Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011


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Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011

  1. 1. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security DevelopmentsInvolving the People’s Republic of China 2011 Office of the Secretary of Defense Preparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately $73,212 in Fiscal Years 2010-2011. Generated on 2011 May06 RefID: 1-4AE81FF
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  3. 3. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011 A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000Section 1246, “Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People‟sRepublic of China,” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Public Law111-84, which amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section1202, Public Law 106-65, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in bothclassified and unclassified form, on military and security developments involving the People‟sRepublic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development of the People‟s Liberation Army and the tenets and probabledevelopment of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizationsand operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. The report shallalso address United States-China engagement and cooperation on security matters during theperiod covered by the report, including through United States-China military-to-militarycontacts, and the United States strategy for such engagement and cooperation in the future.”
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  5. 5. EXECUTIVE SUMMARYChina’s rise as a major international actor is likely to stand out as a defining feature of thestrategic landscape of the early 21st century. Sustained economic development has raised thestandard of living for China’s citizens and elevated China’s international profile. Thisdevelopment, coupled with an expanding science and technology base, has also facilitated acomprehensive and ongoing military modernization program. The United States welcomes astrong, prosperous, and successful China that reinforces international rules and norms andenhances security and peace both regionally and globally.China is steadily assuming new roles and responsibilities in the international community. In2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao articulated new guidance for the People’s Liberation Army(PLA), including missions extending beyond China’s immediate territorial interests. Thiscatalyzed China’s growing involvement in international peacekeeping efforts, counter-piracyoperations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and the evacuation of Chinese citizensfrom overseas trouble spots. China’s 2010 Defense White Paper asserts that China’s ―future anddestiny have never been more closely connected with those of the international community.‖Nonetheless, China’s modernized military could be put to use in ways that increase China’sability to gain diplomatic advantage or resolve disputes in its favor.Although the PLA is contending with a growing array of missions, Taiwan remains its ―mainstrategic direction.‖ China continued modernizing its military in 2010, with a focus on Taiwancontingencies, even as cross-Strait relations improved. The PLA seeks the capability to deterTaiwan independence and influence Taiwan to settle the dispute on Beijing’s terms. In pursuit ofthis objective, Beijing is developing capabilities intended to deter, delay, or deny possible for the island in the event of conflict. The balance of cross-Strait military forces andcapabilities continues to shift in the mainland’s favor.Over the past decade, China’s military has benefitted from robust investment in modernhardware and technology. Many modern systems have reached maturity and others will becomeoperational in the next few years. Following this period of ambitious acquisition, the decadefrom 2011 through 2020 will prove critical to the PLA as it attempts to integrate many new andcomplex platforms, and to adopt modern operational concepts, including joint operations andnetwork-centric warfare.China has made modest, but incremental, improvements in the transparency of its military andsecurity affairs. However, there remains uncertainty about how China will use its growingcapabilities.The United States recognizes and welcomes PRC contributions that support a safe and secureglobal environment. China’s steady integration into the global economy creates new incentivesfor partnership and cooperation, particularly in the maritime domain. Although China’sexpanding military capabilities can facilitate cooperation in pursuit of shared objectives, they canalso increase the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation. Strengthening our military-to-military relationship is a critical part of our strategy to shape China’s choices as we seek tocapitalize on opportunities for cooperation while mitigating risks. To support this strategy, theUnited States must continue monitoring PRC force development and strategy. In concert withour friends and Allies, the United States will also continue adapting our forces, posture, andoperational concepts to maintain a stable and secure East Asian environment. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China I
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  7. 7. Table of ContentsExecutive Summary IChapter One: Annual Update 1 China’s Challenges and Opportunities in 2010 1 Developments in China’s National Security Leadership 1 Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait 2 Developments in the Size, Location, and Capabilities of PRC Military Forces 2 Developments in China’s Space and Cyber Capabilities 5 Developments in China’s Defense Technology Acquisition 6 Challenges to Taiwan’s Deterrent Forces 7 China’s Foreign Military Engagement 7Chapter Two: Understanding China’s Strategy 9 Overview 9 Understanding Chinese Strategy 9 China’s Strategic Priorities 13 The New Historic Missions 16 Debates on Future Strategy 17 China’s Military Strategy 22 Secrecy and Deception 25Chapter Three: Force Modernization Goals and Trends 27 Overview 27 Anti-Access/Area Denial Capability Developments 28 Ballistic Missile Defense 32 Extended Operational Reach 32 Strategic Capabilities 33 Power Projection Beyond Taiwan 37Chapter Four: Resources for Force Modernization 41 Overview 41 Military Expenditure Trends 41 China’s Advancing Defense Industries 41 Trends and Projections 45 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China III
  8. 8. Chapter Five: Force Modernization and Security in the Taiwan Strait 47 Overview 47 Beijing’s Taiwan Strategy 48 Beijing’s Courses of Action Against Taiwan 49Chapter Six: U.S.-China Military-To-Military Contacts 53 Overview 53 Military Relations in 2010 53 U.S. Strategy for Military Engagement 54 Opportunities and Challenges in U.S.-China Military-To-Military Relations 55Special Topic: China’s Evolving Maritime Strategy 57 The Rise of China’s Maritime Security Interests 57 The Evolution in “Maritime Consciousness” 57 Evolving Naval Strategy 57 New Security Interests Driving Requirements 58 New “Firsts” for the PLA Navy 59 China’s Maritime Interests 59 Sea Lane Protection 61 Great Power Status 61 Sea-Based Nuclear Forces 62 Overcoming Key Challenges 62 Assessing the Future 62Special Topic: China’s Military Engagement 65 Traditional Military Diplomacy 65 Combined Exercises 65 Peacekeeping Operations 66 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 67 Arms Sales 67 Conclusion 69Appendix I: 71China and Taiwan Forces Data 71Appendix II: 79Military-To-Military Exchanges 79 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China IV
  9. 9. Glossary of AcronymsAAV: Amphibious Assault Vehicle MIRV: Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry VehiclesAEW&C: Airborne Early Warning and Control MMCA: Military Maritime Consultative AgreementAPCSS: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies MND: Ministry of National DefenseASAT: Anti-Satellite MR: Military RegionASBM: Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile MRBM: Medium-Range Ballistic MissileASCM: Anti-Ship Cruise Missile MRL: Multiple Rocket Launcherbcm: billion cubic meters NCO: Non-Commissioned Officerb/d: barrels per day NDU: National Defense UniversityC4ISR: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, NFU: No First Use and Reconnaissance OMTE: Outline of Military Training and EvaluationCCP: Chinese Communist Party OTH: Over-the-HorizonCMC: Central Military Commission PLA: People’s Liberation ArmyCNO: Computer Network Operations PLAAF: People’s Liberation Army Air ForceCOMSAT: Communications Satellite PRC: People’s Republic of ChinaCONUS: Continental United States R&D: Research and DevelopmentDCT: Defense Consultative Talks S&ED: Strategic and Economic DialogueDDG: Guided-Missile Destroyer SAM: Surface-to-Air MissileDPCT: Defense Policy Coordination Talks SCO: Shanghai Cooperation OrganizationDSS: Defense Security Service SLBM: Submarine-Launched Ballistic MissileDSTL: Developing Sciences and SLOC: Sea Lines of Communication Technologies List SRBM: Short-Range Ballistic MissileEEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone SS: Diesel-Electric Attack SubmarineEU: European Union SSBN: Nuclear-Powered Ballistic MissileFAO: Foreign Affairs Office SubmarineFFG: Guided-Missile Frigate SSN: Nuclear-Powered Attack SubmarineGDP: Gross Domestic Product UAV: Unmanned Aerial VehicleGPS: Global Positioning System UCAV: Unmanned Combat Aerial VehicleHA/DR: Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief UN: United NationsICBM: Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missile UNCLOS: UN Convention on the Law of the SeaIJO: Integrated Joint Operations USCG: United States Coast GuardLACM: Land Attack Cruise Missile USMC: United States Marine Corps Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China V
