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Single Sign-On for the Internet: A Security Story [email_address] [email_address] BlackHat USA, Las Vegas 2007
[object Object]
[object Object]
How do you manage your 169 Web 2.0 accounts today?
Does your “SSO” consist of A login (e.g. johndoe) + 2 passwords (one insecure for web 2.0 sites and one secure for banking sites) ?
Attack #1 a. Fail a user’s login b. Observe the user try every single combination of their username and password, including the secure password..
BlackHat Advice #1 Change your bank password (we man-in-the-middle’d your secure “SSO” last night)
Observation #1 Complexity breeds insecurity
One login to rule them all… … a story about reducing complexity
[object Object],You get to choose who manages your identity e.g. http://john.doe.name/ or http://john.myopenid.com/
Answers the who? question (authentication) are you john.doe.name? Does NOT answer the what? (authorization) is john.doe.name allowed to access this page?
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
How? (demo)
How? (man-in-the-middle secure demo)
 
 
 
 
That was easy!
Oh. Never mind.
[object Object]
Let’s start at the beginning
 
Attack #2 – Which one are you? http://nsa.gov:1/, http://nsa.gov:2/, … https://192.168.1.15/internal/auth?ip=1.1.1.1 http://localhost:8080/ http://www.youtube.com/largemovie.flv http://www.tarpit.com/cgi-bin/hang.pl file:///dev/null
Observation #2 Flexibility and security do not get along (or, why it’s important to be less flexible and more paranoid)
Everybody loves crypto “ associate mode”
Why is crypto required? to protect request & response URLs
Shared symmetric key is generated using Diffie-Hellman
Attack #3 - Diffie-Hellman is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks! So what’s the point of using DH in the first place? The spec suggests running DH over https to improve protocol security
Observation #3 Home brewed crypto is a no no (or, why you should stick to https)
Where are you going?
This way! No, that way! Location: http://www.myopenid.com/server?  openid.assoc_handle =%7BHMAC-SHA1%7D%7B4..&  openid.identity =http://eugene.tsyrklevich.name/&  openid.mode =checkid_setup& openid.return_to =http://www.jyte.com/finish&  openid.trust_root =http://www.jyte.com/
Attack #4a Phishing with malicious RPs
Attack #4b Phishing with malicious URL hosts
Change your bank password BlackHat Advice #2 (we phish’ed your first attempt)
Observation  # 4 Phishers 1 – OpenID 0   (or, why Johnny will never learn to read URLs)
Let me in!
[object Object],Convenient, eh?
[object Object],[object Object],… privacy, anyone?
Observation #5 OpenID makes privacy difficult (or, why some paranoid users might want to use one OpenID login per site)
Not another redirect!
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Attack #6a – Phishing (again!)
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Attack #6b – Replay attack nonce=wVso75KH
Problems with Nonces a. Not part of the OpenID spec (v1) b. Do not actually protect against active attackers!
Observation #6   Nonces are nonsense (or, why you must be drinking absolut kool-aid if you believe nonces will protect you against an active attacker)
I am secure once I am logged in though, right?
Attack #7 Cross-site request forgery <html><body> <iframe id=&quot; login &quot; src=&quot; http://bank.com/login?openid_url=john.doe.name &quot; width=&quot; 0 &quot; height=&quot; 0 &quot; ></iframe> <iframe id=“ transfer &quot; src=&quot; http://bank.com/transfer_money?amount=100&to=attacker &quot; width=&quot; 0 &quot; height=&quot; 0 &quot; ></iframe> </body></html>
Observation #7 OpenID robs you of control (or IdP, not RP, makes the security decisions)
Change your bank password BlackHat Advice #3 Actually don’t bother… ...all your OpenID are belong to us.
[object Object]
Is it really all that bad?! ,[object Object],[object Object]
How?! ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
 
Observation #8 ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Lessons Learnt ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Is OpenID doomed? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],But its security and privacy concerns need further thought
Thanks! [email_address] [email_address] Try it today. http://www.openid.net/ http://www.freeyourid.com/

