ONI Quarterly April_2008_Piracy

Response Worldwide Threat to Shipping Message Maritime Advisories Counter P
wide Threat to Shipping Message Maritime Advisories Counter Piracy Visit BoarThe ONI QuarterlyApril 2008
Office of Naval Intelligence
This Issue:
ONI Support to Combating Piracy
» ONI and Combating Piracy pg. 4
» MOTR Case Study pg. 9
» Piracy and the MOTR Plan pg. 12
» Civil Maritime Intelligence pg. 14

Counter Piracy Visit Board Search and Seizure Maritime Operational Threat R
Visit Board Search and Seizure Maritime Operational Threat Response Worldw
April 2008
Piracy and maritime crime still exist today in parts of the
world—modern day equivalents to the Barbary Pirates
the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps defeated in the
Mediterranean two centuries ago. While modern pirates
employ automatic weapons and satellite
phones instead of muskets and sabers, their
motives to take profit by hijacking ships,
cargoes and/or crews remain constant. They
target merchant ships, aid vessels, and even
cruise ships plying major shipping routes.
As noted, preserving the freedom and
security of the seas has been a core
mission of the U.S. Navy since its founding.
As pirates have become more aggressive, the Navy is
responding to suppress these illicit operators based in
Somalia.
In this edition of The ONI Quarterly, we focus on
how ONI supports fleet anti-piracy activities and
collaborates with the merchant shipping community and
government agencies to prevent such rogue activity.
As the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Security
mandates, international partnerships and coordination
between U.S. services and government agencies are
necessary for achieving maritime security and promoting
the rule of law, ultimately facilitating and defending global
commerce.
In this issue, you will learn about ONI’s long-standing
role in warning commercial shipping interests of
maritime threats, and how ONI analysis factors into the
coordinated response to incidents of piracy and maritime
crime. In a case study of the hijacking of the motor vessel
Safina Al Bisarat off the coast of Somalia, ONI analyst
Dave Pearl demonstrates the complex international
enforcement issues piracy often presents.
We are pleased to share the story of ONI’s anti-piracy
efforts with the readers of The ONI Quarterly.
Introduction from
the Commander

wide Threat to Shipping Message Maritime Advisories Counter Piracy Visit Boar
Quarterly Issue 6, April 2008
Table of Contents
Introduction from 2
the Commander
CAPT James Everett III
ONI and Combating Piracy 4
David Pearl
Safna Al Bisarat Hijacking: 9
A MOTR Case Study
David Pearl
Piracy and the Maritime 12
Operational Threat
Response (MOTR) Plan
LCDR Dave Brown
Civil Maritime Intelligence 14
Randy Balano
The ONI Quarterly
Published by the Office of
Naval Intelligence
Commander | CAPT James Everett III
Office of External Corporate
Relations
Director | Ruane Langton
Editor in Chief | Robert Althage
Consulting Editor | Amanda Schuler Zepp
Production by Multimedia Services
Department
Correspondence should be addressed
to The ONI Quarterly, Office of Naval
Intelligence, External Corporate
Relations (ONI-ODE), 4251 Suitland Road,
Suitland, MD 20395
Tel: 301.669.5670
Email: pao@nmic.navy.mil
Cover | A Visit, Board, Search and
Seizure team from USS Carter Hall
(LSD 50) approaches a dhow to
inspect for indications of piracy,
terrorism or smuggling.
The July 2008 issue of The ONI Quarterly will focus on:
ONI’s Intergrated Maritime Architecture - Creating new
maritime intelligence dissemination capabilities.

