1. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: A
Driving Force Behind Piracy and Armed
Robbery in Somalia
Spencer Ash
2015

2. Table of Contents
General Introduction to Maritime Piracy 1
Defining Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery 2
The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy 4
Piracy and Armed Robbery: Somalia 6
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Activities and Somali Piracy 9
Responses to the Threat of Somali Piracy 13
IMO and United Nations Resolutions 13
Intervention by Foreign Naval Forces 16
Shipboard Deterrence Measures and Private Security 18
Proposed Solutions and Recommendations 19
Addressing IUU Fishing Activities in Somalia 19
Commitment by the State of Somalia & Regional and International Cooperation 21
Appendix I: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations 23
Appendix II: Map of Somalia and Surrounding Area 24
References 25

3. 1
General Introduction to Maritime Piracy
Maritime piracy has existed for as long ships have been transporting people and goods
upon the oceans. Pirates have presented a unique challenge for maritime nations and other third
party states who have put ships to sea, with the occurrence of piracy increasing proportionally
alongside maritime trade and commerce. In the 14th and 15th centuries, piracy was wide spread
causing nation states to establish navies to protect their shipping interests across the globe —
from the Spanish Main and the Barbary Coast to the distant shores of the Far East (Ninic, 2009).
As the concept of the modern nation state began to emerge, individual states were able to
increase their control over maritime resources and territorial seas as well as their responsibilities
to provide for safe passage through their waterways. As a result, reports of piracy on the high
seas diminished from the early 19th century until the last few decades of the 20th century
(Reisman and Tennis, 2009). Throughout the course of history, the security of both national and
international waterways has been of critical importance to states and other stakeholders within
the maritime realm — particularly since the ocean can be used as a source of transportation and
communication, economic exploitation, and as a vital source of foodstuffs (Onuoha, 2009).
According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International
Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center, maritime piracy has been on the rise in recent
years. It appears that it was not until the recent attacks off of the coast of Somalia that Piracy was
an issue of major concern for many nations and their citizens who remained unaware that this
ancient threat has persisted into modern times. For the most part, pirate actions were
concentrated in Asian waters only being surpassed by occurrences of piracy in the Gulf of Aden
and costal Somalia in the mid-2000’s, where it has been estimated that approximately 59
merchant ships have been attacked for every 1,000 voyages (Nincic, 2009; Weir, 2009). Modern

4. 2
pirate attacks have been confined to four major areas including: the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of
Guinea, the Malacca Straits between Indonesia and Malaysia, and along the Indian subcontinent
between India and Sri Lanka with the threats to international maritime commerce being extended
to all forms of oceanic shipping (Hanson, 2010). In 2008, according to the IMB Piracy Reporting
Center, global piracy was shown to have increased by 11% while piracy off the coast of East
Africa had increased by over 200%, where 42 out of 49 successful hijackings in the Gulf Aden
and Indian Ocean occurred off the coast of Somalia (Hanson, 2010). The levels of global piracy
would continue to rise until reaching a maximum around 2010-2011 with over 445 attacks
worldwide (IMB, 2014).
Defining Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery
Under international law, the maintenance of peace and security are fundamental concepts.
In that respect, piracy and armed robbery at sea go against the element of the protection of
general community interests — presenting a direct threat against human life and to the peaceful
navigation of the seas (Tanaka, 2012). As such, pirates (and those who enable them) are
considered to be hostes humani generis (enemies of all mankind) with acts of piracy being
regarded as sui generis (universal crime: an offense against the law of all nations) (Campbell,
2014).
In 1932, the Harvard Group, produced a draft convention (ie. the Harvard Draft) to
address fundamental differences in the definition of piracy so as to allow for the adoption of a
single definition to be used for the purposes of international law. The International Law
Commission was influenced by the research contained in the Harvard Draft and generated four
conventions with respect to the law of the sea, which were introduced in the 1958 Geneva

5. 3
Convention on the High Seas (Campbell, 2014). In 1982, the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) accepted the definition of piracy as drafted by the International
Law Commission:
1982 UNCLOS (article 101)
“Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private
ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board
such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge
of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).”
However, the international legal definition of piracy under 1982 UNCLOS leaves much
ambiguity for certain terms, causing the international shipping community to use several
definitions of what constitutes an act of piracy. For example, under UNCLOS an act of piracy
may only occur within the high seas (extra-territorial areas). All other actions that occur within
territorial seas or within the internal waters of a costal state cannot be considered to be acts of
piracy and are further defined as armed robbery under resolution A.1025 (26) of the IMO Code
of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
(Tanaka, 2012).
Armed Robbery in Resolution A.1025 (26)
“Armed robbery against ships means any of the following acts:
1. any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than
an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or
property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial
sea;
2. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.

