3. DAY 1
COURSE OVERVIEW
This training course aims to provide knowledge to those
who may be designated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of a Ship Security Officer (SSO), as defined
in Chapter VI Regulation VI/5 Table A-VI/5 of the STCW
2010 Manila Amendments and section A/12.1 of the ISPS
code, and in particular the duties and responsibilities with
respect to the security of a ship, for implementing and
maintaining a Ship Security Plan and for liaising with the
Company Security Officer (CSO) and with Port Facility
Security Officers (PFSOs).
4. DAY 1
COMPETENCE TO BE ACHIEVED
• Maintain and Supervise the Implementation of
the Ship Security Plan;
• Assess Security Risk, Threat and Vulnerability;
• Undertake regular inspections of the ship to
ensure that appropriate security measures are
implemented and maintained;
• Ensure that security equipment and systems if any
are properly operated, tested and calibrated;
5. DAY 1
• Encourage Security Awareness and Vigilance.
COMPETENCE TO BE ACHIEVED
6. DAY 1
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
• A Threat to the shipping industry is a means by
which it will affect their operations and cause
considerable commercial loss.
• Incident involving criminal activity in the maritime
environment are the following:
1. Piracy and Armed Robbery
2. Terrorism
3. Contraband Smuggling
8. DAY 1
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
• Based on the statistics shown above, the Ship
Security Course has been updated and revised to
make sure that maritime incidents especially
piracy and armed-robbery has been prevented.
9. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
1. Piracy and Armed Robbery
• Piracy is a term used to describe acts of armed
robbery, hijacking and other malicious acts
against ships in international waters.
• Piracy is carried out with intent of stealing
valuables onboard and/or extorting money from
ship or the crew hostage for ransom.
10. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
1. Piracy and Armed Robbery
• In recent years, there has been a
series of maritime attacks on
vessels by pirates particularly in the
Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin and the
Indian Ocean.
• Thus, vast areas of waters are affected making it a
challenge to prevent maritime piracy incident.
14. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
1. Piracy and Armed Robbery
A. Low Level Armed Robbery
• Attack with the intention of stealing, usually
under cover of darkness.
• Culprits take whatever they can carry from the
dark and the hold
• Violence may occur when the crew tries to stop
them
15. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
1. Piracy and Armed Robbery
B. Medium Level Armed Assault & Robbery (MLAAR)
• Armed Assaults with violence or threats of
violence .
• Pirates come onboard unnoticed and force the
crew to hand over their cash and valuables
• Cargo is also stolen if possible
• Each raid is over in less than an hour
16. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
1. Piracy and Armed Robbery
C. Major Criminal Hijack (MHCJ)
• Carefully planned theft of the entire cargo
• Pirates know every detail of the cargo & ships
stowage plan
• This type of attack usually results in a double digit
million dollar loss
18. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
1. Piracy and Armed Robbery
Threat of Maritime Piracy
• Majority attacks have taken place between first
light and last light
• No successful attacks have occurred on ships at 15
knots and more
20. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
2. Terrorism
• In the international community, terrorism has no
legally binding, criminal law definition.
• It refer only to those violent acts that are
intended to create fear (terror); are perpetrated
for a religious, political or .
• Attacks on high profile symbolic targets are used
to incite counter-terrorism by the state to polarise
the population. This strategy was used by Al
Qaeda in its attacks on the United States in
September 2001
21. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
2. Terrorism
Threat of Terrorism
• The “war on terror” has
focused exclusively on
transitional terrorism since
the hijacking of 9/11
• Domestic terrorism possess a greater
threat in terms of lives and property loss.
22. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
2. Terrorism
Threat of Terrorism
• The threat of international terrorism comes from a
diverse range of sources, including Al Qaida and
associated networks, and those who share Al
Qaida's ideology but do not have direct contact
with them.
• Threat could manifest itself from a lone
individual or group, rather than a larger network.
23. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
2. Terrorism
Groups involved in Global Terrorism
• Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
• Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
• Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
• Armed Islamic Group
• Aum Supreme Truth
• Basque Fatherland and
Liberty (ETA)
24. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
2. Terrorism
Groups involved in Global Terrorism
• Revolutionary People’s Army Liberation Party
• Al-Jihad
• Al-Gamma’a al-Islamiya
• Harakat ul-Mujahidin
• Hizballah (Party of God)
26. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
3. Contraband Smuggling
• Contraband smuggling has increased its statistics
in the maritime industry.
• It is used to for terrorism or pirate attacks at sea .
• According to Homeland Security News Wire, A
new study on sea trafficking reveals that the large
majority of ships involved in the illegal transfer of
weapons, drugs, and banned missile or
WMD equipment are owned by major shipping
companies in the United States, Germany,
and Greece.
28. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
4. Stowaways and Refugees
• “Stowaway”. A person who is secreted on a ship,
or in cargo which is subsequently loaded on the
ship, without the consent of the shipowner or
the master or any other responsible person and
who is detected on board the ship after it has
departed from a port, or in the cargo while
unloading it in the port of arrival, and is reported
as a stowaway by the master to the appropriate
authorities (FAL Convention).
29. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
4. Stowaways and Refugees
• “Attempted stowaway”- a person who is secreted
on a ship, or in cargo which is subsequently
loaded on the ship, without the consent of the
shipowner or the master or any other
responsible person, and who is detected on
board the ship before it has departed from the
port (Ref IMO Doc. FAL 28/10 Annex 1).
30. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
4. Stowaways and Refugees
• “a refugee is a person who "owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality, and is
unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country“
(1951 Convention Relating to the status of
Refugees).
31. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
4. Stowaways and Refugees
• Refugees and asylum-seekers also travel as
stowaways.
• Once discovered, it can be difficult to obtain
permission from coastal States for their
disembarkation, forcing shipmasters to
maintain them on board for prolonged periods
of time, often under difficult conditions
32. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
4. Stowaways and Refugees
• Selecting a place of disembarkation, it is
important to ensure that refugees and asylum-
seekers will be referred to appropriate follow-
up processes where their international
protection needs can be assessed and
addressed (UNHCR, 2011).
33. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
4. Stowaways and Refugees
Threats of Stowaways and Refugees
• Stowaways and refugees is a threat of the
maritime industry because they become a
major burden resulting to huge financial
losses.
• It would cause delay to ships and would
burden ship owners and masters and would
subject them to greater public accountability.
36. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
5. Cargo Theft
• Cargo theft is typically rooted in social, economic
and cultural conditions.
• According to FreightWatch, Mexico, Brazil, South
Africa, the United States and Russia are the
countries most at risk for cargo theft globally.
• Majority of cargo theft are classified as hijacking
or the threat of violence.
38. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
5. Cargo Theft
Threat of Cargo Theft
• Global cargo theft risks shown on the map vary
greatly from country to country.
• Risk also vary from region to region.
39. DAY 1
UPDATED: Product Tanker Hijacked in South China
Sea for Fuel Cargo; Second Boarding in Less Than A
Year
HONDURAS-FLAGGED,
Singapore-operated product
tanker, Moresby 9, was
boarded and hijacked by nine
armed pirates at about 2015 LT,
4 July, approximately 34nm
WNW of Anambas Islands,
South China Sea. The second
boarding of the vessel in less
than a year.
40. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
6. Collateral Damage
• Damage to things that are incidental to the
intended target.
• It is frequently used as a military term where it
can refer to the accidental or unintentional
killing or wounding of non-combatants and/or
destruction to non-combatant property during
attacks on legitimate enemy targets.
41. DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
6. Collateral Damage
• Occurs when nearby fire explosion or attack
results to a ship of facility.
• While the damage is sometimes unintended,
the costs are nevertheless real.
Threat of Collateral Damage
42. DAY 1
International Maritime Security Policy
• The International
Maritime Organization
(IMO) has adopted a
number of resolutions and
conventions in terms of
Maritime Security Policy.
