Negligence obfuscation - delaying tactics etc

Serving our communities to
make them safer and stronger
CO/498/17
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
HUMBERSIDE POLICE
Professional Standards Department
Police Headquarters
Priory Road
Hull HU55SF
Tel No: 01482 578322
Fax No: 01482 305004
Switchboard: 101
This matter is being dealt with by:
profess ionalstandardsbranch@humberside.
pnn. police.uk
www.humberside.polJce.uk
1 August 2018
MrN - ...•...•.
GrimsbY--
North East Lincolnshire
DN32 ~_=
Dear Mr l ",.l
i am writing to you concerning elements of a complaint against the poiicedated the
9th February 2018 and forwarded through Police and Crime Commissioner's office. I
also wish to clarify the history of some salient complaints which I will outline below.
CO/498/17. This complaint was in respect of 3 allegations:
1. Other Neglect or Failure in Duty: The complainant believes a crime has been
committed against him by an officer for failing to record his report as a crime, and
instead referring the matter as a complaint against the police.
2. Other Neglect or Failure in Duty: The complainant believes that the officer
investigating his complaint was not expeditious and intentionally delayed the
investigation so denying him lawful redress in the courts due to the effect of statute
barring.
3. Corrupt Practice: The complainant states the investigating officer was complicit
with the appropriate authority in delaying the investigation, so denying him the
opportunity for lawful redress in the courts due to the effect of statute barring.
This complaint was recorded as above and dis-applied (Vexatious Abuse of
Procedure). You were written to on the 2nd August 2017 the date of the complaint
referred to under a date of 13th July 2017 when it should have stated 14th July 2017.
Enclosed with that letter was a Complainant report listing the three allegations above
so that you should have been under no misunderstanding as to the complaint's
attribution in respect of what the letter was referring to. You were asked for
representations. These you kindly provided by email to Sally Banks within
Professional Standards 5th August 2017.
1

On the 1st September 2017 you received a letter from Del. C. Insp. Scaife to the
effect that the representations made by you had been dismissed but that you had the
right to appeal to the Humberside Police Appeals Body and this you did via email on
the 26th September 2017.
CO/886/17. This complaint is in respect of a single allegation:
1.0ther Neglect or Failure in Duty: The complainant states that in January 2017
he reported a Crime and that this was improperly dealt with and treated as if it were
a complaint submitted under the Police Reform Act 2002. The complaint was
received on 13th July 2017
This complaint was recorded 15th December 2017 when the Case print outlining the
single allegation was sent to you so that you would be able to attribute your
complaint to this specific allegation. This complaint was Dis-applied (Abuse of
Procedure, Vexatious) in essence that you were trying to create another complaint
fundamentally the same as that reported in CO/535/17 which at the time was still
undergoing investigation.
You provided representations against disapplication by way of email on the 22nd
December 2017 to no avail.
This disapplication outcome you appealed to HPAB received on the 31st January
2018 and you were sent a letter 27th July 2018 concerning this by Del. Supt Matthew
Baldwin.
CO/49/18. This complaint was in respect of a single allegation:
1. Other Neglect of Failure in Duty: The complainant alleges he has previously
made a complaint against the police which is being investigated by an Inspector (DI
Foster) and that he has not received updates from the 20th December 2017 and
within the IOPC Statutory guidelines.
This complaint arose from Dl Foster's investigation around the crime allegations you
made against the Ministry of Justice, relevant Ombudsman and North East
Lincolnshire Council concerning Council tax payments which you appeared not to
have timeously met and complaints against the police under CO/535/17.
The case was recorded on the 7th February 2018. Dl Foster received Management
Action outside Misconduct under the Local resolution process which you appealed
on the basis you considered the matter should have been referred to the IOPC. The
Appeal is with HPAB sent on the 22nd June 2018.
Outcome of Appeal CO/498/17. HAS
This Appeal was Upheld on the basis that there appeared to be elements of
confusion in the dates on letters from Professional Standards which might lead the
reader to wonder which complaints and allegations were being referred to despite
the enclosure of the allegations provided to you on corresponding numbers on the
case prints. There appears to be confusion with the single allegation under
CO/886/17 and the 3 allegations under CO/498/17 which were made by way of
complaint 13th and 14th July 2017 respectively in essence a day apart. The HAB
opine that you have not been technically provided with an opportunity to provide
2

~,
representations in regards CO/498/17 (14th July) before disapplication. I would
therefore request that you now provide those representations or indicate
whether they are fundamentally the same as those you have provided to Sally
Banks by way of email 30th August 2017. This will allow the Disapplication to be
re-considered. (CO/498/17 - 3 allegations).
The Appeal summary also requested that Professional Standards formally record the
complaint and single allegation from that complaint raised on the 13th July 2017. This
has been done under CO/886/17. This recorded complaint as noted above met with
disapplication and is also undergoing appeal with HAS.
You will be corresponded with separately concerning the assessment and recording
of your most recent complaint dated 9th February 2018.
If you wish to discuss this with a member of the Professional Standards Department,
please contact the number at the top of this letter.
Yours sincerely
~
Alan Farrow
Detective Chief Inspector
3

Serving our communities to
make them safer and stronger
CO 400/18
Mrr
: _<;1r(''':'--- _---
Grimsby
DN32~
---~
Dear Mr ~_-_-~+
Humberside Police
Police Headquarters
Priory Road
Hull HU55SF
Tel No: 01482 578322
Fax No: 01482 305004
Switchboard: 101
This matter is being dealt with by:
103091 Fleteher
psb@humberside.pnn.police.uk
www.humberside.police.uk
9th August 2018
I am writing to inform you of the outcome of the complaint you made on 9th February
2018 and which was recorded on 25th July 2018 (CO/400/18). This complaint stated
that Professional Standards Branch recorded a complaint on 26th July 2017 in which
you suspected the matter was intentionally grossly mishandled resulting in
Humberside Appeals Body (HAB) referring the case back to the department to re-
submit for your representations before considering whether to dis-apply that
complaint. However there was no further contact with you regarding this matter and
that the deadlines were not adhered to within the IPCC statutory guidelines.
Your complaint has been dealt with by way of the Local Resolution Procedure and I
agree that this is a suitable course of action in the circumstances.
Humberside Police is committed to providing a quality of service to all members of
the public and I am grateful, therefore, that you have taken the trouble to bring this
matter to the Force's attention. Accordingly, the matter causing you concern was
recorded and I was appointed to enquire into it.
The recording and processing of complaints is held within a police software system
and there can be voluminous entries on the complainant's case(s) at each stage as
correspondence is received and appended. At first receipt Professional Standards
Administration (PSA) staff enter the complaint and scan any documents initially
received. An officer within Professional Standards Department (PSD) will then
assess the complaint on face value and complete an electronic Recording and
Allocation form (R&A), which will address and categorise the complaint under the
requirements of the Police Reform Act 2002 as amended by the Police Reform and
Social Responsibility Act 2012. Each element of the complaint will be reflected on
the Case Print as an allegation(s). The R&A form will then be considered by the

Appropriate Authority (Rank of Chief Inspector) as to acceptance of how the
allegations recorded under the complaint will be dealt with and whether it is
recognised that elements of Misconduct or Criminal Acts have been .identified
against any individual officer. The Appropriate Authority will also direct whether the
complaint is best addressed by Local Resolution process or proportionate
investigation/criminal investigation and decide the relevant appeal body.
I am cognizant of the fact you have made a number of complaints going back a few
years essentially arising from the primary issue of unpaid Council Tax and
proceedings taken against you to recover that claimed outstanding debt by North
East Lincolnshire Council. You alleged collusion/malfeasance/fraud by the Council
and Ministry of Justice involving correspondence which you claimed not to have
received and which they were said by you to have later generated to satisfy the
Ombudsman's enquiries. The police became involved around the time a Warrant
was issued for your arrest over alleged unpaid Council Tax and charges. You
reported this as a crime committed by the Council while also raising a number of
complaints about how the police had not dealt with these reports to your
satisfaction.
I note correspondence sent to you dated 1st August 2018 signed by Chief Inspector
Alan Farrow where part of the more recent complaint history has been visited, so I
will not repeat it here extensively. I will lead to and address the detail relevant to
your most recent complaint received on 9th February 2018.
"
CO/00498/17 was reported by you on the 14th July 2017 and contained 3
allegations, two of Neglect or Failure in Duty, one of Corrupt Practice all of which
were derived fundamentally from your dissatisfaction from the matters described in
paragraph five above.
CO/00886/17 reported by you on the day prior, 13th July 2017 contained one
allegation of Neglect or Failure in Duty wherein it was stated that in January 2017
you reported a crime and this was improperly dealt with and treated as if it were a
complaint submitted under the Police Reform Act 2002. This allegation in fact was
materially the same as that recorded under allegation 1 from the 14th July which
stated the complainant believes a crime has been committed against him by an
officer for failing to record his report as a crime, and instead referring the matter as
a complaint against the police. Unfortunately these were originally recorded under
the same reference number that of CO/00498/17 although they do indeed appear to
be fundamentally about the same issue. This has led to confusion within the case-
working of your complaint when the case worker has replied to you and referred to
the complaints of the 13th and 14th July 2017 under one date. When the letter is
compiled the computer software populates the letter and has the capability to draw
on one date only and this was overlooked. Notice was given of the intention to
dissapply the three complaints under CO/00498/17. You responded after making
failed representations by way of Appeal to the Humberside Appeal Body (HAB) on
the 26th September 2017.
Your Appeal submission and representations of the 26th September shows that you
are referring to both complaints of the 13th and 14th July 2017 and the narrative I
believe displays you had clarity of understanding where you state, 'The report
records 3 allegations are associated with the force's letter dated 2nd August 2017
which refers to the 13 July complaint, I assume this is down to a clerical error and
the report has mistakenly been duplicated and enclosed in both letters. Presumably

