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Russian Forces in Ukraine
Igor Sutyagin
Royal United Services Institute  March 2015
Briefing Paper
The annexation of Crimea and the subsequent large-scale deployment of
Russian troops near the Russo-Ukrainian border were popularly referred to
in Russia as ‘Operation Russian Spring’. While the annexation itself of Crimea
was relatively peaceful, the actions of Russian and Russian-backed forces
in eastern Ukraine turned into an increasingly fierce fight as the Ukrainian
government launched its own ‘anti-terrorist operation’ against the Russian-
supported rebels.
In this way, the comparatively bloodless Russian spring gave way to a Russian
winter of fierce combat. The first operational successes of Ukrainian forces
in late June and early July 2014 first prompted Russian artillery fire from
within Russian territory, targeted against advancing Ukrainian troops on
their own soil, from mid-July onwards. Direct intervention by Russian troops
in combat roles then followed in the middle of August, when the prospect of
rebel defeat had become realistic. The presence of large numbers of Russian
troops on Ukrainian sovereign territory has, more or less, since become a
permanent feature of the conflict.
The first phase of large-scale incursions by regular Russian troops
commenced on 11 August 2014 and has involved a substantial array of
forces (see Table 1). Elements of some Russian reconnaissance and special
operations units have operated on Ukrainian soil since 14 July (at the latest),
comprising teams generated by six units.
The Russian military operation against Ukraine is instructive, having been
waged in accordance with the Gerasimov Doctrine of Ambiguous Warfare.1
1.	 Presented by the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Army General Valeriy Gerasimov,
in January 2013 at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences’ annual meeting; key
elements of the Gerasimov Doctrine have since been integrated into the new edition of
the Russian Military Doctrine, as approved in December 2014.
Russian Forces in Ukraine 2
www.rusi.org
Table 1: Russian Combat and Reconnaissance Formations during the August
2014 Incursion.
Battalion tactical groups
(from 11 August)
generated by:
17th
Motor-Rifle Brigade
18th
Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade
21st
Motor-Rifle Brigade
33rd
(Mountain) Motor-Rifle Brigade
247th
Guards Air-Assault Regiment (7th
Guards Air-Assault
Division)
104th
Guards Air-Assault Regiment (76th
Guards Air-Assault
Division)
331st
Guards Airborne Regiment (98th
Guards Airborne
Division)
137th
Guards Airborne Regiment (106th
Guards Airborne
Division)
31st
Guards Air-Assault Brigade
2nd
Spetsnaz Brigade
Reconnaissance teams
(from 14 July)
generated by:
2nd
Spetsnaz Brigade
10th
Spetsnaz Brigade
45th
Guards Spetsnaz Regiment of the Airborne Troops (VDV)
173rd
Guards Separate Recce Company (106th
Guards
Airborne Division)
Recce battalion of the 9th
Motor-Rifle Brigades (the former
84th
Independent Reconnaissance Battalion)
Recce battalion of the 18th
Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade (the
former 18th
Independent Reconnaissance Battalion)
But it has also revealed some of the constraints on Russia’s exercise of military
power; primarily, its limited capacity to sustain an operation of this size.
Indeed, it is obvious that there are insufficient resources – military and
financial – under the Kremlin’s command to sustain military operations at
the current level for over a year: the military capabilities required to carry
out the operation are already reaching their limits. It might be too early
to definitively assess that Russia’s military capacity is overstretched by the
crisis in Ukraine, but some facts are evident. Twenty-eight military units
were required to generate the approximately 90,000 troops stationed on
the Russo–Ukrainian border and within Crimea in spring 2014.2
These units
were drawn from a relatively limited geographic area in this early phase of
the operation against Ukraine. To sustain this deployment and the required
intensity of fighting, it was necessary to call upon more units.
2.	 For additional details see: ‘Ukraine Military Dispositions: The Military Ticks Up While
the Clock Ticks Down’, RUSI Briefing Paper, April 2014.
Russian Forces in Ukraine 3
www.rusi.org
Table 2: Russian Regular Units with Troops Involved in Ukraine Combat Operations, February 2015.
