Whistleblowing in Europe: Legal Protections for Whistleblowers In The EU
EU Sanctions
1. EU Sanctions
by Gabriele Masetti, July 13, 2016
The member states of the EU started imposing sanctions collectively and autonomously in the early
1980s. In the late 1990s, with the launch of the CFSP, the recourse to such diplomatic instruments
increased in number, range and sophistication.1
Under its current framework, EU sanctions derive legal authority from Article 215 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFUE)2
and tend to result in increasingly targeted measures.3
The EU endeavors to implement autonomous4
sanctions with the stated purpose of fighting terrorism
and the proliferationof weapons of mass destruction, to uphold respect for human rights, democracy,
the rule of law and good governance.5
Sanctions are seen as one of the tools pursuant objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) of the EU such as peace, democracy and the respect for the rule of law, human rights and
international law.6
They are also considered holistically, as part of a comprehensive policy approach
involving complementary efforts of political dialogue and diplomacy.7
EU restrictive measuresare currently describedasmeanttobringabouta change inpolicy or activity, as
preventive,non-punitive instrumentsthatare targetedandlimitingadverse consequencesforthose not
directly responsible for the sanctioned actions and policies. Notwithstanding this definition, EU’s
sanctionsdon’talwaysnecessarily aim to change a behavior of induce a cost. More broadly, in practice
other than in theory, they have been consistently employed to signal and constraint.8
1 Clara Portela, Where and why does the EU impose sanctions?, Politique Europeenne, 2005/3 (no. 17), at
https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-europeenne-2005-3-page-83.htm.
2 1. Where a decision, adoptedinaccordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union, provides for the
interruptionor reduction, inpart or completely, of economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, the
Council, actingbya qualifiedmajorityona joint proposalfrom the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
SecurityPolicyand the Commission, shall adopt the necessarymeasures. It shall inform the European Parliament thereof.
2. Where a decisionadoptedinaccordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treatyon EuropeanUnionsoprovides, the Council
mayadopt restrictive measures under the procedure referredto inparagraph1 against natural or legal persons and groups or
non-State entities.
3. The acts referred to in this Article shall include necessary provisions on legal safeguards.
3 FrancescoGiumelli, Paul Ivan, The Effectivenessof EU sanctions:An Analysis of Iran, Belarus, Syria and Myanmar (Burma), The
European Policy Center, November 2013, p.2.
4 Outside of the implementationof sanctions decided bythe UnitedNations Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter.
5 Council of the EuropeanUnion, Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions), 10198/1/04,Brussels, 7 June
2004, at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010198%202004%20REV%201
6 Council of the European Union, Factsheet on EU restrictive measures, Brussels, April 29, 2014, at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/135804.pdf.
7 Ibid.
8 Council of the EuropeanUnion, Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions), 10198/1/04, Brussels, 7 June
2004. It specifies that the purpose of EU’s sanctions is broader, relating to the maintenance or the restoringof international
peace andsecurity, andto reduce to the maximum extent possible unintended consequencesfor non-targetedindividualsand
entities,inthe receiving countryand abroad.
2. EU sanctionsare expected to be reviewed at regular intervals to provide for any adjustment needed,9
have not extra-territorial reach, are publicly notified to the targeted parties, can be appealed to the
Council of the European Union, or challenged before the General Court of the EU.10
Recourse tosuch policyinstrumentsrequiresunanimousagreementby all member states. Decisions by
the Council of the European Union pertaining to arms embargoes and travel bans are directly binding
and directly implemented by each member state.11
Asset freezes and export bans require a specific
Regulation to acquire full legal effect, which in turn is directly binding toward EU citizens and
businesses.12
In these cases, decisions regarding sanctions at the EU level are initiated with the
European External Action Service and translated into proposals by the European Commission’s
DepartmentforForeignPolicyInstruments (FPI) for adoption as EU law by the Council of the European
Union.13
Arms embargoes cover the sale, supply, transport of goods included in an EU common military list, as
well as the technical and financial assistance. The embargo might extend to dual use goods and
technologiesaswell asequipmentdeemedusable forinternal repression.14
Assets freezes target funds
and economicresourcesownedorcontrolledby specific individuals or entities and extend to business
transactions, investments, and provision of resources to the targeted parties.15
Visa and travel bans
prevent traveling in of the territory of the EU.
