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SHIP SECURITY OFFICER
DAY 1
COURSE OVERVIEW
This training course aims to provide knowledge to those
who may be designated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of a Ship Security Officer (SSO), as defined
in Chapter VI Regulation VI/5 Table A-VI/5 of the STCW
2010 Manila Amendments and section A/12.1 of the ISPS
code, and in particular the duties and responsibilities with
respect to the security of a ship, for implementing and
maintaining a Ship Security Plan and for liaising with the
Company Security Officer (CSO) and with Port Facility
Security Officers (PFSOs).
DAY 1
COMPETENCE TO BE ACHIEVED
• Maintain and Supervise the Implementation of
the Ship Security Plan;
• Assess Security Risk, Threat and Vulnerability;
• Undertake regular inspections of the ship to
ensure that appropriate security measures are
implemented and maintained;
• Ensure that security equipment and systems if any
are properly operated, tested and calibrated;
DAY 1
• Encourage Security Awareness and Vigilance.
COMPETENCE TO BE ACHIEVED
DAY 1
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
• A Threat to the shipping industry is a means by
which it will affect their operations and cause
considerable commercial loss.
• Incident involving criminal activity in the maritime
environment are the following:
1. Piracy and Armed Robbery
2. Terrorism
3. Contraband Smuggling
DAY 1
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
4. Stowaways and Refugees
5. Cargo Theft
6. Collateral Damage
DAY 1
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
• Based on the statistics shown above, the Ship
Security Course has been updated and revised to
make sure that maritime incidents especially
piracy and armed-robbery has been prevented.
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
1. Piracy and Armed Robbery
• Piracy is a term used to describe acts of armed
robbery, hijacking and other malicious acts
against ships in international waters.
• Piracy is carried out with intent of stealing
valuables onboard and/or extorting money from
ship or the crew hostage for ransom.
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
1. Piracy and Armed Robbery
• In recent years, there has been a
series of maritime attacks on
vessels by pirates particularly in the
Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin and the
Indian Ocean.
• Thus, vast areas of waters are affected making it a
challenge to prevent maritime piracy incident.
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
1. Piracy and Armed Robbery
A. Low Level Armed Robbery
• Attack with the intention of stealing, usually
under cover of darkness.
• Culprits take whatever they can carry from the
dark and the hold
• Violence may occur when the crew tries to stop
them
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
1. Piracy and Armed Robbery
B. Medium Level Armed Assault & Robbery (MLAAR)
• Armed Assaults with violence or threats of
violence .
• Pirates come onboard unnoticed and force the
crew to hand over their cash and valuables
• Cargo is also stolen if possible
• Each raid is over in less than an hour
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
1. Piracy and Armed Robbery
C. Major Criminal Hijack (MHCJ)
• Carefully planned theft of the entire cargo
• Pirates know every detail of the cargo & ships
stowage plan
• This type of attack usually results in a double digit
million dollar loss
DAY 1
THREATS of Maritime
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
1. Piracy and Armed Robbery
Threat of Maritime Piracy
• Majority attacks have taken place between first
light and last light
• No successful attacks have occurred on ships at 15
knots and more
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
2. Terrorism
• In the international community, terrorism has no
legally binding, criminal law definition.
• It refer only to those violent acts that are
intended to create fear (terror); are perpetrated
for a religious, political or .
• Attacks on high profile symbolic targets are used
to incite counter-terrorism by the state to polarise
the population. This strategy was used by Al
Qaeda in its attacks on the United States in
September 2001
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
2. Terrorism
Threat of Terrorism
• The “war on terror” has
focused exclusively on
transitional terrorism since
the hijacking of 9/11
• Domestic terrorism possess a greater
threat in terms of lives and property loss.
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
2. Terrorism
Threat of Terrorism
• The threat of international terrorism comes from a
diverse range of sources, including Al Qaida and
associated networks, and those who share Al
Qaida's ideology but do not have direct contact
with them.
• Threat could manifest itself from a lone
individual or group, rather than a larger network.
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
2. Terrorism
Groups involved in Global Terrorism
• Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
• Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
• Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
• Armed Islamic Group
• Aum Supreme Truth
• Basque Fatherland and
Liberty (ETA)
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
2. Terrorism
Groups involved in Global Terrorism
• Revolutionary People’s Army Liberation Party
• Al-Jihad
• Al-Gamma’a al-Islamiya
• Harakat ul-Mujahidin
• Hizballah (Party of God)
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
2. Terrorism
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
3. Contraband Smuggling
• Contraband smuggling has increased its statistics
in the maritime industry.
• It is used to for terrorism or pirate attacks at sea .
• According to Homeland Security News Wire, A
new study on sea trafficking reveals that the large
majority of ships involved in the illegal transfer of
weapons, drugs, and banned missile or
WMD equipment are owned by major shipping
companies in the United States, Germany,
and Greece.
DAY 1
Stowaways
and
Refugees
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
4. Stowaways and Refugees
• “Stowaway”. A person who is secreted on a ship,
or in cargo which is subsequently loaded on the
ship, without the consent of the shipowner or
the master or any other responsible person and
who is detected on board the ship after it has
departed from a port, or in the cargo while
unloading it in the port of arrival, and is reported
as a stowaway by the master to the appropriate
authorities (FAL Convention).
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
4. Stowaways and Refugees
• “Attempted stowaway”- a person who is secreted
on a ship, or in cargo which is subsequently
loaded on the ship, without the consent of the
shipowner or the master or any other
responsible person, and who is detected on
board the ship before it has departed from the
port (Ref IMO Doc. FAL 28/10 Annex 1).
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
4. Stowaways and Refugees
• “a refugee is a person who "owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality, and is
unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country“
(1951 Convention Relating to the status of
Refugees).
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
4. Stowaways and Refugees
• Refugees and asylum-seekers also travel as
stowaways.
• Once discovered, it can be difficult to obtain
permission from coastal States for their
disembarkation, forcing shipmasters to
maintain them on board for prolonged periods
of time, often under difficult conditions
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
4. Stowaways and Refugees
• Selecting a place of disembarkation, it is
important to ensure that refugees and asylum-
seekers will be referred to appropriate follow-
up processes where their international
protection needs can be assessed and
addressed (UNHCR, 2011).
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
4. Stowaways and Refugees
Threats of Stowaways and Refugees
• Stowaways and refugees is a threat of the
maritime industry because they become a
major burden resulting to huge financial
losses.
• It would cause delay to ships and would
burden ship owners and masters and would
subject them to greater public accountability.
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
5. Cargo Theft
• Cargo theft is typically rooted in social, economic
and cultural conditions.
• According to FreightWatch, Mexico, Brazil, South
Africa, the United States and Russia are the
countries most at risk for cargo theft globally.
• Majority of cargo theft are classified as hijacking
or the threat of violence.
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
5. Cargo Theft
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
5. Cargo Theft
Threat of Cargo Theft
• Global cargo theft risks shown on the map vary
greatly from country to country.
• Risk also vary from region to region.
DAY 1
UPDATED: Product Tanker Hijacked in South China
Sea for Fuel Cargo; Second Boarding in Less Than A
Year
HONDURAS-FLAGGED,
Singapore-operated product
tanker, Moresby 9, was
boarded and hijacked by nine
armed pirates at about 2015 LT,
4 July, approximately 34nm
WNW of Anambas Islands,
South China Sea. The second
boarding of the vessel in less
than a year.
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
6. Collateral Damage
• Damage to things that are incidental to the
intended target.
• It is frequently used as a military term where it
can refer to the accidental or unintentional
killing or wounding of non-combatants and/or
destruction to non-combatant property during
attacks on legitimate enemy targets.
DAY 1
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
.
6. Collateral Damage
• Occurs when nearby fire explosion or attack
results to a ship of facility.
• While the damage is sometimes unintended,
the costs are nevertheless real.
Threat of Collateral Damage
DAY 1
International Maritime Security Policy
• The International
Maritime Organization
(IMO) has adopted a
number of resolutions and
conventions in terms of
Maritime Security Policy.
DAY 1
International Maritime Security Policy
IMO Conventions Maritime Security
• Resolution A. 545 (13) 1983 - Measures to
Prevent Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships
• Resolution A. 584 (14) 1985 – Measures to
Prevent Unlawful Acts which Threaten Safety of
Ships and Security of Passengers
DAY 1
International Maritime Security Policy
IMO Conventions Maritime Security
• MSC/Circ. 443 1986 – Measures to Prevent
Unlawful Acts Against Passengers and Crew on
Board Ships
• In 1988, the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA) treaties aimed at ensuring that
appropriate judicial action is taken against
persons committing unlawful acts against ships.
DAY 1
International Maritime Security Policy
• Last September 11, 2001, IMO approved the
development of new measures relating to
security of ships and of port facilities the
International Convention for the Safety of Life
Sea at Sea, 1974 in December of 2002.
• In December 2002, Diplomatic Conference
resulted in amendments to SOLAS 74.
• Brief summary of these amendments should be
carried out with mention of changes to Chapter
V but with emphasis on the changes to Chapter
XI, Regulations 3 and 5.
DAY 1
International Maritime Security Policy
• Also it was added to the new Chapter XI-2
Regulation 1-13 and the ISPS Code.
DAY 1
Responsibilities of Government Companies
and Designated Persons
• Government Companies such as
the Maritime Industry Authority
(MARINA) has mandated and
created Memorandum Circulars
for the protection and safety of
the seafarers at Sea.
DAY 1
Responsibilities of Government Companies
and Designated Persons
SOLAS Chapter XI-2 Regulation 1
• States the special measures to enhance maritime
security and the new International Code for the
Security of Ships and Port Facilities (ISPS Code).
Best Management Practice to Deter Piracy
off the Coast of Somalia and the Arabian
Sea Area (BMP3)
DAY 1
Responsibilities of Government Companies
and Designated Persons
Legal Implications of Actions or Non-Acton
by Security Personnel
• Action/non-action by the Ship Security Officer
and other security personnel is likely to have
legal implications
• Personnel will have certain authorities and
obligations yet they will also find that they face
certain constraints
DAY 1
Responsibilities of Government Companies
and Designated Persons
Handling Sensitive Security-Related
Information and Communications
• A category of sensitive but classified information.
• Information obtained in the conduct of security
activities whose public disclosure would, in the
judgment of specified government agencies, harm
transportation security, be an unwarranted
invasion of privacy, or reveal trade secrets or
privileged or confidential information.
1 - Setting applicable security levels and providing
guidance for protection from security incidents
2 - Determining which ports will fall into the category
where they are required to comply with the new
legislation.
This includes establishing appropriate security
measures for fixed, floating platforms and mobile
offshore drilling units, to allow interaction with
ships which are required to comply with the Code
Responsibility of the Contracting Government
3 - Ensure that those ports and flagged ships do comply
with that legislation and have completed security
asessments and plans in line with it.
Governments also verify these security plans and
the issue of certificates of compliance
4 - Advising its flagged ships when required to be at level 2
or 3, what security measures they should take, and
security measures that have been taken by the
government to provide protection against the threat.
Responsibility of the Contracting Government
5 - Exercising control and compliance measures,
over all those bodies which they appoint to carry
out their responsibilities
6 - Determining when Declaration of Security is
required having assessed the risk that the ship to
port interface or the ship to ship activity poses the
people, property and the environment.
Responsibility of the Contracting Government
7 - Establish contact points :
- Government officers to whom an SSO, CSO,
PFSO can report security concerns
- A point of contact for advice (on a 24h basis)
on security for any ship either flying its flag
or operating in its territorial water, or even
intending to enter its territorial water
Responsibility of the Contracting Government
Responsibility of the Contracting Government
• Special consideration to be given to :
– Establish appropriate security measures for fixed and
floating platforms and mobile offshore drilling units on
location to allow interaction with ships which are
required to comply with the ISPS Code
– Establish appropriate security measures to enhance the
security of ships to which the Code does not apply and
to ensure any security provisions applying to such ships
to allow interaction with ships to which the ISPS Code
apply
Contracting Governments shall
set security levels and
provide guidance for
protection from
security incidents.
4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Factors to be considered in setting
appropriate security level :
4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
1 - The degree that the threat information is credible
2 - The degree that the threat information is corroborated
3 - The degree that the threat information is specific or
imminent
4 - The potential consequences of such security
incident
Contracting Governments may delegate to a
Recognised Security Organisation related duties
under chapter XII with the exception of :
4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
1 - Setting of the applicable security level
2 - Approving a port facility security assessment
and subsequent amendments to an approved
assessment
3 - Determining the port facilities which will be
required to designate a Port Facility Security
Officer
4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
4 - Approving a Port Facility Security Plan and
subsequent amendments to an approved plan
5 - Exercising control and compliance measures
pursuant to regulation XI-2/9
6 - Establishing the requirements for a declaration of
security
Contracting Governments may delegate to a
Recognised Security Organisation related duties
under chapter XII with the exception of :
4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
Recognised Security Organisations (RSO)
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Appendix
1
Contracting Governments may authorised a
Recognised Security Organisation to undertake
certain security related activities including :
1 - Approval of ship security plans, or amendments,
on behalf of the Administration
2 - Verification and certification of compliance of
ships on behalf of the Administration
3 - Conducting Port Facility Security Assessments
required by the Contracting Government
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
Recognised Security Organisations (RSO)
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Appendix
1
A RSO may also provide assistance to
Companies or Port facilities on security matters,
including
Ship Security Assessments,
Ship Security Plans,
Port Facility Security Assessments,
Port Facility Security Plans.
If a RSO has done so in respect of a Ship Security
Assessment or Plan that RSO should not be
authorised to approve that Ship Security Plan.
