The main aim of this paper is to examine why the post-Soviet states don’t recognize Kosovo’s independence. This paper is meant to serve as information to the public in Kosovo with regard to this issue. For this purpose, through the revision of scholarly literature (books and periodicals), online publications, conference reports and official statements, it analyzes the present stance of these states towards Kosovo’s declaration of independence and attempts to explain the major tendency towards non-recognition. The paper stresses strong regional political and economic ties and the existence of local territorial disputes (separatist movements) by the post-Soviet states as the central impediments to Kosovo’s recognition.

1. 1
Why do the post-
Soviet states not
recognize Kosovo?
Mikita Cherkasau*
October 2013
*
Mikita Cherkasau was an intern at GAP Institute in 2012 after he finished his
internship at the Kosovo Law Center in Prishtina. Being originally from Minsk,
Belarus, he holds a Bachelor degree in International and European Law from the
European Humanities University in Vilnius, Lithuania, Belarusian University in
exile, and is currently finishing two Master degrees in International Relations from
Lazarski University in Warsaw, Poland, and the University of Wales in Cardiff,
Wales. He worked as a lawyer, researcher and journalist in his home country as
well as abroad. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do
not necessarily represent the views of GAP Institute.

2. 2
Table of Contents
1. Introduction..................................................................................................... 4
2. Armenia ........................................................................................................... 4
3. Azerbaijan........................................................................................................ 6
4. Georgia............................................................................................................. 7
5. Kazakhstan...................................................................................................... 9
6. Ukraine........................................................................................................... 10
7. Moldova......................................................................................................... 11
8. Belarus............................................................................................................ 13
9. Uzbekistan..................................................................................................... 14
10. Kyrgyzstan .................................................................................................... 15
11. Recognition practice by Baltic States ......................................................... 15
12. Conclusion..................................................................................................... 17
13. Bibliography.................................................................................................. 19

3. 3
Abstract
The main aim of this paper is to examine why the post-Soviet states don’t
recognize Kosovo’s independence. This paper is meant to serve as
information to the public in Kosovo with regard to this issue. For this
purpose, through the revision of scholarly literature (books and
periodicals), online publications, conference reports and official statements,
it analyzes the present stance of these states towards Kosovo’s declaration
of independence and attempts to explain the major tendency towards non-
recognition. The paper stresses strong regional political and economic ties
and the existence of local territorial disputes (separatist movements) by the
post-Soviet states as the central impediments to Kosovo’s recognition.
KEY WORDS: Kosovo’s declaration of independence, secession, recognition
of Kosovo, post-Soviet states.

4. 4
1. Introduction
As there seems to be a shift, though relatively slow, within the international
community from non-recognition towards recognition of Kosovo’s
independence, a significant part of non-recognizing states, namely those
from the post-Soviet space (apart from the Baltic states), are not likely to
join this tendency in the near future.
Despite the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in
1991, the former Soviet states have formed a rather specific group of
sovereign entities that have officially acquired independence, but failed to
conduct democratic transition due to a strong Soviet political, social and
cultural heritage, the Baltics excluded. This makes them considerably
dependent on Russia, the most powerful of the successor states. It also did
not give them an impetus to respect the right of self-determination.
In this context, the case of Kosovo appears to be a distinctive instance in the
post-Cold War world, which obviously illustrates the aversion of the post-
Soviet states to secessionism, and thus the pivotal aim of this paper is to
reveal actual reasons for their reluctance to acknowledge Kosovo’s
declaration of independence.
2. Armenia
Today’s political reality in Armenia convincingly demonstrates that
Kosovo’s independence will not be recognized until Armenia accepts
Nagorno-Karabakh1 as a sovereign state. The official stance was
comprehensively expressed by Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan in 2008:
Today one is wondering from time to time why Armenia is not
recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The
answer is simple: for the same reason that it did not recognize
Kosovo's independence. Having the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
Armenia cannot recognize another entity in the same situation as
long as it has not recognized the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.2
Thus, one may rightly ask whether there are any possible solutions for the
“Karabakh problem”. Unfortunately, no satisfactory answer might be found
1
A region in the South Caucasus that is predominantly administered by the Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic, an independent but unrecognized state. Its territory is internationally
considered to be part of Azerbaijan. However, since the end of the war in 1994, the region
has been mostly inhabited by Armenians. The armed conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh broke out in 1988, being heated by nationalist
sentiments from both sides. Despite the fact that ethnic Armenians took over the region, the
issue of Nagorno-Karabakh’s recognition by Armenia remains to be a matter of Armenia’s
position regarding the regional politics.
2
Radio Azatutyun. Armenia Rules Out Abkhazia, South Ossetia Recognition, 4 September 2008,
viewed 28 August 2013, <http://bit.ly/19MEkf3>.

