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Putting Theory into Practice, the Wrong Way

John Iliadis
Network Security Admin
TEIRESIAS S.A.
Understand the theory
…sometimes even Engineers have to go back and
(re)comprehend the theory, to get things done

Understand the problem
Actually listen to the problem before providing a
solution.

Provide an integrated solution
A security mechanism per se is not a solution; it is
merely a tool (more about that later)
Problem
I want to protect
confidentiality of data
exchanged between
network A and
network B

Network
Network
A
A

Network
Network
Service
Service
Provider
Provider

Network
Network
B
B
Problem
I want to protect
confidentiality of data
exchanged between
network A and
network B

Network
Network
A
A

Network
Network
Service
Service
Provider
Provider

VPN

Solution
OK, we ‘ll implement
an IPSec VPN, using
preshared keys

Network
Network
B
B
Problem
I want to protect
confidentiality of data
exchanged between
network A and
network B

Network
Network
A
A

Network
Network
Service
Service
Provider
Provider

VPN

Solution
OK, we ‘ll implement
an IPSec VPN, using
preshared keys

Network
Network
B
B
Problem
I want to protect
confidentiality of data
exchanged between
network A and
network B
Problem
I want to protect
confidentiality of data
exchanged between
network A and
network B

Solution
I trade your problem
with another: that of
managing symmetric
encryption keys
Problem
I want to protect
confidentiality of data
exchanged between
network A and
network B

Problem
How does it sound if I
send a sealed envelope
with the new symmetric
key every week by
courier to the network
admin of network B?

Solution
I trade your problem
with another: that of
managing symmetric
encryption keys
Problem
I want to protect
confidentiality of data
exchanged between
network A and
network B

Solution
I trade your problem
with another: that of
managing symmetric
encryption keys

Problem
How does it sound if I
send a sealed envelope
with the new symmetric
key every week by
courier to the network
admin of network B?

Solution
OK! I ‘ll implement the
IPSec VPN and you
are done!
…exchanging one problem for another,
easier problem to solve
!

"

#% '
$&

Problem
I want a HIGHLY
AVAILABLE network in
order to access Service
X over the Internet
(assuming Service X is
highly available)

Internet
Internet
!

"
Problem
I want a HIGHLY
AVAILABLE network in
order to access Service
X over the Internet
(assuming Service X is
highly available)

Solution
…just another day at
the office…

Switch A
Switch B
Router B
Router A

#% '
$&

Internet
Internet
ISP B
ISP B
ISP A
ISP A
!

"

#% '
&&

Switch B

Switch A

ISP B
ISP B
Router B
Router A

ISP A
ISP A
!

"

#% '
&&

Both lines follow
the same route to
the Computer
Room (same
building shaft)
Switch B

Switch A

ISP B
ISP B
Router B
Router A

ISP A
ISP A
!

"

#% '
&&

Switch B

Switch A

ISP B
ISP B
Router B
Router A

Single point of entry
Into the building

ISP A
ISP A
(

"

• User workstations should be equipped with
centrally managed software:
Antivirus
Antispyware
Firewall
Intrusion detection
Log consolidation
SW/HW Inventory
etc…

Switch
"

"

• No Layer 2 authentication
• The user brings his own, personal laptop
• to work without being “disrupted” by all this
annoying software
• to try some things he couldn’t do on the network
due to this annoying software

Switch
"

"

• Enforce 802.1x authentication
• Implement Port Security
• Trendy add-on: Network Admission
Control

Switch

X
#

'

!
)

1. A turnkey security solution
2. Automatic identification/notification of attacks
3. THE new security panacea (UTMs)
*

%
+

Being given a chance to:
1. identify potential attacks in traffic
2. review related host logs
3. decide if this is indeed a security issue
4. take action

!
)
%
+

!
)

• IDSs give us a chance to identify attacks and
react

• Not much of a use if
network traffic is not captured
there is no experienced security personnel
security personnel is not reviewing IDS logs

not much of a turnkey solution…
,
No Encryption
HTTP

HTTP

HTTP

Way too much encryption
HTTPS

HTTPS

HTTPS
,
No Encryption
HTTP

HTTP

HTTP

Encryption/IDS Balance
HTTPS

HTTPS

HTTP
- .
!
Problem
Alice needs to send a
HIGHLY confidential
mail to Bob once a
month
- .
!
Problem
Alice needs to send a
HIGHLY confidential
mail to Bob once a
month

PKI

Solution

PKI !
Neo takes the blue pill

al
rn
t e ne
Ex Zo

al
rn
te e
In Zon
Organisation

Good
Good
Guys
Guys
Bad
Bad
Guys
Guys
Neo takes the red pill
/
All services & users are born equal.
Some are more equal than others
Expected user experience
Prerequisite (e.g. VoIP, NMS)
QoS as a security mechanism (DoS,
packet filtering alternative, …)
01

*

*

# 222

'
Single Sign-On Island
Service D

Service A
Service B
Service C
Service E

Service G

Service F
Service H
Service I

Service K
01
#
(

*

"

3
4

'

Single Sign-On Island #2
Single Sign-On Island #1

Service I

Service G

Service B

Service H
Service E

Service F

Service K

Service D
Service A
Service C
Threat: unauthorised access
•Impact factor: 1/5
•Impact factor: 3/5
•Impact factor: 5/5
"
#% '
$5

• Effect: Managers taking the wrong (securitywise) strategic decisions
• (Probable) Cause: YOU did not educate them
regarding security matters
"
#% '
&5

• Effect: Users not being security-conscious
enough
• (Probable) Cause: YOU did not educate them
in security matters and the HIGHER
MANAGEMENT did not provide incentives and
show commitment
"
#% '
55