4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
Competency to be demonstrated by the (RSO)
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Appendix
1
1 ) EXPERTISE :
- in relevant aspect of security
2 ) CAPABILITY TO :
- assess the security risks that could occur during
ship and port facility operations, including the
ship/port facility interface and how to
minimise such risks
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
Competency to be demonstrated by the (RSO)
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Appendix
1
3 ) KNOWLEDGE :
- of ship and port operations
- of ship construction if providing services to ships
- of port design and construction if providing services
to port facilities
- of the requirements of the Code and relevant
national and international legislation and security
requirements
- of current security threats and patterns
- on recognition and detection of weapons,
dangerous substances and devices
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
Competency to be demonstrated by the (RSO)
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Appendix
1
3 ) KNOWLEDGE :
- on recognition, on a non-discriminating basis, of
characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons
who are likely to threaten security
- on techniques used to circumvent security
measures
- of security and surveillance equipment and systems
and their operational limitations
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
Competency to be demonstrated by the (RSO)
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Appendix
1
4 ) ABILITY TO :
- maintain and improve the expertise of the personnel
- monitor the trustworthiness of the personnel
- maintain appropriate measures to avoid
unauthorised disclosure of, or access to security
sensitive material
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Ship is required
to act upon the
security levels
set by
Contracting
Government
7 - SHIP SECURITY
Ship is required
to act upon the
security levels
set by
Contracting
Government
7 - SHIP SECURITY
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
In order to communicate the threat
at port facility or for the ship, the
Contracting Government sets the
appropriate security level :
ISPS CODE Security level
Level 1 :
Low threat situation
Level 2 :
Medium threat situation
Level 3 :
High threat situation
2.1 - SECURITY LEVEL 1
The level for which
minimum
appropriate
protective security
measures
shall be maintained
at all times.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 1
1- Ensuring the performance of all ships security duties
2- Controlling access to the ship
3- Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects
4- Monitoring restricted areas ( authorise person only )
6- Supervising the handling of cargo and ship’s stores
7- Ensuring the security communication is readily available
5- Monitoring of deck areas and areas surrounding the ship
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
2.1 - SECURITY LEVEL 2
The level for which
appropriate
additional
protective security
measures
shall be maintained
for a period of time
as a result of
heightened risk of
a security incident.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
2.1 - SECURITY LEVEL 3
The level for which
specific
protective security
measures
shall be maintained
for a period of time
when a
security incident
is probable or
imminent.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
- Additional protective measures as
specified in the ship security plan shall be
implemented
- Further specific protective measures as
specified in the ship security plan shall be
7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3
- The ship shall confirm to the Port Facility Security Officer
the initiation of the implementation of the appropriate
measures and procedures as details in the Ship Security
Plan and report any difficulties in implementation
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
- The ship shall acknowledge receipt of the Administration’s
or of the Contracting Government’s instructions on the
change of security level
7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3
If the ship is required to set, or is already at a
higher level than set for the port it intends to enter,
the ship shall advice the designated authority and
the Port Facility Officer of the situation.
In such cases, the Ship Security Officer
shall liase with the Port Facility
security Officer and co-ordinate
appropriate actions, if necessary.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3
An Administration requiring ships entitled
to fly its flag to set security level 2 or 3
in a port of another
Contracting Government shall inform
that Contracting Government
without delay
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3
When Contracting Governments
set security levels and
ensure the provision of
security level information to ships,
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
such ships shall be advised
to maintain vigilance and report
immediately any information
that comes to their attention
that may affect
maritime security in the area
7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
When advising such ships of
the applicable security level,
a Contracting Government shall
also advise those ships
of any security measure
that they should take and of
measures that have been taken
by the Contracting Government
to provide protection
against the threat.
The company shall ensure that the Ship Security Plan contains :
6 - OBLIGATIONS OF THE COMPANY
- Clear statement emphasising the Master’s
authority
- Master overriding authority and responsibility
to make decisions with respect to the security
of the ship
- Request the assistance of the company or
of any Contracting Government as may be
necessary
The Company Security Officer, the Master and the Ship
Security Officer shall be given the necessary support to fulfil
their duties and responsibilities
A plan to ensure
the application of measures
on board the ship
designed to protect
persons on board, cargo,
cargo transport units,
ship’s stores or the ship
from the risks of
a security incident.
2.1 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN
A plan to ensure
the application of measures
designed to protect the
port facility and ships,
persons, cargo,
cargo transport units
and ship’s stores
within the port facility
from the risks of
a security incident.
2.1 - PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN
The person on board
the ship accountable to the
master for security of the ship,
including implementation and
maintenance of the Ship
Security Plan and for
liaison with the
Company Security Officer
and the Port Facility
Security Officers.
2.1 - SHIP SECURITY OFFICER
MASTER
SHIP
SECURITY
OFFICER
COMPANY
SECURITY
OFFICER
PORT FACILITY
SECURITY
OFFICER
The person ashore
designated by the company
for ensuring that a
ship security assessment
is carried out,
that the Ship Security Plan is
developed, approved
implemented and maintained
and for liaison with
Port Facility Security Officer
and the Ship Security Officer.
2.1 - COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER
SHIP
SECURITY
OFFICER
COMPANY
SECURITY
OFFICER
PORT FACILITY
SECURITY
OFFICER
The person appointed
as responsible for
the development,
implementation, revision
and maintenance of the
Port Facility Security Plan
and for liaison with the
Ship Security Officers
and the
Company Security Officers.
2.1 - PORT FACILITY SECURITY OFFICER
SHIP
SECURITY
OFFICER
COMPANY
SECURITY
OFFICER
PORT FACILITY
SECURITY
OFFICER
- Passenger ships, including passenger
high-speed craft
3 - APPLICATION
- Cargo ships, including high-speed craft
of 500 gross tonnage and upwards
- Mobile offshore drilling units
- Port facilities serving ships
engaged on international voyages
11 - COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER ( CSO )
The company must designate
a Company Security Officer
- A person designated as the CSO
may act as CSO for one or more
ships
- A company may designate several
persons as CSOs provided it is
clearly identified for which ships
each person is responsible
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
1- Advising the level of threats
2- Ensuring that Ship Security
Assessments are carried out
3- Ensuring the development and
maintenance of the SSP
4- Ensuring that the SSP is modified as
appropriate to correct deficiencies
5- Arranging for internal audits and
reviews of security activities
11 - COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER ( CSO )
Duty and Responsibilities
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
7- Ensuring that deficiencies and non-
conformities are promptly addressed
and dealt with
8- Enhancing security awareness and
vigilance
9- Ensuring adequate training for personnel
responsible for the security of the ship
11 - COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER ( CSO )
Duty and Responsibilities
6- Arranging for initial and subsequent
verifications of the ship by the
Administration or the Recognised
Security Organisation
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
10- Ensuring effective communication and
co-operation the Ship Security Officer and
the relevant Port Facility Security Officer
11- Ensuring consistency between security
and safety requirements
12- Ensuring that the SSP for each ship
reflect the specific information accurately
13- Ensuring that any alternative or equivalent
arrangements approved for a particular
ship or group of ships are implemented
and maintained
11 - COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER ( CSO )
Duty and Responsibilities
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
12 - SHIP SECURITY OFFICER ( SSO )
Duty and Responsibilities
1- Undertaking regular security inspections
of the ship
2- Maintaining and supervising the SSP
including any amendments to the SSP
A Ship Security Officer shall be
designated on each ship
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
3- Co-ordinating the security aspects of
the handling of cargo and ship’s stores
with other shipboard personnel and
relevant Port Facility Security Officers
12 - SHIP SECURITY OFFICER ( SSO )
Duty and Responsibilities
4- Proposing modifications to the SSP
6- Enhancing security awareness and
vigilance on board
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
5- Reporting to Company Security Officer
any deficiencies identified during
internal audits, periodic reviews,
security inspections and verifications
7- Ensuring that adequate training has
been provided to shipboard personnel
12 - SHIP SECURITY OFFICER ( SSO )
Duty and Responsibilities
8- Reporting all security incidents
9- Co-ordinating Implementation of the
SSP with the company security officer
and the relevant Port Facility Security
Officer
10- Ensuring that security equipment is
properly operated, tested, calibrated
and maintained
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY
Shipboard personnel having specific
security duties and responsibilities
shall have sufficient knowledge and
ability to perform their assigned duties
The Company Security Officer and
appropriate shore-based personnel
and the Ship Security Officer shall
have knowledge and receive training
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Drills and exercises shall be
conducted at appropriate intervals
taking into account the ship type,
ship personnel changes, port
facilities to be visited and other
relevant circumstances.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
The Company Security Officer shall
ensure the effective co-ordination
and implementation of the SSP by
participating in exercises at
appropriate intervals.
13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Area where knowledge and training may be required:
13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY
1- Security administration
2- International conventions, codes and
recommendations
3- Government legislation and regulations
4- Responsibilities and functions of other
security organisations
5- Methodology of ship security
assessment
CSO
SSO
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Area where knowledge and training may be required:
13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY
6- Methods of ship security surveys and
inspections
7- Ship and port operations and conditions
8- Ship and port operation facility security
measures
9- Emergency preparedness and response
& contingency planning
10- Instruction techniques for security
training and education
CSO
SSO
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Area where knowledge and training may be required:
13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY
11- Handling sensitive security related
information & communications
12- Knowledge of current security threats and
patterns
13- Recognition and detection of weapons,
dangerous substances and devices
14- Recognition of characteristics and
behavioural patterns of persons who are
likely to threaten security
15- Techniques used to circumvent security
measures
CSO
SSO
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Area where knowledge and training may be required:
13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY
16- Security equipment and systems and
their operational limitations
17- Methods of conducting audits, inspection,
control and monitoring
18- Methods of physical searches and
non-intrusive inspections
19- Security drills and exercises, including
drills and exercise with port facilities
20- Assessment of security drills and
exercises
CSO
SSO
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Frequency :
13.6 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY
At least once every
three months
But In case where more than
25 % of the ship’s personnel
has been changed within the
last three months,
a drill should be conducted
within one week of the change.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Frequency :
13.7 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY
At least once every calendar year with no more
than 18 months between the exercises
- CSO
- PFSO
- Relevant
authority of
Contracting
Government
- SSO
- Communications
- Co-ordination
- Resource
availability
- Response
WHAT
WHO
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
Each ship shall carry on board a SSP approved
by the Administration
The plan shall make provisions for
the three security levels.
A Recognised Security Organisation
may prepare the Ship Security Plan of
a specific ship.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
The plan shall be written in the
language or languages of the ship.
English French
Spanish
9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
In such cases the Recognised Security
Organisation, undertaking the review and
approval of the ship security plan,or its
amendments shall not have been involved
in either the preparation of the Ship Security
Assessment or of the Ship Security Plan, or
the amendments, under review.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
The Administration may entrust the review
and approval of the SSP, or of amendments
to previously approved plan, to Recognised
Security Organisations.
Recognised
Organisations
Security
9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
The Administration may entrust the
review and approval of the SSP, or of
amendments to previously approved
plan, to Recognised Security
Organisations.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Submission of ship plans, or
amendments, for approval shall be
accompanied by the security
assessment on the basis of which the
plan, or amendments, have been
developed.
9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
1- Prevent weapons, dangerous
substances and devices intended to
use against people, ships or ports
2- Identification of the restricted areas
and measures for the prevention of
unauthorised access
4- Responding to security threats or
breaches of security
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
The SSP shall consist, at least, of :
3- Prevention of unauthorised access
to the ship
9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
5- Responding to security instructions
given by Contracting Governments at
security level 3
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
The SSP shall consist, at least, of :
6- Evacuation in case of security threats
or breaches of security
7- Duties of shipboard personnel assigned
security responsibilities
8- Auditing the security activities
9- Training drills and exercises
9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
The SSP shall consist, at least, of :
10- Interfacing with port facility security
activities
11- Periodic review of the plan for
updating
12- Reporting security incidents
13- Identification of the Ship Security Officer
14- Identification of the company security
officer including 24-hour contact details
9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
15- Inspection, testing, calibration and
maintenance of security equipment
17- Identification of the locations where the
ship security activation points are
provided
18- Procedures, instructions and guidance
on the use of the ship security alert
system including testing, deactivation
and resetting and to limit false alerts
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
The SSP shall consist, at least, of :
16- Frequency of testing or calibration any
security equipment provided on board
9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
Changes to the Ship Security Plan shall not be
implemented unless approved by the Administration
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
They shall be protected by procedures
aimed at preventing their unauthorised
deletion, destruction or amendment.
The plans shall be protected from
unauthorised access or disclosure.
The records may be kept in electronic
format. In such case :
Audits
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
All SSPs Should :
9.2 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
English French
Spanish
1 - Detail the organisational structure of the
security for the ship
2 - Detail the ship’s relationships with :
company and port facilities,
other ships and relevant authorities
with security responsibility
3 - Detail the communication system to allow
effective communication within the ship &
between the ship and others, including
the port facilities
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
All SSPs Should :
4 - Detail the basic security measures for
security level 1
5 - Detail the additional security measures
that will allow the ship to progress without
delay to security level 2 or 3
6 - Provide for regular review, or audit, and
for its amendment
9.2 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
English French
Spanish
7 - Reporting procedures to the appropriate
Contracting Governments contact points
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
9.8 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
Areas where security measures could be taken :
Access to the ship
Delivery of
ship’s stores
Monitoring
the security
of the ship
Handling
unaccompanied
baggage
Handling
of cargo
Restricted
areas
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
9.9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
Control access to the ship should include any :
Access ladders
Cranes &
hoisting gear
Access doors, side scuttles,
windows and ports
Mooring lines &
anchors chains
Access
ramps
Access
gangways
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
9.14 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
Security measures to control access to the ship may include :
Vehicles
destined to be
loaded on board
car carriers,
ro-ro and others
passenger ships
are subjected
to search
prior loading
In liaison with the port facility
Designated
secure areas
are established
in which
inspections and
searching of
people,baggage,
personnel
effects, vehicles
can take place
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
9.14 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
Checking
the identity
of all
persons
Segregating
embarking
from
disembarking
passengers
Segregating checked persons and their
personal effects from unchecked persons
and their personal effects
Security measures to control access to the ship may include :
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
9.14 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
Identification of
access points
that should be
secured or
attended to
prevent
unauthorised
access
Securing by
locking, or
other means,
access to
unattended
spaces to
passengers
and visitors
Providing security briefings to all ship personnel
on possible threats, the need for vigilance and...