5. 5
at the moment. Due to existing circumstances, the “frozen conflict” between
Armenia and Azerbaijan is likely to preserve the status quo.
The situation emerged around Nagorno-Karabakh certainly illustrates how
the networks of interconnection affect contemporary world politics. Indeed,
the South Caucasus has turned out to be a region where the clash of
cultures is occurring. Undoubtedly, Armenia’s attitude towards the current
status of Nagorno-Karabakh is shaped not merely by domestic political will
but also by the chain of highly interdependent rational preferences of other
powerful global and regional actors, such as the United States, Russia, the
European Union, Turkey, Georgia and Iran. Ironically, some of them are apt
to support both of the opposing sides, as it is, for example, with the case of
the U.S., where the policy on Nagorno-Karabakh is enforced by both
tremendous Armenian lobby and American energy interests in Azerbaijan.3
This kind of balance does probably contribute to current peaceful
coexistence in the region, but obviously hardly affects a further peace
process. However, the American approach to the issue might be considered
as the most consistent one.4
It might seem illogical at first glance that Yerevan5 is reluctant to recognize
the newborn state, especially since Nagorno-Karabakh itself is
predominantly inhabited by Armenians. However, one can observe certain
possible reasons behind it. Firstly, Armenia’s recognition of Karabakh may
possibly be considered by Baku6 as an excuse to quit the peace negotiations
and escalate the conflict. Secondly, Armenia does not want to be excluded
from the dialogue, which is likely to happen if it acknowledges the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as an independent entity. Thirdly, Armenians
do not want the conflict to acquire merely an “Erevan-Baku” format7 and
constantly insist the roundtable should involve three sides (i.e., Karabakh,
as well).
Even though the “Karabakh problem” undoubtedly appears to be one of
the crucial issues in Armenia’s current foreign policy, it has recently been
losing its topicality in the frames of domestic political agenda. No shift in
the local political balance may considerably affect the general policy
towards Karabakh, due to the fact that there is a strong consensus between
the political elites, both the pro-state as well as the opposition. As the
Armenian political scientist Sergey Minasyan posits, it might be related to the
3
Deriglazova L. and Minasyan S. in their Nagorny Karabakh: Paradoksy sily i slabosti v
assymetrichnom konflikte (p.79) emphasize that despite America’s growing interest in
Azerbaijani energy resources and geographical position, Armenia appears to be the main,
after Israel, receiver of direct U.S. financial aid, which in recent 20 years has amounted to
approximately 2 billion dollars. Such an explicit pro-Armenian approach of Washington in
the South Caucasus is explained mostly by the activity of an influential Armenian lobby in
the U.S. The main resource of its power grounds on a large and well-organized Armenian
diaspora, which, being active in the elections and socio-political life, shapes American policy
in the South Caucasus.
4
Ibid, p. 81.
5
The capital of Armenia.
6
The capital of Azerbaijan.
7
Meaning between only Armenia and Azerbaijan.

6. 6
genesis of contemporary statesmen who predominantly emerged during the
Nagorno-Karabakh war.8
Moreover, during the joint press conference with the former President of
Slovenia Danilo Türk, President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan made a
reference to both Kosovo and Karabakh and emphasized that self-
determination inevitably supposes sui generis character of each case
individually:
I am absolutely sure that each case of self-determination is different
and “one size fits all” formula doesn’t apply. However, legal
rulings must emanate from the same principles. The Kosovo
precedent is important for us from the standpoint of the UN
International Court’s unequivocal answer to one particular
question: whether the unilateral declaration of independence
breaches international law or not. The answer was “no”, it does
not. Now, what has happened in case of Karabakh… [A]t the first
opportune moment they exercised their right of self-determination,
i.e. unilaterally declared their independence through the
referendum. As you know, it took place when the Soviet Union was
disintegrating. It means that the people of Nagorno Karabakh acted
in compliance with international law. Azerbaijan unleashed war
on Karabakh – a brutal and exhausting war, violating all military
laws. But Nagorno Karabakh, of course with the assistance of
Armenia and the Armenian people, was able to organize self-
defense. That’s what makes it different: the people of NK were able
to defend themselves without NATO assistance, survive and today
declare out loud – yes, we stand by our independence, we didn’t
violate any international law, and today we wait patiently when
the international community recognizes our right to unilaterally
secede from Azerbaijan. However, I believe that the notion that all
cases are different is indisputable.9
3. Azerbaijan
As for Azerbaijan, it perceives Kosovo’s declaration of independence to be
closely related to its own separatist issues, which supposes that Kosovo
appears to be a theoretically dangerous signal for the settlement of
Azerbaijan’s clash with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. However,
Kosovo and Karabakh arguably seem to possess different statuses.
Despite the fact that Kosovo was regarded as an autonomous province
under the 1946 constitution of Yugoslavia, its status was considerably
advanced in further constitutions of 1963 and 1974. Kosovo’s autonomy
8
Minasyan, S., 2012. ‘Karabakhskiy Konflikt: Vnutripoliticheskoe Izmerenie’. Politcom.ru, 26
September 2012, viewed 15 September 2013, <http://bit.ly/14WP728>.
9
Press Release, Presidents Serzh Sargsyan And Danilo Turk Held Joint Press Conference in
the Framework of the Official Visit of the President of Slovenia to Armenia, 11 October 2010,
viewed 19 September 2013, <http://bit.ly/1dOGLQV>.

