OFZO .docx

OFZO
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
Objectives
Mission Statement
Vision Statement
Keys to Success
II. Description of Business
Company Ownership/Legal Entity
Location
Hours of Operation

Suppliers
Manufacturing
Management
III. Financial Management
Year 1
Income Statement
Sales
Balance Sheet
Cash flow
Year 2
Income Statement
Sales
Cash flow
Revenue year 1
Revenue year 2
IV. Marketing
Market Analysis
Market Segmentation

Pricing
OFZO
V. Appendix
Milestones
Miscellaneous Documents
OFZO
Executive Summary LINDSAY
Objectives
Our main objective would be to expand to the majority of
nightlife goers in a short period of time. We want our
application to be the number one in the party industry. We will
start focusing on Brussels, if that works out we
want to expand to Antwerp. Our main goal would be to cover a
great part of the market in Europe and be the
leading party application. We estimate that this would take us 5
years.
Mission Statement

‘’We want to take partying to another level by giving our
customers exactly what they want, every evening.’’
Vision Statement
‘’To be the number one party app for students international or
worldwide.’’
Keys to Success
Our application will entertain the party people. We will make
sure there is no disappointment in a night out
because our consumers can filter their preferences, every night
again.
We want our application to go viral. It is not meant to be for
one individual. If the usage of the app is widely
distributed, it will be more fun. In general, if your friends use
an application, you will be more likely to install it as
well and share your thoughts and opinion about it.
As we will explain in our financial plan, we focus on IOS for
the first 2 years. In our third year we want to expand
our application for Android users. We want to give everybody
the same opportunity to use our party application,
but as we are a start-up, we must see that it will work out with
IOS first. Android is a fast growing platform as well.
For sure we will include Android in our roadmap later on.

Furthermore, we are taking into account that is better to focus
on smaller markets first. That is the reason why we
are starting with the nightlife in Brussels first. If that works out
well, we will expand our focus towards Antwerp.
The 3 of us are no experts if it comes to the mobile traffic. This
is why we hire a freelancer who creates the
application. This includes the app icon, the visuals and the
design. He will do this the first 3 months. If we are ready
to expand to other cities like , we will need him again to adapt
our application to those other cities.
When it comes to marketing, we will a CPI - Cost Antwerp Per
Install of 0.47 cents (25 000/52 500). These numbers
are later explained in our financial plan.
One of our biggest advantages is that the use of our application
will be free. There is no downloading cost.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/avidlarizadeh/2013/07/19/eight-
tips-for-a-successful-
app/2/#167880c67e7f
tips-for-a-successful-app/2/#167880c67e7f
tips-for-a-successful-app/2/#167880c67e7f
OFZO

Description of Business
Our business is designed for the nightlife based in Brussels. We
will create an application that will help youngsters
to have a night of their preference. The application will provide
all the information about every club. This means;
prices, music, locations and promotions. Our nightlife
application will use a filter. By filling in your preferences for
that night, the application will search for the most suitable club
or party at that evening.
Company Ownership/Legal Entity
OfZo is a Limited liability company The 3 of us have each
33,33% of the company, because we invest 55150 euros
so each of us invest 18 383,33 euros. The 3 of us are also the 3
members in the board of directors of the company.
Location
The official address of our business is located at Boulevard de
waterloo 54. We chose this location because it lies in
the center of the city. Boulevard de waterloo is one of the
bigger streets in Brussels. You will find the Porte de
Namur metro station and Stefanie additionally where many
offices of companies are located. In our office we will
receive our hotline calls and emails that consumers sent us. It is
not a location where you can go to when you have

questions. In case of questions you are able to use the hotline or
our email address.
OFZO
Hours of Operation
We each work 8 hours per week, which makes 24 hours per
week in total.. Additionally, we have a hotline for
people to call if they have a problem what’s or ever. They can
always call us on that number. We will always help
them and answer their questions.
Suppliers
We have suppliers for the event tickets we sell on the app.
Those suppliers are the clubs, which have events for
which we sell their tickets on our app, and for every ticket sold
we get a 3% commission.
Manufacturing
So we only manufacture 1 app the first year. The app we
manufacture will be on IOS software. After 2 years we will
reinvest and use our previous profits to invest in the same app
but also for the Android software. We use a

freelancer to make the app. He will make all the technical stuff
like the app design, the filters, putting it on the app
store, doing the analysis, development, testing, and launch of
the app. We pay him 50 euros per hour and for 9
hours a day 450 euros. It will take him 3 months to make the
app and launch it. And after that we are established
in Brussels and want to expand in other cities and Europe we
will need the freelancer we used before to update
the app.
Management
will be the COO of the company OfZo.
As mentioned before, our team is not specialized in creating
applications or in exploring the mobile traffic. In order
to launch our application successfully, we will hire a freelancer.
Financial Management
Our start-up costs (Registration cost, Spanish taxes ID cost,
Notary cost) are 2500 euros. It is a limited liability
company so that is what we have to pay for the notary costs.
We first are only going to launch it on IOS and want to launch
it on android 2 years later.
The total cost of the making the app is 30150 euros. We use a
freelancer to make the app. It takes around 3

months for the freelancer to make it and we pay him 50 € an
hour so 450 € for a day. So he works on it for 9 hours
a day. For the price he does the analysis, development, testing
and launch of the app. Our app is a medium app.
Some of the characteristics of the app is we have an
email/password sign up, the design for the app is a normal
one easy to navigate it has a searching element, a calendar, an
app icon design and in app purchase. Our app is a
more a sort of in technical terms a database, API app.
· So the email/password sign up is for the regular users and
also for our customers who want the newsletter
of every week with the events and parties there are in Barcelona
that week.
· We took a normal design for the app, so it is easy to use
for our customers.
OFZO
· It has a searching element, so you can put some filters to
find the perfect part for you and your friends.
Some of the filters are: age, dates (that is why we need the
calendar), what kind of music genre it is, you can
also choose the clubs you like. It also gives a little information
about the clubs when you click on one. The

