha directions. Russia continues supplying its forces and training regiments to support operations in Ukraine.
Russia’s Deployment of ‘Wagner’ Private Military Company Юрій Радомський
1) The document discusses the private Russian military company Wagner and its involvement in hybrid wars in Ukraine and Syria since 2014.
2) Wagner has deployed up to 5,000 contractors in Ukraine and Syria, where they have engaged in terrorist activities and helped the leader of the self-proclaimed Luhansk People's Republic, Igor Plotnitsky.
3) The document provides evidence that Wagner was responsible for downing a Ukrainian military transport plane in 2014 that killed 49 Ukrainian soldiers, on the order of Wagner commander Dmitry Utkin.
- Russian Federation armed forces have an estimated 41,100 personnel, 702 tanks, and up to 1,291 armored vehicles stationed along the Ukrainian border and in eastern Ukraine.
- Over the past week there were 155 recorded instances of firing towards Ukrainian positions, with the most intensive firing near Avdeyevka, Novotroitskoye, Triokhizbenka, and Novozvanovka.
- 31 cases of enemy UAV usage were recorded from May 16-22, including 4 instances of armed UAV strikes, with explosive devices dropped near Tarasovka, Andreyevka, and Avdeyevka.
Russian forces and illegal armed groups have amassed over 42,000 personnel, 700 tanks, and over 1,300 armored vehicles on Ukrainian territory. During the past week, 362 ceasefire violations by enemy fire were recorded. Two cases of illegal border crossing involved Russian military equipment, fuel, ammunition and uniforms being transported into Ukraine. Since the beginning of the conflict, Ukrainian forces have suffered over 2,700 casualties while eliminating over 9,400 enemy personnel. The security situation along the contact line remains tense with Russian forces seeking to extend their control of territory.
The document provides an overview of the military and political situation in southeastern Ukraine from March 2-9, 2016. Key developments include:
1) Agreements were signed in Minsk on special marking of minefields and a cessation of military training near the separation line.
2) A UN report found ongoing human rights violations in occupied Donbas and a risk of escalation due to provocative actions by pro-Russian militants.
3) Russia continued military activities near Ukraine including intelligence flights and troop reinforcements near the border, while pro-Russian forces in occupied Donbas took actions like approving passport regulations.
The document provides evidence that Russia's special forces have been involved in developments in eastern Ukraine. It includes intercepted radio communications acknowledging a group arriving from Russia, personal confessions from Russian military officers about crossing the border and coordinating with Moscow, and evidence that the weapons, uniforms, and tactics used by separatist groups match those of Russian special forces. An expert opinion from NATO's Supreme Allied Commander notes behavior and equipment consistent with Russian military training. The document also notes the unpopularity of separatist movements among local populations and their failure to attract significant support.
The Russian military continues to violate the ceasefire agreement in eastern Ukraine by shelling Ukrainian forces up to 20 times per day in order to provoke them. Russia maintains over 42,000 troops near Ukraine equipped with tanks, artillery, and missiles. These forces include 12 battalion tactical groups and 8 company tactical groups deployed along the border and in occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk. Russia is also preparing its nuclear forces for strategic exercises in October, demonstrating its military capabilities and readiness to use force.
This document provides an overview of the open source investigation into the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine on July 17, 2014. It summarizes that in the hours before the attack, social media posts and videos showed a Russian-origin Buk missile system being transported into separatist-controlled territory in a convoy of vehicles. The system was seen moving towards the launch site. The document also reviews the military context in Ukraine at the time, with escalating clashes between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian forces in the skies and on the ground.
The Russian military continues to violate the ceasefire and shell Ukrainian forces on a daily basis, with up to 20 shellings per day reported. Russian forces in the region consist of 12 battalion tactical groups, 8 company tactical groups, and 3 motorized rifle brigades totaling around 42,000 troops. These forces are deployed along the Ukrainian border and in occupied parts of eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Russia is also conducting strategic nuclear forces exercises in October, demonstrating its ongoing military buildup and preparation for conflict.
Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence published new evidence that the Russian Federation is directly involved in the military conflict in Donbas. One hundred and sixty eight service members of the anti-aircraft unit of the 60th Motorized Brigade have been transported to Novocherkask, Rostov region, for further deployment to eastern Ukraine.
According to the intelligence data, Russian troops are equipped with 30 military vehicles and 21 pieces of military hardware, including Tor-M2U surface-to-air missile system. The weapon has similar characteristics to the BUK missile system that downed Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 on July 17, 2014, claiming 298 lives.
The document is a data sheet that describes the Motorola AirDefense Services Platform, which provides holistic network services management for wireless LANs. The platform includes modules for security and compliance, network assurance, infrastructure management, and proximity awareness and analytics. It allows for centralized management of wireless networks, automated security, regulatory compliance, multi-vendor support, and remote troubleshooting.
The document discusses the UK's policy perspective on space security and growth. It notes that space technology has become critical to many systems and will see increasing embedded dependencies over the next 10-15 years. The UK Spaceport will enable low-cost access to space and a developing low Earth orbit economy. However, key orbits will become more congested, requiring solutions for debris and avoiding collisions. The UK's approach is to enhance national security through space, promote a safe environment, and enable industry opportunities through coherent policy, regulation, and security/resilience planning.
Presentation delivered by Captain Dr Gurpreet Khurana, Executive Director, National Maritime Foundation at the RUSI International Sea Powers Conference 2017 - A European Net Assessment of the PLA(N).
23 February 2017
Presentation delivered by Captain (Retd) James Fanell, Government Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy at the RUSI International Sea Powers Conference 2017 - A European Net Assessment of the PLA(N).
