RPKI for Secure Routing
Brief introduction and some statistics
Presentation
Gerardo Viviers - RIPE NCC
About Routing Security
Brief Intro to RPKI
Hey! You!
Ok! I’ll add it to
my routes…
BGP is Naive…
3
I have the network Y
Hi! What’s up?
‘Cause I trust you,
stranger!
• Typing errors
- Also known as “fat
fi
ngers”
- 2 and 3 are really close on our keyboards…
• Routing policy violations
- Leaks,
fi
ltering miscon
fi
gurations
- “We didn’t mean this to go to the public Internet”
• Malicious attacks
- Route manipulation, BGP hijack, BGP DDOS
Routing Incidents
4
If Only We Could Do Something…
5
• Filter Routes based on:
- Best practices
- Internet Routing Registry
- RPKI
• All recommendations from MANRS
You Can Do Something!
6
RPKI System
7
External
Repositories
RIPE NCC ARIN APNIC
Validator
RPKI Repositories
Validated Cache
rsync/RRDP
RPKI-RTR
LACNIC AFRINIC
ROAs
Routing Security using RPKI
8
RPKI repository
ASN K is authorised
to announce
pre
fi
x Y
RIRs
Trust Anchors
I have the
network Y
K
I have the
network Y
X
RPKI Bene
fi
ts
9
Proof of origin
Cryptographic
identity veri
fi
cation
Route hijacking
prevention
• If we compare ROAs and route(6) objects…
- What percent of pre
fi
xes is in the IRR?
- How many are covered by ROAs?
• IRR is not maintained very well
• RPKI has advantage of all
fi
ve RIRs supporting it
RPKI versus IRR?
10
Statistics
To Understand Better
ASNs: 86
IPv4: 1313
IPv6: 186
Routing Statistics Luxembourg
12
Source: RIPEstat
RPKI in Luxembourg
13
ROA Coverage
Neighbour countries comparison
14
% of IPv4 covered by ROAs
Amount of IPv4 address space
• Creating ROAs is only half the job…
• Comparing against BGP is the other half!
• This is what ROV is all about
• You decide what to do with the announcements
What about Route Origin Validation?
15
World Stats on ROV
16
Source: APNIC
Regional Stats on ROV
17
Country RPKI Validates
Netherlands (NL) 71.95%
Luxembourg (LU) 65.96%
Switzerland (CH) 63.84%
France (FR) 56.59%
Belgium (BE) 22.49%
Germany (DE) 5.90% Source: APNIC
DE
LU
NL
BE
FR
CH
• Address space is being covered by ROAs
• But not all address space…
• Why not? What are the obstacles?
• The goal is to have 100% implementation
of RPKI in every network
• End result should be a more secure Internet
Few ROAs, Many ROVs
18
Questions
19
gviviers@ripe.net

RPKI For Routing Security

  • 1.
    RPKI for SecureRouting Brief introduction and some statistics Presentation Gerardo Viviers - RIPE NCC
  • 2.
  • 3.
    Hey! You! Ok! I’lladd it to my routes… BGP is Naive… 3 I have the network Y Hi! What’s up? ‘Cause I trust you, stranger!
  • 4.
    • Typing errors -Also known as “fat fi ngers” - 2 and 3 are really close on our keyboards… • Routing policy violations - Leaks, fi ltering miscon fi gurations - “We didn’t mean this to go to the public Internet” • Malicious attacks - Route manipulation, BGP hijack, BGP DDOS Routing Incidents 4
  • 5.
    If Only WeCould Do Something… 5
  • 6.
    • Filter Routesbased on: - Best practices - Internet Routing Registry - RPKI • All recommendations from MANRS You Can Do Something! 6
  • 7.
    RPKI System 7 External Repositories RIPE NCCARIN APNIC Validator RPKI Repositories Validated Cache rsync/RRDP RPKI-RTR LACNIC AFRINIC ROAs
  • 8.
    Routing Security usingRPKI 8 RPKI repository ASN K is authorised to announce pre fi x Y RIRs Trust Anchors I have the network Y K I have the network Y X
  • 9.
    RPKI Bene fi ts 9 Proof oforigin Cryptographic identity veri fi cation Route hijacking prevention
  • 10.
    • If wecompare ROAs and route(6) objects… - What percent of pre fi xes is in the IRR? - How many are covered by ROAs? • IRR is not maintained very well • RPKI has advantage of all fi ve RIRs supporting it RPKI versus IRR? 10
  • 11.
  • 12.
    ASNs: 86 IPv4: 1313 IPv6:186 Routing Statistics Luxembourg 12 Source: RIPEstat
  • 13.
  • 14.
    Neighbour countries comparison 14 %of IPv4 covered by ROAs Amount of IPv4 address space
  • 15.
    • Creating ROAsis only half the job… • Comparing against BGP is the other half! • This is what ROV is all about • You decide what to do with the announcements What about Route Origin Validation? 15
  • 16.
    World Stats onROV 16 Source: APNIC
  • 17.
    Regional Stats onROV 17 Country RPKI Validates Netherlands (NL) 71.95% Luxembourg (LU) 65.96% Switzerland (CH) 63.84% France (FR) 56.59% Belgium (BE) 22.49% Germany (DE) 5.90% Source: APNIC DE LU NL BE FR CH
  • 18.
    • Address spaceis being covered by ROAs • But not all address space… • Why not? What are the obstacles? • The goal is to have 100% implementation of RPKI in every network • End result should be a more secure Internet Few ROAs, Many ROVs 18
  • 19.