there is a report relating to the 13 July complaint that has not been sent to me'.
It took the HAB to highlight the error and in so doing upheld your appeal. They
directed the Complaint of the 13th July 2017 should now be recorded despite it
being repeated in allegation 1 of your complaint of the 14th. I believe this single
allegation should not have been recorded at inception as it was fundamentally the
same as you repeated on both days. This was touched on in the narrative of the
Appeal report from the HAB dated 31st October 2017.
The sum of what amounts to an administrative error following your appeal resulted
in the recording and single allegation of the 13th July 2017 to be raised under
CO/00886/17, albeit by now very late on 15th December 2018 and well outside the
IOPC guidelines (When arguably it should not have been recorded at all as it was a
repeat of that received the day after). It is therefore not surprising this complaint
likewise met with disapplication although on grounds it was repeating an
investigation ongoing by Det. Insp. Foster in respect of complaint CO/00535/17.
You appealed that disapplication decision to HAB and it has not been upheld as of
20th March 2018.
Because of our failure to correspond accurately, you have received the more recent
letter in respect of your former Upheld Appeal CO/00498/17 dated 1st August 2018
providing a further opportunity for you to lay representations as to why this case
(CO/00498/17) should not be likewise dissapplied. I believe you have already made
those representations in previous correspondence but nevertheless have Q.een
offered further opportunity to satisfy that part of the Appeal process upheld by HAB.
Following my examination of the records and letter/email content I do not believe
you have been confused by the above events as I have demonstrated and are to be
commended on your grasp of them. However, because of the confusion over PSD's
recording of a number of what amount to repetitive complaints in a short period, I do
believe the department has unnecessarily raised your hopes or expectations only to
dash them and for this I extend our sincere apologies. The confusion on our part
appears to be part derived from a software process drawing on a single date
reference, and a number of different administrators and assessors failing to
appreciate the intricacies of the separate complaints. PSD and PSA section of
Humberside Police is a small office of individuals dealing with around 2000 cases of
complaints and events of internal misconduct per annum including those that
ascend to gross-misconduct hearings and criminal cases.
I have noted your suggestion that your complaints have been intentionally
mishandled/obfuscated, but I assure you there is no evidence of this it is simply a
matter of complexity arising from a numerous and sometimes repetitive complaint
profile. I note also your contention that you have received apologies from at least
two Inspectors who had possession of some of your previous complaints and failed
to communicate and update in a timeous manner. Humberside Inspectors also have
the responsibility of investigating complaints as well as competing priorities of
managing their staff and operational demands.
I also note your comment about the individual who has overall responsibility for PSD
being required to progress complaints in line with the statutory guidance and
legislation, but it is unrealistic to expect that individual to handle the minutiae of up
to 2000 individual complaints.

Your final paragraph deals with offences under section 26 of the Criminal Justice
and Courts Act 2015 and the notion that this qualifies for mandatory referral to the
IOPC. These type of referrals and offences are of the highest thresholds and in
practical terms they are 'scoped' and a degree of fact finding engaged before
referral takes place as the IOPC guidance provides for. Further, if during any
ensuing investigation there is some evidence revealed or supporting factors which
necessitate a further severity assessment, there is still provision to later refer to the
IOPC. This has not been the case with your complaints.
I hope the explanation provided goes some way towards allaying your sense of
grievance in respect of failing to meet deadlines and guidelines. Although these are
statutory guidelines the legislation does not provide for offences but refers to
redress through the complaint process and this you have done.
I have enclosed for your information a Fact Sheet entitled "Appealing against the
Local Resolution Process." This document explains how you may appeal to the
Humberside Appeal Body in respect of the outcome of the Local Resolution
process.
The appropriate appeal body is the Humberside Appeal Body as your complaint
does not relate to the conduct of a senior officer, has not been referred to the IOPC,
does not justify criminal or misconduct proceedings and does not arise from the
same incident as a complaint where the IOPC would have to deal with any appeal.
You have 29 days from the date of this letter, within which to make your appeal.
You are advised to post your appeal in good time to ensure it reaches the
Humberside Police Appeal Body before the end of the 29th day. The 29th day is
Friday 7th September 2018 Appeals received after 29 days may not be allowed
unless there are exceptional circumstances.
You might want to consider using guaranteed next-day delivery post service to
ensure that your appeal is received within time.
sincerely
10 3091 M.A. Fleteher
On behalf of the Appropriate Authority

HUMBERSIDE POLICE
Police Headquarters
Priory Road
Hull HU5 5SF
Grimsby
DN32
11 August 2018
Dear Sir/Madam
Re: Complaint Ref: CO/498/17
Please find enclosed contents of the representations made in respect of the appeal dated 20 June
2018 referred to in this letter concerning the complaint with reference CO/49/18.
I am writing concerning the letter I received from DCI Alan Farrow dated 1 August 2018 in respect
of Complaint Ref: CO/498/17.
The position as it now stands with regards complaint reference CO/498/17 is that it was recorded
over a year ago on 26 July 2017 and that is as far it progressed. The letter states that it has been
disapplied but that is evidently not the case. It has not been disapplied in respect of any
correspondence sent to me on the basis that it was vexatious and an abuse of process as the letter
claims.
If after a complaint has been formally recorded the force decides not to deal with it under the Police
Reform Act 2002 (the ‘Act’) and instead intends to take no action on it (for example) the force must
write to the complainant informing him that it intends to disapply the requirements of the Act and
invite the complainant to submit representations if he so wishes to contend the decision explaining
why it should not be disapplied (see page 25 of the Statutory Guidance under para 4.2):
“Before deciding to carry out a disapplication or making an application to the IPCC for
permission to disapply, the appropriate authority must write to the complainant at his or her
last known address inviting him or her to make representations. The letter must state that the
complainant has 28 days from the day following the date of the letter to make any
representations. Any representations that are made must be taken into account before a final
decision to disapply or submit an application for permission to the IPCC is taken as they
may affect the appropriate authority’s decision.
Paragraphs 6 and 7, Schedule 3, Police Reform Act 2002
Regulation 5, Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012”

No such correspondence has been sent to me and so it is this that the force must do now if in fact it
does decide it wishes to handle the complaint otherwise than in accordance with the Act. In order
for me to be able to make representations in relation to the matter, the letter must also identify
which of the grounds set out in regulation 5 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations
2012 (the ‘Regulations’) the decision to disapply has been made in respect of and the reason why
that ground was considered appropriate.
Of course, the force has no lawful grounds to disapply the complaint so it should proceed and be
referred to the IOPC in accordance with regulation 4 of the Regulations given the seriousness of the
allegations, particularly with regard to ‘serious corruption’ under subparagraph 2(a)(iii) as defined
in paragraphs 8.13 - 8.17 of the IOPC Statutory Guidance. It is crucial to remember that it is the
severity of the conduct being alleged on which a decision to refer must be based; the force need not
take into account anything other than this. It is irrelevant that the force may consider the conduct
complained about would not justify criminal or disciplinary proceedings based on the strength of
evidence; this has no bearing on whether the matter is deemed suitable for referral to the IOPC.
In any event, the police subsequent to my crime report (log 343 of 5th June) acknowledged that the
allegation was so serious that it required referring to the IOPC (telephone call 8 June 2017). The
allegations formed the basis of my complaint, the force in turn summarised the content as per the 3
allegations contained in the complaint report of 26 July 2017. The force informed me that the matter
would be referred to Professional Standards Department (PSD) and that the PSD was likely to refer
the matter to the IOPC.
With regards DCI Farrow’s letter requesting that I now provide representations in regards
CO/498/17 or indicate whether they are fundamentally the same as those I provided to Sally Banks
by email on 30 August 2017, I am assuming the email referred to is my email of 5 August 2017 to
her not one dated the 30th. If so, those representations were made as a consequence of my total
confusion about which complaint I was dealing with because of the number of anomalies I was
facing and therefore were not specific to any particular matter as the contents of that email attests:
“I'm replying to your letter dated 2 August 2017 concerning the above referenced complaint.
Humberside police force is making improper use of the Police reform Act 2002 by
exploiting the legislation as an alternative to carrying out the police forces proper function
(to prevent or provide a remedy for acts of crime).