information will be of what events they have in the further,
what music they normally put on, how much an
average night costs and where it is in Barcelona.
· The app icon design is just because you need one if you
want people download your app.
· And in app purchase because we sell tickets on it for
events and get a 3% commission on every ticket we
sell.
We depreciate the app on 5 years, so that makes 6030 euros for
every year we depreciate it.
The total of the app cost is 30150 euros. It takes 3 months for
the freelancer to make it and do everything. So all
the element we pay for are for the size of the app we pay 13500
euros, for the view of the app we pay 6750 euros,
for the email/Password sign up we pay 450 euros, for the
searching element we pay 1350 euros, for the app icon
design we pay 3150 euros, for the filters and calendar we pay
2700 euros and for the in app purchase we pay 2250
euros.
We put 25000 euros for marketing in the first year. In the first
year we will put a lot in marketing because it’s the
beginning and because the second year we are already set up
and are doing everything for word to mouth. So that

people tell and tell each other about our app. But we will also
still continue with the classic marketing strategies.
So we target around 150000 people to download and use our app
so that is around 10% pf the population of
Barcelona. We expect that 35% will download it the first year
which makes 52500 and expect that 35000 of them
will use it on a regular basis. The second year we expect to have
75000 download and 50000 regular users. Our
first revenue is the one on the download of the app. We
calculated that for 52500 download that revenue would
be 5200 euros. Which is around 9 cents per download. Our
second revenue is than on the average users per day
(on excel) with how many minutes they are on the app (around 2
minutes), with the average ad impressions per
minutes (2), the average ad network fill rate (80%). Which is all
calculated in excel. But if we would take it for 500
daily users that would be a daily revenue of 32€. And our third
revenue is on selling tickets for events and take a
commission of 3%.
Our CPI (cost per install) for our first year is around 0,47. That
is calculated by (Marketing/Total installs), so
25000/52500.

OFZO
Market Analysis
Demographics
Brussels is the capital of Belgium. It’s the largest city in
Belgium. Brussels counted an estimated population of 2,1
million in 2019. These numbers are based on residents in
administrative limits.
Brussels is a city that has a lot to offer. What we mean is that it
is one of the leading cities when it comes to
culture, sports, economics, tourism, arts, science, fashion and
the commerce center. According to the World
Population Review of 2019, Brussels is one of the most
economically powerful city based on their GDP in the
European Union.
Brussels is home to many immigrants with approximately 70%
of people of foreign origin, Approximately 32%,
Brussels has a population growth of 0.78% each year.
http://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/barcelona-
population/

Nightlife in Brussels
One of the things that is known for the party culture in Brussels
is that the nightlife does not end until after the sun
has come up. How does a night out look like in Brussels?
The most traditional way to start an evening out, is to have
dinner first. Most people go out for dinner between
7pm to 9pm. After that, going to a music bar and have some
alcoholic drinks is very common. When the clubs
open, around 12.00 at night, you are able to go. Most of the
party people will have pre-drinks until 1AM and than
leave to the party. As said before, the party does not end until
the sun comes up. Most of the clubs in Brussels
close at 6am.
Brussels offers a great variety of music styles. One way to
enjoy nightlife would be by dancing to the latest techno
sounds. Nowadays, the nightclubs in Brussels are famous for
their electronic music. The city receives many top DJ’s
from all over the world. Depending on what type of music you
want to listen will also determined the location for
example if you want hard techno you will most likely end up at
the fuse which is located not far from port de Hal. If
you want some commercial you would go to jeux d’hiver which
is located at the end of the avenue Louis.

Trends
https://www.thespiritsbusiness.com/2017/04/top-five-global-
nightlife-trends/6/
According to The Spirit Business, the clubbing landscape has
undergone a huge transformation. The sticky floors,
cheap tonic and velour seating have made a decrease.
Fortunately, people are not drinking less.
http://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/barcelona-
population/
OFZO
One of the major changes is the upcoming cocktail industry.
This has influenced the way consumers enjoy alcoholic
drinks. Also experienced drinkers place quality above
everything else. Cocktail bars have grown over the past years
because people enjoy the music with a free entrance.
Additionally you get great service and nice cocktails.
Lately it is very important in the party industry to promote
simplified cocktails to stay unique as a club. You must
create an experience. Promoting cocktails will make the choice
easier for the consumer, also the bartender has the
opportunity to create a high-quality drink quicker.
This does not mean that the clubbing experience is shrinking.

People still want a bottle brought to their table, and
all the drama that belongs to that part of clubbing.
People always seek for more. They are demanding more quality,
better service and increasing entertainment. The
key is to build a strong business in the current clubbing
industry.
Competitive Industry
Many industries and companies are using mobile applications to
promote themselves. In our industry we do have
competitors. Our competitors are have to same purpose as we
have which is; inform our consumers about the
parties that night. Nevertheless, our competitive advantage is,
that we can use filters that are able to filter all you
different preferences related to price, music, style, people, age
and many more.
Target Market
We are creating an application for the nightlife in Brussels. This
already states that we are focusing on the people
who want to party. Students and young adults will be our target
market.
The age range of our target group will be 18 until 26 years old.
We will be focusing on both men and women. Most

of the time these youngsters are independent, not married. A
greater amount of the students will receive an
income from their parents. It might either be students who are
doing Erasmus or students who study for their
Bachelor in Brussels. That is going to be our focus, mainly in
the winter periods. On the other hand we have tourist
season as well in Brussels. With tourist season we mean the
months May, June, July, August and a part of
September. In this time of the year we will focus on our
tourists, who are willing to spend more as they are on a
holiday and want to party.
We will have to invest in advertising in order to make people
aware of our application. By asking clubs to hang up
posters of our application, we will be able to reach the target
market in which we are operating.
We as a company can make it more attractive to go out if you
are able to filter the way you want to party. If there
is an opportunity to party with the right music, the right people
in the right club and at the right location by using
an app, you might be more willing to go out. Purchasing habits
of young adult might increase.
OFZO