43. DAY 1
International Maritime Security Policy
IMO Conventions Maritime Security
• Resolution A. 545 (13) 1983 - Measures to
Prevent Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships
• Resolution A. 584 (14) 1985 – Measures to
Prevent Unlawful Acts which Threaten Safety of
Ships and Security of Passengers
44. DAY 1
International Maritime Security Policy
IMO Conventions Maritime Security
• MSC/Circ. 443 1986 – Measures to Prevent
Unlawful Acts Against Passengers and Crew on
Board Ships
• In 1988, the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA) treaties aimed at ensuring that
appropriate judicial action is taken against
persons committing unlawful acts against ships.
45. DAY 1
International Maritime Security Policy
• Last September 11, 2001, IMO approved the
development of new measures relating to
security of ships and of port facilities the
International Convention for the Safety of Life
Sea at Sea, 1974 in December of 2002.
• In December 2002, Diplomatic Conference
resulted in amendments to SOLAS 74.
• Brief summary of these amendments should be
carried out with mention of changes to Chapter
V but with emphasis on the changes to Chapter
XI, Regulations 3 and 5.
46. DAY 1
International Maritime Security Policy
• Also it was added to the new Chapter XI-2
Regulation 1-13 and the ISPS Code.
47. DAY 1
Responsibilities of Government Companies
and Designated Persons
• Government Companies such as
the Maritime Industry Authority
(MARINA) has mandated and
created Memorandum Circulars
for the protection and safety of
the seafarers at Sea.
48. DAY 1
Responsibilities of Government Companies
and Designated Persons
SOLAS Chapter XI-2 Regulation 1
• States the special measures to enhance maritime
security and the new International Code for the
Security of Ships and Port Facilities (ISPS Code).
Best Management Practice to Deter Piracy
off the Coast of Somalia and the Arabian
Sea Area (BMP3)
49. DAY 1
Responsibilities of Government Companies
and Designated Persons
Legal Implications of Actions or Non-Acton
by Security Personnel
• Action/non-action by the Ship Security Officer
and other security personnel is likely to have
legal implications
• Personnel will have certain authorities and
obligations yet they will also find that they face
certain constraints
50. DAY 1
Responsibilities of Government Companies
and Designated Persons
Handling Sensitive Security-Related
Information and Communications
• A category of sensitive but classified information.
• Information obtained in the conduct of security
activities whose public disclosure would, in the
judgment of specified government agencies, harm
transportation security, be an unwarranted
invasion of privacy, or reveal trade secrets or
privileged or confidential information.
51.
52. 1 - Setting applicable security levels and providing
guidance for protection from security incidents
2 - Determining which ports will fall into the category
where they are required to comply with the new
legislation.
This includes establishing appropriate security
measures for fixed, floating platforms and mobile
offshore drilling units, to allow interaction with
ships which are required to comply with the Code
Responsibility of the Contracting Government
53. 3 - Ensure that those ports and flagged ships do comply
with that legislation and have completed security
asessments and plans in line with it.
Governments also verify these security plans and
the issue of certificates of compliance
4 - Advising its flagged ships when required to be at level 2
or 3, what security measures they should take, and
security measures that have been taken by the
government to provide protection against the threat.
Responsibility of the Contracting Government
54. 5 - Exercising control and compliance measures,
over all those bodies which they appoint to carry
out their responsibilities
6 - Determining when Declaration of Security is
required having assessed the risk that the ship to
port interface or the ship to ship activity poses the
people, property and the environment.
Responsibility of the Contracting Government
55. 7 - Establish contact points :
- Government officers to whom an SSO, CSO,
PFSO can report security concerns
- A point of contact for advice (on a 24h basis)
on security for any ship either flying its flag
or operating in its territorial water, or even
intending to enter its territorial water
Responsibility of the Contracting Government
56. Responsibility of the Contracting Government
• Special consideration to be given to :
– Establish appropriate security measures for fixed and
floating platforms and mobile offshore drilling units on
location to allow interaction with ships which are
required to comply with the ISPS Code
– Establish appropriate security measures to enhance the
security of ships to which the Code does not apply and
to ensure any security provisions applying to such ships
to allow interaction with ships to which the ISPS Code
apply
57. Contracting Governments shall
set security levels and
provide guidance for
protection from
security incidents.
4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
58. A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Factors to be considered in setting
appropriate security level :
4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
1 - The degree that the threat information is credible
2 - The degree that the threat information is corroborated
3 - The degree that the threat information is specific or
imminent
4 - The potential consequences of such security
incident
59. Contracting Governments may delegate to a
Recognised Security Organisation related duties
under chapter XII with the exception of :
4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
1 - Setting of the applicable security level
2 - Approving a port facility security assessment
and subsequent amendments to an approved
assessment
3 - Determining the port facilities which will be
required to designate a Port Facility Security
Officer
60. 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
4 - Approving a Port Facility Security Plan and
subsequent amendments to an approved plan
5 - Exercising control and compliance measures
pursuant to regulation XI-2/9
6 - Establishing the requirements for a declaration of
security
Contracting Governments may delegate to a
Recognised Security Organisation related duties
under chapter XII with the exception of :
61. 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
Recognised Security Organisations (RSO)
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Appendix
1
Contracting Governments may authorised a
Recognised Security Organisation to undertake
certain security related activities including :
1 - Approval of ship security plans, or amendments,
on behalf of the Administration
2 - Verification and certification of compliance of
ships on behalf of the Administration
3 - Conducting Port Facility Security Assessments
required by the Contracting Government
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
62. 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
Recognised Security Organisations (RSO)
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Appendix
1
A RSO may also provide assistance to
Companies or Port facilities on security matters,
including
Ship Security Assessments,
Ship Security Plans,
Port Facility Security Assessments,
Port Facility Security Plans.
If a RSO has done so in respect of a Ship Security
Assessment or Plan that RSO should not be
authorised to approve that Ship Security Plan.
63. 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
Competency to be demonstrated by the (RSO)
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Appendix
1
1 ) EXPERTISE :
- in relevant aspect of security
2 ) CAPABILITY TO :
- assess the security risks that could occur during
ship and port facility operations, including the
ship/port facility interface and how to
minimise such risks
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
64. 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
Competency to be demonstrated by the (RSO)
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Appendix
1
3 ) KNOWLEDGE :
- of ship and port operations
- of ship construction if providing services to ships
- of port design and construction if providing services
to port facilities
- of the requirements of the Code and relevant
national and international legislation and security
requirements
- of current security threats and patterns
- on recognition and detection of weapons,
dangerous substances and devices
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
65. 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
Competency to be demonstrated by the (RSO)
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Appendix
1
3 ) KNOWLEDGE :
- on recognition, on a non-discriminating basis, of
characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons
who are likely to threaten security
- on techniques used to circumvent security
measures
- of security and surveillance equipment and systems
and their operational limitations
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
66. 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
Competency to be demonstrated by the (RSO)
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Appendix
1
4 ) ABILITY TO :
- maintain and improve the expertise of the personnel
- monitor the trustworthiness of the personnel
- maintain appropriate measures to avoid
unauthorised disclosure of, or access to security
sensitive material
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
67. Ship is required
to act upon the
security levels
set by
Contracting
Government
7 - SHIP SECURITY
68. Ship is required
to act upon the
security levels
set by
Contracting
Government
7 - SHIP SECURITY
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
69. A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
In order to communicate the threat
at port facility or for the ship, the
Contracting Government sets the
appropriate security level :
ISPS CODE Security level
Level 1 :
Low threat situation
Level 2 :
Medium threat situation
Level 3 :
High threat situation
70. 2.1 - SECURITY LEVEL 1
The level for which
minimum
appropriate
protective security
measures
shall be maintained
at all times.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
71. 7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 1
1- Ensuring the performance of all ships security duties
2- Controlling access to the ship
3- Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects
4- Monitoring restricted areas ( authorise person only )
6- Supervising the handling of cargo and ship’s stores
7- Ensuring the security communication is readily available
5- Monitoring of deck areas and areas surrounding the ship
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
72. 2.1 - SECURITY LEVEL 2
The level for which
appropriate
additional
protective security
measures
shall be maintained
for a period of time
as a result of
heightened risk of
a security incident.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
73. 2.1 - SECURITY LEVEL 3
The level for which
specific
protective security
measures
shall be maintained
for a period of time
when a
security incident
is probable or
imminent.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
74. 7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
- Additional protective measures as
specified in the ship security plan shall be
implemented
- Further specific protective measures as
specified in the ship security plan shall be
75. 7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3
- The ship shall confirm to the Port Facility Security Officer
the initiation of the implementation of the appropriate
measures and procedures as details in the Ship Security
Plan and report any difficulties in implementation
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
- The ship shall acknowledge receipt of the Administration’s
or of the Contracting Government’s instructions on the
change of security level
76. 7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3
If the ship is required to set, or is already at a
higher level than set for the port it intends to enter,
the ship shall advice the designated authority and
the Port Facility Officer of the situation.