Type Units
Northern Operational Area Southern Operational Area
Motorised infantry 2nd
Guards (Tamanskaya) Division (elements of)
8th
Guards Brigade
18th
Brigade
19th
Brigade
20th
Guards Brigade
23rd
Guards Brigade
27th
Guards Brigade
28th
Brigade
32nd
Brigade
33rd
(Mountain) Brigade
37th
Brigade
2nd
Guards (Tamanskaya) Division (elements of)
9th
Brigade
138th
Brigade
Airborne and air-
assault
31st
Guards Air-Assault Brigade
104th
Guards Air-Assault Regiment (76th
Guards Air-
Assault Division)
217th
Guards Airborne Regiment (98th
Guards
Airborne Division)
137th
Guards Airborne Regiment (106th
Guards
Airborne Division)
11th
Guards Air-Assault Brigade
Spetsnaz 10th
Brigade
346th
Brigades
25th
Regiment
FSB Special Operations Centre (elements of)
45th
Guards Airborne Spetsnaz Regiment
561st
Naval Spetsnaz battalion
54th
Reconnaissance units Training Centre
Ministry of Interior Dzerzhinskiy Division (elements of)
107th
Operational Brigade
Chechen MoI combined battalion
Dzerzhinskiy Division (elements of)
Armoured 5th
Guards Brigade
6th
Brigade
13th
Guards Regiment (4th
Guards [Kantemirovskaya]
Division)
12th
Guards Regiment (4th
Guards [Kantemirovskaya]
Division)
Rocket and artillery 1st
Guards Missile Brigade
79th
Guards Brigade
232nd
MRL Brigade
288th
Artillery Brigade
291st
Artillery Brigade
385th
Artillery Brigade
1065th
Guards Artillery Regiment (98th
Guards
Airborne Division)
573rd
Separate Artillery Reconnaissance Battalion
67th
Air Defence Brigade
200th
Artillery Brigade
268th
Guards Artillery Brigade
1140th
Guards Artillery Regiment (76th
Guards Air-
Assault Division)
Combat Support/
Combat Service
Support
74th
SIGINT Regiment
78th
Materiel Support Brigade
7015th
Armaments Maintenance Base
7016th
Armaments Maintenance Base
282nd
Armaments Repair Base
29th
Railway Brigade
59th
Communications Brigade
95th
Communications Brigades
31st
Engineer Regiment
Note: The Northern operational area comprises Debaltseve, Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as the central area of rebel-controlled
territory in the east of Ukraine. The Southern operational area includes Russian and rebel forces deployed near Mariupol.
Russian Forces in Ukraine 4
www.rusi.org
Russian Forces in Ukraine
Following their increasingly large-scale, direct and conventional involvement
in combat against Ukrainian troops in the middle of August 2014,3
Russian
troops in Ukraine numbered between 3,500 and 6,000–6,500 by the end
of August 2014, according to different sources.4
That number fluctuated,
reaching approximately 10,000 at the peak of direct Russian involvement
in the middle of December 2014. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD)
had to involve 117 combat and combat-support units to generate the
approximately 42,000 troops rotating in the vicinity of the Russo–Ukrainian
border: either stationed there, delivering artillery fire against Ukrainian
territory from Russian soil, or directly participating in combat operations on
Ukrainian sovereign territory. It is noteworthy that 104 of these 117 units
have been involved in combat since autumn 2014 in either one of the two
above mentioned forms – 3.5 times more than the number of military units
involvedinCrimeaandinsoutheasternUkraineoverspringandsummer2014.
The overall figure of Russian troops operating in eastern Ukraine reached
approximately 9,000 by the last week of February 2015 and has increased
by at least 1,500–2,000 personnel since then.5
Russian troops stationed in
Crimea should be also kept in mind – they might conservatively be estimated
to number 26,000–28,000 now, including approximately 13,000 of the
Russian Black Sea Fleet (other estimates of the overall number of Russian
troops in Crimea range between 29,000 and 40,000).
It is also worth noting that all but two of Russia’s ten field armies – the 35th
and 5th
Red Banner – contributed troops for the summer-autumn phase of
the Ukrainian operation (military units from Ussuriysk and Vladivostok came
from the Eastern Military District, not from the 5th
Red Banner field army; see
Figure 1). Military units from as far as Vladivostok and the Kuril Islands have
been identified participating in the Ukraine operation. Furthermore, seven
out of ten Russian field armies (namely, the 2nd
Guards, 6th
, 20th
, 49th
, 41st
,
36th
and 29th
Field Armies) have had or still have all manoeuvre units within
their commands mobilised in order to generate sufficient troops for the
summer/autumn and winter stages of the Ukraine operation. The 58th
Field
3.	 Spetsnaz teams and reconnaissance parties operated on the Ukrainian soil much
earlier, the 45th Separate Guards Special Operations (reconnaissance) regiment of the
Russian Airborne Troops was involved into the separatists’ attempt to capture Donetsk
airport in May 2014.
4.	 Sergiy Leschenko, ‘Ukraina: mizh vyboramy ta voennym stanom’ [‘Ukraine: between
ElectionsandaStateofWar],UkrainskaPravda,5September2014;authorinterviewwith
a senior officer of the Operations Directorate, Ukrainian General Staff, 9 February 2015.
5.	 The US military estimates around 12,000 Russian soldiers to be supporting separatists
in eastern Ukraine, according to the US Army’s Commander in Europe, General Ben
Hodges. He estimates the amount of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border and in
Crimea as 50,000 and 29,000, respectively. Reuters, ‘Some 12,000 Russian Soldiers in
Ukraine Supporting Rebels: U.S. Commander’, 3 March 2015.
RussianForcesinUkraine5
www.rusi.org
6
20
2G
58 41
36
29 35
5
Army without units participating
in Ukraine operation
Army with all units participating
in Ukraine operation
Army with all but one units
participating in Ukraine operation
Peacetime station of units involved
102nd
Military Base (not participating)
Figure 1: Russian Units Participating in Operations in Ukraine, February 2015.