…the procedures for reporting suspicious
persons objects or activities
Security measures to control access to the ship may include :
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
9.16 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
In liaison with the Port Facility
Establishing a
restricted area
on the
shore-side
of the ship
Deterring
waterside
access to
the ship
...
… including, for example,
provision of boat patrols
Security measures to control access to the ship may include :
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
9.16 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP )
Limiting the
number of
access points
and identifying
those to be
closed
Assigning
additional
personnel to
patrol deck
areas during
silent hours
Increasing the frequency and details of searches of
people, personal effects, and vehicles being
embarked or loaded onto the ship
Security measures to control access to the ship may include :
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
RISK ASSESSMENT
A structured and systematic
methodology, aimed at enhancing
Maritime safety & security,
including :
- protection of life,
- health,
- marine environment and property,
by using risk and cost / benefit
analysis.
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Causes
Effects
Elements of the system
E2
E1 E3 E4 E5
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
«Bow Tie» Diagram
Initiating
Event
Consequence
1
Consequence
2
Consequence
3
HAZARD
Threat
barriers
Recovery
measures
Saf.Crit.
Saf.Crit.
Saf.Crit.
Saf.Crit.
Management activities and tasks
Threat
1
Threat
2
Threat
3
Example of
Parameters
of a
risk model
Organisation
Poor management practices
Lack of ship specific knowledge
Poor vessel maintenance
Human
Poor decision making
Poor judgement
Lack of knowledge
Poor communication
Vessel reliability
Propulsion
Steering
Electrical power
Structural integrity
Waterway
Location
Wind speed and direction
Tides, Currents, Visibility
Traffic separation
Vessel
Size, Age, Crew
Manoeuvrability
Pilotage requirements
Escorting requirements
Port control
Traffic rules
Navigational equipment
Number of pilots, tugs
Traffic monitoring
equipment
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Hazard
Identification
Risk
assessment
Risk control
options
Cost benefit
assessment
Decision
making
Recommendation
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
RISK ASSESSMENT
SHIP
TRAIN
TRUCK
BARGE
PEOPLE
- Worker
- Visitor
- Passenger
INCOMING OUTGOING
STAY PERIOD
Ex : Movements in port
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
RISK ASSESSMENT
HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION
- Organisational / procedural failure
- Communication failure
- Equipment failure
- Environmental conditions
- Human error
- Navigation aids
- Structured review or brainstorming sessions
- Accident scenarios
- Direct causes
- Most probable outcomes in terms of loss
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
- Harbour authorities
- Port controllers
- Pilots
- Coastguards
- Ship’s crew
- Towage
- Berthing crews
- Emergency services
- Regulators ( MSA / HSE )
- Class societies
- Environmental groups
- Other port users
DATA COLLECTION
- Owners
- Agents
- Oil companies
- Suppliers
- Other commercial
interests
- Residents
- Yacht clubs
- Local authorities
- Other amenity
interests
- Fishing
- Media
Understanding the processes and personnel involved.
1- Stakeholders
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
DATA COLLECTION
- Approaches
- Port entrance
- Navigable channels
- Tanker berths
- Tanker swinging areas
- Others berths / terminals
- Anchorage
- Leisure areas
Understanding the processes and personnel involved.
2- Navigational zones
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
- VLCC / crude tankers
- Gas carriers
- Product tankers
- Tugs
- Pilot vessels
- Rope boats
- Bunker barges
- Ferries
- General cargo
DATA COLLECTION
- Naval vessels
- Supply vessels
- Fishing vessels
- Pleasure craft
- Floating cranes
- Dredgers
Understanding the processes and personnel involved.
3- Vessel types
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
DATA COLLECTION
- Incoming
- Outgoing
- Movement between berths
- Swinging
- Incoming coincident with
outgoing
- Unidentified vessels
- Draught restrictions
- Speed restrictions
- Radar
- Navaids
Understanding the processes and personnel involved.
4- Vessel movement considerations
- Pilot exemptions
- Uncontrolled vessels
- Anchoring /
weighing anchors
- Pilot boarding /
disembarking
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
DATA COLLECTION
Understanding the processes and personnel involved.
5- Environmental conditions
- Wind
- Sea state
- Tide / currents
- Radar clutter
- Visibility ( precipitation )
- Light / darkness
- Temperature
- Radio inference
- Draught restrictions
- Air draught restrictions
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
DATA COLLECTION
Understanding the processes and personnel involved.
6- Ship functions
- Propulsion
- Steering
- Control / manoeuvring
- Electrical
- Communications
- Navigation
- Anchoring
- Mooring
- Piping and pumping
- Safety systems
- Cargo handling,loading,storage
- Life support
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
DATA COLLECTION
- Navigation markers / lights
- Dredging
- Pilotage
- Port control
- Cargo handling,loading,storage
- Berth structures
- Communications
- Emergency services
Understanding the processes and personnel involved.
7- Port based functions
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
DATA COLLECTION
Understanding the processes and personnel involved.
8- Human tasks ( involvement in the following activities )
- Vessel scheduling
- Pre-entry planning and decision making
- Pilot rendezvous with vessel
- Tug rendezvous and attachment
- Navigation to berth
- Berthing and making fast
- Loading / unloading operations
- Port facilities maintenance
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Number
of deaths
Pollution
tonnes/
Incident
Deaths/
Accident
INCIDENT DATA
Tankers in port
Number of
incidents
Accident
category
6
18
0
143
1
2
170
Berthing contact
Collision
Equip. Failure
Fire / Explosion
Flooding
Grounding
Total
0.010
0.018
-
0.396
0.071
0.003
0.051
354
273
20
3052
120
3310
1086
589
1013
751
361
14
611
3339
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
8 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
The SSA is
an essential
and integral
part of
the process
of developing
and updating
the Ship
Security Plan
The Company
Security Officer
shall ensure that
the SSA is
carry out by
persons with
appropriate skills
to evaluate the
security of the ship
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
8 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
The SSA shall include an on-scene security
survey and, at least, with identification of :
1 - Existing security measures, procedures and
operations
2 - And evaluation of key ship board operations
that it is important to protect
3 - Possible threats to the key ship board operation
4 - Weakness, including human factors in the
infrastructure, policies and procedures
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
The SSA shall be documented, reviewed, accepted
and retained by the company.
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
8.3 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
Address the following elements on board or within the ship :
Personnel protection systems
Other areas that may, if damaged or
used for illicit observation, pose a risk to...
Procedural
policies
Radio,
telecommunication,
computer systems
Structural
integrity
Physical
security
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
8.4 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
Those involved should be able to draw upon expert assistance in
relation to :
1- Knowledge of current security threats and
patterns
2- Recognition and detection of weapons,
dangerous substances and devices
3- Recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis
of characteristics and behavioural patterns
of persons who are likely to threaten the
security
4- Techniques used to circumvent security
measures
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
8.4 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
Those involved should be able to draw upon expert assistance in
relation to :
5- Methods used to cause security incident
6- Effect of explosives on ship’s stuctures
and equipment
7- Ship security
8- Ship / Port interface business practices
9- Contingency planning,
emergency preparedness and response
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
8.4 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
Those involved should be able to draw upon expert assistance in
relation to :
10- Physical security
11- Radio and telecommunication systems,
computer systems and networks
12- Marine engineering
13- Ship and port operations
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
8.8 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
Should consider the persons, activities, services and operations
that it is important to protect. This includes :
1- Ship’s personnel
2- Passengers, visitors, vendors, repair
technicians, port facility personnel
3- Capacity to maintain safe navigation and
emergency response
4- Cargo, particularly dangerous goods or
hazardous substances
5-Ship’s stores
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
8.14 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
On-scene security survey should examine and evaluate existing
shipboard protective measures, procedures and operations for :
1- Ensuring the performance of all ship
security duties
2- Monitoring restricted areas to ensure
access only to authorised persons
3- Controlling access to the ship, including
any identification systems
4- Monitoring of deck area and
area surrounding the ship
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
8.14 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA )
On-scene security survey should examine and evaluate existing
shipboard protective measures, procedures and operations for :
5- Controlling the embarkation of persons
and their effects
- Accompanied and unaccompanied baggage
- Ship’s personnel personal effects
6- Supervising the handling of cargo and
the delivery of ship’s store
7- Ensuring that ship security communication,
information, and equipment are readily
available
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
- Contracting Governments
shall determine when a
Declaration Of Security
is required
by assessing the risk
the ship / port interface or
ship to ship activity
poses to
people , property
or the environment.
5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS )
A ship can request completion of a
Declaration Of Security when :
5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS )
1- The ship is operating at a higher security level than
the port facility or another ship it is interfacing with
2- There is an agreement on the declaration of security
between Contracting Governments covering certain
international voyages or specifics ships on those
voyages
3- There has been a security threat or a security
incident involving the ship or the port facility, as
applicable
Requests for the completion of a Declaration Of
Security shall be acknowledge by the
applicable port facility or ship.
5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS )
4- The ship is at port which is not required to have
implemented an approved port facility security plan
5- The ship is conducting ship to ship activities with
another ship not required to have and implement an
approved ship security plan
A ship can request completion of a
Declaration Of Security when :
5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS )
ISPS
-
GUIDANCE
Part
B
Appendix
1
The Declaration Of Security is valid
from to
for the following activities :
Under the following security levels
Security level(s) for the ship :
Security level(s) for the port facility :
Signed for and on behalf of
The port facility The Ship
Declaration
Of
Security
The Declaration Of Security shall be completed by :
5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS )
- The Master or the Ship Security
Officer on behalf of the ship
- The Port Facility Security Officer or,
if the Contracting Government
determines otherwise, by another
body responsible for shore-side
security, on behalf of the port
facility
Declaration
Of
Security
5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS )
The Declaration Of Security shall address the
security requirements that should be shared between
a port facility and a ship or between ships and shall
state the responsibility for each
RESPONSIBILITY
Minimum Period
5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS )
Administration shall specify the minimum period for
which Declarations Of Security shall be kept by ships
entitled to fly their flag.
Contracting Governments shall specify the minimum
period for which Declarations Of Security shall be kept
by port facilities located within their territory.
Click to add text
Security
measures
Criminal acts intended or calculated
to provoke a state of terror
in the general public, a group of persons,
or particular persons for political purposes
Terrorism
• These are our demands - aims…
• If we do not get them, we will continue
until we get them ( continued threat )
• You will never be safe until our aims
are met ( continued fear )
Terrorist Aims and Demands
1 - Terrorist
1 - 2 Terrorist Followers
• It is the best in the long run
• It will make things better
• We all want this anyway, this will make it
happen sooner
• Support us in our demands to achieve this
• Nobody needs to be hurt if we comply
to the demands
Terrorist Aims and Demands
• Lacking will to defuse situation
1 - 3 Media
• Terrorist mouthpiece
• Aggravate the situation
• Leak intended solutions
• Personal / Political views not subject
to government guidelines
Terrorist Aims and Demands
Click to add text
• Vessels
• Fixed Platforms
• Floating weapon
• Ports
• Collision
• Detonation
Terrorist Methods
• Hijack or seizure
- Political and propagandist
- Limited in nature
• Attack
- Warning
- Minimum loss of life
- Targeted
Terrorist Threat - Pre 2000
• GRIEVANCES
• POLITICAL IDEOLOGY
• EXTREMIST
• CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
Terrorist Threat - Pre 2000
• PUBLICITY
• PUBLIC APPREHENSION
• DISCREDITING GOVERNMENTS
• PROVOKING COUNTER MEASURES
• EXTORTION
• FREEING PRISONERS
Terrorist Threat - Pre 2000
• CRUISE LINERS
• TANKERS
• RO-RO PASSENGER FERRIES
• OTHER SHIPS / SPECIAL CARGOES
Terrorist Threat - Pre 2000
• No attention to public opinion
• Strategic / economic targets
• Global reach
• Suicidal and catastrophic
• Multiple and coordinated attacks
• Use of all weaponry
• Transportation as a weapon
• Maximum casualties
Terrorist Threat - Post 2000
• Recruitment and training
• Basing
• Reconnaissance
• Logistics
• Mounting
• SECURITY
Terrorist Modus operandi
• Small / Medium vessels
• Large crude oil carriers
• Liquid Petroleum tankers
• Liquefied natural gas tankers
• Container shipping
Terrorist Targets
• Ship - access
• Crew - recruitment, vetting, licenses
and numbers
• Cargo - attractiveness
• Ports - Singapore to Bangkok or
Dar Es Salaam to Mombasa
• Port Facilities
• Routes – the main areas of threat
• Ship shore interface – crew, visitors, cargo,
stores, baggage etc
Ship Vulnerabilities
• Inflatable loaded with explosives
– USS The Sullivans, Cole and Limburg
• Acquisition of trawlers and medium sized
ships with explosives
– attack warships or other vessels such as
cruise liners
• Private planes stolen from flying clubs
• Underwater demolition teams
– diving schools
Al Qaeda Modus operandi
AL QAEDA
FARC IRA
GOVERNMENTS ?
?
