This document summarizes a research study that analyzes the relationship between climate change and terrorism. The study hypothesizes that climate change influences terrorism as a root cause. It uses a case study analysis of Sudan, South Sudan, Yemen, and Zambia to test this hypothesis. The results showed that increased poverty and climate change effects do lead to higher levels of terrorism. However, democratic forms of government can prevent these factors from leading to terrorism. The findings support promoting democracy in countries vulnerable to climate change in order to reduce terrorism.

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Graham Scott
Climate Change and Terrorism
Abstract:
In popular political discourse, a contentious battle has developed over whether climate change is
a cause of terrorism. In hopes of settling this dispute and better understanding the relationship
between climate change and terrorism, this research study asks whether climate change
influences terrorism. It is hypothesized that climate change influences terrorism as a root cause.
A case study analysis of Sudan, South Sudan, Yemen, and Zambia is used to test the hypothesis.
Along with climate change effects, poverty, and democratization are considered as independent
variables. The results show that increased poverty and climate change effects do lead to higher
levels of terrorism. However, democratic forms of government can prevent this these factors
from leading to terrorism. Such findings support the call for countries most vulnerable to
climate change to reform their governments into open, stable democracies.

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Introduction:
In an unplanned symbolic confluence of terrorism and climate change, the United
Nations Climate Change Conference was held in Paris only weeks after the deadliest attack in
France since World War Two. Helping lead the Conference was President Barack Obama,
whose administration has stated that climate change plays a role in amplifying terrorism (Henry
and Cama 2015). Democratic hopeful Bernie Sanders has also asserted that a direct relationship
exists between climate change and terrorism (Easly 2015). Yet, conservatives have mocked and
attacked such assertions. The question remains, does climate change influence terrorism? Such
a controversial political question demands further analysis. Therefore, this paper will examine
the relationship between climate change and terrorism. It will be argued that while climate
change may not directly lead to the rise of terrorism, it does function as a precondition or root
cause of terrorism.
Literature Review:
The following literature review will give a brief survey of the academic literature
surrounding the causes of terrorism. The review will first examine how scholars have defined
terrorism. Next, the main independent variables hypothesized to cause terrorism will be
presented, including democratization, state power, poverty, modernization, and social causes.
The final independent variable presented will be climate change. This literature review will
examine the results of the climate change variable on terrorism, as well as how authors have
conceptualized and operationalized the climate change variable. Finally, those who have
critiqued research on how climate change influences terrorism will be heard.

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What is terrorism? Where do the boundaries lay with a term often internalized, but
rarely critically reflected upon? It is appropriate to begin with one of the foundational scholars
in this field, Martha Crenshaw. In 1981, Crenshaw laid out the characteristics for terrorism
directed against the state, and non-state terror will be the dependent variable looked at in this
study. Crenshaw (1981) specifies that terrorism is premeditated, and the actual victims of the
attack have little actual value to the terrorists. Instead, terrorists hope to communicate a political
message to a broader audience (Crenshaw 1981). Other researches add that terrorist acts are
committed to alter government policy, even if the actual targets of violence are not in position to
rewrite those policies (Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens 2006). Ross (1993) slightly alters the
definition, writing that terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims are
targets of violence for the purpose of producing disorientation, or to mobilize secondary targets
of demands or targets of attention. Overall, all three scholarly works agree on the basic defining
characteristics of terrorism- political motivation, symbolic violence, and value beyond the direct
victims. With such agreement, we can confidently move forward with the basic definitional
parameters of terrorism.
There is such a wide range of proposed causes of terrorism, it is helpful to organize and
locate these causes in a categorical framework. For that framework, we once again turn to
Martha Crenshaw. She organizes the causes of terrorism into two main categories, preconditions
and precipitants (Crenshaw 1981). Preconditions create an environment for terrorism over a long
term, while precipitants are specific events that directly precede terrorist activity (Crenshaw
1981). Edward (2006) refers to these preconditions as root causes, which he pins to a broad
range of issues, such as poverty, oppression, and population explosion. Crenshaw (1981) further
breaks preconditions down into two sub-categories, permissive factors and motivational factors.