23 February 2017
Dr. Igor Sutyagin presented at the 15th RUSI BMD Conference in London on March 18, 2014 on the topic of the future operational environment and implications for the Royal Navy. The presentation discussed Russian hypersonic anti-ship missiles like the DF-21D and Khalij Fars, as well as cruise and ballistic missiles like the Iskander-M, Oka, Volga, Yakhont, and BrahMos that pose a threat. It also examined Russian over-the-horizon radar systems like Podsolnukh and Laguna that can detect warships at a great distance.
The Russian military occupation of Crimea is now complete, as Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from the peninsula. Russian flags have been raised at all 193 former Ukrainian military bases in Crimea. While around 5,000 Ukrainian soldiers remained loyal to Ukraine, many others switched allegiance to the Russian-backed Crimean authorities. The withdrawal comes after weeks of pressure and attacks by Russian forces against Ukrainian troops. As a result of the occupation, Ukraine has lost over half of its naval vessels, including 51 ships seized by Russia. The Open Dialog Foundation criticizes the Ukrainian government's decision not to introduce martial law or authorize military resistance during the occupation. They are urging support for the soldiers and families withdrawing from Crimea.
General directorate of military cooperation 13 04_2017embassyofukraine
The document summarizes the security situation in eastern Ukraine and Crimea from March 29th to April 12th, 2017. It notes an increase in Russian propaganda efforts and military activity in the region. Specifically, it reports that Russia has increased its military forces in eastern Ukraine and along the Ukrainian border to 12 tactical battle groups. It also notes Russia's continued militarization of Crimea and plans to further increase its naval presence in the Black Sea. Finally, the summary concludes that given Russia's domestic political and economic challenges, the Kremlin seeks to further destabilize Ukraine through information warfare, economic pressure, and support for separatist forces in eastern Ukraine.
This document provides evidence of Russian GRU military involvement in Ukraine, including:
- Names and details of Russian GRU soldiers who participated in hostilities in Ukraine.
- Locations and dates of Russian GRU brigade deployments and operations in Ukraine.
- Details of clashes between Ukrainian forces and Russian GRU units, resulting in casualties on both sides.
- Photos and documentation identifying equipment, weapons, and personnel of Russian GRU subversive groups operating in Ukraine.
- Evidence that Russian GRU officers were involved in artillery attacks on Ukrainian settlements.
The document summarizes evidence that Russia is a major source of militants and weapons flowing into eastern Ukraine to support pro-Russian separatists. It provides examples of gunmen from Russia, including Chechnya and other Caucasian regions, fighting with the separatists. It also describes instances where large groups of armed men and military vehicles have broken through the Ukrainian-Russian border, and notes the inaction of Russian border guards in preventing this illegal cross-border activity. The document suggests the inflow of men and materials from Russia is critical to the separatists due to their ongoing losses against Ukrainian government forces.
The document summarizes information from the Joint Operation Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine regarding Russian and illegal armed forces on Ukrainian territory. It notes the presence of over 41,000 Russian and illegal armed personnel, over 1,300 armored vehicles, and 734 artillery assets in Ukraine. It also details locations of heavy firing along the border, illegal border crossings by Russia, and personnel and equipment losses over time. The situation in conflict zones remains tense, with escalations along the Artiomovsk, Avdeyevka, and Volnovakha directions. Russia continues supplying its forces and training regiments to support operations in Ukraine.
Russia’s Deployment of ‘Wagner’ Private Military Company Юрій Радомський
1) The document discusses the private Russian military company Wagner and its involvement in hybrid wars in Ukraine and Syria since 2014.
2) Wagner has deployed up to 5,000 contractors in Ukraine and Syria, where they have engaged in terrorist activities and helped the leader of the self-proclaimed Luhansk People's Republic, Igor Plotnitsky.
3) The document provides evidence that Wagner was responsible for downing a Ukrainian military transport plane in 2014 that killed 49 Ukrainian soldiers, on the order of Wagner commander Dmitry Utkin.
- Russian Federation armed forces have an estimated 41,100 personnel, 702 tanks, and up to 1,291 armored vehicles stationed along the Ukrainian border and in eastern Ukraine.
- Over the past week there were 155 recorded instances of firing towards Ukrainian positions, with the most intensive firing near Avdeyevka, Novotroitskoye, Triokhizbenka, and Novozvanovka.
- 31 cases of enemy UAV usage were recorded from May 16-22, including 4 instances of armed UAV strikes, with explosive devices dropped near Tarasovka, Andreyevka, and Avdeyevka.
Russian forces and illegal armed groups have amassed over 42,000 personnel, 700 tanks, and over 1,300 armored vehicles on Ukrainian territory. During the past week, 362 ceasefire violations by enemy fire were recorded. Two cases of illegal border crossing involved Russian military equipment, fuel, ammunition and uniforms being transported into Ukraine. Since the beginning of the conflict, Ukrainian forces have suffered over 2,700 casualties while eliminating over 9,400 enemy personnel. The security situation along the contact line remains tense with Russian forces seeking to extend their control of territory.
The document provides an overview of the military and political situation in southeastern Ukraine from March 2-9, 2016. Key developments include:
1) Agreements were signed in Minsk on special marking of minefields and a cessation of military training near the separation line.
2) A UN report found ongoing human rights violations in occupied Donbas and a risk of escalation due to provocative actions by pro-Russian militants.
3) Russia continued military activities near Ukraine including intelligence flights and troop reinforcements near the border, while pro-Russian forces in occupied Donbas took actions like approving passport regulations.