In such cases, the Ship Security Officer
shall liase with the Port Facility
security Officer and co-ordinate
appropriate actions, if necessary.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
77. 7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3
An Administration requiring ships entitled
to fly its flag to set security level 2 or 3
in a port of another
Contracting Government shall inform
that Contracting Government
without delay
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
78. 7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3
When Contracting Governments
set security levels and
ensure the provision of
security level information to ships,
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
such ships shall be advised
to maintain vigilance and report
immediately any information
that comes to their attention
that may affect
maritime security in the area
79. 7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
When advising such ships of
the applicable security level,
a Contracting Government shall
also advise those ships
of any security measure
that they should take and of
measures that have been taken
by the Contracting Government
to provide protection
against the threat.
80. The company shall ensure that the Ship Security Plan contains :
6 - OBLIGATIONS OF THE COMPANY
- Clear statement emphasising the Master’s
authority
- Master overriding authority and responsibility
to make decisions with respect to the security
of the ship
- Request the assistance of the company or
of any Contracting Government as may be
necessary
The Company Security Officer, the Master and the Ship
Security Officer shall be given the necessary support to fulfil
their duties and responsibilities
81. A plan to ensure
the application of measures
on board the ship
designed to protect
persons on board, cargo,
cargo transport units,
ship’s stores or the ship
from the risks of
a security incident.
2.1 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN
82. A plan to ensure
the application of measures
designed to protect the
port facility and ships,
persons, cargo,
cargo transport units
and ship’s stores
within the port facility
from the risks of
a security incident.
2.1 - PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN
83. The person on board
the ship accountable to the
master for security of the ship,
including implementation and
maintenance of the Ship
Security Plan and for
liaison with the
Company Security Officer
and the Port Facility
Security Officers.
2.1 - SHIP SECURITY OFFICER
MASTER
SHIP
SECURITY
OFFICER
COMPANY
SECURITY
OFFICER
PORT FACILITY
SECURITY
OFFICER
84. The person ashore
designated by the company
for ensuring that a
ship security assessment
is carried out,
that the Ship Security Plan is
developed, approved
implemented and maintained
and for liaison with
Port Facility Security Officer
and the Ship Security Officer.
2.1 - COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER
SHIP
SECURITY
OFFICER
COMPANY
SECURITY
OFFICER
PORT FACILITY
SECURITY
OFFICER
85. The person appointed
as responsible for
the development,
implementation, revision
and maintenance of the
Port Facility Security Plan
and for liaison with the
Ship Security Officers
and the
Company Security Officers.
2.1 - PORT FACILITY SECURITY OFFICER
SHIP
SECURITY
OFFICER
COMPANY
SECURITY
OFFICER
PORT FACILITY
SECURITY
OFFICER
86. - Passenger ships, including passenger
high-speed craft
3 - APPLICATION
- Cargo ships, including high-speed craft
of 500 gross tonnage and upwards
- Mobile offshore drilling units
- Port facilities serving ships
engaged on international voyages
87.
88. 11 - COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER ( CSO )
The company must designate
a Company Security Officer
- A person designated as the CSO
may act as CSO for one or more
ships
- A company may designate several
persons as CSOs provided it is
clearly identified for which ships
each person is responsible
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
89. 1- Advising the level of threats
2- Ensuring that Ship Security
Assessments are carried out
3- Ensuring the development and
maintenance of the SSP
4- Ensuring that the SSP is modified as
appropriate to correct deficiencies
5- Arranging for internal audits and
reviews of security activities
11 - COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER ( CSO )
Duty and Responsibilities
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
90. 7- Ensuring that deficiencies and non-
conformities are promptly addressed
and dealt with
8- Enhancing security awareness and
vigilance
9- Ensuring adequate training for personnel
responsible for the security of the ship
11 - COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER ( CSO )
Duty and Responsibilities
6- Arranging for initial and subsequent
verifications of the ship by the
Administration or the Recognised
Security Organisation
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
91. 10- Ensuring effective communication and
co-operation the Ship Security Officer and
the relevant Port Facility Security Officer
11- Ensuring consistency between security
and safety requirements
12- Ensuring that the SSP for each ship
reflect the specific information accurately
13- Ensuring that any alternative or equivalent
arrangements approved for a particular
ship or group of ships are implemented
and maintained
11 - COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER ( CSO )
Duty and Responsibilities
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
92.
93. 12 - SHIP SECURITY OFFICER ( SSO )
Duty and Responsibilities
1- Undertaking regular security inspections
of the ship
2- Maintaining and supervising the SSP
including any amendments to the SSP
A Ship Security Officer shall be
designated on each ship
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
3- Co-ordinating the security aspects of
the handling of cargo and ship’s stores
with other shipboard personnel and
relevant Port Facility Security Officers
94. 12 - SHIP SECURITY OFFICER ( SSO )
Duty and Responsibilities
4- Proposing modifications to the SSP
6- Enhancing security awareness and
vigilance on board
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
5- Reporting to Company Security Officer
any deficiencies identified during
internal audits, periodic reviews,
security inspections and verifications
7- Ensuring that adequate training has
been provided to shipboard personnel
95. 12 - SHIP SECURITY OFFICER ( SSO )
Duty and Responsibilities
8- Reporting all security incidents
9- Co-ordinating Implementation of the
SSP with the company security officer
and the relevant Port Facility Security
Officer
10- Ensuring that security equipment is
properly operated, tested, calibrated
and maintained
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
96.
97. 13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY
Shipboard personnel having specific
security duties and responsibilities
shall have sufficient knowledge and
ability to perform their assigned duties
The Company Security Officer and
appropriate shore-based personnel
and the Ship Security Officer shall
have knowledge and receive training
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
98. Drills and exercises shall be
conducted at appropriate intervals
taking into account the ship type,
ship personnel changes, port
facilities to be visited and other
relevant circumstances.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
The Company Security Officer shall
ensure the effective co-ordination
and implementation of the SSP by
participating in exercises at
appropriate intervals.