Future plans could be to focus on events, not only for
youngsters but also adults. For example you filter, rooftop -
fancy - middle age, and then find the party. Using this strategy,
we can expand our business idea.
We will always adapt towards the demand in the market. We are
youngsters ourselves so we are able to know
when the market changes.
The motivation behind this demographical chosen target market,
is that we have a quite specific target market. We
are focusing on people who want to party because we are
creating an app focused on the clubs in Barcelona.
Market Segmentation
We are targeting people between 18 and 26 years old. This is a
6-year age difference. We are able to segment the
market in three different groups; 18 -20 years, 21 – 23 years, 24
– 26 years old. Age differences will change
preferences as well. Our application is able to filter those
preferences in order to make sure that every segment in
our target market will be satisfied. The segment that will benefit
most of our party application will be the people
from 21 to 23 years old because they are the biggest percentage
of the market.

OFZO
Pricing
We don’t have a price, our app is free. It is free in order that we
can get more people to download it. But we have
prices on the tickets we sell on our app. be the price is decided
by the club who sells them and we get 3% on each
ticket sold.
Advertising and Promotion
Our budget for the Marketing Plan is 25 000 euros. With this
amount of money we will invest in advertisements
and promotions.
Advertising is related to your target market. As we are focusing
most on students, young adults, we are more likely
to reach them through social media platforms.
Our way to promote our application via social media would be
the organic promotion. Organic promotion means
having a presence. This can be a Facebook page, a Twitter
account or an Instagram profile. We will create these
accounts in order to be able to follow the people within our

target market. Trying to connect with our audience is
one of the key aspects to get their attention. Be posting relevant
information we will increase followers.
Because of their broad audiences and ability to segment,
Facebook and Instagram are very effective advertisement
platforms for mobile apps. And since Facebook owns Instagram,
they make it incredibly easy to places app install
ads on both.
Furthermore, there are many celebrities and influencers on
social media platforms that suit our target market.
Reaching those people would be a great boost for our brand
awareness. They will post something about OfZo (our
party application) and reach a very widely spread amount of
followers who will get aware of our application. Many
of their followers are inspired by that post and will download
OfZo.
Another way we will promote our app is through traditional
advertising. This means promoting in-stores. The most
effective places to hang up our flyer, would be the clubs that we
are selling the tickets for. Also places that our
target audience comes a lot.
As we mentioned before, we will spend 8 hours a week on our
application ourselves. This means we will spend an

hour a day on updating our Facebook, Instagram and Twitter
accounts.
http://info.localytics.com/blog/8-ways-to-promote-your-app
OFZO
Appendix
Milestones
After 2 years we want to have the app also on the Android
software. After 3 years we want to expand to Madrid
and after 5 years we want to be in at least 5 major cities in
europe and employe a couple of people to help us. And
after that we want to be the first app students use in major cities
we are in when they are going to a party or to
look for information.

OFZO
Here you will find the resumes of Lavinia, Arthur and Lindsay.
Savyapps, last visited January 7 2018,
https://savvyapps.com/blog/how-do-free-apps-make-money
bplans, last visited January 7 2018,
https://articles.bplans.com/the-key-elements-of-the-financial-
plan/
thebalance, last visited January 7 2018,
https://www.thebalance.com/writing-the-business-plan-section-
8-
2947026
smallbusiness, last visited January 7 2018,
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/sell-mobile-advertising-space-
41704.html
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/calculate-cpm-787.html

businessofapps, last visited January 7 2018
http://www.businessofapps.com/guide/cost-per-install/
lequidy, last visited January 7 2018,
https://www.lequidy.com/incorporate-in-spain/
ryanmorel, last visited January 7 2018, http://ryanmorel.com
ryanmorel, last visited January 7 2018,
http://ryanmorel.com/mobile-advertising-calculator/
reviveconsultant, last visited January 7 2018,
http://www.reviveconsultant.com/articles/what-is-ecpm-and-
how-is-
it-calculated/
desginertoolbox,last visited January 7 2018,
http://designerstoolbox.com/designresources/banners/
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/list-advertising-expense-
classified-
balance-sheet-19257.html
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/calculate-mobile-ad-revenue-
74440.html

plan/
plan/
8-2947026
8-2947026
41704.html
41704.html
http://ryanmorel.com/
http://ryanmorel.com/
how-is-it-calculated/
how-is-it-calculated/
classified-balance-sheet-19257.html
classified-balance-sheet-19257.html
74440.html
74440.htmlExecutive Summary LINDSAYObjectivesMission

StatementVision StatementKeys to SuccessDescription of
BusinessCompany Ownership/Legal EntityLocationHours of
OperationSuppliersManufacturingManagementFinancial
ManagementMarket AnalysisMarket
SegmentationPricingAdvertising and
PromotionAppendixMilestones

