The document discusses methods for identifying and investigating lateral movement by attackers during security incidents. It describes common tools and techniques used by attackers during different stages of an advanced persistent threat (APT) incident, including initial investigation, internal reconnaissance, spreading infection, and deleting evidence. The document analyzes logs and commands from past APT attacks to identify patterns in attacker behavior that can help with incident response. It notes that default system logs often do not provide enough information, so additional logging of events, processes, and network connections may be needed to fully trace attacker activities within a target network.
Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by An...CODE BLUE
Industroyer is the first ever malware specifically designed to attack power grids. This unique and extremely dangerous malware framework was involved in the December 2016 blackout in Ukraine. What sets Industroyer apart from other malware targeting infrastructure, such as BlackEnergy (a.k.a. SandWorm), is its ability to control switches and circuit breakers directly via 4 different industrial communication protocols.
In addition to explaining why Industroyer can be considered the biggest threat to industrial control systems since the infamous Stuxnet worm, we will take a look at the 2016 power outage in the context of the other numerous cyberattacks against Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the recent years.
As the protocols and hardware targeted by Industroyer are employed in power supply infrastructure, transportation control systems, and other critical infrastructure systems, like water and gas, worldwide, the malware can be re-purposed to target vital services in other countries. This discovery should serve as a wake-up call for those responsible for security of these critical systems.
Anton Cherepanov
Anton Cherepanov is currently working at ESET as Senior Malware Researcher; his responsibilities include the analysis of complex threats. He has done extensive research on cyber-attacks in Ukraine. His research was presented on numerous conferences, including Virus Bulletin, CARO Workshop, PHDays, and ZeroNights. His interests focus on reverse engineering and malware analysis automation.
Róbert Lipovský
Róbert Lipovský is Senior Malware Researcher in ESET’s Security Research Laboratory, with 10 years’ experience with malware research. He is responsible for malware intelligence and analysis and leads the Malware Research team in ESET’s HQ in Bratislava. He is a regular speaker at security conferences, including Black Hat, Virus Bulletin, and CARO. He runs a reverse engineering course at the Slovak University of Technology, his alma mater and the Comenius University. When not bound to a keyboard, he enjoys sports, playing guitar and flying an airplane.
A New Era of SSRF - Exploiting URL Parser in Trending Programming Languages! ...CODE BLUE
We propose a new exploit technique that brings a whole-new attack surface to bypass SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) protections. This is a very general attack approach, in which we used in combination with our own fuzzing tool to discover many 0days in built-in libraries of very widely-used programming languages, including Python, PHP, Perl, Ruby, Java, JavaScript, Wget and cURL. The root cause of the problem lies in the inconsistency of URL parsers and URL requesters.
Being a very fundamental problem that exists in built-in libraries, sophisticated web applications such as WordPress (27% of the Web), vBulletin, MyBB and GitHub can also suffer, and 0days have been discovered in them via this technique. This general technique can also adapt to various code contexts and lead to protocol smuggling and SSRF bypassing. Several scenarios will be demonstrated to illustrate how URL parsers can be exploited to bypass SSRF protection and achieve RCE (Remote Code Execution), which is the case in our GitHub Enterprise demo.
Understanding the basics of this technique, the audience won’t be surprised to know that more than 20 vulnerabilities have been found in famous programming languages and web applications aforementioned via this technique.
Detection index learning based on cyber threat intelligence and its applicati...CODE BLUE
While the importance of sharing cyber threat intelligence (CTI) and considering countermeasures in advance as cyber attacks become more sophisticated is increasing, IP addresses and domains as detection indices included in CTI are attacked by attackers in short cycles Dispose (change or disappear). As a countermeasure on the defender side, we are moving towards increasing the cost of attackers by improving the sharing speed of CTI, and we receive large amounts of CTI every day. As a result, the situation is such that the CTI is also disposable in a short cycle. In this report, we built a detection index learning method based on CTI that is accumulated day by day and implemented a detection index learning engine learning how detection indices are used by attackers Report on the learning result. We also report on the possibility of reconstructing and combining the result of learning the detection index and applying it to mid- to long-term advanced protection in combination with another data source.
International collaborative efforts to share threat data in a vetted member c...CODE BLUE
The APWG has been sharing threat data for over 12 years to help protect organizations and the all internet users against cyber threats. Initially founded to focus on the phishing, as the threat landscape on the internet has grown so has APWG. Today our vetted member community shares information to fight cybercrime and fraud not only on phishing but numerous other types of threat data including malicious IP addresses and ransomware information. This session will look at the history of sharing these types of data, how sharing has changed over the years and the necessity to automate these process.
The Art of Exploiting Unconventional Use-after-free Bugs in Android Kernel by...CODE BLUE
In this talk, we are going to disclose two unconventional Use-after-free kernel bugs on Android we found last year, and introduce the new techniques we used to make these exploits 100% reliable.
The first bug is CVE-2017-0403, which we used to gain root privilege on almost all devices shipped with 3.10 or earlier Linux kernel last year. So far more than 14 million users have successfully rooted their smartphones with this exploit. With this vulnerability, an attacker only can overwrite the freed object at a fixed offset with a pointer to object itself. How to achieve kernel code execution with this bug can be very challenging.To solve the problem, we propose a new method which is using iovec to re-fill the freed object and compromising the pipe subsystem in kernel.In this way we can covert this unusual memory corruption to arbitrary kernel memory overwriting.
The second bug is CVE-2016-6787. The bug is an UAF due to race condition, may corrupt a critical kernel structure, and lead to the kernel crash when scheduler switched context back to attacker's process. So we'll introduce a way to freeze the attacker's process soon after UAF happened ,stop kernel from crashing, and make the exploit reliable.
In summary, this presentation gives out the new techniques of exploiting use-after-free bugs we just found in Android kernel. The ideas of exploitation are fresh, detail of bugs is also never discussed before.
The security landscape has changed such that simply focusing on preventing is no longer an effective strategy. This talk will look at the idea of Assume Breach and how detection and response to threats aligns to an attacker methodology. Demonstrations and research will highlight how organizations can achieve more finely tuned detection capabilities through threat simulation and war-game exercises.
Industroyer: biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet by An...CODE BLUE
Industroyer is the first ever malware specifically designed to attack power grids. This unique and extremely dangerous malware framework was involved in the December 2016 blackout in Ukraine. What sets Industroyer apart from other malware targeting infrastructure, such as BlackEnergy (a.k.a. SandWorm), is its ability to control switches and circuit breakers directly via 4 different industrial communication protocols.