I consider having to engage further in this process on account of the routine abuse of the
Police Reform Act 2002 is an injustice which is the price I'm paying as a direct result of the
loyalty police officers dealing with complaints have for their colleagues.
The force also seems to view dealing with these matters as a contest or game which is
clearly an inappropriate use of taxpayer resources and my time personally.
I suggest the force looks again at its proposed decision to disapply these matters because it
justifies doing so erroneously on the basis that the complaints are repetitive. Humberside
police is treating complaints about the force and reports of crime as one and the same which
is a fundamental abuse of the Police Reform Act 2002.”
Clearly DCI Farrow is misconceived by stating that I should have been under no misunderstanding
as to the complaint’s attribution in respect of what the letter was referring to with regard the letter of
2 August 2017 and the accompanying Complainant report listing the three allegations.
For the avoidance of doubt, not only did the letter of 2 August 2017 refer incorrectly to the
complaint date in respect of reference CO/498/17, neither did the letter identifying the grounds it
relied on and the reasons explaining why it intended to disapply the complaint bear any relation to
either of the two matters that purportedly caused confusion (CO/498/17 and CO/886/17). The
content of the letter referred to an entirely unrelated complaint concerning the impersonation of a
police officer for which the force were proposing to disapply on the basis that it was vexatious and
an abuse of process - i.e. the complainant had ‘previously complained about warrant officers
allegedly impersonating police officers’.
To reiterate, I have not made representations in regards CO/498/17 nor have I been asked to in
accordance with the law and clearly those representations in respect of my email of August 2017 to
Sally Banks can not be taken to be appropriate because I have first to be informed of the ground(s)
relied on by the force and the reasons explaining why it intends to disapply the complaint.
Furthermore the outcome dated 31 October 2017 upholding the appeal which arose out of the
confusion is not correct in respect of the 2 August 2017 letter (see below):
“..... A letter was then sent from PSB to the complainant on 2 August 2017. This refers to
the complaint made on 13 July only and states that PSB are considering disapplying the
complaint and invites the complainant to submit any representations before a decision is
made. This letter is technically incorrect; it only refers to the complaint received on 13 July.
It does not make reference to the complaints submitted on 14 July - despite it being these
complaint which are on the Complainant Record.”

As aforementioned, the 2 August 2017 letter refers neither to the 13 or 14 July 2017 complaint.
Only the Complainant Record accompanying the letter can be said to refer to the 14 July matter, but
the record was included mistakenly because the letter related to the complaint about warrant officers
impersonating police officers. The corresponding letter (proposing to disapply) relating to
CO/886/17 was dated 19 December 2017 in any event not 2 August 2017 as stated in the appeal
outcome dated 31 October 2017.
Anomaly surrounding complaint CO/49/18 (in respect of a single allegation)
DCI Farrow confuses fact and fiction in his 1 August 2018 account surrounding complaint
CO/49/18, i.e. that it was ‘in respect of a single allegation’. He implies that my complainant went
no further than alleging that I had not received updates within the IOPC Statutory guidelines in
respect of the investigation which was purportedly being carried out by DI Foster as part of the
complaint process in relation to CO/49/18. The account goes on to inaccurately describe how the
complaint arose which included the false statement that the crime allegations concerned North East
Lincolnshire Council and Council tax payments which I appeared not to have timeously met. The
20 June 2018 appeal1
I made to Humberside Police Appeals Body (HPAB) on being dissatisfied
with the outcome of the Local resolution process was misleadingly described as being based ONLY
upon my consideration that the matter should have been referred to the IOPC.
For the avoidance of doubt, the complaint did not just raise a single allegation. The force only
included a single allegation in the Complaint report of 7 February 2018 but the complaint raised a
number of issues which were not acknowledged, for example concerns about negligence of the PSD
were raised. The crux of the matter was that the investigating officer clearly had no serious
intentions of satisfying himself that a crime had occurred in respect of CO/535/17 (Recorded 9
August 2017) and the exercise was merely the force going through the motions. The irony is that the
crime had already been proven beyond all reasonable doubt in any event before the force were
directed by the IOPC to deal with the matter. The allegation as specified in the Complaint report (7
February) regarding not receiving updates within the IOPC Statutory guidelines was of secondary
importance to the obvious failure to pursue all reasonable lines of enquiry.
To be clear, the complaint did not arise from DI Foster’s investigation around the crime allegations
concerning Council tax payments which I appeared not to have timeously met, but did relate to
complaints against the police under CO/535/17 - i.e. the failure of police to investigate criminal
1
DCI Farrow’s letter of 1 August 2018 mistakenly states 22 June 2018 as the date the appeal was sent

allegations involving a false claim made by the MoJ that 10 items of post had been sent to me
between December 2013 and July 2016 and which I claim never to have received and believe they
were dishonestly constructed later to satisfy enquiries made by the judicial ombudsman.
With regards the appeal sent on the 20 June 2018 which is with HPAB; - that was not merely
contested on the basis that the matter should have been referred to the IOPC. The representations
attached support this assertion.
I trust that this letter sufficiently explains why I have not, and am unable to provide my
representations in respect of complaint CO/498/17 and so await notification of how the force wishes
to proceed
Yours sincerely
.
Enclosure

Representations in respect of appeal
Ref: CO/49/18
Do you agree with the outcome of the local resolution? [No]
I don’t consider that the complaint was suitable for Local Resolution. Humberside police must be
satisfied in accordance with the Police Reform Act 2002 that the complaint is suitable for local
resolution. The criteria for whether a complaint can be dealt with by Local Resolution are set out in
paragraph 6 (sub-paragraphs 6 to 8) of Schedule 3 of that Act. Paragraph 6 provides so far as is
relevant, as follows:
“Handling of complaints by the appropriate authority
6. (1) This paragraph applies where a complaint has been recorded by the appropriate
authority.
........
(4) If the appropriate authority determines that the complaint is suitable for being
subjected to local resolution, it shall make arrangements for it to be so subjected.
(5) If the appropriate authority determines that the complaint is not so suitable, it shall
make arrangements for the complaint to be investigated by the authority on its own
behalf.
(6) A determination that a complaint is suitable for being subjected to local resolution
may not be made unless the following conditions are both met.
(7) The first condition is that the appropriate authority is satisfied that the conduct
complained of (even if it were proved) would not justify the bringing of any criminal
or disciplinary proceedings against the person whose conduct is complained of.
(8) The second condition is that the appropriate authority is satisfied that the conduct
complained of (even if it were proved) would not involve the infringement of a
person's rights under Article 2 or 3 of the Convention (within the meaning of the
Human Rights Act 1998).
(9) ........”

IPCC guidance on handling complaints elaborates on the relevant provision of the Police Reform
Act 2002 in this matter. It is evident from the guidance that the force need not take into account
anything other than the conduct complained of, i.e., the strength of evidence has no bearing on
whether the matter is deemed suitable for being subjected to local resolution as opposed to an
investigation.
Though no question arises, the guidance does state ‘if there is doubt about a complaint being
suitable for local resolution, err on the side of caution and conduct an investigation’. Quoted from
page 2 of the August 2014 issue (Focus) the following provides clarification for assessing suitability
for local resolution:
“The test is whether the conduct complained about, even if proven, would not justify
criminal or disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, when considering if the conduct would
justify the bringing of proceedings, there should be no consideration of the strength of the
evidence, whether the complaint is likely to be upheld, or the likeliness of prosecution.
When assessing a complaint using the suitability test, the complaint should be taken at face
value, focusing on the substance of the conduct being complained about. The decision
should not be based on the wording of the complaint alone (the relevant appeal body test is
applied in this way). It also should not be based on reviewing the evidence available and
exploring the likely outcome (the special requirements test on investigations is applied in
this way).
The person assessing the complaint’s seriousness should consider contacting the
complainant to better understand their complaint and to get further information. A mini-
investigation to assess the strength of evidence for the complaint (such as getting custody
records, incident logs, speaking to the officers concerned, etc) should not be conducted. If
the evidence does not support the complaint then the complaint is not upheld following an
investigation, it does not make it any more suitable for local resolution.
It is possible for a complaint that uses exaggerated language to be locally resolved, but the
right of appeal is to the IPCC. It is also possible for a complaint to be deemed unsuitable for
local resolution, but then the appointed investigating officer, upon reviewing the evidence,
does not apply special requirements to the subsequent investigation.”
Humberside police could not conceivably have been satisfied that if proven the conduct complained
of would not have justified the bringing of criminal and/or disciplinary proceedings against the
officer complained about.
The complaint raised a wide scope of concerns ranging from the failure to provide updates within
the appropriate time period to the improper exercise of police powers (an offence under s.26 of the

Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015). The response focussed only on the matter as it was
described briefly in the recorded complaint report, i.e., the failure to update within the appropriate
time period according to the IOPC Statutory guidelines.
The force has confirmed in its findings that it could not be relied on to pursue all reasonable lines of
enquiry, though, this would be more accurately expressed if it was said that the force pursued all
irrelevant lines of enquiry in a systematic effort to obfuscate the investigation process. The present
complaint was raised because it was clear that the investigating officer had no serious intentions of
satisfying himself that a Crime had occurred and the exercise was merely Humberside Police going
through the motions.
After eventually being referred the matter to deal with on 17 September 2017 after being instructed
to do so by the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) DI Foster communicated by email
regarding the investigation on 3 occasions up until the outcome of 25 May 2018. Within those
emails it was manifestly shown that he had no intention of seriously pursuing the matter. He wrote 7
weeks after he had received signed copies of the 10 letters purportedly sent by the Justices’ clerk to
confirm that he had ‘now identified the person within the Justice clerk system’ who he needed to
speak with, and asked for ‘the content of the letters in question’ to be identified. Other information
which he had already been provided weeks earlier was also asked for.
Another anomaly casting doubt as to the seriousness with which the investigation was being
pursued was an email apparently sent by the Judicial Appointment and Conduct Ombudsman’s
Office (JACO). The authenticity of the email was in question (hence ‘apparently sent’) as the
encoding revealed within the file’s properties was inconsistent with that of other JACO employees’
emails and appeared not to have been sent from an official government email server. However, it
was stated in the correspondence that the Ombudsman had been approached by Humberside Police
in connection with a complaint of corruption that had been made regarding North East Lincolnshire
Council, including that the complainant had not received letters that the Council had sent (a possible
red herring).
Putting to one side the email’s questionable origins, the anomaly in respect of the focus being on the
Council rather than the Ministry of Justice was consistent with the outcome of 25 May 2018,
because this report also supports, either by incompetence or design, that there was a
misunderstanding about what was required to be investigated. For a start, the report irrelevantly
referred to enquiries that were made with a number of Officers from North East Lincolnshire
Council (NELC) and Andrew Hobley from the Local Government Ombudsman. DI Foster had not

been led to believe that NELC was involved in the dishonesty (at least not in this matter). He had in
any event the opportunity to re-evaluate what lines of enquiry were pertinent when I asked him to
clarify why it was relevant that he enquired about whether a complaint had been made to NELC
(and if so any contact details). He was asked for clarification but this was never forthcoming.
The report is littered with what are effectively red herrings to distract anyone from what is really
going on, especially anyone unfamiliar with the case who had no idea how compelling the evidence
was that was omitted from mention in the report. The objective clearly with this ploy has been to
dupe those in the dark into believing that thorough enquiries had been carried out. The reality
however, is that to anyone informed it would be so overwhelmingly obvious that the content was
not worth the paper it was written on.
For example, it is not difficult to see how the following might have succeeded in prejudicing the
opinion of any uninformed person considering the merits of the investigation to the extent that they
were satisfied that all reasonable lines of enquiry had been pursued:
“The [Judicial] Ombudsman did not consider any issues regarding the Local Authority's
handling of its correspondence to you nor did they make any enquires, the Ombudsman have
no knowledge of any other letters being produced to them.
I also made contact with the Local Government Ombudsman, they were not in a position to
provide any details of complaints made to them as these are strictly confidential and they are
statutorily barred from sharing this information.”
To anyone informed it is glaringly obvious that Humberside police has been complicit in a cover-up
of serious criminal wrongdoing carried out by the Ministry of Justice. It is also obvious that
pretending to misunderstand the allegations thereby inventing matters to investigate is a well
practiced tactical ploy to obfuscate the process.
It is telling that the evidence which proved the allegations beyond reasonable doubt was not even
mentioned in the 25 May 2018 outcome, so is the fact that myself, who was under no statutory duty
to keep the complaint details confidential, could have provided what the LGO refused but I was not
asked to. However, it is puzzling what DI Foster thought could be achieved anyway by pursuing the
Council and LGO. Even the Judicial Ombudsman who has been most closely involved was hardly
going to reveal anything to the police willingly which would materially assist an investigation. The
Judicial Ombudsman had already made it clear it was only his concern that he had obtained the

letters; it was immaterial to him whether the letters had been created after the event to cover their
tracks once enquiries were made.
It also does not look good for the police that I had made it clear early on that I considered it unlikely
that the dishonesty would not have been known about or even instigated by officials more senior
than the Justices' Clerk. A response on 6 October 2017 contained the following to the police asking
me if there were any further comments I would like to add in regards to my complaint:
“Regarding further comments, I think it is appropriate given that you have referred to the
Judicial Ombudsman etc., that it is my opinion that the Ombudsman HMCTS/MoJ are more
likely than not complicit. I would think it highly unlikely that the Justices' Clerk would
make the decision herself to attempt to pull this off, and suggest either she has been
pressured to do so by someone more senior or has known she could rely on being backed up
by her employer. This has already been implied in an email (attached) to HMCTS' Head of
Customer Investigations, Richard Redgrave, responding to his 6 April 2017 outcome of the
investigation”
Apart from the deliberate obfuscation tactics employed it is also noted that the report’s findings
amount to zero. The declaration below tells me nothing I do not already know or reveals to DI
Foster anything that was not available to him in the various documents that the police had already
been provided:
“I have spoken with Alison Watts (HMCTS Humber and South Yorkshire), I am aware she
has responded to some of your concerns in past correspondence. She has indicated that any
letters issued would have been sent in the normal course of events and posted with any other
mail, copies of letters would be kept which would be dated. She has no knowledge of why
you did not receive these letters.
I have also noted a response sent to you by the Cluster Manager for HMCTS (Paul
Hopgood), in this he sets out the response regarding the number of letters sent by HMCTS
Humber and South Yorkshire that were not received by you nor returned to HMCTS by the
Royal Mail. This response states that they could not identify why you did not receive these
letters nor if they were sent by recorded or registered delivery as set out under the
Magistrates Courts Rules 1981, they apologised for this.
I have also spoken with the Judicial Ombudsman's office (JACO), they have reviewed two
complaints to identify whether there was any maladministration in the Judicial conduct
Investigation process, one of the issues was that you did not receive three letters from the
advisory committee, these letters were subsequently obtained and sent to you in February
2016......”

Clearly all the force has done here is exploit the findings of the Judicial Ombudsman and HMCTS
who were only ever, at the very most, going to concede that there had been “a very poor level of
service” which had incidentally taken a total 408 days from first being aware of the fraud on 23
February 2016 until 6 April 2017 when the admission was eventually prized from the multi stage
Complaints handling mechanism.
The force is clearly implying that because these two bodies are apparently satisfied there has been
no criminal wrongdoing it has been handed a get out from carrying out its duty to investigate. But
the force already tried to pull this one and failed in its attempt to circumvent the correct process in a
previous complaint. The IOPC found that this along with other grounds were unsatisfactory so they
upheld my complaint and directed the force to record it. The IOPC letter of 28 July 2017 upholding
the appeal contained the following:
“I do not consider that your complaint dated 25 February 2017 is an abuse of the police
complaints procedures. I note the force have referred to the Judicial Ombudsman and
HMCTS being the correct forum for this matter. However, I believe that the crux of your
complaint is that the police have decided not to criminally investigate the Magistrate's Court
for conduct which you consider to be criminal.”
The only relevance of the Judicial Ombudsman and HMCTS’ involvement in the matter is that they
elicited responses from the Justices' Clerk to letters which had, as far as I was concerned, not been
responded to over a several year period which gave me every reason to suspect they had been
produced afterwards. The protracted period over which the letters were purportedly sent and the fact
that there were as many as 10 of them was always going to make the task of covering their tracks a
difficult one and one which was evidently not managed successfully despite various officials
implying differently. It was these aggravating circumstances, along with other contributing factors
which demonstrated, beyond reasonable doubt that dishonesty was involved, and would
unquestionably have satisfied the test laid out in R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 (or whichever case
applies since the Supreme Court in Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017] UKSC 67 overturned the test).
The report’s findings yell out at you that the force’s handling of the complaint was no more than a
token gesture with obvious signs that generic content had been used from templates which had not
even been updated to reflect the Supreme Court’s overruling of the Ghosh test (see its barefaced and
utterly unsupported denial):

“In reviewing any allegation the Police have to satisfy themselves that a Crime has occurred.
They then need to demonstrate, beyond reasonable doubt that a dishonest act has occurred,
the definition of dishonesty is laid out in case law of R V GHOSH.
Having conducted these proportionate enquires, I cannot demonstrate that the points to
prove for the offences laid out in your complaint are satisfied, therefore the matters will not
be investigated.”
Presumably the above is officially stating that the force is not only unable to demonstrate beyond
reasonable doubt that a dishonest act has occurred but also that they are satisfied themselves that a
crime has not occurred. If so, the force must itself be guilty of dishonesty, because the accused's
conduct was incontrovertibly dishonest by the standards of ordinary, reasonable and honest people.
Incidentally, it is not now a consideration that a jury would need satisfying that the accused must
have realised that what he was doing was, by those standards, dishonest. The ‘proportionate
enquires’ referred to, as previously highlighted, were no more than a token gesture of accountability
which revealed nothing new and were obviously not meant to. This of course was gross misconduct
as the line of enquiry followed by the force pursued the route most guaranteed to lead nowhere and
a blind eye turned to the most relevance factors which would satisfy the force that it was dealing
with crime.
Records confirm that a substantial amount of material had been collated and made available to the
force in an email of 19 March 2017 in which Christine Wilson (head of specialist crime) was
copied. This evidence fully backed up the allegations recorded in police log of 7 January 2017 and
was of sufficient strength to satisfy the force that the matter was a criminal one and imperative that
it was fully investigated. The only logical explanation for the obstruction that involved channelling
the matter through the police statutory complaints process was that the force was complicit in a
cover up (the establishment protecting its own). There is every reason to suspect that the evidence
was given no consideration whatsoever. Instead, resources were disproportionately diverted to
initially rejecting a complaint on the basis that it was not a police matter, which then changed to an
abuse of the complaints process, because the allegations were a repetition of previously complained
of matters (entirely unconnected) and for which it presented a case to convince the police regulator.