Russian Forces in Ukraine 6
www.rusi.org
Army mobilised all but one of its manoeuvre units, which is stationed abroad
without direct access to Russian territory (namely, the 102nd
Military Base
in Armenia; this is marked by a light-blue star in Figure 1). It is illustrative
that the 102nd
Military Base is the Russian beachhead in Armenia, which has
been involved in a conflict with neighbouring Azerbaijan over the disputed
Nagorno-Karabakh area since late 1989; the conflict has shown signs of
heating up in recent months. The other Russian military base without direct
access to Russian territory – the 201st
in Tajikistan – was reported to be
sending troops to the Russo–Ukrainian border in late January 2015.
The Russian MoD kept sending reinforcements to the east of Ukraine even
after the ceasefire was signed in Minsk on 13 February. Indeed, two days
later detachments of the 2nd
Guards were detected in combat near Mariupol,
where they arrived as a fresh reserve to replace the 138th
Motor-Rifle Brigade,
which had suffered serious manpower losses over a three-week period.
Force Sustainment
With the ‘regime of silence’ (an informally agreed ceasefire) introduced in
the east of Ukraine in early December 2014, Russian troops were moved
to the rear, behind rebel formations, carrying out combat-service support
(for instance, logistical supply) and combat support (long-range artillery
fire) functions. This served the Kremlin’s political aim to avoid disrupting the
then-forthcoming Minsk negotiations that were scheduled for 11 February,
with which the Kremlin planned to achieve a political framework for re-
introducing rebel territories back into Ukraine. (There were voices in Ukraine
calling for acceptance of the occupation of Donbass in order to prevent it
from being used as a Trojan horse within the Ukrainian political system.)
At the same time, casualties have forced the Russian command, instead of
using Battalion Tactical Groups originating from a single brigade or division, to
establish ad hoc formations that combine detachments from different units
into combined tactical groups. Those two facts combined prompted some
observers to suggest there are no Russian regular units fighting as coherent
formations in the combat zone – with only individual ‘volunteer’ servicemen
fighting and the organised regular Russian military present in exclusively
command roles and as specialist crews to operate the most sophisticated
Russian Forces in Ukraine 7
www.rusi.org
equipment.6
However, with a new round of fighting starting immediately
after the ceasefire was signed, Russian units returned to prioritised forward
locations, as the most capable strike force; rebel formations have in essence
been used as cannon fodder. During the February fighting on the northern
front, combined formations of Russian regulars have been detected on a
number of occasions:
•	 On 1–2 February, a combined formation – consisting of the 8th
Guards
and 18th
Guards Motor-Rifle brigades, 25th
Spetsnaz Regiment,
and elements of the 232nd
MRL brigade – was involved in combat
near Debaltseve
•	 At the same time, the 8th
Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade deployed some
of its personnel within a combined formation – of the 8th
Guards
Motor-Rifle Brigade and 5th
Tank Brigade – to serve as infantry support
to armoured forces near Gorlovka
•	 A combined formation of the 27th
Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade and
217th
Guards Airborne Regiment (98th
Guards Airborne Division)
moved to Logvinovo on 14 February when the combined formation of
136th
Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade and 25th
Spetsnaz Regiment fighting
there to close the corridor to Debaltsevo had to be withdrawn after
severe manpower losses. (The combined formation of the 27th
Guards
and 217th
Guards Airborne was itself established around the core of
the latter’s Battalion Tactical Group after it took heavy losses.)
•	 The 20th
Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade’s tactical group had to be
reformed into a combined formation with 18th
Guards Motor-Rifle
Brigade elements after 13 February; the 20th
Guards elements were a
substitute for the elements of the 8th
Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade due
to the latter’s substantial losses
•	 Other combined formations – of 19th
Motor-Rifle Brigade with 10th
Spetsnaz Brigade; of the 13th
Guards Tank Regiment (4th
Guards
[Kantemirovskaya] Tank Division) with the 32nd
Motor-Rifle brigade;
6.	 See, for example, remarks by the US ambassador to NATO on 4 February 2015 that
Russian troops were present in eastern Ukraine, but only in a command role and to
operate advanced equipment, and that a large-scale intervention did not appear
imminent. Reuters, ‘Russians Present in Ukraine in Specialist Roles: U.S. Envoy’, 4
February 2015. The Daily Mail further detailed the ambassador’s statement at a briefing
before a meeting of NATO defence ministers: ‘“Back in August, we saw a spike in direct
Russian intervention in the form of Russian military units. We saw Russian battalions as
coherent formations deployed into Ukraine,” Lute told a news briefing before a NATO
defence ministers’ meeting on Thursday. “We don’t see another such direct intervention
[by Russian units] as imminent,” he said.’ Daily Mail, ‘Russians Present in Ukraine in
Specialist Roles: U.S. Envoy’, 4 February 2014.