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Permissive factors include a government’s inability to prevent terrorism, modernization, and
urbanization, all factors that permit terrorism to exist and flourish. Motivational factors are
direct causes of terrorism that include grievances of a subgroup, or a lack of opportunity for
political participation (Crenshaw 1981). Motivational factors, therefore, are somewhat situated
between permissive preconditions and precipitants in their timing before an attack, directness to
terrorism, and conceptual broadness. All of the hypothesized independent variables examined
here fall into Crenshaw’s framework as preconditions.
The first and perhaps most prominent grouping of independent variables centers on
political freedom and democratization. There are those that see authoritarianism and restrictions
of political freedom as a simple green light to terrorism. Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens
(2006) propose a linear relationship between terrorism and political openness, finding that
terrorism decreases as political openness increases. Edward (2006) concurs, stating that the
deadliest terrorist organizations correlate with areas that have lower human and political rights
records. The theory here is that democracy opens up legitimate channels for individuals to voice
their concerns through, thereby negating the need to take such radical measures as terrorism to
achieve political change.
Other scholars believe in a more nuanced and less linear relationship between political
freedom and terrorism. Research has found that, “countries with intermediate levels of political
freedom are shown to be more prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political
freedom or countries with highly authoritarian regimes,” (Alberto 2004, 3). The reasoning
behind such results hypothesizes that highly democratic countries have appropriate channels for
individuals to voice their complaints through, while highly authoritarian countries eliminate
political dissent to a point of effectively repressing terrorism. Stuck in the middle are regimes

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with intermediate levels of political freedom and democracies. Alberto (2004) also notes that
these intermediate regimes are often in democratic transition, when government institutions are
unstable. Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens (2006) lend support to Alberto’s association of
intermediate democracy with high levels of terrorism in the closely related areas of security
rights and subsistence rights. Security rights refer to the right of individuals to be free from
violence by their government. Subsistence rights pertain to the basic needs to live, such as food,
clean water, and shelter. The research shows terrorism at its highest levels with intermediate
levels of security and subsistence rights, while those states at both ends of the spectrum have
lower terrorism levels (Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens 2006). The previously mentioned
theoretical reasoning behind Alberto’s nonlinear relationship can also be applied here.
In total opposition to the belief of democracy as a bulwark against terrorism is Katerina
(2011), who asserts that there is no statistical evidence to support the common belief that
democracy prevents terrorism. The tendency of democracies to create a tyranny by the majority
may lead minority groups to enact terrorist measures (Katerina 2011). With this belief,
democracy’s legitimate channels in which to enact political change ironically works against the
voice of the minority, who may not have the popularity to achieve goals through such channels,
forcing them to step outside of legitimate means to terrorism. Despite Katerina’s stance, the
majority of the literature on political freedom and terrorism supports that high levels of political
freedom correlate with low levels of terrorism.
Closely related to, and in possible conflict with, political freedom is state power.
Crenshaw (1981) positions a government’s inability to prevent terrorism as the most salient
permissive cause of terrorism. Inadequate police and intelligence agencies allow terror plots to
spread. Contributing leniency can be found in both ineffective dictatorships and democracies

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that sacrifice security in the name of civil liberty (Crenshaw 1981). Crenshaw (1981) points to
repressive military regimes in Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina that have crushed terrorist
organizations, as examples of effective state power limiting terrorism. Research specifically
looking at Pakistan has also found that the lack of law enforcement was the highest cited cause
of terrorism in that country (Sajid et al. 2015). At the conclusion of our first two groupings of
independent variables, it would seem that states should somehow manage to promote high levels
of political freedom with high levels of security. This, however, seems to be a difficult
combination to strike. Interestingly, a highly authoritarian regime, as Crenshaw has pointed to,
seems to be the most feasible form of government in limiting terrorism.
We shift our focus now to poverty as a possible cause of terrorism. In Pakistan,
poverty was ranked as the second most important cause of terrorism, with sixty percent of the
Pakistani population living below the poverty line (Sajid et al. 2015). Closely related to poverty,
unemployment was ranked fifth (Sajid et al. 2015). The study argues that unemployment leads
to grievances against the state that may turn people to insurgent groups (Sajid et al. 2015). Sajid
and others (2015) clarify that poverty has not created terrorist groups in Pakistan, but does create
an opportune environment for terrorist groups to emerge. With this clarification, poverty slots
into Crenshaw’s categorical framework as a permissive factor.
Alberto argues against poverty as a cause of terrorism. He notes that terrorism’s negative
effect on economic prosperity causes methodological problems in arguing that poverty leads to
terrorism (Alberto 2004). He further claims that terrorist risk is not higher in impoverished
countries when other factors, such as political freedom and geography are taken into account
(Alberto 2004).