Al Qaeda Threat Aims
Click to add text
PROFILING
Behavioral
Characteristics
Click to add text
• Individuals
- Criminal seeking to extort money
- Refugees seeking political asylum
- Mentally disturbed
• Groups
Behavioral Characteristics
Click to add text
- Person( s ) seen in area for no obvious reason
Behavioral Characteristics
- Person( s ) not dressed for that particular area
or function
- Person( s ) seen in area more than once or is
necessary
- Person( s ) being nervous, sweaty when coming
aboard ship
Click to add text
Behavioral Characteristics
- Person( s ) having literature or paper work that
seem to be of suspicious nature
- Person( s ) being in possession of large sums of
money
- Person( s ) meeting other personnel not associated
with that party or crew
- Person( s ) being in areas of the ship that they
have no reason to be there or are talking a
particular interest in a part of the ship
Click to add text
weapons,
dangerous substances
and devices
Recognition of :
Click to add text
Recognition and detection of
weapons, dangerous substances
and devices
• X-Ray screening
• Low powered radar sensors
• Walk through detectors
• Trace detectors
• Screening containers
PISTOL 9MM
Pistols
Parts
AK 47 / AKM - RUSSIA, CHINA, SOVIET BLOCK STATES
Assault Rifles
STANDARD PARTS
Parts
Heckler Koch - GERMANY- Heckler Koch (Germany / UK)
Machine
Pistols
Cal: 9mm
Weight: 3.425kg (7.55lb)
Length: 368mm (14.49”)
Carfare: 550rpm
Mag: 32rnds
Machine Pistols
INGRAM (MAC 10) - USA
Cal: .45
Weight: 3.818kg (8.4lb)
Length: 269mm (10.59”)
Carfare: 1.145rpm
Mag: 30rnd
Ingram - MAC 10 (USA)
UZI - ISRAEL
Cal: 9mm
Weight: 3.11kg ((6.85lb)
Length: 360mm (14.17”)
Carfare: 950rpm
Mag: 20,25,32rnds
Uzi - Israel
SKORPION - CZECH
s
Skorpion - Czech
RPG 7 – Used in Piraeus against HMS Ark Royal by
Revolutionary Organization
Stinger – Used by Al Quaeda, Mujahadeen, FARC, PIRA?
DSHK – Used by PIRA,
Somalis etc
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Explosive is a substance that can react
on its own chemically producing gases
in relative high temperature and pressure
and such speed that destroys surrounding
objects.
Explosives
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Kill by :
- Pressure higher than
atmospheric pressure
- Shrapnel
- Temperature
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Explosives
 Black Powder
 Nitroglycerin (Dynamite)
 Ammonium Nitrate (ANFO)
 TNT
 Tetryl
 C4
 PETN
 RDX
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Explosives
- Explosive
- Detonator
- Triggering mechanism
time, contact, remote
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Explosives
GRENADES
Grenades
1.75” / 4.4mm
.26” / .7mm
TETRYL A.S.A
L1A1 - DOES NOT NEED PRIMER (IE. EXTRA POWER TO DETONATE EXPLOSIVE.
NON - ELECTRIC
TETRYL
2”” / 5mm
.25”
L2A1 - DOES NOT NEED PRIMER TO DETONATE EXPLOSIVE
ELECTRIC
ASA
ASA
Detonators
RESISTORS FORM 2 FUNCTIONS.
1. LIMIT (RESIST) THE FLOW OF CURRENT THROUGH A CIRCUIT.
2. SET VOLTAGE LEVELS AT SPECIFIC POINTS IN A CIRCUIT
Resistors
THESE ALLOW THE RESISTANCE TO BE VARIED FROM 0 ohm TO MAXIMUM
RESISTER VALUE. VALUE IS DETRMINED USING THE SCREW AT THE SIDE
Variable Resistor
Thyristor/ SCR
3 LAYER TERMINAL OPERATING SWITCH WHICH NEEDS ONLY A SMALL CURRENT
TO OPEN THE GATE TO ALLOW A LARGER CURRENT TO PASS THROUGH
Capacitor
STORES A CHARGE UNTIL IT IS RELEASED. USED FOR
1. LONG CHARGING PERIOD (TIME DELAY)
2. RAPID DISCHARGE
Additional Equipment
CIRCUIT BOARD
LIGHT DIODE
TILT SWITCH
BATTERY CONNECTION
Circuit Board
What Can It Does ?
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
INFLAMMABLE
LIQUID
CORROSIVE
CORROSIVE
CORROSIVE
SOLID
INFLAMMABLE
A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
The vapor concentration on the surface of
a flammable liquid or flammable gases can
create an explosive atmosphere.
Explosive Gases
Vapors
- LEL: lower explosion level
- HEL: higher explosion level
(example: propane 2,4 – 9,5 %)
Explosive Range
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Toxic Gases
- Ammonium (refrigerated vessels)
- Carbon Monoxide
- Chlorine (Carriers)
- Cyanide
- H2S
- SO2
- Phosgene (Heated Solvents)
- Nitric Acid (NO3)
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Flammable Gases
- Acetylene
- Methane
- Propane
- Butane
- Hydrogen
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Liquefied Gases
Gases stored in liquid form through the use
of pressure and low temperatures
(e.g. LPG / LNG)
BLEVE (Boiling, Liquid, Expansion, Vapor,
Explosion)
(e.g. Propane expands 270 times
in vapor form compared with its
liquid form)
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Gases under Pressure
 Gas bottle contain gas in pressure
around 140 atm.
 Gas bottles always should be constrain
 Acetylene and oxygen bottles to be kept
apart
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Flammable Liquids
Flash Point : Lower temperature at which
a liquid produces explosive vapors.
- Flammable Liquid : Flash point < 38oC
- Petrol : - 40oC
- Evaporation tendency
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Solvents
- Toluene
- Benzene
- etc….
Corrosive Liquids
- Acids
- Caustic
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Oxidizing Agents
Substances that contain oxygen or
chlorine
Flammable Solids
- Magnesium
- White & Red & Yellow Phosphorus
- Naphthalene
- Sodium
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Carcinogenic / Mutogenic
- e.g : PCB
Chemical Agents
- Asphyxiation - Blistring ( Cl )
- Blood Gases ( Co )
- Nerve Gases ( organophosphate )
- Tear : Irritating Gases
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
Biological Agents
Radioactive Substances
- Ionizing alpha, beta, gamma rays
- Non ionizing radiation
- Radio isotope : Plutonium, Uranium 238
- Dirty Bomb
- Anthrax
- Ebola
- Smallpox
- etc...
COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO

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POWERPOINT_PRESENTATION_SSO.ppt

  • 2.
  • 3. DAY 1 COURSE OVERVIEW This training course aims to provide knowledge to those who may be designated to perform the duties and responsibilities of a Ship Security Officer (SSO), as defined in Chapter VI Regulation VI/5 Table A-VI/5 of the STCW 2010 Manila Amendments and section A/12.1 of the ISPS code, and in particular the duties and responsibilities with respect to the security of a ship, for implementing and maintaining a Ship Security Plan and for liaising with the Company Security Officer (CSO) and with Port Facility Security Officers (PFSOs).
  • 4. DAY 1 COMPETENCE TO BE ACHIEVED • Maintain and Supervise the Implementation of the Ship Security Plan; • Assess Security Risk, Threat and Vulnerability; • Undertake regular inspections of the ship to ensure that appropriate security measures are implemented and maintained; • Ensure that security equipment and systems if any are properly operated, tested and calibrated;
  • 5. DAY 1 • Encourage Security Awareness and Vigilance. COMPETENCE TO BE ACHIEVED
  • 6. DAY 1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE • A Threat to the shipping industry is a means by which it will affect their operations and cause considerable commercial loss. • Incident involving criminal activity in the maritime environment are the following: 1. Piracy and Armed Robbery 2. Terrorism 3. Contraband Smuggling
  • 7. DAY 1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 4. Stowaways and Refugees 5. Cargo Theft 6. Collateral Damage
  • 8. DAY 1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE • Based on the statistics shown above, the Ship Security Course has been updated and revised to make sure that maritime incidents especially piracy and armed-robbery has been prevented.
  • 9. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 1. Piracy and Armed Robbery • Piracy is a term used to describe acts of armed robbery, hijacking and other malicious acts against ships in international waters. • Piracy is carried out with intent of stealing valuables onboard and/or extorting money from ship or the crew hostage for ransom.
  • 10. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 1. Piracy and Armed Robbery • In recent years, there has been a series of maritime attacks on vessels by pirates particularly in the Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin and the Indian Ocean. • Thus, vast areas of waters are affected making it a challenge to prevent maritime piracy incident.
  • 11. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
  • 12. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
  • 13. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
  • 14. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 1. Piracy and Armed Robbery A. Low Level Armed Robbery • Attack with the intention of stealing, usually under cover of darkness. • Culprits take whatever they can carry from the dark and the hold • Violence may occur when the crew tries to stop them
  • 15. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 1. Piracy and Armed Robbery B. Medium Level Armed Assault & Robbery (MLAAR) • Armed Assaults with violence or threats of violence . • Pirates come onboard unnoticed and force the crew to hand over their cash and valuables • Cargo is also stolen if possible • Each raid is over in less than an hour
  • 16. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 1. Piracy and Armed Robbery C. Major Criminal Hijack (MHCJ) • Carefully planned theft of the entire cargo • Pirates know every detail of the cargo & ships stowage plan • This type of attack usually results in a double digit million dollar loss
  • 17. DAY 1 THREATS of Maritime
  • 18. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 1. Piracy and Armed Robbery Threat of Maritime Piracy • Majority attacks have taken place between first light and last light • No successful attacks have occurred on ships at 15 knots and more
  • 19. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
  • 20. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 2. Terrorism • In the international community, terrorism has no legally binding, criminal law definition. • It refer only to those violent acts that are intended to create fear (terror); are perpetrated for a religious, political or . • Attacks on high profile symbolic targets are used to incite counter-terrorism by the state to polarise the population. This strategy was used by Al Qaeda in its attacks on the United States in September 2001
  • 21. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 2. Terrorism Threat of Terrorism • The “war on terror” has focused exclusively on transitional terrorism since the hijacking of 9/11 • Domestic terrorism possess a greater threat in terms of lives and property loss.
  • 22. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 2. Terrorism Threat of Terrorism • The threat of international terrorism comes from a diverse range of sources, including Al Qaida and associated networks, and those who share Al Qaida's ideology but do not have direct contact with them. • Threat could manifest itself from a lone individual or group, rather than a larger network.
  • 23. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 2. Terrorism Groups involved in Global Terrorism • Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) • Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) • Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade • Armed Islamic Group • Aum Supreme Truth • Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
  • 24. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 2. Terrorism Groups involved in Global Terrorism • Revolutionary People’s Army Liberation Party • Al-Jihad • Al-Gamma’a al-Islamiya • Harakat ul-Mujahidin • Hizballah (Party of God)
  • 25. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 2. Terrorism
  • 26. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 3. Contraband Smuggling • Contraband smuggling has increased its statistics in the maritime industry. • It is used to for terrorism or pirate attacks at sea . • According to Homeland Security News Wire, A new study on sea trafficking reveals that the large majority of ships involved in the illegal transfer of weapons, drugs, and banned missile or WMD equipment are owned by major shipping companies in the United States, Germany, and Greece.
  • 28. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 4. Stowaways and Refugees • “Stowaway”. A person who is secreted on a ship, or in cargo which is subsequently loaded on the ship, without the consent of the shipowner or the master or any other responsible person and who is detected on board the ship after it has departed from a port, or in the cargo while unloading it in the port of arrival, and is reported as a stowaway by the master to the appropriate authorities (FAL Convention).
  • 29. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 4. Stowaways and Refugees • “Attempted stowaway”- a person who is secreted on a ship, or in cargo which is subsequently loaded on the ship, without the consent of the shipowner or the master or any other responsible person, and who is detected on board the ship before it has departed from the port (Ref IMO Doc. FAL 28/10 Annex 1).
  • 30. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 4. Stowaways and Refugees • “a refugee is a person who "owing to a well- founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country“ (1951 Convention Relating to the status of Refugees).
  • 31. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 4. Stowaways and Refugees • Refugees and asylum-seekers also travel as stowaways. • Once discovered, it can be difficult to obtain permission from coastal States for their disembarkation, forcing shipmasters to maintain them on board for prolonged periods of time, often under difficult conditions
  • 32. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 4. Stowaways and Refugees • Selecting a place of disembarkation, it is important to ensure that refugees and asylum- seekers will be referred to appropriate follow- up processes where their international protection needs can be assessed and addressed (UNHCR, 2011).
  • 33. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 4. Stowaways and Refugees Threats of Stowaways and Refugees • Stowaways and refugees is a threat of the maritime industry because they become a major burden resulting to huge financial losses. • It would cause delay to ships and would burden ship owners and masters and would subject them to greater public accountability.
  • 34. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
  • 35. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS
  • 36. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 5. Cargo Theft • Cargo theft is typically rooted in social, economic and cultural conditions. • According to FreightWatch, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, the United States and Russia are the countries most at risk for cargo theft globally. • Majority of cargo theft are classified as hijacking or the threat of violence.
  • 37. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 5. Cargo Theft
  • 38. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 5. Cargo Theft Threat of Cargo Theft • Global cargo theft risks shown on the map vary greatly from country to country. • Risk also vary from region to region.
  • 39. DAY 1 UPDATED: Product Tanker Hijacked in South China Sea for Fuel Cargo; Second Boarding in Less Than A Year HONDURAS-FLAGGED, Singapore-operated product tanker, Moresby 9, was boarded and hijacked by nine armed pirates at about 2015 LT, 4 July, approximately 34nm WNW of Anambas Islands, South China Sea. The second boarding of the vessel in less than a year.
  • 40. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 6. Collateral Damage • Damage to things that are incidental to the intended target. • It is frequently used as a military term where it can refer to the accidental or unintentional killing or wounding of non-combatants and/or destruction to non-combatant property during attacks on legitimate enemy targets.
  • 41. DAY 1 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND PATTERNS . 6. Collateral Damage • Occurs when nearby fire explosion or attack results to a ship of facility. • While the damage is sometimes unintended, the costs are nevertheless real. Threat of Collateral Damage
  • 42. DAY 1 International Maritime Security Policy • The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has adopted a number of resolutions and conventions in terms of Maritime Security Policy.