Russian Forces in Ukraine 8
www.rusi.org
and of the 104th
Guards Air-Assault Regiment (76th
Guards Air-Assault
Division) with the ‘Kalmius’ rebel formation – were also detected in
combat in the Northern Operational Area in February
•	 The 9th
Motor-Rifle Brigade operated in a combined formation with
elements of an unidentified unit in the Southern Operational Area.
The wide geographic dispersion of the units involved in generating troops
for the operation could be considered to reflect the typical desire of military
planners to give troops experience in a combat environment whenever
such an opportunity arises. But this is not the primary case for the current
situation; there are indications of other reasons.
The units permanently located in the Russian MoD’s Southern and Western
military districts generated the Battalion Tactical Groups for the spring phase
of the operation, yet they were only able to supply Company Tactical Groups
in the autumn and especially the winter periods. Some units struggled to
meet even those lower requirements. For instance, the 536th
Coastal Artillery
Brigade had to temporarily assign some of its professional servicemen to
serve in the 61st
Marine Brigade to allow the latter to generate a tactical
group to be sent to Ukraine.
At the same time, Siberian units have been ordered to generate much
more than Battalion Tactical Groups; the 36th
Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade’s
contribution was of nearly regimental size, with tank, motorised-infantry
and artillery battalions, plus additional, smaller combat-support and
combat service-support detachments. This appears to indicate a shortage
of badly needed manpower, while the fact that the Siberian units have been
transported into the Ukrainian area of operations with their own organic
assets – instead of just ferrying their personnel into the area – implies a
shortage of military hardware in theatre. Taken together, it suggests that
enabling troops to train in realistic combat environments is certainly not the
only reason for the participation of such remotely located units.
Furthermore, generating new ‘professionals’ out of unwitting conscripts is
another key indicator that a lack of personnel – and not the combat-training
benefits – is the real cause for the involvement of distantly located units.
There are reports of Russian military personnel being intimidated into
‘volunteering’ for covert combat in eastern Ukraine. On several occasions,
conscripts have been fraudulently ‘converted’ into professional status to
do so, sometimes being recorded as apparently having expressed a desire
to become professionals; on at least one occasion it was reported that
the unit’s commander forged contracts, signing them himself for unaware
conscripts. It is hardly necessary to describe how such activities may be
harmful to troop morale.
Russian Forces in Ukraine 9
www.rusi.org
A further example of such actions is the deployment of the Russian Ministry
of the Interior’s Dzerzhinskiy Division in the role of ‘barrier squads’ – punitive
action, anti-retreat troops – behind the lines of rebels and Russian regulars.
This has been reported at both the northern part of the rebel-controlled
territory near Debaltseve and near Mariupol on the southern operational
axis. On five identifiable occasions, detachments of the Dzerzhinskiy Division
have undertaken punitive action against Russian regulars; rebels have also
reported punitive actions by the Dzerzhiskiy Division against them. The
necessity of such deployments further highlights problems the Russian
command has with the morale of both its own troops and the rebels.
Taken together, these factors are the most compelling evidence yet of the
lack of trained military personnel with which Russia might sustain operations
against Ukraine. This is without further investigation of the actual combat
capabilitiesofthosedeployedtroops,whichareassessedtobeunsatisfactory,
not least given these widespread reports of low morale.
Conclusion
There is evidence of Russian troops present in eastern Ukraine – not only
in a command role and to operate advanced equipment, but as coherent
fighting formations too. Those forces deployed to Ukraine, on or near the
border, and in Crimea represent a serious and direct threat to Ukraine. That
is due to the numbers of these Russian forces, which nearly matches that of
all of Kiev’s available combat forces. Further, rebel forces more or less under
Russian control number half the total of Russian troops. Hence, Kiev cannot
generate or count on numerical superiority.
The main strategic objective of Russian troops is to secure the continued
existence of Russian-controlled ‘republics’ in eastern Ukraine. Yet Russia
is having trouble sustaining its forces generated for the operation
against Ukraine.
Under such circumstances, one cannot exclude the possibility that the
Kremlin might opt to capitalise upon its relatively advantageous position –
while it still exists – over a Ukrainian military that is currently weakened by its
forced retreat from the Debaltseve area, in which it took substantial losses of
equipment and probably manpower. This would also solidify the rebels’ new
territorial gains. The large industrial centre and seaport of Mariupol would
be the most likely target.
Relocation of Russian and rebel forces from the Debaltseve area to
concentrationsnorthandeastofMariupolindicatethatthisoptioniscertainly
being considered in the Kremlin. Should this be the case, a further escalation
of hostilities and a Russian military push to expand rebel-controlled territory
remains a realistic possibility.
Russian Forces in Ukraine
www.rusi.org
10
Royal United Services Institute for
Defence and Security Studies
Whitehall, London SW1A 2ET, UK
Tel:	 +44 (0) 20 7747 2600
Fax:	 +44 (0) 20 7321 0943
The views expressed in this paper are
those of the author(s) alone, and do not
represent the views of RUSI.