The document provides evidence that Russia's special forces have been involved in developments in eastern Ukraine. It includes intercepted radio communications acknowledging a group arriving from Russia, personal confessions from Russian military officers about crossing the border and coordinating with Moscow, and evidence that the weapons, uniforms, and tactics used by separatist groups match those of Russian special forces. An expert opinion from NATO's Supreme Allied Commander notes behavior and equipment consistent with Russian military training. The document also notes the unpopularity of separatist movements among local populations and their failure to attract significant support.
The Russian military continues to violate the ceasefire agreement in eastern Ukraine by shelling Ukrainian forces up to 20 times per day in order to provoke them. Russia maintains over 42,000 troops near Ukraine equipped with tanks, artillery, and missiles. These forces include 12 battalion tactical groups and 8 company tactical groups deployed along the border and in occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk. Russia is also preparing its nuclear forces for strategic exercises in October, demonstrating its military capabilities and readiness to use force.
This document provides an overview of the open source investigation into the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine on July 17, 2014. It summarizes that in the hours before the attack, social media posts and videos showed a Russian-origin Buk missile system being transported into separatist-controlled territory in a convoy of vehicles. The system was seen moving towards the launch site. The document also reviews the military context in Ukraine at the time, with escalating clashes between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian forces in the skies and on the ground.
The Russian military continues to violate the ceasefire and shell Ukrainian forces on a daily basis, with up to 20 shellings per day reported. Russian forces in the region consist of 12 battalion tactical groups, 8 company tactical groups, and 3 motorized rifle brigades totaling around 42,000 troops. These forces are deployed along the Ukrainian border and in occupied parts of eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Russia is also conducting strategic nuclear forces exercises in October, demonstrating its ongoing military buildup and preparation for conflict.
Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence published new evidence that the Russian Federation is directly involved in the military conflict in Donbas. One hundred and sixty eight service members of the anti-aircraft unit of the 60th Motorized Brigade have been transported to Novocherkask, Rostov region, for further deployment to eastern Ukraine.
According to the intelligence data, Russian troops are equipped with 30 military vehicles and 21 pieces of military hardware, including Tor-M2U surface-to-air missile system. The weapon has similar characteristics to the BUK missile system that downed Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 on July 17, 2014, claiming 298 lives.
The document is a data sheet that describes the Motorola AirDefense Services Platform, which provides holistic network services management for wireless LANs. The platform includes modules for security and compliance, network assurance, infrastructure management, and proximity awareness and analytics. It allows for centralized management of wireless networks, automated security, regulatory compliance, multi-vendor support, and remote troubleshooting.
The document discusses the UK's policy perspective on space security and growth. It notes that space technology has become critical to many systems and will see increasing embedded dependencies over the next 10-15 years. The UK Spaceport will enable low-cost access to space and a developing low Earth orbit economy. However, key orbits will become more congested, requiring solutions for debris and avoiding collisions. The UK's approach is to enhance national security through space, promote a safe environment, and enable industry opportunities through coherent policy, regulation, and security/resilience planning.
Presentation delivered by Captain Dr Gurpreet Khurana, Executive Director, National Maritime Foundation at the RUSI International Sea Powers Conference 2017 - A European Net Assessment of the PLA(N).
23 February 2017
Presentation delivered by Captain (Retd) James Fanell, Government Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy at the RUSI International Sea Powers Conference 2017 - A European Net Assessment of the PLA(N).
23 February 2017
Dr. Igor Sutyagin presented at the 15th RUSI BMD Conference in London on March 18, 2014 on the topic of the future operational environment and implications for the Royal Navy. The presentation discussed Russian hypersonic anti-ship missiles like the DF-21D and Khalij Fars, as well as cruise and ballistic missiles like the Iskander-M, Oka, Volga, Yakhont, and BrahMos that pose a threat. It also examined Russian over-the-horizon radar systems like Podsolnukh and Laguna that can detect warships at a great distance.
The Russian military occupation of Crimea is now complete, as Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from the peninsula. Russian flags have been raised at all 193 former Ukrainian military bases in Crimea. While around 5,000 Ukrainian soldiers remained loyal to Ukraine, many others switched allegiance to the Russian-backed Crimean authorities. The withdrawal comes after weeks of pressure and attacks by Russian forces against Ukrainian troops. As a result of the occupation, Ukraine has lost over half of its naval vessels, including 51 ships seized by Russia. The Open Dialog Foundation criticizes the Ukrainian government's decision not to introduce martial law or authorize military resistance during the occupation. They are urging support for the soldiers and families withdrawing from Crimea.
General directorate of military cooperation 13 04_2017embassyofukraine
The document summarizes the security situation in eastern Ukraine and Crimea from March 29th to April 12th, 2017. It notes an increase in Russian propaganda efforts and military activity in the region. Specifically, it reports that Russia has increased its military forces in eastern Ukraine and along the Ukrainian border to 12 tactical battle groups. It also notes Russia's continued militarization of Crimea and plans to further increase its naval presence in the Black Sea. Finally, the summary concludes that given Russia's domestic political and economic challenges, the Kremlin seeks to further destabilize Ukraine through information warfare, economic pressure, and support for separatist forces in eastern Ukraine.
This document provides evidence of Russian GRU military involvement in Ukraine, including:
- Names and details of Russian GRU soldiers who participated in hostilities in Ukraine.
- Locations and dates of Russian GRU brigade deployments and operations in Ukraine.
- Details of clashes between Ukrainian forces and Russian GRU units, resulting in casualties on both sides.
- Photos and documentation identifying equipment, weapons, and personnel of Russian GRU subversive groups operating in Ukraine.