6. 4
This definition is particularly problematic for the enforcement of laws against piracy as
international law only allows action against piratical acts to be taken outside the territorial sea of
a nation1
, even if that nation is unable to prevent or suppress acts of violence against ships within
its waters. For the purposes of this case study, the IMB definition of piracy will be used when
referring to the occurrence of pirate actions as it uses a broader term to define “piracy” choosing
to collectively recognize “piracy and armed robbery” in such a way that includes all acts of
violence against a ship within the jurisdictional boundaries of both domestic and international
law (Campbell, 2014). This is a more commercial definition which allows for the financial
impact of global acts of violence towards ships to be calculated more thoroughly.
The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy
The costs of maritime piracy can be significant and are felt throughout the world
economy. IMB estimates suggest that shipping companies are losing anywhere between US$13-
$15 billion per year due to pirate activity, although the complete cost of piratical acts is difficult
to calculate since roughly 50-70% of all attacks on commercial vessels go unreported (Sterio,
2009; Bowden, 2010). The economic costs associated with piracy and armed robbery come from
the loss of stolen goods and vessels (as well as damage), vessel delays in leaving ports due to
pirate activity in high-risk areas, transit delays due to vessels altering routes to avoid areas of
pirate activity (this includes the vessels fuel and more paid days at sea for the crews), and
1
Unless the state in which the act of “piracy” occurred has specifically adopted measures in their criminal codes to
criminalize piracy within their national jurisdiction or in the case where a coastal state has granted permission for
another to act within its’ territorial waters. For the most part, an act that occurs within a nation’s territorial seas
against a vessel (regardless of the vessels origin) is considered to be that of armed robbery by definition, unless
otherwise defined by that state.

7. 5
increases in insurance rates (Sterio, 2009; Nincic, 2009). In 2010, the cost of war risk insurance2
increased by nearly 300%, where companies previously paid as little as USUS$ 500$500 per
voyage and are now facing rates as high as US$ 20,000 for transiting high-risk areas, the cost of
Kidnap and Ransom premiums increased by a factor of ten, hull insurance coverage nearly
doubled, and cargo insurance increased from US$ 25 to over US$ 100 per container (Bowden,
2010). In addition, many crews now demand increased wages for sailing through pirate-infested
waters and several vessels have incorporated armed guards into their vessel security plans — all
of which add increased costs to goods being shipped and result in higher prices to be borne by
the consumers on the world market.
Piracy has also increased the cost of maritime commerce in other ways as well. For
example, if a ship has been successfully hijacked, shipping companies may be required to pay
multi-million dollar ransoms for the return of their vessels, cargoes, and crew members. In the
majority of cases, these ransoms are either paid directly by the shipping or insurance companies
increasing the overall cost of doing business (Sterio, 2009). In 2013 the ransom and recovery
costs for Somali piracy alone have been estimated at being between US $21.6 million and US
$43.2 million. The total cost of Somali piracy in 2013 (excluding insured ransom payments) has
been estimated to be as high as US $3.2 billion (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2013). However, the
paying of ransoms has increased the occurrence of pirate attacks as the exchange of money for
vessels, cargoes, and crews incentivizes the continued hijacking of vessels. The hijacking of
vessels has become a rather sustainable business model as international trade increases.
Considering that the average yearly income in Somalia is less than US $600, piracy has become
a highly lucrative business, particularly since the seizure of a vessel may result in upwards of US
2
In 2008, Lloyds Marker Association Joint War Committee classified the Gulf of Aden as a “war risk area”
(Bowdin, 2010).

8. 6
$150,000 for each pirate (Sterio, 2009). It is important to note here that many pirate attacks and
hijackings are not reported to international or local authorities as many shipping companies
handle the situation internally in hopes of avoiding repetitional injury and/or the increased costs
associated with investigations, vessel delays, and insurance rates (Sterio, 2009). Thus, the true
number pirate attacks and incidents of armed robbery at sea are in fact higher than those
published by the IMO, IMB, and other organizations, making the estimation of the economic
costs of piracy very difficult.
Piracy and Armed Robbery: Somalia
The Somali Republic was established in 1960 following independence from British
authority and the unification of the Italian controlled Somaliland. Within a period of nine years,
the fledgling republic was overthrown by General Muhammad Siad Barre, who established a
dictatorship in October 1969 (Weir, 2009). Under the Barre Regime, the territorial waters of
Somalia became the foundation of the State’s costal economy and the national waters were
maintained by a maritime force which protected the regions fisheries by selling licenses to
foreign fishing fleets, controlling access and monitoring port activities, and preventing maritime
crime such as piracy and illegal fishing (Weir, 2009). Following the collapse of the Barre regime
in 1991, the nation fell into a state of decay which was compounded by continuous civil war and
a series of droughts which destroyed the national economy creating a humanitarian crisis
(Nincic, 2009). As of 2009, over one million people have been displaced internally with over
one-third of the population (3.25 million people) reliant upon food aid (Nincic, 2009). From the
time of the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991 until 1995, the sea passages around the Horn of
Africa and along the Somali coastline were maintained by a naval task force authorized by the