Chapter 10
The Nature of Mental States
Hilary Putnam

The typical concerns of the Philosopher of Mind might be
represented by three questions
: (1) How do we know that other people have pains? (2) Are
pains brain states?
(3) What is the analysis of the concept pain? I do not wish to
discuss questions (1) and
(3) in this chapter. I shall say something about question (2).
Identity Questions
is pain a brain stater (Or, is the property of having a pain at
time t a brain stater)
! It is
impossible to discuss this question sensibly without saying
something about the peculiar
rules which have grown up in the course of the development of
'
analytical philoso-
phy
'- rules which, far from leading to an end to all conceptual
confusions, themselves
represent considerable conceptual confusion. These rules- which
are, of course, implicit
rather than explicit in the practice of most analytical
philosophers- are (1) that a
statement of the form ' being A is being B
'
(e.g., ' being in pain is being in a certain brain

state') can be corred only if it follows, in some sense, from the
meaning of the terms
A and B; and (2) that a statement of the form ' being A is being
B can be philosophically
infonnatit1e only if it is in some sense reductive (e.g., ' being in
pain is having a certain
unpleasant sensation
' is not philosophically informative; ' being in pain is having a
certain behavior disposition
' is, if true, philosophically informative). These rules are
excellent rules if we still believe that the program of reductive
analysis (in the style of
the 1930s) can be carried out; if we don
't, then they turn analytical philosophy into
a mug
's game, at least so far as
'is' questions are concerned.
In this paper I shall use the term
'
property
' as a blanket term for such things as being
in pain, being in a particular brain state, having a particular
behavior disposition, and
also for magnitudes such as temperature, etc.- i.e., for things
which can naturally be
represented by one- or-more-place predicates or functors. I shall
use the term
'
concept

'
for things which can be identified with synonymy-classes of
expressions. Thus the
concept temperature can be identified a maintain) with the
synonymy-class of the word'
temperature
'.2 (This is like saying that the number 2 can be identified with
the class of
all pairs. This is quite a different statement from the peculiar
statement that 2 is the class
of all pairs. I do not maintain that concepts are synonymy-
classes, whatever that might
mean, but that they can be identified with synonymy-classes, for
the purpose of formal-
ization of the relevant discourse.)
The question What is the concept temperaturer is a very
'
funny
' one. One might take
it to mean What is temperature? Please take my question as a
conceptual one.
' In that
case an answer might be (pretend for a moment ' heat
' and 'temperature
' are synonyms)'
temperature is heat
'

, or even
'the concept of temperature is the same concept as the
concept of heat
'. Or one might take it to mean What are concepf$, really? For
example,
what is "the concept of temperature
'7 In that case heaven knows what an 'answer'
�
52 Hilary Putnam
would be. ( perhaps it would be the statement that concepts can
be identified with
synonymy-c Iasses.)
Of course, the question What is the property temperaturef is
also
'
funny
'. And one
way of interpreting it is to take it as a question about the
concept of temperature. But
this is not the way a physicist would take it .
The effect of saying that the property PI can be identical with
the property P2 only if
the terms PI, P2 are in some suitable sense
'

synonyms
' is, to all intents and purposes,
to collapse the two notions of
'
property
' and 'concept
'
into a single notion. The view
that concepts (intensions) are the same as properties has been
explicitly advocated by
Camap (e.g., in Meaning and Necessity). This seems an
unfortunate view, since
'
temperature
is mean molecular kinetic energy
'
appears to be a perfectly good example of a true
statement of identity of properties, whereas
'the concept of temperature is the same
concept as a concept of mean molecular kinetic energy
' is simply false.
Many philosophers believe that the statement
'
pain is a brain state
' violates some
rules or norms of English. But the arguments offered are hardly

convincing. For example
, if the fact that I can know that I am in pain without knowing
that I am in brain state
S shows that pain cannot be brain state S, then, by exactly the
same argument, the fact
that I can know that the stove is hot without knowing that the
mean molecular kinetic
energy is high (or even that molecules exist) shows that it is
false that temperature is
mean molecular kinetic energy, physics to the contrary. In fact,
all that immediately
follows from the fact that I can know that I am in pain without
knowing that I am in
brain state S is that the concept of pain is not the same concept
as the concept of being
in brain state S. But either p~ or the state of being in p~ or
some p~ or some pain
state, might still be brain state S. After all, the concept of
temperature is not the same
concept as the concept of mean molecular kinetic energy. But
temperature is mean
molecular kinetic energy.
Some philosophers maintain that both
'
pain is a brain state
' and 'pain states are brain
states' are unintelligible. The answer is to explain to these
philosophers, as well as we
can, given the vagueness of all scientific methodology, what
sorts of considerations
lead one to make an empirical reduction (i.e., to say such things
as

'water is H2O
'
, 'light
is electromagnetic radiation
'
,
'
temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy
'
). If, without
giving reasons, he still maintains in the face of such examples
that one cannot
imagine parallel circumstances for the use of
'
pains are brain states
'
(or, perhaps,
'
pain
states are brain states'), one has grounds to regard him as
perverse.
Some philosophers maintain that
'
PI is P2
' is something that can be true, when the'is' involved is the 'is'
of empirical reduction, only when the properties PI and P 2 are

(a) associated with a spatio- temporal region; and (b) the region
is one and the same in
both cases. Thus 'temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy
' is an admissible empirical
reduction, since the temperature and the molecular energy are
associated with the
same space-time region, but ' having a pain in my arm is being
in a brain state
' is not,
since the spatial regions involved are different.
This argument does not appear very strong. Surely no one is
going to be deterred
from saying that mirror images are light reflected from an
object and then from the
surface of a mirror by the fact that an image can be 1ocated
' three feet behind the
mirror! ( Moreover, one can always Bnd some common property
of the reductions one is
willing to allow- e.g., temperature is mean molecular kinetic
energy- which is not
a property of some one identification one wishes to disallow.
This is not very impressive
unless one has an argument to show that the very purposes of
such identification
depend upon the common property in question.)
Again , other philosophers have contended that all the
predictions that can be derived