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The next variable to be discussed is modernization. Common belief might associate the
highly modernized societies of the West with low levels of terrorism and more agrarian,
undeveloped societies of the South and East with high level of terrorism. However, the research
actually supports the reverse of this relationship. Crenshaw lays out why modernization
positively correlates with terror risk. Higher levels of communication and transportation
infrastructure offer greater mobility and opportunities for publicity to terrorists (Crenshaw 1981).
Ross links modernization to terrorism through multiple factors. These factors include more,
“vulnerable targets, destructive weapons and technology, mass media, populations with
increased literacy, conflicts with traditional ways of life, and networks of transportation,” (Ross
1993, 322). Ross (1993) also links modernization with urbanization, which is another permissive
cause proposed by Crenshaw.
Our next main grouping of hypothesized independent variables will be organized under
the umbrella of social and ideological causes. Religion is commonly held to be a cause of
terrorism, but Katerina (2011) brushes this aside, arguing that the religious teachings of Islam
may justify a Muslim terrorist, but not explain why he committed a terrorist act. Katerina (2011)
favors social dislocation instead. Social dislocation can also be understood in the terms of social
marginalization or alienation. She points that social dislocation explains why economically
successful individuals still commit terrorism (Katerina 2011). Ross shifts from social dislocation
to social facilitation. By social facilitation, he means the ability of a group with shared beliefs to
influence the individuals within that group to commit terrorist acts (Ross 1993). Such
facilitation lowers an individual’s perception of the risks of attempting a terrorist attack, and
supplies that individual with the necessary resources to commit an attack (Ross 1993).
Furthermore, social facilitation heightens inspiration to carry out attacks through consistent

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streams of discourse (Ross 1993). Crenshaw (1981) also proposes social facilitation as a
permissive cause. Social facilitation encourages terrorism by justifying violence and setting
examples of the types of attacks that should be carried out (Crenshaw 1981).
Finally, we have this paper’s hypothesized independent variable of climate change.
Researchers have asserted that climate change has induced terrorism throughout Africa in recent
history (Afolabi, Folami, and Folami 2013). However, climate change is a permissive or root
cause, operating in this research through the intervening variable of food insecurity (Afolabi,
Folami, and Folami 2013). Climate change leads to drought and floods, which leads to reduced
food, which leads to hunger, which leads to anger against the government and violent
competition for dwindling amounts of resources (Afolabi, Folami, and Folami 2013). Smith
(2007) describes other causal links climate change influences terrorism through. Severe weather
destruction retards national development. Rising sea levels threaten coastal populations, which
leads to internal migration. Government stability is threatened by increases in diseases such as
Malaria, and dissatisfaction with government responses to storm damage (Smith 2007). These
factors create weaker states, which creates political space and freedom for terrorist groups to
form and flourish (Smith 2007). Smith (2007) also locates climate change in Crenshaw’s
categorical framework as a permissive cause, not directly causing terrorism, but setting up the
environment for terrorism to flourish.
What’s missing from the research studying the link between climate change and
terrorism? When reading these works on climate change, it is apparent that the research is heavy
on theoretical predictions, and light on empirical findings. Barnett (2000) agrees that there has
been inadequate proof to back up much of what has been written on what he terms the
environment-conflict thesis. He explicitly states that there is no proof that overpopulation leads