9. 7
United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I/II). However, civil unrest
forced vessels to stop entering Somali ports and the area was eventually closed to foreign
vessels. The United Nations left Somalia in 1995 with no effective means of governance and the
state was unable to maintain its territorial waters in the face of civil unrest (Weir, 2009). Since
the fall of the Barre regime in 1991, Somalia has been in a state of anarchy characterized by a
lack of functional governance and the rise of warlords and militias (Onuoha, 2009). The result of
the State’s inability to govern itself has resulted in the development of a criminal economy that
has flourished in the absence of a functioning navy, police force, and civil authority. Militias and
gangs sanctioned by regional warlords control individual townships and have established
societies that rely upon the economic support provided by actions such as piracy (Onuoha, 2009;
Sterio, 2009).
Piracy in Africa is not a new issue, however in recent years it has become prominent due
to the development and concentration of violence in several regions as well as the frequency and
intensity of pirate attacks emanating from the Somali coast, Nigerian waters, and around the
Mozambique Channel (Onuoha, 2009). In 2008, the number of recorded (actual and attempted)
pirate attacks off of the coast of Africa surpassed the total amount of attacks in S.E. Asia. The
highest number of attacks from the African coast occurred in the Gulf of Aden with origins in the
failed state of Somalia (92 attacks initiated from Somali compared to 37 attacks from the rest of
Africa) with all types of vessels being targeted, including: general cargo, bulk carriers, tankers,
roll-on roll-off vessels, fishing vessels, sailing yachts, tugboats, and UN/World Food Programme
chartered aid ships (Fouche, 2009; Onuoha, 2009). Attacks from this region occurred within the
territorial sea of Somalia as well as within high seas regions within the Indian Ocean - at
distances from which pirate actions had not previously occurred (Fouche, 2009).

10. 8
On 18 November 2008, Somali pirates hijacked a Saudi Arabian flagged tanker, the M/V
Sirius Star, carrying a shipment of oil valued at over US $100 million. The attack on the M/V
Sirius Star occurred 500 miles at sea and was at the time the largest vessel that had been taken by
Somali pirates (Onuoha, 2009). The vessel was released in January, 2009 with the ransom
amount having yet to be disclosed. The hijacking of the M/V Sirius Star exemplifies the
capabilities of the modern Somali pirate and shows the seriousness of the threat that East African
piracy poses to international trade routes (Onouoha, 2009). Taking into account that over 80% of
all world trade travels by sea, a large majority of the 93,000 vessels transporting over six billion
tons of cargo is bound to pass through the high-risk areas of the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal
(Swanson, 2014; Bowden, 2010). The potential impact of an increasing frequency of this kind of
attack is quite significant.
The number of acts of piracy, armed robbery, and attacks (committed or attempted)
against ships that were reported to the IMB in 2010 was approximately 445, of which 219 were
attributed to Somali pirates (IMB, 2014). In that same year, the IMO recorded a total of 489
committed or attempted attacks worldwide which represented an overall increase in global piracy
of 20.4% compared to the 406 that were reported in 2009 (Swanson, 2014). Piracy off the Horn
of Africa continued to increase in 2011, with 237 reported attacks being attributed to Somali
pirates. However, according to the annual IMB piracy report, piratical events in the area began to
significantly dissipate the following year with only 75 reported attacks in 2012 attributable to
Somali pirates, a number that would continue to fall with the arrival of a more active
international naval presence (IMB, 2014). At the conclusion of 2014, the number of attacks in
the region attributed to Somali pirate activity was at a low with 11 reported attacks, none of
which were successful in hijacking or boarding the targeted vessel (IMB, 2014). However, at the

