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TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment Enterprise
ACE Threats Integration
Threats Newsletter
Red Diamond
TC 7-100.2, OPPOSING FORCE TACTICS UPDATE IN 2017
by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration, Operations
US Army Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics, will be updated in FY 2017.
Army Regulation 350-2 identifies the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G-
2 as the responsible official for the Operational
Environment (OE) and Opposing Force (OPFOR)
Program across the Army. Within TRADOC G-2, the
Analysis and Control Element Threats Integration
(ACE-TI) serves as the Army lead for designing,
documenting, and integrating threats or OPFOR and
OE conditions in support of all US Army training,
education, and leader development programs.
A comprehensive study of regular forces, irregular
forces, criminal organizations, and actions such as
terrorism produces the TC 7-100 series on hybrid
threats and the variables of an operational
environment. Requirements from the US Army
assist in ensuring a credible composite OPFOR
representation of actual worldwide forces and
capabilities in doctrine, tactics, techniques, organizations, equipment, and systems.
We are collecting data on state and non-state actors such as Russia, proxies, and
groups such as ISIL or al Shabaab. Send your data on regular or irregular threats to
us as we plan refinements to how the Army presents complex OEs and hybrid
threats—realistic, robust, and relevant OPFOR—for Army readiness. TRADOC G-2
ACE Threats Integration POC: jon.h.moilanen.ctr@mail.mil.
Fort Leavenworth, KS Volume 7, Issue 05 MAY 2016
INSIDE THIS ISSUE
Turkey and Complex OE..... 3
Threats Resource- ATN .... 12
Saber Junction 16-04 ........ 13
Al Shabaab Hotel Targets. 19
Combating Terrorism........ 24
Agricultural Terrorism ...... 25
Russian EW........................ 34
Pathankot Attack ............... 36
Threats Tactics Course..... 40
Threats ACE-TI POCs........ 43
OEE Red Diamond published
by TRADOC G-2 OEE
ACE Threats Integration
Send suggestions to:
ATTN: Red Diamond
Jon H. Moilanen (IDSI Ctr),
Operations, ACE-TI
and
Laura Deatrick (CGI Ctr),
Editor, ACE-TI
Army Posture Statement2016
Today, state and non-state actors are destabilizing major regions of the
world by combining conventional and irregular warfare with terrorism. Acts
of aggression also occur through surrogates, cyber and electronic systems,
organized criminal activity, and economic coercion.
HonorablePatrickJ. Murphyand General Mark A. Milley
Army Posture Statement 2016
Today, state and non-state actors are destabilizing major regions of the
world by combining conventional and irregular warfare with terrorism.
Honorable Patrick J. Murphy and General Mark A. Milley

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RED DIAMOND TOPICS OF INTEREST
by Jon H. Moilanen, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration, Operations, Red Diamond Newsletter (IDSI Ctr)
This issue of Red Diamond opens with the ongoing
collection and analysis of data on regular forces, irregular
forces, criminal organizations, and actions such as
terrorism that will produce the 2017 update to US Army
Training Circular TC 7-100.2 on hybrid threat opposing
force (OPFOR) tactics and variables of a complex
operational environment.
The concluding part of a two-part series addresses
changes that have occurred in the Syrian operational
environment since the beginning of the Syrian civil war,
and the impact those changes have had on the US,
Turkey, and the anti-ISIL alliance.
The SABER JUNCTION 16-04 article describes OPFOR
actions in this NATO Response Force/DATE training
rotation at JMRC. The OPFOR required significant
augmentation by US Army Reserve, National Guard, and
NATO partner units in order to replicate an Arianian
brigade tactical group for the training exercise.
Al Shabaab has conducted numerous attacks on hotels
during the past seven years. An article examines these
attacks as a whole, the intended targets, possible
motives, and different techniques used in the attacks on
hotels. Examples have training implications for use in
Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE)-based and
other exercises.
An article provides a primer on agroterrorism threats and
discusses its representation in training by using opposing
force doctrine and data in DATE. The article presents a
hypothetical scenario of agroterrorism that reinforces
recognition of this threat in all combatant commands.
In the recent conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, the Russian
Armed Forces have used electronic warfare (EW)
systems with great effectiveness and skill. The Russians
are adapting and developing new techniques and
procedures to optimize the capabilities of their systems
to attack and counter enemy conventional and
unconventional systems. An article describes several
Russian EW systems, operational and tactical applications,
and developments.
A TRADOC G-2 Threat Action Report analyzes the 2016
Jaish-e-Mohammed attack on the Pathankot Airbase in
northwest India with sophisticated planning, deception,
and decentralized command and control.
TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration conducted the
spring 2016 Threat Tactics Course (TTC) at Ft Leavenworth,
KS. Attendees represented 15 organizations from
throughout the joint, interagency, intergovernmental,
and multinational communities. The typical small group
size is 16 students per resident course classroom. The
maximum resident course size is 48 students. Improved
awareness and understanding of threats is an outcome
of discussions and classroom tactical exercises. The next
TTC at Ft Leavenworth will occur 15–19 August 2016.
To be added to the Red Diamond e-distribution list,
contact:
Dr. Jon H. Moilanen (IDSI Ctr)
TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration, Operations
jon.h.moilanen.ctr@mail.mil
Red Diamond Disclaimer
The Red Diamond newsletter presents professional information but the views expressed herein are those
of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect
the official US Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official US Army
publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of material that they
reference. The Red Diamond staff reserves the right to edit material. Appearance of external hyperlinks
does not constitute endorsement by the US Army for information contained therein.
Red Diamond Disclaimer
The Red Diamond newsletter presents professional information but the views expressed herein are those of the
authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official US
Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official US Army publications. Authors
are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of material that they reference. The Red Diamond
staff reserves the right to edit material. Appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by
the US Army for information contained therein.

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by Jim Bird, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (IDSI CTR) Part 2 of 2-Part Series
This article is the concluding increment of a two-part series that addresses changes that have occurred in the Syrian
operational environment (OE) since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, and the impact those changes have had on the
US, Turkey, and the Anti-ISIL*
alliance. For the sake of convenience to the reader, Table 1 is republished in this issue, to
provide situational awareness of several Kurdish groups that have been active in the Syrian OE since 2012.
Table 1: Kurdish groups active in the Syrian OE since 2012
The role of selected additional groups that have surfaced in both Turkey and Syria since the table was published will be
discussed as needed throughout this article. As noted in Part I, the Russian intervention in Syria during the last quarter of
2015 turned out to be a game-changer.
It was the first major military operation undertaken by Russia outside the bounds of the former Soviet Union since that
regime’s collapse in late 1991. The intervention set in motion a train of events that caught all the major players off-guard,
even if the advantage of 20/20 hindsight suggests that worst-case planning by both sides might have predicted the
dangerous outcome.
*
ISIL: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

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Repercussions of Russian Intervention in Syria
In 2015, with the help of newly-arrived Russian air cover, forces supporting the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad
began to win battles, while coalition air forces—particularly those of Turkey and the United States—began to curtail close
air support to avoid the risk of a major power confrontation in the skies over northern Syria. Meanwhile the Syrian Kurds,
not too particular about who was supplying air cover as long as it came from somewhere, also continued to rack up
victories in Syria’s northern provinces. Inside Turkey, in early June 2015, the shaky two-year ceasefire between
government authorities and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) still held, but its days were numbered. Across
Turkey’s southern border, in Syria, Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (YPG) militias had ousted ISIL from Tal Abyad, an
important border city that Assad-regime forces formerly held as a logistics base; it had also served as a transit point for
foreign fighters moving from Turkey into Syria.
Figure 1. YPG militia waving their flag on the outskirts of Tal Abyad, Syria, June 2015
Shortly after Tal Abyad fell to the Kurds, Turkey’s government-sanctioned press conceded that “the PYD’s fight against ISIS
[ISIL] has gained the sympathy of the entire world. Turkey is also happy with the fact that ISIS has been pushed back.”1
Ominously, however, the official media also accused the PYD of “replacing the Turkmen and Arab population in the region
with a Kurdish population.”2
The Turkish government also cautioned the PYD against cooperating in any way with the
Assad regime.
Not without reason, Ankara was becoming extremely concerned about the murky distinction between Kurdish militants
in Turkey and their counterparts in Syria. By mid-October 2015, the Turkish government had become convinced that the
PKK in Turkey and the PYD in Syria were essentially one-and-the-same band of terrorists.3
National paranoia increased
after the tenth of the month, when Ankara suffered twin suicide
bombings that killed nearly a hundred people, mostly Kurds
attending an anti-government peace rally; several hundred more
were injured. Although the authorities were quick to accuse the
PKK of conducting the attack, evidence gathered later pointed
toward ISIL perpetrators. That group, though, uncharacteristically
never claimed responsibility.4
Predictably, pro-Kurdish groups inside Turkey accused the
government of negligence and insensitivity—if not downright
collusion with militant Sunni Arab factions—in failing to prevent
the peace rally bombing.5
Meanwhile, efforts to form a coalition
government had floundered in the aftermath of the 7 June 2015
parliamentary elections, so the 10 October terrorist attack came
during the run-up for new elections scheduled for 1 November.
Figure 2. Pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic
Party Leader Selahattin Demirtas

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In those elections, public insecurity and a collective desire for greater stability swept the ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKP) back into power in a resounding victory that cemented its grip on the machinery of national government until
2019.6
Unintended Consequences: Escalation Happens
The danger of a great power confrontation in Syria rose to a new level on 24 November 2015, when Turkish warplanes
shot down a Russian Sukhoi Su-24M “Fencer” aircraft that was conducting strikes against ethnic Turkmen near the
Syrian/Turkish border. Turkey contended that the Russian aircraft had violated its airspace, an allegation promptly met by
emphatic denials and countercharges that
accused Turkey of stabbing Russia in the back
and sympathizing with International terrorists.
Shortly thereafter, Russia deployed its most
advanced surface-to-air missile system, the S400
Triumf, to Syria.7
Noting this swift escalation of
measures and countermeasures, as well as the
fact that twelve countries now had warships in
the eastern Mediterranean, Turkish press
reports suggested that Russia had essentially
“turned the Mediterranean into an ‘ammunition
depot.’”8
Clearly, the Syrian operational
environment (OE) became a much more
dangerous neighborhood after the 24 November incident, and since it involved a violent collision between the air forces
of Russia and a NATO ally, it naturally raised the specter of a potential deployment of coalition forces into the OE.9
Turkey’s Internal War: New Threat Actors, and Old Threat Actors with New Techniques
By late summer 2015, in the immediate aftermath of the 20 July suicide bombing in Suruc, the fragile truce between
Turkey’s ruling party and the Kurdish militants became a dead letter.10
The AKP ruling party soon began a major
deployment of security forces to Turkey’s troubled southeastern provinces. The military operation in Sirnak province
provides an apt example of what unfolded in the country’s southeastern quadrant. There a radical PKK spin-off group
called the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H) “dug trenches and set up barricades in some urban locations,
sealing off parts of towns and restricting movement.”11
Figure 3. Russian Sukhoi SU-24 (Fencer) aircraft
Figure 4. YDG-H barricades in Nusaybin, Turkey, near the border with Syria