7. 7
was enhanced, endowing it with authority likewise the founding six
federative republics enjoyed. Similarly, in its Article 72 the Soviet
constitution declared that each republic preserves the right to secede from
the USSR without restrictions but stated nothing about autonomous
regions.10 The right of secession, however, was not applied in the case of
Nagorno-Karabakh, and the region, predominantly inhabited with
Armenians, was not granted a similar right as other 15 nominal units. If it is
basically implied that the implementation of the right to self-determination
should not break domestic law of a prior state unless an obvious genocide
or apartheid occurs, then Kosovo’s separation produced no breach of
Yugoslavia’s constitution, which, on the contrary, was the case with the
other federative units. Nevertheless, the Soviet constitution deprived
Nagorno-Karabakh of the right to pursue independence.
Nevertheless, while Karabakh and Kosovo appear to constitute different
cases, Azerbaijan and Serbia seem to apply rather similar approaches
towards secession: non-recognition of the newly created states is
indisputable.
4. Georgia
One can scarcely cast doubt on the fact that Georgia’s non-recognition of
Kosovo’s independence is largely explained by its own separatist case in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia had “no intention to recognize the
declaration of Kosovo’s independence”, President Mikheil Saakashvili
stated on 9 May 2008:
We are saying loud and clear that we have never planned to recognize
Kosovo. Nor do we plan to do so in the future. The way out of the
situation that has been chosen is not the best one. The Serbs should
have been given more time for negotiations. The solution for Kosovo
was a hasty one.11
Both cases can be seen not only as simply related but rather as
interdependent to a considerable extent. As Ronald Asmus implies in his
“A Little War that Shook the World”, the case of Kosovo, or, to be precise, the
fact that the United States alongside with its European allies supported
Kosovo’s declaration of independence, had a strong effect on Georgia’s
situation. He argues: “Apart from simply reassuring Georgia that Kosovo would
not set a precedent for frozen conflicts elsewhere, there was no attempt to handle
these two sets of issues as an integrated whole. The West simply underestimated
10
Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1977, viewed
19 September 2013, <http://bit.ly/oiOfmj>.
11
B92.net. Georgia will not recognize Kosovo, 9 May 2008, viewed 28 August 2013,
<http://bit.ly/X7T2sj>.

8. 8
Moscow’s deep-seated and long-standing anger on Kosovo and its willingness to
retaliate against Western policy moves.”12
Asmus puts forward the assumption that the West, having acknowledged
Kosovo’s independence, was not prudent enough and did not trouble itself
with apprehending Russia’s explicit threats of retaliation:
The problem was not that the West did not develop any kind of Plan B
for managing the consequences of that policy for Georgia – either on
the ground or diplomatically with Moscow. This step increased
instability and tension in Abkhazia and South Ossetia at a time when
tensions were already high. Diplomatically the West’s argument
about the uniqueness of Kosovo was a double-edged sword that
Moscow now used to pursue its own interests. Its message was clear:
uniqueness in the Balkans will beget uniqueness elsewhere. If the
West could act with impunity against Moscow’s wishes in the
Balkans, the Kremlin would show that it could act with impunity in
the Southern Caucasus. All of this enhanced Georgia’s vulnerability
by handing Moscow a pretext to move against Tbilisi and helped
trigger the Russian political and military escalation that culminated
in war on August 7, 2008.13
As Asmus posits, “the two cases became interrelated due to “international law,
changing Western diplomatic priorities, and the dynamics of a resurgent Russia
seeking to challenge the United States and Europe.”14 At the first glance, both
conflicts seem to present rather similar instances of separatist ethnic
movements that pursue independence from central authorities. In other
words, it was the common self-determination vs. territorial integrity clash.
However, the resemblance between the encounters is less considerable than
the dissimilarity. In this relation, Asmus points out certain implications,
which are of particular consideration.
First of all, it is a question of demography. In Kosovo, ethnic Albanians
constituted the majority – namely, approximately 90% - of the population,
whereas in Abkhazia, the Abkhaz were the minority and it was the
Georgian population who was subject to ethnic cleansing. Moreover, the
essence of the conflicts is different, Asmus notices. He arguably claims that
Kosovar Albanians had never enjoyed considerable autonomy, neither prior
to the Communist era nor within the former Yugoslavia. On the other hand,
Asmus reckons, the Abkhaz, as the ethnic group, enjoyed a rather advanced
status under the Soviet regime.15
Secondly, Kosovar and Abkhaz statesmen appeared to have radically
different perception of self-government. If the former, under the
international pressure, managed to develop an extensive framework for
12
Asmus, R., 2010. A Little War that Shook the World. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 88.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid, p. 90.
15
Ibid, p. 97.