  10. 10. (This page left intentionally blank)Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China VI
  11. 11. CHAPTER ONE: ANNUAL UPDATE“In the next five years, our economy and society will develop faster, boosting comprehensivenational power. The developments will provide an even more stable material base to ourdefense and military buildup.” – PRC Defense Minster Liang GuanglieSeveral significant developments in China over the past year relate to the questions Congressposed in Section 1246 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (PublicLaw 111-84).CHINA’S CHALLENGES ANDOPPORTUNITIES IN 2010The government of China remained focused Much of the PLA’s success over the nexton maintaining economic development and decade will be determined by how effectivelyenhancing China’s security interests in 2010. it integrates emerging capabilities andThe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has platforms into the force. By most accounts,built its legitimacy on the promise of the PLA is on track to achieve its goal ofeconomic growth, stability, and national building a modern, regionally-focusedunity. To ensure its position, the CCP closely military by 2020.monitors potential sources of domestic unrest, In tandem with the PLA’s improvedfrom unemployment and rising income capacities for regional military operations,disparities to pro-democracy movements and PRC officials in recent years haveethnic tensions. Additionally, Beijing is emphasized China’s sovereignty andseeking to balance a more confident assertion territorial interests with greater frequency.of its growing interests in the international Citing a violation of these ―core interests,‖ thecommunity with a desire to avoid generating PLA suspended military-to-military relationsopposition and countervailing responses from with the United States in January 2010,regional and major powers. An example of following U.S. approval of arms sales tothis could be seen in Beijing’s recalibrated Taiwan.rhetorical approach to regional territorialdisputes such as the South China Sea DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’Sfollowing the June 2010 Association of NATIONAL SECURITY LEADERSHIPSoutheast Asian Nations Regional Forum(ARF). Vice President Xi Jinping became a viceThe 11th Five Year Plan concluded in 2010 chairman of the CCP Central Militaryand was marked by new milestones in PLA Commission (CMC) at the 5th Plenum of theforce development and technology 17th Central Committee in October 2010.acquisition. Motivated by expanding Based on historical precedent, this moveeconomic and security interests, the PLA is could be the penultimate step to Xi becomingnow venturing into the global maritime the General Secretary of the CCP anddomain, a sphere long dominated by the U.S. Chairman of the Central Military CommissionNavy. Relations with Taiwan have continued (CMC). During the leadership transitionto improve, but the PLA shows no sign of process that is expected to unfold around theslowing its efforts to develop plans and 18th Party Congress in the fall of 2012, it iscapabilities for a cross-Strait contingency. not clear if President Hu Jintao will relinquish Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 1
  12. 12. the Party General Secretary and CMC Consistent with a near-term focus onChairman positions, or if he will follow the preparing for Taiwan Strait contingencies,precedent set by Jiang Zemin in 2002 and China continues to base many of its mostretain the CMC Chairmanship for a number advanced systems in the military regionsof months, or even years, to facilitate the (MRs) opposite Taiwan. Although thesepower transition. capabilities could be employed for a variety of regional crisis or conflict scenarios, ChinaDEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY has made less progress on capabilities thatSITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT extend global reach or power projection. Outside of peacetime counter-piracySince the election in Taiwan of President Ma missions, for example, China’s Navy has littleYing-jeou in March 2008, Beijing and Taipei operational experience beyond regionalhave made significant progress in improving waters. Although the PLA’s new roles andcross-Strait relations. Both Beijing and missions in the international domain reflectTaipei have emphasized expanding economic China’s expanding set of interests, regionaland cultural ties as a means of reducing contingencies continue to dominate resourcestension and sustaining the current positive and planning.cross-Strait atmosphere. Ballistic and Cruise Missiles. China hasBeijing and Taipei signed the Economic prioritized land-based ballistic and cruiseCooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) missile programs. It is developing and testingin 2010. Beijing has at times demonstrated several new classes and variants of offensiveflexibility on the issue of Taiwan’s missiles, forming additional missile units,participation in international forums, but has upgrading older missile systems, andalso continued to pressure players in the developing methods to counter ballisticinternational community to restrict this missile defenses.participation. The PLA is acquiring large numbers ofDespite the warming of cross-Strait ties, highly accurate cruise missiles, many ofChina continued its military modernization in which have ranges in excess of 185 km.2010, including specific efforts to provide a This includes the domestically-produced,credible range of military options in ground-launched DH-10 land-attacka Taiwan contingency. In the current decade cruise missile (LACM); the domesticallyto 2020, the PLA is likely to steadily expand produced ground- and ship-launched YJ-its military options for Taiwan, including 62 anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM); thethose to deter, delay, or deny third party Russian SS-N-22/SUNBURN supersonicintervention. ASCM, which is fitted on China’s SOVREMENNY-class DDGs acquiredDEVELOPMENTS IN THE SIZE, from Russia; and, the Russian SS-N-LOCATION, AND CAPABILITIES OF 27B/SIZZLER supersonic ASCM onPRC MILITARY FORCES China’s Russian-built, KILO-class diesel-China’s long-term, comprehensive military electric attack submarines.modernization is improving the PLA’s By December 2010, the PLA hadcapacity to conduct high-intensity, regional deployed between 1,000 and 1,200 short-military operations, including ―anti-access range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to unitsand area denial‖ (A2AD) operations. The opposite Taiwan. To improve theterms ―anti-access and area denial‖ refer to lethality of this force, the PLA iscapabilities that could be employed to deter or introducing variants of missiles withcounter adversary forces from deploying to, improved ranges, accuracies, andor operating within, a defined space. payloads. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2
  13. 13. China is developing an anti-ship ballistic and advanced surface combatants, including missile (ASBM) based on a variant of the aircraft carriers. Submarine tunnel facilities CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile at the base could also enable deployments (MRBM). Known as the DF-21D, this from this facility with reduced risk of missile is intended to provide the PLA the detection. capability to attack large ships, including China’s aircraft carrier research and aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific development program includes renovation Ocean. The DF-21D has a range of the ex-VARYAG, which could begin exceeding 1,500 km and is armed with a sea trials in 2011, although without maneuverable warhead. aircraft. It will likely serve initially as a China is modernizing its nuclear forces by training and evaluation platform, and adding more survivable delivery systems. eventually offer a limited operational In recent years, the road mobile, solid capability. China could begin propellant CSS-10 Mod 1 and CSS-10 construction of a fully indigenous carrier Mod 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A) in 2011, which could achieve operational intercontinental-range ballistic missiles capability after 2015. China likely will (ICBMs) have entered service. The CSS- build multiple aircraft carriers with 10 Mod 2, with a range in excess of support ships over the next decade. 