In addition to explaining why Industroyer can be considered the biggest threat to industrial control systems since the infamous Stuxnet worm, we will take a look at the 2016 power outage in the context of the other numerous cyberattacks against Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the recent years.
As the protocols and hardware targeted by Industroyer are employed in power supply infrastructure, transportation control systems, and other critical infrastructure systems, like water and gas, worldwide, the malware can be re-purposed to target vital services in other countries. This discovery should serve as a wake-up call for those responsible for security of these critical systems.
Anton Cherepanov
Anton Cherepanov is currently working at ESET as Senior Malware Researcher; his responsibilities include the analysis of complex threats. He has done extensive research on cyber-attacks in Ukraine. His research was presented on numerous conferences, including Virus Bulletin, CARO Workshop, PHDays, and ZeroNights. His interests focus on reverse engineering and malware analysis automation.
Róbert Lipovský
Róbert Lipovský is Senior Malware Researcher in ESET’s Security Research Laboratory, with 10 years’ experience with malware research. He is responsible for malware intelligence and analysis and leads the Malware Research team in ESET’s HQ in Bratislava. He is a regular speaker at security conferences, including Black Hat, Virus Bulletin, and CARO. He runs a reverse engineering course at the Slovak University of Technology, his alma mater and the Comenius University. When not bound to a keyboard, he enjoys sports, playing guitar and flying an airplane.
A New Era of SSRF - Exploiting URL Parser in Trending Programming Languages! ...CODE BLUE
We propose a new exploit technique that brings a whole-new attack surface to bypass SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) protections. This is a very general attack approach, in which we used in combination with our own fuzzing tool to discover many 0days in built-in libraries of very widely-used programming languages, including Python, PHP, Perl, Ruby, Java, JavaScript, Wget and cURL. The root cause of the problem lies in the inconsistency of URL parsers and URL requesters.
Being a very fundamental problem that exists in built-in libraries, sophisticated web applications such as WordPress (27% of the Web), vBulletin, MyBB and GitHub can also suffer, and 0days have been discovered in them via this technique. This general technique can also adapt to various code contexts and lead to protocol smuggling and SSRF bypassing. Several scenarios will be demonstrated to illustrate how URL parsers can be exploited to bypass SSRF protection and achieve RCE (Remote Code Execution), which is the case in our GitHub Enterprise demo.
Understanding the basics of this technique, the audience won’t be surprised to know that more than 20 vulnerabilities have been found in famous programming languages and web applications aforementioned via this technique.
Detection index learning based on cyber threat intelligence and its applicati...CODE BLUE
While the importance of sharing cyber threat intelligence (CTI) and considering countermeasures in advance as cyber attacks become more sophisticated is increasing, IP addresses and domains as detection indices included in CTI are attacked by attackers in short cycles Dispose (change or disappear). As a countermeasure on the defender side, we are moving towards increasing the cost of attackers by improving the sharing speed of CTI, and we receive large amounts of CTI every day. As a result, the situation is such that the CTI is also disposable in a short cycle. In this report, we built a detection index learning method based on CTI that is accumulated day by day and implemented a detection index learning engine learning how detection indices are used by attackers Report on the learning result. We also report on the possibility of reconstructing and combining the result of learning the detection index and applying it to mid- to long-term advanced protection in combination with another data source.
International collaborative efforts to share threat data in a vetted member c...CODE BLUE
The APWG has been sharing threat data for over 12 years to help protect organizations and the all internet users against cyber threats. Initially founded to focus on the phishing, as the threat landscape on the internet has grown so has APWG. Today our vetted member community shares information to fight cybercrime and fraud not only on phishing but numerous other types of threat data including malicious IP addresses and ransomware information. This session will look at the history of sharing these types of data, how sharing has changed over the years and the necessity to automate these process.
The Art of Exploiting Unconventional Use-after-free Bugs in Android Kernel by...CODE BLUE
In this talk, we are going to disclose two unconventional Use-after-free kernel bugs on Android we found last year, and introduce the new techniques we used to make these exploits 100% reliable.
The first bug is CVE-2017-0403, which we used to gain root privilege on almost all devices shipped with 3.10 or earlier Linux kernel last year. So far more than 14 million users have successfully rooted their smartphones with this exploit. With this vulnerability, an attacker only can overwrite the freed object at a fixed offset with a pointer to object itself. How to achieve kernel code execution with this bug can be very challenging.To solve the problem, we propose a new method which is using iovec to re-fill the freed object and compromising the pipe subsystem in kernel.In this way we can covert this unusual memory corruption to arbitrary kernel memory overwriting.
The second bug is CVE-2016-6787. The bug is an UAF due to race condition, may corrupt a critical kernel structure, and lead to the kernel crash when scheduler switched context back to attacker's process. So we'll introduce a way to freeze the attacker's process soon after UAF happened ,stop kernel from crashing, and make the exploit reliable.
In summary, this presentation gives out the new techniques of exploiting use-after-free bugs we just found in Android kernel. The ideas of exploitation are fresh, detail of bugs is also never discussed before.
The security landscape has changed such that simply focusing on preventing is no longer an effective strategy. This talk will look at the idea of Assume Breach and how detection and response to threats aligns to an attacker methodology. Demonstrations and research will highlight how organizations can achieve more finely tuned detection capabilities through threat simulation and war-game exercises.
Passive Fingerprinting of HTTP/2 Clients by Ory SegalCODE BLUE
HTTP/2 is the second major version of the HTTP protocol. It changes the way HTTP is transferred “on the wire” by introducing a full binary protocol that is made up of TCP connections, streams, and frames, rather than a plain-text protocol. Such a fundamental change from HTTP/1.x to HTTP/2, means that client-side and server-side implementations have to incorporate completely new code in order to support new HTTP/2 features. This introduces nuances in protocol implementations, which, in return, might be used to passively fingerprint web clients.
Our research is based on more than 10 million HTTP/2 connections from which we extracted fingerprints for over 40,000 unique user agents across hundreds of implementations.
In the presentation, we intend provide the following:
*HTTP/2 Overview
- Introduction into the basic elements of the protocol
- a review the different components chosen for the fingerprint format (alongside a discussion on those left out)
- Potential use cases of the proposed fingerprint
- Usage Statistics - prevalence of HTTP/2 usage on Akamai’s platform
*Examples of common HTTP/2 Implementations & Client fingerprints collected during the research
*HTTP/2 support (or the lack of) among common web security tools (Burp suite, sqlmap, etc.)