11. 9
end of December, 2014 Somali pirates were still suspected to be holding over 33 crew members
hostage from previous attacks (IMB, 2014).
Out of the 11 attacks that were reported to the IMB in 2014, only two of the incidents
involved the targeted vessel being fired upon. It would appear from the reduction in reported
attacks (from 237 in 2011 to 11 in 2014), that the combined actions of international naval task
forces in the area, increased vessel compliance with anti-piracy measures, the use of contracted
security personnel, and stabilization efforts within the centralized Somali government have been
successful in reducing the occurrence of piratical acts in the area (IMB, 2014). Yet, as noted by
the IMB Piracy Reporting Center and the United States Navy Office of Naval Intelligence, pirate
capabilities and their capacity to carry out attacks in the area have not been diminished —
cautioning shipowners and their crews to remain vigilant, as even a single successful hijacking
could ignite piracy in the region once again (IMB, 2014; ONI, 2015).
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Activities and Somali Piracy
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing frequently occurs on the high seas, but
it is also common within the exclusive economic zones and territorial seas of costal states that
are unable to address the problem due to resource, financial, or political constraints (Hughes,
2011). The occurrence of IUU fishing in a region presents a significant barrier to effective
fisheries management and contributes to the overexploitation of fish stocks and the recovery of
exploitable populations of fishable species and the ecosystems upon which they rely (Agnew et
al., 2009). The world bank identified the link between poverty and overfishing in the 2005 report
Turning of the Tide, noting that the occurrence of IUU fishing significantly effects the economy
of coastal states by reducing the value of fish landings through direct economic losses and also

12. 10
by indirect losses associated with un-captured landing fees and taxes from legal fishing
operations (Hughes, 2001). Worldwide, economic losses from IUU activities have been
estimated at being between US $10-23.5 billion annually, representing between 11-26 million
metric tons of fish biomass — although measuring the impact of IUU fishing is complicated by a
number of factors including its mobility and illegality (Agnew et al. 2009).
Prior to the 1991 collapse of the Barre regime in Somalia, the state strictly enforced its
jurisdictional control over its nutrient rich and highly productive fishery zones, as these areas
represented a significant source of income for the government (Schofield, 2009; Arky, 2010).
After the 1991 state collapse, fishing contracts previously managed by the Somali Coast Guard
were no longer enforced along the 2,060-mile coastline resulting in uncontrolled exploitation by
technologically advanced foreign fishing fleets (Arky, 2010; Weir, 2009). As foreign fishing
vessels began to enter Somali territorial waters, domestic artisanal fishers using traditional
methods could not compete placing their coastal subsistence economy in danger of collapse. At
this point in time, the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that
there were over 700 foreign flagged fishing vessels engaged in destructive IUU fishing activities
(eg. the use of drift nets, dynamite fishing, and trawling) off the Somali coast (Schofield, 2009;
Arky, 2010). These vessels aggressively pursued the living marine resources in the area, often
forcing local fishermen away from productive areas through the use of high-pressure hoses and
scalding water. The value of illegal catches from Somalia’s territorial seas and economic zone
has been estimated at being between US $90-300 million annually (Schofield, 2009).
Between 1992 and 2000, the catch of artisanal Somali fishermen was reported to be
between 20,600 to 25,500 tons where estimates on IUU catches were placed at an average of
90,000 tons annually (Arky, 2010). Between 1990 and 1994, IUU fishing had increased by over

13. 11
30% effectively pushing local fishers out of the market (Arky, 2010). With foreign fishing
identified as being responsible for the loss of sizable amounts of revenue for local subsistence
fishermen and coastal communities, the IUU activities of these fleets acted a catalyst for
maritime piracy in the region (Fouche, 2009). By 2001, the IMB Piracy Reporting Center had
recorded 335 attacks along the Somali coast and by 2002 the center noted that the risk of being
attacked in the region had gone from being a ‘possibility’ to being a ‘certainty,' as the number of
attacks increased to 370 by the years end (Weir, 2009).
Initially, Somali fishermen boarded foreign vessels in attempts to enforce their local
fisheries — something that the government of the failed state was no longer able to do. Somali
fishermen attacked these fishing vessels, accusing them of fishing illegally and often demanding
compensation for the illegal catches taken from the territorial waters (Weir, 2009). In response to
the local attacks against their vessels, foreign fishing corporations began to arm their crews
which began engaging in increasingly aggressive actions against the Somali fishers - actions
ranging from the cutting of fishing nets and the destruction of boats to attacks on the fishers
themselves (Arky, 2010). Taking advantage of the power vacuum following the state collapse,
Somali warlords began to claim regional territories and stated negotiate protection in the form of
fishing licenses with foreign fishing vessels (Arky, 2010). With the revenues from such fishing
licenses, the local warlords were able to finance their militias and increase their authority within
the regional territories. However, the warlords were often unable to deliver protection against
attacks on the foreign fishing vessels and Somali efforts to prevent foreign exploitation of their
natural resources escalated into piracy and armed robbery against vessels regardless of illegal
fishing (Weir, 2009; Arky, 2010).