When people think about combating pirates, they often think
of warships racing to the aid of a vessel in distress and
saving the day. As such, people may think the Office of Naval
Intelligence’s (ONI) role in combating piracy is employing
the latest and greatest in top secret high-tech
wizardry to direct fleet forces in hunting down
pirates to bring them to justice. While this
may occur on rare occasions, the reality is that
combating piracy on the high seas is the least
desirable and least cost effective tactic, and
ONI’s role in combating piracy is far less pulse-
pounding but no less integral. This issue of The
ONI Quarterly will focus on the role ONI plays
in combating piracy, as well as dispelling a few
myths about piracy along the way.
ONI’s primary role in combating piracy is actually dedicated
to providing the hard working men and women of the
merchant maritime community with accurate and timely
threat warning information. The United States learned a
costly lesson about the need to provide intelligence to the
shipping industry at the end of the Vietnam War. On May
12, 1975, the U.S. flagged container ship SS Mayaguez
was headed directly into a hotspot in the Gulf of Thailand
that had previously seen several acts of aggression against
merchant shipping by forces of Cambodia’s Communist
dictatorship, Khmer Rouge. With the proper threat warning
mechanisms in place, Mayaguez could have easily avoided
the trouble spot. Unfortunately, the various U.S. agencies
that supported the shipping industry and those that tracked
maritime threats were not aware of one another. As a result,
Mayaguez sailed directly into the danger zone and was
captured by the Khmer Rouge. The vessel was eventually
liberated but at great loss of life to U.S. service members.
More than 30 years later, ONI still takes this lesson very
seriously. We work closely with other U.S. government
agencies to ensure high risk areas are identified and
merchant mariners are provided access to threat warning
information. To accomplish this, ONI produces the
Worldwide Threat to Shipping Message which provides
information on threats to, and criminal action against
merchant shipping worldwide that occurred in the last 30
days. Each week this message is posted for worldwide
viewing on the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s
(NGA) Maritime Safety Information homepage. NGA then
enters each incident into its publicly available Anti-Shipping
Activity Message database. When specific areas are
identified in the course of threat research and reporting,
ONI coordinates with the Department of Transportation’s
ONI and Combating Piracy
by David Pearl, ONI Maritime Armed Crime Analyst

Dec. 10, 2007 - Merchant
Vessel Golden Nori is underway
after pirates departed the
vessel.

Maritime Administration and the State Department to
promulgate special advisories as needed.
ONI’s primary role of providing threat warning to the
maritime industry leads to the ability to provide context
on the exact nature of various maritime threats, like
piracy, to fleet forces and policy makers. After more than
15 years of producing the Worldwide Threat to Shipping
Message, ONI can help customers understand reporting
limitations and identify real threats while weeding out
agenda motivated hype. Not every act of maritime crime
or piracy is reported, and not every incident reported as
an act of piracy actually is one. Only the perpetrators and
the victims know what really goes on out on the water and
there are a host of reasons to downplay or exaggerate
the accuracy of incident reporting. After researching and

reporting on thousands of incidents over the past 15 years,
ONI knows better than most that all piracy-prone areas are
a symptom of socioeconomic and political conditions ashore.
Therefore, efforts to combat piracy without addressing
hard to tackle root causes like poverty, unemployment,
hunger, illegal fishing, organized crime, and corruption is
doomed to be temporary at best. That is not to say that an
enforcement presence afloat is not an important factor—it
most certainly is. However, it is unfortunately the only factor
typically addressed. Ironically, when enforcement efforts
afloat start working and incident reporting goes down,
those enforcement resources are usually moved elsewhere
because they are expensive to maintain. Since the root
causes ashore are usually not addressed, the piracy cycle is
doomed to repeat.
A Visit, Board, Search and Seizure
(VBSS) team assigned to the dock
landing ship USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
travels to an Indian cargo dhow to
perform a master consent boarding.