9. 9
respecting minority rights of Serbs, the latter were reluctant to introduce
non-discriminative approach towards Georgian regions, since it could
undermine the legitimacy of their power.
Thirdly, the moral basis of the cases is different. Serbian authorities
committed grave human rights violations and started an ethnic cleansing
campaign which led to the deaths of thousands of people and the
displacement of more than one million people. Arguably, this gave impetus
to NATO to intervene and stop the atrocities. On the other hand, Georgia
had not committed similar crimes towards South Ossetia and Abkhazia;
contrarily, it was the Georgians who were subject to ethnic cleansing on the
part of the Abkhaz backed by Russians.16
Finally, the most significant difference between the two encounters is the
actual reaction of the international community and its involvement. NATO
initiated humanitarian intervention in the Balkans, while the United
Nations established the interim administration. The OSCE conducted an
extensive mission on institution and democracy-building alongside with
the promotion of human rights and the rule of law. The European Union
provided financial support for economic development and the integration
of the Balkans. The process of final settlement of Kosovo’s status was
authorized by the United Nations, and, consequently, had full international
support. By contrast, Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia were obviously
deprived of that. None of the aforementioned international bodies
demonstrated substantial interest in the region, or, at least, the endeavor to
prevent the conflict.17
5. Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan’s official stance toward the Kosovo’s recognition of
independence was comprehensively expressed by former Prime Minister of
Kazakhstan, Karim Masimov in December 2008: “We have an official position:
Kazakhstan has not recognized Kosovo and does not tend to recognize Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. We consider that borders are defined and Kazakhstan will not
recognize any new states.”18
Generally, when it came to secessionism, Kazakhstan had repeatedly
expressed such attitude. Undoubtedly, as regarding the issues of foreign
policy, Russia and Kazakhstan seem to exercise similar behavior. The
policies of Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev are also of
16 See Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia’s Role in the Conflict (Human
Rights Watch report, March 1995, vol. 7, no. 7).
17
Asmus R., 2010. A Little War that Shook the World. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.99.
18 Polit.ru. Rukovodstvo Kazakstana ne budet priznavat’ nezavisimost’ Abkhazii i Juzhnoi Ossetii, 12
December 2008, viewed 28 August 2013, http://polit.ru/news/2008/12/12/independence/

10. 10
particular consideration. Whatever conflict Kazakhstan reacted to, it had
always explicitly expounded the politics of anti-separatism.
Kazakhstan had continuously been apprehensive about separatism, as it
had its own potential troubles in the ‘90s, when the northern part of the
state could have seceded and enclosed to Russia. And, though this issue
does not apply today, the government is inclined to underline that it is still
against any form of secessionism.
In February 2008, Yerzhan Akshibayev, a representative of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, stated:
The position of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the situation in Kosovo
is based on the United Nations fundamental principles of preservation
of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states within their
internationally recognized borders, on the search for exclusively
peaceful ways of disputes resolution on the basis of provisions
contained in the documents on the crisis settlement, particularly UN
Security Council resolution on the Kosovo peace plan.19
6. Ukraine
When Kosovo’s independence was declared, Ukraine attempted to keep up
with the neutral status towards the issue.20 This neutrality was
accompanied by a considerable amount of uncertainty, which was
convincingly demonstrated in Yulia Tymoshenko’s statement during a joint
briefing with PACE21 President Lluís Maria de Puig in Strasbourg in the
framework of the visit to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe. As she claimed, “it is important to know whether Kosovo is already a
norm, a common practice or a unique event the world should react on.”22
Simultaneously, at the 16th Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council,
Volodymyr Ogryzko, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, expressed
a more strict position: “Non-use of force as a means of settling disputes, respect
for sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of internationally recognized
borders have always been at the heart of my country’s foreign policy. This is why
Ukraine will never compromise on the question of territorial integrity of
19
Izvestia-Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan ne priznaet nezavisimosti Kosovo, 19 February 2008, viewed
28 August 2013, <http://bit.ly/15wrnVD>.
20
Unian. Ukraine’s stance on Kosovo dictated by its desire to keep neutral status, 22 October 2008,
viewed 22 September 2013, <http://bit.ly/17lKRv2>.
21
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe brings together 318
parliamentarians from the Council of Europe’s 47 member states, in order to uphold the
shared values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law that are the "common
heritage" of the peoples of Europe.
22
Office of Mass Media Relations of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Secretariat. Yulia
Tymoshenko: Ukraine will determine its stance concerning Kosovo independence after respective
evaluation of international institutions, 16 April 2008, viewed 22 September 2013,
<http://bit.ly/Z39Htq>.