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According to Turkey’s semiofficial Anadolu news agency, the government intent for this operation was “to neutralize the
members of the separatist terrorist organization nesting in residential areas,” to “establish public order and security,” and
to “enable civilians to resume normal living conditions.”12
The locals, however, seemed to have their own ideas about
what public order and security meant, and Turkish security forces faced an enemy that differed from the old PKK they
fought in former times. Several months later, in December, government officials were still vowing that the operation
would continue “until public security is established.”13
In past outbreaks, the PKK operated mainly against government
security forces in southeastern Turkey’s rural areas. The group’s techniques appear to be evolving, however, based on
lessons the Kurds gleaned from US deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as from the 2011 Arab Spring protests.
A few days after the Turkish government affirmed its determination to stay the course against the PKK insurrection, a
mortar round exploded at a major international airport in Istanbul, Turkey, killing a member of a Pegasus Airlines cleaning
crew, injuring another, and damaging approximately five aircraft and a terminal building. On Christmas day 2015, a
nondescript group calling itself the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) claimed responsibility for that attack.14
TAK had been
last heard from in 2012, when it claimed responsibility for a similar incident at another airport. The group’s origins date
to the early 2000s, when it began a cordial—if blurry—relationship with the PKK, a home-grown organization long known
as “Turkey’s premier pro-Kurdish militant group.”15
Like the PKK, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons heap scorn on the Turkish
government and the ruling Justice and Development Party, and since late July 2015 have repeatedly condemned the
ongoing security operation in the southeast. TAK differs from the PKK, however, in its willingness to target civilians and
foreign tourists in urban centers across the length and breadth of Turkey.16
Dreams of Autonomy, Yesterday’s War, and the Mad Max Generation
Militant pro-Kurdish groups operating in and outside of Turkey are notorious for fighting among themselves. Discord and
disagreement abound, and past clashes have occurred on a range of issues. That said, they all essentially share a common
goal: greater autonomy if not outright independence for ethnic Kurds in all countries. In the waning months of 2015, the
Turkish government continued to meet stiffening local resistance, not excluding armed opposition, in areas where it had
imposed curfews and other measures that amounted to martial law. It also closed schools and recalled teachers in some
areas, stoking fears among political opposition leaders “that the government was gearing up for a massacre” of Kurds
comparable with Saddam Hussein’s 1988 poison gas attack on Halabja, Iraq, during the Iran-Iraq War.17
Urban warfare and massive civil disobedience in urban environments, a new wrinkle in PKK techniques, are closely related
to demographics. Back in the 1990s, Turkey’s military successfully waged a fight that degraded the PKK’s ability to conduct
guerrilla operations in the rural countryside. But Middle East scholar Micha’el Tanchum points out that the 1990s conflict
“was yesterday’s war, and it won’t work with today’s Kurdish movement, which is overwhelmingly urban, politically
sophisticated, and broad based.”18
Today’s Kurdish movement is also youthful, comprised in large measure of fighters
aged 15–25, who the Turkish media refer to as “the ‘Mad Max’ generation.”19
According to Tanchum, these young people
grew up during the so-called dirty war of the 1990s, “and came of age witnessing the success of asymmetrical urban
warfare conducted by jihadist organizations in Iraq and Syria. [Like them,] the Kurdish YDG-H have their own culture of
extreme self-sacrifice and are fueled by a narrative that vilifies the Turkish state . . . and lionizes the most extreme PKK
fighters.”20
One such iconic role model was Serafettin Elci, a respected elderly Kurdish philosopher and lawyer who once
served time in a Turkish military prison. Before his death in 2012, Elci told government authorities that a peaceful
resolution of the Kurdish issue could come only through negotiation and compromise. He warned, “We are the last
generation you are going to negotiate with. After us, you will confront an angry youth that has grown up in war.”21
February Synthesis: Two Wars Become One (Again)
On 17 February 2016, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons made their presence known again. At about 6:30 PM local time, twin
vehicle borne improvised explosives devices—suicide car bombs—detonated in Ankara, Turkey’s capital city, claiming the
lives of 28 people, over two-thirds of whom were off-duty military personnel, and wounding over 60 others. The attack
occurred near the Turkish national parliament building and Supreme Military Administrative Court, only a short distance
from the US embassy. The car bombs targeted military busses transporting Turkish security forces. The explosions
occurred as the buses were stopped at a traffic signal waiting for the light to change.22

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Almost immediately after the Ankara suicide bombing, two contradictory narratives emerged about who to blame. On 19
February, the TAK claimed responsibility on its website and warned Turkish citizens and foreigners alike to avoid tourist
areas, especially those frequented by foreign nationals, because the tourism sector of Turkey’s economy would offer
prime targets for future attacks. An Overseas Advisory Council analyst observed that “the [Ankara] bombing falls in line
with the targeting and methods of past Kurdish militant attacks in Turkey and Turkish militant groups’ currently stated
motives for carrying [out] attacks.”23
Before the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons’ announcement, however, the government
had already issued its own version of what happened, linking one of the suicide bombers to Syrian People’s Protection
Units (YPG) operating across the border in Syria. The common denominator in these contradictory narratives is that they
both pin the blame on Kurdish militants. The main difference between them is that the government version claimed that
the terrorist perpetrators were affiliated with a group the United States regards as a key ally and force multiplier in the
war against ISIL. Meanwhile, the Democratic Union Party (PYD)—the YPG’s political wing in Syria—issued a statement
categorically denying any involvement in the attack, and insisting that Turkey was not its enemy.24
What appeared to some observers as Turkey’s rush to judgement in blaming the YPG for the 17 February Ankara bombing
highlighted a dispute that had been brewing between that country and the US since the previous June, when Ankara
announced some “red lines” related to Kurdish military gains against Islamic extremists in northern Syria. Turkish
government officials expressed concern that Syrian Kurds might threaten the future territorial integrity of Syria by
establishing their own autonomous Kurdish state. A Turkish foreign ministry document quoted by Voice of America
declared, “No one can act in their own interest just because they are fighting ISIL. The demographic structure of the region
cannot be changed through a fait accompli.”25
Much had transpired, though, between the time Turkey first took this
position in June 2015 and the Ankara attack that occurred eight months later. The internal war with the PKK had reignited
in the interim, and Russian airpower in the Syrian operational environment had proven to be decisive, enabling further
YPG advances along the trace of the Syrian/Turkish border. In December 2015, Russia had also begun providing weapons
to Syrian Kurds fighting north of Aleppo.26
In both Iraq and Syria, Kurdish populations recently have achieved a greater degree of independence, but for different
reasons. After mid-2014, the central government in Baghdad was unable to exercise much control over northern regions
of the country because of setbacks inflicted by ISIL. This vacuum of national authority soon translated into greater
autonomy for Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and led to conditions that allowed the US to establish a liaison
center in Iraqi Kurdistan charged with responsibility for coordinating the activities of several disparate Kurdish factions.27
In Syria, the writ of neither the Assad regime nor ISIL counted for very much in regions where coalition forces had gained
the upper hand, leaving the US-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) and its Kurdish allies free to establish their own rules on
turf previously occupied by adversaries. Certainly in northern Syria there is little question that the YPG’s 50,000-man
force—the fourth-largest non-government paramilitary group in Syria behind ISIL, the FSA, and the Islamic Front—
possesses the capacity to wield considerable influence.28
Figure 5. Russian airstrikes in Syria: February 29–March 15, 2016 (modified by ACE-TI)

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During the last week of January and first two weeks of February 2016, Russian air power proved crucial to the success of
a Syrian government offensive near Turkey’s southern border, incidentally opening a window of opportunity for Kurdish
militia forces to score still more successes against ISIL.29
These most recent gains were so impressive as to render the
Turkish government’s red lines of the previous summer irrelevant and inoperative. Turkish artillery batteries began firing
on YPG positions in Syria on 13 February 2016, and fighting during the overnight hours of 15–16 February brought YPG
militia elements to within seven kilometers of the Turkish border. All this made Turkish fears of an autonomous Kurdish
zone stretching from Afrin (a Syrian canton northwest of Aleppo) in the west to the border with Iraq in the east seem
closer to reality.30
Kobani Remains a Raw Nerve
Meanwhile, during the last week of January 2016, the city of Kobani celebrated the first anniversary of its liberation from
ISIL forces. To mark the occasion, over the weekend of 30–31 January Brett McGurk, a US Presidential Envoy to the Anti-
ISIL Coalition, made an undisclosed visit to Kobani. The route he followed to get there started in the Kurdistan Regional
Government of Iraq, and traversed a 400-kilometer sector of northern Syria only recently liberated from ISIL. In a symbolic
gesture, McGurk visited a cemetery holding the remains of Kurdish fighters who fell in defense of Kobani, even as the US
delegation traveling with him plotted strategy with local YPG commanders.31
McGurk’s visit to Kobani, once it became public, angered Turkish officials. On 9 February 2016, about a week after
McGurk’s Kobani visit and a week prior to the suicide bombing in Ankara, Turkey summoned the US ambassador to express
its displeasure after a State Department spokesman declared that Washington did not regard Syria’s Kurdish Democratic
Union Party as a terrorist organization.32
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan told Washington that it needed to choose
between Turkey and
the PYD. “How can we
trust you?” asked
Erdogan. “Is it me that
isyourpartnerorisitthe
terrorists in Kobani?”33
Erdogan’s comments
underscored and also
reiterated Turkey’s
position equating the
Syrian YPG militias
with the PKK. Like
Turkey, the US
formally regards the latter as a terrorist organization, but differentiates it from the YPG, which Washington considers a
cornerstone of the campaign against ISIL.
Figure 6. US Presidential Envoy Brett McGurk and Kurdish cemeteries visited by him during his Kobani trip
Figure 7. US Presidential Envoy McGurk meeting in Kobani with the Anti-ISIL Coalition