Another misconception ONI constantly battles is the
temptation to link piracy with terrorism in order to allocate
resources to combat it. Piracy has been a threat to mariners
and free trade for a long time, and will be around for a long
time to come. The victim looking down the barrel of a gun
standing on the bridge of an underway merchant vessel could
not care less if the masked man with his finger on the trigger
has political or economic motives. It seems unnecessary
to need to read the minds of perpetrators to decide if what
they are doing is worth combating. If anything, combating
piracy for the sake of combating piracy will deny terrorists
any chance of leveraging a piracy-prone environment to their
advantage.
Regardless of political or religious affiliations, piracy is an
issue all nations agree is bad and needs to be addressed.
For example, the piracy problem off the coast of Somalia
created unlikely allies between the United States and North
Korea. When a North Korean merchant vessel temporarily fell
victim to Somali criminals who attempted to hijack the vessel
as it departed Mogadishu, the determined North Korean
mariners battled the Somali hijackers and overpowered them.
A U.S. warship was in a position to respond and rendered
medical assistance in the aftermath of the melee. However,
how nations go about addressing piracy is where things get
sensitive. Through constant monitoring of piracy reporting
and various efforts to combat piracy, ONI is well aware of
these sensitivities. Addressing maritime criminal behavior in
areas like Southeast Asia, where sovereignty concerns are of
utmost importance, requires an entirely different approach
than it does off the coast of Somalia, which currently lacks an
effective system of governance.
Overall, when factoring in the number of incidents reported
and the number of vessels operating around the world, the
odds of falling victim to acts of piracy are low. However,
as long as the risk exists in any form, ONI will continue
to monitor hot spots, warn mariners, and drive efforts
to understand root causes so they may one day finally be
resolved.
Dec. 13, 2007 - The merchant vessel Golden Nori refuels with the
U.S. Navy dock landing ship USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) following
its release from Somalia-based pirates on Dec. 12.

wide Threat to Shipping Message Maritime Advisories Counter Piracy Visit BoarSafina Al Bisarat Hijacking:
A MOTR Case Study
by Dave Pearl, Maritime Armed Crime Analyst
In mid January 2006, the Indian flagged cargo dhow
Safina Al Bisarat and its crew of 16 Indian mariners was
on a routine cargo run to Somalia that quickly became
anything but routine. Wooden dhows of this nature make
many perilous trips between the
Middle East and Somalia, bringing
much desired cargo to the war-
torn Somali capitol of Mogadishu.
They then sail south to the Somali
port of Kismayo to pick up charcoal
and bring it back to the Middle
East where much of it is likely used
to fuel the ubiquitous Shisha pipe.
These slow moving dhows simply
cannot afford the time and fuel required to sail out and
around the high risk areas where Somali pirates are
known to hunt for victims. As the Safina Al Bisarat was
returning to the Middle East with its load of charcoal,
it caught the attention of ten Somali pirates who were
divided among three small fishing skiffs and armed with
AK-47 machine guns and rocket propelled grenades.
The slow moving dhow did not have a chance against the
determined pirates, and it quickly fell under pirate control
without anyone hearing a distress call. Ten well armed
pirates now had the perfect mothership to take them
far out to the shipping lanes to hunt for large merchant
vessels that pay large ransoms, and no one was the
wiser.
On the morning of January 20, 2006, the pirated dhow
was just beyond 200 nautical miles off the Somali coast
when a large bulk carrier came within visual range. Likely
based on the speed of the bulk carrier, its distance
and heading to the pirates, and how low it was riding
in the water, the pirates decided to launch their two
smaller attack skiffs. The bulk carrier the pirates were
racing toward was the Bahamian flagged Delta Ranger.
The alert crewmembers aboard Delta Ranger knew to
be on the lookout for Somali pirates due to the many
warnings issued by organizations like the Office of Naval
Intelligence (ONI) and the International Maritime Bureau
(IMB). Delta Ranger’s vigilant master increased speed
and began evasive maneuvers. The pirates responded by
firing at the bridge, trying to intimidate the master into
stopping. When this attempt failed they took up position
on either side of the vessel and brought out makeshift
hook ladders. However, Delta Ranger had a characteristic
the pirates did not account for: The railing on top of the
gunwales was slightly wider than the gap of the hooks
on top of the ladders. This prevented the pirates from