*Review of attacks over HTTP/2 observed on Akamai’s platform
Hunting for APT in network logs workshop presentationOlehLevytskyi1
Nonamecon 2021 presentation.
Network logs are one of the most efficient sources to hunt adversaries, but building good analytics capabilities require a deep understanding of benign activity and attacker behavior. This training focuses on detecting real-case attacks, tools and scenarios by the past year.
The training is highly interactive and retains a good balance between theory and a lot of hands-on exercises for the students to get used to the detection engineering methodology and prepare them to start implementing this at their organizations.
Presentation topics:
- Netflow Mitre Matrix view
- Full packet captures vs Netflow
- Zeek
- Zeek packages
- RDP initial comprometation
- Empire Powershell and CobaltStrike or what to expect after initial loader execution.
- Empire powershell initial connection
- Beaconing. RITA
- Scanning detection
- Internal enumeration detection
- Lateral movement techniques widely used
- Kerberos attacks
- PSExec and fileless ways of delivering payloads in the network
- Zerologon detection
- Data exfiltration
- Data exfiltration over C2 channel
- Data exfiltration using time size limits (data chunks)
- DNS exfiltration
- Detecting ransomware in your network
- Real incident investigation
Authors:
Oleh Levytskyi (https://twitter.com/LeOleg97)
Bogdan Vennyk (https://twitter.com/bogdanvennyk)
This talk focuses on various ways to attempt to be as much like normal users/behavior/traffic as possible. We also demonstrate the limitations of signature-based detection systems and then discuss a prototype Remote Access Tool (RAT) that is designed to blend in with normal activity.
Presented at CodeMash, January 8, 2014
"Into the Fog The Return of ICEFOG APT" - Chi en (Ashley) ShenPROIDEA
Chi-en Shen (Ashley) is a security researcher at FireEye, where she focuses on threat intelligence research. She specializes in threat hunting, malware analysis, reverse engineering, and targeted attacks research. Prior to FireEye, Ashley helped found Team T5, a threat research security company where she also works as a threat analyst. For supporting women in InfoSec, Ashley co-founded “HITCON GIRLS” – the first security community for women in Taiwan. Ashley is also a regular speaker at global security conferences, including Black Hat Europe, Black Hat Asia, FIRST, HITB GSEC, CODE BLUE, Troopers, HITCON and VXCON. Ashley also serves as a member of the Black Hat Asia review board where she evaluates research for briefings and training.
Take a Jailbreak -Stunning Guards for iOS Jailbreak- by Kaoru OtsukaCODE BLUE
In this talk, I investigate several exploiting ideas for iOS kernel jailbreak using recently exposed vulnerabilities. Recently, Ian Beer found the following promising vulnerabilities:
CVE-2016-7637: Broken kernel mach port name ‘uref’ handling on iOS/MacOS can lead to privileged port name replacement in other processes,
CVE-2016-7644: XNU kernel UaF due to lack of locking in set_dp_control_port,
CVE-2016-7661: MacOS/iOS arbitrary port replacement in powerd.
However, naive combination of the above vulnerabilities cannot easily break recent mitigations implemented in iOS versions. Recent iOS provides the kernel level mitigations against exploitation such as kernel patch protection, sandboxing, AMFI(Apple Mobile File Integrity), MAC(Mandatory Access Control) policy, KASLR(Kernel ASLR) etc. These mitigations will be briefly explained.
Ross Bevington, Microsoft
In ‘The Matrix’ sentient machines subdue the population by developing a highly sophisticated simulation. High interaction honeypots are a lot like The Matrix, designed to convince an attacker to execute an attack so we can monitor them. But these honeypots are flawed!
Attackers are continually adapting in order to evade our defenses - meaning that it’s often not enough to just set up a honeypot and watch the results roll in. Is a new approach better?
Did you know that 40% of IaaS VMs in Azure are Linux? For Microsoft to protect itself and its customers Linux is a priority.
At MSTIC we’ve developed a new type of Linux honeypot that allows us to deceive and control the behavior of an attacker. We are using this to understand the person behind the attack, examining them as they examine us. Using these techniques, we are able to better track the person behind the threat, build better protections and ultimately protect more Linux users - whether they are using Azure or not.
In this presentation I’ll show some of the successes of running a Matrix like environment, failures where a glitch was spotted as well as deception approaches that could be applied to other domains. Finally I’ll show how easy it is to leverage Azure’s big data capabilities to build and ultimately query all this data at scale as well as how you can immediately reap the benefits of this work by connecting your Linux box to Azure Security Center.
"A rootkits writer’s guide to defense" - Michal PurzynskiPROIDEA
Michal will take you on a journey all the way to 90’s and back, sharing the Mozilla detection framework - a systematic way to detect and hunt down threat actors. Why did we spend hours digging through some old Phrack issues? How does a blue team's member approach writing rootkits? What is better - a fail negative or a false positive? I will share answers to these questions plus a lot of alerting and evil-doing code.
Introduction to Memory Exploitation (CppEurope 2021)Patricia Aas
Stack based exploitation has gotten all the fame, but many platform and compiler mitigations have made it very hard to exploit stack vulnerabilities. Heap based exploits are still very relevant, and since this is black magic for most developers I will here give an introduction to the field.
There is increased discussion around threats that adopt so-called “living off the land” tactics. Attackers are increasingly making use of tools already installed on targeted computers or are running simple scripts and shellcode directly in memory. Creating fewer new files on the hard disk, or being completely fileless, means less chance of being detected by traditional security tools and therefore minimizes the risk of an attack being blocked. Using simple and clean dual-use tools allows the attacker to hide in plain sight among legitimate system administration work.
Further reading:
Attackers are increasingly living off the land (https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/attackers-are-increasingly-living-land)
Living off the land and fileless attack techniques (https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf)
Passive Fingerprinting of HTTP/2 Clients by Ory SegalCODE BLUE
HTTP/2 is the second major version of the HTTP protocol. It changes the way HTTP is transferred “on the wire” by introducing a full binary protocol that is made up of TCP connections, streams, and frames, rather than a plain-text protocol. Such a fundamental change from HTTP/1.x to HTTP/2, means that client-side and server-side implementations have to incorporate completely new code in order to support new HTTP/2 features. This introduces nuances in protocol implementations, which, in return, might be used to passively fingerprint web clients.