- Evidence that Russian GRU officers were involved in artillery attacks on Ukrainian settlements.
The document summarizes evidence that Russia is a major source of militants and weapons flowing into eastern Ukraine to support pro-Russian separatists. It provides examples of gunmen from Russia, including Chechnya and other Caucasian regions, fighting with the separatists. It also describes instances where large groups of armed men and military vehicles have broken through the Ukrainian-Russian border, and notes the inaction of Russian border guards in preventing this illegal cross-border activity. The document suggests the inflow of men and materials from Russia is critical to the separatists due to their ongoing losses against Ukrainian government forces.
Russia`s Military Aggression Against Ukraine: Evidence of the Russian Armed F...UAReforms
Russia`s Military Aggression
Against Ukraine:
Evidence of the Russian Armed Forces
Involvement
in Combat Actions in Donbas and Violation
of the Minsk Agreements
1. Russian troops have invaded and seized control of strategic facilities in Crimea, Ukraine such as airports, communications centers, and military bases. They are blocking and attempting to disarm Ukrainian military units.
2. Russia is staging provocations and spreading misinformation about extremist threats to justify their military invasion. They claim they need to protect Russian citizens and Russian-speaking populations in Crimea, although these claims have been debunked.
3. Through military force and pressure, Russia aims to install fully controlled and loyal pro-Russian authorities in Crimea who will hold a referendum to legitimize secession from Ukraine.
Британский портал журналистских расследований Bellingcat опубликовал масштабный Russia’s Path(s) to War (Российская тропа войны), посвященный анализу путей вторжения российских войск в Донбасс
The evidence presented in the report confirms that Russia’s armed forces participated in the war throughout the entire summer of 2014. Moreover, it is further shown that this participation by Russia decisively changed the course of the war.
This report analyzes satellite imagery of the Ukrainian-Russian border region during summer 2014 to investigate alleged cross-border activity by Russian forces during the conflict. It identifies at least 60 tracks crossing the border, with 4-5 seen as large-scale crossings likely related to the Russian military. New tracks were documented in July, August, and September 2014 corresponding to major battles. The report describes approximately 30 crossings and finds a close temporal and geographic relationship between crossings and battles, suggesting Russian forces participated decisively and changed the course of the war. Visual evidence includes military vehicles and large groups transiting cross-border paths. The analysis provides additional evidence of Russia's involvement beyond its denials.
Illegal armed inits and Russian Federation Armed Forces strengthUkrEmbLondon
The document summarizes Russian and separatist forces along the Ukrainian border and within Ukraine, including personnel numbers, equipment, and locations. It notes over 300 instances of ceasefire violations in a week, especially around Avdeyevka, Luhanskoe, Zaitsevo, and Mayorsk. Losses for Russian and separatist forces since the beginning of the conflict are listed, including over 200 personnel and military equipment. The situation along the conflict line is described as tense with escalations around Artiomovsk, Avdeyevka, and Volnovakha.
- Armed Russian troops seized government buildings in Crimea and raised Russian flags, calling themselves "self-defense forces". This comes amid increased Russian military activity in Crimea and near the Ukrainian border.
- The Ukrainian government described this as an "armed invasion and occupation", fearing Russia may attempt to annex Crimea as it did with parts of Georgia in 2008.
- International organizations like NATO and the EU called on Russia not to interfere in Ukraine and violate its territorial integrity. However, Russia claims to not be interfering and that the situation is an internal Ukrainian matter. Tensions continue to escalate over control of Crimea.
केरल उच्च न्यायालय ने 11 जून, 2024 को मंडला पूजा में भाग लेने की अनुमति मांगने वाली 10 वर्षीय लड़की की रिट याचिका को खारिज कर दिया, जिसमें सर्वोच्च न्यायालय की एक बड़ी पीठ के समक्ष इस मुद्दे की लंबित प्रकृति पर जोर दिया गया। यह आदेश न्यायमूर्ति अनिल के. नरेंद्रन और न्यायमूर्ति हरिशंकर वी. मेनन की खंडपीठ द्वारा पारित किया गया
18062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
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15062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
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#First_India_NewsPaper
16062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
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19 जून को बॉम्बे हाई कोर्ट ने विवादित फिल्म ‘हमारे बारह’ को 21 जून को थिएटर में रिलीज करने का रास्ता साफ कर दिया, हालांकि यह सुनिश्चित करने के बाद कि फिल्म निर्माता कुछ आपत्तिजनक अंशों को हटा दें।
Recent years have seen a disturbing rise in violence, discrimination, and intolerance against Christian communities in various Islamic countries. This multifaceted challenge, deeply rooted in historical, social, and political animosities, demands urgent attention. Despite the escalating persecution, substantial support from the Western world remains lacking.
projet de traité négocié à Istanbul (anglais).pdfEdouardHusson
Ceci est le projet de traité qui avait été négocié entre Russes et Ukrainiens à Istanbul en mars 2022, avant que les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne ne détournent Kiev de signer.
#WenguiGuo#WashingtonFarm Guo Wengui Wolf son ambition exposed to open a far...rittaajmal71
Since fleeing to the United States in 2014, Guo Wengui has founded a number of projects in the United States, such as GTV Media Group, GTV private equity, farm loan project, G Club Operations Co., LTD., and Himalaya Exchange.
Why We Chose ScyllaDB over DynamoDB for "User Watch Status"ScyllaDB
Yichen Wei and Adam Drennan share the architecture and technical requirements behind "user watch status" for a major global media streaming service, what that meant for their database, the pros and cons of the many options they considered for replacing DynamoDB, why they ultimately chose ScyllaDB, and their lessons learned so far.