Do you feel the outcome was a proper outcome? [No]
The outcome did not reflect the complaint I submitted on 2 February 2018. The response focussed
only on the matter as it was described briefly in the recorded complaint report (failure to update
appropriately). The force is obliged to take into account all of the representations including those
which have been provided additionally during the process (SI 2012/1204, regulation 6). The
prescribed complaint form in any event made it clear it would not be expected that the issues were
comprehensively set out initially.
Consequently the matters raised which were not dealt with are as follows:
1. Concerns about the Professional Standards Branch’s (PSB) inappropriate referral of the
complaint to DI Foster bearing in mind his “Operational commitments”. This matter has
been raised before and therefore is inexcusable. In any event, the seriousness of the reported
crime warranted the fullest attention of an investigator with the appropriate expertise in
dealing with the type of offence involved.
2. Inappropriately considering the complaint suitable for Local resolution when it should
instead have been referred to the IOPC. It was brought to DI Foster’s attention that the
allegation patently concerned the improper exercise of police powers (an offence under s.26
of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015) and any alleged conduct that could arguably
fall within the definition of an offence under s.26 of the 2015 Act must be referred to the
IOCC in accordance with the IPCC operational advice note (Mandatory referral criteria
update, April 2017). This matter has been raised before.
3. It was made clear in my response to DI Foster’s enquiries that I expected the allegation to be
recorded as a crime and an investigation undertaken pursuing all reasonable lines of enquiry.
I expressed also my opinion that the Judicial Ombudsman and or HMCTS were more likely
than not complicit as it would be highly unlikely that the Justices' Clerk under her own
initiative would have dishonestly constructed the letters and so suggested she has been
pressured to do so by someone more senior. There was no recognition of this and the
comments obviously not considered because the outcome letter demonstrates that the basis
of the “proportionate enquiries” revolved around the decisions of the Judicial Ombudsman
etc., and other irrelevancies. The present complaint raised these concerns but were evidently

not dealt with. The previous section goes into more detail (re, “do you agree with the
outcome of the local resolution”)
4. In the same response to DI Foster I queried why I was being asked if I had lodged any
complaint to North East Lincolnshire Council (it indicated a misunderstanding of the
allegations or more seriously that they had not even been considered at all). Again there was
no recognition of this and the comments obviously not considered as the outcome letter
stated without logical reason that ‘in the course of my enquires I have made contact with a
number of Officers from North East Lincolnshire Council’. These concerns were raised in
the present complaint after DCI Scaife contacted me on 17 April 2018 to confirm details of
correspondence that had been sent. The anomaly in respect of the focus being on the Council
rather than the MoJ was consistent as the 17 April correspondence asked for it to be verified
that I had emailed DI Foster on 21 February to confirm that I ‘did not receive council
letters’. I had sent an email that day to DI Foster but it was to reiterate that I had not
received the 10 items of post and to stress that I had provided evidence to support the
allegation so the question of identifying whether it amounted to a criminal offence did not
come into it. Also clearly stated was that it was the MoJ against whom the allegations were
made (not council).
5. I raised concerns in a subsequent email to DI Foster (15 March 2018) about a couple of
suspicious emails sent to me purportedly by John Critchfield of the Judicial Ombudsman’s
Office. The emails also wrongly refer to missing letters sent by the Council (referred to in
more detail previously). Again there was no recognition of this and the comments obviously
not considered as there was no evidence in the outcome letter that the matter formed any
part of the “proportionate enquiries”. These concerns were raised in the present complaint
in response to DCI Scaife’s 17 April 2018 enquiries but were evidently not considered.
6. Also in response to DCI Scaife’s enquiries I expressed that my principle expectation on the
outcome of the complaint was to discover why none of my communications / evidence had
been taken into account and I had been repeatedly asked for information I had already sent.
Again no evidence is present in either of the local resolution outcomes that this had been
taken on board. My response to DCI Scaife included a chronology of correspondence briefly
highlighting the anomalies with the expectation that this would assist his enquiries into the
doubt that had arisen as to the seriousness with which the investigation was being pursued.
The chronology of correspondence was duplicated in DCI Scaife’s outcome letter as a

declaration of what additional information I had provided but to reiterate, it was omitted
what my expectation on the outcome of the complaint was which I provided in the same
email.
20 June 2018

Representations in respect of appeal
Ref: CO/400/18
Do you agree with the outcome of the local resolution? [No]
I don’t consider that the complaint was suitable for Local Resolution. Humberside police must be
satisfied in accordance with the Police Reform Act 2002 that the complaint is suitable for local
resolution. The criteria for whether a complaint can be dealt with by Local Resolution are set out in
paragraph 6 (sub-paragraphs 6 to 8) of Schedule 3 of that Act. Paragraph 6 provides so far as is
relevant, as follows:
“Handling of complaints by the appropriate authority
6. (1) This paragraph applies where a complaint has been recorded by the appropriate
authority.
........
(4) If the appropriate authority determines that the complaint is suitable for being
subjected to local resolution, it shall make arrangements for it to be so subjected.
(5) If the appropriate authority determines that the complaint is not so suitable, it shall
make arrangements for the complaint to be investigated by the authority on its own
behalf.
(6) A determination that a complaint is suitable for being subjected to local resolution
may not be made unless the following conditions are both met.
(7) The first condition is that the appropriate authority is satisfied that the conduct
complained of (even if it were proved) would not justify the bringing of any criminal
or disciplinary proceedings against the person whose conduct is complained of.
(8) The second condition is that the appropriate authority is satisfied that the conduct
complained of (even if it were proved) would not involve the infringement of a
person's rights under Article 2 or 3 of the Convention (within the meaning of the
Human Rights Act 1998).
(9) ........”
IPCC guidance on handling complaints elaborates on the relevant provision of the Police Reform
Act 2002 in this matter. It is evident from the guidance that the force need not take into account

anything other than the conduct complained of, i.e., the strength of evidence has no bearing on
whether the matter is deemed suitable for being subjected to local resolution as opposed to an
investigation.
Though no question arises, the guidance does state ‘if there is doubt about a complaint being
suitable for local resolution, err on the side of caution and conduct an investigation’. Quoted from
page 2 of the August 2014 issue (Focus) the following provides clarification for assessing suitability
for local resolution:
“The test is whether the conduct complained about, even if proven, would not justify
criminal or disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, when considering if the conduct would
justify the bringing of proceedings, there should be no consideration of the strength of the
evidence, whether the complaint is likely to be upheld, or the likeliness of prosecution.
When assessing a complaint using the suitability test, the complaint should be taken at face
value, focusing on the substance of the conduct being complained about. The decision
should not be based on the wording of the complaint alone (the relevant appeal body test is
applied in this way). It also should not be based on reviewing the evidence available and
exploring the likely outcome (the special requirements test on investigations is applied in
this way).
The person assessing the complaint’s seriousness should consider contacting the
complainant to better understand their complaint and to get further information. A mini-
investigation to assess the strength of evidence for the complaint (such as getting custody
records, incident logs, speaking to the officers concerned, etc) should not be conducted. If
the evidence does not support the complaint then the complaint is not upheld following an
investigation, it does not make it any more suitable for local resolution.
It is possible for a complaint that uses exaggerated language to be locally resolved, but the
right of appeal is to the IPCC. It is also possible for a complaint to be deemed unsuitable for
local resolution, but then the appointed investigating officer, upon reviewing the evidence,
does not apply special requirements to the subsequent investigation.”
Humberside police could not conceivably have been satisfied that if proven the conduct complained
of would not have justified the bringing of criminal and/or disciplinary proceedings against the
officer complained about.
The resolving officer has demonstrated in the following paragraph (quoted from the outcome letter)
that the law has not been adhered to regarding what is required in the decision making process when
determining whether a complaint requires referral to the IOPC or if it is suitable to be dealt with by
way of Local Resolution.