14. 12
Organized groups of Somali pirates with names such as the “Somali Marines” and
“Somali Coast Guard” began to appear in 1994 as an extension of the organized militias that
formed after the 1991 state collapse and gained regional power after the exit of the UNOSOM
I/II forces (Arky, 2010). Along with the development of organized groups of pirates came a shift
in tactics where robbery and theft at sea eventually turned into hostage taking of both ships and
crews for ransom with the hijacking of the merchant vessel Clove in 1996 - the first vessel to be
attacked and held for ransom beyond the Somali territorial seas (Arky, 2010). However, it was
not until after the 2004 tsunami that the profitability of entrepreneurial and organized piracy
would be recognized.
On December 26, 2004, the Indian Ocean tsunami impacted many of the nations and
local populations that surround the Indian Ocean. Somalia was significantly affected by the
tsunami, which had resulted in the death of around 298 people and severe regional economic
damage. The tsunami struck Somali harder than any other part of Africa and destroyed over 800
buildings, 600 fishing boats (approximately 2/3 of the Somali vessel capacity), and nearly 75%
of all fishing gear (an estimated 25,000 nets and 3,700 traps) compounding the economic
devastation to the coastal communities that had resulted from the 1991 collapse and from
increasing levels of IUU fishing activity (Beloff, 2013; Arky, 2010). The 2004 tsunami was thus
followed by an upsurge in the occurrence of piracy off the Somali coast as many Somalis turned
to hijacking foreign vessels out of desperation and the due to the fact that new targets began to
appear along with the inflow of relief aid being transported by ships (Beloff, 2013; Arky, 2010).
By 2005 Somali’s unemployment rate was nearly 50% and roughly 2,500 Somali fishermen,
lacking a means of survival found that they could apply their skills and knowledge of the sea
towards piracy — a developing growth industry with unlimited potential compared to

15. 13
subsistence fishing for limited stocks (Arky, 2010). With the influx of former fishermen and the
increasing organization and sophistication of pirate groups under the leadership of regional
warlords who developed a sustainable business model for attacks at sea, piracy would continue
to increase until reaching its maximum around 2011.
Responses to the Threat of Somali Piracy
IMO and United Nations Resolutions
Maritime piracy is a highly complex issue due to numerous lines of interaction between
various state interests, national laws, and international conventions. As addressed earlier, piracy
is limited by a narrow definition restricting piracy to actions on the high seas that include illegal
acts of violence, detention, or depredation committed against another vessel voluntarily for
private ends by private individuals. Since the deterioration of Somali rule of law and the
occurrence of intensified acts of violence against vessels both within the territorial seas of the
state and in extraterritorial waters, the international community has sought to address the issue of
maritime piracy through the use of several mechanisms with mixed results.
Within the framework of the United Nations, the IMO has attempted to highlight the
threats of modern piracy off the coast of Somalia by addressing both the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) and what is now the Federal Republic of Somalia (Onuoha, 2009). The issue of
Somali piracy was brought to the UNSC in 2005 with the IMO and United Nation’s World Food
Programme (WFP) issuing a joint letter in 2007 which expressed “grave concern over the
degrading maritime security situation along the Somali coast” and called on the “UN to act to
prevent and suppress acts of piracy in the region” (Onuoha, 2009, p39). The IMO also released
Resolution A1002/25 in 2007 which requested that the then Transitional Federal Government

16. 14
(TFG) of Somalia take action to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships that
originate within their territorial waters in addition to advising the UNSC on the IMO council’s
recommendations to provide foreign warships and aircraft to combat piracy in the region
(Onuoha, 2009).
The actions taken by the IMO regarding piracy in Somali at this point in time remained,
for the most part, relegated towards agenda setting activities and lacked any significant or
functional resolutions. The inability of the Somali State to enforce national jurisdiction and
sovereignty over the territorial seas persisted and due to the lack of enforcement capabilities,
Somali pirates were able to operate from the coast with impunity as the state had no mechanism
in place to either apprehend or prosecute criminal actions occurring at sea (Hanson, 2010). This
presented significant challenges to foreign states who were conducting anti-piracy patrols along
trade routes in the Gulf of Aden, prompting the UNSC to adopt several resolutions; including
Resolution 1816 and Resolution 1851.
Resolution 1816 was adopted in June, 2008 and pertained to combating acts of piracy and
armed robbery off the Somali coast (Tanaka, 2012). Resolution 1816 was adopted with the
consent of the TFG, to authorize foreign naval vessels to enter the territorial seas of Somalia for
the purposes of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery through all necessary means, in a
manner consistent with international law under UNCLOS articles 105 and 107 (Weir, 2009;
Sterio, 2009). Effectively, Resolution 1816 made international laws pertaining to piracy
applicable within the territorial waters of Somali, permitting foreign vessels to pursue pirates
from the high seas into national waters (Sterio, 2009). While this resolution was aimed at
preventing piracy in the region, it did not address the underlying causes of the issue.
Additionally, pirate organizations simply adjusted their tactics and began attacking vessels