  • 43. DAY 1 International Maritime Security Policy IMO Conventions Maritime Security • Resolution A. 545 (13) 1983 - Measures to Prevent Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships • Resolution A. 584 (14) 1985 – Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts which Threaten Safety of Ships and Security of Passengers
  • 44. DAY 1 International Maritime Security Policy IMO Conventions Maritime Security • MSC/Circ. 443 1986 – Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers and Crew on Board Ships • In 1988, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) treaties aimed at ensuring that appropriate judicial action is taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships.
  • 45. DAY 1 International Maritime Security Policy • Last September 11, 2001, IMO approved the development of new measures relating to security of ships and of port facilities the International Convention for the Safety of Life Sea at Sea, 1974 in December of 2002. • In December 2002, Diplomatic Conference resulted in amendments to SOLAS 74. • Brief summary of these amendments should be carried out with mention of changes to Chapter V but with emphasis on the changes to Chapter XI, Regulations 3 and 5.
  • 46. DAY 1 International Maritime Security Policy • Also it was added to the new Chapter XI-2 Regulation 1-13 and the ISPS Code.
  • 47. DAY 1 Responsibilities of Government Companies and Designated Persons • Government Companies such as the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) has mandated and created Memorandum Circulars for the protection and safety of the seafarers at Sea.
  • 48. DAY 1 Responsibilities of Government Companies and Designated Persons SOLAS Chapter XI-2 Regulation 1 • States the special measures to enhance maritime security and the new International Code for the Security of Ships and Port Facilities (ISPS Code). Best Management Practice to Deter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and the Arabian Sea Area (BMP3)
  • 49. DAY 1 Responsibilities of Government Companies and Designated Persons Legal Implications of Actions or Non-Acton by Security Personnel • Action/non-action by the Ship Security Officer and other security personnel is likely to have legal implications • Personnel will have certain authorities and obligations yet they will also find that they face certain constraints
  • 50. DAY 1 Responsibilities of Government Companies and Designated Persons Handling Sensitive Security-Related Information and Communications • A category of sensitive but classified information. • Information obtained in the conduct of security activities whose public disclosure would, in the judgment of specified government agencies, harm transportation security, be an unwarranted invasion of privacy, or reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential information.
  • 51.
  • 52. 1 - Setting applicable security levels and providing guidance for protection from security incidents 2 - Determining which ports will fall into the category where they are required to comply with the new legislation. This includes establishing appropriate security measures for fixed, floating platforms and mobile offshore drilling units, to allow interaction with ships which are required to comply with the Code Responsibility of the Contracting Government
  • 53. 3 - Ensure that those ports and flagged ships do comply with that legislation and have completed security asessments and plans in line with it. Governments also verify these security plans and the issue of certificates of compliance 4 - Advising its flagged ships when required to be at level 2 or 3, what security measures they should take, and security measures that have been taken by the government to provide protection against the threat. Responsibility of the Contracting Government
  • 54. 5 - Exercising control and compliance measures, over all those bodies which they appoint to carry out their responsibilities 6 - Determining when Declaration of Security is required having assessed the risk that the ship to port interface or the ship to ship activity poses the people, property and the environment. Responsibility of the Contracting Government
  • 55. 7 - Establish contact points : - Government officers to whom an SSO, CSO, PFSO can report security concerns - A point of contact for advice (on a 24h basis) on security for any ship either flying its flag or operating in its territorial water, or even intending to enter its territorial water Responsibility of the Contracting Government
  • 56. Responsibility of the Contracting Government • Special consideration to be given to : – Establish appropriate security measures for fixed and floating platforms and mobile offshore drilling units on location to allow interaction with ships which are required to comply with the ISPS Code – Establish appropriate security measures to enhance the security of ships to which the Code does not apply and to ensure any security provisions applying to such ships to allow interaction with ships to which the ISPS Code apply
  • 57. Contracting Governments shall set security levels and provide guidance for protection from security incidents. 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
  • 58. A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO Factors to be considered in setting appropriate security level : 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS 1 - The degree that the threat information is credible 2 - The degree that the threat information is corroborated 3 - The degree that the threat information is specific or imminent 4 - The potential consequences of such security incident
  • 59. Contracting Governments may delegate to a Recognised Security Organisation related duties under chapter XII with the exception of : 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS 1 - Setting of the applicable security level 2 - Approving a port facility security assessment and subsequent amendments to an approved assessment 3 - Determining the port facilities which will be required to designate a Port Facility Security Officer
  • 60. 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO 4 - Approving a Port Facility Security Plan and subsequent amendments to an approved plan 5 - Exercising control and compliance measures pursuant to regulation XI-2/9 6 - Establishing the requirements for a declaration of security Contracting Governments may delegate to a Recognised Security Organisation related duties under chapter XII with the exception of :
  • 61. 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS Recognised Security Organisations (RSO) ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B Appendix 1 Contracting Governments may authorised a Recognised Security Organisation to undertake certain security related activities including : 1 - Approval of ship security plans, or amendments, on behalf of the Administration 2 - Verification and certification of compliance of ships on behalf of the Administration 3 - Conducting Port Facility Security Assessments required by the Contracting Government A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 62. 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS Recognised Security Organisations (RSO) ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B Appendix 1 A RSO may also provide assistance to Companies or Port facilities on security matters, including Ship Security Assessments, Ship Security Plans, Port Facility Security Assessments, Port Facility Security Plans. If a RSO has done so in respect of a Ship Security Assessment or Plan that RSO should not be authorised to approve that Ship Security Plan.
  • 63. 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS Competency to be demonstrated by the (RSO) ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B Appendix 1 1 ) EXPERTISE : - in relevant aspect of security 2 ) CAPABILITY TO : - assess the security risks that could occur during ship and port facility operations, including the ship/port facility interface and how to minimise such risks A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 64. 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS Competency to be demonstrated by the (RSO) ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B Appendix 1 3 ) KNOWLEDGE : - of ship and port operations - of ship construction if providing services to ships - of port design and construction if providing services to port facilities - of the requirements of the Code and relevant national and international legislation and security requirements - of current security threats and patterns - on recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 65. 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS Competency to be demonstrated by the (RSO) ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B Appendix 1 3 ) KNOWLEDGE : - on recognition, on a non-discriminating basis, of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security - on techniques used to circumvent security measures - of security and surveillance equipment and systems and their operational limitations A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 66. 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS Competency to be demonstrated by the (RSO) ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B Appendix 1 4 ) ABILITY TO : - maintain and improve the expertise of the personnel - monitor the trustworthiness of the personnel - maintain appropriate measures to avoid unauthorised disclosure of, or access to security sensitive material A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 67. Ship is required to act upon the security levels set by Contracting Government 7 - SHIP SECURITY
  • 68. Ship is required to act upon the security levels set by Contracting Government 7 - SHIP SECURITY A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 69. A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO In order to communicate the threat at port facility or for the ship, the Contracting Government sets the appropriate security level : ISPS CODE Security level Level 1 : Low threat situation Level 2 : Medium threat situation Level 3 : High threat situation
  • 70. 2.1 - SECURITY LEVEL 1 The level for which minimum appropriate protective security measures shall be maintained at all times. A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 71. 7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 1 1- Ensuring the performance of all ships security duties 2- Controlling access to the ship 3- Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects 4- Monitoring restricted areas ( authorise person only ) 6- Supervising the handling of cargo and ship’s stores 7- Ensuring the security communication is readily available 5- Monitoring of deck areas and areas surrounding the ship A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 72. 2.1 - SECURITY LEVEL 2 The level for which appropriate additional protective security measures shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a security incident. A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 73. 2.1 - SECURITY LEVEL 3 The level for which specific protective security measures shall be maintained for a period of time when a security incident is probable or imminent. A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 74. 7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3 A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO - Additional protective measures as specified in the ship security plan shall be implemented - Further specific protective measures as specified in the ship security plan shall be
  • 75. 7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3 - The ship shall confirm to the Port Facility Security Officer the initiation of the implementation of the appropriate measures and procedures as details in the Ship Security Plan and report any difficulties in implementation A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO - The ship shall acknowledge receipt of the Administration’s or of the Contracting Government’s instructions on the change of security level
  • 76. 7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3 If the ship is required to set, or is already at a higher level than set for the port it intends to enter, the ship shall advice the designated authority and the Port Facility Officer of the situation. In such cases, the Ship Security Officer shall liase with the Port Facility security Officer and co-ordinate appropriate actions, if necessary. A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 77. 7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3 An Administration requiring ships entitled to fly its flag to set security level 2 or 3 in a port of another Contracting Government shall inform that Contracting Government without delay A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 78. 7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3 When Contracting Governments set security levels and ensure the provision of security level information to ships, A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO such ships shall be advised to maintain vigilance and report immediately any information that comes to their attention that may affect maritime security in the area
  • 79. 7 - SHIP SECURITY at LEVEL 2 & 3 A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO When advising such ships of the applicable security level, a Contracting Government shall also advise those ships of any security measure that they should take and of measures that have been taken by the Contracting Government to provide protection against the threat.
  • 80. The company shall ensure that the Ship Security Plan contains : 6 - OBLIGATIONS OF THE COMPANY - Clear statement emphasising the Master’s authority - Master overriding authority and responsibility to make decisions with respect to the security of the ship - Request the assistance of the company or of any Contracting Government as may be necessary The Company Security Officer, the Master and the Ship Security Officer shall be given the necessary support to fulfil their duties and responsibilities
  • 81. A plan to ensure the application of measures on board the ship designed to protect persons on board, cargo, cargo transport units, ship’s stores or the ship from the risks of a security incident. 2.1 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN
  • 82. A plan to ensure the application of measures designed to protect the port facility and ships, persons, cargo, cargo transport units and ship’s stores within the port facility from the risks of a security incident. 2.1 - PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN
  • 83. The person on board the ship accountable to the master for security of the ship, including implementation and maintenance of the Ship Security Plan and for liaison with the Company Security Officer and the Port Facility Security Officers. 2.1 - SHIP SECURITY OFFICER MASTER SHIP SECURITY OFFICER COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER PORT FACILITY SECURITY OFFICER
  • 84. The person ashore designated by the company for ensuring that a ship security assessment is carried out, that the Ship Security Plan is developed, approved implemented and maintained and for liaison with Port Facility Security Officer and the Ship Security Officer. 2.1 - COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER SHIP SECURITY OFFICER COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER PORT FACILITY SECURITY OFFICER
  • 85. The person appointed as responsible for the development, implementation, revision and maintenance of the Port Facility Security Plan and for liaison with the Ship Security Officers and the Company Security Officers. 2.1 - PORT FACILITY SECURITY OFFICER SHIP SECURITY OFFICER COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER PORT FACILITY SECURITY OFFICER
  • 86. - Passenger ships, including passenger high-speed craft 3 - APPLICATION - Cargo ships, including high-speed craft of 500 gross tonnage and upwards - Mobile offshore drilling units - Port facilities serving ships engaged on international voyages
  • 87.
  • 88. 11 - COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER ( CSO ) The company must designate a Company Security Officer - A person designated as the CSO may act as CSO for one or more ships - A company may designate several persons as CSOs provided it is clearly identified for which ships each person is responsible A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 89. 1- Advising the level of threats 2- Ensuring that Ship Security Assessments are carried out 3- Ensuring the development and maintenance of the SSP 4- Ensuring that the SSP is modified as appropriate to correct deficiencies 5- Arranging for internal audits and reviews of security activities 11 - COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER ( CSO ) Duty and Responsibilities A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 90. 7- Ensuring that deficiencies and non- conformities are promptly addressed and dealt with 8- Enhancing security awareness and vigilance 9- Ensuring adequate training for personnel responsible for the security of the ship 11 - COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER ( CSO ) Duty and Responsibilities 6- Arranging for initial and subsequent verifications of the ship by the Administration or the Recognised Security Organisation A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 91. 10- Ensuring effective communication and co-operation the Ship Security Officer and the relevant Port Facility Security Officer 11- Ensuring consistency between security and safety requirements 12- Ensuring that the SSP for each ship reflect the specific information accurately 13- Ensuring that any alternative or equivalent arrangements approved for a particular ship or group of ships are implemented and maintained 11 - COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER ( CSO ) Duty and Responsibilities A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 92.
  • 93. 12 - SHIP SECURITY OFFICER ( SSO ) Duty and Responsibilities 1- Undertaking regular security inspections of the ship 2- Maintaining and supervising the SSP including any amendments to the SSP A Ship Security Officer shall be designated on each ship A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO 3- Co-ordinating the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ship’s stores with other shipboard personnel and relevant Port Facility Security Officers
  • 94. 12 - SHIP SECURITY OFFICER ( SSO ) Duty and Responsibilities 4- Proposing modifications to the SSP 6- Enhancing security awareness and vigilance on board A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO 5- Reporting to Company Security Officer any deficiencies identified during internal audits, periodic reviews, security inspections and verifications 7- Ensuring that adequate training has been provided to shipboard personnel
  • 95. 12 - SHIP SECURITY OFFICER ( SSO ) Duty and Responsibilities 8- Reporting all security incidents 9- Co-ordinating Implementation of the SSP with the company security officer and the relevant Port Facility Security Officer 10- Ensuring that security equipment is properly operated, tested, calibrated and maintained A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 96.