&om the conjunction of neurophysiological laws with such
statements as
'
pain
states are such-and-such brain states
'
can equally well be derived &om the conjunction
of the same neurophysiological laws with ' being in pain is
correlated with such
-and-
such brain states
'
, and hence (sic!) there can be no methodological grounds for
saying
that pains (or pain states) are brain states, as opposed to saying
that they are correlated
(invariantly ) with brain states. This argument , too , would
show that light is only correlated
with electromagnetic radiation . The mistake is in ignoring the
fact that , although
the theories in question may indeed lead to the same predictions
, they open and
exclude different questions.
'
Ught is invariantly correlated with electromagnetic radia
-

tion
'
would leave open the questions What is the light then, if it isn
'
t the same as the
electromagnetic radiationr and What makes the light accompany
the electromagnetic
radiation ?
' -
questions which are excluded by saying that the light is the
electromagnetic
radiation . Similarly , the purpose of saying that pains are brain
states is precisely to
exclude from empirical meaningfulness the questions What is
the pain, then, if it isn
'
t
the same as the brain stater and What makes the pain
accompany the brain state?
'
If
there are grounds to suggest that these questions represent, so to
speak, the wrong way
to look at the matter , then those grounds are grounds for a
theoretical identification of
pains with brain states.
If all arguments to the contrary are unconvincing , shall we then
conclude that it is

meaningful (and perhaps true ) to say either that pains are brain
states or that pain states
are brain states?
1. It is perfectly meaningful (violates no
'
rule of English
'
, involves no
'
extension
of usage
'
) to say
'
'
.
2. It is not meaningful (involves a
'
changing of meaning
'
or
'
an extension of
usage

'
, etc.) to say
'
'
.
My own position is not expressed by either 1 or 2. It seems to
me that the notions'
change of meaning
'
and
'
extension of usage
'
are simply so ill defined that one cannot in
fact say either 1 or 2. I see no reason to believe that either the
linguist , or the man-on -
the-street, or the philosopher possess es today a notion of
'
change of meaning
'
applicable
to such cases as the one we have been discussing. The job for
which the notion of
change of meaning was developed in the history of the language

was just a much cruder
job than this one.
But, if we don
'
t assert either 1 or 2- in other words , if we regard the
'
change of
meaning
'
issue as a pseudoissue in this case
- then how are we to discuss the question
with which we started?
'
Is pain a brain stater
The answer is to allow statements of the form
'
pain is A
'
, where
'
pain
'
and
'
A

'
are in
no sense synonyms , and to see whether any such statement can
be found which might
be acceptable on empirical and methodological grounds . This is
what we shall now
proceed to do .
Is Pain a Brain State?
We shall discuss is pain a brain stater then . And we have
agreed to waive the
'
change
of meaning
'
issue.
Since I am discussing not what the concept of pain comes to ,
but what pain is, in a
sense of
'
is
'
which requires empirical theory - construdion (or , at least,
empirical speculation
), I shall not apologize for advancing an empirical hypothesis .
Indeed, my strategy

The Nature of Mental States S3
S4 Hilary Putnam
will be to argue that pain is not a brain state, not on a priori
grounds, but on the
grounds that another hypothesis is more plausible. The detailed
development and
verification of my hypothesis would be just as Utopian a task as
the detailed development
and verification of the brain-state hypothesis. But the putting-
forward, not of
detailed and scientifically
'finished' hypotheses, but of schemata for hypotheses, has
long been a function of philosophy. I shall, in short, argue that
pain is not a brain
state, in the sense of a physical-chemical state of the brain (or
even the whole nervous
system), but another kind of state entirely. I propose the
hypothesis that pain, or the
state of being in pain, is a functional state of a whole organism.
To explain this it is necessary to introduce some technical
notions. In previous papers
I have explained the notion of a Turing Machine and discussed
the use of this notion
as a model for an organism. The notion of a Probabilistic
Automaton is de Aned similarly
to a Turing Machine, except that the transitions between
'states' are allowed to be
with various probabilities rather than being

'deterministic'. (Of course, a Turing
Machine is simply a special kind of Probabilistic Automaton,
one with transition prob-
abilities 0, 1). I shall assume the notion of a Probabilistic
Automaton has been generalized
to allow for 'sensory inputs
' and 'motor outputs
'- that is, the Machine Table
specifies, for every possible combination of a
'state' and a complete set of
'
sensory
inputs
'
, an
'instruction' which determines the probability of the next
'state', and also the
probabilities of the
'motor outputs
'. ( This replaces the idea of the Machine as printing
on a tape.) I shall also assume that the physical realization of
the sense organs responsible
for the various inputs, and of the motor organs, is specified, but
that the
'
states'

and the 'inputs
' themselves are, as usual, specified only
'
implicitly
'- i.e., by the set of
transition probabilities given by the Machine Table.
Since an empirically given system can simultaneously be a
'
physical realization
' of
many different Probabilistic Automata, I introduce the notion of
a Description of a
system. A Description of 5 where 5 is a system, is any true
statement to the effect that 5
possess es distinct states 51, 51, . . . ~ which are related to one
another and to the motor
outputs and sensory inputs by the transition probabilities given
in such-and-such a
Machine Table. The Machine Table mentioned in the
Description will then be called the
Functional Organization of 5 relative to that Description, and
the 5, such that 5 is in
state 5, at a given time will be called the Total State of 5 (at the
time) relative to
that Description. It should be noted that knowing the Total State
of a system relative to
a Description involves knowing a good deal about how the
system is likely to ' behave
'
,

given various combinations of sensory inputs, but does not
involve knowing the physical
realization of the 5, as, e.g., physical-chemical states of the
brain. The 5" to repeat,
are specified only implicitly by the Description- i.e., specified
only by the set of transition
probabilities given in the Machine Table.
The hypothesis that ' being in pain is a functional state of the
organism
'
may now be
spelled out more exactly as follows:
1. All organisms capable of feeling pain are Probabilistic
Automata.
2. Every organism capable of feeling pain possess es at least
one Description of a
certain kind (i.e., being capable of feeling pain is possessing an
appropriate kind
of Functional Organization).
3. No organism capable of feeling pain possess es a
decomposition into parts
which separately possess Descriptions of the kind referred to in
2.
4. For every Description of the kind referred to in 2, there exists
a subset of the
sensory inputs such that an organism with that Description is in
pain when and
only when some of its sensory inputs are in that subset.
This hypothesis is admittedly vague, though surely no vaguer