11,200 km, can reach most locations China currently has a land-based training within the continental United States. program for carrier pilots; however, it will China may also be developing a new still take several additional years for road-mobile ICBM, possibly capable of China to achieve a minimal level of carrying a multiple independently combat capability on an aircraft carrier. targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV). The PLA Navy is improving its over-the-Naval Forces. Since the 1990s, the PLA horizon (OTH) targeting capability withNavy has rapidly transformed from a large sky wave and surface wave OTH radars.fleet of low-capability, single-mission In combination with early-warningplatforms, to a leaner force equipped with aircraft, unmanned aerial vehiclesmore modern, multi-mission platforms. In (UAVs), and other surveillance andcontrast to the fleet just a decade ago, many reconnaissance equipment, the sky wavePLA Navy combatants are equipped with OTH radar allows the PRC to carry outadvanced air-defense systems and modern surveillance and reconnaissance over theASCMs, with ranges in excess of 185 km. western Pacific. The OTH radars can beThese capabilities not only increase the used in conjunction with reconnaissancelethality of PLA Navy platforms, particularly satellites to locate targets at greatin the area of anti-surface warfare (ASuW), distances from the PRC, therebybut also enable them to operate beyond the supporting long-range precision strikes,range of land-based air defenses. including employment of ASBMs.The PLA Navy possesses some 75 principal China continues to produce a new class ofsurface combatants, more than 60 submarines, nuclear-powered ballistic missile55 medium and large amphibious ships, and submarine (SSBN). JIN-class (Type 094)roughly 85 missile-equipped small SSBNs will eventually carry the JL-2combatants. The PLA has now completed submarine-launched ballistic missile withconstruction of a major naval base at Yulin, an estimated range of some 7,400 km.on the southernmost tip of Hainan Island. The JIN and the JL-2 will give the PLAThe base is large enough to accommodate a Navy its first credible sea-based nuclearmix of attack and ballistic missile submarines capability. Although DoD initially Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 3
  14. 14. forecast the JL-2 would reach IOC by medium-range HHQ-16 vertically2010, the program has faced repeated launched naval SAM. These shipsdelays. significantly improve the PLA Navy’s area air defense capability, which will beChina has expanded its force of nuclear- critical as the PLA Navy expands itspowered attack submarines (SSN). Two operations into ―distant seas,‖ beyond thesecond-generation SHANG-class (Type range of shore-based air defense.093) SSNs are already in service and asmany as five third-generation Type 095 Air and Air Defense Forces. China basesSSNs will be added in the coming years. 490 combat aircraft within unrefueledWhen complete, the Type 095 will operational range of Taiwan and has theincorporate better quieting technology, airfield capacity to expand that number byimproving its capability to conduct a hundreds. Newer and more advanced aircraftrange of missions from surveillance to the make up a growing percentage of theinterdiction of surface vessels with inventory.torpedoes and ASCMs. The January 2011 flight test of China’sThe current mainstay modern diesel next generation fighter prototype, the J-powered attack submarines (SS) in the 20, highlights China’s ambition toPLA Navy’s submarine force are the 13 produce a fighter aircraft that incorporatesSONG-class (Type 039) units. Each can stealth attributes, advanced avionics, andcarry the YJ-82 ASCM. The follow-on to super-cruise capable engines over the nextthe SONG is the YUAN-class SS; as several years.many as four of which are already in China is upgrading its B-6 bomber fleetservice. The YUAN-class SS might also (originally adapted from the Soviet Tu-include an air-independent power system. 16) with a new, longer-range variant thatThe SONG, YUAN, SHANG and the will be armed with a new long-rangestill-to-be-deployed Type 095 all will be cruise missile.capable of launching the long-range CH-SS-NX-13 ASCM, once the missile The PLA Air Force has continuedcompletes development and testing. expanding its inventory of long-range, advanced SAM systems and nowChina has deployed some 60 of its new possesses one of the largest such forces inHOUBEI-class (Type 022) wave-piercing the world. Over the past five years, Chinacatamaran hull missile patrol boats. Each has acquired multiple SA-20 PMU2boat can carry up to eight YJ-83 ASCMs. battalions, the most advanced SAMThese ships have increased the PLA system Russia exports. It has alsoNavy’s littoral warfare capabilities. introduced the indigenously designedThe PLA Navy has acquired a new HQ-9.generation of domestically produced China’s aviation industry is developingsurface combatants. These include at several types of airborne early warningleast two LUYANG II-class (Type 052C) and control system (AWACS) aircraft.DDGs fitted with the indigenous HHQ-9 These include the KJ-200, based on the Y-long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) 8 airframe, for AWACS as well aswith additional hulls under construction; intelligence collection and maritimetwo LUZHOU-class (Type 051C) DDGs surveillance, and the KJ-2000, based on aequipped with the Russian SA-N-20 long- modified Russian IL-76 airframe.range SAM; and as many as eightJIANGKAI II-class (Type 054A) guided- Ground Forces. The PLA has about 1.25missile frigates (FFG) fitted with the million ground force personnel, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 4
  15. 15. approximately 400,000 of whom are based in to complete a regional network by 2012the three military regions (MRs) opposite and a global network by 2020.Taiwan. China continues to gradually China launched nine new remote sensingmodernize its large ground force. Much of satellites in 2010, which can perform boththe observed upgrade activity has occurred in civil and military applications.units with the potential to be involved in aTaiwan contingency. Examples of ground In 2010, Beijing also launched twounit modernization include the Type 99 third- communications satellites (one militarygeneration main battle tank, a new-generation and one civil), a meteorological satellite,amphibious assault vehicle, and a series of two experimental small satellites, and itsmultiple rocket launch systems. second lunar mission during the year.In October 2010, the PLA conducted its first China continues to develop the LongGroup Army-level exercise, which it called March V (LM-V) rocket, which is―MISSION ACTION (SHIMING intended to lift heavy payloads into space.XINGDONG).‖ The primary participants LM-V will more than double the size offrom the Beijing, Lanzhou, and Chengdu the Low Earth Orbit and GeosynchronousMilitary Regions practiced maneuver, Orbit payloads China is capable of placingground-air coordination, and long-distance into orbit. To support these rockets,mobilization via military and commercial China began constructing the Wenchangassets as they transited between MRs. Given Satellite Launch Center in 2008. Locatedthat these MRs are located along China’s land on Hainan Island, this launch facility isborders, the exercise scenario was likely expected to be complete by 2012, with thebased on border conflict scenarios. In initial LM-V launch scheduled for 2014.addition to providing large-scale mobility and Cyberwarfare Capabilities. In 2010,joint experience, the exercise allowed PLA numerous computer systems around thecommand staff to test their ability to plan and world, including those owned by the U.S.execute a large joint campaign while Government, were the target of intrusions,practicing communication between command some of which appear to have originatedelements across dispersed forces. This skill is within the PRC. These intrusions werecritical to responding to crises along China’s focused on exfiltrating information. Althoughperiphery. this alone is a serious concern, the accesses and skills required for these intrusions areDEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’S SPACE similar to those necessary to conductAND CYBER CAPABILITIES computer network attacks. China’s 2010Space and Counterspace Capabilities. In Defense White Paper notes China’s own2010, China conducted a national record 15 concern over foreign cyberwarfare efforts andspace launches. It also expanded its space- highlighted the importance of cyber-securitybased intelligence, surveillance, in China’s national defense.reconnaissance, navigation, meteorological, Cyberwarfare capabilities could serve PRCand communications satellite constellations. military operations in three key areas. FirstIn parallel, China is developing a multi- and foremost, they allow data collectiondimensional program to improve its through exfiltration. Second, they can becapabilities to limit or prevent the use of employed to constrain an adversary’s actionsspace-based assets by adversaries during or slow response time by targeting network-times of crisis or conflict. based logistics, communications, and During 2010, Beijing launched five commercial activities. Third, they can serve BeiDou navigation satellites. China plans as a force multiplier when coupled with Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 5