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OpenID Security

  • 1. Single Sign-On for the Internet: A Security Story [email_address] [email_address] BlackHat USA, Las Vegas 2007
  • 2.
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  • 4. How do you manage your 169 Web 2.0 accounts today?
  • 5. Does your “SSO” consist of A login (e.g. johndoe) + 2 passwords (one insecure for web 2.0 sites and one secure for banking sites) ?
  • 6. Attack #1 a. Fail a user’s login b. Observe the user try every single combination of their username and password, including the secure password..
  • 7. BlackHat Advice #1 Change your bank password (we man-in-the-middle’d your secure “SSO” last night)
  • 8. Observation #1 Complexity breeds insecurity
  • 9. One login to rule them all… … a story about reducing complexity
  • 10.
  • 11. Answers the who? question (authentication) are you john.doe.name? Does NOT answer the what? (authorization) is john.doe.name allowed to access this page?
  • 12.
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  • 22. Let’s start at the beginning
  • 23.  
  • 24. Attack #2 – Which one are you? http://nsa.gov:1/, http://nsa.gov:2/, … https://192.168.1.15/internal/auth?ip=1.1.1.1 http://localhost:8080/ http://www.youtube.com/largemovie.flv http://www.tarpit.com/cgi-bin/hang.pl file:///dev/null
  • 25. Observation #2 Flexibility and security do not get along (or, why it’s important to be less flexible and more paranoid)
  • 26. Everybody loves crypto “ associate mode”
  • 27. Why is crypto required? to protect request & response URLs
  • 28. Shared symmetric key is generated using Diffie-Hellman
  • 29. Attack #3 - Diffie-Hellman is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks! So what’s the point of using DH in the first place? The spec suggests running DH over https to improve protocol security
  • 30. Observation #3 Home brewed crypto is a no no (or, why you should stick to https)
  • 31. Where are you going?
  • 32. This way! No, that way! Location: http://www.myopenid.com/server? openid.assoc_handle =%7BHMAC-SHA1%7D%7B4..& openid.identity =http://eugene.tsyrklevich.name/& openid.mode =checkid_setup& openid.return_to =http://www.jyte.com/finish& openid.trust_root =http://www.jyte.com/
  • 33. Attack #4a Phishing with malicious RPs
  • 34. Attack #4b Phishing with malicious URL hosts
  • 35. Change your bank password BlackHat Advice #2 (we phish’ed your first attempt)
  • 36. Observation # 4 Phishers 1 – OpenID 0 (or, why Johnny will never learn to read URLs)
  • 38.
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  • 40. Observation #5 OpenID makes privacy difficult (or, why some paranoid users might want to use one OpenID login per site)
  • 42.
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  • 44. Problems with Nonces a. Not part of the OpenID spec (v1) b. Do not actually protect against active attackers!
  • 45. Observation #6 Nonces are nonsense (or, why you must be drinking absolut kool-aid if you believe nonces will protect you against an active attacker)
  • 46. I am secure once I am logged in though, right?
  • 47. Attack #7 Cross-site request forgery <html><body> <iframe id=&quot; login &quot; src=&quot; http://bank.com/login?openid_url=john.doe.name &quot; width=&quot; 0 &quot; height=&quot; 0 &quot; ></iframe> <iframe id=“ transfer &quot; src=&quot; http://bank.com/transfer_money?amount=100&to=attacker &quot; width=&quot; 0 &quot; height=&quot; 0 &quot; ></iframe> </body></html>
  • 48. Observation #7 OpenID robs you of control (or IdP, not RP, makes the security decisions)
  • 49. Change your bank password BlackHat Advice #3 Actually don’t bother… ...all your OpenID are belong to us.
  • 50.
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  • 57. Thanks! [email_address] [email_address] Try it today. http://www.openid.net/ http://www.freeyourid.com/