than the brain-state
hypothesis in its present form. For example, one would like to
know more about the
kind of Functional Organization that an organism must have to
be capable of feeling
pain, and more about the marks that distinguish the subset of
the sensory inputs
referred to in 4. With respect to the first question, one can
probably say that the
Functional Organization must include something that resembles
a
'
preference function
'
,
or at least a preference partial ordering and something that
resembles an
'inductive
logic
'
(i.e., the Machine must be able to 'learn from experience
'
). In addition, it seems
natural to require that the Machine possess
'
pain sensors
'
, i.e., sensory organs which

normally signal damage to the Machine
's body, or dangerous temperatures, pressures,
etc., which transmit a special subset of the inputs, the subset
referred to in 4. Finally, and
with respect to the second question, we would want to require at
least that the inputs in
the distinguished subset have a high disvalue on the Machine
's preference function or
ordering (further conditions are discussed in the previous
chapter). The purpose of
condition 3 is to rule out such 'organisms
'
(if they can count as such) as swarms of bees
as single pain-feelers. The condition 1 is, obviously, redundant,
and is only introduced
for expository reasons. (It is, in fact, empty, since everything is
a Probabilistic Automaton
under some Description.)
I contend, in passing, that this hypothesis, in spite of its
admitted vagueness, is far
less vague than the
'
physical-chemical state
'
hypothesis is today, and far more susceptible
to investigation of both a mathematical and an empirical kind.
Indeed, to investigate

this hypothesis is just to attempt to produce
'mechanical' models of organisms- and
isn't this, in a sense, just what psychology is about? The
difficult step, of course, will be
to pass from models of specific organisms to a nomull fonn for
the psychological description
of organisms- for this is what is required to make 2 and 4
precise. But this too
seems to be an inevitable part of the program of psychology.
I shall now compare the hypothesis just advanced with (a) the
hypothesis that pain is
a brain state, and (b) the hypothesis that pain is a behavior
disposition.
Functional State versus Brain State
It may, perhaps, be asked if I am not somewhat unfair in taking
the brain-state theorist
to be talking about physical-chemical states of the brain. But (a)
these are the only sorts
of states ever mentioned by brain-state theorists. (b) The brain-
state theorist usually
mentions (with a certain pride, slightly reminiscent of the
Village Atheist) the incompatibility
of his hypothesis with all forms of dualism and mentalism. This
is natural if
physical-chemical states of the brain are what is at issue.
However, functional states of
whole systems are something quite different. In particular, the
functional-state hypothesis
is not incompatible with dualism! Although it goes without

saying that the hypothesis
is 'mechanistic' in its inspiration, it is a slightly remarkable fact
that a system consisting
of a body and a
'soul', if such things there be, can perfectly well be a
Probabilistic
Automaton. (c) One argument advanced by Smart is that the
brain-state theory assumes
only
'
physical
'
properties, and Smart finds
'non-physical
'
properties unintelligible. The
Total States and the
'
inputs
' defined above are, of course, neither mental nor physical
per se, and I cannot imagine a functionalist advancing this
argumentd ) If the brain-state
theorist does mean (or at least allow) states other than physical-
chemical states, then his
hypothesis is completely empty, at least until he specifies what
sort of
'states' he does
mean.

Taking the brain-state hypothesis in this way, then, what
reasons are there to prefer
the functional-state hypothesis over the brain-state hypothesis?
Consider what the
The Nature of Mental States 55
S6 Hilary Putnam
brain-state theorist has to do to make good his claims. He has to
spedfy aphysical-
chemical state such that any organism (not just a mammal) is in
pain if and only if (a) it
possess es a brain of a suitable physical- chemical structure;
and (b) its brain is in that
physical- chemical state. This means that the physical- chemical
state in question must be
a possible state of a mammalian brain, a reptilian brain, a
mollusc
's brain (octopus es are
mollusca. and certainly feel pain), etc. At the same time, it must
not be a possible
(physically possible) state of the brain of any physically
possible creature that cannot
feel pain. Even if such a state can be found, it must be
nomologically certain that it will
also be a state of the brain of any extraterrestrial life that may
be found that will
be capable of feeling pain before we can even entertain the
supposition that it may be
pain.
It is not altogether impossible that such a state will be found.

Even though octopus
and mammal are examples of parallel (rather than sequential)
evolution, for example,
virtually identical structures (physically speaking) have evolved
in the eye of the octopus
and in the eye of the mammal, notwithstanding the fact that this
organ has evolved
from different kinds of cells in the two cases. Thus it is at least
possible that parallel
evolution, all over the universe, might always lead to one and
the same physical
' corre-
late' of pain. But this is certainly an ambitious hypothesis.
Finally, the hypothesis becomes still more ambitious when we
realize that the brain-
state theorist is not just saying that pain is a brain state; he is,
of course, concerned to
maintain that every psychological state is a brain state. Thus if
we can find even one
psychological predicate which can clearly be applied to both a
mammal and an octopus
(say ' hungry
'
), but whose physical- chemical
'correlate' is different in the two cases,
the brain-state theory has collapsed. It seems to me
overwhelmingly probable that we
can do this. Granted, in such a case the brain-state theorist can
save himself by ad
hoc assumptions (e.g., defining the disjunction of two states to
be a single

'
physical-
chemical state'), but this does not have to be taken seriously.
Turning now to the considerations for the functional-state
theory, let us begin with
the fact that we identify organisms as in pain, or hungry, or
angry, or in heat, etc., on
the basis of their behavior. But it is a truism that similarities in
the behavior of two
systems are at least a reason to suspect similarities in the
functional organization of the
two systems, and a much Wtllker reason to suspect similarities
in the actual physical
details. Moreover, we
'
expect the various psychological states- at least the basic ones,
such as hunger, thirst, aggression, etc.- to have more or less
similar
'transition prob-
abilities' (within wide and i Il- defined limits, to be sure) with
each other and with behavior
in the case of different species, because this is an artifact of the
way in which we
identify these states. Thus, we would not count an animal as
thirsty if its
'unsatiated'
behavior did not seem to be directed toward drinking and was
not followed by