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to conflict (Barnett 2000). Simon Dalby (2002) attacks Robert Kaplan’s “The Coming
Anarchy,” an article that helped spur the popularity of the environment-conflict thesis, on similar
grounds of claims without proof. Kaplan believes that environmental degradation will cause an
unraveling of weak states in the global South, leading to a process Kaplan causes
“reprimitivization” (Dalby 2002). However, Dalby (2002) writes, “reprimitivization is specified
(by Kaplan) as the indirect result of environmental degradation, a process that is asserted
frequently but not argued, demonstrated, or investigated in any detail,” (40). In summary, the
first major critique of the existing research on climate change and terrorism is a lack of empirical
evidence.
The second main critique comes from a post-colonial perspective. Barnett (2000) asserts
that the environment-conflict thesis is used by the North to legitimate continued intervention in
the South. He writes, “Environmental problems only have meaning for security if security is
understood in human terms,” (284). Similarly, Dalby (2002) criticizes Kaplan for not properly
identifying the reasons for environmental destruction in Africa. He takes further issue with
Kaplan’s implicit concerns with environmental degradation. Rather than have concern for the
well being of those individuals within Africa, Kaplan is mainly concerned that environmentally
induced political disorder in the South will spill over into the North (Dalby 2002). Barnett and
Dalby both articulate a desire for environmental degradation to be viewed through a human
security lens, as well as a post-colonial lens.
The research study presented here addresses both of these concerns. The first main
critique of the existing research is a lack of empirical evidence. This study not only develops a
theory to explain the link between climate change and violence, but also supports this claim with
current, empirical evidence gathered from reputable sources. The second critique of the existing

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research is its misplaced focus on how climate change impacts threaten the West. This study
does not attempt to link effects of climate change to threats against the West. Instead, it
examines how climate change in a certain country affects terrorism within that same country.
And, since domestic terrorism can target anyone across the political power spectrum, this study
hopes to alleviate violence against individuals living in countries with high levels of terrorism.
Thus, this study responds to both post-colonial critiques and calls for increased empirical
evidence.
Analytical Framework:
Positive Peace Research will be the theoretical lens through which the analysis is
focused. Peace Researchers are concerned with making the world safer primarily for states, but
also for individuals. Positive Peace Research goes beyond military power to consider other
threats, in this case climate change and domestic terrorism by non-state actors. This is a
positivist theory, meaning that it seeks a causal relationship between two variables, in order to
explain a phenomenon. Finally, this theory has a normative aspect, in that its analysis attempts
to generate knowledge that can be acted upon to protect states and individuals from violence. In
accordance with these characteristics of Positive Peace Research, this study intends to discover
whether a causal relationship exists between climate change and terrorism, and if so, will provide
informative advice to combat terrorism by combatting climate change. It is hypothesized that
climate change has a positive relationship with terrorism; an increase in the severity of climate
change effects such as drought, floods, and storms, brings about an increase in the frequency and
severity of terrorist attacks. The causal link supporting the hypothesis follows much of what the
literature has already stated; primarily, that these climate change effects shrink the amount of

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available land, food, and water, thereby increasing competition between individuals for these
resources and straining constituent-government relations.
Two options existed in how to methodologically approach the research question at hand.
A “large N” study with linear regressions could have been employed to generalize a relationship
from a large number of cases. However, a “small N” case study was chosen to generalize a
relationship from a small number cases with an in-depth look at each case. A case study
approach was chosen, in order to better document and recognize the complex web of factors
influencing terrorism.
The dependent variable is non-state terrorism. In the literature review, scholars agreed
that terrorism is politically motivated, symbolic, and valued beyond its direct victims. The 2015
Global Terrorism Index was used in order to measure terrorism. The Global Terrorism Index is
collaboratively produced by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism (START) led by the University of Maryland, and the Institute for Economics and
Peace. The Global Terrorism Index defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal
force and violence by a non state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal
through fear, coercion, or intimidation,” (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015, 6). While not
in perfect alignment with the definitional characteristics presented in the literature review, the
GTI’s definition does capture the political nature of terrorist violence and restricts their cases to
terrorism committed by non-state actors. The GTI ranks countries by the impact of terrorism in
each country, which is based upon the number of terrorist incidents, and their resulting fatalities,
injuries, and property damage.
Three independent variables were chosen. Of course climate change needed to be
measured. What is of concern is not the mere increase of temperatures, but rather how climate