Shark Tank Jargon | Operational ProfitabilityTheUnitedIndian
Don't let fancy business words confuse you! This blog is your cheat sheet to understanding the Shark Tank Jargon. We'll translate all the confusing terms like "valuation" (how much the company is worth) and "royalty" (a fee for using someone's idea). You'll be swimming with the Sharks like a pro in no time!
13062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
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Slide deck with charts from our Digital News Report 2024, the most comprehensive exploration of news consumption habits around the world, based on survey data from more than 95,000 respondents across 47 countries.
Christian persecution in Islamic countries has intensified, with alarming incidents of violence, discrimination, and intolerance. This article highlights recent attacks in Nigeria, Pakistan, Egypt, Iran, and Iraq, exposing the multifaceted challenges faced by Christian communities. Despite the severity of these atrocities, the Western world's response remains muted due to political, economic, and social considerations. The urgent need for international intervention is underscored, emphasizing that without substantial support, the future of Christianity in these regions is at grave risk.
https://ecspe.org/the-rise-of-christian-persecution-in-islamic-countries/
ग्रेटर मुंबई के नगर आयुक्त को एक खुले पत्र में याचिका दायर कर 540 से अधिक मुंबईकरों ने सभी अवैध और अस्थिर होर्डिंग्स, साइनबोर्ड और इलेक्ट्रिक साइनेज को तत्काल हटाने और 13 मई, 2024 की शाम को घाटकोपर में अवैध होर्डिंग के गिरने की विनाशकारी घटना के बाद अपराधियों के खिलाफ सख्त कार्रवाई की मांग की है, जिसमें 17 लोगों की जान चली गई और कई निर्दोष लोग गंभीर रूप से घायल हो गए।
लालू यादव की जीवनी LALU PRASAD YADAV BIOGRAPHYVoterMood
Discover the life and times of Lalu Prasad Yadav with a comprehensive biography in Hindi. Learn about his early days, rise in politics, controversies, and contribution.
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Russian forces in Ukraine
1. Russian Forces in Ukraine
Igor Sutyagin
Royal United Services Institute March 2015
Briefing Paper
The annexation of Crimea and the subsequent large-scale deployment of
Russian troops near the Russo-Ukrainian border were popularly referred to
in Russia as ‘Operation Russian Spring’. While the annexation itself of Crimea
was relatively peaceful, the actions of Russian and Russian-backed forces
in eastern Ukraine turned into an increasingly fierce fight as the Ukrainian
government launched its own ‘anti-terrorist operation’ against the Russian-
supported rebels.
In this way, the comparatively bloodless Russian spring gave way to a Russian
winter of fierce combat. The first operational successes of Ukrainian forces
in late June and early July 2014 first prompted Russian artillery fire from
within Russian territory, targeted against advancing Ukrainian troops on
their own soil, from mid-July onwards. Direct intervention by Russian troops
in combat roles then followed in the middle of August, when the prospect of
rebel defeat had become realistic. The presence of large numbers of Russian
troops on Ukrainian sovereign territory has, more or less, since become a
permanent feature of the conflict.
The first phase of large-scale incursions by regular Russian troops
commenced on 11 August 2014 and has involved a substantial array of
forces (see Table 1). Elements of some Russian reconnaissance and special
operations units have operated on Ukrainian soil since 14 July (at the latest),
comprising teams generated by six units.
The Russian military operation against Ukraine is instructive, having been
waged in accordance with the Gerasimov Doctrine of Ambiguous Warfare.1
1. Presented by the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Army General Valeriy Gerasimov,
in January 2013 at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences’ annual meeting; key
elements of the Gerasimov Doctrine have since been integrated into the new edition of
the Russian Military Doctrine, as approved in December 2014.
2. Russian Forces in Ukraine 2
www.rusi.org
Table 1: Russian Combat and Reconnaissance Formations during the August
2014 Incursion.
Battalion tactical groups
(from 11 August)
generated by:
17th
Motor-Rifle Brigade
18th
Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade
21st
Motor-Rifle Brigade
33rd
(Mountain) Motor-Rifle Brigade
247th
Guards Air-Assault Regiment (7th
Guards Air-Assault
Division)
104th
Guards Air-Assault Regiment (76th
Guards Air-Assault
Division)
331st
Guards Airborne Regiment (98th
Guards Airborne
Division)
137th
Guards Airborne Regiment (106th
Guards Airborne
Division)
31st
Guards Air-Assault Brigade
2nd
Spetsnaz Brigade
Reconnaissance teams
(from 14 July)
generated by:
2nd
Spetsnaz Brigade
10th
Spetsnaz Brigade
45th
Guards Spetsnaz Regiment of the Airborne Troops (VDV)
173rd
Guards Separate Recce Company (106th
Guards
Airborne Division)
Recce battalion of the 9th
Motor-Rifle Brigades (the former
84th
Independent Reconnaissance Battalion)
Recce battalion of the 18th
Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade (the
former 18th
Independent Reconnaissance Battalion)
But it has also revealed some of the constraints on Russia’s exercise of military
power; primarily, its limited capacity to sustain an operation of this size.
Indeed, it is obvious that there are insufficient resources – military and
financial – under the Kremlin’s command to sustain military operations at
the current level for over a year: the military capabilities required to carry
out the operation are already reaching their limits. It might be too early
to definitively assess that Russia’s military capacity is overstretched by the
crisis in Ukraine, but some facts are evident. Twenty-eight military units
were required to generate the approximately 90,000 troops stationed on
the Russo–Ukrainian border and within Crimea in spring 2014.2
These units
were drawn from a relatively limited geographic area in this early phase of
the operation against Ukraine. To sustain this deployment and the required
intensity of fighting, it was necessary to call upon more units.