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After Turkey initiated cross-border artillery fire against YPG positions, Erdogan took to the airwaves to vow that Turkey
would not permit the creation of an autonomous Kurdish enclave in northern Syria. Alluding to a PKK mountain stronghold
in northern Iraq, the prime minister said, “we will not allow a new Qandil on our southern border . . . They tell us to stop
shelling [Kurdish positions in Syria]. Forgive me, but there is no question of us doing such a thing. Whoever fires shells on
Turkey will not get just a tit-for-tat response but an even greater one.”34
He added, “The fact that the United States is
continuing to support the YPG is something I find hard to understand. Aren’t we NATO allies? Are you our friend or the
friend of the PYD?”35
Prime Minister Erdogan went on to insist that the links between the PKK in Turkey and the PYD in
Syria were as close as those between al-Qaeda and the al Nusra Front.
A Ceasefire Gamble, and a Troubled Path Ahead
While this spat between NATO allies was still playing out, on 23 February 2016 Russia, the United States, and their
associated allies jointly announced a cessation of hostilities agreement in Syria that was scheduled to go into effect the
following Saturday (27 February). Turkish officials indicated their country would abide by the ceasefire agreement, but
held open the option of continuing to fire on YPG positions in Syria if conditions warranted it. As of the end of February,
the ceasefire continued to hold, however tenuously, between Assad-regime forces and a collection of anti-ISIL groups in
the US-led coalition.
No comparable truce exists between Turkish authorities and the country’s rebellious Kurds, nor is one likely to be called
in the immediate future. The Kurds see themselves as repressed freedom fighters deprived of the fruits of an Arab Spring
that has failed to materialize inside their own homeland.36
The idea of a Kurdish spring rings hollow, though, with Turkish
patriots who view the PKK and its sympathizers at home and in Syria as threats to their country’s sovereignty—and even
survival. As an AKP member of parliament recently told a British reporter visiting Diyarbakir in southeastern Turkey, “We
don’t have a Kurdish problem; we have a terror problem. Because there [are] Kurdish citizens who live all over Turkey. But
in this area what we have is the issue of terrorism that is increasing, and it accelerated after . . . the June 7 election.”37
Recent Developments
After the first portion of this article went to press in early March, events in the Syrian OE continued to unfold at a relentless
pace. The costs and logistical headaches inherent in accommodating a huge flow of refugees are a constant aggravation
to Turkish officials. Their country currently hosts 2.7 million refugees. In February 2016, President Erdogan took the United
Nations to task for not doing more to alleviate the suffering: “They are telling us to open our borders . . . OK, but U.N.,
what good do you do, what is your duty? How
have you supported Turkey, who has spent 10
billion dollars on refugees, until now?”38
On 18 March 2016, Turkey struck a deal with the
European Union that provides for the temporary
return to Turkey of Syrian refugees arriving in
Greece, until they can be adequately vetted
before eventually receiving formal asylum in a
European country.39
Russian President Vladimir Putin startled the
international community on 14 March by
announcing a drawdown of his country’s armed
forces in Syria, based on the premise that their
mission had been essentially accomplished. The
Russian force reduction, however, hardly signaled
any diminished influence in Middle East
geopolitics. Still fuming over the downing of their
Su-24 jet in late November, Russian officials seem
to be drawing an ever-tightening noose around
Turkey. Shortly after the shoot-down of the
Figure 8. Refugees and internally displaced persons
congregated at the Syrian/Turkish border

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aircraft, President Putin simply stated, “we know what we need to do.”40
In February of this year came the announcement
that Russian Mig-29 fighter aircraft would be sent to a Russian base in Armenia, approximately 25 miles from the Turkish
border. In the Syrian OE, despite any impending force reductions and the cessation of hostilities agreement, Russian
airpower remains on hand to enable the Assad regime’s selective continuation of the bombing campaign. Finally—and
unopposed by the US—Russia brought considerable diplomatic power to bear on behalf of Kurdish interests during peace
negotiations held in Geneva, Switzerland, where Turkey had managed to forestall attendance by delegates representing
the Syrian PYD.
The day before Putin announced the drawdown of Russian forces in the Syrian
OE, TAK carried out another suicide car bombing in Ankara, Turkey. The attack,
which claimed the lives of 37 people, came only hours after government
authorities imposed a curfew in the country’s Kurdish region. The TAK website
declared that “the attack was carried out . . . in the streets of the capital of the
fascist Turkish republic,” and identified Seher Cagla Demir as the perpetrator.41
According to a pro-secular Turkish newspaper, Demir, a university student, was
already standing trial for membership in the PKK when she carried out the
attack. Government sources claimed that she had received training from
Kurdish YPG elements in Syria. The attack occurred on a Sunday; the following
Thursday, Germany closed its embassy in Ankara, as well as a consulate and
school in Istanbul.
On 16 March 2016, the Syrian Kurds announced their intent to declare an autonomous federal region comprised of the
three cantons they control in northern Syria. This move is likely the first step in establishing a regime patterned after Iraq’s
Kurdistan Regional government. The Kurds have also implemented compulsory military training for all male citizens—
Kurd, Arab, and Syriac Christians alike—between the ages of 18–30 who reside in areas under YPG control. Men in these
demographic categories are compelled to serve a nine-month stint in the newly-formed Autonomous Protection Forces
(APF). Meanwhile, inside Turkey, Cemil Bayik, a prominent PKK leader, vowed to step up militant attacks against
government security forces operating in the southeast. In response to President Erdogan’s call for surrender, Bayik
declared, “the Kurds will defend themselves to the end . . . of course the PKK will escalate the war.”42
It was against this backdrop that US coalition leaders decided to deploy a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS)
to southeastern Turkey, presumably to be used against ISIL targets in northern Syria. According to a recent Associated
Press article, Turkish Foreign Minister Melvut
Cavusoglu stated during a 26 April 2016 interview
that “U.S. HIMARS missiles would arrive in May as
part of a joint effort to combat IS [ISIL].”43
Currently Turkish artillery can reach 40 kilometers
into Syria; HIMARS will extend that range to a
distance of 90 kilometers.
Deployment of state-of-the-art US weaponry to
Turkey demonstrates that if the anti-ISIL alliance
is strained, it has not broken. A show of solidarity
with a longstanding ally is a positive move, and
both the US and Turkey are still bound by the
tenets of the NATO partnership. It cannot be
denied, however, that the situations on the
ground inside Turkey and Syria remain extremely
fluid. Their implications for deployable US units is self-evident. Thus it behooves commanders at all levels to stay well-
informed about the region and its key players, and to translate their knowledge into realistic training scenarios grounded
in the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and the US Army Training Circular 7-100 series. Analyst Stephen Starr’s
prediction mentioned at the beginning of this work bears repeating: that events unfolding in the Syrian OE would render
Figure 9. Seher Cagla Demir
Figure 10. US M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
(HIMARS) in action