E-mail:	 publications@rusi.org
Web:	 www.rusi.org
All RUSI briefing papers are the
copyright of the Royal United Services
Institute. They may be copied and
electronically transmitted freely. They
may not be reproduced in a different
form without prior permission from the
Institute.
BRIEFING PAPER
Dr Igor Sutyagin is Senior Research Fellow in Russian Studies at RUSI.
The military aspects of Russian operations against Ukraine from 2014 to
early 2015 will be discussed in greater detail in a forthcoming RUSI occasional
paper, ‘ZAPAD-2009 to Russian Spring: Russia’s Military Operations against
Ukraine, 2014–15’.

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Russian forces in Ukraine

  • 1. Russian Forces in Ukraine Igor Sutyagin Royal United Services Institute March 2015 Briefing Paper The annexation of Crimea and the subsequent large-scale deployment of Russian troops near the Russo-Ukrainian border were popularly referred to in Russia as ‘Operation Russian Spring’. While the annexation itself of Crimea was relatively peaceful, the actions of Russian and Russian-backed forces in eastern Ukraine turned into an increasingly fierce fight as the Ukrainian government launched its own ‘anti-terrorist operation’ against the Russian- supported rebels. In this way, the comparatively bloodless Russian spring gave way to a Russian winter of fierce combat. The first operational successes of Ukrainian forces in late June and early July 2014 first prompted Russian artillery fire from within Russian territory, targeted against advancing Ukrainian troops on their own soil, from mid-July onwards. Direct intervention by Russian troops in combat roles then followed in the middle of August, when the prospect of rebel defeat had become realistic. The presence of large numbers of Russian troops on Ukrainian sovereign territory has, more or less, since become a permanent feature of the conflict. The first phase of large-scale incursions by regular Russian troops commenced on 11 August 2014 and has involved a substantial array of forces (see Table 1). Elements of some Russian reconnaissance and special operations units have operated on Ukrainian soil since 14 July (at the latest), comprising teams generated by six units. The Russian military operation against Ukraine is instructive, having been waged in accordance with the Gerasimov Doctrine of Ambiguous Warfare.1 1. Presented by the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Army General Valeriy Gerasimov, in January 2013 at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences’ annual meeting; key elements of the Gerasimov Doctrine have since been integrated into the new edition of the Russian Military Doctrine, as approved in December 2014.
  • 2. Russian Forces in Ukraine 2 www.rusi.org Table 1: Russian Combat and Reconnaissance Formations during the August 2014 Incursion. Battalion tactical groups (from 11 August) generated by: 17th Motor-Rifle Brigade 18th Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade 21st Motor-Rifle Brigade 33rd (Mountain) Motor-Rifle Brigade 247th Guards Air-Assault Regiment (7th Guards Air-Assault Division) 104th Guards Air-Assault Regiment (76th Guards Air-Assault Division) 331st Guards Airborne Regiment (98th Guards Airborne Division) 137th Guards Airborne Regiment (106th Guards Airborne Division) 31st Guards Air-Assault Brigade 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade Reconnaissance teams (from 14 July) generated by: 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade 10th Spetsnaz Brigade 45th Guards Spetsnaz Regiment of the Airborne Troops (VDV) 173rd Guards Separate Recce Company (106th Guards Airborne Division) Recce battalion of the 9th Motor-Rifle Brigades (the former 84th Independent Reconnaissance Battalion) Recce battalion of the 18th Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade (the former 18th Independent Reconnaissance Battalion) But it has also revealed some of the constraints on Russia’s exercise of military power; primarily, its limited capacity to sustain an operation of this size. Indeed, it is obvious that there are insufficient resources – military and financial – under the Kremlin’s command to sustain military operations at the current level for over a year: the military capabilities required to carry out the operation are already reaching their limits. It might be too early to definitively assess that Russia’s military capacity is overstretched by the crisis in Ukraine, but some facts are evident. Twenty-eight military units were required to generate the approximately 90,000 troops stationed on the Russo–Ukrainian border and within Crimea in spring 2014.2 These units were drawn from a relatively limited geographic area in this early phase of the operation against Ukraine. To sustain this deployment and the required intensity of fighting, it was necessary to call upon more units. 2. For additional details see: ‘Ukraine Military Dispositions: The Military Ticks Up While the Clock Ticks Down’, RUSI Briefing Paper, April 2014.