Our research is based on more than 10 million HTTP/2 connections from which we extracted fingerprints for over 40,000 unique user agents across hundreds of implementations.
In the presentation, we intend provide the following:
*HTTP/2 Overview
- Introduction into the basic elements of the protocol
- a review the different components chosen for the fingerprint format (alongside a discussion on those left out)
- Potential use cases of the proposed fingerprint
- Usage Statistics - prevalence of HTTP/2 usage on Akamai’s platform
*Examples of common HTTP/2 Implementations & Client fingerprints collected during the research
*HTTP/2 support (or the lack of) among common web security tools (Burp suite, sqlmap, etc.)
*Review of attacks over HTTP/2 observed on Akamai’s platform
Hunting for APT in network logs workshop presentationOlehLevytskyi1
Nonamecon 2021 presentation.
Network logs are one of the most efficient sources to hunt adversaries, but building good analytics capabilities require a deep understanding of benign activity and attacker behavior. This training focuses on detecting real-case attacks, tools and scenarios by the past year.
The training is highly interactive and retains a good balance between theory and a lot of hands-on exercises for the students to get used to the detection engineering methodology and prepare them to start implementing this at their organizations.
Presentation topics:
- Netflow Mitre Matrix view
- Full packet captures vs Netflow
- Zeek
- Zeek packages
- RDP initial comprometation
- Empire Powershell and CobaltStrike or what to expect after initial loader execution.
- Empire powershell initial connection
- Beaconing. RITA
- Scanning detection
- Internal enumeration detection
- Lateral movement techniques widely used
- Kerberos attacks
- PSExec and fileless ways of delivering payloads in the network
- Zerologon detection
- Data exfiltration
- Data exfiltration over C2 channel
- Data exfiltration using time size limits (data chunks)
- DNS exfiltration
- Detecting ransomware in your network
- Real incident investigation
Authors:
Oleh Levytskyi (https://twitter.com/LeOleg97)
Bogdan Vennyk (https://twitter.com/bogdanvennyk)
This talk focuses on various ways to attempt to be as much like normal users/behavior/traffic as possible. We also demonstrate the limitations of signature-based detection systems and then discuss a prototype Remote Access Tool (RAT) that is designed to blend in with normal activity.
Presented at CodeMash, January 8, 2014
"Into the Fog The Return of ICEFOG APT" - Chi en (Ashley) ShenPROIDEA
Chi-en Shen (Ashley) is a security researcher at FireEye, where she focuses on threat intelligence research. She specializes in threat hunting, malware analysis, reverse engineering, and targeted attacks research. Prior to FireEye, Ashley helped found Team T5, a threat research security company where she also works as a threat analyst. For supporting women in InfoSec, Ashley co-founded “HITCON GIRLS” – the first security community for women in Taiwan. Ashley is also a regular speaker at global security conferences, including Black Hat Europe, Black Hat Asia, FIRST, HITB GSEC, CODE BLUE, Troopers, HITCON and VXCON. Ashley also serves as a member of the Black Hat Asia review board where she evaluates research for briefings and training.
Take a Jailbreak -Stunning Guards for iOS Jailbreak- by Kaoru OtsukaCODE BLUE
In this talk, I investigate several exploiting ideas for iOS kernel jailbreak using recently exposed vulnerabilities. Recently, Ian Beer found the following promising vulnerabilities:
CVE-2016-7637: Broken kernel mach port name ‘uref’ handling on iOS/MacOS can lead to privileged port name replacement in other processes,
CVE-2016-7644: XNU kernel UaF due to lack of locking in set_dp_control_port,
CVE-2016-7661: MacOS/iOS arbitrary port replacement in powerd.
However, naive combination of the above vulnerabilities cannot easily break recent mitigations implemented in iOS versions. Recent iOS provides the kernel level mitigations against exploitation such as kernel patch protection, sandboxing, AMFI(Apple Mobile File Integrity), MAC(Mandatory Access Control) policy, KASLR(Kernel ASLR) etc. These mitigations will be briefly explained.
Ross Bevington, Microsoft
In ‘The Matrix’ sentient machines subdue the population by developing a highly sophisticated simulation. High interaction honeypots are a lot like The Matrix, designed to convince an attacker to execute an attack so we can monitor them. But these honeypots are flawed!
Attackers are continually adapting in order to evade our defenses - meaning that it’s often not enough to just set up a honeypot and watch the results roll in. Is a new approach better?
Did you know that 40% of IaaS VMs in Azure are Linux? For Microsoft to protect itself and its customers Linux is a priority.
At MSTIC we’ve developed a new type of Linux honeypot that allows us to deceive and control the behavior of an attacker. We are using this to understand the person behind the attack, examining them as they examine us. Using these techniques, we are able to better track the person behind the threat, build better protections and ultimately protect more Linux users - whether they are using Azure or not.
In this presentation I’ll show some of the successes of running a Matrix like environment, failures where a glitch was spotted as well as deception approaches that could be applied to other domains. Finally I’ll show how easy it is to leverage Azure’s big data capabilities to build and ultimately query all this data at scale as well as how you can immediately reap the benefits of this work by connecting your Linux box to Azure Security Center.
"A rootkits writer’s guide to defense" - Michal PurzynskiPROIDEA
Michal will take you on a journey all the way to 90’s and back, sharing the Mozilla detection framework - a systematic way to detect and hunt down threat actors. Why did we spend hours digging through some old Phrack issues? How does a blue team's member approach writing rootkits? What is better - a fail negative or a false positive? I will share answers to these questions plus a lot of alerting and evil-doing code.
Introduction to Memory Exploitation (CppEurope 2021)Patricia Aas
Stack based exploitation has gotten all the fame, but many platform and compiler mitigations have made it very hard to exploit stack vulnerabilities. Heap based exploits are still very relevant, and since this is black magic for most developers I will here give an introduction to the field.
There is increased discussion around threats that adopt so-called “living off the land” tactics. Attackers are increasingly making use of tools already installed on targeted computers or are running simple scripts and shellcode directly in memory. Creating fewer new files on the hard disk, or being completely fileless, means less chance of being detected by traditional security tools and therefore minimizes the risk of an attack being blocked. Using simple and clean dual-use tools allows the attacker to hide in plain sight among legitimate system administration work.