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Turkey vulnerable to groups that would “plot and plan long-term attacks on the Turkish state with impunity.”44
As Turkey
and the US alike strive to discern who their real adversaries are, perhaps the most dangerous threat of all is the law of
unintended consequences: it could draw regional and world powers into what Starr aptly described as “Syria’s slide into
a widening sinkhole.”45
Notes
1 Karen Kaya. “Kurds Push Back ISIS in Tal Abyad.” OE Watch. July 2015.
2 Karen Kaya. “Kurds Push Back ISIS in Tal Abyad.” OE Watch. July 2015.
3 Karen Kaya. “Russia and the Syrian Kurds.” OE Watch. November 2015.
4 Simon Tisdall. “Ankara Bombing: Blaming Kurds Suits Erdogan’s Political Ends.” The Guardian. 17 February 2016; Canadian Security Intelligence
Service. The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon and Related Security Trends in the Middle East. January 2016. Pgs 123–128.
5 Karen Kaya. “The Ankara Bombing: Turkey’s Latest 9/11.” OE Watch. November 2015; BBC News. “Turkey Profile/Timeline.” 14 January 2016.
6 BBC News. “Turkey Profile/Timeline.” 14 January 2016; Karen Kaya. “AKP Wins Decisive Victory in November 1 Elections.” OE Watch. December
2015; Joris Leverink. “Turkey Descends Into Civil War as Conflict in Southeast Escalates.” Global Issues. 4 February 2016.
7 Karen Kaya. “Russia’s Expanding Presence in the Mediterranean.” OE Watch. January 2016; BBC News. “Turkey Profile/Timeline.” 14 January
2016.
8 Karen Kaya. “Russia’s Expanding Presence in the Mediterranean.” OE Watch. January 2016.
9 Karen Kaya. “Towards CIS Collective Security and a Joint Air Defense System.” OE Watch. February 2016.
10 For details of the Suruc, Turkey, terrorist attack and its context relative to the current Kurdish insurrection, see Part I of this article, published in
the March 2016 issue of the Red Diamond.
11 US Department of State Overseas Advisory Council. “December 23 Istanbul Airport Security Incident.” 30 December 2015.
12 Greg Botelho and Gul Tuysuz. “Turkish Military Says 68 PKK Terrorists Killed in Kurdish Areas.” CNN. 19 December 2015.
13 Greg Botelho and Gul Tuysuz. “Turkish Military Says 68 PKK Terrorists Killed in Kurdish Areas.” CNN. 19 December 2015; US Department of State
Overseas Advisory Council. “December 23 Istanbul Airport Security Incident.” 30 December 2015.
17 Greg Botelho and Gul Tuysuz. “Turkish Military Says 68 PKK Terrorists Killed in Kurdish Areas.” CNN. 19 December 2015; BBC News. “Who Are the
Kurds?” 14 March 2016.
18 Micha’el Tanchum. “New Kurds on the Block: The Rise of Turkey’s Militant Youth.” Foreign Affairs. 23 September 2015.
22 US Department of State Overseas Advisory Council. “February 17 Attack in Ankara Possible Prelude to More Violence.” 26 February 2016.
23 US Department of State Overseas Advisory Council. “February 17 Attack in Ankara Possible Prelude to More Violence.” 26 February 2016.
24 BBC News. “Ankara Blast: Turkey Accuses Syria Kurds of Deadly Attack.” 18 February 2016; US Department of State Overseas Advisory Council.
“February 17 Attack in Ankara Possible Prelude to More Violence.” 26 February 2016; Soner Cagaptay. “Terror Attack in Ankara: A New Era of
Kurdish Politics for Turkey?” CNN. 18 February 2016.
25 Jamie Dettmer. “Turkey Warns US About Kurdish Advances in Syria.” Voice of America. 22 June 2015.
26 Gonul Tol. “Turkey’s Syria Strategy Lies in Ruins as Rebel-Held Aleppo Teeters.” CNN. 10 February 2016.
27 Egemen Bezi and Nicholas Borroz. “ISIS Helps Forge the Kurdish Nation.” The National Interest. 5 February 2016.
28 Egemen Bezi and Nicholas Borroz. “ISIS Helps Forge the Kurdish Nation.” The National Interest. 5 February 2016; Terrorism Research & Analysis
Consortium. “Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG).” Accessed 22 February 2016.
29 Tulay Karadeniz, Ece Toksabay, and Humera Pamuk. “Turkey Seeks Allies’ Support for Ground Operation as Syria War Nears Border.” Reuters. 16
February 2016.
30 Jamie Dettmer. “Bitter Rebels Blame Kurds for Looming Tide of Syrian Refugees.” Voice of America. 16 February 2016.
31 Sirwan Kajjo. “US Envoy Meets with Syrian Kurds to Step Up Fight Against IS.” Voice of America. 1 February 2016.
32 Dasha Afanasieva and Tulay Karadeniz. “Turkey Summons U.S. Envoy Over Comments on Kurdish PYD in Syria.” Yahoo! News. 9 February 2016;
Gonel Tol. “Turkey’s Syria Strategy Lies in Ruins as Rebel-Held Aleppo Teeters.” CNN. 10 February 2016.
33 Associated Press. “Erdogan: US Must Choose Between Turkey, Kurdish Forces.” Times of Israel. 8 February 2016.
34 Agence France-Presse. “Erdogan Vows Not to Allow Kurdish Stronghold in Northern Syria.” Yahoo! News. 17 February 2016.
35 Agence France-Presse. “Erdogan Vows Not to Allow Kurdish Stronghold in Northern Syria.” Yahoo! News. 17 February 2016.
36 Andrew Hosken. “PKK Defiant Over Long War With Turkey.” BBC News. 26 January 2015.
37 Andrew Hosken. “PKK Defiant Over Long War With Turkey.” BBC News. 26 January 2015.
38 Karen Kaya. “Mass Refugee Flow from Aleppo Expected Into Turkey.” OE Watch. March 2016.
39 Agence France-Presse. “Turkey PM Warns EU to Stick By Visa Free Travel Promise.” Yahoo! News. 18 April 2016; Associated Press. “Turkey Wants
EU Visa Changes By June Or Migrant Deal is Off.” Yahoo! News. 19 April 2016; Reuters. “EU: We Will Not Water Down Criteria For Turkish
Visas.” Al Jazeera. 19 April 2016.
40 Michael A. Reynolds. “Will Putin Be the ‘Liberator Tsar’ of the Kurds?” Newsweek. 20 March 2016.

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41 BBC News. “Ankara Blast: Kurdish Group TAK Claims Bombing.” 17 March 2016; Tom Porter. “Kurdistan Freedom Falcons: What We Know About
Militant PKK Offshoot Allegedly Responsible for Ankara Attacks.” Yahoo! News. 15 March 2016.
42 Press TV (Iran). “PKK Vows To Intensify Militant Attacks Against Turkish Forces.” 25 April 2016.
43 Associated Press. “Turkish Official: US Deploying Rocket Launchers Near Syria.” Chron. 26 April 2016.
44 Stephen Starr. “The Renewed Threat of Terrorism to Turkey.” CTC Sentinel. 25 June 2013.
45 Stephen Starr. “The Renewed Threat of Terrorism to Turkey.” CTC Sentinel. 25 June 2013.
_______________
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by Mike Spight, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (CGI Ctr)
Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) Rotation 16-04 was conducted at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center
(JMRC), Hohenfels, Germany, on 29 March–24 April 2016, with box dates (force on force) running from 11–20 April. Like
all previous Saber Junction DATE rotations, this was a Title 10 funded exercise, and the rotational training unit (RTU) in
this case was the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (BCT), which is stationed in Vincenzo, Italy. Along with the 2nd
STRYKER, Cavalry Regiment (Cav Regt) of Vilseck, Germany it is one of only two infantry brigades the US Army maintains
in Europe at the present time. The BCT deployed with all of its organic units: 1st and 2nd Battalions (Bns)/503rd Parachute
Infantry Regiment, 1st Squadron (Sqdn)/91st Cav Regt, 4th Bn/319th Artillery Regiment (Arty Regt), and its Battlefield
Enhancement Battalion and support battalion. It did receive attached aviation support from 3rd Bn/227th Aviation Regt
out of Ft. Hood, TX. The 173rd was augmented with multiple NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations to produce a
formidable US led multinational brigade (+) as blue forces (BLUFOR). An element from Headquarters (HQ), 4th Infantry
Division served as Higher Control during the rotation, and worked out of JMRC’s Building 100 Operations Center.
As last year, this exercise was observed by a Combat Training Center (CTC) Accreditation Team comprised of personnel
from the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G27 Operational Environment/Opposing Force Program
Management, TRADOC G-2 Analysis & Control Element Threats Integration (ACE-TI), and the Combined Arms Center’s
Combat Training Center Directorate. This accreditation focused on specific areas such as: equipping, manning, and training
of the opposing force (OPFOR); replication of the operational environment (OE); replication of the PMESII-PT variables
(political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical terrain, and time); how well the overall DATE
environment and hybrid threat are replicated and OPFOR doctrine and tactics planned and executed; and how well the
informational environment is replicated at the CTC and within the framework of the exercise. This article focuses on how
the OPFOR battalion executed its tactical plan for challenging the RTU commander’s training objectives.
Like previous NATO Response Force/DATE rotations, the OPFOR was built around JMRC’s organic unit, the 1st Battalion,
4th Infantry Regiment (Inf Regt). Due to a significant reduction in the battalion’s authorized personnel strength, it required
significant augmentation by US Army Reserve (USAR), National Guard (NG), and NATO partner units in order to replicate
an Arianian brigade tactical group (BTG). For this rotation, the OPFOR replicated the 303rd BTG that is organic to the 11th
Division Tactical Group (DTG) of the Arianian Army. The 303rd BTG consisted of three organic battalion detachments
(BDETS) replicated by Apache, Blackfoot, and Cherokee companies (Cos) and three attached BDETS—Task Force (TF)
Bushmaster, TF Wolf, and TF Sierra. These were replicated, respectively, by B Co/1st Bn/181st Inf Regt (-), which is a
California Army NG infantry company; a Latvian infantry company (-); and a Serbian infantry company (-). Additionally, a
platoon of Lithuanian infantry was attached to Apache Co, and a Slovenian armor platoon to Blackfoot Co. As always, the
OPFOR’s organic aviation detachment, Falcon, participated in this exercise. The OPFOR Bn was also augmented by a USAR
engineer company (387th Engineer Bn); USAR civil affairs, public affairs office, and psychological operations teams; and a
medical platoon. Elements of the USAR engineer company were task organized into each of the OPFOR Bn’s elements to
provide breaching and route clearance support as required.
The Lithuanian light infantry platoon provided dismounts for Apache Co’s OPFOR surrogate vehicle (OSV) BMPs, and the
Slovenian tank platoon was task organized within Blackfoot Co and was utilized as required by the tactical situation. The
OPFOR Bn did have OSV T-72/80 main battle tanks that were task organized into Apache or Blackfoot companies to provide
additional fire power and the ability to engage BLUFOR vehicles at long range. Cherokee Company personnel portrayed
Arianian special purpose force (SPF) personnel and South Atropian People’s Army (SAPA) insurgent cells, and served as
the BTG’s reconnaissance elements, which were equipped with OSV BRDMs that also provided an antiarmor capability.

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There was a significant amount of blue special operations forces (BLUSOF) activity during this rotation, with the BLUFOR
receiving support from both US Special Forces (SF) companies and teams, and several NATO-nation SOF units. SOF missions
were executed in both the constructive wrap-around and in the box during the force-on-force portion of the exercise. The
greatest significance for the OPFOR was BLUSOF conducting special reconnaissance missions and also acting as advisors
for the Atropian Loyalist Militia (ALM), who were portrayed by a platoon of Bosnian infantry.
The RTU commander’s training objectives drove refinement of the overall exercise scenario and the tactical tasks selected
by the OPFOR, which were specifically developed to provide the RTU with a rigorous validation of its training status. For
this exercise, the RTU commander’s primary focus was on conduct of offensive and defensive operations, cyber/electronic
warfare (EW) defense, counter unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations, mission command, and employment of joint
fires.
The 303rd BTG operations order directed its subordinate units to conduct an area reconnaissance, reconnaissance attack,
and integrated attack. After conducting those missions, the 303rd BTG would prepare for conduct of a maneuver defense.
Those operations, particularly the maneuver defense, were designed to defeat BLUFOR in order to allow the 303rd BTG’s
higher headquarters (the 11th DTG) to build combat power after the DTG was forced to withdraw by BLUFOR operations.
Figure 1. Recon attack1
Once the BTG had inserted reconnaissance elements and SPF throughout the depth and breadth of the maneuver box,
SPF were able to conduct counterreconnaissance operations and identify locations of the RTU’s maneuver battalions, the
geographic disposition of the cavalry squadron’s guard mission, and critical high value targets (HVTs) such as the BCT’s