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change impacts the environment of an area, whether that is through increased droughts, floods,
or storms. The Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN) was used to operationalize
this variable. Specifically, countries were ranked by ND-GAIN’s “Exposure” component.
Exposure is defined as, “The degree to which a system is exposed to significant climate change
from a biophysical perspective. It is a component of vulnerability independent of socio economic
context. Exposure indicators are projected impacts for the coming decades and are therefore
invariant overtime in ND-GAIN,” (Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index 2015). There are
twelve indicators for Exposure, including “projected change of cereal yields,” “projected change
of annual groundwater runoff,” and “projected change of warm periods.” The ND-GAIN
Country Index can take into account many other indicators to form an overall ranking, but
“Exposure” was specifically chosen for its pure representation of direct environmental impact,
without being clouded by other socioeconomic and governance factors. One might be quick to
criticize this measure for its focus on the future impact of climate change, rather than the past or
present. However, it is plausible and logical that those countries at the highest risk of future
climate change impacts are the countries that have already experienced the largest impacts of
climate change.
Poverty, a variable discussed in the literature review, was also chosen as an independent
variable. The United Nations 2015 Human Development Report was utilized to operationalize
this variable. Specifically, the Mulidimensional Poverty Index was used for variable
operationalization. The MPI considers three dimensions: “Health,” “Education,” and “Standard
of Living.” Each dimension is based on multiple indicators such as child mortality rate, the
percentage of children enrolled in school, and the percentage of houses with a toilet. Why use
this measurement over GDP per capita? First, it quantifies wealth in a way that better represents

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how individuals live everyday. Secondly, it is literally multidimensional, taking into account
several factors that paint a more complete picture. Finally, it is better suited to gauging poverty
in developing societies that are more dependent on agrarian lifestyles of subsistence farming than
on monetary transactions.
Also featured prominently in the literature review, the final independent variable
considered is democratization. The Economist Intelligence Unit produces an annual ranking of
countries by democratization. Their Democracy Index 2015 is used here to operationalize this
final variable. The Democracy Index 2015 is calculated by aggregating country scores in five
categories: “Electoral Process and Pluralism,” “Functioning of Government,” “Political
Participation,” “Democratic Political Culture,” and “Civil Liberites.” Each category score is
determined by binary questions answered by both experts and public opinion surveys (Economist
Intelligence Unit 2016). The decision to use Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index
2015 is primarily based on their accounting for government performance, as well as the liberties
held by individuals. Government performance and functionality is especially important when
considering the role governments theoretically take in order to adapt their country to climate
change and combat terrorism. Furthermore, it is important to account for whether corruption
exists in governments of developing states.
Four countries were chosen in this case study, with each country representing one case.
Those countries were Sudan, South Sudan, Yemen, and Zambia. All four countries were rated
by ND-GAIN as highly exposed to climate change (ND-GAIN 2015). Sudan, South Sudan, and
Yemen were also rated near the top of the 2015 Global Terrorism Index (Institute for Economics
and Peace 2015). Zambia was chosen as an outlier, ranking high in climate change exposure, but
low in terrorism impact. This selection of Zambia was deliberately done to trouble the climate

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change – terrorism link, and direct a closer examination at what other factors may have
prevented this link from taking root in Zambia.
Analysis/Results:
First, let’s focus on climate change and terrorism. Yemen was ranked 181st of 192
countries in exposure to climate change, meaning that Yemen faces some of the highest climate
change impacts of any country. In particular, Yemen is faced with warming temperatures,
decreasing crop yields, and decreasing water (ND-GAIN 2015). Meanwhile, Yemen ranks 7th of
162 countries in the 2015 Global Terrorism Index, with 512 terrorist incidents in 2014, causing
654 fatalities (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015). Yemen provides a strong correlation
between climate change impact and terrorist violence.
The ND-GAIN Country Index considers South Sudan as part of Sudan in its analysis.
Sudan is ranked 170th in exposure to climate change. Sudan’s is particularly exposed in a
decreasing food supply, and decreasing groundwater replenishment. It is projected that Sudan
will also suffer from an increase in climate change induced diseases, often stemming from
malnutrition (ND-GAIN 2015). Located in the Sahel desert, Sudan is at particular risk of
drought. It is easy to see drought having a domino effect on crop yields and malnutrition.
Turning to terrorism, Sudan and South Sudan are ranked 16th and 15th respectively in the 2015
Global Terrorism Index. Terrorist attacks in the two countries resulted in 952 total deaths
(Institute for Economics and Peace 2015). Once again, a strong correlation is presented between
climate change impact and terrorism.
Similar to our other cases, Zambia is a country brutally exposed to climate change. It
actually is the worst ranked country of the three, coming in at 183rd of 192 countries. Zambia