  • 3. Russian Forces in Ukraine 3 www.rusi.org Table 2: Russian Regular Units with Troops Involved in Ukraine Combat Operations, February 2015. Type Units Northern Operational Area Southern Operational Area Motorised infantry 2nd Guards (Tamanskaya) Division (elements of) 8th Guards Brigade 18th Brigade 19th Brigade 20th Guards Brigade 23rd Guards Brigade 27th Guards Brigade 28th Brigade 32nd Brigade 33rd (Mountain) Brigade 37th Brigade 2nd Guards (Tamanskaya) Division (elements of) 9th Brigade 138th Brigade Airborne and air- assault 31st Guards Air-Assault Brigade 104th Guards Air-Assault Regiment (76th Guards Air- Assault Division) 217th Guards Airborne Regiment (98th Guards Airborne Division) 137th Guards Airborne Regiment (106th Guards Airborne Division) 11th Guards Air-Assault Brigade Spetsnaz 10th Brigade 346th Brigades 25th Regiment FSB Special Operations Centre (elements of) 45th Guards Airborne Spetsnaz Regiment 561st Naval Spetsnaz battalion 54th Reconnaissance units Training Centre Ministry of Interior Dzerzhinskiy Division (elements of) 107th Operational Brigade Chechen MoI combined battalion Dzerzhinskiy Division (elements of) Armoured 5th Guards Brigade 6th Brigade 13th Guards Regiment (4th Guards [Kantemirovskaya] Division) 12th Guards Regiment (4th Guards [Kantemirovskaya] Division) Rocket and artillery 1st Guards Missile Brigade 79th Guards Brigade 232nd MRL Brigade 288th Artillery Brigade 291st Artillery Brigade 385th Artillery Brigade 1065th Guards Artillery Regiment (98th Guards Airborne Division) 573rd Separate Artillery Reconnaissance Battalion 67th Air Defence Brigade 200th Artillery Brigade 268th Guards Artillery Brigade 1140th Guards Artillery Regiment (76th Guards Air- Assault Division) Combat Support/ Combat Service Support 74th SIGINT Regiment 78th Materiel Support Brigade 7015th Armaments Maintenance Base 7016th Armaments Maintenance Base 282nd Armaments Repair Base 29th Railway Brigade 59th Communications Brigade 95th Communications Brigades 31st Engineer Regiment Note: The Northern operational area comprises Debaltseve, Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as the central area of rebel-controlled territory in the east of Ukraine. The Southern operational area includes Russian and rebel forces deployed near Mariupol.
  • 4. Russian Forces in Ukraine 4 www.rusi.org Russian Forces in Ukraine Following their increasingly large-scale, direct and conventional involvement in combat against Ukrainian troops in the middle of August 2014,3 Russian troops in Ukraine numbered between 3,500 and 6,000–6,500 by the end of August 2014, according to different sources.4 That number fluctuated, reaching approximately 10,000 at the peak of direct Russian involvement in the middle of December 2014. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) had to involve 117 combat and combat-support units to generate the approximately 42,000 troops rotating in the vicinity of the Russo–Ukrainian border: either stationed there, delivering artillery fire against Ukrainian territory from Russian soil, or directly participating in combat operations on Ukrainian sovereign territory. It is noteworthy that 104 of these 117 units have been involved in combat since autumn 2014 in either one of the two above mentioned forms – 3.5 times more than the number of military units involvedinCrimeaandinsoutheasternUkraineoverspringandsummer2014. The overall figure of Russian troops operating in eastern Ukraine reached approximately 9,000 by the last week of February 2015 and has increased by at least 1,500–2,000 personnel since then.5 Russian troops stationed in Crimea should be also kept in mind – they might conservatively be estimated to number 26,000–28,000 now, including approximately 13,000 of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (other estimates of the overall number of Russian troops in Crimea range between 29,000 and 40,000). It is also worth noting that all but two of Russia’s ten field armies – the 35th and 5th Red Banner – contributed troops for the summer-autumn phase of the Ukrainian operation (military units from Ussuriysk and Vladivostok came from the Eastern Military District, not from the 5th Red Banner field army; see Figure 1). Military units from as far as Vladivostok and the Kuril Islands have been identified participating in the Ukraine operation. Furthermore, seven out of ten Russian field armies (namely, the 2nd Guards, 6th , 20th , 49th , 41st , 36th and 29th Field Armies) have had or still have all manoeuvre units within their commands mobilised in order to generate sufficient troops for the summer/autumn and winter stages of the Ukraine operation. The 58th Field 3. Spetsnaz teams and reconnaissance parties operated on the Ukrainian soil much earlier, the 45th Separate Guards Special Operations (reconnaissance) regiment of the Russian Airborne Troops was involved into the separatists’ attempt to capture Donetsk airport in May 2014. 4. Sergiy Leschenko, ‘Ukraina: mizh vyboramy ta voennym stanom’ [‘Ukraine: between ElectionsandaStateofWar],UkrainskaPravda,5September2014;authorinterviewwith a senior officer of the Operations Directorate, Ukrainian General Staff, 9 February 2015. 5. The US military estimates around 12,000 Russian soldiers to be supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine, according to the US Army’s Commander in Europe, General Ben Hodges. He estimates the amount of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border and in Crimea as 50,000 and 29,000, respectively. Reuters, ‘Some 12,000 Russian Soldiers in Ukraine Supporting Rebels: U.S. Commander’, 3 March 2015.