• Effect: Stakeholders perceive Security as an
obstacle to business
• (Probable) Cause: Security is not a goal in
itself. YOU must treat it as a business enabler,
before anyone else can
/
6

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Network Security: Putting Theory into Practice, the Wrong Way

  • 1. Putting Theory into Practice, the Wrong Way John Iliadis Network Security Admin TEIRESIAS S.A.
  • 2. Understand the theory …sometimes even Engineers have to go back and (re)comprehend the theory, to get things done Understand the problem Actually listen to the problem before providing a solution. Provide an integrated solution A security mechanism per se is not a solution; it is merely a tool (more about that later)
  • 3. Problem I want to protect confidentiality of data exchanged between network A and network B Network Network A A Network Network Service Service Provider Provider Network Network B B
  • 4. Problem I want to protect confidentiality of data exchanged between network A and network B Network Network A A Network Network Service Service Provider Provider VPN Solution OK, we ‘ll implement an IPSec VPN, using preshared keys Network Network B B
  • 5. Problem I want to protect confidentiality of data exchanged between network A and network B Network Network A A Network Network Service Service Provider Provider VPN Solution OK, we ‘ll implement an IPSec VPN, using preshared keys Network Network B B
  • 6. Problem I want to protect confidentiality of data exchanged between network A and network B
  • 7. Problem I want to protect confidentiality of data exchanged between network A and network B Solution I trade your problem with another: that of managing symmetric encryption keys
  • 8. Problem I want to protect confidentiality of data exchanged between network A and network B Problem How does it sound if I send a sealed envelope with the new symmetric key every week by courier to the network admin of network B? Solution I trade your problem with another: that of managing symmetric encryption keys
  • 9. Problem I want to protect confidentiality of data exchanged between network A and network B Solution I trade your problem with another: that of managing symmetric encryption keys Problem How does it sound if I send a sealed envelope with the new symmetric key every week by courier to the network admin of network B? Solution OK! I ‘ll implement the IPSec VPN and you are done!
  • 10. …exchanging one problem for another, easier problem to solve
  • 11. ! " #% ' $& Problem I want a HIGHLY AVAILABLE network in order to access Service X over the Internet (assuming Service X is highly available) Internet Internet
  • 12. ! " Problem I want a HIGHLY AVAILABLE network in order to access Service X over the Internet (assuming Service X is highly available) Solution …just another day at the office… Switch A Switch B Router B Router A #% ' $& Internet Internet ISP B ISP B ISP A ISP A
  • 13. ! " #% ' && Switch B Switch A ISP B ISP B Router B Router A ISP A ISP A
  • 14. ! " #% ' && Both lines follow the same route to the Computer Room (same building shaft) Switch B Switch A ISP B ISP B Router B Router A ISP A ISP A
  • 15. ! " #% ' && Switch B Switch A ISP B ISP B Router B Router A Single point of entry Into the building ISP A ISP A
  • 16. ( " • User workstations should be equipped with centrally managed software: Antivirus Antispyware Firewall Intrusion detection Log consolidation SW/HW Inventory etc… Switch
  • 17. " " • No Layer 2 authentication • The user brings his own, personal laptop • to work without being “disrupted” by all this annoying software • to try some things he couldn’t do on the network due to this annoying software Switch
  • 18. " " • Enforce 802.1x authentication • Implement Port Security • Trendy add-on: Network Admission Control Switch X
  • 19. # ' ! ) 1. A turnkey security solution 2. Automatic identification/notification of attacks 3. THE new security panacea (UTMs)
  • 20. * % + Being given a chance to: 1. identify potential attacks in traffic 2. review related host logs 3. decide if this is indeed a security issue 4. take action ! )
  • 21. % + ! ) • IDSs give us a chance to identify attacks and react • Not much of a use if network traffic is not captured there is no experienced security personnel security personnel is not reviewing IDS logs not much of a turnkey solution…
  • 22. , No Encryption HTTP HTTP HTTP Way too much encryption HTTPS HTTPS HTTPS
  • 24. - . ! Problem Alice needs to send a HIGHLY confidential mail to Bob once a month
  • 25. - . ! Problem Alice needs to send a HIGHLY confidential mail to Bob once a month PKI Solution PKI !
  • 26. Neo takes the blue pill al rn t e ne Ex Zo al rn te e In Zon Organisation Good Good Guys Guys Bad Bad Guys Guys
  • 27. Neo takes the red pill
  • 28. / All services & users are born equal. Some are more equal than others Expected user experience Prerequisite (e.g. VoIP, NMS) QoS as a security mechanism (DoS, packet filtering alternative, …)
  • 29. 01 * * # 222 ' Single Sign-On Island Service D Service A Service B Service C Service E Service G Service F Service H Service I Service K
  • 30. 01 # ( * " 3 4 ' Single Sign-On Island #2 Single Sign-On Island #1 Service I Service G Service B Service H Service E Service F Service K Service D Service A Service C Threat: unauthorised access •Impact factor: 1/5 •Impact factor: 3/5 •Impact factor: 5/5
  • 31. " #% ' $5 • Effect: Managers taking the wrong (securitywise) strategic decisions • (Probable) Cause: YOU did not educate them regarding security matters
  • 32. " #% ' &5 • Effect: Users not being security-conscious enough • (Probable) Cause: YOU did not educate them in security matters and the HIGHER MANAGEMENT did not provide incentives and show commitment
  • 33. " #% ' 55 • Effect: Stakeholders perceive Security as an obstacle to business • (Probable) Cause: Security is not a goal in itself. YOU must treat it as a business enabler, before anyone else can
  • 34. / 6