17. 15
farther from shore increasing the size of the area that would need to be patrolled by naval forces
(Fouche, 2009).
Resolution 1851 was adopted by the UNSC in December, 2008 and gave states and
regional organizations participating in the effort to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery the
authority to take “all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purpose of
suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea” (Sterio, 2009, p1473; Tanaka, 2012). The
operational use of the phrase in Somalia extended the geographical scope of the right to hot
pursuit of pirates and criminals from the water onto the land itself (Sterio, 2009). This resolution
effectively increased the ability of nations to combat piracy by extending their authority to the
internal territories of Somalia and allowing for the pursuit of pirates within their operational
bases ashore - eliminating all safe haven. While this resolution made great strides towards
combating maritime piracy by extending the reach of international maritime authority, it is
important to note that no state has yet to make effective use of the actions authorized by this
resolution. It is also important to note that Resolution 1851, as well as Resolution 1816, are
limited in scope with regard to combating piracy on a global scale as they only apply to Somalia,
that they were not intended to establish customary law, they require the consent of the Somali
government for all actions, and they apply only to nations currently patrolling the Gulf of Aden
(Sterio, 2009).
In January, 2009 the IMO organized a meeting of 17 states in Djibouti, Africa to discuss
matters of state cooperation in dealing with the interdiction and seizure of suspected pirate
vessels as well the rescuing of vessels, persons, property, and cargoes that have been subjected to
acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea (Fouche, 2009). Those states in attendance included
representatives from Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, France, Jordan, Kenya,

18. 16
Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia,
South Africa, Sudan, the UAE, Tanzania, Yemen, and several other IMO member states
(Onuoha, 2009). On 29 January 2009, the meeting adopted a code of conduct (the Djibouti Code
of Conduct or DCoC) meant to deal with the prevention of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the
western Indian Ocean (Onuoha, 2009). Of the 17 principle states in attendance, only nine
regional countries have signed the DCoC with consideration for the other 12 nations to sign
remaining open (Fouche, 2009). Under the DCoC, signatory states are to conduct a review of
existing national legislation with an emphasis on ensuring that there are laws established to
criminalize acts of piracy and armed robbery in such a way that is relatable to international
standards regarding the investigation and prosecution such acts (Fouche, 2009). The DCoC is a
step forward in establishing more coherent lines of cooperation between nations. However, the
capacity of African states, even working in a cooperative manner, is still limited concerning their
ability to enforce established laws over the entirety of the African coast, territorial seas, and
Exclusive Economic Zones (Fouche, 2009). Further multilateral cooperation agreements among
the members of the international community would be required to produce a concrete
infrastructure (eg. coordinated patrols, information and intelligence exchange, common
prosecution frameworks) for dealing with maritime piracy (Fouche, 2009).
Intervention by Foreign Naval Forces
The majority of international efforts in combating the threat of piracy off the Horn of
Africa have primarily focused on the provision of naval forces to deter, detect, and interdict
pirate activity in the region. Intervention by foreign navies is the result of mixed national and
international interest concerning individual state priorities and global maritime trade and security

