2-5-2012




    New thinking on the politics of development: 
    New thinking on the politics of development:
             From incentives to ideas? 

                       Insights from Uganda

                 Sam Hickey, IDPM, University of Manchester
    Co‐Research Director, Effective States and Inclusive Development Centre

               Seminar on Rethinking State, Economy and Society: 
      Political settlements and transformation potential of African States.
                     27 April 2012, IOB, University of Antwerp




      Effective States and Inclusive Development 
                 (ESID) Research Centre
•       www.effective‐states.org
        www effective‐states org

•       “What kinds of politics can help secure inclusive 
        development & how can these be promoted?”

•       Based at the Institute for Development Policy and 
        Management (IDPM), University of Manchester, 

•       Partner countries: Ghana, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda, 
        Bangladesh, India 




                                                                                    1
2-5-2012




                           Structure
• Rethinking the politics of development 
   – Problems with the new mainstream


• The new politics of development in Uganda: 
  towards structural transformation?

• Implications: theory and practice




         Beyond new institutionalism
• “…historical political economy offer(s) a more robust 
  explanation of institutional change and development than new 
  institutional economics” (di John and Putzel 2009: 6)
              l            ” (d h     d      l        )
   – ‘political settlements’ Mushtaq Khan (2000, 2010)

• Historical institutionalism: theories of path generation 
   – ‘Limited access orders’ (North, Wallis & Weingast 2009)
   – Autonomy, interests, power and coalitions (Mahoney and Thelen 2011)

• Some important differences (e.g. on capitalism) but more unites 
  than separates them viz. earlier work

• Increasingly influential: theory and practice




                                                                                 2
2-5-2012




                           Key insights 
• Elite bargaining as central to political settlements/social order
   – Elites centralise violence and establish institutions that align the 
     distribution of benefits with the underlying distribution of power 
     (Khan 2010). 
   – Elite bargains give rise to institutions that shape social change; in 
     ‘limited access orders’ these involve special deals based on 
     personalistic ties not impersonal organisations (North et al 2009)

• Explains how rent‐seeking & patronage dominates the politics 
  of development in most developing countries

• Shapes the capacity of the state to act and establishes the 
  incentives to which elites respond
   – Explains the failure of the good governance agenda




                     Critical problems
• Problems of application
   – Limited elaboration and testing to date
     Limited elaboration and testing to date
   – Danger of conceptual over‐reach


• Intrinsic: ontological oversights
   – Elitist: downplays the role of subordinate groups 
   – Foundational: lack proximity to policy and policy actors
                          p       y p y             p y
   – Rational‐actor approach: tends to overlook the role of 
     ideology, beliefs, discursive politics (e.g. nationalism)
   – Tend towards methodological nationalism




                                                                                    3
2-5-2012




      Materialism/incentives vs. ideas 
• Khan: elites as rational actors intent only on securing and 
  maintaining power. Ideology important only in keeping ruling 
              gp              gy p             y       p g     g
  coalitions together 

• North et al (2009: 262): beliefs as an outcome of different 
  social orders not a cause: “Controlling violence through rent‐
  seeking results in a society based on personal identities and 
  privilege”: rules out ideas around equality or impersonality

• Broader literature takes more account of ideas
   – Nationalism, national identity and developmental states (e.g. SE Asia)
   – Critical to social democracy in South: Sandbrook et al (2007) on 
     programmatic political parties; Singh (2010): ‘we‐ness’ and ‘equality’
   – Clarke (2012): ‘incentives’ versus ‘idealist’ approaches to the English 
     Industrial Revolution: ‘historical materialism’ as a hybrid approach




 Insights from beyond the mainstream
• African studies, e.g. ‘negotiated statehood’
   – ““…states are not only the product and realm of bureaucrats, policies 
                          l h        d      d    l   fb                li i
     and institutions, but also of imageries, symbols and discourses. 
     (Hagmann and Peclard 2010: 543). 
   – “By these and other processes, political power in Africa is increasingly 
     ‘internationalized’ and statehood partly suspended (Schlichte, 2008).” 
     (Hagmannn and Peclard 2010: 556), with reference to China, South‐
     South transfers, transnational migration etc. 