13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY
99. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Area where knowledge and training may be required:
13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY
1- Security administration
2- International conventions, codes and
recommendations
3- Government legislation and regulations
4- Responsibilities and functions of other
security organisations
5- Methodology of ship security
assessment
CSO
SSO
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
100. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Area where knowledge and training may be required:
13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY
6- Methods of ship security surveys and
inspections
7- Ship and port operations and conditions
8- Ship and port operation facility security
measures
9- Emergency preparedness and response
& contingency planning
10- Instruction techniques for security
training and education
CSO
SSO
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
101. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Area where knowledge and training may be required:
13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY
11- Handling sensitive security related
information & communications
12- Knowledge of current security threats and
patterns
13- Recognition and detection of weapons,
dangerous substances and devices
14- Recognition of characteristics and
behavioural patterns of persons who are
likely to threaten security
15- Techniques used to circumvent security
measures
CSO
SSO
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
102. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Area where knowledge and training may be required:
13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY
16- Security equipment and systems and
their operational limitations
17- Methods of conducting audits, inspection,
control and monitoring
18- Methods of physical searches and
non-intrusive inspections
19- Security drills and exercises, including
drills and exercise with port facilities
20- Assessment of security drills and
exercises
CSO
SSO
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
103. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Frequency :
13.6 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY
At least once every
three months
But In case where more than
25 % of the ship’s personnel
has been changed within the
last three months,
a drill should be conducted
within one week of the change.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
104. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Frequency :
13.7 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY
At least once every calendar year with no more
than 18 months between the exercises
- CSO
- PFSO
- Relevant
authority of
Contracting
Government
- SSO
- Communications
- Co-ordination
- Resource
availability
- Response
WHAT
WHO
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
105.
106. 9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
Each ship shall carry on board a SSP approved
by the Administration
The plan shall make provisions for
the three security levels.
A Recognised Security Organisation
may prepare the Ship Security Plan of
a specific ship.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
The plan shall be written in the
language or languages of the ship.
English French
Spanish
107. 9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
In such cases the Recognised Security
Organisation, undertaking the review and
approval of the ship security plan,or its
amendments shall not have been involved
in either the preparation of the Ship Security
Assessment or of the Ship Security Plan, or
the amendments, under review.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
The Administration may entrust the review
and approval of the SSP, or of amendments
to previously approved plan, to Recognised
Security Organisations.
Recognised
Organisations
Security
108. 9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
The Administration may entrust the
review and approval of the SSP, or of
amendments to previously approved
plan, to Recognised Security
Organisations.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Submission of ship plans, or
amendments, for approval shall be
accompanied by the security
assessment on the basis of which the
plan, or amendments, have been
developed.
109. 9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
1- Prevent weapons, dangerous
substances and devices intended to
use against people, ships or ports
2- Identification of the restricted areas
and measures for the prevention of
unauthorised access
4- Responding to security threats or
breaches of security
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
The SSP shall consist, at least, of :
3- Prevention of unauthorised access
to the ship
110. 9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
5- Responding to security instructions
given by Contracting Governments at
security level 3
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
The SSP shall consist, at least, of :
6- Evacuation in case of security threats
or breaches of security
7- Duties of shipboard personnel assigned
security responsibilities
8- Auditing the security activities
9- Training drills and exercises
111. 9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
The SSP shall consist, at least, of :
10- Interfacing with port facility security
activities
11- Periodic review of the plan for
updating
12- Reporting security incidents
13- Identification of the Ship Security Officer
14- Identification of the company security
officer including 24-hour contact details
112. 9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
15- Inspection, testing, calibration and
maintenance of security equipment
17- Identification of the locations where the
ship security activation points are
provided
18- Procedures, instructions and guidance
on the use of the ship security alert
system including testing, deactivation
and resetting and to limit false alerts
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
The SSP shall consist, at least, of :
16- Frequency of testing or calibration any
security equipment provided on board
113. 9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
Changes to the Ship Security Plan shall not be
implemented unless approved by the Administration
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
They shall be protected by procedures
aimed at preventing their unauthorised
deletion, destruction or amendment.
The plans shall be protected from
unauthorised access or disclosure.
The records may be kept in electronic
format. In such case :
Audits
114. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
All SSPs Should :
9.2 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
English French
Spanish
1 - Detail the organisational structure of the
security for the ship
2 - Detail the ship’s relationships with :
company and port facilities,
other ships and relevant authorities
with security responsibility
3 - Detail the communication system to allow
effective communication within the ship &
between the ship and others, including
the port facilities
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
115. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
All SSPs Should :
4 - Detail the basic security measures for
security level 1
5 - Detail the additional security measures
that will allow the ship to progress without
delay to security level 2 or 3
6 - Provide for regular review, or audit, and
for its amendment
9.2 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
English French
Spanish
7 - Reporting procedures to the appropriate
Contracting Governments contact points
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
116. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
9.8 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
Areas where security measures could be taken :
Access to the ship
Delivery of
ship’s stores
Monitoring
the security
of the ship
Handling
unaccompanied
baggage
Handling
of cargo
Restricted
areas
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
117. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
9.9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
Control access to the ship should include any :
Access ladders
Cranes &
hoisting gear
Access doors, side scuttles,
windows and ports
Mooring lines &
anchors chains
Access
ramps
Access
gangways
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
118. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
9.14 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
Security measures to control access to the ship may include :
Vehicles
destined to be
loaded on board
car carriers,
ro-ro and others
passenger ships
are subjected
to search
prior loading
In liaison with the port facility
Designated
secure areas
are established
in which
inspections and
searching of
people,baggage,
personnel
effects, vehicles
can take place
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
119. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
9.14 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
Checking
the identity
of all
persons
Segregating
embarking
from
disembarking
passengers
Segregating checked persons and their
personal effects from unchecked persons
and their personal effects
Security measures to control access to the ship may include :
120. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
9.14 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
Identification of
access points
that should be
secured or
attended to
prevent
unauthorised
access
Securing by
locking, or
other means,
access to
unattended
spaces to
passengers
and visitors
Providing security briefings to all ship personnel
on possible threats, the need for vigilance and...
…the procedures for reporting suspicious
persons objects or activities
Security measures to control access to the ship may include :
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
121. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
9.16 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
In liaison with the Port Facility
Establishing a
restricted area
on the
shore-side
of the ship
Deterring
waterside
access to
the ship
...
… including, for example,
provision of boat patrols
Security measures to control access to the ship may include :
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
122. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
9.16 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
Limiting the
number of
access points
and identifying
those to be
closed
Assigning
additional
personnel to
patrol deck
areas during
silent hours
Increasing the frequency and details of searches of
people, personal effects, and vehicles being
embarked or loaded onto the ship
Security measures to control access to the ship may include :
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
123. RISK ASSESSMENT
A structured and systematic
methodology, aimed at enhancing
Maritime safety & security,
including :
- protection of life,
- health,
- marine environment and property,
by using risk and cost / benefit
analysis.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
127. Example of
Parameters
of a
risk model
Organisation
Poor management practices
Lack of ship specific knowledge
Poor vessel maintenance
Human
Poor decision making
Poor judgement
Lack of knowledge
Poor communication
Vessel reliability
Propulsion
Steering
Electrical power
Structural integrity
Waterway
Location
Wind speed and direction
Tides, Currents, Visibility
Traffic separation
Vessel
Size, Age, Crew
Manoeuvrability
Pilotage requirements
Escorting requirements
Port control
Traffic rules
Navigational equipment
Number of pilots, tugs
Traffic monitoring
equipment
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
130. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION
- Organisational / procedural failure
- Communication failure
- Equipment failure
- Environmental conditions
- Human error
- Navigation aids
- Structured review or brainstorming sessions
- Accident scenarios
- Direct causes
- Most probable outcomes in terms of loss
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
131. - Harbour authorities
- Port controllers
- Pilots
- Coastguards
- Ship’s crew
- Towage
- Berthing crews
- Emergency services
- Regulators ( MSA / HSE )
- Class societies
- Environmental groups
- Other port users
DATA COLLECTION
- Owners
- Agents
- Oil companies
- Suppliers
- Other commercial
interests
- Residents
- Yacht clubs
- Local authorities
- Other amenity
interests
- Fishing
- Media
Understanding the processes and personnel involved.
1- Stakeholders
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
132. DATA COLLECTION
- Approaches
- Port entrance
- Navigable channels
- Tanker berths
- Tanker swinging areas
- Others berths / terminals
- Anchorage
- Leisure areas
Understanding the processes and personnel involved.