  • 5. RussianForcesinUkraine5 www.rusi.org 6 20 2G 58 41 36 29 35 5 Army without units participating in Ukraine operation Army with all units participating in Ukraine operation Army with all but one units participating in Ukraine operation Peacetime station of units involved 102nd Military Base (not participating) Figure 1: Russian Units Participating in Operations in Ukraine, February 2015.
  • 6. Russian Forces in Ukraine 6 www.rusi.org Army mobilised all but one of its manoeuvre units, which is stationed abroad without direct access to Russian territory (namely, the 102nd Military Base in Armenia; this is marked by a light-blue star in Figure 1). It is illustrative that the 102nd Military Base is the Russian beachhead in Armenia, which has been involved in a conflict with neighbouring Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh area since late 1989; the conflict has shown signs of heating up in recent months. The other Russian military base without direct access to Russian territory – the 201st in Tajikistan – was reported to be sending troops to the Russo–Ukrainian border in late January 2015. The Russian MoD kept sending reinforcements to the east of Ukraine even after the ceasefire was signed in Minsk on 13 February. Indeed, two days later detachments of the 2nd Guards were detected in combat near Mariupol, where they arrived as a fresh reserve to replace the 138th Motor-Rifle Brigade, which had suffered serious manpower losses over a three-week period. Force Sustainment With the ‘regime of silence’ (an informally agreed ceasefire) introduced in the east of Ukraine in early December 2014, Russian troops were moved to the rear, behind rebel formations, carrying out combat-service support (for instance, logistical supply) and combat support (long-range artillery fire) functions. This served the Kremlin’s political aim to avoid disrupting the then-forthcoming Minsk negotiations that were scheduled for 11 February, with which the Kremlin planned to achieve a political framework for re- introducing rebel territories back into Ukraine. (There were voices in Ukraine calling for acceptance of the occupation of Donbass in order to prevent it from being used as a Trojan horse within the Ukrainian political system.) At the same time, casualties have forced the Russian command, instead of using Battalion Tactical Groups originating from a single brigade or division, to establish ad hoc formations that combine detachments from different units into combined tactical groups. Those two facts combined prompted some observers to suggest there are no Russian regular units fighting as coherent formations in the combat zone – with only individual ‘volunteer’ servicemen fighting and the organised regular Russian military present in exclusively command roles and as specialist crews to operate the most sophisticated
  • 7. Russian Forces in Ukraine 7 www.rusi.org equipment.6 However, with a new round of fighting starting immediately after the ceasefire was signed, Russian units returned to prioritised forward locations, as the most capable strike force; rebel formations have in essence been used as cannon fodder. During the February fighting on the northern front, combined formations of Russian regulars have been detected on a number of occasions: • On 1–2 February, a combined formation – consisting of the 8th Guards and 18th Guards Motor-Rifle brigades, 25th Spetsnaz Regiment, and elements of the 232nd MRL brigade – was involved in combat near Debaltseve • At the same time, the 8th Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade deployed some of its personnel within a combined formation – of the 8th Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade and 5th Tank Brigade – to serve as infantry support to armoured forces near Gorlovka • A combined formation of the 27th Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade and 217th Guards Airborne Regiment (98th Guards Airborne Division) moved to Logvinovo on 14 February when the combined formation of 136th Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade and 25th Spetsnaz Regiment fighting there to close the corridor to Debaltsevo had to be withdrawn after severe manpower losses. (The combined formation of the 27th Guards and 217th Guards Airborne was itself established around the core of the latter’s Battalion Tactical Group after it took heavy losses.) • The 20th Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade’s tactical group had to be reformed into a combined formation with 18th Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade elements after 13 February; the 20th Guards elements were a substitute for the elements of the 8th Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade due to the latter’s substantial losses • Other combined formations – of 19th Motor-Rifle Brigade with 10th Spetsnaz Brigade; of the 13th Guards Tank Regiment (4th Guards [Kantemirovskaya] Tank Division) with the 32nd Motor-Rifle brigade; 6. See, for example, remarks by the US ambassador to NATO on 4 February 2015 that Russian troops were present in eastern Ukraine, but only in a command role and to operate advanced equipment, and that a large-scale intervention did not appear imminent. Reuters, ‘Russians Present in Ukraine in Specialist Roles: U.S. Envoy’, 4 February 2015. The Daily Mail further detailed the ambassador’s statement at a briefing before a meeting of NATO defence ministers: ‘“Back in August, we saw a spike in direct Russian intervention in the form of Russian military units. We saw Russian battalions as coherent formations deployed into Ukraine,” Lute told a news briefing before a NATO defence ministers’ meeting on Thursday. “We don’t see another such direct intervention [by Russian units] as imminent,” he said.’ Daily Mail, ‘Russians Present in Ukraine in Specialist Roles: U.S. Envoy’, 4 February 2014.