• Critical political theory and cultural political economy
  Critical political theory and cultural political economy
   – e.g. Jessop’s (2007) strategic‐relational approach to state power
   – Discursive hegemonic strategies central to state power
   – Transnational: “international relations intertwine with these internal 
     relations of nation‐states, creating new, unique and historically 
     concrete combinations”. 




                                                                                       4
2-5-2012




Thinking about the politics of inclusive development: 
               a relational approach




                                                               5
2-5-2012




               Trends in PAF funding 1997/98‐20010/11




1997/98 - 2005/06 (PEAP evaluation: PSR 2005); 2007/10 (BPR excluding donors
for 2008-9); 2010-11: National BFP 10/11-14/15; 2011-12: National BFP 11/12-15/15




    Allocations & Performance: Roads and Energy




                                                                                          6
2-5-2012




        Uganda’s new political economy




          Domestic/aid shares of budget




Source: 2003/4 (BTTB 2009/10); 2004/5-2006/7 (BTTB 2010/11); 2007/08-20010/11
(BTTB 2011:43); 2011/12 (Budget Speech 2011). *= Budget




                                                                                      7
2-5-2012




       The return of multi‐partyism




• Shoring up the ruling coalition
• Deepened the clientelistic political settlement
• The ambiguous politicisation of policy-making
   •Personalised patronage; but also programmatic?




                      Ideas matter
• Political/Presidential discourse on ‘modernisation’ 
  and  transformation
  and ‘transformation’
   – Historical: reignited by political/political economy shifts


• NDP: no poverty data; review of E Asian experience

• Transnational
   – World Bank Country Memo (2007): gains traction amongst 
     some leading technocrats
   – Financial crisis further undermines neoliberalism




                                                                         8
2-5-2012




                                    A new convergence?
       • ‘As economic tectonic 
         plates have shifted, 
         paradigms must shift too’
              di         t hift t ’
       • ‘This is no longer about the 
         Washington Consensus’ 
       • ‘Securing transformation’
            – Robert Zoellick, WB President 
              (Sept 2010)

       • Th ‘
         The ‘new structural 
                           l
         economics’
            – Justin Lin, Chief Economist 

       • BUT: an idea without 
         agency on the ground




                  Will the NDP be implemented?
INITIAL
CONDIT                                                IDEOLOGY & DISCOURSE
                                              ‘Transformation’ displaces PWC (growth &
  IONS      POLITICAL
                                              poverty) but lacks agency in policy circles
                                                                                                                                  ??
 New oil    ECONOMY
  finds;;   Oil & rising powers
declinin    displace trad donors
 g food
                                     POLITICAL                                 COALITIONS                    DEVELOPMENT
security;   Growth creates new       SETTLEMENTS                               AND PACTS*                    STRATEGY
  rising    constituencies                                                     In transit: pro-              Transformation?
 cost of
                                     Ruling coalition                          poor pact (aid,               Jobless growth?
 living;
                                     narrowing,                                MoF & CSOs)                   Social protection?
  rising
                                     reduced                                   broken
  youth                                                        C&C
unemplo                              legitimacy?
                                                                               New deals &
 yment                                                                                                       DELIVERY
                                     Remains highly                            actors required
                                                                                                             MECHANISMS
            INSTITUTIONAL            clientelistic                             for new strategy
                                                                                                             Declining PS
            FORMS                                                              not yet in place
                                                                                                             performance
                                                                                                                f
            Presidentialist                                                                                  Districtisation
            ‘Multiparty’ politics
            Subord groups
            disorganised
            Corruption                                                                            Feedback