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tactical operations center (TOC) and logistics nodes, which were primarily located in the vicinity of the Short Take
Off/Landing (STOL) strip and Aghijabadi City, which is the provincial capital. Cherokee Company executed harassment
attacks and called indirect fire missions (only mortars were available during this phase) against RTU elements, as well. At
that point, the 303rd BTG was set to execute its reconnaissance attack against the RTU. Additionally, SAPA cells, located
throughout the box, provided information to SPF and to the 303rd BTG regarding RTU unit locations, with particular focus
on critical command and control (C2) and logistics nodes. SPF advised, supplied, and led SAPA cells in some instances.
The 303rd BTG conducted its reconnaissance attack against the RTU once Cherokee Company (the enabling and supporting
element) had penetrated the RTU’s cavalry squadron guard positions, and Cherokee Company then focused its
reconnaissance assets, SPF, and SAPA on continuing to conduct reconnaissance activities and harassing attacks in the
northern sector of the box and to establish and maintain contact with BLUFOR elements in the north. That facilitated
Blackfoot Company’s (the action element) execution of the reconnaissance attack in the southern sector, with the purpose
of determining BLUFOR unit dispositions, composition, and strength by penetrating as deeply as possible into the RTU’s
rear areas. The OPFOR reconnaissance attack was reported to have been very successful, and more RTU elements were
located and identified. During this phase, indirect fires could be called for and were provided (constructively) by a D30
battalion providing constituent fires to the 303rd BTG and a 2S16 battalion and multiple rocket launcher company
providing supporting fires.
Figure 2. Integrated attack

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The integrated attack consisted of two avenues of approach, with the main avenue to the north to be executed by Apache
Company (the action [assault] element), and the supporting attack in the south, which would be executed by Blackfoot
Company (the enabling [deception] element).
During the conduct of this attack, the author was able to accompany the Apache Company commander in his command
OSV BMP. Apache Company, accompanied and supported by TF Wolf (Latvian infantry company) and TF Sierra (Serbian
infantry company), which were both initially disruption/fixing elements, would advance along Axis Amstel, with the
ultimate objective of seizing Objective Lion (STOL strip). TF Sierra’s specific mission was to fix BLUFOR elements located
on/near Axis Amstel, as would Apache Company, with the plan for TF Wolf to actually pass by both TF Sierra and Apache
Company as they fixed RTU combat power on Axis Amstel. TF Wolf would then assume the role of the assault element and
attack the RTU’s Brigade Support Area and other HVTs located on or near the STOL strip. Additionally, Aghijabadi City (the
provincial capital) was also in close proximity. Apache Company would not cross the Line of Departure (LD) and commence
its attack until approximately one hour after Blackfoot Company initiated movement for its supporting attack and had
crossed Phase Line Ironwood.
Figure 3. Maneuver defense
Blackfoot Company and TF Bushmaster (CA NG infantry company), were the deception/fixing element, and were to cross
the LD and leave their tactical assembly early, with a mission to deceive the RTU into believing they were the main effort
and to eventually fix RTU elements on objectives southwest and south of the STOL strip (OBJ Lion). Additionally, Cherokee

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Company would support this attack by continuing SPF and SAPA operations in Aghijabadi City and in the vicinity of other
Apache and Blackfoot Company objectives.
The integrated attack went extremely well, and suspension of battlefield events was declared by the Commander,
Operations Group as Apache Company TF Wolf approached within one kilometer of the STOL strip. Additionally, Blackfoot
Company and TF Bushmaster achieved their objectives of fixing RTU elements south and west of the STOL strip. This
success was facilitated by excellent use of cyber/EW operations conducted by the OPFOR Bn, to include use of Raven UAVs
against BLUFOR. BLUFOR also employed both Raven and Shadow unmanned aerial systems (UASs) during this exercise,
although UAS/UAV ops were curtailed between 1000–1800 hrs on certain days while the US Air Force flew sorties in
support of the RTU. During those periods, both the OPFOR and RTU were forced to utilize virtual UAS/UAV capability
provided by JMRC.
Following the normal suspension of battlefield events so that both BLUFOR and OPFOR could reset for the next phase of
the rotation (BLUFOR attack, OPFOR defend), both the OPFOR and the RTU prepared for the next phase of this rotation.
Of note is that after a brief experiment during a rotation last January, the OPFOR Bn (303rd BTG) moved its TOC from
garrison into the field. For this rotation, it jumped the TOC to the town of Kebirli, located in the far western end of the
maneuver box. By doing so, the BTG made good use of “cultural shielding,” as the town was populated by Atropian citizens
who were pro-SAPA and supportive of all anti-government operations. Although the RTU knew the TOC was there, based
on its EW efforts and the fact that it kept a Shadow UAS overhead, it could not engage the TOC with indirect fires or with
air assets. Once the OPFOR established its TOC in the box, the garrison location functioned as an administrative/logistics
operations center for the duration of the defense. This decision to jump the TOC was partially driven by comments during
previous accreditation visits that it would make the box more competitive, as the RTU would now have OPFOR signals to
locate and would be able to work its cyber/EW skills to a greater degree than when the OPFOR TOC was in garrison and
out of play. Although this was a new technique employed by the OPFOR Bn, it all appeared to go very smoothly, with its
TOC fitting quite well into one multi-story building in Kebirli.
For its maneuver defense, the 303rd BTG established defense with an identified disruption element, combat security
outposts (CSOPs), kill zones, contact and shielding elements, and a counterattack/reserve element. Additionally, SPF/SAPA
elements, located in the RTU’s rear areas and along its two likely avenues of approach for its deliberate attack, would
provide real-time reconnaissance input to the 303rd BTG, and would also provide calls for indirect fires and the capability
of conducting limited attacks against RTU HVTs, if the opportunity presented itself.
In this instance, the RTU’s most likely avenue of approach was determined to be in the north sector of the box, with the
supporting attack coming from the southern sector. In each case, one of the RTU’s two maneuver battalions would attack,
augmented by the NATO and PfP nations that were attached to the RTU for this exercise. This was, however, a light infantry
unit, and movement would be relatively slow and tentative due to the lack of heavy or even medium armor in support.
During this phase, the ability of the 303rd BTG to “read the RTU’s mail” with regard to its voice communications proved
to be a significant advantage. An earlier capture of an RTU recon element and one of its communication re-transmission
sites provided all the information necessary to allow the OPFOR to listen in on the RTU’s command and admin/log
communications nets, and to continue to do so even after the RTU was aware of the problem and took steps to correct
the situation. The OPFOR was also able to direct an indirect fire strike against the RTU’s Raven control station by hacking
into the system controlling the Raven’s transmission of data, which had also been re-transmitted to BLUFOR assets by an
AH-64 attack helicopter. OPFOR was able to capture the data transmission, backtrack it to the BLUFOR Raven control
station’s exact locations, and subsequently destroy them with indirect fire.
As to the OPFOR’s actual plan for its defense, Cherokee Company established combat security outposts (CSOPs) with
reconnaissance assets, along with SPF and SAPA in depth. TF Bushmaster and TF Wolf executed the disruption/contact
element mission, overlooking large kill zones established on each of the anticipated RTU axes of advance, with TF Wolf
oriented on the northern axis. Directly to their rear was the shielding element, which was the mission for Apache and
Blackfoot Companies. To the rear of the entire maneuver defense was TF Sierra, with the mission as the
counterattack/reserve element. As can be seen from the maneuver defense graphic, withdrawal/passage of lines routes

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were identified, along with alternate/subsequent simple battle positions for the disruption/contact element to move into
once specified loss criteria had been met.
Although the author was not in the field with the OPFOR/303rd BTG for the defense, it was reported to be a very successful
operation that fully challenged the RTU commander’s training objectives. It was later reported that the RTU, in fact,
utilized the southern corridor for its main axis of attack, with the northern corridor as its supporting axis. It also launched
two separate air assault missions to the rear of the OPFOR’s main defensive belt and reserve, one just to the northwest
of Kebirli and one just to the east of the town. The supporting attack element in the north were able to locate and pass
through a seam in the OPFOR defense, and established support by fire positions east of town. The main attack element,
from the southern corridor, executed a bold movement to contact and then attacked. The RTU was eventually able to
clear Kebirli.
Not surprisingly, the OPFOR’s familiarity with the ground, its understanding of hybrid threat tactics, its dedication to the
mission, and its aggressive nature are all significant advantages that can mitigate the RTU’s advantages in numbers and
quality of equipment and technology.
Significant factors in the OPFOR’s success, as described earlier, were its ability to leverage EW and its limited cyber
capabilities, with particular focus on capitalizing on the RTU’s mistakes with regard to safeguarding communications
frequencies, key lists, and failure to properly encrypt its own technology. The OPFOR also exercised an excellent
information warfare operation against the RTU that utilized propaganda videos of captured RTU soldiers, in which the
story was manipulated to embarrass the RTU and counter all of its efforts to win over Atropian civilian and local
governmental support to its cause.
This rotation can be described as a significant success for continued implementation of the principles contained in DATE
2.2 and the Training Circular 7-100 series of publications with liberal applications of real-world lessons from the existing
operational environment, which continues to evolve.
Note
1 All graphics used in this article were provided by JMRC Operations Group and/or OPFOR, with any modifications done solely to improve legibility.
_______________

Red Diamond Page 19
by Laura Deatrick, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (CGI Ctr)
During the past seven years, al Shabaab has carried out no fewer than 21 separate attacks on hotels. While the majority
of these have taken place in Mogadishu, Somalia, some have also occurred as far away as Mombasa, Kenya—575 miles
from the Somali capital. This article examines these attacks as a whole, including intended targets, possible motives, and
the different techniques used.
Targets and Motives
Most of the incidents under consideration can be broken out into four general categories. In the first, the attacks occur at
hotel restaurants and target civilians. The attacks of 16 January 2013, 12 October 2014, and 21 January 2016 fall into this
category. In the latter case, an al Shabaab spokesman identified the hotel as a location “where government employees
frequent,” and claimed it as a “major operation against the enemy of Allah,” despite the fact that the venue was popular
with primarily younger Somalis.1
Table 1. Attacks on hotels by al Shabaab (not exhaustive)