11. 11
Georgia.”23 It basically implied that any state’s territorial integrity would not
be compromised.
However, when the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on
Kosovo’s declaration of independence acknowledged its compliance with
international law, Ukraine’s attitude did not appear to change. As Press
Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine, Oleksandr Dikusarov said at a
briefing in Kyiv on July 27 2010, “Ukraine's position not to recognize the
independence of Kosovo remains unchanged: relying on basic international legal
documents… Ukraine is committed to the principle of absolute respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states with recognized international
borders.”24
It is obvious that Ukraine practices similar approaches towards any case of
secession – be it Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia or Nagorno
Karabakh. However, what drives its aversion to secessionism is a debatable
question. It might supposedly stem from Ukraine’s own fears of domestic
separatism - as it can be the case of Crimea or Western Ukraine - but at the
moment there seems to be no indicators of any particularly considerable
and active separatist movements within the country. It might also be
assumed that Ukraine would fall under Russia’s influence in relation to the
issues of separatism.
7. Moldova
Moldova does not tend to recognise Kosovo’s independence because it does
not want to create a precedent for the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic
(hereinafter – Transnistria), a state with limited recognition emerged two
decades ago, which was also followed by a military conflict with the
intervention of Russian forces. Today, it is considered to be one of the post-
Soviet ‘frozen conflicts.’25 It is worth elaborating on the causes of the
conflict as well as on the implications on its settlement, since it generally
presents a relevant subject to the case of Kosovo.
Though the main initial sources of the conflict seem to have ceased to exist,
the confrontation has given birth to legitimate preferences that played a
substantial role in safeguarding the ‘frozen’ status-quo. Additionally,
influential foreign powers, though declaring the endeavour to reach the
agreement over the problem, de-facto exercised approaches that
contributed to its delay.
23
Ogryzko, V., 2008. Statement at the 16th Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, 4
December, viewed 28 August 2013, <http://www.osce.org/mc/35365>.
24
KyivPost. Ukraine Not to Change Position on Kosovo in Wake of United Nations Court Judgment,
27 July 2010, viewed 15 February 2013, <http://bit.ly/Zw3AxW>.
25
See, for instance, J. Peet’s ‘Frozen Conflicts’ in The Economist (2008).

12. 12
The original causes of the conflict go back to the decline of the Soviet Union,
when the political scene of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic put on
agenda two basic issues: the essence of interactions between Moldova and
Russia and the status of the Russian and Moldovan (Romanian) languages.
Since the political powers that were striving to secede from the Soviet
Union and simultaneously to increase the state of Romanian language
acquired support in Chisinau,26 the elements of Soviet bureaucracy
(particularly industrial entrepreneurs) that opted to keep the Soviet Union,
backed by authoritative politicians in Moscow, established a separate
political force in Tiraspol.27 In September 1990, they announced the
Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (within the USSR).
Driven by the willingness to revive the status of the Russian language and
the aversion to re-emergence of Moldova with Romania, the leaders of the
newly created Transnistria, being supported by the Soviet military and
applying violence, enclosed additional lands.28
Throughout the decades, international community has infrequently tried to
contribute to a resolution,29however, its commitment was driven by its own
restricted preferences, which was supported by the absence of obvious
violence and West’s indifference to Moldova. The deficiency of different
resolution suggestions since the break-out of the conflict and the deadlock
in frames of the multilateral negotiating process formed in 2002 by the
OSCE has given birth to profound uncertainty regarding the possibilities
for a sound settlement of the conflict.30
It should be underlined that a settlement cannot be enacted only by foreign
powers, but simultaneously it is explicit that regional players are not
capable of settling the issue independently.31 A lawful outcome can be
attained exclusively on the basis of the frameworks that have been
contemplated throughout the last decades within the OSCE and the Council
of Europe, considering that all state players are committed to their
responsibilities as participants in these bodies.
However, as long as its status remains ‘frozen,’ Moldavia will not change its
approach towards recognition of Kosovo’s independence.
26
The capital of Moldova.
27
The second largest city in Moldova and the capital and administrative centre of the
unrecognized Transnistria.
28
On historical background and the main issues, see also Transdniestrian conflict: origins and
issues issued by the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre.
29
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union. The Transnistrian Issue: Moving
Beyond the Status-quo, October 2012, p. 41.
30
See OSCE Mission to Moldova webpage available at http://bit.ly/GQ1PuC.
31
On what might also be contributing to the status quo, see Moldova: Regional Tensions over
Transdniestria by the International Crisis Group (2004; pp. 17-22).