  • 8. Russian Forces in Ukraine 8 www.rusi.org and of the 104th Guards Air-Assault Regiment (76th Guards Air-Assault Division) with the ‘Kalmius’ rebel formation – were also detected in combat in the Northern Operational Area in February • The 9th Motor-Rifle Brigade operated in a combined formation with elements of an unidentified unit in the Southern Operational Area. The wide geographic dispersion of the units involved in generating troops for the operation could be considered to reflect the typical desire of military planners to give troops experience in a combat environment whenever such an opportunity arises. But this is not the primary case for the current situation; there are indications of other reasons. The units permanently located in the Russian MoD’s Southern and Western military districts generated the Battalion Tactical Groups for the spring phase of the operation, yet they were only able to supply Company Tactical Groups in the autumn and especially the winter periods. Some units struggled to meet even those lower requirements. For instance, the 536th Coastal Artillery Brigade had to temporarily assign some of its professional servicemen to serve in the 61st Marine Brigade to allow the latter to generate a tactical group to be sent to Ukraine. At the same time, Siberian units have been ordered to generate much more than Battalion Tactical Groups; the 36th Guards Motor-Rifle Brigade’s contribution was of nearly regimental size, with tank, motorised-infantry and artillery battalions, plus additional, smaller combat-support and combat service-support detachments. This appears to indicate a shortage of badly needed manpower, while the fact that the Siberian units have been transported into the Ukrainian area of operations with their own organic assets – instead of just ferrying their personnel into the area – implies a shortage of military hardware in theatre. Taken together, it suggests that enabling troops to train in realistic combat environments is certainly not the only reason for the participation of such remotely located units. Furthermore, generating new ‘professionals’ out of unwitting conscripts is another key indicator that a lack of personnel – and not the combat-training benefits – is the real cause for the involvement of distantly located units. There are reports of Russian military personnel being intimidated into ‘volunteering’ for covert combat in eastern Ukraine. On several occasions, conscripts have been fraudulently ‘converted’ into professional status to do so, sometimes being recorded as apparently having expressed a desire to become professionals; on at least one occasion it was reported that the unit’s commander forged contracts, signing them himself for unaware conscripts. It is hardly necessary to describe how such activities may be harmful to troop morale.
  • 9. Russian Forces in Ukraine 9 www.rusi.org A further example of such actions is the deployment of the Russian Ministry of the Interior’s Dzerzhinskiy Division in the role of ‘barrier squads’ – punitive action, anti-retreat troops – behind the lines of rebels and Russian regulars. This has been reported at both the northern part of the rebel-controlled territory near Debaltseve and near Mariupol on the southern operational axis. On five identifiable occasions, detachments of the Dzerzhinskiy Division have undertaken punitive action against Russian regulars; rebels have also reported punitive actions by the Dzerzhiskiy Division against them. The necessity of such deployments further highlights problems the Russian command has with the morale of both its own troops and the rebels. Taken together, these factors are the most compelling evidence yet of the lack of trained military personnel with which Russia might sustain operations against Ukraine. This is without further investigation of the actual combat capabilitiesofthosedeployedtroops,whichareassessedtobeunsatisfactory, not least given these widespread reports of low morale. Conclusion There is evidence of Russian troops present in eastern Ukraine – not only in a command role and to operate advanced equipment, but as coherent fighting formations too. Those forces deployed to Ukraine, on or near the border, and in Crimea represent a serious and direct threat to Ukraine. That is due to the numbers of these Russian forces, which nearly matches that of all of Kiev’s available combat forces. Further, rebel forces more or less under Russian control number half the total of Russian troops. Hence, Kiev cannot generate or count on numerical superiority. The main strategic objective of Russian troops is to secure the continued existence of Russian-controlled ‘republics’ in eastern Ukraine. Yet Russia is having trouble sustaining its forces generated for the operation against Ukraine. Under such circumstances, one cannot exclude the possibility that the Kremlin might opt to capitalise upon its relatively advantageous position – while it still exists – over a Ukrainian military that is currently weakened by its forced retreat from the Debaltseve area, in which it took substantial losses of equipment and probably manpower. This would also solidify the rebels’ new territorial gains. The large industrial centre and seaport of Mariupol would be the most likely target. Relocation of Russian and rebel forces from the Debaltseve area to concentrationsnorthandeastofMariupolindicatethatthisoptioniscertainly being considered in the Kremlin. Should this be the case, a further escalation of hostilities and a Russian military push to expand rebel-controlled territory remains a realistic possibility.
  • 10. Russian Forces in Ukraine www.rusi.org 10 Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Whitehall, London SW1A 2ET, UK Tel: +44 (0) 20 7747 2600 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7321 0943 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) alone, and do not represent the views of RUSI. E-mail: publications@rusi.org Web: www.rusi.org All RUSI briefing papers are the copyright of the Royal United Services Institute. They may be copied and electronically transmitted freely. They may not be reproduced in a different form without prior permission from the Institute. BRIEFING PAPER Dr Igor Sutyagin is Senior Research Fellow in Russian Studies at RUSI. The military aspects of Russian operations against Ukraine from 2014 to early 2015 will be discussed in greater detail in a forthcoming RUSI occasional paper, ‘ZAPAD-2009 to Russian Spring: Russia’s Military Operations against Ukraine, 2014–15’.