  • 97. 13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY Shipboard personnel having specific security duties and responsibilities shall have sufficient knowledge and ability to perform their assigned duties The Company Security Officer and appropriate shore-based personnel and the Ship Security Officer shall have knowledge and receive training A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 98. Drills and exercises shall be conducted at appropriate intervals taking into account the ship type, ship personnel changes, port facilities to be visited and other relevant circumstances. A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO The Company Security Officer shall ensure the effective co-ordination and implementation of the SSP by participating in exercises at appropriate intervals. 13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY
  • 99. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B Area where knowledge and training may be required: 13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY 1- Security administration 2- International conventions, codes and recommendations 3- Government legislation and regulations 4- Responsibilities and functions of other security organisations 5- Methodology of ship security assessment CSO SSO A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 100. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B Area where knowledge and training may be required: 13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY 6- Methods of ship security surveys and inspections 7- Ship and port operations and conditions 8- Ship and port operation facility security measures 9- Emergency preparedness and response & contingency planning 10- Instruction techniques for security training and education CSO SSO A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 101. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B Area where knowledge and training may be required: 13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY 11- Handling sensitive security related information & communications 12- Knowledge of current security threats and patterns 13- Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices 14- Recognition of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security 15- Techniques used to circumvent security measures CSO SSO A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 102. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B Area where knowledge and training may be required: 13 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY 16- Security equipment and systems and their operational limitations 17- Methods of conducting audits, inspection, control and monitoring 18- Methods of physical searches and non-intrusive inspections 19- Security drills and exercises, including drills and exercise with port facilities 20- Assessment of security drills and exercises CSO SSO A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 103. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B Frequency : 13.6 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY At least once every three months But In case where more than 25 % of the ship’s personnel has been changed within the last three months, a drill should be conducted within one week of the change. A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 104. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B Frequency : 13.7 - TRAINING DRILLS & EXERCISE on SHIP SECURITY At least once every calendar year with no more than 18 months between the exercises - CSO - PFSO - Relevant authority of Contracting Government - SSO - Communications - Co-ordination - Resource availability - Response WHAT WHO A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 105.
  • 106. 9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP ) Each ship shall carry on board a SSP approved by the Administration The plan shall make provisions for the three security levels. A Recognised Security Organisation may prepare the Ship Security Plan of a specific ship. A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO The plan shall be written in the language or languages of the ship. English French Spanish
  • 107. 9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP ) In such cases the Recognised Security Organisation, undertaking the review and approval of the ship security plan,or its amendments shall not have been involved in either the preparation of the Ship Security Assessment or of the Ship Security Plan, or the amendments, under review. A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO The Administration may entrust the review and approval of the SSP, or of amendments to previously approved plan, to Recognised Security Organisations. Recognised Organisations Security
  • 108. 9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP ) The Administration may entrust the review and approval of the SSP, or of amendments to previously approved plan, to Recognised Security Organisations. A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO Submission of ship plans, or amendments, for approval shall be accompanied by the security assessment on the basis of which the plan, or amendments, have been developed.
  • 109. 9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP ) 1- Prevent weapons, dangerous substances and devices intended to use against people, ships or ports 2- Identification of the restricted areas and measures for the prevention of unauthorised access 4- Responding to security threats or breaches of security A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO The SSP shall consist, at least, of : 3- Prevention of unauthorised access to the ship
  • 110. 9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP ) 5- Responding to security instructions given by Contracting Governments at security level 3 A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO The SSP shall consist, at least, of : 6- Evacuation in case of security threats or breaches of security 7- Duties of shipboard personnel assigned security responsibilities 8- Auditing the security activities 9- Training drills and exercises
  • 111. 9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP ) A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO The SSP shall consist, at least, of : 10- Interfacing with port facility security activities 11- Periodic review of the plan for updating 12- Reporting security incidents 13- Identification of the Ship Security Officer 14- Identification of the company security officer including 24-hour contact details
  • 112. 9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP ) 15- Inspection, testing, calibration and maintenance of security equipment 17- Identification of the locations where the ship security activation points are provided 18- Procedures, instructions and guidance on the use of the ship security alert system including testing, deactivation and resetting and to limit false alerts A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO The SSP shall consist, at least, of : 16- Frequency of testing or calibration any security equipment provided on board
  • 113. 9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP ) Changes to the Ship Security Plan shall not be implemented unless approved by the Administration A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO They shall be protected by procedures aimed at preventing their unauthorised deletion, destruction or amendment. The plans shall be protected from unauthorised access or disclosure. The records may be kept in electronic format. In such case : Audits
  • 114. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B All SSPs Should : 9.2 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP ) English French Spanish 1 - Detail the organisational structure of the security for the ship 2 - Detail the ship’s relationships with : company and port facilities, other ships and relevant authorities with security responsibility 3 - Detail the communication system to allow effective communication within the ship & between the ship and others, including the port facilities A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 115. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B All SSPs Should : 4 - Detail the basic security measures for security level 1 5 - Detail the additional security measures that will allow the ship to progress without delay to security level 2 or 3 6 - Provide for regular review, or audit, and for its amendment 9.2 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP ) English French Spanish 7 - Reporting procedures to the appropriate Contracting Governments contact points A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 116. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B 9.8 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP ) Areas where security measures could be taken : Access to the ship Delivery of ship’s stores Monitoring the security of the ship Handling unaccompanied baggage Handling of cargo Restricted areas A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 117. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B 9.9 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP ) Control access to the ship should include any : Access ladders Cranes & hoisting gear Access doors, side scuttles, windows and ports Mooring lines & anchors chains Access ramps Access gangways A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 118. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B 9.14 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP ) Security measures to control access to the ship may include : Vehicles destined to be loaded on board car carriers, ro-ro and others passenger ships are subjected to search prior loading In liaison with the port facility Designated secure areas are established in which inspections and searching of people,baggage, personnel effects, vehicles can take place A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 119. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B 9.14 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP ) Checking the identity of all persons Segregating embarking from disembarking passengers Segregating checked persons and their personal effects from unchecked persons and their personal effects Security measures to control access to the ship may include :
  • 120. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B 9.14 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP ) Identification of access points that should be secured or attended to prevent unauthorised access Securing by locking, or other means, access to unattended spaces to passengers and visitors Providing security briefings to all ship personnel on possible threats, the need for vigilance and... …the procedures for reporting suspicious persons objects or activities Security measures to control access to the ship may include : A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 121. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B 9.16 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP ) In liaison with the Port Facility Establishing a restricted area on the shore-side of the ship Deterring waterside access to the ship ... … including, for example, provision of boat patrols Security measures to control access to the ship may include : A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 122. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B 9.16 - SHIP SECURITY PLAN ( SSP ) Limiting the number of access points and identifying those to be closed Assigning additional personnel to patrol deck areas during silent hours Increasing the frequency and details of searches of people, personal effects, and vehicles being embarked or loaded onto the ship Security measures to control access to the ship may include : A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 123. RISK ASSESSMENT A structured and systematic methodology, aimed at enhancing Maritime safety & security, including : - protection of life, - health, - marine environment and property, by using risk and cost / benefit analysis. A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 124. A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 125. Causes Effects Elements of the system E2 E1 E3 E4 E5 A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 127. Example of Parameters of a risk model Organisation Poor management practices Lack of ship specific knowledge Poor vessel maintenance Human Poor decision making Poor judgement Lack of knowledge Poor communication Vessel reliability Propulsion Steering Electrical power Structural integrity Waterway Location Wind speed and direction Tides, Currents, Visibility Traffic separation Vessel Size, Age, Crew Manoeuvrability Pilotage requirements Escorting requirements Port control Traffic rules Navigational equipment Number of pilots, tugs Traffic monitoring equipment A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 129. SHIP TRAIN TRUCK BARGE PEOPLE - Worker - Visitor - Passenger INCOMING OUTGOING STAY PERIOD Ex : Movements in port A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO RISK ASSESSMENT
  • 130. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION - Organisational / procedural failure - Communication failure - Equipment failure - Environmental conditions - Human error - Navigation aids - Structured review or brainstorming sessions - Accident scenarios - Direct causes - Most probable outcomes in terms of loss A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 131. - Harbour authorities - Port controllers - Pilots - Coastguards - Ship’s crew - Towage - Berthing crews - Emergency services - Regulators ( MSA / HSE ) - Class societies - Environmental groups - Other port users DATA COLLECTION - Owners - Agents - Oil companies - Suppliers - Other commercial interests - Residents - Yacht clubs - Local authorities - Other amenity interests - Fishing - Media Understanding the processes and personnel involved. 1- Stakeholders A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 132. DATA COLLECTION - Approaches - Port entrance - Navigable channels - Tanker berths - Tanker swinging areas - Others berths / terminals - Anchorage - Leisure areas Understanding the processes and personnel involved. 2- Navigational zones A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 133. - VLCC / crude tankers - Gas carriers - Product tankers - Tugs - Pilot vessels - Rope boats - Bunker barges - Ferries - General cargo DATA COLLECTION - Naval vessels - Supply vessels - Fishing vessels - Pleasure craft - Floating cranes - Dredgers Understanding the processes and personnel involved. 3- Vessel types A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 134. DATA COLLECTION - Incoming - Outgoing - Movement between berths - Swinging - Incoming coincident with outgoing - Unidentified vessels - Draught restrictions - Speed restrictions - Radar - Navaids Understanding the processes and personnel involved. 4- Vessel movement considerations - Pilot exemptions - Uncontrolled vessels - Anchoring / weighing anchors - Pilot boarding / disembarking A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 135. DATA COLLECTION Understanding the processes and personnel involved. 5- Environmental conditions - Wind - Sea state - Tide / currents - Radar clutter - Visibility ( precipitation ) - Light / darkness - Temperature - Radio inference - Draught restrictions - Air draught restrictions A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 136. DATA COLLECTION Understanding the processes and personnel involved. 6- Ship functions - Propulsion - Steering - Control / manoeuvring - Electrical - Communications - Navigation - Anchoring - Mooring - Piping and pumping - Safety systems - Cargo handling,loading,storage - Life support A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 137. DATA COLLECTION - Navigation markers / lights - Dredging - Pilotage - Port control - Cargo handling,loading,storage - Berth structures - Communications - Emergency services Understanding the processes and personnel involved. 7- Port based functions A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 138. DATA COLLECTION Understanding the processes and personnel involved. 8- Human tasks ( involvement in the following activities ) - Vessel scheduling - Pre-entry planning and decision making - Pilot rendezvous with vessel - Tug rendezvous and attachment - Navigation to berth - Berthing and making fast - Loading / unloading operations - Port facilities maintenance A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 139. Number of deaths Pollution tonnes/ Incident Deaths/ Accident INCIDENT DATA Tankers in port Number of incidents Accident category 6 18 0 143 1 2 170 Berthing contact Collision Equip. Failure Fire / Explosion Flooding Grounding Total 0.010 0.018 - 0.396 0.071 0.003 0.051 354 273 20 3052 120 3310 1086 589 1013 751 361 14 611 3339 A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 140.
  • 141. 8 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA ) The SSA is an essential and integral part of the process of developing and updating the Ship Security Plan The Company Security Officer shall ensure that the SSA is carry out by persons with appropriate skills to evaluate the security of the ship A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 142. 8 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA ) The SSA shall include an on-scene security survey and, at least, with identification of : 1 - Existing security measures, procedures and operations 2 - And evaluation of key ship board operations that it is important to protect 3 - Possible threats to the key ship board operation 4 - Weakness, including human factors in the infrastructure, policies and procedures A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO The SSA shall be documented, reviewed, accepted and retained by the company.
  • 143. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B 8.3 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA ) Address the following elements on board or within the ship : Personnel protection systems Other areas that may, if damaged or used for illicit observation, pose a risk to... Procedural policies Radio, telecommunication, computer systems Structural integrity Physical security A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 144. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B 8.4 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA ) Those involved should be able to draw upon expert assistance in relation to : 1- Knowledge of current security threats and patterns 2- Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices 3- Recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten the security 4- Techniques used to circumvent security measures A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 145. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B 8.4 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA ) Those involved should be able to draw upon expert assistance in relation to : 5- Methods used to cause security incident 6- Effect of explosives on ship’s stuctures and equipment 7- Ship security 8- Ship / Port interface business practices 9- Contingency planning, emergency preparedness and response A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 146. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B 8.4 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA ) Those involved should be able to draw upon expert assistance in relation to : 10- Physical security 11- Radio and telecommunication systems, computer systems and networks 12- Marine engineering 13- Ship and port operations A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 147. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B 8.8 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA ) Should consider the persons, activities, services and operations that it is important to protect. This includes : 1- Ship’s personnel 2- Passengers, visitors, vendors, repair technicians, port facility personnel 3- Capacity to maintain safe navigation and emergency response 4- Cargo, particularly dangerous goods or hazardous substances 5-Ship’s stores A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 148. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B 8.14 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA ) On-scene security survey should examine and evaluate existing shipboard protective measures, procedures and operations for : 1- Ensuring the performance of all ship security duties 2- Monitoring restricted areas to ensure access only to authorised persons 3- Controlling access to the ship, including any identification systems 4- Monitoring of deck area and area surrounding the ship A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 149. ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B 8.14 - SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ( SSA ) On-scene security survey should examine and evaluate existing shipboard protective measures, procedures and operations for : 5- Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects - Accompanied and unaccompanied baggage - Ship’s personnel personal effects 6- Supervising the handling of cargo and the delivery of ship’s store 7- Ensuring that ship security communication, information, and equipment are readily available A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 150. - Contracting Governments shall determine when a Declaration Of Security is required by assessing the risk the ship / port interface or ship to ship activity poses to people , property or the environment. 5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS )
  • 151. A ship can request completion of a Declaration Of Security when : 5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS ) 1- The ship is operating at a higher security level than the port facility or another ship it is interfacing with 2- There is an agreement on the declaration of security between Contracting Governments covering certain international voyages or specifics ships on those voyages 3- There has been a security threat or a security incident involving the ship or the port facility, as applicable
  • 152. Requests for the completion of a Declaration Of Security shall be acknowledge by the applicable port facility or ship. 5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS ) 4- The ship is at port which is not required to have implemented an approved port facility security plan 5- The ship is conducting ship to ship activities with another ship not required to have and implement an approved ship security plan A ship can request completion of a Declaration Of Security when :
  • 153. 5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS ) ISPS - GUIDANCE Part B Appendix 1 The Declaration Of Security is valid from to for the following activities : Under the following security levels Security level(s) for the ship : Security level(s) for the port facility : Signed for and on behalf of The port facility The Ship Declaration Of Security
  • 154. The Declaration Of Security shall be completed by : 5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS ) - The Master or the Ship Security Officer on behalf of the ship - The Port Facility Security Officer or, if the Contracting Government determines otherwise, by another body responsible for shore-side security, on behalf of the port facility Declaration Of Security
  • 155. 5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS ) The Declaration Of Security shall address the security requirements that should be shared between a port facility and a ship or between ships and shall state the responsibility for each RESPONSIBILITY
  • 156. Minimum Period 5 - DECLARATION OF SECURITY ( DOS ) Administration shall specify the minimum period for which Declarations Of Security shall be kept by ships entitled to fly their flag. Contracting Governments shall specify the minimum period for which Declarations Of Security shall be kept by port facilities located within their territory.