  16. 16. kinetic attacks during times of crisis or The PRC also utilizes a large, well-organizedconflict. network of enterprises, defense factories, affiliated research institutes, and computerDeveloping capabilities for cyberwarfare is network operations to facilitate the collectionconsistent with authoritative PLA military of sensitive information and export-controlledwritings. Two military doctrinal writings, technology, as well as basic research andScience of Strategy, and Science of science that supports U.S. defense systemCampaigns identify information warfare (IW) integral to achieving informationsuperiority and an effective means for Many of the organizations comprisingcountering a stronger foe. Although neither China’s military-industrial complex have bothdocument identifies the specific criteria for military and civilian research andemploying computer network attack against development functions. This network ofan adversary, both advocate developing government-affiliated companies and researchcapabilities to compete in this medium. institutes often enables the PLA to access sensitive and dual-use technologies orThe Science of Strategy and Science of knowledgeable experts under the guise ofCampaigns detail the effectiveness of IW and civilian research and development. Thecomputer network operations in conflicts and enterprises and institutes accomplish thisadvocate targeting adversary command and through technology conferences andcontrol and logistics networks to impact their symposia; legitimate contracts and jointability to operate during the early stages of commercial ventures; partnerships withconflict. As the Science of Strategy explains, foreign firms; and joint development of―In the information war, the command and specific technologies.control system is the heart of informationcollection, control, and application on the In the case of key national securitybattlefield. It is also the nerve center of the technologies, controlled equipment, and otherentire battlefield.‖ materials not readily obtainable through commercial means or academia, the PRC hasIn parallel with its military preparations, utilized its intelligence services and employedChina has increased diplomatic engagement other illicit approaches that violate U.S. lawsand advocacy in multilateral and international and export controls.forums where cyber issues are discussed anddebated. Beijing’s agenda is frequently in In August 2010, Noshir Gowadia wasline with the Russian Federation’s efforts to convicted of providing the PRC withpromote more international control over cyber classified U.S. defense technology.activities. China has not yet agreed with the Gowadia assisted the PRC in developing aU.S. position that existing mechanisms, such low-signature cruise missile exhaustas International Humanitarian Law and the system capable of rendering a cruiseLaw of Armed Conflict, apply in cyberspace. missile resistant to detection by infraredChina’s thinking in this area is evolving as it missiles.becomes more engaged. In September 2010, Chi Tong Kuok was convicted for conspiracy to illegallyDEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’S export U.S. military encryptionDEFENSE TECHNOLOGY technology and smuggle it to Macau andACQUISITION Hong Kong. The relevant technology included encryption, communicationsChina relies on foreign technology, equipment, and Global Positioningacquisition of key dual-use components, and System (GPS) equipment used by U.S.focused indigenous research and development and NATO forces.(R&D) to advance military modernization. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 6
  17. 17. CHALLENGES TO TAIWAN’S CHINA’S FOREIGN MILITARYDETERRENT FORCES ENGAGEMENTThere were no armed incidents in the vicinity China’s military engages with foreignof the Taiwan Strait in 2010 and the overall militaries to build relationships, improvesituation remained stable. However, the functional capabilities, and shape foreignPRC’s military modernization and the perceptions of China. PLA engagementdeployment of advanced capabilities opposite activities support China’s militarythe island have not eased, and the balance of modernization goals through acquisition ofmilitary force continues to shift in Beijing’s advanced weapons systems; increasedfavor. operational experience both within and beyond Asia; and access to foreign militaryTaiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s defense practices, operational doctrine, and trainingreforms designed to streamline and methods.professionalize the military continue, butbudget shortfalls and escalating costs will China continues to conduct counter-piracylengthen the time necessary for operations in the Gulf of Aden. PLAimplementation. Navy ships have remained in the Gulf ofTaiwan plans to cut its military force to Aden since January 2009. In July 2011215,000 troops and transition to an all- the PLA Navy deployed its ninth escortvolunteer military by 2015, but recruitment formation. Outside of foreign ―goodwilland cost challenges may require a cruises,‖ this represents the PLA Navy’sreevaluation of the scope or implementation only series of operational deploymentsschedule. It will also reorganize several beyond the immediate western Pacificsupport commands and looks to civilianize its region.key defense research and development China’s Ministry of National Defensefacilities to improve efficiency and (MND) announced that by Decemberproductivity. 2010, it had comprehensively expandedConsistent with the provisions of the Taiwan foreign military relations throughRelations Act, Public Law 96-8 (1979), the establishment of military relations withUnited States continues to make available over 150 countries, including attachédefense articles and defense services to enable offices in 112 countries. 102 countriesTaiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense have military attaché offices in China.capability. Toward this end, in January 2010, The PLA continues sending over 170the Obama Administration announced its military delegations overseas every yearintent to sell to Taiwan $6.4 billion in and receiving over 200 foreign militarydefensive arms and equipment, including UH- delegations as part of high-level strategic60 utility helicopters; PATRIOT PAC-3 air consultations and professional andand missile defense systems; HARPOON technical missiles; Multifunctional Information In April 2010, China introduced itsDistribution Systems technical support for ―August First‖ aerial demonstration teamTaiwan’s Syun An command, control, to the international media and discussedcommunications, computers, intelligence, the PLA Air Force’s intention for thesurveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) team to perform in foreign countries.system; and OSPREY-class minehunting Combined Exercises. PLA participation inships. bilateral and multilateral exercises is increasing. The PLA derives political benefit through increased influence and enhanced ties Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 7
  18. 18. with partner states and organizations. Such of the UN Security Council. China’sexercises provide the PLA opportunities to contributions have included engineering,improve capabilities and gain operational logistics, medical troops, civilian police, andinsights by observing tactics, command observers. In January 2004, China had 359decision-making, and equipment used by peacekeepers deployed to eight UNmore advanced militaries. peacekeeping missions, with no single contingent larger than 70 troops. As of During the recently completed 11th Five- January 2010, China had 2,131 peacekeepers Year Plan, the PLA held 32 joint exercise supporting 10 UN missions, with five and training events with foreign militaries. separate contingents larger than 200 troops. These activities covered issues such as counter-terrorism, maritime drills, ground In September 2010, China co-hosted its forces training, peacekeeping, and search first UN peacekeeping senior commanders and rescue. training course at the PRC MND Peacekeeping Center. In July, PLA and Brazilian special operations forces conducted China has maintained a force of 125 riot FRIENDSHIP-2010, a joint counter- police in Haiti, in support of the UN terrorism exercise, which included live stabilization force. After Haiti suffered a fire exercises supported by devastating earthquake in January 2010, fighter/bombers, transport aircraft, and these riot police provided escorts to the attack and transport helicopters. PRC medical team Beijing dispatched to the country for humanitarian support. China and Peru conducted ―PEACE ANGEL 2010,‖ a humanitarian medical China’s civilian and military leaders have rescue exercise in November. identified humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as an area for China to In early November, the PLA conducted