                    UNDERLYING CONDITIONS FOR                                      PROXIMATE CONDITIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT
                          DEVELOPMENT




                                                                                                                                             9
2-5-2012




                           Implications
• Achieving structural transformation requires more than a new 
  political and political context and a new strategy
   – Shifts in elite‐level relations are critical: but within policy coalitions as 
     well as political coalitions
   – Ideas matter: not just about incentives
   – Transnational factors (actors, flows) interplay with both

• Theory 
   – Need to go beyond the new mainstream: critical insights from the 
     margins

• Practice 
   – Ideas (not just institutions) provide external actors with an interface 
     for engagement
   – Developing agents for structural transformation?




                      Introducing ESID
• A six‐year research consortium funded by the UK 
   epa e o           e a o a e e op e
  Department for International Development

• One of four new consortia focused on governance

• Roughly £6.25 mn, 2011‐2016

• Research, capacity‐strengthening & uptake

• Moving into primary research phase now




                                                                                           10
2-5-2012




                     Who are we?
•   Based at the Institute for Development Policy and 
    Management (IDPM) and the B k W ld P
    M               (IDPM) d h Brooks World Poverty 
    Institute (BWPI), University of Manchester, 
•   CEO: David.Hulme@manchester.ac.uk
•   Research Directors: Sam.Hickey@manchester.ac.uk; 
    Kunal.Sen@manchester.ac.uk
Consortium partners: 
            p
•   Institute for Economic Growth, India
•   BRAC Development Institute, Bangladesh
•   University of Malawi
•   Centre for Democratic Development, Ghana
•   Centre for International Development at KSG, Harvard. 




      ESID’s Core research questions
What kinds of politics can help secure inclusive 
  development & how can these be promoted?

1.   What capacities do states require to help deliver inclusive 
     development? 

2.   What shapes elite commitment to delivering inclusive 
       h h        l                   d l          l
     development and state effectiveness? 

3.   Under what conditions do developmental forms of state 
     capacity and elite commitment emerge and become 
     sustained? 




                                                                         11
2-5-2012




                     Research programmes
1.       Concepts, Theory and Measurement
2.       The Politics of Accumulation
     •      Development and growth strategies
     •      Natural resources: exploitation and governance
3.       The Politics of Social Provisioning
     •      Basic services; social protection; focus on implementation
4.       The Politics of Recognition
                             g
     •      Elite commitment to inclusion (e.g. quotas, anti‐discrimination)
     •      Impact of inclusion on state capacity and development outcomes
5.       The Transnational Politics of Development
     •      New geopolitics of aid (e.g. non‐traditional donors, new approaches 
            to governance reform)
     •      Beyond aid: transnational drivers of capacity and commitment