2- Navigational zones
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
133. - VLCC / crude tankers
- Gas carriers
- Product tankers
- Tugs
- Pilot vessels
- Rope boats
- Bunker barges
- Ferries
- General cargo
DATA COLLECTION
- Naval vessels
- Supply vessels
- Fishing vessels
- Pleasure craft
- Floating cranes
- Dredgers
Understanding the processes and personnel involved.
3- Vessel types
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
134. DATA COLLECTION
- Incoming
- Outgoing
- Movement between berths
- Swinging
- Incoming coincident with
outgoing
- Unidentified vessels
- Draught restrictions
- Speed restrictions
- Radar
- Navaids
Understanding the processes and personnel involved.
4- Vessel movement considerations
- Pilot exemptions
- Uncontrolled vessels
- Anchoring /
weighing anchors
- Pilot boarding /
disembarking
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
135. DATA COLLECTION
Understanding the processes and personnel involved.
5- Environmental conditions
- Wind
- Sea state
- Tide / currents
- Radar clutter
- Visibility ( precipitation )
- Light / darkness
- Temperature
- Radio inference
- Draught restrictions
- Air draught restrictions
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
136. DATA COLLECTION
Understanding the processes and personnel involved.
6- Ship functions
- Propulsion
- Steering
- Control / manoeuvring
- Electrical
- Communications
- Navigation
- Anchoring
- Mooring
- Piping and pumping
- Safety systems
- Cargo handling,loading,storage
- Life support
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
137. DATA COLLECTION
- Navigation markers / lights
- Dredging
- Pilotage
- Port control
- Cargo handling,loading,storage
- Berth structures
- Communications
- Emergency services
Understanding the processes and personnel involved.
7- Port based functions
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
138. DATA COLLECTION
Understanding the processes and personnel involved.
8- Human tasks ( involvement in the following activities )
- Vessel scheduling
- Pre-entry planning and decision making
- Pilot rendezvous with vessel
- Tug rendezvous and attachment
- Navigation to berth
- Berthing and making fast
- Loading / unloading operations
- Port facilities maintenance
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
139. Number
of deaths
Pollution
tonnes/
Incident
Deaths/
Accident
INCIDENT DATA
Tankers in port
Number of
incidents
Accident
category
6
18
0
143
1
2
170
Berthing contact
Collision
Equip. Failure
Fire / Explosion
Flooding
Grounding
Total
0.010
0.018
-
0.396
0.071
0.003
0.051
354
273
20
3052
120
3310
1086
589
1013
751
361
14
611
3339
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
140.
141. 8 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
The SSA is
an essential
and integral
part of
the process
of developing
and updating
the Ship
Security Plan
The Company
Security Officer
shall ensure that
the SSA is
carry out by
persons with
appropriate skills
to evaluate the
security of the ship
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
142. 8 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
The SSA shall include an on-scene security
survey and, at least, with identification of :
1 - Existing security measures, procedures and
operations
2 - And evaluation of key ship board operations
that it is important to protect
3 - Possible threats to the key ship board operation
4 - Weakness, including human factors in the
infrastructure, policies and procedures
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
The SSA shall be documented, reviewed, accepted
and retained by the company.
143. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
8.3 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
Address the following elements on board or within the ship :
Personnel protection systems
Other areas that may, if damaged or
used for illicit observation, pose a risk to...
Procedural
policies
Radio,
telecommunication,
computer systems
Structural
integrity
Physical
security
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
144. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
8.4 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
Those involved should be able to draw upon expert assistance in
relation to :
1- Knowledge of current security threats and
patterns
2- Recognition and detection of weapons,
dangerous substances and devices
3- Recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis
of characteristics and behavioural patterns
of persons who are likely to threaten the
security
4- Techniques used to circumvent security
measures
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
145. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
8.4 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
Those involved should be able to draw upon expert assistance in
relation to :
5- Methods used to cause security incident
6- Effect of explosives on ship’s stuctures
and equipment
7- Ship security
8- Ship / Port interface business practices
9- Contingency planning,
emergency preparedness and response
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
146. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
8.4 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
Those involved should be able to draw upon expert assistance in
relation to :
10- Physical security
11- Radio and telecommunication systems,
computer systems and networks
12- Marine engineering
13- Ship and port operations
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
147. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
8.8 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
Should consider the persons, activities, services and operations
that it is important to protect. This includes :
1- Ship’s personnel
2- Passengers, visitors, vendors, repair
technicians, port facility personnel
3- Capacity to maintain safe navigation and
emergency response
4- Cargo, particularly dangerous goods or
hazardous substances
5-Ship’s stores
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
148. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
8.14 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
On-scene security survey should examine and evaluate existing
shipboard protective measures, procedures and operations for :
1- Ensuring the performance of all ship
security duties
2- Monitoring restricted areas to ensure
access only to authorised persons
3- Controlling access to the ship, including
any identification systems
4- Monitoring of deck area and
area surrounding the ship
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
149. ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
8.14 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
On-scene security survey should examine and evaluate existing
shipboard protective measures, procedures and operations for :
5- Controlling the embarkation of persons
and their effects
- Accompanied and unaccompanied baggage
- Ship’s personnel personal effects
6- Supervising the handling of cargo and
the delivery of ship’s store
7- Ensuring that ship security communication,
information, and equipment are readily
available
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
150. - Contracting Governments
shall determine when a
Declaration Of Security
is required
by assessing the risk
the ship / port interface or
ship to ship activity
poses to
people , property
or the environment.
5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS )
151. A ship can request completion of a
Declaration Of Security when :
5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS )
1- The ship is operating at a higher security level than
the port facility or another ship it is interfacing with
2- There is an agreement on the declaration of security
between Contracting Governments covering certain
international voyages or specifics ships on those
voyages
3- There has been a security threat or a security
incident involving the ship or the port facility, as
applicable
152. Requests for the completion of a Declaration Of
Security shall be acknowledge by the
applicable port facility or ship.
5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS )
4- The ship is at port which is not required to have
implemented an approved port facility security plan
5- The ship is conducting ship to ship activities with
another ship not required to have and implement an
approved ship security plan
A ship can request completion of a
Declaration Of Security when :
153. 5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS )
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Appendix
1
The Declaration Of Security is valid
from to
for the following activities :
Under the following security levels
Security level(s) for the ship :
Security level(s) for the port facility :
Signed for and on behalf of
The port facility The Ship
Declaration
Of
Security
154. The Declaration Of Security shall be completed by :
5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS )
- The Master or the Ship Security
Officer on behalf of the ship
- The Port Facility Security Officer or,
if the Contracting Government
determines otherwise, by another
body responsible for shore-side
security, on behalf of the port
facility
Declaration
Of
Security
155. 5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS )
The Declaration Of Security shall address the
security requirements that should be shared between
a port facility and a ship or between ships and shall
state the responsibility for each
RESPONSIBILITY
156. Minimum Period
5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS )
Administration shall specify the minimum period for
which Declarations Of Security shall be kept by ships
entitled to fly their flag.
Contracting Governments shall specify the minimum
period for which Declarations Of Security shall be kept
by port facilities located within their territory.