  • 157. Click to add text Security measures
  • 158. Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons, or particular persons for political purposes Terrorism
  • 159. • These are our demands - aims… • If we do not get them, we will continue until we get them ( continued threat ) • You will never be safe until our aims are met ( continued fear ) Terrorist Aims and Demands 1 - Terrorist
  • 160. 1 - 2 Terrorist Followers • It is the best in the long run • It will make things better • We all want this anyway, this will make it happen sooner • Support us in our demands to achieve this • Nobody needs to be hurt if we comply to the demands Terrorist Aims and Demands
  • 161. • Lacking will to defuse situation 1 - 3 Media • Terrorist mouthpiece • Aggravate the situation • Leak intended solutions • Personal / Political views not subject to government guidelines Terrorist Aims and Demands
  • 162. Click to add text • Vessels • Fixed Platforms • Floating weapon • Ports • Collision • Detonation Terrorist Methods
  • 163. • Hijack or seizure - Political and propagandist - Limited in nature • Attack - Warning - Minimum loss of life - Targeted Terrorist Threat - Pre 2000
  • 164. • GRIEVANCES • POLITICAL IDEOLOGY • EXTREMIST • CRIMINAL ACTIVITY Terrorist Threat - Pre 2000
  • 165. • PUBLICITY • PUBLIC APPREHENSION • DISCREDITING GOVERNMENTS • PROVOKING COUNTER MEASURES • EXTORTION • FREEING PRISONERS Terrorist Threat - Pre 2000
  • 166. • CRUISE LINERS • TANKERS • RO-RO PASSENGER FERRIES • OTHER SHIPS / SPECIAL CARGOES Terrorist Threat - Pre 2000
  • 167. • No attention to public opinion • Strategic / economic targets • Global reach • Suicidal and catastrophic • Multiple and coordinated attacks • Use of all weaponry • Transportation as a weapon • Maximum casualties Terrorist Threat - Post 2000
  • 168. • Recruitment and training • Basing • Reconnaissance • Logistics • Mounting • SECURITY Terrorist Modus operandi
  • 169. • Small / Medium vessels • Large crude oil carriers • Liquid Petroleum tankers • Liquefied natural gas tankers • Container shipping Terrorist Targets
  • 170. • Ship - access • Crew - recruitment, vetting, licenses and numbers • Cargo - attractiveness • Ports - Singapore to Bangkok or Dar Es Salaam to Mombasa • Port Facilities • Routes – the main areas of threat • Ship shore interface – crew, visitors, cargo, stores, baggage etc Ship Vulnerabilities
  • 171. • Inflatable loaded with explosives – USS The Sullivans, Cole and Limburg • Acquisition of trawlers and medium sized ships with explosives – attack warships or other vessels such as cruise liners • Private planes stolen from flying clubs • Underwater demolition teams – diving schools Al Qaeda Modus operandi
  • 172. AL QAEDA FARC IRA GOVERNMENTS ? ? Al Qaeda Threat Aims
  • 173. Click to add text PROFILING Behavioral Characteristics
  • 174. Click to add text • Individuals - Criminal seeking to extort money - Refugees seeking political asylum - Mentally disturbed • Groups Behavioral Characteristics
  • 175. Click to add text - Person( s ) seen in area for no obvious reason Behavioral Characteristics - Person( s ) not dressed for that particular area or function - Person( s ) seen in area more than once or is necessary - Person( s ) being nervous, sweaty when coming aboard ship
  • 176. Click to add text Behavioral Characteristics - Person( s ) having literature or paper work that seem to be of suspicious nature - Person( s ) being in possession of large sums of money - Person( s ) meeting other personnel not associated with that party or crew - Person( s ) being in areas of the ship that they have no reason to be there or are talking a particular interest in a part of the ship
  • 177. Click to add text weapons, dangerous substances and devices Recognition of :
  • 178. Click to add text Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices • X-Ray screening • Low powered radar sensors • Walk through detectors • Trace detectors • Screening containers
  • 180. Parts
  • 181. AK 47 / AKM - RUSSIA, CHINA, SOVIET BLOCK STATES Assault Rifles
  • 183. Heckler Koch - GERMANY- Heckler Koch (Germany / UK) Machine Pistols Cal: 9mm Weight: 3.425kg (7.55lb) Length: 368mm (14.49”) Carfare: 550rpm Mag: 32rnds Machine Pistols
  • 184. INGRAM (MAC 10) - USA Cal: .45 Weight: 3.818kg (8.4lb) Length: 269mm (10.59”) Carfare: 1.145rpm Mag: 30rnd Ingram - MAC 10 (USA)
  • 185. UZI - ISRAEL Cal: 9mm Weight: 3.11kg ((6.85lb) Length: 360mm (14.17”) Carfare: 950rpm Mag: 20,25,32rnds Uzi - Israel
  • 187. RPG 7 – Used in Piraeus against HMS Ark Royal by Revolutionary Organization Stinger – Used by Al Quaeda, Mujahadeen, FARC, PIRA? DSHK – Used by PIRA, Somalis etc
  • 188. COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 189. Explosive is a substance that can react on its own chemically producing gases in relative high temperature and pressure and such speed that destroys surrounding objects. Explosives COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 190. Kill by : - Pressure higher than atmospheric pressure - Shrapnel - Temperature COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO Explosives
  • 191.  Black Powder  Nitroglycerin (Dynamite)  Ammonium Nitrate (ANFO)  TNT  Tetryl  C4  PETN  RDX COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO Explosives
  • 192. - Explosive - Detonator - Triggering mechanism time, contact, remote COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO Explosives
  • 194. 1.75” / 4.4mm .26” / .7mm TETRYL A.S.A L1A1 - DOES NOT NEED PRIMER (IE. EXTRA POWER TO DETONATE EXPLOSIVE. NON - ELECTRIC TETRYL 2”” / 5mm .25” L2A1 - DOES NOT NEED PRIMER TO DETONATE EXPLOSIVE ELECTRIC ASA ASA Detonators
  • 195. RESISTORS FORM 2 FUNCTIONS. 1. LIMIT (RESIST) THE FLOW OF CURRENT THROUGH A CIRCUIT. 2. SET VOLTAGE LEVELS AT SPECIFIC POINTS IN A CIRCUIT Resistors
  • 196. THESE ALLOW THE RESISTANCE TO BE VARIED FROM 0 ohm TO MAXIMUM RESISTER VALUE. VALUE IS DETRMINED USING THE SCREW AT THE SIDE Variable Resistor
  • 197. Thyristor/ SCR 3 LAYER TERMINAL OPERATING SWITCH WHICH NEEDS ONLY A SMALL CURRENT TO OPEN THE GATE TO ALLOW A LARGER CURRENT TO PASS THROUGH
  • 198. Capacitor STORES A CHARGE UNTIL IT IS RELEASED. USED FOR 1. LONG CHARGING PERIOD (TIME DELAY) 2. RAPID DISCHARGE
  • 199. Additional Equipment CIRCUIT BOARD LIGHT DIODE TILT SWITCH BATTERY CONNECTION
  • 201. What Can It Does ?
  • 202. COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO INFLAMMABLE LIQUID CORROSIVE CORROSIVE CORROSIVE SOLID INFLAMMABLE A-M CHAUVEL - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 203. The vapor concentration on the surface of a flammable liquid or flammable gases can create an explosive atmosphere. Explosive Gases Vapors - LEL: lower explosion level - HEL: higher explosion level (example: propane 2,4 – 9,5 %) Explosive Range COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 204. Toxic Gases - Ammonium (refrigerated vessels) - Carbon Monoxide - Chlorine (Carriers) - Cyanide - H2S - SO2 - Phosgene (Heated Solvents) - Nitric Acid (NO3) COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 205. Flammable Gases - Acetylene - Methane - Propane - Butane - Hydrogen COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 206. Liquefied Gases Gases stored in liquid form through the use of pressure and low temperatures (e.g. LPG / LNG) BLEVE (Boiling, Liquid, Expansion, Vapor, Explosion) (e.g. Propane expands 270 times in vapor form compared with its liquid form) COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 207. Gases under Pressure  Gas bottle contain gas in pressure around 140 atm.  Gas bottles always should be constrain  Acetylene and oxygen bottles to be kept apart COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 208. Flammable Liquids Flash Point : Lower temperature at which a liquid produces explosive vapors. - Flammable Liquid : Flash point < 38oC - Petrol : - 40oC - Evaporation tendency COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 209. Solvents - Toluene - Benzene - etc…. Corrosive Liquids - Acids - Caustic COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 210. Oxidizing Agents Substances that contain oxygen or chlorine Flammable Solids - Magnesium - White & Red & Yellow Phosphorus - Naphthalene - Sodium COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 211. Carcinogenic / Mutogenic - e.g : PCB Chemical Agents - Asphyxiation - Blistring ( Cl ) - Blood Gases ( Co ) - Nerve Gases ( organophosphate ) - Tear : Irritating Gases COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO
  • 212. Biological Agents Radioactive Substances - Ionizing alpha, beta, gamma rays - Non ionizing radiation - Radio isotope : Plutonium, Uranium 238 - Dirty Bomb - Anthrax - Ebola - Smallpox - etc... COUYOU - KARATZAS - BUREAU VERITAS - DNS / DCO

Editor's Notes

  1. Since Sept 11 2001, the world in which ships trade has changed, perhaps forever. We must all contribute to the effort – contending with new rules governing, security, customs and immigration; recognising the legal and insurance responsibilities we have; and adjusting to the shifting economic and trade environment. It is my aim in this presentation to identify and highlight the actual threats to those critical assets which could cause significant loss of life or damage to property or to the environment.
  2. Terrorism Setting aside political and ideological considerations the definition of terrorism: Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons, or particular persons for political purposes Suffices for the layman and permits a distinction between maritime terrorism and maritime piracy, even though the overt acts against a vessel may be outwardly the same. After all, there are only a few ways to board a ship and a limited categories of criminal offences that can be committed thereon.
  3. Terrorism It is emphasised that maritime terrorism takes on many forms. It has been conducted on board vessels or fixed platforms, such as the vicious armed attacks against Chinese, Indonesian and Korean vessels near Sri Lanka in 1997 resulting in the loss of the vessels, and the several hostage-taking incidents on Shell oil-drilling platform in Nigerian waters in 1999. The vessel may itself be the weapon used against another, as happened in the year 2000 in Yemen when the USS Cole was severely damaged by suicide bombers using a small dinghy to come into direct contact with the American navy destroyer They have also been perpetrated against ports or coastal facilities such as the bombing of two tourist resorts in Turkey in 1994, armed raids against two fishing villages in Cambodia in 1998, or the kidnapping of foreigners in using small arms, grenades and rocket launchers, or other improvised weapons that have been in common use in land based terrorist activities. Bombs of various types can be concealed in cargo or baggage and timed to detonate while in port or when it is already inside a vessel and at sea. But the most terrifying maritime scenarios do not involve just these deadly items. One possible scenario is the deliberate collision of a passenger vessel against another vessel resulting in great civilian causalities. Another is the deliberate collision of a laden VLCC, oil tanker or LPG carrier in an area such as the Malacca Straits, causing un-describable damage to the marine environment. Another is the detonation of a vessel laden with explosive or volatile cargo within any of the many port cities of the world.
  4. Now to the terrorist threat. For greater ease and simplification I have divided this into pre 2000 and post in order to make my point. Of course there were suicide bombers in the last century – Tamil Tigers notably among them. In simple terms however there were “rules”. Hijack or seizure Political and propagandist Limited in nature Attack Warning Minimum loss of life Incidents might lead to loss of life but it was never catastrophic and preferably targeted. The big indicator of change was the Hizbollah attack on the US and French military camps in Lebanon in 1986. This is seen as a role model. Mass, coordinated, simultaneous.
  5. Terrorists and Saboteurs can be broadly be grouped under the following headings Those whose grievances essentially territorial, nationalist, separatist, ethnic or religious. Those whose political ideology is extreme left, right or fundamentalist. Extremist groups supporting trade protection, animal rights oer environmental issues Those promoting criminal activities. Drug trafficking, illegal immigration
  6. Terrorist Acts may be aimed at 1. Attracting publicity, advertising a cause and pressurising Governments to change policy 2. Making public apprehensive 3. Discrediting the Government by exposing their inability to protect their citizens 4. Provoking counter measures which impinge on ‘civil rights’ such as travel restriction, curfews, etc alienating public opinion. 5. Extorting money or equipment from Govt., major companies or rich individuals. 6. Freeing imprisoned colleagues in return for release of hostages and promoting other illegal activity.
  7. Cruise Liners - could be targeted because of their high profile, their flag, ownership, particular destination or nationality of passengers. Cruise passengers may be perceived as a high income group and this alone could make them a target (although now difficult) Tankers - with the political sensitivity of their cargo and the potential environmental impact with resulting high publicity given to tanker incidents, this makes them potential targets, although their size, complexity and terminal where they call make boarding difficult. Gas Tankers with their potentially volatile cargoes might be considered to offer a particularly high profile. RO-RO Ferries - may be vulnerable to a car bomb attack aimed at damaging, disabling or sinking a vessel, causing fire on board and harm to passengers and crew. Other ships / special cargoes - those that are transporting hazardous material, nucvlear goods, materials or waste could be potentially attractive targets due to publicity and safety concerns. Terminals - those that handle gas or oil might prove to be potential targets.
