This presentation by J.R. Borrell, C. Garcia, J.L. Jimenez and J.M. Ordonez-de-Haro summarises the key findings of their research paper on Gender bias in cartel engagement submitted to the OECD project on Gender inclusive competition policy. It was delivered during a workshop held virtually on 7 October 2021. More materials on the topic can be found at http://oe.cd/gicp. This presentation was uploaded with the authors’ consent.

1. Gender inclusive
competition policy
oe.cd/gicp
Project #4: Gender bias in
cartel engagement
By J.R. Borrell, C. García,
J.L. Jiménez &
J.M. Ordóñez de Haro

2. Motivation:
1. The fight against cartels.
2. The role of board members in cartel activity engagement.
Research questions:
 Is there a gender bias in cartel engagement?
 Do firms change course in cartel engagement when there is greater gender
equality in board members?
 Should cartel policy enforcement design consider such gender bias? How?

 Are binding or non-binding quotas effective in promoting gender diversity
and encouraging anti-cartel behavior?
About the project

3. Two sources:
 European cartel cases (2010-2019) from Connor (2020).
 52 cartelized firms (end up with 40-50).
 Financial data (Amadeus Database) & gender composition of boards of directors
(own elaboration from firms’ annual reports).
 Counterfactual: similar non-cartelized firms (country, sector & operating revenues).
 Average cartel duration=2 yrs.
 Spanish cartel cases (1998-2018), own elaboration.
 Financial data (SABI) & data on appointments and terminations of board members
(web-scrapping, from INFOEMPRESA).
 Counterfactual: matched non-cartelized firms (age, sector, total assets, indebtedness,
leverage, personnel expenses).
 End up with 182 cartelized firms and 175 matched similar non-cartelized firms.
 Average cartel duration=4.7 yrs.
Data

4. 1. Logit model: Analyze whether more women in corporate boards have any
clear-cut impact on firm’s cartel engagement and cartel break-up.
- Cartel formation: value 1 for cartelized firms during cartel, and 0 before and after.
Value 0 for non-cartelized firms.
- Cartel breakup: value 1 for cartelized firms after cartel, and 0 before and during.
Value 0 for non-cartelized firms.
Pr(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1% 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ℎ=2
8
𝛽𝛽ℎ𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2. Difference-in-differences estimator: How cartel formation and cartel busting
impacts on the gender composition of the boards of directors.
% 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒊 ∗
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕 +𝛽𝛽4 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝜷𝜷𝟓𝟓𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒊 ∗ 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕 + ∑ℎ=6
12
𝛽𝛽ℎ𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
Methodology

5. Average presence of women on boards by group of
firms over the cartel life.
Key findings: European cartels
Conditional mean differences in the presence of women
in cartelized vs non-cartelized firms over the cartel life.

6. Key findings: European cartels
The effect comes from the
implementation of binding
quotas, finding no significant
effect in the case of countries
with non-binding quotas.
Conditional mean differences in the presence of women in cartelized vs non-cartelized firms in countries
with binding and non-binding policies.

7. Conditional mean differences in the percentage of women’s
appointments (with respect to total appointments) on boards
in cartelized vs non-cartelized firms over the cartel life.
Key findings: Spanish cartels
Conditional mean differences in the percentage of women’s
terminations (with respect to total terminations) on boards
in cartelized vs non-cartelized firms over the cartel life.

8. 1. More women in corporate boards do not seem to influence cartel formation nor
cartel break-up.
 Further research: If women’s participation in boards is marginal (meaning not at
parity levels) would we see the full effects?
2. Cartel busting leads to corporate board restructuring, only in countries with
binding gender quotas.
3. Corporate board seems to be clearly restructured aiming to clean the reputation
after being sanctioned by anti-cartel authorities, and the restructuring is
balancing gender composition in countries with binding gender quotas.
Key findings

9. Main take-away:
Binding gender policies and cartel policies interact, and influence gender
board composition of firms sanctioned by anti-cartel authorities.
Catchy lesson:
Cartel sanctioning and prosecution is an effective tool for corporate
restructuring, which may lead to greater gender balance in corporate boards
if gender quotas are binding.
Key findings

10. Cartel policy is a weapon for achieving greater gender balance
in boards
Competition Agencies may claim that cartel busting is not only
the traditional antitrust policy
It is also a policy that promotes gender balance in corporate
boards when combined with gender binding quotas
Recommendations to competition agencies

11. 1. Data quality: expand the sample to more cartel cases in EU; board composition of
Spanish firms.
2. Improve the analysis of the impact of the presence of women on cartel engagement:
Does it take a critical mass of women for the risk aversion and other tendencies to take
effect in board decisions?
3. Study the differences among listed and non-listed companies.
4. Analyse case studies of cartelized firms that restructured the board of directors after
breakup:
i. Interplay between cartel policy enforcement & the compliance with gender policies?
ii. Are these (restructured) firms deterred from recidivism?
5. As more countries adopt gender binding policies, study how cartel policy may make
corporate board restructuring more effective.
6. Study data on the gender balance on management boards and senior managers: lower
level of management appears to be engaged in cartel conduct.
Recommendations for future work

12. About the authors
Joan-Ramon Borrell
Associate Professor
Universitat de Barcelona
Research fields: competition policy, regulation
& evaluation of public policy.
@jrborrell Joan-Ramon Borrell
Carmen García
Part-time Professor
Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria
Research fields: competition policy, evaluation
of public policy & applied microeconometrics.
@cgarciagalindo Carmen García Galindo
Juan Luis Jiménez
Associate Professor
Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria
Research fields: competition policy, regulation &
public economics.
@JuanLuis_JG
José Manuel Ordóñez
Associate Professor
Universidad de Málaga
Research fields: industrial organization,
competition policy, regulation & public economics.
https://theeconomics.uma.es/en/jose-manuel-ordonez-de-
haro__trashed/

13. Gender inclusive
competition policy
Read Paper #4 at bit.ly/3iqCAmr
oe.cd/gicp