158. Criminal acts intended or calculated
to provoke a state of terror
in the general public, a group of persons,
or particular persons for political purposes
Terrorism
159. • These are our demands - aims…
• If we do not get them, we will continue
until we get them ( continued threat )
• You will never be safe until our aims
are met ( continued fear )
Terrorist Aims and Demands
1 - Terrorist
160. 1 - 2 Terrorist Followers
• It is the best in the long run
• It will make things better
• We all want this anyway, this will make it
happen sooner
• Support us in our demands to achieve this
• Nobody needs to be hurt if we comply
to the demands
Terrorist Aims and Demands
161. • Lacking will to defuse situation
1 - 3 Media
• Terrorist mouthpiece
• Aggravate the situation
• Leak intended solutions
• Personal / Political views not subject
to government guidelines
Terrorist Aims and Demands
163. • Hijack or seizure
- Political and propagandist
- Limited in nature
• Attack
- Warning
- Minimum loss of life
- Targeted
Terrorist Threat - Pre 2000
166. • CRUISE LINERS
• TANKERS
• RO-RO PASSENGER FERRIES
• OTHER SHIPS / SPECIAL CARGOES
Terrorist Threat - Pre 2000
167. • No attention to public opinion
• Strategic / economic targets
• Global reach
• Suicidal and catastrophic
• Multiple and coordinated attacks
• Use of all weaponry
• Transportation as a weapon
• Maximum casualties
Terrorist Threat - Post 2000
168. • Recruitment and training
• Basing
• Reconnaissance
• Logistics
• Mounting
• SECURITY
Terrorist Modus operandi
169. • Small / Medium vessels
• Large crude oil carriers
• Liquid Petroleum tankers
• Liquefied natural gas tankers
• Container shipping
Terrorist Targets
170. • Ship - access
• Crew - recruitment, vetting, licenses
and numbers
• Cargo - attractiveness
• Ports - Singapore to Bangkok or
Dar Es Salaam to Mombasa
• Port Facilities
• Routes – the main areas of threat
• Ship shore interface – crew, visitors, cargo,
stores, baggage etc
Ship Vulnerabilities
171. • Inflatable loaded with explosives
– USS The Sullivans, Cole and Limburg
• Acquisition of trawlers and medium sized
ships with explosives
– attack warships or other vessels such as
cruise liners
• Private planes stolen from flying clubs
• Underwater demolition teams
– diving schools
Al Qaeda Modus operandi
173. Click to add text
PROFILING
Behavioral
Characteristics
174. Click to add text
• Individuals
- Criminal seeking to extort money
- Refugees seeking political asylum
- Mentally disturbed
• Groups
Behavioral Characteristics
175. Click to add text
- Person( s ) seen in area for no obvious reason
Behavioral Characteristics
- Person( s ) not dressed for that particular area
or function
- Person( s ) seen in area more than once or is
necessary
- Person( s ) being nervous, sweaty when coming
aboard ship
176. Click to add text
Behavioral Characteristics
- Person( s ) having literature or paper work that
seem to be of suspicious nature
- Person( s ) being in possession of large sums of
money
- Person( s ) meeting other personnel not associated
with that party or crew
- Person( s ) being in areas of the ship that they
have no reason to be there or are talking a
particular interest in a part of the ship
177. Click to add text
weapons,
dangerous substances
and devices
Recognition of :
178. Click to add text
Recognition and detection of
weapons, dangerous substances
and devices
• X-Ray screening
• Low powered radar sensors
• Walk through detectors
• Trace detectors
• Screening containers
187. RPG 7 – Used in Piraeus against HMS Ark Royal by
Revolutionary Organization
Stinger – Used by Al Quaeda, Mujahadeen, FARC, PIRA?
DSHK – Used by PIRA,
Somalis etc
189. Explosive is a substance that can react
on its own chemically producing gases
in relative high temperature and pressure
and such speed that destroys surrounding
objects.
Explosives
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
190. Kill by :
- Pressure higher than
atmospheric pressure
- Shrapnel
- Temperature
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Explosives
194. 1.75” / 4.4mm
.26” / .7mm
TETRYL A.S.A
L1A1 - DOES NOT NEED PRIMER (IE. EXTRA POWER TO DETONATE EXPLOSIVE.
NON - ELECTRIC
TETRYL
2”” / 5mm
.25”
L2A1 - DOES NOT NEED PRIMER TO DETONATE EXPLOSIVE
ELECTRIC
ASA
ASA
Detonators
195. RESISTORS FORM 2 FUNCTIONS.
1. LIMIT (RESIST) THE FLOW OF CURRENT THROUGH A CIRCUIT.
2. SET VOLTAGE LEVELS AT SPECIFIC POINTS IN A CIRCUIT
Resistors
196. THESE ALLOW THE RESISTANCE TO BE VARIED FROM 0 ohm TO MAXIMUM
RESISTER VALUE. VALUE IS DETRMINED USING THE SCREW AT THE SIDE
Variable Resistor
197. Thyristor/ SCR
3 LAYER TERMINAL OPERATING SWITCH WHICH NEEDS ONLY A SMALL CURRENT
TO OPEN THE GATE TO ALLOW A LARGER CURRENT TO PASS THROUGH
198. Capacitor
STORES A CHARGE UNTIL IT IS RELEASED. USED FOR
1. LONG CHARGING PERIOD (TIME DELAY)
2. RAPID DISCHARGE
202. COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
INFLAMMABLE
LIQUID
CORROSIVE
CORROSIVE
CORROSIVE
SOLID
INFLAMMABLE
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
203. The vapor concentration on the surface of
a flammable liquid or flammable gases can
create an explosive atmosphere.
Explosive Gases
Vapors
- LEL: lower explosion level
- HEL: higher explosion level
(example: propane 2,4 – 9,5 %)
Explosive Range
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
206. Liquefied Gases
Gases stored in liquid form through the use
of pressure and low temperatures
(e.g. LPG / LNG)
BLEVE (Boiling, Liquid, Expansion, Vapor,
Explosion)
(e.g. Propane expands 270 times
in vapor form compared with its
liquid form)
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
207. Gases under Pressure
Gas bottle contain gas in pressure
around 140 atm.
Gas bottles always should be constrain
Acetylene and oxygen bottles to be kept
apart
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
208. Flammable Liquids
Flash Point : Lower temperature at which
a liquid produces explosive vapors.
- Flammable Liquid : Flash point < 38oC
- Petrol : - 40oC
- Evaporation tendency
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Since Sept 11 2001, the world in which ships trade has changed, perhaps forever. We must all contribute to the effort – contending with new rules governing, security, customs and immigration; recognising the legal and insurance responsibilities we have; and adjusting to the shifting economic and trade environment.
It is my aim in this presentation to identify and highlight the actual threats to those critical assets which could cause significant loss of life or damage to property or to the environment.
Terrorism
Setting aside political and ideological considerations the definition of terrorism:
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons, or particular persons for political purposes
Suffices for the layman and permits a distinction between maritime terrorism and maritime piracy, even though the overt acts against a vessel may be outwardly the same. After all, there are only a few ways to board a ship and a limited categories of criminal offences that can be committed thereon.
Terrorism
It is emphasised that maritime terrorism takes on many forms. It has been conducted on board
vessels or
fixed platforms, such as the vicious armed attacks against Chinese, Indonesian and Korean vessels near Sri Lanka in 1997 resulting in the loss of the vessels, and the several hostage-taking incidents on Shell oil-drilling platform in Nigerian waters in 1999.
The vessel may itself be the weapon used against another, as happened in the year 2000 in Yemen when the USS Cole was severely damaged by suicide bombers using a small dinghy to come into direct contact with the American navy destroyer
They have also been perpetrated against ports or coastal facilities such as the bombing of two tourist resorts in Turkey in 1994, armed raids against two fishing villages in Cambodia in 1998, or the kidnapping of foreigners in using small arms, grenades and rocket launchers, or other improvised weapons that have been in common use in land based terrorist activities. Bombs of various types can be concealed in cargo or baggage and timed to detonate while in port or when it is already inside a vessel and at sea.
But the most terrifying maritime scenarios do not involve just these deadly items.
One possible scenario is the deliberate collision of a passenger vessel against another vessel resulting in great civilian causalities.
Another is the deliberate collision of a laden VLCC, oil tanker or LPG carrier in an area such as the Malacca Straits, causing un-describable damage to the marine environment.
Another is the detonation of a vessel laden with explosive or volatile cargo within any of the many port cities of the world.
Now to the terrorist threat.
For greater ease and simplification I have divided this into pre 2000 and post in order to make my point. Of course there were suicide bombers in the last century – Tamil Tigers notably among them.
In simple terms however there were “rules”.
Hijack or seizure
Political and propagandist
Limited in nature
Attack
Warning
Minimum loss of life
Incidents might lead to loss of life but it was never catastrophic and preferably targeted.