cooperate with foreign partners and advance FRIENDSHIP ACTION-2010 with PRC interests. Albanian forces. This marked the PLA’s third exercise with foreign troops within As of early 2011, China had pledged 250 China and the first with a European million U.S. dollars to Pakistan for flood military. relief. This pledge of aid, which came after international criticism of China’s The PLA Air Force participated in two initial response, constituted China’s major international events in 2010; a largest-ever humanitarian aid package to a bilateral air exercise with Turkey and foreign nation. Beijing dispatched two of subsequently, PEACE MISSION 2010, its international search-and-rescue teams which was conducted under the auspices to aid Pakistan, and the PLA sent a of the Shanghai Cooperation medical team. In another first for China, Organization. This latter exercise the PLA deployed four military involved launching air operations from helicopters out of China to support the PRC bases to fly missions over relief effort. Kazakhstan. In July 2010, China’s Ministry ofPeacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance/ National Defense announced that the PLADisaster Relief Operations. China’s had participated in at least 20 internationalparticipation in UN peacekeeping operations humanitarian rescue missions since 2002,increased six-fold during the six-year period and that its international rescue team hadfrom January 2004 to January 2010. China is joined six international rescue missionsnow the leading contributor of peacekeeping since its creation in 2001.personnel among the five permanent members Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 8
  19. 19. CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGYOVERVIEWChina’s leaders characterize the initial two capabilities has increased concerns in thedecades of the 21st century as a ―strategic region about China’s intentions.window of opportunity.‖ They assess thatduring this period, both domestic and UNDERSTANDING CHINESEinternational conditions will be conducive to STRATEGYexpanding China’s ―comprehensive nationalpower‖ (zonghe guoli—综合国力), a term that China uses white papers, speeches, and articles as the principal mechanisms toencapsulates all elements of state power publicly communicate policy and strategy.including economic capacity, military might, Published on March 31, 2011, China’sand diplomacy. Speaking in December 2010, Defense White Paper for 2010 summarizesPRC Defense Minister Liang Guanglie four national defense ―goals‖ as:asserted that ―making the country prosperousand making the armed forces strong are two safeguarding national sovereignty,major cornerstones for realizing the great security and interests of nationalrejuvenation of the Chinese nation.‖ China’s development;leaders anticipate that a successful expansionof comprehensive national power will serve maintaining social harmony and stability;China’s overriding strategic objectives, which accelerating the modernization of nationalinclude perpetuating CCP rule; sustaining defense and the armed forces; and,economic growth and development;maintaining domestic political stability; maintaining world peace and stability.defending national sovereignty and territorial The Defense White Paper for 2010 notes thatintegrity; and securing China’s status as a China continues to implement the militarygreat power. strategy of ―Active Defense‖ and is enhancingIn the near term, the PRC regards stable ―national strategic capabilities‖ whilerelations with the U.S. and China’s neighbors maintaining China’s ―no first use‖ policy onas essential to stability and critical to nuclear weapons. China’s stated defensemaximizing this window of opportunity. At strategy is focused on fostering a securitythe same time, China’s growing economic and environment conducive to China’smilitary confidence and capabilities comprehensive development.occasionally manifest in more assertive While addressing many of the themesrhetoric and behavior when Beijing perceives presented in previous PRC Defense Whitethreats to its national interests or feels Papers, the latest version conveys somecompelled to respond to public expectations. important differences. The new documentThe PRC is particularly concerned that expresses confidence that the China’s positionregional actors might counterbalance China’s relative to other major powers has improvedrise through military development and substantially. Relations with the Unitedcoalitions. China publicly states that its rise is States are portrayed with a degree of concern,―peaceful‖ and that it harbors no ―hegemonic‖ while the current state of cross-Strait relationsdesigns or aspirations for territorial is presented in a favorable light. The latestexpansion. However, China’s lack of version highlights the PLA’s growing focustransparency surrounding these growing on military operations other than war, but Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 9
  20. 20. overall, the document presents only Defense White Papers, establishment of aincremental new insights into the PLA’s MND spokesperson, the launch of an officialstructure, doctrine and capabilities. Overall, MND website, wider media coverage ofthe transparency of China’s military and military issues, and growing availability ofsecurity affairs has improved gradually in books and professional journals on militaryrecent years, highlighted by its publication of and security topics. Military Decision Making Structures and Processes in China The PLA is the armed instrument of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and organizationally, is subordinate to the Party apparatus. Career military officers are CCP members, and units at the company level and above have political officers responsible for personnel decisions, propaganda, and counterintelligence. Major decisions at all levels are made by CCP committees, also led by the political officers and commanders. The PLA’s highest decision-making body, the Central Military Commission (CMC), is technically a department of the CCP Central Committee, but is staffed primarily by military officers. The Chairman is a civilian, usually the General Secretary of the CCP and the President. Other members include the commanders of the service arms and the four general headquarters departments, and a number of Vice Chairmen. Vice President Xi Jinping, the anticipated successor to PRC President Hu Jintao, is one of three Vice Chairmen and the only other civilian on the CMC. China’s Ministry of National Defense is a relatively small office specializing in military-related tasks that are the responsibility of the civilian government rather than the armed forces, including foreign military relations, mobilization, recruitment, and civil support to military operations. The Minister of Defense is a uniformed military officer and CMC member. The PLA currently has less representation in key party decision-making bodies than in the mid-1990s or even the mid-2000s. With the passing of China’s revolutionary generation, fewer national leaders hail from a military background. However, PLA leaders are increasingly inclined to voice their thoughts and opinions on international affairs in the public domain. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 10
  21. 21. The Chinese High CommandThe PRC Military Structure Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 11
  22. 22. China’s Upcoming Military Leadership TransitionChina’s civilian and military leadership are expected to undergo extensive changes during the18th Party Congress, likely to be held in the fall of 2012. Vice President Xi Jinping wasappointed Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in October 2010. It isunclear whether Hu will follow in the footsteps of his predecessor Jiang Zemin and remainCMC chairman for some period of time after relinquishing his other leadership roles.The uniformed CMC membership is also expected to experience a major transition during the18th Party Congress. Seven of the ten uniformed CMC members will almost certainly retirebased on age limits. In December 2010, Defense Minister Liang highlighted the PLA’s shifttowards a ―more rational‖ force structure as the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Corpstake on a larger and more prominent place in the PLA.The three uniformed members expected to retain their CMC posts beyond 2012 are:General Chang Wanquan, Director of the General Armament Department (GAD), is the onlyground forces officer eligible by age to serve an additional term. A former commander of theShenyang Military Region (MR) and chief of staff of the Beijing MR, General Chang spentmost of his career in operations and training posts in the Lanzhou MR. He also served asdirector of the campaign teaching and research office at the National Defense University in thelate 1990s. In his current post as GAD director, Chang oversees foreign weapon procurementand domestic production, military testing, and the space and satellite programs. Two currentsenior CMC members, Chief of the General Staff Chen Bingde and director of the GeneralPolitical Department Li Jinai, are also former GAD chiefs, underscoring the emphasis the Partyhas placed on these elements of the PLA’s modernization program.Admiral Wu Shengli, the Commander of the PLA Navy, has presided over a substantialincrease in the Navy’s international engagement, including its ongoing counter-piracydeployment to the Gulf of Aden. A former destroyer captain in China’s East Sea Fleet andlater commandant of the Dalian Naval Vessels Academy who rose to become commander ofthe South Sea Fleet, Wu also served as a deputy chief of the general staff in the mid-2000s. Heis the second naval officer to serve on the CMC since the Navy, Air Force and 2nd ArtilleryCorps commanders were added to its membership in 2004.General Xu Qiliang, the Commander of the PLA Air Force is a former pilot who served muchof his career in the Nanjing MR opposite Taiwan. He rose to Chief of Staff of the Beijing MRAir Force and then Commander of the Shenyang MR Air Force. Along with Wu Shengli, hispromotion to Commander of his service followed a tour as a Deputy Chief of the General Staffin the mid-2000s. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 12