13. 13
8. Belarus
Public statements made by Belarusian politicians convincingly demonstrate
the official stance of Belarus towards the issue of Kosovo. After the
declaration of Kosovo’s independence, Belarusian President Alexander
Lukashenko sent a message to the former Serbian President Boris Tadic
saying that “Belarus expresses its solidarity with the Serb intention to defend their
sovereignty and territorial integrity.”32
This was also supported by the Belarusian National Assembly, which in its
statement condemned the decision of the Kosovo authorities and appealed
to ‘parliaments of the world to announce the declaration on independence
as invalid.’ The statement read that “the events in Kosovo destabilize the
situation in the Balkans and have a direct influence on the international stability.
Kosovo sets a precedent for similar crisis situations in other countries.”33
Moreover, the Foreign Ministry of Belarus held that:
“The settlement of the Kosovo and Metochia status should progress
under international law, based on UN Security Council resolution
1244 (of 1999) which is a fundamental document for the Kosovo
settlement certifying the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic of Serbia, and based on the key provisions of the UN Charter
and Helsinki Final Act, with the essential role of the UN Security
Council bearing a predominant responsibility for safeguarding
international peace and security.”34
At a public sitting at the International Court of Justice on the 3rd of
December 2009 on the accordance with international law of the unilateral
declaration of independence by the provisional institutions of self-
government of Kosovo, Belarusian delegation argued: ‘If one analyses the
situation with Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence beyond the traditional
decolonization context of external self-determination, we will come to the
conclusion that there are no convincing legal arguments in favor of Kosovo’s
secession from the Republic of Serbia.’35 Consequently, it inferred that:
“Self-determination in no case seems to be absolutely synonymous
with independence. For attainment of this right which the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights defines as “to freely determine their political
32
BelTA. Belarus Supports Serbians’ pursuit of territorial integrity, 28 February 2008, viewed 28
August 2013, <http://bit.ly/1fiUjSu>.
33
BelTA. Belarus’ Parliament issues statement in connection with Kosovo self-declaration of
independence, 21 February 2008, viewed 28 August 2013, <http://bit.ly/13Z9Ya0>.
34
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus. Statement by the Foreign Ministry
of the Republic of Belarus relating to the unilateral proclamation of independence by the
Kosovo temporary authorities of self-government, viewed 28 August 2013,
<http://bit.ly/10ocTCs>.
35
ICJ Kosovo case: Public hearing transcripts, CR 2009/27, 3 December 2009, pp. 30-31,
viewed 22 September 2013, <http://bit.ly/1dAVPRb>.

14. 14
status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development”36
freedom is more important than independence. Adequate constitutional
arrangements within a single State can satisfy the rights of ethnic
minorities, including the right to development.
The principles of international law being interpreted in good faith and
in a harmonious and systematic manner allow us to arrive at the
conclusion that the external self-determination is an extraordinary
event, which may take place only under extreme conditions.
Historically, only colonial oppression is universally accepted as such
an extreme condition constituting a special case for external self-
determination. The Republic of Belarus does not perceive such
conditions in the Kosovo case.”37
It is obvious that Belarus does not experience any territorial problems and it
has never faced separatist movements. Therefore, its reluctance to recognize
Kosovo is based merely on its current political reality, which is, first of all,
highly dependent on such powerful regional player as Russia. Additionally,
China’s opposition to Kosovo’s secession might also be of consideration,
since Belarus, finding itself in a very isolated position, strives not to irritate
its few allies. Moreover, as the Belarusian ambassador to Serbia Uladzimir
Chushaw said in an interview to a Serbian newspaper, ‘In the past five years
trade between our countries tripled and reached a record high of $145 million last
year,’38 which underlines the stable economic ties between Belgrade and
Minsk.39 Thus, as long as Belarus remains rather a weak and subdued
political actor, hardly able to produce its own policies towards global
issues, including such as Kosovo’s declaration of independence and
secessionism in general, it will not recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state.
9. Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan generally seems to be rather distant from the Kosovo problem,
as well as that, for example, of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However,
though not willing to announce it publicly, Uzbekistan worries about its
Karakalpakstan, an autonomous republic where the population, even in the
conditions of an extremely totalitarian regime, contemplates self-
determination, which means, in other words, secession and autonomy or
attachment to Kazakhstan. Separatist endeavor is still rather active there,
36
Art.1 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, viewed 22
September 2013, <http://bit.ly/110fsO0>.
37
ICJ Kosovo case: Public hearing transcripts, CR 2009/27, 3 December 2009, p. 32, viewed
22 September 2013, <http://bit.ly/1dAVPRb>.
38
Naviny.by. Belarus will never recognize Kosovo’s independence, says ambassador to Serbia,
viewed 15 September 2013, <http://bit.ly/192A6hN>.
39
The capital of Belarus.