2. For additional details see: ‘Ukraine Military Dispositions: The Military Ticks Up While
the Clock Ticks Down’, RUSI Briefing Paper, April 2014.
3. Russian Forces in Ukraine 3
www.rusi.org
Table 2: Russian Regular Units with Troops Involved in Ukraine Combat Operations, February 2015.
Type Units
Northern Operational Area Southern Operational Area
Motorised infantry 2nd
Guards (Tamanskaya) Division (elements of)
8th
Guards Brigade
18th
Brigade
19th
Brigade
20th
Guards Brigade
23rd
Guards Brigade
27th
Guards Brigade
28th
Brigade
32nd
Brigade
33rd
(Mountain) Brigade
37th
Brigade
2nd
Guards (Tamanskaya) Division (elements of)
9th
Brigade
138th
Brigade
Airborne and air-
assault
31st
Guards Air-Assault Brigade
104th
Guards Air-Assault Regiment (76th
Guards Air-
Assault Division)
217th
Guards Airborne Regiment (98th
Guards
Airborne Division)
137th
Guards Airborne Regiment (106th
Guards
Airborne Division)
11th
Guards Air-Assault Brigade
Spetsnaz 10th
Brigade
346th
Brigades
25th
Regiment
FSB Special Operations Centre (elements of)
45th
Guards Airborne Spetsnaz Regiment
561st
Naval Spetsnaz battalion
54th
Reconnaissance units Training Centre
Ministry of Interior Dzerzhinskiy Division (elements of)
107th
Operational Brigade
Chechen MoI combined battalion
Dzerzhinskiy Division (elements of)
Armoured 5th
Guards Brigade
6th
Brigade
13th
Guards Regiment (4th
Guards [Kantemirovskaya]
Division)
12th
Guards Regiment (4th
Guards [Kantemirovskaya]
Division)
Rocket and artillery 1st
Guards Missile Brigade
79th
Guards Brigade
232nd
MRL Brigade
288th
Artillery Brigade
291st
Artillery Brigade
385th
Artillery Brigade
1065th
Guards Artillery Regiment (98th
Guards
Airborne Division)
573rd
Separate Artillery Reconnaissance Battalion
67th
Air Defence Brigade
200th
Artillery Brigade
268th
Guards Artillery Brigade
1140th
Guards Artillery Regiment (76th
Guards Air-
Assault Division)
Combat Support/
Combat Service
Support
74th
SIGINT Regiment
78th
Materiel Support Brigade
7015th
Armaments Maintenance Base
7016th
Armaments Maintenance Base
282nd
Armaments Repair Base
29th
Railway Brigade
59th
Communications Brigade
95th
Communications Brigades
31st
Engineer Regiment
Note: The Northern operational area comprises Debaltseve, Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as the central area of rebel-controlled
territory in the east of Ukraine. The Southern operational area includes Russian and rebel forces deployed near Mariupol.
4. Russian Forces in Ukraine 4
www.rusi.org
Russian Forces in Ukraine
Following their increasingly large-scale, direct and conventional involvement
in combat against Ukrainian troops in the middle of August 2014,3
Russian
troops in Ukraine numbered between 3,500 and 6,000–6,500 by the end
of August 2014, according to different sources.4
That number fluctuated,
reaching approximately 10,000 at the peak of direct Russian involvement
in the middle of December 2014. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD)
had to involve 117 combat and combat-support units to generate the
approximately 42,000 troops rotating in the vicinity of the Russo–Ukrainian
border: either stationed there, delivering artillery fire against Ukrainian
territory from Russian soil, or directly participating in combat operations on
Ukrainian sovereign territory. It is noteworthy that 104 of these 117 units
have been involved in combat since autumn 2014 in either one of the two
above mentioned forms – 3.5 times more than the number of military units
involvedinCrimeaandinsoutheasternUkraineoverspringandsummer2014.
The overall figure of Russian troops operating in eastern Ukraine reached
approximately 9,000 by the last week of February 2015 and has increased
by at least 1,500–2,000 personnel since then.5
Russian troops stationed in
Crimea should be also kept in mind – they might conservatively be estimated
to number 26,000–28,000 now, including approximately 13,000 of the
Russian Black Sea Fleet (other estimates of the overall number of Russian
troops in Crimea range between 29,000 and 40,000).
It is also worth noting that all but two of Russia’s ten field armies – the 35th
and 5th
Red Banner – contributed troops for the summer-autumn phase of
the Ukrainian operation (military units from Ussuriysk and Vladivostok came
from the Eastern Military District, not from the 5th
Red Banner field army; see
Figure 1). Military units from as far as Vladivostok and the Kuril Islands have
been identified participating in the Ukraine operation. Furthermore, seven
out of ten Russian field armies (namely, the 2nd
Guards, 6th
, 20th
, 49th
, 41st
,
36th
and 29th
Field Armies) have had or still have all manoeuvre units within
their commands mobilised in order to generate sufficient troops for the
summer/autumn and winter stages of the Ukraine operation. The 58th
Field
3. Spetsnaz teams and reconnaissance parties operated on the Ukrainian soil much
earlier, the 45th Separate Guards Special Operations (reconnaissance) regiment of the
Russian Airborne Troops was involved into the separatists’ attempt to capture Donetsk
airport in May 2014.
4. Sergiy Leschenko, ‘Ukraina: mizh vyboramy ta voennym stanom’ [‘Ukraine: between
ElectionsandaStateofWar],UkrainskaPravda,5September2014;authorinterviewwith
a senior officer of the Operations Directorate, Ukrainian General Staff, 9 February 2015.