As of December2013, the EU has usedrestrictive measures33times,with32 percentof the total onlyin
the period2010-2011. 16
The language justifyingthe measures implemented to date highlights the five
principal typesof contingencies drivingEU restrictive measures:(1) conflictmanagement;(2) promotion
of democracyandhumanrights;(3) post conflictstabilization;(4) non-proliferation; and (5) terrorism.17
In assessing the EU regime of sanctions it is important to underline that, as a unique international
political construct – one substantiallylackingthe collective capacitytoenforce itsdecisionsbyforce, yet
one collectively representing a substantial share of the world’s economic market - the EU has
traditionallycome toincreasinglyrelyuponsoftpoweras a way to conceptualize and operationalize its
identity and actions on the arena of foreign policy. In that respect, the track records of restrictive
measuresreflectsthe perceived role and status of the EU as a normative, soft power. Another singular
trait of EU sanctionsisthat so far theyhave beenusedconcurrentlywith other diplomatic instruments,
9 Council of the European Union, Factsheet on EU restrictive measures, Brussels, April 29, 2014, at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/135804.pdf.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13
Information acquired via the Websites of the European Commission and the Council of the European Union at
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/what-we-do/sanctions_en.htm and http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/
14 Council of the European Union, Factsheet on EU restrictive measures, Brussels, April 29, 2014.
15 Ibid.
16 Dina Esfandiary, Assessing the European Union’s sanctions Policy:Iranas a Case Study, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium,
Non-Proliferation Papers, No. 34, December 2013.
17 FrancescoGiumelli, Paul Ivan, The Effectiveness of EU sanctions: An Analysis of Iran, Belarus, Syria and Myanmar (Burma),
The European Policy Center, November 2013, p.12.
3. such as political dialogue, incentives, and financial aid.18
In fact, in 2013, the then Swedish Foreign
Minister mentioned that there he could scarcely remember a meeting with his peers at the EU level
where sanctions had not been discussed.19
Key EU normative:
Reg.881/2002 of May 27, 2002 imposingcertainspecificrestrictive measuresdirectedagainst
certainpersonsandentitiesassociatedwithUsamabinLaden,the Al-Qaidanetworkandthe
Taliban,andrepealingCouncilRegulation(EC) No467/2001 prohibitingthe exportof certain
goodsand servicestoAfghanistan,strengtheningthe flightbanandextendingthe freeze of
fundsandother financial resourcesinrespectof the Talibanof Afghanistan,at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:139:0009:0022:EN:PDF.
Council of the EuropeanUnion,BasicPrinciplesonthe Use of Restrictive Measures(Sanctions),
10198/1/04, Brussels,7June 2004, at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010198%202004%20REV%201
Council of the EuropeanUnion,Guidelinesonimplementationandevaluationof restrictive
measures(sanctions)inthe frameworkof the EU CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy,new
elements,9068, Brussels,April 30,2013, at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209068%202013%20INIT
Council Reg.(EU) No 833/2014 of July31, 2014 concerningrestrictive measuresinview of
Russia’sactionsdestabilizingthe situationinUkraine,at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0833&from=EN
FactsheetonEU restrictive measures,Brussels,April 29,2014, at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/135804.pdf
C (2015) 6477 final of September25,2015, CommissionGuidance onthe implementationof
certainprovisionsof Regulation(EU) No833/2014, at
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/documents/russia_sanctions/1_act_part1_v2_en.pdf
(Measuresof sectoral cooperationandexchangeswiththe RussianFederation)
Other important documents:
Link to the restrictive measures in force:
http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf
Linkto the European External Action Service and the “Consolidated list of persons, groups and
entities subject to EU financial sanctions”: http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/consol-
list/index_en.htm
18 Ibid. See alsoCouncil of the European Union, Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (sanctions), 10198/1/04,
Brussels, June 7, 2004, at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010198%202004%20REV%201.
19 See statement of Carl Bildt, on April 9, 2013 at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, at
http://carnegieindia.org/2013/04/09/assessing-efficacy-of-sanctions-for-nonproliferation/iv9e.