Further reading:
Attackers are increasingly living off the land (https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/attackers-are-increasingly-living-land)
Living off the land and fileless attack techniques (https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf)
Revealing the Attack Operations Targeting Japan by Shusei Tomonaga & Yuu Nak...CODE BLUE
Japan is recently experiencing a rise in targeted attacks. However, it is rare that details of such attacks are revealed. Under this circumstance, JPCERT/CC has been investigating the attack operations targeting Japanese organizations including the government and leading enterprises. We have especially been tracking two distinct cases over a prolonged period.
The first case, which became public in 2015, drew nationwide attention for victimizing several Japanese organizations. In this case, the attacker conducts sophisticated attacks through network intrusion and targeting weak points of the organizations.
The second case has been continuously targeting certain Japanese organizations since 2013. Although this case has not drawn as much attention, the attacker has advanced techniques and uses various interesting attack methods.
This presentation will introduce the above two attack operations, including attack techniques we revealed through prolonged investigation, the malware/tools being used, as well as useful techniques/tools for analyzing related malware.
From the infection phase to the command & control functionalities, this talk is a 360 degrees analysis of a recent Russian botnet distribution package. Particular features of this botnet are communication over HTTP protocol and use of PHP and Mysql.
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find ThemRoss Wolf
Presented at Black Hat 2019
https://www.blackhat.com/us-19/briefings/schedule/index.html#fantastic-red-team-attacks-and-how-to-find-them-16540
Casey Smith (Red Canary)
Ross Wolf (Endgame)
bit.ly/fantastic19
Abstract:
Red team testing in organizations over the last year has shown a dramatic increase in detections mapped to MITRE ATT&CK™ across Windows, Linux and macOS. However, many organizations continue to miss several key techniques that, unsurprisingly, often blend in with day-to-day user operations. One example includes Trusted Developer Utilities which can be readily available on standard user endpoints, not just developer workstations, and such applications allow for code execution. Also, XSL Script processing can be used as an attack vector as there are a number of trusted utilities that can consume and execute scripts via XSL. And finally, in addition to these techniques, trusted .NET default binaries are known to allow unauthorized execution as well, these include tools like InstallUtil, Regsvcs and AddInProcess. Specific techniques, coupled with procedural difficulties within a team, such as alert fatigue and lack of understanding with environmental norms, make reliable detection of these events near impossible.
This talk summarizes prevalent and ongoing gaps across organizations uncovered by testing their defenses against a broad spectrum of attacks via Atomic Red Team. Many of these adversary behaviors are not atomic, but span multiple events in an event stream that may be arbitrarily and inconsistently separated in time by nuisance events.
Additionally, we introduce and demonstrate the open-sourced Event Query Language for creating high signal-to-noise analytics that close these prevalent behavioral gaps. EQL is event agnostic and can be used to craft analytics that readily link evidence across long sequences of log data. In a live demonstration, we showcase powerful but easy to craft analytics that catch adversarial behavior most commonly missed in organizations today.
When it comes to actual, real-world, active malware detection there are surprisingly few choices. Most companies invest in one anti-virus vendor and when they suspect a compromise they simply wait for them to issue signatures.
If a company thinks they may be compromised but there is no AV signature, then what?
What if we could use basic python scripting to identify malware based on signatures we produce in real time? There are plenty of python tools, scripts and frameworks for malware identification including yara, pefile, nsrl hash db, pyemu, hachoir, volatility and pyew.
What if we could integrate these together into a system for centrally issuing
indicators of compromise? What if hosts we suspect as being compromised used this system to check themselves for compromise? Lets find out...
Lab-10 Malware Creation and Denial of Service (DoS) In t.docxpauline234567
Lab-10: Malware Creation and Denial of Service (DoS)
In this lab, you will create a malware by using the Metasploit Framework. You will also launch as Denial of Service (DoS) attack.Section-1: Create a Malware
Hackers usually create malicious files for different purposes, such as command and control, defense evasion, and persistence. Pentesters create malicious files for ethical purposes, such as performing tests to check the strength of the existing countermeasures. In this lab, you will create a malicious file, and you will explore the strategies to evade the antivirus systems.
Method-1: Create a malicious file by using msfvenom
1) Log in to Kali VM on your personal computer (as set up in Lab 1).
2) Open a terminal window by clicking the terminal icon on the taskbar.
3) Type
msfvenom -a x86 --platform windows -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_https LHOST=10.10.10.10 LPORT=443 -f exe -o ethical.exe in terminal window and press enter.
You can copy this command and paste it to the terminal window of the Kali VM.
4) After running this command, a file named
ethical.exe will be created.
Notes:
msfvenom is a command-line tool within the Metasploit Framework. It is used to create payloads such as malicious executables such as shellcodes and reverse shells. This page shows the different kinds of malicious shells that can be made by using msfvenom. Have a look at the headings:
https://burmat.gitbook.io/security/hacking/msfvenom-cheetsheet. If you want to learn more about msfvenom, refer to
https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/msfvenom/
LHOST (Local Host): Specifies the attacker's IP address. When the victim runs this executable, it will establish a connection to that IP address. The IP address is 10.10.10.10. It is a randomly selected IP, and you will not connect to that IP in this lab.
LPORT (Local Port): Specifies the port on which the attacker machine (10.10.10.10) will listen to incoming connections from the victim machine. In this example, when the victim runs the executable, the victim's computer will create a connection to port 443 at the attacker machine (10.10.10.10). After the victim makes a connection to the attacker machine, the attacker can start performing malicious activities, including controlling the victim machine, accessing sensitive information, deleting files, etc.
Using port 443 in this malicious activity is the safest way for hackers because it is one of the ports that is not blocked by the firewalls and routers on the Internet and LANs (Local Area Networks). It is the default port for TLS traffic. (Mostly encrypted web traffic)
Msfvenom uses reverse_https payload to create a malicious file. The malicious file will then make a reverse https connection between the victim's and the attacker's computers once initiated by the victim.
The other parameters of msfvenom are relatively more straightforward. x86 specifies t.
MMIX Peering Forum and MMNOG 2020: Packet Analysis for Network SecurityAPNIC
APNIC Senior Network Analyst/Technical Trainer Warren Finch presents on packet analysis for network security at the MMIX Peering Forum and MMNOG 2020 in Yangon, Myanmar, from 13 to 17 January 2020.
Unmasking Careto through Memory Forensics (video in description)Andrew Case
My presentation from SecTor 2014 on analyzing the sophisticated Careto malware with memory forensics & Volatility
Video here: http://2014.video.sector.ca/video/110388398
ENPM808 Independent Study Final Report - amaster 2019Alexander Master
Research involving commonly exploited web application functionality, with analysis of the threats at the application, network, and protocol levels. Provided demonstrations of the exploits, as well as proposed detection techniques using open source tools
Breaking the cyber kill chain! This slide was presented in securITy – information security conference digital world 2017. This talk is about proactive security and threat hunting.