19. 17
(Onuoha, 2009). European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR) and Combined Task
Force 150 (a multi-national counter terrorism operation) were patrolling the Gulf of Aden, the
Gulf of Oman, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean by the end of 2008. By January, 2009 around
thirty warships representing over 13 nations, NATO, and the EU were deployed to the Gulf of
Aden patrolling an area of around 2.5 million square miles within the US Naval Central
Command’s Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) (Hanson, 2010; Onuoha, 2009). During this
time, Close Support Protection Systems conducted by the French navy and a European Union
operation (ATLANTA) were initiated and involved escorting convoys of merchant ships through
transit corridors established by the UKMTO and MSCHOA (Hanson, 2010).
The success of naval forces and their operations in the Gulf of Aden remains unclear.
While it may seem that pirates are finding it more difficult to target vessels within the protected
region as shown by a reduced number of attacks, the occurrence of successful attacks has in fact
increased with the presence of naval forces until very recently (Hanson, 2010). International
naval forces have been unable to prevent all hijackings due to the expansive area that they must
cover, which makes the mission of patrolling against pirate attacks nearly impossible (Arky,
2010). In addition, it will become difficult for nations to justify a naval presence in the area at
times when no pirate activity is occurring, due to the expensive nature of continued naval
operations which the US Government Accountability Office reported in 2010 as being around
US$ 1.3 billion dollars per year3
, excluding administrative budgets and the individual
expenditures of participating nations (Bowden, 2010). Piratical actions are likely to increase as
naval forces withdraw from the area, especially if the socio-economic stability of the Somali
State remains unresolved (Hanson, 2010).
3
The GAO reported an estimated daily cost of US $82,794 per vessel, with roughly 43 vessels operating in the
region 365 days per year (Bowden, 2010).

20. 18
Shipboard Deterrence Measures and Private Security
One seemingly successful response mechanism to the threat of piracy against merchant
vessels has been the adoption of IMO guidance for Best Management Practices (BMP) for
Protection Against Somali Piracy and the incorporation of mandatory International Ship and Port
Facility Security Code (ISPS).
While compliance with the IMO’s BMP is entirely voluntary for merchant vessels, the
majority of ships transiting through high-risk areas tend to follow at least some of the basic
deterrent measures outlined in the document which is designed to assist vessels in avoiding,
deterring, and delaying pirate attacks (BMP4, 2011). BMP provides suggested planning and
operational practices for ship operators and masters of ships that include risk assessments, the
registration of a vessel and any planned vessel movements with the MSCHOA prior to entering a
high-risk area, the daily reporting of a vessels position within high-risk areas, and
implementation of basic ship protection measures (BMP4, 2011). Basic ship protection measures
include such things as: enhanced watch keeping, anti-piracy watches, the provision of kevlar
jackets and helmets to essential crew, enhanced bridge protection, access control measures to the
bridge, accommodation, and machinery spaces, incorporation of physical barriers and alarms,
additional lighting, the use of a citadel, drills, and the practicing of evasive vessel maneuvers
(BMP4, 2011).
Several shipping companies have also opted to use embarked security teams (PCASP)
that consist of either armed or unarmed private security guards trained in anti-piracy tactics. The
use of armed guards aboard merchant ships has been a controversial topic, with proponents
arguing that the use of armed guards enhances a vessels security, while others argue that it may
increase hostilities and violence (Weir, 2009). There is concern about the use of armed security

21. 19
aboard ships and the implications associated with unregulated activities of anti-piracy measures
at sea. Private security companies aboard ships have a mixed record successful piracy deterrence,
despite several claims that no properly armed vessel has ever been successfully hijacked at sea
(Hanson, 2010).
Proposed Solutions and Recommendations
International solutions for addressing maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia have
tended to focus on increasing the safety of merchant vessels through the use of UNSC
resolutions, naval intervention forces, and the improvement of safety aboard ships that travel
through the designated high-risk areas (Campbell, 2008). However, these solutions do not
address the underlying factors which have historically driven Somali piracy from the start. The
issues at hand are of political failure and lack of effective governance, socio-economic turmoil,
and environmental degradation due to IUU fishing activity. The solutions to the problems
outlined in this case study should incorporate some form of the following recommendations that
involve addressing the problem of illegal fishing, increased nation state commitments, and
enhanced regional and international cooperation in efforts to develop commonly applicable laws
and statutes of enforcement regarding piracy and armed robbery at sea.
Addressing IUU Fishing Activities in Somalia
Controlling illegal (IUU) fishing activities in Somali waters would be an important step
towards the restoration of the peace, security, and the stability of the state. As discussed
perviously, many Somali pirates are former fishermen who resorted to piracy as a means of
survival after the collapse of the national economy in 1991, the continued destruction of a viable