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faces even worse projected crop yield decreases than Sudan. An increasing population will put
even further strain on food resources in Zambia (ND-GAIN 2015). However, Zambia is not
rated high in the Global Terrorism Index. In fact, Zambia was tied with 38 countries for last in
the 2015 Global Terrorism Index. Along with these 38 other countries, Zambia had no terrorist
incidents in 2014. In fact, a terrorist attack has not occurred in Zambia since 2002 (Institute for
Economics and Peace 2015). Can poverty or democratization explain Zambia’s immunity to
terrorism, despite facing the same environmental degradation as Sudan, South Sudan, and
Yemen?
To put the following data in context, Mexico has a Multidimensional Poverty Index
(MPI) of 0.024 (a lower score is better), with 6 percent of its population in multidimensional
poverty. Yemen has a MPI of 0.2, with 40 percent of its population in multidimensional poverty.
Sudan fares slightly worse with a MPI of 0.29, and with 53.1 percent of its population in
multidimensional poverty. South Sudan scores even lower with a MPI of 0.551. 89.3 percent of
the South Sudan’s population lives in multidimensional poverty (United Nations Development
Program 2015). According to theorists who link poverty to terrorism, Zambia’s MPI should be
lower than all three of these countries, correlating with its low levels of terrorist violence. In
actuality, Zambia scores a MPI of 0.264, with 54.4 percent of its population in multidimensional
poverty (United Nations Development Program 2015). Zambia’s MPI falls below Yemen’s and
a greater percentage of its population lives in multidimensional poverty than Sudan’s. This data
does not support an argument that poverty causes terrorism.
Finally, democratization and government functionality are examined. Yemen ranked
154th of 167 countries in the Democracy Index 2015. Its worse scores came in “Functioning of
Government” and “Electoral Process and Pluralism,” (Economist Intelligence Unit 2016). Sudan

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is tied with Eritrea for 151st, scoring a flat zero in “Electoral Process and Pluralism,” (Economist
Intelligence Unit 2016). South Sudan is not ranked. Finally, Zambia ranked 73rd with its highest
scores coming in “Electoral Process and Pluralism” and “Civil Liberties,” (Economist
Intelligence Unit 2016). The largest difference between Zambia and both Sudan and Yemen
occurred in “Electoral Process and Pluralism.” This lends credence to those scholars who argue
democracy reduces terrorism.
Aggregated together, what does the data from these three variables demonstrate? First,
neither poverty or climate change can be placed totally at fault for terrorism. Zambia
demonstrates that poverty and intense climate change effects are not automatic triggers of
terrorism. However, Yemen, Sudan, and South Sudan show that poverty and climate change
effects can inflame terrorism. By examining the democratization variable, it is evident that a
democracy with an open, functioning electoral system and a protection of civil liberties
suppresses terrorism, despite the strains of poverty and climate change effects.
Conclusion:
This study sought to test whether climate change influenced terrorism, arguing that
climate change would positively correlate with terrorism in the form of a root cause. While the
effects of climate change appeared to drive terrorism in Sudan, South Sudan, and Yemen,
Zambia presented a perplexing break of this relationship. Zambia demonstrated that increasing
climate change effects did not necessarily lead to increased terrorism. Democratization appears
to be the bulwark against terrorism, even when faced with increasing climate change impacts.
This study agrees with those scholars who believe that democratization suppresses terrorism.
However, this is not to say that climate change has no relationship with terrorism, merely that

17. 17
democratization is a means for countries to overcome the correlation between climate change
and terrorism. Such findings only increase the calls for countries such as Sudan, South Sudan,
and Yemen to establish functioning democracies that are open to all people and protect the civil
liberties of all people. Terrorism will flourish as long as failed states and corrupt governments
continue to exist.
Future research is needed to examine what mechanisms of democracy suppress terrorism,
and whether developed democracies are the bulwark against terrorism that Zambia’s has proven
to be. A case study approach is recommended to all future research of the environment-conflict
thesis. This approach allows the in-depth research needed to examine how a root cause operates
through a long and complex causal link to influence the dependent variable. However, an
increase of funding and time is needed to conduct a proper study. The ideal research design for
this paper in particular would have been an actual trip to Sudan, South Sudan, Yemen, and
Zambia, for interviews of tribes, individuals, and local government officials, as well as extended
observation. Obviously, this is not feasible for an undergraduate study, but the high levels of
violence in these countries make it an option professional policy-makers and academics should
consider.

18. 18
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