[cb22] Hayabusa Threat Hunting and Fast Forensics in Windows environments fo...CODE BLUE
It started with computer hacking and Japanese linguistics as a kid. Zach Mathis has been based in Kobe, Japan, and has performed both red team services as well as blue team incident response and defense consultation for major Japanese global Japanese corporations since 2006. He is the founder of Yamato Security, one of the largest and most popular hands-on security communities in Japan, and has been providing free training since 2012 to help improve the local security community. Since 2016, he has been teaching security for the SANS institute and holds numerous GIAC certifications. Currently, he is working with other Yamato security members to provide free and open-source security tools to help security analysts with their work.
[cb22] Tales of 5G hacking by Karsten NohlCODE BLUE
Most 5G networks are built in fundamentally new ways, opening new hacking avenues.
Mobile networks have so far been monolithic systems from big vendors; now they become open vendor-mixed ecosystems. Networks are rapidly adopting cloud technologies including dockerization and orchestration. Cloud hacking techniques become highly relevant to mobile networks.
The talk dives into the hacking potential of the technologies needed for these open networks. We illustrate the security challenges with vulnerabilities we found in real-world networks.
[cb22] Your Printer is not your Printer ! - Hacking Printers at Pwn2Own by A...CODE BLUE
Printer has become one of the essential devices in the corporate intranet for the past few years, and its functionalities have also increased significantly. Not only print or fax, cloud printing services like AirPrint are also being supported as well to make it easier to use. Direct printing from mobile devices is now a basic requirement in the IoT era. We also use it to print some internal business documents of the company, which makes it even more important to keep the printer safe.
Nowadays, most of the printers on the market do not have to be connected with USB or traditional cable. As long as you are using a LAN cable connected to the intranet, the computer can find and use the printer immediately. Most of them are based on protocols such as SLP and LLMNR. But is it really safe when vendors adopt those protocols? Furthermore, many printers do not use traditional Linux systems, but use RTOS(Real-Time Operating System) instead, how will this affect the attacker?
In this talk, we will use Canon ImageCLASS MF644Cdw and HP Color LaserJet Pro MFP M283fdw as case study, showing how to analyze and gain control access to the printer. We will also demonstrate how to use the vulnerabilities to achieve RCE in RTOS in unauthenticated situations.
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...CODE BLUE
While hackers have known the importance of sharing research to improve security for years, the importance of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is increasingly recognized by governments around the world. The principals of disclosure an protecting security researchers are common across borders, but different countries have some key differences. This panel will present a global perspective that may in turn inform key public policy and company behavior.
ENISA has published 'Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policies in the EU' in April 2022 . This report not only provides an objective introduction to the current state of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies in the Member States of the European Union, but also introduces the operation of vulnerability disclosure in China, Japan and the USA. Based on these findings, the desirable and good practice elements of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process are examined, followed by a discussion of the challenges and issues.
This session aims to share the contents of this report and clarify the challenges and future direction of operations in Japan, as well as national security and vulnerability handling issues in the US, in a panel discussion with representatives from various jurisdictions.
The panelists are involved in the practice of early warning partnership notified bodies in Japan, the authors of the above report in Europe and the contributors to the above report in the US.
In Japan, the issues of system awareness, incentives, increase in the number of outstanding cases in handling and so-called triage in handling vulnerabilities will be introduced.
From the United States, the Vulnerabilities Equities Process for National Security and the publication of a non-prosecution policy for vulnerability research will be introduced, as well as a historical background on the issue.
The aim is that the panel discussion will enable the audience to understand the international situation surrounding CVD, as well as future trends, in particular the important role of vulnerability in cybersecurity and the challenges faced by society around it.
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...CODE BLUE
While hackers have known the importance of sharing research to improve security for years, the importance of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is increasingly recognized by governments around the world. The principals of disclosure an protecting security researchers are common across borders, but different countries have some key differences. This panel will present a global perspective that may in turn inform key public policy and company behavior.
ENISA has published 'Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policies in the EU' in April 2022 . This report not only provides an objective introduction to the current state of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies in the Member States of the European Union, but also introduces the operation of vulnerability disclosure in China, Japan and the USA. Based on these findings, the desirable and good practice elements of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process are examined, followed by a discussion of the challenges and issues.
This session aims to share the contents of this report and clarify the challenges and future direction of operations in Japan, as well as national security and vulnerability handling issues in the US, in a panel discussion with representatives from various jurisdictions.
The panelists are involved in the practice of early warning partnership notified bodies in Japan, the authors of the above report in Europe and the contributors to the above report in the US.
In Japan, the issues of system awareness, incentives, increase in the number of outstanding cases in handling and so-called triage in handling vulnerabilities will be introduced.
From the United States, the Vulnerabilities Equities Process for National Security and the publication of a non-prosecution policy for vulnerability research will be introduced, as well as a historical background on the issue.
[cb22] ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...CODE BLUE
While hackers have known the importance of sharing research to improve security for years, the importance of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is increasingly recognized by governments around the world. The principals of disclosure an protecting security researchers are common across borders, but different countries have some key differences. This panel will present a global perspective that may in turn inform key public policy and company behavior.
ENISA has published 'Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policies in the EU' in April 2022 . This report not only provides an objective introduction to the current state of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies in the Member States of the European Union, but also introduces the operation of vulnerability disclosure in China, Japan and the USA. Based on these findings, the desirable and good practice elements of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process are examined, followed by a discussion of the challenges and issues.
This session aims to share the contents of this report and clarify the challenges and future direction of operations in Japan, as well as national security and vulnerability handling issues in the US, in a panel discussion with representatives from various jurisdictions.
The panelists are involved in the practice of early warning partnership notified bodies in Japan, the authors of the above report in Europe and the contributors to the above report in the US.
In Japan, the issues of system awareness, incentives, increase in the number of outstanding cases in handling and so-called triage in handling vulnerabilities will be introduced.
From the United States, the Vulnerabilities Equities Process for National Security and the publication of a non-prosecution policy for vulnerability research will be introduced, as well as a historical background on the issue.
The aim is that the panel discussion will enable the audience to understand the international situation surrounding CVD, as well as future trends, in particular the important role of vulnerability in cybersecurity and the challenges faced by society around it.