, satiation
for liquid
'. Thus any animal that we count as capable of these various
states will at
least seem to have a certain rough kind of functional
organization. And, as already
remarked, if the program of finding psychological laws that are
not species-specific-
i.e., of finding a normal form for psychological theories of
different species- ever
succeeds, then it will bring in its wake a delineation of the kind
of functional organization
that is necessary and sufficient for a given psychological state,
as well as a precise
definition of the notion 'psychological state
'. In contrast, the brain-state theorist has to
hope for the eventual development of neurophysiological laws
that are species-independent
, which seems much less reasonable than the hope that
psychological laws (of a
sufficiently general kind) may be species-independent, or, still
weaker, that aspecies-
independent fonn can be found in which psychological laws can
be written .
Functional State versus Behavior-Disposition
The theory that being in pain is neither a brain state nor a

functional state but a
behavior disposition has one apparent advantage : it appears to
agree with the way in
which we verify that organisms are in pain . We do not in
practice know anything about
the brain state of an animal when we say that it is in pain; and
we possess little if any
knowledge of its functional organization , except in a crude
intuitive way . In fact,
however , this
'
advantage
'
is no advantage at all : for , although statements about how we
verify that .r is A may have a good deal to do with what the
concept of being A comes
to , they have precious little to do with what the property A is.
To argue on the ground
just mentioned that pain is neither a brain state nor a functional
state is like arguing
that heat is not mean molecular kinetic energy &om the fact that
ordinary people do not
(they think ) ascertain the mean molecular kinetic energy of
something when they verify
that it is hot or cold . It is not necessary that they should ; what
is necessary is that the
marks that they take as indications of heat should in fact be
explained by the mean
molecular kinetic energy . And , similarly , it is necessary to

our hypothesis that the marks
that are taken as behavioral indications of pain should be
explained by the fact that the
organism is a functional state of the appropriate kind , but not
that speakers should
know that this is so.
The difficulties with ' behavior disposition
'
accounts are so well known that I shall
do little more than recall them here. The difficulty
- it appears to be more than a'
difficulty ,
'
in fact- of specifying the required behavior disposition except
as
'
the disposition
of X to behave as if X were in pain
'
, is the chief one, of course. In contrast , we
can specify the functional state with which we propose to
identify pain, at least roughly ,
without using the notion of pain . Namely , the functional state
we have in mind is the
state of receiving sensory inputs which playa certain role in the
Functional Organization
of the organism . This role is characterized, at least partially ,

by the fact that the
sense organs responsible for the inputs in question are organs
whose function is to
detect damage to the body , or dangerous extremes of
temperature , pressure, etc., and
by the fact that the
'
inputs
'
themselves, whatever their physical realization , represent a
condition that the organism assigns a high disvalue to . As I
stressed in ' The mental life
of some machines
'
, this does not mean that the Machine will always avoid being in
the
condition in question (
'
pain
'
); it only means that the condition will be avoided unless
not avoiding it is necessary to the attainment of some more
highly valued goal . Since
the behavior of the Machine (in this case, an organism ) will
depend not merely on the
sensory inputs , but also on the Total State (i.e., on other
values, beliefs, etc.), it seems

hopeless to make any general statement about how an organism
in such a condition
must behave; but this does not mean that we must abandon hope
of characterizing the
condition . Indeed, we have just characterized it .
Not only does the behavior - disposition theory seem hopelessly
vague; if the ' behav-
ior' referred to is peripheral behavior , and the relevant stimuli
are peripheral stimuli
(e.g ., we do not say anything about what the organism will do
if its brain is operated
upon ), then the theory seems clearly false. For example, two
animals with all motor
nerves cut will have the same actual and potential ' behavior'
(namely , none to speak
of); but if one has cut pain Bbers and the other has uncut pain
Bbers, then one will
feel pain and the other won
'
t . Again , if one person has cut pain Bbers, and another
suppress es all pain responses deliberately due to some strong
compulsion , then the
actual and potential peripheral behavior may be the same, but
one will feel pain and the
other won
'
t . (Some philosophers maintain that this last case is
conceptually impossible ,
but the only evidence for this appears to be that they can
'

t, or don
'
t want to , conceive of
it .) If , instead of pain, we take some sensation the ' bodily
expression
'
of which is easier
The Nature of Mental States 57
58 Hilary Putnam
Methodological Considerations
So far we have considered only what might be called the
'
empirical
'
reasons for saying
that being in pain is a functional state , rather than a brain state
or a behavior disposition ;
namely , that it seems more likely that the functional state we
described is invariantly
'
correlated
'
with pain , species

-
independently , than that there is either a physical
-chemical
state of the brain (must an organism have a brain to feel pain ?
perhaps some ganglia
will do ) or a behavior disposition so correlated . If this is
correct , then it follows that the
identification we proposed is at least a candidate for
consideration . What of method -
ological considerations ?
The methodological considerations are roughly similar in all
cases of reduction , so no
surprises need be expected here . First , identification of
psychological states with functional
states means that the laws of psychology can be derived from
statements of the
form
'
such -and -such organisms have such
-and -such Descriptions
'
together with the
identification statements (' being in pain is such
-and -such a functional state
'
, etc .). Secondly