                                                                                        12

Ppt hickey sh antwerp seminar april 2012 presentation

  • 1.
    2-5-2012 New thinking on the politics of development:  New thinking on the politics of development: From incentives to ideas?  Insights from Uganda Sam Hickey, IDPM, University of Manchester Co‐Research Director, Effective States and Inclusive Development Centre Seminar on Rethinking State, Economy and Society:  Political settlements and transformation potential of African States. 27 April 2012, IOB, University of Antwerp Effective States and Inclusive Development  (ESID) Research Centre • www.effective‐states.org www effective‐states org • “What kinds of politics can help secure inclusive  development & how can these be promoted?” • Based at the Institute for Development Policy and  Management (IDPM), University of Manchester,  • Partner countries: Ghana, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda,  Bangladesh, India  1
  • 2.
    2-5-2012 Structure • Rethinking the politics of development  – Problems with the new mainstream • The new politics of development in Uganda:  towards structural transformation? • Implications: theory and practice Beyond new institutionalism • “…historical political economy offer(s) a more robust  explanation of institutional change and development than new  institutional economics” (di John and Putzel 2009: 6) l ” (d h d l ) – ‘political settlements’ Mushtaq Khan (2000, 2010) • Historical institutionalism: theories of path generation  – ‘Limited access orders’ (North, Wallis & Weingast 2009) – Autonomy, interests, power and coalitions (Mahoney and Thelen 2011) • Some important differences (e.g. on capitalism) but more unites  than separates them viz. earlier work • Increasingly influential: theory and practice 2
  • 3.
    2-5-2012 Key insights  • Elite bargaining as central to political settlements/social order – Elites centralise violence and establish institutions that align the  distribution of benefits with the underlying distribution of power  (Khan 2010).  – Elite bargains give rise to institutions that shape social change; in  ‘limited access orders’ these involve special deals based on  personalistic ties not impersonal organisations (North et al 2009) • Explains how rent‐seeking & patronage dominates the politics  of development in most developing countries • Shapes the capacity of the state to act and establishes the  incentives to which elites respond – Explains the failure of the good governance agenda Critical problems • Problems of application – Limited elaboration and testing to date Limited elaboration and testing to date – Danger of conceptual over‐reach • Intrinsic: ontological oversights – Elitist: downplays the role of subordinate groups  – Foundational: lack proximity to policy and policy actors p y p y p y – Rational‐actor approach: tends to overlook the role of  ideology, beliefs, discursive politics (e.g. nationalism) – Tend towards methodological nationalism 3
  • 4.
    2-5-2012 Materialism/incentives vs. ideas  • Khan: elites as rational actors intent only on securing and  maintaining power. Ideology important only in keeping ruling  gp gy p y p g g coalitions together  • North et al (2009: 262): beliefs as an outcome of different  social orders not a cause: “Controlling violence through rent‐ seeking results in a society based on personal identities and  privilege”: rules out ideas around equality or impersonality • Broader literature takes more account of ideas – Nationalism, national identity and developmental states (e.g. SE Asia) – Critical to social democracy in South: Sandbrook et al (2007) on  programmatic political parties; Singh (2010): ‘we‐ness’ and ‘equality’ – Clarke (2012): ‘incentives’ versus ‘idealist’ approaches to the English  Industrial Revolution: ‘historical materialism’ as a hybrid approach Insights from beyond the mainstream • African studies, e.g. ‘negotiated statehood’ – ““…states are not only the product and realm of bureaucrats, policies  l h d d l fb li i and institutions, but also of imageries, symbols and discourses.  (Hagmann and Peclard 2010: 543).  – “By these and other processes, political power in Africa is increasingly  ‘internationalized’ and statehood partly suspended (Schlichte, 2008).”  (Hagmannn and Peclard 2010: 556), with reference to China, South‐ South transfers, transnational migration etc.  • Critical political theory and cultural political economy Critical political theory and cultural political economy – e.g. Jessop’s (2007) strategic‐relational approach to state power – Discursive hegemonic strategies central to state power – Transnational: “international relations intertwine with these internal  relations of nation‐states, creating new, unique and historically  concrete combinations”.  4
  • 5.
  • 6.