22. 20
fishery by foreign fishing fleets, and the disastrous effects of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.
Removing the issue of IUU fishing from Somali waters would not only help to improve the
costal economy of the state by providing access to living marine resources and by restoring
artisanal fishing, but also because it would undermine the claims of legitimacy to those engaged
in the pirate trade for the purpose of preventing illegal fishing activity (Schofield, 2009).
The solutions to eliminate illegal fishing activities often follow increased governance
capabilities of the state and the establishment of a stable system of law in addition to
coordination between regional management authorities that are able to provide controls on
activities through monitoring and enforcement efforts aimed at reducing the economic incentives
for IUU fishing activities (Agnew et al., 2009). This may be possible in Somali due to the
formation of the new Federal Government of Somali on August 20, 2012, which has provided
some semblance of governance in the region. Under the newly established federal government,
present models of fisheries management could be implemented and improved upon to provide
certain levels of security against illegal fishing and other maritime based crime. Since the
occurrence of maritime piracy has been reduced and has seemingly diminished in recent years,
there may be an opportunity to resolve any ambiguity pertaining to the control of Somali
maritime resources through increased levels of local involvement and the creation of an effective
body for the issuance of licenses, registrations, and for the provision of local monitoring and
enforcement efforts. The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency could be one such model, as the
members of this organization have been able to provide a decent framework for enforcement
collaboration between several states (Weir, 2009). The Regional Commission for Fisheries, an
association of Middle Eastern states, has outlined development, conservation, and management
frameworks that could potentially provide another model for a Somali fisheries management

23. 21
organization that emphasizes central control and state sovereignty over marine resources (Weir,
2009).
Commitment by the State of Somalia & Regional and International Cooperation
Since the majority of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden have originated from the Somali
coast, there is a need for the Somali State to make a significant commitment to the elimination of
piracy from within its borders and territorial seas. The emergence of the Federal Government of
Somali and the current levels of support from the international community may provide the state
the opportunity to reform its national rule of law and in doing so, include criminal statutes
regarding acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea (Sterio, 2009). At this time, the government of
Somalia would be able to prevent the safe harbor of pirates and criminals by leveraging
international assistance under UNSC resolutions 1816 and 1851 while bolstering internal law
enforcement efforts to patrol the territorial seas under national jurisdiction and sovereignty.
While the State still has the assistance of the international community under the UNSC
resolutions, it is critical that a Somali Coast Guard is established under an effective maritime
authority within the central government. Until such a time where the state is able to accomplish
this, an interim coast guard should be established by the international community under an
organization such as the United Nations or the African Union (Hanson, 2010). In addition to the
formation of a Somali Coastguard, international support for the establishment and financing of
an effective, well managed, and strategically located internal police force would prove to be a
cost-effective strategy for preventing piracy by addressing the issue before suspected pirates are
able to reach the shoreline. The long term security of the Somali coastline and the suppression of

24. 22
piracy in the region will ultimately require that the state makes a sizable commitment in taking
responsibility for its own enforcement activities.
Regional cooperation will be essential for the future security of Somalia as well. Regional
governments must begin to take responsibility for local issues and provide support for each other
(Reisman and Tennis, 2009). The state of Kenya in particular has suggested that it would be
willing to act as a partner in the fight against maritime piracy by opening its legal system to the
prosecution of piratical acts that occur within the Gulf of Aden (Sterio, 2009). Additionally,
regional maritime states could work together on anti-piracy efforts by honoring commitments
made in the DCoC (ie. regional anti-piracy patrols and the sharing of intelligence through
counter piracy coordination centers) in addition to following the model of the 2006 Regional
Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (ReCAAP) in
which 16 SE Asian nations established a system for the coordination of anti-piracy efforts
(Reisman and Tennis, 2009).
On the international level, cooperation is required to develop commonly applicable laws
and enforcement standards regarding maritime piracy. Individual nations should commit to a
review of national legislation and if not present, statutes on the criminalization of piracy should
be created that are in line with international law. A common system for piracy trials should also
be developed (such as an amended ICC or under the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea (ITLOS)) in which regional tribunals could give way to a singular system in which all cases
of piracy are tried under consistent standards and interpretations of the law — piracy after all is
universal crime and an offense against the law of all nations.

25. 23
Appendix I: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations
BMP: Best Management Practices
DCoC: Djibouti Code of Conduct
EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone
EU: European Union
EU NAVFOR: European Union Naval Force Somalia
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization
ICC: International Criminal Court
IMB: International Maritime Bureau
IMBPRC: International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Center
IMO: International Maritime Organization
ISPS: International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
ITLOS: International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
IUU: Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated fishing activities
MSCHOA: Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa
MSPA: Maritime Security Patrol Area
M/V: Motor Vessel
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ONI: Office of Naval Intelligence (US)
PCASP Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
ReCAAP: Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships
TFG: Transitional Federal Government
UKMTO: United Kingdom Marine Trade Operations
UN: United Nations
UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law Of the Seas
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
UNSOM: United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia

26. 24
Appendix II: Map of Somalia and Surrounding Area

27. 25
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