  23. 23. CHINA’S STRATEGIC PRIORITIES Militarily, China’s sustained modernization program is paying visible dividends. DuringSince China launched its ―reform and 2010, China made strides toward fielding anopening,‖ in 1978, the essential elements of operational anti-ship ballistic missile,China’s strategy have remained relatively continued work on its aircraft carrier program,constant. Rather than challenge the existing and finalized the prototype of its first stealthglobal order, China has adopted a pragmatic aircraft. Despite continued gaps in some keyapproach to international relations and areas, large quantities of antiquated hardware,economic development that seeks to and a lack of operational experience, the PLAstrengthen the economy, modernize the is steadily closing the technological gap withmilitary, and solidify the CCP’s hold on modern armed forces.power. This approach reflects Beijing’sassumption that great power status over the China’s leaders speak about their strategiclong-term is best achieved by avoiding priorities in terms of what they call China’sconfrontation in the near-term. China’s ―core interests.‖ In a December 2010leaders routinely emphasize the goal of exposition on China’s foreign policy, Statereaching critical economic and military Councilor Dai Bingguo enumerated China’sbenchmarks by 2020 and eventually core interests as:becoming a world-class economic and The state system, political system, andmilitary power by 2050. political stability of China; that is theChina’s leaders appear to make decisions leadership of the CCP, the socialistbased on an array of interrelated and system, and the path of socialism withsometimes competing strategic priorities, Chinese characteristics.which include perpetuating CCP rule; The sovereignty and security, territorialsustaining economic growth and integrity, and national unity of China.development; maintaining domestic politicalstability; defending national sovereignty and The basic guarantee for the sustainedterritorial integrity; and securing China’s development of the economy and societystatus as a great power. Although evolving of challenges and growing capabilities The PRC leadership is also focused on thehave prompted adjustments over the past many potential problems that couldthree decades, the overarching strategic vision complicate or derail China’s growth trajectoryhas remained largely intact. or its strategy of ―peaceful development.‖ These include the following:During 2010, China continued on a pathtoward its long-term strategic objectives. Economics: Continued economicDespite domestic concerns over inflation, development remains the bedrock ofgrowing income disparities, and a possible social stability and underwrites China’shousing bubble, to date China’s economy military power. A wide range ofappears to have weathered the global economic factors could disrupt thiseconomic turmoil with relative success. In trajectory, including the rapid contraction2010, the PRC economy surpassed that of of a potentially overheated economy.Japan to become the world’s second largest. China’s leaders have already scaled backAlthough PRC leaders remain concerned over GDP targets for 2011-2015 to mitigatea number of economic challenges, many risk of overheating and to manageanalysts have suggested that China’s expectations. Other potential economiceconomic performance in recent years has risks for China include shifting globalendowed Beijing with greater confidence in trade patterns, resource constraints, orits economic model and in its relative attempts to challenge access to resources.strength. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 13
  24. 24. Nationalism: Communist Party leaders Domestic Political Pressures: Regimeand military officials continue to exploit survival shapes the strategic outlook ofnationalism to bolster the legitimacy of China’s leaders and drives decisionthe Party and deflect domestic criticism. making. The Communist Party continuesHowever, this approach is inherently risk- to face long-term popular demands forladen, as these forces could easily turn improved government responsiveness,against the state or complicate China’s transparency and accountability. Ifpolicy process. Nationalistic appeals for a unmet, these factors weaken CCPmore muscular PRC posture, particularly legitimacy.during times of crisis, effectively Demographic Pressures: Demographicconstrain more moderate, pragmatic elites stresses will increase in the future,in China’s foreign policy establishment. creating a structural constraint on China’sAlternatively, PRC elites may point to ability to sustain high economic growthnationalism as a justification for their own rates as well as a social challenge for theinflexibility in dialogues with foreign CCP.interlocutors. Environment: China’s economicGrowing Expectations: China’s development has come at a highdevelopment has translated into greater environmental cost. China’s leaders areexpectations both at home and abroad for increasingly concerned that environmentalinvolvement in the international arena. degradation could undermine regimeOther nations have called on Beijing to legitimacy by threatening economicshoulder a greater role in solving development, public health, socialinternational problems, to a point at which stability, and China’s international image.some Chinese leaders worry about takingon more than they can handle. At the Cross-Strait Dynamics: Despite asame time, the domestic perception of reduction in tensions following the MarchChina’s growing status is producing 2008 election of Taiwan President Mapopular demands for a more assertive Ying-jeou, the possibility of a militarypursuit of China’s international interests. conflict with Taiwan, including U.S. military intervention, remains a pressing,Regional Balancing: China’s growing long-term focus for the PLA. In theeconomic, diplomatic and military absence of a peaceful cross-Straitpresence and influence in Asia and resolution or long-term non-aggressionglobally is raising concerns among many pact, the Taiwan mission will likelycountries about China’s ultimate aims – continue to dominate PLA modernizationand the threats this could present to them. and operational planning.These regional concerns could catalyzeregional or global balancing efforts. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 14
  25. 25. China’s Territorial DisputesChina faces extensive territorial disputes along its land and maritime periphery. Next to thestatus of Taiwan, these disputes play a central role in PLA planning. Although China hasgenerally adopted a less confrontational posture towards its regional disputes since the late1990s (China has settled eleven land disputes with six of its neighbors since 1998), someregional actors fear China’s growing military and economic weight is beginning to produce amore assertive posture, particularly in the maritime domain.In addition to a longstanding and contentious border dispute with India, China has maritimeboundary disputes with Japan over the East China Sea and throughout the South China Seawith Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan. These have sparkedoccasional armed conflict, including a 1962 border conflict with India and a 1979 groundinvasion of Vietnam. In the South China Sea, China fought Vietnamese forces in the ParacelIslands in 1974 and near Fiery Cross Reef in 1988. In 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef,also in the Spratly Islands, amid protest from the Philippines. In 2002, Beijing and ASEANbrokered a Declaration on Conduct in the South China Sea. While non-binding, thedeclaration was followed by a period of relative stability.China’s broad claim to potentially all of the South China Sea remains a source of regionalcontention. Beginning in the 1930s and 1940s, the Republic of China began publishingregional maps with a dashed line around the perimeter of South China Sea. After takingpower in 1949, the CCP maintained this claim. Both the PRC and Taiwan continue to basetheir South China Sea claims on that broad delineation. China increasingly regards the SouthChina Sea as a vital commercial and security corridor for East and Southeast Asia.In recent years, some of China’s neighbors have questioned Beijing’s long-term commitmentto peacefully and cooperatively resolve the remainder of its disputes. PLA Navy assets haverepeatedly circumnavigated the South China Sea since 2005, and civilian enforcement ships,sometimes supported by the PLA Navy, have occasionally harassed foreign vessels.Underscoring the volatility of these various disputes, a PRC-flagged fishing boat collidedwith Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea,triggering a highly charged political standoff between Tokyo and Beijing in September 2010. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 15