“Your final paragraph deals with offences under section 26 of the Criminal Justice and
Courts Act 2015 and the notion that this qualifies for mandatory referral to the IOPC. These
type of referrals and offences are of the highest thresholds and in practical terms they are
'scoped' and a degree of fact finding engaged before referral takes place as the IOPC
guidance provides for. Further, if during any ensuing investigation there is some evidence
revealed or supporting factors which necessitate a further severity assessment, there is still
provision to later refer to the IOPC. This has not been the case with your complaints.
The IOPC Operational advice note (Mandatory referral criteria update, April 2017) was referred to
in my complaint in the context of the force’s legal obligation to refer cases to the IOPC when an
allegation falls within the definition of an offence of ‘corruption or other improper exercise of
police powers and privileges’ under s.26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. For ease of
reference the contents of the relevant page of the Operational advice note (page 6) is quoted below:
‘Section 2: Additional guidance on applying the mandatory referral criteria
The statutory offence of police corruption
3.1 On 13 April 2015, a new statutory offence of ‘corruption or other improper exercise of
police powers and privileges’ was introduced by section 26 of the Criminal Justice and
Courts Act 2015.
3.2 For the avoidance of doubt, any alleged conduct that could arguably fall within the
definition of this offence would constitute an allegation of serious corruption and must
therefore be referred to the IPCC.’
The resolving officer has failed to recognise that the allegation must, by law, be taken at face value
for the purposes of making a referral to the IOPC and instead justified the force making its own
judgement as to whether the allegation meets the threshold based on the strength of evidence etc.
The IOPC statutory guidance states in this regard that ‘the appropriate authority must refer
complaints and recordable conduct matters that include allegations of conduct which constitutes
serious corruption’. It is therefore irrelevant that the force may consider the conduct complained
about would not justify criminal or disciplinary proceedings based on the strength of evidence; this
has no bearing on whether the matter is deemed suitable for referral to the IOPC.
For the avoidance of doubt, the complaint alleges misconduct which categorically falls under two of
the sub-groups of the Mandatory referral criteria (serious corruption) defined under paragraph 8.13
of the IOPC Statutory Guidance. The Mandatory referral criteria derives its authority from
subparagraph 2(a)(iii) of regulation 4 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012.
Conformation in the 2017 Operational advice note that any alleged conduct that could arguably fall

within the definition of the improper exercise of police powers just adds weight to the fact that by
law the complaint was required to be referred to the IOPC.
To be clear, the negligence, obfuscation delaying tactics and general unlawful manner in which the
Professional Standards Department deals with complaints and conduct matters has given the force
the green light to routinely turn a blind eye to serious crimes even when evidence supporting the
allegations have proved them beyond reasonable doubt. The routine failure of the force to properly
exercise its powers etc. has not only allowed these crimes to go unpunished, it also means I have
been a repeat victim as a consequence. Given the substantial injustice arising as a consequence of
the improper exercise of police powers the failure has been severely to my detriment and therefore
amounts to an offence under subsections (5) and (6) of Section 26 of the Criminal Justice and
Courts Act 2015.
Because of the failure arising from matters associated with this complaint I have been:-
wrongly convicted of an offence and consequently have a criminal record
incurred direct financial loss of £620 in various court costs and charges etc. in respect
of the wrongful conviction.
experienced distressing effects of wrongful arrest and false imprisonment (twice)
damaged reputation attributed to criminal record and local Newspaper publishing
biased/defamatory report.
substantial injustice caused having to engage with the court for its serious errors in
respect of matters which led to my wrongful conviction and police neglecting to
investigate fraud and perjury (were it not for force’s failure I would have been saved
being subjected to the court’s ineptitude).
in respect of police conduct; failure to investigate timeously more serious allegations
against the police than allegations against me due to unlawfully suspending
investigation of the complaint until after the trial therefore attributing to the
miscarriage of justice and delay
in respect of police conduct; denied right to legal remedy due to delay dealing with
complaint that ensured by the time investigations had completed any legal proceedings
regarding the breach of Human Rights I may have intended bringing upon the
outcome, would be statute barred
force failing to record and investigate allegations made against the witnesses who
submitted perjured evidence

determining unlawfully that the police complaint submitted 8 November 2015 was
suitable for being subjected to local resolution when it blatantly was not adding
hundreds of days to the process which has because of the need to re-investigate still
not completed.
pursued by North East Lincolnshire Council’s bailiff contractor (two firms) for a
potentially fraudulent amount of £975
left open to further injustice by North East Lincolnshire Council, potentially leading to
imprisonment for a debt engineered by the council
engaging in time consuming and totally pointless disputes with sham or powerless
organisations; for example; PHSO; LGO; IOPC; police complaints & appeals;
appealing Magistrates court’s decision to Crown court. etc., etc.
see Annex A for a more detailed account of the injustice caused attributable to the
miscarriage of justice in the criminal matter
The above just gives a flavour of the kind of injustice I have been caused as a consequence of
Humberside police officers improperly exercising their powers and the Professional Standards
Department’s corrupt handling of concerns raised subsequently about it.
Obfuscation tactics continue in this local resolution outcome
Even after being repeatedly told it is incorrect, the force still accounts for North East Lincolnshire
Council being involved in the criminal matter about the Ministry of Justice claiming to have sent 10
letters which were never sent but dishonestly constructed at a later date to cover their tracks. Not
much of the following paragraph quoted from the local resolution outcome is correct which makes
one wonder where the information has been obtained especially as a Warrant has never been issued
for my arrest over alleged unpaid Council Tax and charges:
“I am cognizant of the fact you have made a number of complaints going back a few years
essentially arising from the primary issue of unpaid Council Tax and proceedings taken
against you to recover that claimed outstanding debt by North East Lincolnshire Council.
You alleged collusion/malfeasance/fraud by the Council and Ministry of Justice involving
correspondence which you claimed not to have received and which they were said by you to
have later generated to satisfy the Ombudsman's enquiries. The police became involved
around the time a Warrant was issued for your arrest over alleged unpaid Council Tax and
charges. You reported this as a crime committed by the Council while also raising a number
of complaints about how the police had not dealt with these reports to your satisfaction.”

The untrue statement about an arrest over alleged unpaid Council Tax and charges is as far as I’m
aware a newly invented one by the force. It is the first time I have seen it in any of Humberside
police’s formal correspondence. Typically when this happens and brought to the attention of the
resolving officer that it is untrue there is not only no recognition by the force but it continues to
make the incorrect statement whenever the opportunity arises. A clear example of this happening
was when Det Ch Insp Christine Calvert who was then the Temporary Detective Inspector in charge
of the Economic Crime Unit continued to make untrue statements even after being brought to her
attention they were untrue (see Annex B, paras 54 - 57).
It was thought initially that officers dealing with complaints were hopelessly inept, either that or
concerns were simply ignored, but the evidence increasingly points to criminal corruption. The
outcome letter and the letter referred to dated 1 August 2018 signed by DCI Farrow demonstrate
that material relevant to the issues has been considered to a reasonable degree, but evidently not in
order to deal with the issues objectively. As my reply to DCI Farrow’s letter confirms, the facts
were twisted so it appears on the record that I had fully understood what was going on despite all
the anomalies which is simply untrue.
Evidently complaints are not dealt with in the interest of the aggrieved person but contrived
purposely to provide an outcome that will stand up to scrutiny if appealed (see later under heading
‘Legislation does not provide for offences’). In order to achieve this, it is not necessary to deal with
them fairly or even stick to facts which accounts for why the force is so indifferent when told its
version of events are untrue. By the time a matter reaches an appeal stage the findings and whether
they have been arrived at fairly or even true are irrelevant because an adjudicator restricts his focus
to whether the correct procedure has been followed so the whole exercise is therefore pointless and
a waste of time.
Wrongly assuming I had clarity of understanding
The outcome refers to my appeal dated 26 September 2017 in the context that it showed I had
clarity of understanding of what was going on with the recording of the complaints. The
representations I was requested to provide in regards CO/498/17 which I provided to Sally Banks
on 5 August 2017 (not 30 August as stated in DCI Farrow’s letter) were made as a consequence of
my total confusion about which complaint I was dealing with because of the number of anomalies I
was facing and therefore were not specific to any particular matter as the contents of that email
attests (see further Annex C):