5. The US military estimates around 12,000 Russian soldiers to be supporting separatists
in eastern Ukraine, according to the US Army’s Commander in Europe, General Ben
Hodges. He estimates the amount of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border and in
Crimea as 50,000 and 29,000, respectively. Reuters, ‘Some 12,000 Russian Soldiers in
Ukraine Supporting Rebels: U.S. Commander’, 3 March 2015.
5. RussianForcesinUkraine5
www.rusi.org
6
20
2G
58 41
36
29 35
5
Army without units participating
in Ukraine operation
Army with all units participating
in Ukraine operation
Army with all but one units
participating in Ukraine operation
Peacetime station of units involved
102nd
Military Base (not participating)
Figure 1: Russian Units Participating in Operations in Ukraine, February 2015.
6. Russian Forces in Ukraine 6
www.rusi.org
Army mobilised all but one of its manoeuvre units, which is stationed abroad
without direct access to Russian territory (namely, the 102nd
Military Base
in Armenia; this is marked by a light-blue star in Figure 1). It is illustrative
that the 102nd
Military Base is the Russian beachhead in Armenia, which has
been involved in a conflict with neighbouring Azerbaijan over the disputed
Nagorno-Karabakh area since late 1989; the conflict has shown signs of
heating up in recent months. The other Russian military base without direct
access to Russian territory – the 201st
in Tajikistan – was reported to be
sending troops to the Russo–Ukrainian border in late January 2015.
The Russian MoD kept sending reinforcements to the east of Ukraine even
after the ceasefire was signed in Minsk on 13 February. Indeed, two days
later detachments of the 2nd
Guards were detected in combat near Mariupol,
where they arrived as a fresh reserve to replace the 138th
Motor-Rifle Brigade,
which had suffered serious manpower losses over a three-week period.
Force Sustainment
With the ‘regime of silence’ (an informally agreed ceasefire) introduced in
the east of Ukraine in early December 2014, Russian troops were moved
to the rear, behind rebel formations, carrying out combat-service support
(for instance, logistical supply) and combat support (long-range artillery
fire) functions. This served the Kremlin’s political aim to avoid disrupting the
then-forthcoming Minsk negotiations that were scheduled for 11 February,
with which the Kremlin planned to achieve a political framework for re-
introducing rebel territories back into Ukraine. (There were voices in Ukraine
calling for acceptance of the occupation of Donbass in order to prevent it
from being used as a Trojan horse within the Ukrainian political system.)
At the same time, casualties have forced the Russian command, instead of
using Battalion Tactical Groups originating from a single brigade or division, to
establish ad hoc formations that combine detachments from different units
into combined tactical groups. Those two facts combined prompted some
observers to suggest there are no Russian regular units fighting as coherent
formations in the combat zone – with only individual ‘volunteer’ servicemen
fighting and the organised regular Russian military present in exclusively
command roles and as specialist crews to operate the most sophisticated
7. Russian Forces in Ukraine 7
www.rusi.org
equipment.6
However, with a new round of fighting starting immediately
after the ceasefire was signed, Russian units returned to prioritised forward
locations, as the most capable strike force; rebel formations have in essence
been used as cannon fodder. During the February fighting on the northern
front, combined formations of Russian regulars have been detected on a
number of occasions:
• On 1–2 February, a combined formation – consisting of the 8th
Guards
and 18th
Guards Motor-Rifle brigades, 25th
Spetsnaz Regiment,
and elements of the 232nd
MRL brigade – was involved in combat
near Debaltseve
• At the same time, the 8th
Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade deployed some
of its personnel within a combined formation – of the 8th
Guards
Motor-Rifle Brigade and 5th
Tank Brigade – to serve as infantry support
to armoured forces near Gorlovka
• A combined formation of the 27th
Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade and
217th
Guards Airborne Regiment (98th
Guards Airborne Division)
moved to Logvinovo on 14 February when the combined formation of
136th
Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade and 25th
Spetsnaz Regiment fighting
there to close the corridor to Debaltsevo had to be withdrawn after
severe manpower losses. (The combined formation of the 27th
Guards
and 217th
Guards Airborne was itself established around the core of
the latter’s Battalion Tactical Group after it took heavy losses.)
• The 20th
Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade’s tactical group had to be
reformed into a combined formation with 18th
Guards Motor-Rifle
Brigade elements after 13 February; the 20th
Guards elements were a
substitute for the elements of the 8th
Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade due
to the latter’s substantial losses
• Other combined formations – of 19th
Motor-Rifle Brigade with 10th
Spetsnaz Brigade; of the 13th
Guards Tank Regiment (4th
Guards
[Kantemirovskaya] Tank Division) with the 32nd
Motor-Rifle brigade;
6. See, for example, remarks by the US ambassador to NATO on 4 February 2015 that
Russian troops were present in eastern Ukraine, but only in a command role and to
operate advanced equipment, and that a large-scale intervention did not appear
imminent. Reuters, ‘Russians Present in Ukraine in Specialist Roles: U.S. Envoy’, 4
February 2015. The Daily Mail further detailed the ambassador’s statement at a briefing
before a meeting of NATO defence ministers: ‘“Back in August, we saw a spike in direct
Russian intervention in the form of Russian military units. We saw Russian battalions as
coherent formations deployed into Ukraine,” Lute told a news briefing before a NATO
defence ministers’ meeting on Thursday. “We don’t see another such direct intervention
[by Russian units] as imminent,” he said.’ Daily Mail, ‘Russians Present in Ukraine in
Specialist Roles: U.S. Envoy’, 4 February 2014.
