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RIPE Network Coordination Centre




                      Pollution in 1.0.0.0/8

          Or why having 1.2.3.4 might not be that cool after all....




                 Mark Dranse <markd@ripe.net>
                              and
              Franz Schwarzinger <franz@ripe.net>

                               RIPE NCC

Mark Dranse                        APRICOT 2010                     http://www.ripe.net    1
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




                Background

• Many networks filter unallocated address space (bogons)
 - Some time passes

• Unallocated addresses become allocated
 - Filters are not always well maintained
 - Freshly allocated space is not fully reachable

• ISPs and users complain
 - RIRs get some of the blame


  Mark Dranse                 APRICOT 2010                http://www.ripe.net    2
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




                Debogon Project

• Mitigate issues surrounding new address space
 - Increase communications
 - Provide tools to measure and monitor reachability

• Using existing RIS infrastructure since 2005
 - Announce a few prefixes from new /8s
 - Provide target IPs for ping/traceroute
 - Measure reachability and produce graphs


                   http://www.ris.ripe.net/debogon/

  Mark Dranse                    APRICOT 2010               http://www.ripe.net    3
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




               Debogon Reports




• Combined yearly report for all /8s

 Mark Dranse                APRICOT 2010         http://www.ripe.net    4
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




              Debogon Tools




                http://www.ris.ripe.net/cgi-bin/debogon.cgi


Mark Dranse                       APRICOT 2010                 http://www.ripe.net    5
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




                The 1.0.0.0/8 story

• “Reserved” since 1981
• Changed to “unallocated” by IANA in 2008
• Allocated to APNIC in January 2010 ‘randomly’

 - Added to the debogon report as usual
     • 1.255.0.0/16
     • 1.50.0.0/22


 - As a special experiment, we also announced:
     • 1.1.1.0/24
     • 1.2.3.0/24


  Mark Dranse                   APRICOT 2010           http://www.ripe.net    6
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




                Measurement Setup

• RIS Remote Route Collector (rrc03.ripe.net)
 - Connected to 3 Dutch IXPs
     • AMS-IX
     • NL-IX
     • GN-IX
 - AMS-IX port is 10 100 MBit/s
 - Outbound traffic via RIPE NCC network
 - About 100 active peers




  Mark Dranse                APRICOT 2010             http://www.ripe.net    7
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




                27th January 2010

• Announcements began just before midday
 - Instantly maxed out our AMS-IX port




  Mark Dranse                 APRICOT 2010         http://www.ripe.net    8
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




              RIS View




Mark Dranse              APRICOT 2010         http://www.ripe.net    9
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




                RIS View

• 14 distinct ASes
• 26 prefixes
 - /30 to /13




  Mark Dranse              APRICOT 2010         http://www.ripe.net    10
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




                Some analysis

• 900k packet sample taken on 28th January

• Looked at:
 - Sources
 - Destinations
 - Protocols




  Mark Dranse                   APRICOT 2010         http://www.ripe.net    11
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




              Packet destinations




                                   • Two busiest destinations:
                                       - 90% of packets to 1.1.1.1
                                       - 3.3% of packets to 1.2.3.4




Mark Dranse                  APRICOT 2010                      http://www.ripe.net    12
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




              Packet Sources

• 96,160 unique IP addresses
   • 95% sent ≤ 10 packets
   • 33% sent 1 packet

• 30% of packets from 23 IP addresses
   • 4.4% from 1 IP address

• 90% from 43 /8s
   • 15% claims to originate from 10/8


Mark Dranse                APRICOT 2010         http://www.ripe.net    13
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




              Packet Sources




         %




                  Year in which parent /8 was allocated
Mark Dranse                      APRICOT 2010                   http://www.ripe.net    14
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




              Packet Sources




       %




                     Responsible RIR for parent /8
Mark Dranse                    APRICOT 2010                http://www.ripe.net    15
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




              What was the traffic?




Mark Dranse                  APRICOT 2010         http://www.ripe.net    16
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




                What was the traffic?
• 80% UDP traffic                                                              • 20 %TCP traffic
   - 60% SIP INVITE (VoIP) scans *                                               - 50% HTTP
   - 30% Media Gateway Protocol                                                  - 5.4% SMTP




   * Thanks to Sandro Gauci and others for pointing this out!

  Mark Dranse                                                   APRICOT 2010                  http://www.ripe.net    17
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




                 Feedback

• Give it to me!

• Don’t give it to me!

• Don’t give it to anyone!

• How representative is this?
- Is it just ‘normal’ background noise?
- Isolated data point?