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The second category reflects attacks that specifically targeted military personnel, and includes the incidents of 18 March
2014 and 26 March 2014. Both of these occurred in the same town and at the same hotel, which was being used as lodging
for Somali and foreign (African Union) military officers. Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attacks and bragged
about killing senior military leaders in both cases.3
Category three encompasses the attacks of 15 June 2014 and 14 October 2014. The former was an attack on an entire
town not unlike those perpetrated by Boko Haram.4
Al Shabaab claimed credit, its declared motive being retaliation for
the presence of Kenyan troops in Somalia and the killing of Somali Muslims. The latter incident was an attack on both
government and military personnel that may have targeted the town in general.
The fourth category of attacks is also the most common. The remaining 14 incidents—with the possible exception of the
11 March 2015 attack—all targeted Somali and foreign government officials, to include the Somali president, his ministers,
members of parliament, and foreign diplomats. These attacks were almost without exception claimed by al Shabaab, with
the group’s spokesmen referring to their intended victims as apostates, invaders, infidels, and enemies.
Table 2. Techniques used in al Shabaab hotel attacks (not exhaustive)

Red Diamond Page 21
Why Hotels?
The question now arises as to why government and foreign personnel are to be found in these hotels so often. The answer,
quite simply, is security. One BBC reporter described the hotels of Mogadishu as “like fortresses, with high surrounding
walls, two sets of giant metal gates, private security and scanners. This
is to try to protect government officials and other al-Shabab [sic] targets,
who often live there for years.”8
After so many decades of fighting, the
hotels do not take the safety of their guests for granted. Neither do the
guests themselves, for that matter. A quick perusal of the TripAdvisor
website reveals the following opinions regarding the Jazeera Hotel:9
 “We felt secure in the hotel; lots of necessary security checks
which puts your mind at rest”
 “The Most secure, clean and luxurious palatial Hotel in
Mogadishu .” [sic]
 “Friendly staff, good food and good security.”
 “…most important maybe, it has high-level security staff and
equipments [sic].”
Prior to an attack on 26 July 2015, this particular hotel hosted not only
senior government officials—including the Somali president himself—
but also served as the location of several diplomatic missions, such as
those of China and Qatar.
Al Shabaab considers these hotels to be legitimate government targets. A group spokesman stated, “We consider as
legitimate targets five, six or seven hotels in the capital, I forget the exact number. They know who they are because they
provide lodging for members of the apostate government, certain members of the diaspora, foreigners and other
infidels.”10
At another time a spokesman declared, “We don't consider it [Maka al-Mukaram Hotel] to be a hotel—it's a
government base.”11
The constant presence of and reliance by government personnel on local hotels only guarantees that
these facilities will continue to be subject to attacks by the insurgent group.
Figure 2. Jazeera hotel before and after the 26 July 2015 attack, with close-up
Common Hotel Attack Techniques
Method #1: SVBIED/VBIED
This method is very basic. A suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) is driven into the gate or the wall
of the hotel compound and detonated (Figure 3). An alternative means is to use a vehicle borne IED (VBIED), which is
parked by the hotel wall/gate and detonated after the driver has cleared the area (Figure 4). Both techniques require few
assets and carry minimal risk, while having a potentially large payoff in terms of casualties, property damage, and
information warfare (INFOWAR). Al Shabaab recognizes this, with the Somaliland Press reporting that the group “said their
usage of a suicide bombing was the most effective way to execute government officials.”12
This basic method was used in
five of the incidents under consideration, including the aforementioned 26 July 2015 attack on the Jazeera Hotel, and a
variant was used in a sixth event.
Figure 1. Jazeera hotel gate

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Figure 3. SVBIED attack
Figure 4. VBIED attack

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Method #2: Small Arms Fire
This method is also basic, but
carries a higher cost in terms of
personnel. A small element,
usually numbering four to five
insurgents, breaches the gate
using small arms fire. The
militants then continue firing
while they storm the hotel. Once
inside, they attempt to kill
everyone they see.
Variations include using person
borne IEDs (PBIEDs) or grenades
in the breach attempt and/or the
assaulting gunmen wearing
PBIEDs. This method or a variant
was used in six of the attacks
examined.
Method #3: SVBIED with Small
Arms Fire
This method involves the most
planning and commitment of
resources, but also offers the
largest payoff in terms of
casualties, property damage, and
INFOWAR objectives. The attack
begins with an SVBIED crashing
into the wall or gate of the hotel
compound.
A small element of gunmen then
breach the compound, shooting
as they storm the hotel.
A secondary VBIED, aimed at first
responders, may also be
employed in this type of attack.
Variations include initiating the
assault with a VBIED instead of an
SVBIED, the participating
gunmen wearing PBIEDs, and/or
using an SVBIED as the secondary
VBIED.
Eight of the attacks in this study
used this method or one of its
variants.
Figure 5. Small arms fire attack
Figure 6. SVBIED with small arms fire attack

Red Diamond Page 24
Training Implications
These attack methods are examples of an assault, as described in TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics. It should be noted
that, in methods two and three, none of the insurgents intend to come out of the hotel alive—hence disallowing the
possibility of calling the methods raids. Two groups contained in the Decisive Action Training Environment that would use
the techniques discussed in this article are the Limarian Liberation Front (LLF) and the Free Lower Janga Movement (FLJM).
These two organizations are on opposite sides of Atropia’s conflict with Limaria over the Lower Janga region: FLJM wishes
to see Lower Janga return to Atropian control, while LLF is fighting to ensure Limaria’s continued supremacy over
the territory.
References
Nearly 200 references were used for this article, with an average of 8–9 per attack. For a complete list of references, please contact the author.
Notes
1 Caleb Weiss. "Shabaab targets popular Mogadishu beach resort." Long War Journal. 24 January 2016; Agence France-Presse. "At least 19 dead in
Somalia al-Shabaab restaurant attack." Horseed Media. 22 January 2016.
2 Mursal. “First Al-Shabaab attack on Barawe since militants withdrew.” Harar24 News. 14 October 2014.
3 Agencies. “Al Shabab claim deadly attack on African Union hotel in Somalia.” Deutsche Welle. 18 March 2014; Reuters. “Al-Shabaab militants raid
hotel in central Somalia: report.” CBC News (Canada). 26 June 2014.
4 For more information on attacks by Boko Haram against towns, see “Boko Haram: Arrack on Baga, Nigeria” and “Boko Haram and Shifting
Techniques: Towns under Fire” in previous editions of the Red Diamond.
5 For more details on this attack, see the “Al Shabaab Update” Threat Report, dated 15 November 2012.
6 For more details on this attack, see the “If At First You Don’t Succeed: 1 January 2014 Bombing of the Jazeera Hotel” Threat Report, dated March
2014, or the Red Diamond article by the same name in the January 2014 edition.
7 Mursal. “First Al-Shabaab attack on Barawe since militants withdrew.” Harar24 News. 14 October 2014.
8 Mary Harper. "Why does al-Shabab target hotels?" BBC News. 7 November 2015.
9 Trip Advisor. “Jazeera Palace Hotel.” 2016.
10 Mary Harper. "Why does al-Shabab target hotels?" BBC News. 7 November 2015.
11 BBC News. "Somali forces end deadly al-Shabab Mogadishu hotel siege." 28 March 2015.
12 Somaliland Press. “Somalia: Who Carried Out The Suicide Attack in Beletwein? - Alshabab Tells the Story.” 21 June 2009.
_______________

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AGRICULTURAL TERRORISM (AGROTERRORISM)
by Kris Lechowicz (DAC) and Marc Williams (ThreatTec Ctr), TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration
Agroterrorism is a critical threat that is largely neglected by both military analysts and the US Army training community.
The article provides a basic primer for the agroterrorism threat and discusses scenario replication by using opposing force
(OPFOR) doctrine, such as the Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series, and the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE).
The article also provides a hypothetical scenario that reinforces the importance of the subject for US Northern Command
or units outside of the US supporting contingency operations. The hybrid threat continues to evolve and will use a broad
range of weapons that could include agroterrorism to attack US and coalition partners.
Potential Scenario
A successful series of bombings by an unknown terrorist organization in shopping malls throughout the heartland of the
US has caused panic and sharply increased security measures. Now a strange event has taken place: the nation’s wheat,
corn, soybean crops, and cattle herds have all been struck with a new type of disease that cannot be identified. The US
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Institute of Health are
investigating, but have no solid conclusions as to the source of this contamination. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are conducting concurrent investigations to determine if this is an
act of sabotage by either foreign or homegrown terrorists. Experts are predicting a loss of up to 90% of the entire annual
yield for the affected crops. As news of this contamination spreads, panic begins to set in. Market speculation drives the
stock prices to fluctuate wildly. Across the globe, news of the possible loss of all US food causes runs on grocery stores
and markets. Law enforcement agencies prepare for possible food riots and massive political unrest caused by perceptions
of governmental failure as well as a fear of starvation. The Department of Defense has begun planning the use of military
capabilities to conduct stability operations in both the US and internationally, if needed.
Could something like this actually happen?
A 2003 RAND study proposed agroterrorism could take place effectively following a successful conventional terrorist
campaign.
Terrorists can choose from a large menu of bio-agents, most of which are environmentally hardy, are not
the focus of concerted livestock vaccination programs, and can be easily smuggled into the country. The
food chain offers a low-tech mechanism for achieving human deaths. Many animal pathogens cannot be
transmitted to humans, which makes them easier for terrorists to work with. Finally, because livestock
are the primary vector for pathogenic transmission, there is no weaponization obstacle to overcome.1
The threat to the world’s food supply is always a source of concern, especially in the US. According to the Agricultural
Council of America, “The top five agricultural commodities are cattle and calves, dairy products, broilers, corn and
soybeans. US farmers produce 46% of the world’s soybeans, 41% of the world’s corn, 20.5% of the world’s cotton and 13%
of the world’s wheat.”2
In the 1960s, “one farmer supplied food for 25.8 persons in the US and abroad. Today, one farmer
supplies food for 144 people.”3
There are a number of vulnerabilities within the US food chain that makes it attractive to
terrorists. These include, but are not limited to, concentrated contemporary farming practices, increased susceptibility of