    2-5-2012 Trends in PAF funding 1997/98‐20010/11 1997/98 - 2005/06 (PEAP evaluation: PSR 2005); 2007/10 (BPR excluding donors for 2008-9); 2010-11: National BFP 10/11-14/15; 2011-12: National BFP 11/12-15/15 Allocations & Performance: Roads and Energy 6
  • 7.
    2-5-2012 Uganda’s new political economy Domestic/aid shares of budget Source: 2003/4 (BTTB 2009/10); 2004/5-2006/7 (BTTB 2010/11); 2007/08-20010/11 (BTTB 2011:43); 2011/12 (Budget Speech 2011). *= Budget 7
  • 8.
    2-5-2012 The return of multi‐partyism • Shoring up the ruling coalition • Deepened the clientelistic political settlement • The ambiguous politicisation of policy-making •Personalised patronage; but also programmatic? Ideas matter • Political/Presidential discourse on ‘modernisation’  and  transformation and ‘transformation’ – Historical: reignited by political/political economy shifts • NDP: no poverty data; review of E Asian experience • Transnational – World Bank Country Memo (2007): gains traction amongst  some leading technocrats – Financial crisis further undermines neoliberalism 8
  • 9.
    2-5-2012 A new convergence? • ‘As economic tectonic  plates have shifted,  paradigms must shift too’ di t hift t ’ • ‘This is no longer about the  Washington Consensus’  • ‘Securing transformation’ – Robert Zoellick, WB President  (Sept 2010) • Th ‘ The ‘new structural  l economics’ – Justin Lin, Chief Economist  • BUT: an idea without  agency on the ground Will the NDP be implemented? INITIAL CONDIT IDEOLOGY & DISCOURSE ‘Transformation’ displaces PWC (growth & IONS POLITICAL poverty) but lacks agency in policy circles ?? New oil ECONOMY finds;; Oil & rising powers declinin displace trad donors g food POLITICAL COALITIONS DEVELOPMENT security; Growth creates new SETTLEMENTS AND PACTS* STRATEGY rising constituencies In transit: pro- Transformation? cost of Ruling coalition poor pact (aid, Jobless growth? living; narrowing, MoF & CSOs) Social protection? rising reduced broken youth C&C unemplo legitimacy? New deals & yment DELIVERY Remains highly actors required MECHANISMS INSTITUTIONAL clientelistic for new strategy Declining PS FORMS not yet in place performance f Presidentialist Districtisation ‘Multiparty’ politics Subord groups disorganised Corruption Feedback UNDERLYING CONDITIONS FOR PROXIMATE CONDITIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT 9
  • 10.
    2-5-2012 Implications • Achieving structural transformation requires more than a new  political and political context and a new strategy – Shifts in elite‐level relations are critical: but within policy coalitions as  well as political coalitions – Ideas matter: not just about incentives – Transnational factors (actors, flows) interplay with both • Theory  – Need to go beyond the new mainstream: critical insights from the  margins • Practice  – Ideas (not just institutions) provide external actors with an interface  for engagement – Developing agents for structural transformation? Introducing ESID • A six‐year research consortium funded by the UK  epa e o e a o a e e op e Department for International Development • One of four new consortia focused on governance • Roughly £6.25 mn, 2011‐2016 • Research, capacity‐strengthening & uptake • Moving into primary research phase now 10
  • 11.
    2-5-2012 Who are we? • Based at the Institute for Development Policy and  Management (IDPM) and the B k W ld P M (IDPM) d h Brooks World Poverty  Institute (BWPI), University of Manchester,  • CEO: David.Hulme@manchester.ac.uk • Research Directors: Sam.Hickey@manchester.ac.uk;  Kunal.Sen@manchester.ac.uk Consortium partners:  p • Institute for Economic Growth, India • BRAC Development Institute, Bangladesh • University of Malawi • Centre for Democratic Development, Ghana • Centre for International Development at KSG, Harvard.  ESID’s Core research questions What kinds of politics can help secure inclusive  development & how can these be promoted? 1. What capacities do states require to help deliver inclusive  development?  2. What shapes elite commitment to delivering inclusive  h h l d l l development and state effectiveness?  3. Under what conditions do developmental forms of state  capacity and elite commitment emerge and become  sustained?  11
  • 12.
    2-5-2012 Research programmes 1. Concepts, Theory and Measurement 2. The Politics of Accumulation • Development and growth strategies • Natural resources: exploitation and governance 3. The Politics of Social Provisioning • Basic services; social protection; focus on implementation 4. The Politics of Recognition g • Elite commitment to inclusion (e.g. quotas, anti‐discrimination) • Impact of inclusion on state capacity and development outcomes 5. The Transnational Politics of Development • New geopolitics of aid (e.g. non‐traditional donors, new approaches  to governance reform) • Beyond aid: transnational drivers of capacity and commitment 12