15. 15
which definitely makes Tashkent40 feel apprehensive about secessionism in
general.41
Moreover, Uzbekistan is a highly heterogeneous country, as is the case with
Georgia, for instance. Therefore, besides Karakalpakstan, there is a
considerable number of Tajik people in Uzbekistan (more than a million) –
predominantly in Samarkand and Bukhara - who would also desire to
secede in favor of Tajikistan.42 Thus, for Uzbeks, the question of recognition
of any newly emerged states appears to be rather a sensitive one, which is
also backed by the fact that Tashkent tends to keep balance in its relations
with Washington and Moscow.
10. Kyrgyzstan
The Kyrgyz Republic officially refuses to recognize Kosovo’s independence.
As a Central Asian state, domestic separatist problems might be a reason,
though it is indeed difficult to determine whether separatism in Kyrgyzstan
is a political fiction or reality, especially in the light of the events in June
2010, when ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbek occurred in the
southern part of the country, mostly in the cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad.43 It
is, nevertheless, hard to say what the original causes of the conflict were,
but what can be argued undoubtedly is that Kyrgyzstan experiences
tremendous problems when it comes to the interaction between ethnic
groups in this region.44 Generally, the tension is largely illustrated as
separatism because for the central authorities in Bishkek45 it is far more
convenient to do so, in order to justify the crisis. Moreover, i is a mere
problem of minorities’ representation since Uzbek people have never
enjoyed proper representation in the government.46
11. Recognition practice by Baltic States
When Kosovo’s independence was declared in February 2008, all three
Baltic States reacted supportively towards the Balkan country’s willingness
to form a sovereign state. Baltic consideration in favour of Kosovo was
generally expected because of the shared repressive past under the rule of
40 Tashkent is the capital of Uzbekistan.
41
Goble, P., 2010. ‘Karakalpak Separatism Again on the Rise, Analyst Says’. Georgian Daily,
viewed 7 October 2013, <http://bit.ly/15gNMXo>.
42
Liu, M., 1997. ‘The Perils of Nationalism in Independent Uzbekistan’. The Journal of the
International Institute, vol. 4, no. 2, viewed 7 October2013, <http://bit.ly/19uX27K>.
43
Schwirtz, M., 2010. ‘New Violence in Kyrgyzstan Leads to Troop Deployment’. The New
York Times, viewed 7 October 2013, <http://nyti.ms/GI1Sri>.
44
International Crisis Group report. Kyrgyzstan: Widening Ethnic Divisions in the South, 29
March 2012, viewed 7 October 2013, <http://bit.ly/H3Ibn7>.
45
The capital of Kyrgyzstan.
46
Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry Into the Events in Southern
Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, par. 2 of the Executive Summary.