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livestock to disease, insufficient security and surveillance, and a focus on aggregate instead of individual livestock
statistics.4
At the national level, the US biodefense system is fragmented and does not share information across agencies. A Blue
Ribbon Study Panel in 2015 highlighted the following:5
 Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), USDA, and DHS cannot detect a biological agent upon release
or attribute the perpetrator responsible. The current DHS BioWatch system is only deployed in a few dozen
cities and has numerous inadequacies, including up to 36 hours to alert for pathogens.
 HHS and USDA have no way to treat exposed people or animals, including decontamination and remediation. No
agency is statutorily responsible for deciding when an affected area has been sufficiently decontaminated,
remediated, and cleared for re-occupancy.
 Despite 50+ political appointees and 12 departments and agencies participating in biodefense, there is no
comprehensive national strategic plan, leader, or budget.
 Government response plans are based on naturally occurring infectious diseases—not weaponized pathogens—
and exercises rarely take attribution into consideration.
 The US lacks a nationally-reportable list of animal diseases in domestic and wild animals comparable to that for
humans.
 The US lacks a nationwide, population-based disease surveillance and detection system for human and animal
populations.
 The point where biological threats and cyber threats intersect has not yet been explored. There is a vast amount
of pathogen data in biotechnology companies, universities, and government research laboratories.
The infectious agents required to successfully infect livestock are relatively easy to acquire and require very little
experience to conduct an act of agroterrorism.6
In 2006, the National Institute of Justice funded research concerning a
foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) agroterrorist attack effect on the State of Kansas and the US. FMD was chosen because:
Twenty times more infectious than smallpox, the disease [FMD] causes painful blisters on the tongues,
hooves, and teats of cloven-hoofed animals—cattle, hogs, sheep, goats, deer—rendering them unable to
walk, give milk, eat, and drink. Although people generally cannot contract the disease, they can carry the
virus in their lungs up to 48 hours and transmit it to animals.7
This was a multi-agency study that included Kansas State University and multiple state and county law enforcement
agencies. The study concluded there were five major groups that could threaten agriculture and food supplies:
 International terrorists
 Domestic terrorists
 Militant animal rights groups
 Economic opportunists
 Disgruntled employees seeking revenge8
Domestically
Even before the 9/11 attacks, the US government identified the need to safeguard the food supply. In the 2001 budget,
developed in 2000, was a line item for $39.8 million for the USDA for additional security measures. “Its inclusion reflects
a growing concern that the agricultural sector, which accounts for roughly one sixth of US GDP - more if related food
industries and suppliers are factored in - may become the target of a future act of chemical or biological (CB) terrorism.
This concern has been generated by a growing realization that CB attacks against livestock and the food chain are
substantially easier and less risky to carry out than those directed at civilian targets.”9
In 2002, the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, published a federal strategy to counter
agricultural bioterrorism.10
It addressed emerging threats to food security and how to counter the threat, and offered
multiple recommendations.

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Food and agriculture are one of “16 critical infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical
or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating
effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.”11
Work continues concerning agroterrorism. DHS, USDA, and HHS work actively together concerning agroterrorism within
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The Biosecurity Research Institute (BRI) at Kansas State University is a
biocontainment research facility that “supports comprehensive ‘farm-to-fork’ infectious disease research programs that
address threats to plant, animal, and human health.”12
The BRI works to “protect the US population from natural,
accidental or intentional outbreaks of high consequence agents that may impact the agricultural infrastructure or food
supply.”13
Figure 1. Kansas State University Biosecurity Research Institute at Pat Roberts Hall
Internationally
Some historical examples of the impact of contaminated food sources include 2001 in the UK and 2006 in the Netherlands.
Dioxin-contaminated animal feed cost $1 billion to the Netherlands. The FMD outbreak in the UK cost $21 billion. In
Canada, Defence Research and Development Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency have focused on FMD,
“bird flu,” swine fever, and the Nipah virus. Bird flu spreading around the globe has been the cause of millions of chicken,
turkey, duck, and geese culls.
Militarily, offensive bioweapons are banned under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). However, the
Department of State assesses that China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Syria continue to engage in dual-use or biological
weapons-specific activities and are failing to comply with the BWC.14
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Challenges
The food supply is not just vulnerable to biological agents, but could also be contaminated with chemical or radiological
agents and nuclear events. Overuse of antibiotics worldwide has caused “superbugs” to flourish with no known cures. “In
several parts of the world, more than 50% in tonnage of all antimicrobial production is used in food-producing animals. In
addition, veterinarians in some countries earn at least 40% of their income from the sale of drugs, creating a strong
disincentive to limit their use. The problem arises when drugs used for food production are medically important for human

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health, as evidence shows that pathogens that have developed resistance to drugs in animals can be transmitted to
humans.”15
Biological agents “that have been used in threats or reported to have been deployed include Bacillus anthracis (anthrax),
Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) mallei (glanders), fleas infected with the plague bacillus (Yersinia pestis), Newcastle disease
virus, African swine fever virus, [and] FMD virus.”16
Impact on an Army Brigade
Within the US borders, Army brigades would not serve as a first or second responder to an agroterrorism incident. If
needed, Army National Guard brigades may be used for multiple consequence management missions. However, an Army
brigade would be called into action if the incident required that level of support and state resources were exhausted.
Internationally, the situation may be entirely different, as would be the supporting brigade’s mission set. To prepare for
this, DATE 2.2 contains a fictional event that includes operational environment variable conditions and linked Mission
Essential Task List (METL) tasks.
Figure 2. DATE 2.2 event with associated METL tasks
The METL tasks of every Brigade Combat Team (BCT) include executing that task under nuclear, biological, and/or chemical
warfare conditions. In order to challenge the BCT, an opposing force (OPFOR) needs to possess offensive CBRN capability.
An exercise using a biological attack would fully stress a unit.
DATE 2.2 and OPFOR Doctrine
When designing an exercise, DATE 2.2 is the basis for scenario development. OPFOR doctrine manuals are the source for
developing a credible hybrid threat to challenge US commanders’ training objectives.

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Biological release authority. In OPFOR doctrine, the decision to employ biological weapons is made by the National
Command Authority in each respective country. “The prolonged incubation period makes it difficult to track down the
initial location and circumstances of contamination. Thus, there is the possibility of plausible deniability. Even if an
opponent might be able to trace a biological attack back to the OPFOR, it may not be able to respond in kind.”17
DATE 2.2 countries and CBRN offensive capabilities. The countries in DATE 2.2 are Ariana, Atropia, Donovia, Gorgas, and
Limaria. Donovia and Ariana have some tier 1 military capabilities and the other three are tier 2. While the below table
shows offensive capabilities, it is important to remember that “the OPFOR closely controls information about the status
of its biological warfare capabilities. This creates uncertainty among its neighbors and other potential opponents as to
what types of biological agents the OPFOR might possess and how it might employ them.”18
Table 1. DATE 2.2 offensive CBRN capability by country
OPFOR units and delivery means. There are two basic ways to deliver biological agents: point-source bomblets delivered
directly on target, and line-source tanks that release the agent upwind from the target. This can include “rockets, artillery
shells, aircraft sprayers, saboteurs, and infected rodents.”19
The OPFOR has surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) capable of carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological
warheads. Most OPFOR artillery is capable of delivering chemical munitions, and most systems 152-mm
and larger are capable of firing nuclear rounds. Additionally, the OPFOR could use aircraft systems and

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cruise missiles to deliver a CBRN attack. The OPFOR has also trained special-purpose forces (SPF) as
alternate means of delivering CBRN munitions packages.20
Table 2. DATE 2.2 specialized CBRN units and delivery systems by country
Unit examples. Following are examples from DATE 2.2 of specialized units that can deliver CBRN weapons and materials.
Figure 3. The 941st Special Purpose Forces (SPF) Battalion, Atropia

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Atropia, 941st Special Purpose Forces (SPF) Battalion (DATE 2.2, page 2B-9-6): SPF units come with a very unique set of
capabilities. They can be task organized by scenario writers and exercise planners to reflect mission requirements.
The wire diagram below shows an Army SPF battalion during peacetime. SPF units are organized within the Navy, Air
Force, Strategic Forces, and Internal Security Forces. “Any SPF units (from the SPF Command or from other service
components’ SPF) that have reconnaissance or direct action missions supporting strategic-level objectives or intelligence
requirements would normally be under the direct control of the Supreme High Command (SHC) or under the control of
the SPF Command, which reports directly to the SHC.”21
Donovia, 366th Missile Brigade (SSM), Western Army (DATE 2.2, page 2C-9-57): The medium-range ballistic missiles in this
brigade have a range of 1,280 kilometers and can carry up to five warheads, each which target different destinations.
Figure 4. The 366th Missile Brigade (SSM), Western Army, Donovia
Specialized units. For your exercise, you may need to consider irregular units that specialize in CBRN or weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) to portray a hybrid threat (conventional-irregular mix). In an insurgent support unit, it may look
something as in figure 5 (below).
In this case, the WMD effort would be the responsibility of the technical support team. “Use of a WMD such as a
radiological (dirty bomb) and biological weapon can require specific expertise in fabrication, emplacement, and
detonation or activation of the WMD.
The WMD support team acquires necessary expertise and material from outside the local insurgent organization.”22
Once
the weapon has been prepared, it is emplaced by members of a direct action cell with a representative from the WMD
support team to ensure proper placement and detonation.
A WMD support team can be organized and equipped like this (taken from TC 7-100.4, Appendix C):
Team Leader/Sr Demo Expert/Chem Tech (x1) PM/AKMS
Asst Tm Ldr/Demo Expert/Electrician/Fuze (x1) AKMS
Demo Specialist/Communications/Radiation (x1) AKMS
Demo Specialist/Computer Tech (x1) PM/RPK
Demo Specialist/Chemical Spec (x1) AKM/BG-15
Total Personnel 5

Red Diamond Page 32
Figure 5. Insurgent supporting cell graphic symbols
Principal Items of equipment – WMD Support team
Equipment Total Equipment Total
9-mm Pistol, PM........................................ 2 Camera, Digital ............................ 1
7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM...................... 1 Electrician Set .............................. 2
7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS .......................... 3 GPS Receiver, Handheld............... 3
7.62-mm LMG, RPK................................... 1 Night-Vision Goggles ................... 1
40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 ............ 1 Radios:
Demolition, Fuzes/Detonators ...............Assorted Cell Phone ............................... 10
Demolition Materiel ...............................Assorted Computer, Laptop..................... 3
Mines (AP, AT, & AV) ..............................Assorted Computer, PDA......................... 2
IED, WMD ................................................... 1 Handheld, Long-Range
Sedan, Civilian ............................................ 1 Cordless Telephone……….…. 3
Van, Civilian ................................................ 1 Handheld, Very-Low-Power ..... 5
Binoculars.................................................... 1 Portable, Satellite Telephone…. 1
Camcorder, Video ....................................... 1