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...CODE BLUE
While hackers have known the importance of sharing research to improve security for years, the importance of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is increasingly recognized by governments around the world. The principals of disclosure an protecting security researchers are common across borders, but different countries have some key differences. This panel will present a global perspective that may in turn inform key public policy and company behavior.
ENISA has published 'Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policies in the EU' in April 2022 . This report not only provides an objective introduction to the current state of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies in the Member States of the European Union, but also introduces the operation of vulnerability disclosure in China, Japan and the USA. Based on these findings, the desirable and good practice elements of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process are examined, followed by a discussion of the challenges and issues.
This session aims to share the contents of this report and clarify the challenges and future direction of operations in Japan, as well as national security and vulnerability handling issues in the US, in a panel discussion with representatives from various jurisdictions.
The panelists are involved in the practice of early warning partnership notified bodies in Japan, the authors of the above report in Europe and the contributors to the above report in the US.
In Japan, the issues of system awareness, incentives, increase in the number of outstanding cases in handling and so-called triage in handling vulnerabilities will be introduced.
From the United States, the Vulnerabilities Equities Process for National Security and the publication of a non-prosecution policy for vulnerability research will be introduced, as well as a historical background on the issue.
The aim is that the panel discussion will enable the audience to understand the international situation surrounding CVD, as well as future trends, in particular the important role of vulnerability in cybersecurity and the challenges faced by society around it.
[cb22] Are Embedded Devices Ready for ROP Attacks? -ROP verification for low-...CODE BLUE
Yuuma Taki is enrolled in the Hokkaido Information University Information Media Faculty of Information Media (4th year).
At university he is focusing on learning about security for lower-level components, such OS and CPU. In his third year of undergraduate school, he worked on trying to implement the OS security mechanism "KASLR", at Sechack365.
Currently, he is learning about ROP derivative technology and embedded equipment security.
[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...CODE BLUE
In October 2021, we published the first analysis of Wslink – a unique loader likely linked to the Lazarus group. Most samples are packed and protected with an advanced virtual machine (VM) obfuscator; the samples contain no clear artifacts and we initially did not associate the obfuscation with a publicly known VM, but we later managed to connect it to CodeVirtualizer. This VM introduces several additional obfuscation techniques such as insertion of junk code, encoding of virtual operands, duplication of virtual opcodes, opaque predicates, merging of virtual instructions, and a nested VM.
Our presentation analyzes the internals of the VM and describes our semi automated approach to “see through” the obfuscation techniques in reasonable time. We demonstrate the approach on some bytecode from a protected sample and compare the results with a non-obfuscated sample, found subsequent to starting our analysis, confirming the method’s validity. Our solution is based on a known deobfuscation method that extracts the semantics of the virtual opcodes, using symbolic execution with simplifying rules. We further treat the bytecode chunks and some internal constructs of the VM as concrete values instead of as symbolic ones, enabling the known deobfuscation method to deal with the additional obfuscation techniques automatically.
[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...CODE BLUE
Kimsuky is a North Korean APT possibly controlled by North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau. Based on reports from the Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA) and other vendors, TeamT5 identified that Kimsuky's most active group, CloudDragon, built a workflow functioning as a "Credential Factory," collecting and exploiting these massive credentials.
The credential factory powers CloudDragon to start its espionage campaigns. CloudDragon's campaigns have aligned with DPRK's interests, targeting the organizations and key figures playing a role in the DPRK relationship. Our database suggested that CloudDragon has possibly infiltrated targets in South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Victims include think tanks, NGOs, media agencies, educational institutes, and many individuals.
CloudDragon's "Credential Factory" can be divided into three small cycles, "Daily Cycle," "Campaign Cycle," and "Post-exploit Cycle." The"Daily Cycle" can collect massive credentials and use the stolen credentials to accelerate its APT life cycle.
In the "Campaign Cycle," CloudDragon develops many new malware. While we responded to CloudDragon's incidents, we found that the actor still relied on BabyShark malware. CloudDragon once used BabyShark to deploy a new browser extension malware targeting victims' browsers. Moreover, CloudDragon is also developing a shellcode-based malware, Dust.
In the "Post-exploit Cycle," the actor relied on hacking tools rather than malicious backdoors. We also identified that the actor used remote desktop software to prevent detection.
In this presentation, we will go through some of the most significant operations conducted by CloudDragon, and more importantly, we will provide possible scenarios of future invasions for defense and detection.
[cb22] From Parroting to Echoing: The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...CODE BLUE
Social media is no doubt a critical battlefield for threat actors to launch InfoOps, especially in a critical moment such as wartime or the election season. We have seen Bot-Driven Information Operations (InfoOps, aka influence campaign) have attempted to spread disinformation, incite protests in the physical world, and doxxing against journalists.
China's Bots-Driven InfoOps, despite operating on a massive scale, are often considered to have low impact and very little organic engagement. In this talk, we will share our observations on these persistent Bots-Driven InfoOps and dissect their harmful disinformation campaigns circulated in cyberspace.
In the past, most bots-driven operations simply parroted narratives of the Chinese propaganda machine, mechanically disseminating the same propaganda and disinformation artifacts made by Chinese state media. However, recently, we saw the newly created bots turn to post artifacts in a livelier manner. They utilized various tactics, including reposting screenshots of forum posts and disguised as members of “Milk Tea Alliance,” to create a false appearance that such content is being echoed across cyberspace.
We particularly focus on an ongoing China's bots-driven InfoOps targeting Taiwan, which we dub "Operation ChinaRoot." Starting in mid-2021, the bots have been disseminating manipulated information about Taiwan's local politics and Covid-19 measures. Our further investigation has also identified the linkage between Operation ChinaRoot and other Chinese state-linked networks such as DRAGONBRIDGE and Spamouflage.
[cb22] Who is the Mal-Gopher? - Implementation and Evaluation of “gimpfuzzy”...CODE BLUE
Malwares written in Go is increasing every year. Go's cross-platform nature makes it an opportune language for attackers who wish to target multiple platforms. On the other hand, the statically linked libraries make it difficult to distinguish between user functions and libraries, making it difficult for analysts to analyze. This situation has increased the demand for Go malware classification and exploration.
In this talk, we will demonstrate the feasibility of computing similarity and classification of Go malware using a newly proposed method called gimpfuzzy. We have implemented "gimpfuzzy", which incorporates Fuzzy Hashing into the existing gimphash method. In this talk, we will verify the discrimination rate of the classification using the proposed method and confirm the validity of the proposed method by discussing some examples from the classified results. We will also discuss issues in Go-malware classification.