“I'm replying to your letter dated 2 August 2017 concerning the above referenced complaint.
Humberside police force is making improper use of the Police reform Act 2002 by
exploiting the legislation as an alternative to carrying out the police forces proper function
(to prevent or provide a remedy for acts of crime).
I consider having to engage further in this process on account of the routine abuse of the
Police Reform Act 2002 is an injustice which is the price I'm paying as a direct result of the
loyalty police officers dealing with complaints have for their colleagues.
The force also seems to view dealing with these matters as a contest or game which is
clearly an inappropriate use of taxpayer resources and my time personally.
I suggest the force looks again at its proposed decision to disapply these matters because it
justifies doing so erroneously on the basis that the complaints are repetitive. Humberside
police is treating complaints about the force and reports of crime as one and the same which
is a fundamental abuse of the Police Reform Act 2002.”
It is apparent that by the time I submitted the 26 September appeal I had figured out to some extent
what had happened but it is an exaggeration to say I had clarity of understanding. For example, I
had wrongly stated that the force’s letter dated 2 August 2017 referred to the 13 July complaint. The
content of the letter referred to an entirely unrelated complaint concerning the impersonation of a
police officer for which the force were proposing to disapply on the basis that it was vexatious and
an abuse of process.
The outcome letter makes a further reference to my alleged understanding of the issues:
“Following my examination of the records and letter/email content I do not believe you have
been confused by the above events as I have demonstrated...”.
However, as I have briefly explained above and in more detail in Annex C it clearly did not make
sense to me at all why the content of the letter proposing to disapply dated 2 August 2017 referred
to my complaint being vexatious on account of my previous concerns about warrant officers
impersonating police officers. Neither complaint CO/498/17 nor CO/886/17 raised issues in any
way connected with that offence. But if I previously had clarity of understanding (which clearly I
did not) the following quoted from the outcome letter puts paid to that:
“The sum of what amounts to an administrative error following your appeal resulted in the
recording and single allegation of the 13th July 2017 to be raised under CO/00886/17, albeit
by now very late on 15th December 2018 and well outside the IOPC guidelines (When
arguably it should not have been recorded at all as it was a repeat of that received the day

after). It is therefore not surprising this complaint likewise met with disapplication although
on grounds it was repeating an investigation ongoing by Det. Insp. Foster in respect of
complaint CO/00535/17. You appealed that disapplication decision to HAB and it has not
been upheld as of 20th March 2018.”
Just to clarify, the letter proposing the disapplication relating to CO/886/17 is dated 19 December
2017. However, what does not make sense is the comment that it was ‘not surprising’ that the
complaint ‘met with disapplication’ based on the notion that it was a repeat of that received the day
after. It does not make sense because the complaints were categorically different.
One matter related to a crime reported on Humberside police’s website on 4 June 2017 (log 343 of 5
June 2017) surrounding among other things Inspector Parsons, the resolving officer, holding a
complaint for 370 days before even opening it thus denying my right to legal remedy for being
statute barred due to the delay. This is complaint CO/498/17 of 14 July 2017 (three recorded
allegations); the element of the complaint which the force wrongly asserts to be a repeat and is
recorded as a single allegation in complaint CO/886/17 of 13 July 2017 relates to the force
improperly dealing with the reported crime and treating it as if it were a complaint submitted under
the Police Reform Act 2002.
The other matter, complaint CO/886/17 of 13 July 2017, related to a different crime reported on or
around 7 January 2017 (log 207 of 7 January 2017) about the force improperly handling it as if it
were a complaint submitted under the Police Reform Act 2002. A letter sent to me (5 April 2017)
was referred to in my complaint which irrationally contained the following in response to the
reported crime:
“I am writing with reference to your complaint you made on the 7th January 2017, Incident
log 207 07/01/17 refers, regarding the suspicions that within the Humber and South division
of the Magistrate's court, operations had been run criminally after items of correspondence
had not been delivered to you.
Professional Standards Branch within Humberside Police have reviewed this and confirmed
that this is not a complaint against police or an allegation of misconduct against any police
officer or support member of staff.”
It is therefore illogical to assert that there were legitimate grounds to disapply the 13 July complaint
on the grounds that the two complaints were the same. The only common theme linking the two
matters were that they both raised an issue about improperly handling a reported crime as if it were
a complaint submitted under the Police Reform Act 2002. There would be little achieved having
legislation preventing a complaint being dealt with just on the basis that the same misconduct had

once been raised before, even if it were a separate occurrence. That would mean in effect that the
force was given the green light, once the force had investigated a particular type of misconduct, to
repeatedly engage in the same without fear of scrutiny.
The IOPC letter of date 7 July 2017 upholding my appeal against the force not recording a
complaint on the grounds that it was repetitious (IOPC Ref: 2017/085998) clarifies the point made
above. See relevant content below:
“Having reviewed your previous complaint reference CO/1/17, you have alleged that two
Humberside police warrant officers have impersonated police officers.
It appears that the allegation made in your new complaint dated 16 May 2017 (1X/578/17) is
regarding the handling of your crime report as a complaint (CO/1/17). As such the
allegations are concerning different officers and thus cannot be considered to be repetitive.
Therefore, your appeal is upheld on this basis.
Humberside Police's PSD are directed to record your complaint made within your complaint
form dated 16 May 2017.”
There are yet more anomalies in respect of the disapplication grounds that the force relies on, i.e.,
that it was repeating an investigation ongoing by DI Foster in respect of complaint CO/535/17. The
first anomaly is that it is also claimed to be a repeat of the 14 July 2017 complaint, but that related
to the force improperly dealing with the reported crime as a complaint in respect of the resolving
officer not opening the complaint file for 370 days (CO/498/17).
The second anomaly is that neither the letter dated 19 December 2017 proposing the disapplication,
the decision to disapply of 15 January 2018 nor the appeal outcome of 20 March 2018 identified the
matter which the force claimed complaint CO/886/17 had repeated nor supported why it also
considered it to be vexatious (see IOPC Statutory Guidance, para 13.44).
“The disapplication decision should show on which ground the decision to disapply has
been made and the reason why that ground was considered appropriate.....”
A relevant observation for this appeal is that my representations of 22 December 2017 made
subsequent to the proposal letter to disapply could reasonably be said to have given the force no
room to manoeuvre because none of the relevant requirements set out in the IOPC statutory
guidance were adhered to. The representations comprehensively set out the procedure failings yet
the decision to disapply provided no evidence that the submission had been considered. My appeal

reiterated the failure and likewise, the appeal outcome provided no evidence that the representations
had been taken into account.
Another significant anomaly which points further to deliberate obfuscation tactics is the appeal
outcome report stating the following (emphasis added):
“The complainant was offered the opportunity to make representations before the decision to
disapply was made. Representations were received dated 3rd February 2017. These
representations were considered when the decision to disapply was contemplated”
My representations were sent 22 December 2017, not 3 February 2017. I did however send
representations on 3 February about the force proposing to disapply a complaint (CO/14/17) on the
basis that I could have complained sooner. The matter was in connection with that dealt with in
Annex B (Det Insp in charge of the Economic Crime Unit, Christine Calvert, reiterating untrue
statements even after being brought to her attention they were untrue).
Apart from the complaint obviously being dealt with in a way to facilitate a cover-up, it is noted in
relation to the CO/14/17 that there was no report supporting the 24 April 2017 decision not to
uphold the appeal similar to the one in CO/886/17 which confirmed that the force offered the
opportunity to make representations and when they were received. It is also noted that the usual
Humberside Police Appeal Body reference numbers were omitted on both of the appeal outcome
documents. Given the dubious way the complaints and appeal system is routinely handled, the
omission of reference numbers tends to makes you suspect that this is done to enable the matter to
be dealt with unofficially and off the record.
Progress complaints in line with the statutory guidance
The force defends in the outcome allegations of the improper exercise of police powers made
against the head of the Professional Standards Department which relate to the repeat failure to
progress complaints in line with the statutory guidance because of inadequate supervisory provision
in place. It does so, on the basis that ‘it is unrealistic to expect that individual to handle the
minutiae of up to 2000 individual complaints’. To begin with, it can hardly be considered minutiae
when injustice like the gross injustice I have been caused is likely to be inflicted on complainants
routinely. Secondly, the complaint specifically refers to previous matters about which similar
concerns have also been raised and purportedly addressed yet the same errors occur time and again.
For example, the concern in respect of the resolving officer not opening the complaint file for 370
days is set out in detail in Annex A. Paragraphs 83–89 record the difficulty pursuing updates was

proving once the investigation had resumed after it had been unlawfully suspended which attests to
the fact the negligence should not to be taken lightly because the consequences can be serious.
Another aspect is the force implying that heads of departments should not be held accountable for
whatever goes on under their watch. Presumably the head of the Professional Standards Department
is remunerated to reflect the responsibility. It is indefensible then to say that someone who carries
the title and has the salary to go with it should carry no responsibility for the malpractice that
routinely goes on and is frequently reported.
Requirement to refer to the IOPC on discovery of later evidence not being the case
The claim that there have been no supporting factors revealed which would require referral to the
IOPC from the extensive evidence provided subsequent to the force’s negligent decisions (re,
criminal allegations) has no credibility whatsoever. The Annexes to this complaint are some
examples revealing evidence and supporting factors which would necessitate referral to the IOPC in
the case of all my complaints.
Legislation does not provide for offences (failing to meet deadlines)
The assertion that legislation does not provide for offences in respect of ‘failing to meet deadlines’
has no bearing on the element of my complaint which alleges that circumstances were deliberately
engineered so the consequences have been to my severe detriment. There is a difference between
someone who is simply aggrieved by not receiving updates from the force and someone who alleges
that the force’s actions are dishonest and done with criminal intent.
The allegation as implied in the complaint report (2 August 2018) regarding not receiving updates
within the IOPC Statutory guidelines was of secondary importance to what was specifically
recorded in the complaint report about intentionally grossly mishandling the complaint recorded on
26 July 2017 concerning complaint CO/498/17.
Recording a complaint with the intention to disapply
An apology is given for the recording of a number of complaints which were subsequently
disapplied, though accounts for this being because they were repetitive complaints submitted in a
short period. However, it has been comprehensively explained why there were no grounds for
disapplying the complaints on the basis of repetition. It is more likely than not that the force had

recorded these complaints, albeit in a grossly mishandled manner, knowing full well it would
subsequently disapply the requirements of Schedule 3 of the Police Reform Act 2002 in relation to a
complaint. Page 5 of the January 2016 issue (Focus) clarifies the position with regards recording a
complaint with the intention to disapply:
“Recording a complaint with the intention to disapply falsely raises the complainant’s
expectations and may result in the loss of an independent appeal right to the IPCC2
. This
would create issues of fairness and is a misapplication of the legislation.”
23 August 2018