The big indicator of change was the Hizbollah attack on the US and French military camps in Lebanon in 1986. This is seen as a role model. Mass, coordinated, simultaneous.
Terrorists and Saboteurs can be broadly be grouped under the following headings
Those whose grievances essentially territorial, nationalist, separatist, ethnic or religious.
Those whose political ideology is extreme left, right or fundamentalist.
Extremist groups supporting trade protection, animal rights oer environmental issues
Those promoting criminal activities. Drug trafficking, illegal immigration
Terrorist Acts may be aimed at
1. Attracting publicity, advertising a cause and pressurising Governments to change policy
2. Making public apprehensive
3. Discrediting the Government by exposing their inability to protect their citizens
4. Provoking counter measures which impinge on ‘civil rights’ such as travel restriction, curfews, etc alienating public opinion.
5. Extorting money or equipment from Govt., major companies or rich individuals.
6. Freeing imprisoned colleagues in return for release of hostages and promoting other illegal activity.
Cruise Liners - could be targeted because of their high profile, their flag, ownership, particular destination or nationality of passengers. Cruise passengers may be perceived as a high income group and this alone could make them a target (although now difficult)
Tankers - with the political sensitivity of their cargo and the potential environmental impact with resulting high publicity given to tanker incidents, this makes them potential targets, although their size, complexity and terminal where they call make boarding difficult. Gas Tankers with their potentially volatile cargoes might be considered to offer a particularly high profile.
RO-RO Ferries - may be vulnerable to a car bomb attack aimed at damaging, disabling or sinking a vessel, causing fire on board and harm to passengers and crew.
Other ships / special cargoes - those that are transporting hazardous material, nucvlear goods, materials or waste could be potentially attractive targets due to publicity and safety concerns.
Terminals - those that handle gas or oil might prove to be potential targets.
Post 2000
If I am to paraphrase or define the benchmark for terrorism this century these are some of the phases I would be using;
No attention to public opinion
Strategic or economic targets
Global reach
Suicidal and catastrophic
Multiple and coordinated attacks
Use of all weaponry
Transportation as a weapon
Maximum casualties
It is nihilism (the rejection of all religious and moral principals, an extreme form of scepticism maintaining that nothing has a real existence). on a grand stage. Let me dwell on a few:
Strategic thinking and from a targeting point of view brilliance with 9/11 attack
Economic targets. IRA were a lost cause in mid 80,s until they started to bomb the city. The tourism industry is in panic. The motivation is clear.
If you regard the West as peddling cultural and moral pollution, a strike at the economic aspects that personify western values in the world are prime tgts.
There is enough of a risk that any weapon is acceptable and obtainable to take seriously the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Even at the lower end the idea of firing SAMs at airliners is fairly extreme!! The intent certainly exists.
The combination of transport as a weapon and tourism as a target would make me very worried if I was a cruise line owner.
Finally maximum casualties are another avowed aim.
It is all good stuff and a decade ago would have belonged to Hollywood.
Remember that the terrorist has to follow the same pattern as anyone else – the terrorist modus operandi
Imagine attacking a ship in the port of wherever and how it might be set up
Recruit and train a team
Infiltrate the region and find a base……….
to carry out reconnaissance
Additional members as operators would link up
Move the required equipment in be it weapons or explosives or both
Mount an attack
The prime consideration for any terrorist is Security (OPSEC as we know it Operational security)
Security, security – most terrorist organisations are paranoid. Own internal security is of paramount importance.
What are the terrorsit likely tgts
The threat of terrorist groups hijacking vessels to use them as floating bombs or to block narrow maritime passages. A well trained team whose members expect to die in the course of the action would be difficult to prevent.
The obvious tgts for such an attack would be large crude oil carriers and liquid petroleum gas or liquefied natural gas tankers. An attack that resulted in the ignition of these vessels cargoes, but particularly the LNG and LPG tankers highly volatile gas, would produce a devastating explosion and massive damage if the ship was forced close to a major populated area. Similarly, there is a high level of concern particularly in the US over the use of ship-borne containers to convey terrorist weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, into tgt countries.
Let me just remind you of the vulnerable points which are threatened
Ship - access
Crew - recruitment, vetting, licenses and numbers
Cargo - attractiveness
Ports - Singapore to Bangkok or Dar Es Salaam to Mombasa
Port Facilities
And Routes – the main areas of threat
Ship shore interface – crew, visitors, cargo, gash, stores, baggage etc
A never ending list once we get down into the weeds
Let us have a look at AL Qa’eda MO
Morocco confirmed on June 11 2002 that the country’s authorities arrested three Saudi Arabian members of al-qaida in May, who were planning to carry out attacks against US and British navy ships in the Straits of Gibraltar. The arrests highlight the potential threat to shipping from al-qaida cells. The three men were apparently planning to attack US AND British naval vessels patrolling the MED, there is a credible risk of attacks against commercial shipping. The plot to attack naval shipping in the Straits of Gibraltar is reminiscent of the Oct 2000 attack on the USS Cole in a Yemini port. As in that case, the three Saudis were reportedly planning to carry out suicide attacks, ramming ships in the dinghies packed with explosives
Limburg
Initial reaction was that this was a tank cell explosion because of the outward facing fragments on the hull. Effect of explosive and pressures. Targeting the refinery because of the load. Impact beyond the damage was;
The spill and Yemeni claim
Insurance rates x 3 or 4
Trade loss $ 3.8 million per month and the impact on Aden
Al Qaidas tactics of using small boats laden with explosives mean that the greatest threat is to ships in harbours or at narrow choke-points. The following areas are likely to be particularly vulnerable:
The Gulf of Aden
The Horn of Africa
The Persian Gulf and The Straits of Hormuz Example of Hormuz and the Musandam-Iran connection. From Iran 300-500 boats a night. Policing problem. Radar and patrols. Shoreline. Speed. Local impact.
The Red sea and the Suez canal
The Western Med and Straits of Gib
The Malacca Straits
Medium sized vessels such as trawlers, dhows, possibly leisure craft, and in certain parts of the world this would be only be too easy.
Planes we have seen and the attempts to use small planes
Underwater teams. Not to be derided. Tamil tigers used this effectively against the Sri Lankan navy. Expertly trained frogmen attacking boats with limpet charges. Suicide missions. Al Quada are believed to have underwater apparatus and trained personnel.
What type of people carry out such crimes and what type of character are they? I do not profess to being a trained Trick cyclist, so we will look at specifically the piracy/terrorist hijack scenario.
Individual pirates/hijackers
Criminal seeking to extort money
Refugees seeking political asylum
Mentally disturbed – the mentally abnormal have a marked inferiority complex, nervousness, hijacking provides an opportunity for the insecure to prove themselves and achieve personal publicity. They could be armed with a hoax weapon or have a bomb in a contained package or wired to devices as suicide bombers, they do not have to be mentally disturbed just a believer in their faith!
Groups
The politically motivated groups of terrorists operate in groups of 2-5, but can be larger dependent on the task in hand, I.e. the Moscow theatre siege and the personnel involved in 9/11. It will possibly be only the leader who will know the overall plan – remember the Security MO covered in the Threat presentation – well trained and organised, well prepared plans, they will converse in their own language as well as negotiate or demand in a National language. They will possibly know the layout of the vessel, the security and crew procedures and have a fundamental understanding of navigation. They will be well equipped with communications, modern weapons and explosives, which could have been prepositioned on board in advance. They will primarily attempt to access the bridge and using the shock of an armed assault as part of their technique will inevitable gain control of the ship.They will then try to locate the crew/passengers into one part of the ship to ease guarding and control. Initially ruthless, irrational and heavy handed, the elation of their success may ebb away and concern for their own safety and security will be of concern. Unless suicide bombers etc.their aggressive tendencies will reappear as the vessel approaches land or set deadlines.