Office of Naval Intelligence 10
in a position to investigate the report. The ship quickly
hunted down the dhow and then fired warning shots. Then
the most unprecedented thing happened: The pirates
surrendered. The U.S. Navy was now in control of ten
Somali nationals who had just attacked a Bahamian
flagged vessel with Greek ownership in international
waters by using an Indian flagged dhow full of Indian
nationals whom they had hijacked several days earlier.
Now what?
getting their hook ladders locked in and the pirates were
forced to abort their attack.
This failed attack was the start of the pirates’ demise.
Delta Ranger reported the location and description
of the dhow to the IMB’s Piracy Reporting Center in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The IMB then quickly relayed
this perishable information to the Combined Maritime
Forces Headquarters based in Bahrain. Fortunately, USS
Winston S. Churchill, of the NASSAU Strike Group, was
Jan. 21, 2006 - Dhow controlled by suspected
pirates intercepted by the U.S. Navy destroyer
USS Winston Churchill (DDG 81).

11 Quarterly Issue 6, April 2008
This is exactly the kind of complex issue the Maritime
Operational Threat Response (MOTR) process is
designed to help coordinate. It was through this
mechanism that ONI was able to provide greater context
regarding the history of the Somali piracy problem to
a host of interagency stakeholders. This issue needed
to be coordinated among a surprisingly large number
of interested parties, including several offices in the
Department of State, Department of Justice, U.S. Coast
Guard, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to name a
few. MOTR was the foundation of the process that got
the Somali pirates into the custody of the Kenyan judicial
system within eight days, allowing U.S. naval assets
to get back to the job of maritime security operations.
Subsequently, Kenya found the Somalis guilty of high seas
piracy and sentenced them to seven years in prison.

Visit Board Search and Seizure Maritime Operational Threat Response WorldwPiracy and the Maritime
Operational Threat
Response (MOTR) Plan
by LCDR Dave Brown, NMIC Watchfloor Deputy
The process by which the U.S. government determines
responses to piracy incidents inherently involves a high
degree of interagency coordination. There are many
equities involved which affect the options available to
the United States and shape the eventual
outcome. There are the concerns of the
registry state to consider and those of the
country that actually owns the ship. The
nature and origin of the cargo will impact
the decision maker, as will the citizenship
of the crew members. All of these must be
considered when choosing possible courses
of action.
Enter the Maritime Operational Threat Response
(MOTR) Plan. One of eight supporting plans to the
September 2005 National Strategy for Maritime
Security, MOTR provides a forum in which decision
makers can consider competing interests and
concerns. MOTR aims to achieve a coordinated U.S.
government response to a wide spectrum of maritime
threats against the United States and its interests
worldwide. In addition to piracy, these threats may
include the transport of terrorists and criminals,
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation,
drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, fisheries
incursions, and unresolved radiation alarms.
The MOTR process is essentially a virtual coordination
meeting, in unclassified channels whenever possible, that
brings together several lead and supporting agencies.
The specific nature of the event or threat determines
which agencies are involved and which inherently has the
lead. The Department of Defense is the pre-designated
lead for nation-state and other threats occurring
overseas, such as piracy. The Department of State plays
a key support role by coordinating with flag, state, and
port states to authorize or facilitate operations, and
to provide foreign policy advice and insights to the lead
agency.
Where does the National Maritime Intelligence Center
(NMIC) come in? Under the Global Maritime Intelligence
Integration (GMII) plan, the NMIC is designated as the
strategic-level core maritime intelligence element,
leveraging the existing capabilities of ONI and the Coast
Guard’s Intelligence Coordination Center. As such, the
NMIC is called on to provide tailored intelligence support
to the lead MOTR agencies, providing information to
decision makers that might otherwise be unavailable.

Dec. 13, 2007 - The merchant vessel Golden
Nori comes alongside the U.S. Navy dock
landing ship USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41)
following its release from Somalia-based
pirates on Dec. 12.