  26. 26. China’s Disputed Territories. This map is an approximate presentation of PRC and other regional claims. China has remained ambiguous on the extent and legal justification for these regional claims. Three of China‟s major ongoing territorial disputes are based on claims along its shared border with India and Bhutan, the South China Sea, and with Japan in the East China Sea.THE NEW HISTORIC MISSIONS Provide a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of strategicIn 2004, Hu Jintao articulated a mission opportunity for national development.statement for the armed forces titled, the Provide a powerful strategic support for―Historic Missions of the Armed Forces in the safeguarding national interests.New Period of the New Century‖ (xin shijixin jieduan wojun lishi shiming— Play an important role in safeguarding ). These ―new world peace and promoting common development.historic missions‖ focus primarily onadjustments in the PRC leadership’s According to official writings, the drivingassessment of the international security factors behind the articulation of theseenvironment and the expanding definition of missions were: changes in China’s securitynational security. These missions were situation, challenges and priorities regardingfurther codified in a 2007 amendment to the China’s national development, and a desire toCCP Constitution. The missions, as currently realign the tasks of the PLA with the CCP’sdefined, include: objectives. Politburo member and CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou in 2005 asserted ―the Provide an important guarantee of historic missions embody the new strength for the party to consolidate its requirements imposed on the military by the ruling position. Party’s historic tasks, accommodate new Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 16
  27. 27. changes in our national development strategy, sea lanes, cyber warfare, security of space-and conform to the new trends in global based assets, conducting military diplomacy,military development.‖ and preparing for unexpected conditions and events.In a point reiterated in the latest PRC DefenseWhite Paper, economic development remains The PLA Navy’s ongoing deployment toa central task and the PLA is expected to conduct counter-piracy escort missions insupport China’s economic interests and the Gulf of Aden is one example ofsecurity. This poses new challenges for a China’s pursuit of its new historicmilitary that, until recently had virtually no missions.operational experience outside of its region. Another example was the 2010 voyage ofPresident Hu Jintao’s strategic guidance to the China’s first large hospital ship, whichmilitary reflects this view, calling on the PLA made stops in Asia and Africa. The shipto play a broader role in securing China’s is able to support combat operations, butstrategic interests, including those beyond its PRC official press reporting stresses theterritorial boundaries. In a March 2009 humanitarian aspects of the ship’sspeech to military delegates to China’s mission.National People’s Congress, President Hu Most recently, the PLA employed lifturged the military to concentrate on ―building assets to assist in the evacuation of PRCcore military capabilities,‖ but also ―the citizens from Libya. This marked theability to carry out military operations other PLA’s first noncombatant evacuationthan war‖ (fei zhanzheng junshi xingdong— operation (NEO).非战争军事行动). Hu maintained, ―with theprerequisite of satisfactorily completing all DEBATES ON FUTURE STRATEGYmissions—taking preparation for militarystruggle as the lead—the armed forces must China’s current strategy remains one ofparticipate actively in and support national managing the external environment to ensureeconomic construction and public welfare.‖ conditions are conducive to China’s economic development and military modernization.China’s 2010 Defense White Paper highlights This approach serves the paramount goal ofthe PLA’s evolving roles and missions, noting preserving the survival and leadership of thethat: CCP. Although this strategy appears to enjoy They organize preparations for military widespread acceptance among Beijing’s operations other than war (MOOTW) in foreign and security policy establishment, a scientific way, work out pre-designed military and academic writings reveal strategic programs against non- differences of opinion concerning the means traditional security threats, reinforce of achieving China’s broad national the building of specialized forces for objectives. emergency response, and enhance Although the view is increasingly articulated capabilities in counter-terrorism and that the time has come for China to discuss stability maintenance, emergency more candidly and pursue its national rescue, and the protection of security. interests, the prevailing voices within China’sAuthoritative PRC media describe these leadership have supported former paramount―military operations other than war‖ as leader Deng Xiaoping’s dictum from the earlyincluding: counter-terrorism, maintaining 1990s that China should, ―observe calmly;social stability, disaster relief and rescue, and secure our position; cope with affairs calmly;international peacekeeping operations. hide our capabilities and bide our time; beChina’s leaders have mentioned other ―non- good at maintaining a low profile; and neverwar military‖ activities including protecting claim leadership.‖ This guidance reflected Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 17
  28. 28. Deng’s belief that PRC interests are best would have been impossible for the PLA toserved by focusing on internal development pursue just a decade ago. Proponents of aand stability while steering clear of direct more active and assertive PRC role on theconfrontation or antagonism with major world stage have suggested that China wouldpowers. In December 2010, State Councilor be better served by a firm stance in the face ofDai Bingguo specifically cited Deng’s U.S. or other regional pressure.guidance, insisting China adhered to a ―path There has also been an active debate amongof peaceful development‖ and would not seek military and civilian theorists in Chinaexpansion or hegemony. He asserted that the concerning future capabilities the PLA should―bide and hide‖ rhetoric was not a develop to advance China’s interests beyond―smokescreen‖ employed while China builds traditional requirements. Some seniorits strength, but rather an admonition to be officers and civilian theorists advocate anpatient and not stand out. expansion of the PLA’s power projectionSome PRC scholars question whether Deng’s capabilities to facilitate missions well beyondpolicy approach will continue to win support Taiwan and regional disputes. Publicly, PRCas China’s interests and power expand. officials contend that increasing the scope ofChina’s perceived security interests have China’s maritime capabilities is intended tochanged considerably since Deng’s era to build capacity for international peacekeeping,include a heavy reliance on maritime humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, andcommerce. China’s improving naval protection of sea lanes.capabilities enable roles and missions that Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 18