   Mark Dranse                APRICOT 2010         http://www.ripe.net    18
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




                Further Research

• Comparison with other prefixes
• Announce for longer
  - From a “real” network with high capacity
• Collect more data
  - Don’t just analyse small samples




  Mark Dranse                 APRICOT 2010           http://www.ripe.net    19
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




                References

• RIPE Labs
  - http://labs.ripe.net/content/pollution-18
  - http://labs.ripe.net/node/195
• Debogon Report
  - http://www.ris.ripe.net/debogon
• APOPS list
  - http://archive.apnic.net/mailing-lists/apops/archive/2010/02/
• Reddit.com
  - http://www.reddit.com/r/programming/comments/axltd/
   pollution_in_10008/


  Mark Dranse                 APRICOT 2010                  http://www.ripe.net    20
RIPE Network Coordination Centre




              Questions?




Mark Dranse      APRICOT 2010         http://www.ripe.net    21

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Pollution in 1.0.0.0/8

  • 1. RIPE Network Coordination Centre Pollution in 1.0.0.0/8 Or why having 1.2.3.4 might not be that cool after all.... Mark Dranse <markd@ripe.net> and Franz Schwarzinger <franz@ripe.net> RIPE NCC Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 1
  • 2. RIPE Network Coordination Centre Background • Many networks filter unallocated address space (bogons) - Some time passes • Unallocated addresses become allocated - Filters are not always well maintained - Freshly allocated space is not fully reachable • ISPs and users complain - RIRs get some of the blame Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 2
  • 3. RIPE Network Coordination Centre Debogon Project • Mitigate issues surrounding new address space - Increase communications - Provide tools to measure and monitor reachability • Using existing RIS infrastructure since 2005 - Announce a few prefixes from new /8s - Provide target IPs for ping/traceroute - Measure reachability and produce graphs http://www.ris.ripe.net/debogon/ Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 3
  • 4. RIPE Network Coordination Centre Debogon Reports • Combined yearly report for all /8s Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 4
  • 5. RIPE Network Coordination Centre Debogon Tools http://www.ris.ripe.net/cgi-bin/debogon.cgi Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 5
  • 6. RIPE Network Coordination Centre The 1.0.0.0/8 story • “Reserved” since 1981 • Changed to “unallocated” by IANA in 2008 • Allocated to APNIC in January 2010 ‘randomly’ - Added to the debogon report as usual • 1.255.0.0/16 • 1.50.0.0/22 - As a special experiment, we also announced: • 1.1.1.0/24 • 1.2.3.0/24 Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 6
  • 7. RIPE Network Coordination Centre Measurement Setup • RIS Remote Route Collector (rrc03.ripe.net) - Connected to 3 Dutch IXPs • AMS-IX • NL-IX • GN-IX - AMS-IX port is 10 100 MBit/s - Outbound traffic via RIPE NCC network - About 100 active peers Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 7
  • 8. RIPE Network Coordination Centre 27th January 2010 • Announcements began just before midday - Instantly maxed out our AMS-IX port Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 8
  • 9. RIPE Network Coordination Centre RIS View Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 9
  • 10. RIPE Network Coordination Centre RIS View • 14 distinct ASes • 26 prefixes - /30 to /13 Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 10
  • 11. RIPE Network Coordination Centre Some analysis • 900k packet sample taken on 28th January • Looked at: - Sources - Destinations - Protocols Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 11
  • 12. RIPE Network Coordination Centre Packet destinations • Two busiest destinations: - 90% of packets to 1.1.1.1 - 3.3% of packets to 1.2.3.4 Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 12
  • 13. RIPE Network Coordination Centre Packet Sources • 96,160 unique IP addresses • 95% sent ≤ 10 packets • 33% sent 1 packet • 30% of packets from 23 IP addresses • 4.4% from 1 IP address • 90% from 43 /8s • 15% claims to originate from 10/8 Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 13
  • 14. RIPE Network Coordination Centre Packet Sources % Year in which parent /8 was allocated Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 14
  • 15. RIPE Network Coordination Centre Packet Sources % Responsible RIR for parent /8 Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 15
  • 16. RIPE Network Coordination Centre What was the traffic? Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 16
  • 17. RIPE Network Coordination Centre What was the traffic? • 80% UDP traffic • 20 %TCP traffic - 60% SIP INVITE (VoIP) scans * - 50% HTTP - 30% Media Gateway Protocol - 5.4% SMTP * Thanks to Sandro Gauci and others for pointing this out! Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 17
  • 18. RIPE Network Coordination Centre Feedback • Give it to me! • Don’t give it to me! • Don’t give it to anyone! • How representative is this? - Is it just ‘normal’ background noise? - Isolated data point? Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 18
  • 19. RIPE Network Coordination Centre Further Research • Comparison with other prefixes • Announce for longer - From a “real” network with high capacity • Collect more data - Don’t just analyse small samples Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 19
  • 20. RIPE Network Coordination Centre References • RIPE Labs - http://labs.ripe.net/content/pollution-18 - http://labs.ripe.net/node/195 • Debogon Report - http://www.ris.ripe.net/debogon • APOPS list - http://archive.apnic.net/mailing-lists/apops/archive/2010/02/ • Reddit.com - http://www.reddit.com/r/programming/comments/axltd/ pollution_in_10008/ Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 20
  • 21. RIPE Network Coordination Centre Questions? Mark Dranse APRICOT 2010 http://www.ripe.net 21