[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...CODE BLUE
Malware analysts normally obtain IP addresses of the malware's command & control (C2) servers by analyzing samples. This approach works in commoditized attacks or campaigns. However, with targeted attacks using APT malware, it's difficult to acquire a sufficient number of samples for organizations other than antivirus companies. As a result, malware C2 IOCs collected by a single organization are just the tip of the iceberg.
For years, I have reversed the C2 protocols of high-profile APT malware families then discovered the active C2 servers on the Internet by emulating the protocols. In this presentation, I will explain how to emulate the protocols of two long-term pieces of malware used by PRC-linked cyber espionage threat actors: Winnti 4.0 and ShadowPad.
Both pieces of malware support multiple C2 protocols like TCP/TLS/HTTP/HTTPS/UDP. It's also common to have different data formats and encoding algorithms per each protocol in one piece of malware. I'll cover the protocol details while referring to unique functions such as server-mode in Winnti 4.0 and multiple protocol listening at a single port in ShadowPad. Additionally, I'll share the findings regarding the Internet-wide C2 scanning and its limitations.
After the presentation, I'll publish over 140 C2 IOCs with the date ranges in which they were discovered. These dates are more helpful than just IP address information since the C2s are typically found on hosted servers, meaning that the C2 could sometimes exist on a specific IP only for a very limited time. 65% of these IOCs have 0 detection on VirusTotal as of the time of this writing.
[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...CODE BLUE
We are swamped with new types of malware every day. The goal of malware analysis is not to reveal every single detail of the malware. It is more important to develop tools for efficiency or introduce automation to avoid repeating the same analysis process. Therefore, malware analysts usually actively develop tools and build analysis systems. On the other hand, it costs a lot for such tool developments and system maintenance. Incident trends change daily, and malware keeps evolving. However, it is not easy to keep up with new threats. Malware analysts spend a long time maintaining their analysis systems, and it results in reducing their time for necessary analysis of new types of malware.
To solve these problems, we incorporate DevOps practices into malware analysis to reduce the cost of system maintenance by using CI/CD and Serverless. This presentation shares our experience on how CI/CD, Serverless, and other cloud technologies can be used to streamline malware analysis. Specifically, the following case studies are discussed.
* Malware C2 Monitoring
* Malware Hunting using Cloud
* YARA CI/CD system
* Malware Analysis System on Cloud
* Memory Forensic on Cloud
Through the above case studies, we will share the benefits and tips of using the cloud and show how to build a similar system using Infrastructure as Code (IaC). The audience will learn how to improve the efficiency of malware analysis and build a malware analysis system using Cloud infrastructure.
Adjusting primitives for graph : SHORT REPORT / NOTESSubhajit Sahu
Graph algorithms, like PageRank Compressed Sparse Row (CSR) is an adjacency-list based graph representation that is
Multiply with different modes (map)
1. Performance of sequential execution based vs OpenMP based vector multiply.
2. Comparing various launch configs for CUDA based vector multiply.
Sum with different storage types (reduce)
1. Performance of vector element sum using float vs bfloat16 as the storage type.
Sum with different modes (reduce)
1. Performance of sequential execution based vs OpenMP based vector element sum.
2. Performance of memcpy vs in-place based CUDA based vector element sum.
3. Comparing various launch configs for CUDA based vector element sum (memcpy).
4. Comparing various launch configs for CUDA based vector element sum (in-place).
Sum with in-place strategies of CUDA mode (reduce)
1. Comparing various launch configs for CUDA based vector element sum (in-place).
Techniques to optimize the pagerank algorithm usually fall in two categories. One is to try reducing the work per iteration, and the other is to try reducing the number of iterations. These goals are often at odds with one another. Skipping computation on vertices which have already converged has the potential to save iteration time. Skipping in-identical vertices, with the same in-links, helps reduce duplicate computations and thus could help reduce iteration time. Road networks often have chains which can be short-circuited before pagerank computation to improve performance. Final ranks of chain nodes can be easily calculated. This could reduce both the iteration time, and the number of iterations. If a graph has no dangling nodes, pagerank of each strongly connected component can be computed in topological order. This could help reduce the iteration time, no. of iterations, and also enable multi-iteration concurrency in pagerank computation. The combination of all of the above methods is the STICD algorithm. [sticd] For dynamic graphs, unchanged components whose ranks are unaffected can be skipped altogether.
Opendatabay - Open Data Marketplace.pptxOpendatabay
Opendatabay.com unlocks the power of data for everyone. Open Data Marketplace fosters a collaborative hub for data enthusiasts to explore, share, and contribute to a vast collection of datasets.
First ever open hub for data enthusiasts to collaborate and innovate. A platform to explore, share, and contribute to a vast collection of datasets. Through robust quality control and innovative technologies like blockchain verification, opendatabay ensures the authenticity and reliability of datasets, empowering users to make data-driven decisions with confidence. Leverage cutting-edge AI technologies to enhance the data exploration, analysis, and discovery experience.
From intelligent search and recommendations to automated data productisation and quotation, Opendatabay AI-driven features streamline the data workflow. Finding the data you need shouldn't be a complex. Opendatabay simplifies the data acquisition process with an intuitive interface and robust search tools. Effortlessly explore, discover, and access the data you need, allowing you to focus on extracting valuable insights. Opendatabay breaks new ground with a dedicated, AI-generated, synthetic datasets.
Leverage these privacy-preserving datasets for training and testing AI models without compromising sensitive information. Opendatabay prioritizes transparency by providing detailed metadata, provenance information, and usage guidelines for each dataset, ensuring users have a comprehensive understanding of the data they're working with. By leveraging a powerful combination of distributed ledger technology and rigorous third-party audits Opendatabay ensures the authenticity and reliability of every dataset. Security is at the core of Opendatabay. Marketplace implements stringent security measures, including encryption, access controls, and regular vulnerability assessments, to safeguard your data and protect your privacy.
Pursue the Attackers – Identify and Investigate Lateral Movement Based on Behavior Pattern – by Shuhei Tomonaga, Keisuke-Muda
1. Pursue the Attackers
- Identify and Investigate Lateral
Movement Based on Behavior Pattern -
Shusei Tomonaga (JPCERT/CC)
Keisuke Muda (Internet Initiative Japan Inc.)