  8. Post 2000 If I am to paraphrase or define the benchmark for terrorism this century these are some of the phases I would be using; No attention to public opinion Strategic or economic targets Global reach Suicidal and catastrophic Multiple and coordinated attacks Use of all weaponry Transportation as a weapon Maximum casualties It is nihilism (the rejection of all religious and moral principals, an extreme form of scepticism maintaining that nothing has a real existence). on a grand stage. Let me dwell on a few: Strategic thinking and from a targeting point of view brilliance with 9/11 attack Economic targets. IRA were a lost cause in mid 80,s until they started to bomb the city. The tourism industry is in panic. The motivation is clear. If you regard the West as peddling cultural and moral pollution, a strike at the economic aspects that personify western values in the world are prime tgts. There is enough of a risk that any weapon is acceptable and obtainable to take seriously the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Even at the lower end the idea of firing SAMs at airliners is fairly extreme!! The intent certainly exists. The combination of transport as a weapon and tourism as a target would make me very worried if I was a cruise line owner. Finally maximum casualties are another avowed aim. It is all good stuff and a decade ago would have belonged to Hollywood.
  9. Remember that the terrorist has to follow the same pattern as anyone else – the terrorist modus operandi Imagine attacking a ship in the port of wherever and how it might be set up Recruit and train a team Infiltrate the region and find a base………. to carry out reconnaissance Additional members as operators would link up Move the required equipment in be it weapons or explosives or both Mount an attack The prime consideration for any terrorist is Security (OPSEC as we know it Operational security) Security, security – most terrorist organisations are paranoid. Own internal security is of paramount importance.
  10. What are the terrorsit likely tgts The threat of terrorist groups hijacking vessels to use them as floating bombs or to block narrow maritime passages. A well trained team whose members expect to die in the course of the action would be difficult to prevent. The obvious tgts for such an attack would be large crude oil carriers and liquid petroleum gas or liquefied natural gas tankers. An attack that resulted in the ignition of these vessels cargoes, but particularly the LNG and LPG tankers highly volatile gas, would produce a devastating explosion and massive damage if the ship was forced close to a major populated area. Similarly, there is a high level of concern particularly in the US over the use of ship-borne containers to convey terrorist weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, into tgt countries.
  11. Let me just remind you of the vulnerable points which are threatened Ship - access Crew - recruitment, vetting, licenses and numbers Cargo - attractiveness Ports - Singapore to Bangkok or Dar Es Salaam to Mombasa Port Facilities And Routes – the main areas of threat Ship shore interface – crew, visitors, cargo, gash, stores, baggage etc A never ending list once we get down into the weeds
  12. Let us have a look at AL Qa’eda MO Morocco confirmed on June 11 2002 that the country’s authorities arrested three Saudi Arabian members of al-qaida in May, who were planning to carry out attacks against US and British navy ships in the Straits of Gibraltar. The arrests highlight the potential threat to shipping from al-qaida cells. The three men were apparently planning to attack US AND British naval vessels patrolling the MED, there is a credible risk of attacks against commercial shipping. The plot to attack naval shipping in the Straits of Gibraltar is reminiscent of the Oct 2000 attack on the USS Cole in a Yemini port. As in that case, the three Saudis were reportedly planning to carry out suicide attacks, ramming ships in the dinghies packed with explosives Limburg Initial reaction was that this was a tank cell explosion because of the outward facing fragments on the hull. Effect of explosive and pressures. Targeting the refinery because of the load. Impact beyond the damage was; The spill and Yemeni claim Insurance rates x 3 or 4 Trade loss $ 3.8 million per month and the impact on Aden Al Qaidas tactics of using small boats laden with explosives mean that the greatest threat is to ships in harbours or at narrow choke-points. The following areas are likely to be particularly vulnerable: The Gulf of Aden The Horn of Africa The Persian Gulf and The Straits of Hormuz Example of Hormuz and the Musandam-Iran connection. From Iran 300-500 boats a night. Policing problem. Radar and patrols. Shoreline. Speed. Local impact. The Red sea and the Suez canal The Western Med and Straits of Gib The Malacca Straits Medium sized vessels such as trawlers, dhows, possibly leisure craft, and in certain parts of the world this would be only be too easy. Planes we have seen and the attempts to use small planes Underwater teams. Not to be derided. Tamil tigers used this effectively against the Sri Lankan navy. Expertly trained frogmen attacking boats with limpet charges. Suicide missions. Al Quada are believed to have underwater apparatus and trained personnel.
  13. What type of people carry out such crimes and what type of character are they? I do not profess to being a trained Trick cyclist, so we will look at specifically the piracy/terrorist hijack scenario. Individual pirates/hijackers Criminal seeking to extort money Refugees seeking political asylum Mentally disturbed – the mentally abnormal have a marked inferiority complex, nervousness, hijacking provides an opportunity for the insecure to prove themselves and achieve personal publicity. They could be armed with a hoax weapon or have a bomb in a contained package or wired to devices as suicide bombers, they do not have to be mentally disturbed just a believer in their faith! Groups The politically motivated groups of terrorists operate in groups of 2-5, but can be larger dependent on the task in hand, I.e. the Moscow theatre siege and the personnel involved in 9/11. It will possibly be only the leader who will know the overall plan – remember the Security MO covered in the Threat presentation – well trained and organised, well prepared plans, they will converse in their own language as well as negotiate or demand in a National language. They will possibly know the layout of the vessel, the security and crew procedures and have a fundamental understanding of navigation. They will be well equipped with communications, modern weapons and explosives, which could have been prepositioned on board in advance. They will primarily attempt to access the bridge and using the shock of an armed assault as part of their technique will inevitable gain control of the ship.They will then try to locate the crew/passengers into one part of the ship to ease guarding and control. Initially ruthless, irrational and heavy handed, the elation of their success may ebb away and concern for their own safety and security will be of concern. Unless suicide bombers etc.their aggressive tendencies will reappear as the vessel approaches land or set deadlines.
  14. What type of people carry out such crimes and what type of character are they? I do not profess to being a trained Trick cyclist, so we will look at specifically the piracy/terrorist hijack scenario. Individual pirates/hijackers Criminal seeking to extort money Refugees seeking political asylum Mentally disturbed – the mentally abnormal have a marked inferiority complex, nervousness, hijacking provides an opportunity for the insecure to prove themselves and achieve personal publicity. They could be armed with a hoax weapon or have a bomb in a contained package or wired to devices as suicide bombers, they do not have to be mentally disturbed just a believer in their faith! Groups The politically motivated groups of terrorists operate in groups of 2-5, but can be larger dependent on the task in hand, I.e. the Moscow theatre siege and the personnel involved in 9/11. It will possibly be only the leader who will know the overall plan – remember the Security MO covered in the Threat presentation – well trained and organised, well prepared plans, they will converse in their own language as well as negotiate or demand in a National language. They will possibly know the layout of the vessel, the security and crew procedures and have a fundamental understanding of navigation. They will be well equipped with communications, modern weapons and explosives, which could have been prepositioned on board in advance. They will primarily attempt to access the bridge and using the shock of an armed assault as part of their technique will inevitable gain control of the ship.They will then try to locate the crew/passengers into one part of the ship to ease guarding and control. Initially ruthless, irrational and heavy handed, the elation of their success may ebb away and concern for their own safety and security will be of concern. Unless suicide bombers etc.their aggressive tendencies will reappear as the vessel approaches land or set deadlines.
  15. What type of people carry out such crimes and what type of character are they? I do not profess to being a trained Trick cyclist, so we will look at specifically the piracy/terrorist hijack scenario. Individual pirates/hijackers Criminal seeking to extort money Refugees seeking political asylum Mentally disturbed – the mentally abnormal have a marked inferiority complex, nervousness, hijacking provides an opportunity for the insecure to prove themselves and achieve personal publicity. They could be armed with a hoax weapon or have a bomb in a contained package or wired to devices as suicide bombers, they do not have to be mentally disturbed just a believer in their faith! Groups The politically motivated groups of terrorists operate in groups of 2-5, but can be larger dependent on the task in hand, I.e. the Moscow theatre siege and the personnel involved in 9/11. It will possibly be only the leader who will know the overall plan – remember the Security MO covered in the Threat presentation – well trained and organised, well prepared plans, they will converse in their own language as well as negotiate or demand in a National language. They will possibly know the layout of the vessel, the security and crew procedures and have a fundamental understanding of navigation. They will be well equipped with communications, modern weapons and explosives, which could have been prepositioned on board in advance. They will primarily attempt to access the bridge and using the shock of an armed assault as part of their technique will inevitable gain control of the ship.They will then try to locate the crew/passengers into one part of the ship to ease guarding and control. Initially ruthless, irrational and heavy handed, the elation of their success may ebb away and concern for their own safety and security will be of concern. Unless suicide bombers etc.their aggressive tendencies will reappear as the vessel approaches land or set deadlines.
  16. What type of people carry out such crimes and what type of character are they? I do not profess to being a trained Trick cyclist, so we will look at specifically the piracy/terrorist hijack scenario. Individual pirates/hijackers Criminal seeking to extort money Refugees seeking political asylum Mentally disturbed – the mentally abnormal have a marked inferiority complex, nervousness, hijacking provides an opportunity for the insecure to prove themselves and achieve personal publicity. They could be armed with a hoax weapon or have a bomb in a contained package or wired to devices as suicide bombers, they do not have to be mentally disturbed just a believer in their faith! Groups The politically motivated groups of terrorists operate in groups of 2-5, but can be larger dependent on the task in hand, I.e. the Moscow theatre siege and the personnel involved in 9/11. It will possibly be only the leader who will know the overall plan – remember the Security MO covered in the Threat presentation – well trained and organised, well prepared plans, they will converse in their own language as well as negotiate or demand in a National language. They will possibly know the layout of the vessel, the security and crew procedures and have a fundamental understanding of navigation. They will be well equipped with communications, modern weapons and explosives, which could have been prepositioned on board in advance. They will primarily attempt to access the bridge and using the shock of an armed assault as part of their technique will inevitable gain control of the ship.They will then try to locate the crew/passengers into one part of the ship to ease guarding and control. Initially ruthless, irrational and heavy handed, the elation of their success may ebb away and concern for their own safety and security will be of concern. Unless suicide bombers etc.their aggressive tendencies will reappear as the vessel approaches land or set deadlines.
  17. Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices Not as easy as it sounds, within the military and civilian field there numerous cses to attend from using different weapons to identifying foreign equipment and weapons of various sizes, designs, makes , models etc. And the experience gained cannot be passed on over night. It requires experts in the relevant fields to be able to recognise and detect weapons, dangerous substances and devices. What we are concerned with is the prevention of such materials entering the ports and on board vessels. To achieve this we require control similar airport security systems. X-Ray screening to detect weapons made of metal, plastic, ceramics etc. Low powered radar sensors to detect weapons Walk through detectors Trace detectors for dangerous substances and confirming cargos, illegal immigrants etc. Screening containers for chemical, biological, radioactive or nuclear cargo Dirty bombs - Radioactive material surrounded by explosive. Detonation spreads the radioactivity over a wide area, killing potentially hundreds of people and leaving whole areas uninhabitable for decades. As reported in the press Feb 1 2003 British Intelligence services have uncovered a plot by A l Qaeda to build a nuclear dirty bomb after discovering documents in Heart in Afghanistan indicating that the bomb had been assembled. The where abouts are unknown and it is feared it could have been moved along the smuggling routes which spread west from Heart close to the Iranian border.In the Senate of the United States Jan 17 2003 a bill has been introduced to direct the Secretary of Energy to carry out a programme to evaluate and demonstrate the operation of radiation detection systems for the use at seaports in the US. The act is to cited as the @Radiation detection for dirty bomb material in containers and bulk cargo act of 2003’ Read the Act To make ourselves less vulnerable by the use of education, awareness and the introduction of security procedures coupled with important intelligence will enable crews and personnel to identify suspicious materials and report them to the correct authorities for identification. (Nisha as an example)
  18. Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices Not as easy as it sounds, within the military and civilian field there numerous cses to attend from using different weapons to identifying foreign equipment and weapons of various sizes, designs, makes , models etc. And the experience gained cannot be passed on over night. It requires experts in the relevant fields to be able to recognise and detect weapons, dangerous substances and devices. What we are concerned with is the prevention of such materials entering the ports and on board vessels. To achieve this we require control similar airport security systems. X-Ray screening to detect weapons made of metal, plastic, ceramics etc. Low powered radar sensors to detect weapons Walk through detectors Trace detectors for dangerous substances and confirming cargos, illegal immigrants etc. Screening containers for chemical, biological, radioactive or nuclear cargo Dirty bombs - Radioactive material surrounded by explosive. Detonation spreads the radioactivity over a wide area, killing potentially hundreds of people and leaving whole areas uninhabitable for decades. As reported in the press Feb 1 2003 British Intelligence services have uncovered a plot by A l Qaeda to build a nuclear dirty bomb after discovering documents in Heart in Afghanistan indicating that the bomb had been assembled. The where abouts are unknown and it is feared it could have been moved along the smuggling routes which spread west from Heart close to the Iranian border.In the Senate of the United States Jan 17 2003 a bill has been introduced to direct the Secretary of Energy to carry out a programme to evaluate and demonstrate the operation of radiation detection systems for the use at seaports in the US. The act is to cited as the @Radiation detection for dirty bomb material in containers and bulk cargo act of 2003’ Read the Act To make ourselves less vulnerable by the use of education, awareness and the introduction of security procedures coupled with important intelligence will enable crews and personnel to identify suspicious materials and report them to the correct authorities for identification. (Nisha as an example)