Red Diamond Page 33
Summary
Agricultural terrorism is a real threat that requires multi-agency planning and response. Future enemies are on the lookout
for soft targets with maximum impact. A biological attack on the US or allied food supplies would have some physical
effects, but the psychological impacts would be deep, far-reaching, and long-lasting. Second- and third-order effects
include diverting of maneuver units from deployment capability to conducting long-term security operations, massive
governmental spending on upgrades and programs, and serious loss of confidence in a government’s ability to provide
security.23
Exercise planners and scenario writers should consider this or a similar scenario for future training.
References
Clark, Dennis, Gloria Cypret, Cynthia Gonsalves, et al. “Biological Detection System Technologies Technology and Industrial Base Study: A primer on
Biological Detection Technologies.” North American Technology and Industrial Base Organization. February 2001.
Headquarters, Army Materiel Command. CBRN Handbook: An Industrial Base Product Guide for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Items
for the US Army. Edgewood Chemical Biological Center. June 2009.
Noble, Ronald K. “Opening Speech, INTERPOL Workshop on Preventing Bioterrorism.” INTERPOL. 6 November 2006
Notes
* Peter Chalk. “Agroterrorism: What Is the Threat and What Can Be Done About It?” RAND Corporation. 2003. {Author’s summary of report findings.]
2 Agriculture Council of America. “Agriculture Fact Sheet.” 2016.
3 Agriculture Council of America. “Agriculture Fact Sheet.” 2016.
4 Peter Chalk. “Agroterrorism: What Is the Threat and What Can Be Done About It?” RAND Corporation. 2003.
5 Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense. “A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform Needed to Optimize Efforts.” 28
October 2015.
6 Carlton Gyles. “Agroterrorism.” National Center for Biotechnology Information. April 2010.
7 Glenn R. Schmitt. “Agroterrorism-Why We’re Not ready: A Look at the Role of law Enforcement.” National Institute of Justice. June 2007.
8 Terry Knowles, James Lane, Gary Bayens, Nevil Spear, Jerry Jaax, David Carter, and Andra Bannister. “Defining Law Enforcement’s Role in Protecting
American Agriculture from Agroterrorism.” National Institute of Justice. 30 June 2005. Pg iv.
9 Peter Chalk. “The US agricultural sector: a new target for terrorism?” Rand Corporation. 9 February 2001.
10 Henry S. Parker. “Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat.” Institute for National Strategic Studies. March 2002.
11 US Department of Homeland Security. “Critical Infrastructure Sectors.” 27 October 2015.
12 Kansas State University. “Biosecurity Research Institute.” 16 February 2016.
13 Turner Construction Company. “Kansas State University Biosecurity Research Institute at Pat Roberts Hall.” 2016.
14 US Department of State. “2015 Report on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and
Commitments.” 5 June 2015. Part III.
15 Margaret Chan. “World Health Day 2011.” World Health Organization. 6 April 2011.
16 Carlton Gyles. “Agroterrorism.” National Center for Biotechnology Information. April 2010.
17 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats
Integration. 9 December 2011. Para 13-52.
20 Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. Worldwide Equipment Guide, Volume 1: Ground Systems. TRADOC G-2
Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. August 2015. Chapter 12. Pg 2.
21 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.4, Hybrid Threat Force Structure Organization Guide. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and
Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. June 2015. Para 2-16.
22 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE)
Threats Integration. January 2014. Para 2-130.
23 Response is expensive. The cost of quarantine and care for a single dog in Texas suspected of Ebola exposure was nearly $27,000. Add to that the
cost of personal protective equipment for responders, medical personnel, and hospitals, as well as the research and development costs of
developing a vaccine followed by information campaigns and inoculation programs.
_______________

Red Diamond Page 34
RUSSIAN ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEMS IN UKRAINE AND SYRIA
by John Cantin, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (BMA Ctr)
In the recent conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, the Russian Armed Forces have used electronic warfare (EW) systems with
great effectiveness and skill. The Russians are adapting and developing new techniques and procedures to maximize the
capabilities of their systems to attack and counter opposing forces’ conventional and unconventional systems and
weapons.
Russia has used primarily three EW systems in conjunction with ground forces, the electronic attack (EA) radar jammer
1L245, mainly used to defeat airborne radar systems and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). This
system also has the capability to locate and jam ground systems as well. The EA jammer Infauna is fielded to EW battalions
in airborne forces of the Russian Army. As part of the airborne forces, this system will be used to accompany initial entry
troops and assist with securing key terrain to enable follow-on forces—motorized, mechanized, and armor—to deploy
into combat areas. The EW system Leer-2 is used as an electronic emulation and electronic countermeasures system and
is designed for developing radio emitters, jamming, and suppressing radioelectronic means, including cellular phone
systems.
Each of these systems is ideal for use with airborne, Spetsnaz, and other initial entry forces to establish a footprint to allow
larger, follow-on forces to deploy. These systems have been used in both Ukraine and Syria: with the “little green men” in
Crimea, and with the Russian airborne and Spetsnaz troops in Syria.
Russian EW System Capabilities and Characteristics
The 1L245 is a system that is used to jam and defeat airborne
and JSTARS radar systems. This system is usually used/employed
with initial entry forces to provide cover for follow-on troops.
The 1L245 is generally deployed on airfields or at established
military outposts. The 1L245 has been used in Crimea, usually
deployed on former Ukrainian bases now occupied by the
Russians. This system can also jam ground combat systems, but
its use in areas such as Donbass in eastern Ukraine is unknown
at this time. In Syria, the Russians have used this system mainly
on air bases to counter US and NATO airborne radar systems to
allow the Russians some air superiority as they support Assad
Regime forces.
The EA jammer Infauna is a BMD-mounted jamming system that is fielded to EW battalions in airborne forces of the
Russian army. As part of the airborne forces, this system will be used to accompany initial entry troops and assist with
securing key terrain to enable follow-on forces—motorized, mechanized, and armor—to deploy into combat areas.
This tactic was used in the seizure of Crimea by the little green men of
the Russian army. The Infauna is capable of protecting combat vehicles
and troops against radio controlled mines and explosives, including
improvised explosive devices. The Infauna also features soft-kill
aerosol interference against high-precision weapons with laser and
video-management systems. As these forces secured key lines of
communication, government facilities, military installations, and key
infrastructure, the Infauna was critical to disrupting Ukrainian military
and civilian communications, effectively paralyzing Ukrainian
command and control systems.
Figure 1: Russian airborne EA radar jammer
1L245
Figure 2: Russian airborne EA jammer
Infauna

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In Syria, the Infauna has accompanied Russian “advisors” on missions throughout the country. Although the extent of the
effectiveness of this system is unknown, one can assume that it is being used in the same manner as it was in Crimea. The
units that took on the Syria mission are the same ones that deployed to Crimea, and it is highly probable that the Russians
took their experiences from that mission and adjusted and updated their techniques in Syria.
The LEER-2 mobile technical control, electronic emulation, and electronic
countermeasures system is designed for developing radio emitters, jamming, and
suppressing radioelectronic means, including cellular phone systems. This system
is used with the same units previously discussed. Due to its ability to jam and
suppress cellular systems, this system provides the Russians a means to disrupt
civilian cell systems that are the de facto back-up communications network for
military and government communications systems.
The LEER is an asset that the Russians are most likely using in Ukraine and Syria.
Reports of civilian, military, and cellular communication networks being jammed
have been numerous. The advantage of the LEER system is that it is able to take
down and disrupt networks of nation-states and autonomous insurgent groups.
This gives the Russians flexibility to tailor an EW campaign for each conflict and
mission.
System Proliferation
These three systems are primarily in the Russian inventory for now. It is not
inconceivable that they will either provide systems and technical support
(advisors) to allies or sell them these systems in the future. Belarus, Syria, and
Kazakhstan are three possible destinations for Russian assistance and training.
Training Implications
The Russians have been building up and developing their EW capabilities for the past 10–15 years to make up for their
shortcomings in conventional equipment and personnel. As part of the concept of hybrid war or asymmetric warfare, the
Russians view EW as an invaluable asset. The ability of a handful of systems to degrade an enemy’s communication
systems is more efficient and cost-effective until the Russians can close the conventional arms gap. For now the Russians
are using Ukraine and Syria as a training ground for systems and personnel.
The US Army can use the Russian EW effort in its training as well. Units can train with degraded communications to develop
sound countermeasures and workarounds. The need to be able to perform in the analog world should be emphasized, as
digital and computer networks may not always be available. The Russians are well aware that the modern battlefield is a
networked, computerized, and satellite-centric environment. They will continue to develop and refine their EW
capabilities and tactics as they continue to do more with less in their military operations. A more detailed description of
these systems can be found in Volume I of the 2015 Worldwide Equipment Guide on the Army Training Network.
References
Buckhout, Laurie Moe. “Modern Russian Electronic Warfare.” SITREP. April 2016.
Chivers, C.J. and David M. Herszelhorn. “In Crimea, Russia Showcases a Rebooted Army.” New York Times. 2 April 2014.
Kislyakov, Andrei. “Russian Military Makes Strides In Electronic Warfare.” Russia Beyond The Headlines. 20 December 2013.
O’Gorman, Rod. “Russia’s Electronic Warfare Concept in Ukraine.” Open Briefing. 7 July 2015.
Patterson, Caitlin. “Russia’s Surging Electronic Warfare Capabilities.” The Diplomat. 19 April 2016.
Perry, Bret. “How NATO Can Disrupt Russia’s New Way of War.” Defense One. 23 March 2016.
Russian Defense Policy Blog. “How Good Is Russian Electronic Warfare?” 27 October 2015.
Stupples, David. “How Syria Is Becoming a test Zone for Electronic Warfare.” CNN. 9 October 2015.
Note
1 Link not accessible from a US government computer.
Figure 3: Russia mobile EW
system LEER-21

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