The U.S. Navy’s role in combating piracy dates back to
the early nineteenth century when President Thomas
Jefferson sought to end the practice of paying annual
tribute to the Barbary States of North Africa (Tripoli,
Tunis, Morocco and Algiers) to ensure the
safe passage of American merchant vessels
in the Mediterranean. Although the initial
naval operations by American frigates against
the pirates between 1801 and 1805 failed to
“fight these pirates into reason,” Jefferson’s
successor, President James Madison,
ultimately prevailed by dispatching a squadron
of ten ships in 1815. Subsequent American
naval victories against the pirates compelled
their leaders to sign a treaty ending the tribute payments.
Piracy has not been relegated to the history books,
however. It continues to pose a serious threat in certain
parts of the world, facilitated by economic and political
instability, corruption, and jurisdictional disputes in heavily
trafficked strategic chokepoints.
ONI traditionally followed civil maritime issues as part
of its original mission upon its establishment in 1882,
tracking the commercial trading activities of major
Civil Maritime
Intelligence
by Randy Balano, ONI Historian
maritime powers. During World War II, ONI concentrated
on identifying and targeting enemy merchant shipping to
undermine the Axis Powers’ ability to wage war. In the
Cold War era, ONI closely scrutinized the transport in
commercial vessels of weapons, foreign aid, and other
strategic materials to and from the Soviet Union and
Soviet bloc nations.
A dramatic incident in 1975 illustrated the need for a
new civil maritime mission for naval intelligence. In the
weeks after the fall of Cambodia to Communist forces in
mid-April, naval forces of the Khmer Rouge, Cambodia’s
Communist dictatorship, began harassing and seizing
merchant vessels operating in a regular shipping lane
in the Gulf of Siam near an island the Khmer Rouge
claimed as its territory. Khmer Rouge forces captured 27
crewmen of Thai fishing boats, fired upon a South Korean
freighter, captured seven South Vietnamese vessels, and
held a Panamanian ship for more than 35 hours. When
the Captain of the American merchant containership SS
Mayaguez departed from Hong Kong bound for Sattahip,
Thailand, he had no knowledge of these incidents. On May
12, 1975, as Mayaguez transited the channel, it was
approached by two American-made Patrol Craft, Fast
(PCF) “Swift” boats manned by Khmer Rouge forces that

fired shots across her bow. The ship was boarded and
the 40-man crew taken captive. Failed diplomatic efforts
to win the crew’s release resulted in President Gerald R.
Ford ordering a military operation to secure their freedom.
As the Navy and Marine Corps forces initiated the assault,
the Khmer Rouge was already in the process of releasing
the crew. Fifteen U.S. servicemen were killed, three went
missing and fifty more were wounded in the operation.
The Mayaguez incident clearly illustrated the need to
protect neutral shipping in war zones. Accordingly, ONI
refined its efforts to incorporate protection of U.S. and
allied merchant shipping as a key mission on par with
tracking and destroying the merchant shipping of the
enemy.
In 1980, the protracted “Tanker War” between Iran and
Iraq escalated into attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf,
precipitating an international crisis. The importance of
civil maritime intelligence was rapidly elevated from the
tactical level to the national level. ONI’s merchant analysts
responded by developing a thorough understanding of the
shipping industry. They established legal and effective
means to pass information to and from merchant ships
bearing the flags of many nations, making a significant
contribution to the U.S. Navy’s operation that successfully
escorted 270 merchant ships in 136 convoys during the
war.
The lessons learned and procedures developed in these
operations have been effectively applied to combat the
scourge of modern-day piracy. ONI works closely with
allies, coalition navies, international police forces, and
other international organizations to support anti-piracy
operations around the world.
A P-3 took this photo of SS Mayaguez with two Khmer Rouge
gunboats tied alongside.

Timely - Relevant - Predictive
www.nmic.navy.mil
oni@nmic.navy.mil

ONI Quarterly April_2008_Piracy

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