, the presence of the functional state (i .e., of inputs which play
the role we have
described in the Functional Organization of the organism ) is
not merely
'
correlated
with
'
but actually explains the pain behavior on the part of the
organism . Thirdly , the
identification serves to exclude questions which (if a
naturalistic view is correct ) represent
an altogether wrong way of looking at the matter , e.g ., What is
pain if it isn
'
t
either the brain state or the functional stater and What causes
the pain to be always
accompanied by this sort of functional stater In short , the
identification is to be tentatively
accepted as a
'
theory which leads to both fruitful predictions and to fruitful
questions, and which serves to discourage fruitless and
empirically senseless questions ,
where by
'

empirically senseless
'
I mean
'
senseless
'
not merely from the standpoint of
verification , but from the standpoint of what there in fact is.
Notes
1. In this paper I wish to avoid the vexed question of the
relation between pRins and pRin states. I only
remark in passing that one common argument against
identification of these two - namely, that a pain
can be in one
'
s ann but a state (of the organism) cannot be in one
's ann- is easily seen to be fallacious.
2. There are some well-known remarks by Alonzo Church on
this topic. Those remarks do not bear (as
might at Ant be supposed) on the identification of concepts with
synonymy-classes as such, but rather
support the view that (in formal semantics) it is necessary to
retain Frege
's distinction between the
normal and the 'oblique

'
use of expressions. That is, even if we say that the concept of
temperature is the
synonymy-class of the word
'
temperature
'
, we must not thereby be led into the error of supposing that'the
concept of temperature
'
is synonymous with
'the synonymy -class of the word
"
temperature
" ' - for
then 'the concept of temperature
' and ' dtr Btgriff dtr T emperatur' would not be synonymous,
which they
are. Rather, we must say that the concept of
'
temperature
'
rt/trs to the synonymy-class of the word'
temperature
'
(on this particular reconstruction); but that class is identifitd
not as

'
the synonymy-class to
which such-and-such a word belongs
'
, but in another way (e.g., as the synonymy-class whose
membeR
have such-and-such a characteristic use).
chpt10.pdf
VAPIANO
What is Vapiano
Vapiano is a German restaurant franchise company established
in 2002 in Hamburg. The
chain's restaurants offer Italian food according to the fast-casual
principle. In April 2017,
Vapiano totaled 180 locations in 31 countries including France,
Australia, China, Saudi Arabia,
Luxembourg, Brazil, Mexico, Sweden, the United States, etc.
2
Problems ? Need ?
- Italian food is one of the most popular in Belgium.
There is a lack innovation and originalty in the market, and

Vapiano could modernize it.
- People want to eat quickly, not expensive and healthy. We are
able to offer what they want.
Location
Place Jourdan
SWOT
Strenghts
- Knowaround the world
- High quality -> Low price
- Healthy Product
Modern and Innovative design
Have a Bar
Weaknesses
- Standardised
- Lack of online presence (can be also an opportunity)
Opportunities
- There isn’t any Vapiano in Belgium
- More and more innovation on the men u to reinforce the brand

image
Threats
- Intense competitors
- High rent because of a good location
Competitors
- Every Italian restaurants
- O’tacos
- Mama Roma
- Carrefour market
- Deli Traiteur
- Every fast restaurant not expensive
Segmentation
Geographic / Socio Demographic
Brussels
12 – 55
Men – Women

Psychographic
Generationnal groups
Esay to attract
Loyal attitude
Target Market
- Business Men/Women
- Students
Financial Aspect
Franchise Cost : 45 000
Suppliers
- Trendy Food
- Cafe Liegeois (Cafe, Hot chocolat, Tea)
Cipapy (Salad)
JuicyFruit (Fruit juice)

Q&A
Thank you
.MsftOfcThm_Accent1_Fill {
fill:#4472C4;
}
.MsftOfcThm_Accent1_Stroke {
stroke:#4472C4;
}
A. INTRODUCTION
Vapiano is a German restaurant franchise company established
in 2002 in Hamburg. The
chain's restaurants offer Italian food according to the fast-casual
principle. In April 2017,
Vapiano totaled 180 locations in 31 countries including France,
Australia, China, Saudi
Arabia,
Luxembourg, Brazil, Mexico, Sweden, the United States, etc.
Fast casual restaurants offer the ease and convenience of fast
food, but with a more inviting
sit-down atmosphere. In Vapiano, Italian dishes are ordered
directly from the chefs at the
individual stations in the middle of the restaurant. The dishes

are prepared in front of the
guests. Everyone can have his meal prepared to his own
personal preference. For example,
customers select their sauce, their kinds of pastas, the meat
according to their preferences.
There is also a designed menu available for customers.
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The Italian cuisine is one of the most popular in Belgium, there
are more than 200 Italian
restaurants in the entire country. However, it lacks of
innovation and originality that could
modernize the market. The only famous Italian fast-food is
Mama Roma but it is not as
innovative as Vapiano.
D. BELGIAN MAIN COMPETITOR
MAMMA ROMA is a Belgian brand that was founded in 2005
Today Mamma Roma has 6
restaurants in Brussels (Flagey, Châtelain, Jourdan, Boondael,
Saint-Gilles and a stand at
Brussels Expo) and 5 restaurants in Paris (Cherche-Midi (6th
arrondissement), Francoeur
(18th arrondissement), Oberkampf (11th arrondissement), Niel
(17th arrondissement) and
a
stand at Parc des Expositions Paris Nord Villepinte. Recently,
Mamma Roma also opened a
restaurant in the South of France in Nice.
Mamma Romma also belongs to the fast-casual restaurant
category. They offer

healthier, fresher, and more varied dishes than traditional fast
foods, served in a
more appealing environment. They propose rectangles of pizzas
cut in front of the customer
and served by weight. There offer several pizza’s varieties at a
time by choosing out of more
than 130 original and modern recipes, based on authentic Italian
products.
+ Every Italian restaurants
- O’tacos
- Mama Roma
- Carrefour market
- Deli Traiteur
- Every fast restaurant not expensive

OFZO .docx

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to OFZO .docx

Similar to OFZO .docx (20)

More from vannagoforth

More from vannagoforth (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

OFZO .docx