What type of people carry out such crimes and what type of character are they? I do not profess to being a trained Trick cyclist, so we will look at specifically the piracy/terrorist hijack scenario.
Individual pirates/hijackers
Criminal seeking to extort money
Refugees seeking political asylum
Mentally disturbed – the mentally abnormal have a marked inferiority complex, nervousness, hijacking provides an opportunity for the insecure to prove themselves and achieve personal publicity. They could be armed with a hoax weapon or have a bomb in a contained package or wired to devices as suicide bombers, they do not have to be mentally disturbed just a believer in their faith!
Groups
The politically motivated groups of terrorists operate in groups of 2-5, but can be larger dependent on the task in hand, I.e. the Moscow theatre siege and the personnel involved in 9/11. It will possibly be only the leader who will know the overall plan – remember the Security MO covered in the Threat presentation – well trained and organised, well prepared plans, they will converse in their own language as well as negotiate or demand in a National language. They will possibly know the layout of the vessel, the security and crew procedures and have a fundamental understanding of navigation. They will be well equipped with communications, modern weapons and explosives, which could have been prepositioned on board in advance. They will primarily attempt to access the bridge and using the shock of an armed assault as part of their technique will inevitable gain control of the ship.They will then try to locate the crew/passengers into one part of the ship to ease guarding and control. Initially ruthless, irrational and heavy handed, the elation of their success may ebb away and concern for their own safety and security will be of concern. Unless suicide bombers etc.their aggressive tendencies will reappear as the vessel approaches land or set deadlines.
What type of people carry out such crimes and what type of character are they? I do not profess to being a trained Trick cyclist, so we will look at specifically the piracy/terrorist hijack scenario.
Individual pirates/hijackers
Criminal seeking to extort money
Refugees seeking political asylum
Mentally disturbed – the mentally abnormal have a marked inferiority complex, nervousness, hijacking provides an opportunity for the insecure to prove themselves and achieve personal publicity. They could be armed with a hoax weapon or have a bomb in a contained package or wired to devices as suicide bombers, they do not have to be mentally disturbed just a believer in their faith!
Groups
The politically motivated groups of terrorists operate in groups of 2-5, but can be larger dependent on the task in hand, I.e. the Moscow theatre siege and the personnel involved in 9/11. It will possibly be only the leader who will know the overall plan – remember the Security MO covered in the Threat presentation – well trained and organised, well prepared plans, they will converse in their own language as well as negotiate or demand in a National language. They will possibly know the layout of the vessel, the security and crew procedures and have a fundamental understanding of navigation. They will be well equipped with communications, modern weapons and explosives, which could have been prepositioned on board in advance. They will primarily attempt to access the bridge and using the shock of an armed assault as part of their technique will inevitable gain control of the ship.They will then try to locate the crew/passengers into one part of the ship to ease guarding and control. Initially ruthless, irrational and heavy handed, the elation of their success may ebb away and concern for their own safety and security will be of concern. Unless suicide bombers etc.their aggressive tendencies will reappear as the vessel approaches land or set deadlines.
What type of people carry out such crimes and what type of character are they? I do not profess to being a trained Trick cyclist, so we will look at specifically the piracy/terrorist hijack scenario.
Individual pirates/hijackers
Criminal seeking to extort money
Refugees seeking political asylum
Mentally disturbed – the mentally abnormal have a marked inferiority complex, nervousness, hijacking provides an opportunity for the insecure to prove themselves and achieve personal publicity. They could be armed with a hoax weapon or have a bomb in a contained package or wired to devices as suicide bombers, they do not have to be mentally disturbed just a believer in their faith!
Groups
The politically motivated groups of terrorists operate in groups of 2-5, but can be larger dependent on the task in hand, I.e. the Moscow theatre siege and the personnel involved in 9/11. It will possibly be only the leader who will know the overall plan – remember the Security MO covered in the Threat presentation – well trained and organised, well prepared plans, they will converse in their own language as well as negotiate or demand in a National language. They will possibly know the layout of the vessel, the security and crew procedures and have a fundamental understanding of navigation. They will be well equipped with communications, modern weapons and explosives, which could have been prepositioned on board in advance. They will primarily attempt to access the bridge and using the shock of an armed assault as part of their technique will inevitable gain control of the ship.They will then try to locate the crew/passengers into one part of the ship to ease guarding and control. Initially ruthless, irrational and heavy handed, the elation of their success may ebb away and concern for their own safety and security will be of concern. Unless suicide bombers etc.their aggressive tendencies will reappear as the vessel approaches land or set deadlines.
Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices
Not as easy as it sounds, within the military and civilian field there numerous cses to attend from using different weapons to identifying foreign equipment and weapons of various sizes, designs, makes , models etc. And the experience gained cannot be passed on over night. It requires experts in the relevant fields to be able to recognise and detect weapons, dangerous substances and devices. What we are concerned with is the prevention of such materials entering the ports and on board vessels. To achieve this we require control similar airport security systems.
X-Ray screening to detect weapons made of metal, plastic, ceramics etc.
Low powered radar sensors to detect weapons
Walk through detectors
Trace detectors for dangerous substances and confirming cargos, illegal immigrants etc.
Screening containers for chemical, biological, radioactive or nuclear cargo
Dirty bombs - Radioactive material surrounded by explosive. Detonation spreads the radioactivity over a wide area, killing potentially hundreds of people and leaving whole areas uninhabitable for decades. As reported in the press Feb 1 2003 British Intelligence services have uncovered a plot by A l Qaeda to build a nuclear dirty bomb after discovering documents in Heart in Afghanistan indicating that the bomb had been assembled. The where abouts are unknown and it is feared it could have been moved along the smuggling routes which spread west from Heart close to the Iranian border.In the Senate of the United States Jan 17 2003 a bill has been introduced to direct the Secretary of Energy to carry out a programme to evaluate and demonstrate the operation of radiation detection systems for the use at seaports in the US. The act is to cited as the @Radiation detection for dirty bomb material in containers and bulk cargo act of 2003’
Read the Act
To make ourselves less vulnerable by the use of education, awareness and the introduction of security procedures coupled with important intelligence will enable crews and personnel to identify suspicious materials and report them to the correct authorities for identification. (Nisha as an example)
Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices
Not as easy as it sounds, within the military and civilian field there numerous cses to attend from using different weapons to identifying foreign equipment and weapons of various sizes, designs, makes , models etc. And the experience gained cannot be passed on over night. It requires experts in the relevant fields to be able to recognise and detect weapons, dangerous substances and devices. What we are concerned with is the prevention of such materials entering the ports and on board vessels. To achieve this we require control similar airport security systems.
X-Ray screening to detect weapons made of metal, plastic, ceramics etc.
Low powered radar sensors to detect weapons
Walk through detectors
Trace detectors for dangerous substances and confirming cargos, illegal immigrants etc.
Screening containers for chemical, biological, radioactive or nuclear cargo
Dirty bombs - Radioactive material surrounded by explosive. Detonation spreads the radioactivity over a wide area, killing potentially hundreds of people and leaving whole areas uninhabitable for decades. As reported in the press Feb 1 2003 British Intelligence services have uncovered a plot by A l Qaeda to build a nuclear dirty bomb after discovering documents in Heart in Afghanistan indicating that the bomb had been assembled. The where abouts are unknown and it is feared it could have been moved along the smuggling routes which spread west from Heart close to the Iranian border.In the Senate of the United States Jan 17 2003 a bill has been introduced to direct the Secretary of Energy to carry out a programme to evaluate and demonstrate the operation of radiation detection systems for the use at seaports in the US. The act is to cited as the @Radiation detection for dirty bomb material in containers and bulk cargo act of 2003’
Read the Act
To make ourselves less vulnerable by the use of education, awareness and the introduction of security procedures coupled with important intelligence will enable crews and personnel to identify suspicious materials and report them to the correct authorities for identification. (Nisha as an example)