  29. 29. China Debates its National Security Strategy in 2010Throughout 2010, a line of commentary in Western and Chinese media and academic circles,suggested that China has grown stronger relative to the United States, particularly as a result ofthe global financial crisis. Some commentators asserted that a more powerful China shouldmore proactively pursue its national interests. While this increasingly public debate indicatesthe CCP is allowing discussion of competing strategic priorities, there is little indication thatits senior leaders are abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy legacy in the near term.The tension between managing China’s image and advancing China’s interests was revealedon several occasions in 2010. This included discussions of how Beijing should respond toSouth China Sea tensions and U.S.-South Korea joint exercises in the Yellow Sea. Much ofthe resulting commentary hailed perceptions that Beijing had taken a stronger stand on theseissues in line with its growing international weight. Some commentators argued that Chinaneeded to take a still stronger stand or asserted that on the contrary, Beijing lacked sufficientpower to sustain a more assertive position, despite a relative U.S. decline.An increasingly public debate in China regarding the exercise of national power reflects thefact that both assertive and accommodating behaviors come with a set of costs for Beijing.Many in China feel that the steady expansion of comprehensive national power entitles Chinato greater respect and deference. However, during the current ―strategic window ofopportunity,‖ the Chinese leadership remains wary of undermining their long-term objectives.By autumn 2010, commentary on security relations with the United States had moderated,probably due to efforts to smooth the way for President Hu Jintao’s planned early 2011 visit tothe United States. The official communiqué of the 5th Plenum of the 17th CCP CentralCommittee held from October 15-18, 2010: ―stressed that our country is still in the importantstrategic opportunity period.‖ We judge this to be a re-affirmation of Deng’s strategy ofcarefully preserving a stable environment for China’s development as opposed to a call forBeijing to take a more assertive stance. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 19
  30. 30. Military and Security Aspects of Beijing’s Regional Energy StrategyChina’s engagement, investment, and foreign construction related to energy continue togrow. Beijing has constructed or invested in energy projects in more than 50 countries,spanning nearly every continent. This ambitious investment in energy assets is drivenprimarily by two factors. First, Beijing is increasingly dependent upon imported energy tosustain its economy. A net oil exporter until 1993, China still lacks trust in internationalenergy markets. Second, energy projects present a viable option for investing China’s vastforeign currency holdings.In addition to ensuring reliable energy sources, Beijing hopes to diversify both producers andtransport options. Although energy independence is no longer realistic for China, givenpopulation growth and increasing per capita energy consumption, Beijing still seeks tomaintain a supply chain less susceptible to external disruption.In 2009, China imported approximately 56 percent of its China’s Top Crude Oil Suppliers 2009oil and conservative estimates project that China willimport almost two-thirds of its oil by 2015 and three- Country Volume %quarters by 2030. Beijing looks primarily to the Persian Saudi Arabia 843 21 AddddddAra %Gulf, Central Asia, and Africa to satisfy its growing Angola bia 646 16demand for oil. Imported oil contributes to Iran 465 11approximately 10% of China’s total energy consumption. Russia 307 8 Sudan 245 6A second goal of Beijing’s foreign energy strategy is to Oman 234 6alleviate China’s heavy dependence on Sea Lines of Iraq 144 4Communication (SLOCs), particularly the South China Kuwait 142 3Sea and Strait of Malacca. In 2010, over 80 percent of Libya 127 3China’s oil imports transited the South China Sea and Kazakhstan 121 3Strait of Malacca. A crude oil pipeline from Kazakhstan Other 818 19to China illustrates efforts to increase overland supply. TOTAL 4,092In January 2011, a 300,000 b/d spur pipeline fromSiberia to Daqing began delivering crude to China. Volumes are in 1,000 barrels per dayChina also commenced construction on a pipeline Figures have been roundeddesigned to transport crude oil and natural gas fromKyuakpya, Burma, to Kunming, China, bypassing the Strait of Malacca. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 20
  31. 31. China’s import transit routes/critical chokepoints and proposed/under construction SLOC bypass routes.Given China’s growing energy demand, new pipelines will only slightly alleviate China’smaritime dependency in either the Strait of Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz. The sheervolume of oil and liquefied natural gas imports to China from the Middle East will makestrategic SLOCs increasingly important to Beijing.In 2009 a pipeline that will deliver up to 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas peryear from Turkmenistan to China via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan commenced operation.Another natural gas pipeline designed to deliver 14 bcm per year from Burma is in theinitial stages of construction and estimated for completion in 2013. Additionally Beijing isnegotiating with Moscow for two pipelines that could supply China with up to 69 bcm ofgas. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 21
  32. 32. CHINA’S MILITARY STRATEGY Academic research suggests that the current guidelines most likely date to 1993, reflectingPLA theorists have developed a framework the impact of the 1991 Persian Gulf War andfor doctrine-driven reform with the long-term the collapse of the Soviet Union on PRCgoal of building a force capable of fighting military-strategic thinking. The guidelinesand winning ―local wars under conditions of were revised in 2002 and 2004, likelyinformatization.‖ Drawing upon foreign reflecting China’s perceptions of its evolvingmilitary experiences, particularly U.S.-led security environment and the changingcampaigns up to and including Operation character of modern warfare.ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation In practice, this strategic evolution hasIRAQI FREEDOM, Soviet and Russian prompted a major shift toward investments inmilitary theory, and the PLA’s own combat asymmetric, network-centric warfare andhistory, China is transforming across the A2AD capabilities that are intended to denywhole of its armed forces. elements of the modern battle space toChina relies on a body of overall principles potential enemies. According to the 2008and guidance known as the ―National Military Defense White Paper, these guidelinesStrategic Guidelines for the New Period‖ (xin emphasize fighting and winning local warsshiqi guojia junshi zhanlüe fangzhen— under conditions of informatization and 期国家军事战略方針) to plan and building toward integrated joint operations, with a stress on asymmetric warfare to ―makemanage the development and use of the armed the best use of our strong points to attack theforces. This is the closest equivalent in China enemy’s weak points.‖of the U.S. ―National Military Strategy.‖ Citing the need to ensure ―close coordinationThe current operational component of China’s between military struggle and political,National Military Strategic Guidelines for the diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legalNew Period is known as ―Active Defense‖ endeavors,‖ the guidelines also emphasize the(jiji fangyu—积极防御). Active Defense is importance of integrating multiplethe highest-level strategic guidance for all instruments of state power to ensurePLA activities and applies to all services. deterrence and prevent conflict.Tenets of Active Defense include the Naval Warfare. During the mid 1980s, thefollowing: CMC approved a specific naval component of ―Overall, our military strategy is ―Active Defense‖ called ―Offshore Defense‖ defensive. We attack only after being (jinhai fangyu—近海防御), which is attacked. But our operations are sometimes translated more literally as, ―Near offensive.‖ Seas Defense.‖ Offshore Defense is an ―Space or time will not limit our counter- overarching strategic concept that directs the offensive.‖ PLA Navy to prepare for three essential missions including: ―We will not put boundaries on the limits of our offenses.‖ keeping the enemy within limits and resisting invasion from the sea; ―We will wait for the time and conditions that favor our forces when we do initiate protecting the nation’s territorial offensive operations.‖ sovereignty; and, ―We will focus on the opposing force’s safeguarding the motherland’s unity and weaknesses.‖ maritime rights. The so-called ―near seas,‖ which remain a primary focus for the Navy, include the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 22
  33. 33. Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Senior civilian officials and PLA officers haveSea. Increasingly, the PLA is taking on argued that China’s economic and politicalmissions that reflect China’s expanding power is contingent upon access to, and use ofcommercial and diplomatic interests beyond the sea, and that a strong Navy is required tothe near seas, into the ―far seas‖ which include safeguard such access. Despite an increasinglythe Philippine Sea and beyond. PLA Navy public discussion concerning missions fartherdoctrine for maritime operations focuses on six from China, the Navy appears primarilyoffensive and defensive campaigns: blockade, focused on contingencies within the ―first andanti-sea lines of communication, maritime-land second island chains‖ (see map), withattack, anti-ship, maritime transportation emphasis on a potential conflict with, and naval base defense. forces over Taiwan or a territorial dispute. The First and Second Island Chains. PRC military theorists refer to two “island “chains” along China‟s maritime perimeter. The First Island Chain includes Taiwan and the Ryuku Islands, the Second Island Chain extends from Japan to Guam. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 23