8. Russian Forces in Ukraine 8
www.rusi.org
and of the 104th
Guards Air-Assault Regiment (76th
Guards Air-Assault
Division) with the ‘Kalmius’ rebel formation – were also detected in
combat in the Northern Operational Area in February
• The 9th
Motor-Rifle Brigade operated in a combined formation with
elements of an unidentified unit in the Southern Operational Area.
The wide geographic dispersion of the units involved in generating troops
for the operation could be considered to reflect the typical desire of military
planners to give troops experience in a combat environment whenever
such an opportunity arises. But this is not the primary case for the current
situation; there are indications of other reasons.
The units permanently located in the Russian MoD’s Southern and Western
military districts generated the Battalion Tactical Groups for the spring phase
of the operation, yet they were only able to supply Company Tactical Groups
in the autumn and especially the winter periods. Some units struggled to
meet even those lower requirements. For instance, the 536th
Coastal Artillery
Brigade had to temporarily assign some of its professional servicemen to
serve in the 61st
Marine Brigade to allow the latter to generate a tactical
group to be sent to Ukraine.
At the same time, Siberian units have been ordered to generate much
more than Battalion Tactical Groups; the 36th
Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade’s
contribution was of nearly regimental size, with tank, motorised-infantry
and artillery battalions, plus additional, smaller combat-support and
combat service-support detachments. This appears to indicate a shortage
of badly needed manpower, while the fact that the Siberian units have been
transported into the Ukrainian area of operations with their own organic
assets – instead of just ferrying their personnel into the area – implies a
shortage of military hardware in theatre. Taken together, it suggests that
enabling troops to train in realistic combat environments is certainly not the
only reason for the participation of such remotely located units.
Furthermore, generating new ‘professionals’ out of unwitting conscripts is
another key indicator that a lack of personnel – and not the combat-training
benefits – is the real cause for the involvement of distantly located units.
There are reports of Russian military personnel being intimidated into
‘volunteering’ for covert combat in eastern Ukraine. On several occasions,
conscripts have been fraudulently ‘converted’ into professional status to
do so, sometimes being recorded as apparently having expressed a desire
to become professionals; on at least one occasion it was reported that
the unit’s commander forged contracts, signing them himself for unaware
conscripts. It is hardly necessary to describe how such activities may be
harmful to troop morale.
9. Russian Forces in Ukraine 9
www.rusi.org
A further example of such actions is the deployment of the Russian Ministry
of the Interior’s Dzerzhinskiy Division in the role of ‘barrier squads’ – punitive
action, anti-retreat troops – behind the lines of rebels and Russian regulars.
This has been reported at both the northern part of the rebel-controlled
territory near Debaltseve and near Mariupol on the southern operational
axis. On five identifiable occasions, detachments of the Dzerzhinskiy Division
have undertaken punitive action against Russian regulars; rebels have also
reported punitive actions by the Dzerzhiskiy Division against them. The
necessity of such deployments further highlights problems the Russian
command has with the morale of both its own troops and the rebels.
Taken together, these factors are the most compelling evidence yet of the
lack of trained military personnel with which Russia might sustain operations
against Ukraine. This is without further investigation of the actual combat
capabilitiesofthosedeployedtroops,whichareassessedtobeunsatisfactory,
not least given these widespread reports of low morale.
Conclusion
There is evidence of Russian troops present in eastern Ukraine – not only
in a command role and to operate advanced equipment, but as coherent
fighting formations too. Those forces deployed to Ukraine, on or near the
border, and in Crimea represent a serious and direct threat to Ukraine. That
is due to the numbers of these Russian forces, which nearly matches that of
all of Kiev’s available combat forces. Further, rebel forces more or less under
Russian control number half the total of Russian troops. Hence, Kiev cannot
generate or count on numerical superiority.
The main strategic objective of Russian troops is to secure the continued
existence of Russian-controlled ‘republics’ in eastern Ukraine. Yet Russia
is having trouble sustaining its forces generated for the operation
against Ukraine.
Under such circumstances, one cannot exclude the possibility that the
Kremlin might opt to capitalise upon its relatively advantageous position –
while it still exists – over a Ukrainian military that is currently weakened by its
forced retreat from the Debaltseve area, in which it took substantial losses of
equipment and probably manpower. This would also solidify the rebels’ new
territorial gains. The large industrial centre and seaport of Mariupol would
be the most likely target.
Relocation of Russian and rebel forces from the Debaltseve area to
concentrationsnorthandeastofMariupolindicatethatthisoptioniscertainly
being considered in the Kremlin. Should this be the case, a further escalation
of hostilities and a Russian military push to expand rebel-controlled territory
remains a realistic possibility.
10. Russian Forces in Ukraine
www.rusi.org
10
Royal United Services Institute for
Defence and Security Studies
Whitehall, London SW1A 2ET, UK
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7747 2600
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7321 0943
The views expressed in this paper are
those of the author(s) alone, and do not
represent the views of RUSI.
E-mail: publications@rusi.org
Web: www.rusi.org
All RUSI briefing papers are the
copyright of the Royal United Services
Institute. They may be copied and
electronically transmitted freely. They
may not be reproduced in a different
form without prior permission from the
Institute.
BRIEFING PAPER
Dr Igor Sutyagin is Senior Research Fellow in Russian Studies at RUSI.
The military aspects of Russian operations against Ukraine from 2014 to
early 2015 will be discussed in greater detail in a forthcoming RUSI occasional
paper, ‘ZAPAD-2009 to Russian Spring: Russia’s Military Operations against
Ukraine, 2014–15’.