16. 16
an authoritarian, more extensive state (USSR), which forced them to
struggle for sovereign states in the late 1980s.
Formal statements emphasizing the Baltics willingness to support Kosovo
appeared instantaneously after the main conference of the EU’s foreign
ministers on 18 February in Brussels. However, many statesmen openly
expressed their position on Kosovo’s declaration of independence right
following its adoption on 17 February.
“Lithuania, as member of the European Union and NATO, has always
underlined the importance of security and stability,” former Lithuanian
President Valdas Adamkus stated. “I am convinced that security in Europe is
impossible without a stable Kosovo… It is greatly important for the European
Union to find more and broader cooperation opportunities with Serbia and once
again confirm that all Western Balkan countries have a European perspective,” he
added.47
Unsurprisingly, Kosovo’s declaration of independence gave birth to a
diverse reaction among the citizens of the Baltics. For instance, many ethnic
Russians, constituting a considerable part of the Baltic population, seemed
to refuse to acknowledge it.48
Considering the fact that European political circles also appeared to be
divided in their attitude towards Kosovo’s independence, as, for example,
Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia and Romania had not recognized the
independence, Baltic statesmen emphasized the significance of European
coherence on the debatable case.
With regards to other Baltic States stances “Latvia stands for harmonized
European Union action on the issue of Kosovo. Latvia considers a solution for the
issue of the status of Kosovo as crucial for the political and economic stability of the
Western Balkan states, as well as for their future development,” claimed Latvia’s
Foreign Ministry in its official statement on 17 February 2008.49
As the majority of European countries did, the Baltic States also stressed the
sui generis character of the situation and underlined that the case should not
create a precedent for other parts of the world. “The uniqueness lies in the fact
that the Serbian authorities have not had any real administrative functions in
Kosovo for a long period of time – many duties were performed by the international
community,” Latvian Foreign Minister Maris Riekstins commented.50
47
Press Service of the President of the Republic of Lithuania. President Adamkus Welcomes
Kosovo Independence, 18 February 2008, viewed 15 September 2013,
<http://bit.ly/15ugR1P>.
48
Estonian Public Broadcasting. Paet: Estonia gotova priznat’ nezavisimost’ Kosovo, 17 February
2008, viewed 22 September2013, <http://bit.ly/1aWCJnv>.
49
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. Foreign Ministry announcement on
situation in Kosovo, 17 February 2008, viewed 15 September 2013, <http://bit.ly/10rEaTc>.
50
Archdeacon, S. T., 2008. ‘Baltics Support Kosovo Independence’. The Baltic Times, 20
February 2008, viewed 15 September 2013, <http://bit.ly/1eQP0MP>.

17. 17
12. Conclusion
Firstly, though secession as a whole is a debatable topic, which, indeed, it
requires dozens of academic papers to shed light on its essence, it should be
noticed that the theoretical basis here has an extremely limited and partial
value. The right to secede should not be constitutionally constrained. On
the other hand, constitution regularly happens to be a means of political
manipulation, rhetoric or demagogy, thus its efficiency may be severely
undermined in a democratically unstable society. Besides, no secessionist
case from the past has appeared as an arena for a fair legal debate, rather it
has always sprung from the highly politicized clash of nationalist
sentiments.
As for the Kosovo case particularly, secession should be supported,
considering the fact that, ethnic Albanians endured discriminative
oppression on the part of the federal government in Belgrade. Apart from
that, doubt should be casted on the original motivation of the involvement
of international community, which was initiated in the form of
humanitarian intervention and subsequently emerged in frames of the
interim administration. This is, nevertheless, a completely distinct question,
which goes far beyond the scope of the given report.
The main inference reached as a result of the current research expounds
rather stable tendencies among the modern states towards secession, the
right of self-determination, territorial integrity and recognition of the newly
created states. The majority of the post-Soviet states are not inclined to
recognize Kosovo’s independence in the nearest future. Neither are they
likely to acknowledge that of any other seceded entity.
Two basic implications drive these countries’ aversion to secessionism.
First, it is firm regional ties. Despite the fact that all of the formerly Soviet
republics legally gained independence after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, they failed (except from the Baltics) to conduct democratic transition
and sustain political and economic autonomy, which forced them to fall
into strong dependency from such powerful regional actor as Russia. The
latter has its own, domestic apprehensions towards separatism, as it is, for
example, with the case of Chechnya, thus it does not generally support
secessionist movements. Surprisingly, it did once – in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia – but that probably was a very subtle political step, to demonstrate
that Russia is an “independent and autonomous” player. Obviously, in the
given situation, under the pressure of an aggressive local dominator such as
Russia, the rest of the post-Soviet community is reluctant to decide
independently on such a sensitive question as secession, even if some
would be inclined to do so, which is highly unlikely today.
And the second reason to oppose separatism is that most of the post-Soviet
countries simply cannot afford recognition of the newly formed states, as
they have their own territorial problems and secessionist movements. It is
especially much with the Caucasian states. This is, commonly, true not only

18. 18
of the former Soviet republics but also, for instance, of some European
states, such as Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia and Romania, who also
experience domestic separatist endeavors.
There might also be other reasons for non-recognition. Suppose a certain
state has strong economic or political relations with a parent state (one that
endures separation), thus it will probably have no incentive to support
secession, in order not to damage the beneficial relationship with its close
partner. Considering high interconnectedness and deep regionalization in
the contemporary world, states attempt to avoid undermining the present
networks.

19. 19
13. Bibliography
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20. 20
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22. 22
GAP Institute is a local think-tank founded in October 2007 in Kosovo. GAP’s
main purpose is to attract professionals by creating a professional research
and development environment commonly found in similar institutions in
Western countries. This will include providing Kosovars with an opportunity
to research, develop, and implement projects that would strengthen Kosovo
society. A priority of the Institute is to mobilize professionals to address the
country’s pressing economic, political and social challenges. GAP’s main
objectives are to bridge the gap between government and people, and to
bridge the gap between problems and solutions.