1
Annex A
Report supplementing
Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) directed
investigation
19 February 2018
Humberside Police Complaint:
IOPC:
Grimsby Magistrates’ court:
Police/CPS Unique Reference Number:
Criminal Cases Review Commission:
CO/432/15
2017/082079
161500245442
16AY/2837/15
01304/2016
Introduction
1. This matter concerns a police conduct complaint submitted 8 November 2015 which was
initially dealt with by way of Local Resolution. The outcome (which was appealed and
referred to the IOPC) was provided on 3 April 2017. On completing the review, the IOPC
deemed the statutory conditions were not met for the matter to be suitable for local
resolution and directed the force to fully investigate the complaint, taking into consideration
further information such as evidence in support of alleged collusion between the police, CPS
and Courts.
2. The investigation must essentially identify all failings that led to the miscarriage of justice.
For the avoidance of doubt, the wrongful arrest, false imprisonment and alleged incitement
to commit perjury set out in the 8 November complaint form only part of the overall
injustice which is now evident needs to be investigated. The prescribed complaint form in
any event made it clear it would not be expected that the issues were comprehensively set
out initially. These matters by themselves should not have led to a wrongful conviction and
so the processes, involving the police, CPS and courts, subsequent to the arrest and
imprisonment have failed. This document therefore focuses on a number of key areas

2
considered relevant for the respective public bodies to examine in respect of my complaint
and allegations.
3. In light of the systemic failures reported in the national press recently regarding disclosure
issues it is appropriate (in addition to the IOPC recommendations)1
that the Criminal Cases
Review Commission (CCRC) looks again at this case. Although the CCRC rejected the case
for review, despite the appeal grounds unwittingly raising disclosure failures, these now
have been more clearly identified and set out in these representations. The Chairman of the
CCRC reportedly2
stated that “non-disclosure of material that could prove a suspect's
innocence is the 'biggest single problem’ affecting the right to a fair trial” so it is now very
much in the public interest that this case is reviewed.
4. The representations highlight the force proceeding to charge in circumstances where the law
required no further action to be taken (the evidential standards were patently not met). The
CPS subsequently failed to identify that the police incorrectly charged the case. Despite
these failures, a further safeguard (the proper disclosure of evidence) should have resulted in
the discontinuance of the case. Instead, the police failed to disclose clearly relevant material
which was likely to have proved my innocence, categorising such evidence as ‘Clearly Not
Disclosable’. See below paras 58-64.
5. However, the failure having most serious consequences must be attributed to paperwork
being improperly served. As a result I was uninformed about the CPS’ and my own
obligations in respect of disclosure, submitting a defence statement and calling a defence
witness etc. It is only since familiarising myself with the legislation to fight my wrongful
conviction that I am aware of the extent to which the CPS and police failed to discharge
their duty of disclosure that led to the denial of a fair trial, and as a consequence, have an
insight into a process that was alien to me at the time I was prosecuted.
6. The ultimate safeguard, which clearly failed was the court, as a judge has to be satisfied so
that he is sure of a defendant’s guilt. The court could not conceivably have been satisfied
1
IOPC letter upholding appeal against Humberside police (29 August 2017); ‘On a separate note it appears you may
also have complaints concerning both the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the Court. As the [IOPC] has no
jurisdiction over these two formal bodies, please make your complaints directly to them’
2
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5209339/Watchdogs-warning-evidence-buried-police.html

3
that there was fair disclosure of the material which was capable of undermining the
prosecution case. The court had been denied the opportunity to assess material that called
into question the witnesses, and on that basis alone, the CPS could not have credibly proved
its case beyond reasonable doubt. According to a review3
commissioned by Lord Justice
Gross, then Senior Presiding Judge (emphasis added);
“The primary duty of the court is to actively manage a case following the entering of a
not guilty plea. This requires close scrutiny of the information set out in the effective
trial preparation form. The prosecution’s compliance with its disclosure obligations
must be considered and the defence must be encouraged to provide sufficient
information to progress the case at the first hearing, including the provision of a
defence statement.”
7. I had formally confirmed on 4 September 2015 that a ‘not guilty’ plea would be entered at
the first hearing. Despite this, there is no evidence to suggest that the court required proper
disclosure being made sufficiently in advance of the hearing. The schedule of unused
material was not even a matter considered at the first hearing; consequently no direction was
made for further material to be disclosed. In fact no matters at all were raised at the first
hearing regarding disclosure, or the ‘effective trial preparation form’. The prescribed form,
which will be referred to later, was required to be used by the parties, and the court for case
management, in accordance with the accompanying guidance notes.
The Director's Guidance on Charging
8. I was charged with the offence on 4 September 2015 by which time a further witness
statement had been obtained by PC Mills 1978 (1 September 2015) from Mrs Johnson. She
was present with her husband, Arthur Johnson on the day of the alleged offence who had
produced his statement the same day (27 August 2015). Hence, her account was given 5
days after his witness statement (and all others) had been obtained. It is unquestionably the
statement of Mrs Johnson (if it had been true) which would have most satisfied the
investigation that there was a case to answer in respect of the serious allegations. However,
it was also Mrs Johnson who had to the greatest degree committed wilfully to providing an
account of events which were known to be false.
3
Magistrates’ Court Disclosure Review, May 2014 (Annex A, page 52)

4
9. I had on 27 August 2015: (i) denied all wrongdoing; (ii) reiterated that denial later in
interview; (iii) highlighted the unsuitability/unreliability of Mr Johnson as a witness; and
(iv) remained voluntarily to assist (I knew CCTV footage could not have incriminated me).
Therefore, the circumstances even at that early stage gave ample reason for Humberside
police to question the reliability of the evidence. Furthermore, the credibility of the evidence
had to be in question given the nature of the allegations and the alleged offence was in the
immediate vicinity of the police station. I had also stated in the defendant interview (27
August) that I hoped there was CCTV footage as it would confirm my account. Mrs
Johnson’s delayed witness statement attests further that there was no case to answer, not
only by virtue of her untruthfulness but also because it was an obviously contrived account,
constructed from knowledge gleaned over the 5 day period she was given to produce it, see
22 April 2017 Appeal against the Local Resolution outcome (‘April Appeal’), under
heading: “time to get the story straight”.
10. For example, she had demonstrably exploited knowledge acquired regarding the alleged fly
undoing, i.e., she emphasised buttons knowing that Mr Johnson had already been discredited
by his false claim that he had witnessed the operation of a zip (false in respect of being
operated and a zip). This false claim had been brought to PC Blake’s attention in the
presence of the Johnsons shortly after the accusations were made. Mr Johnson, not wishing
to contradict himself, tactically omitted any reference to how the fly operated in his written
statement but Mrs Johnson in her formal account obtained 5 days later specifically referred
to a buttoned fly, thus exploiting the circumstances.
11. Another example pointing to Mrs Johnson’s account being contrived around events which
were confirmed prior to her witness statement was the established fact that there was no
evidence that I had urinated. Again, she had exploited knowledge acquired regarding this
i.e., that Mr Johnson had been discredited for falsely stating to Mr Warriner that he had seen
me ‘pissing up the tree’. In this instance she was able, in retrospect, to state that she had not
seen me urinate but emphasised that it appeared to her as if I was about to. Similarly as in
the previous example, Mr Johnson, with the benefit of hindsight hedged his bets by
including in his written statement that ‘it looked like he was going to have a wee against the
tree’.

5
12. The Full Code Test set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors (s.10 of the Prosecution of
Offences Act 1985) could not reasonably have been considered to have been met. The Full
Code Test required the CPS to be satisfied that there would be a realistic prospect of
conviction based on an objective assessment of the evidence (paras 4.5 and 4.6 of the Code):
“4.5 The finding that there is a realistic prospect of conviction is based on the
prosecutor's objective assessment of the evidence, including the impact of any
defence, and any other information that the suspect has put forward or on which he or
she might rely. It means that an objective, impartial and reasonable jury or bench of
magistrates or judge hearing a case alone, properly directed and acting in accordance
with the law, is more likely than not to convict the defendant of the charge alleged.
This is a different test from the one that the criminal courts themselves must apply. A
court may only convict if it is sure that the defendant is guilty
4.6 When deciding whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute, prosecutors
should ask themselves the following:
Can the evidence be used in court?
Prosecutors should consider whether there is any question over the admissibility of
certain evidence. In doing so, prosecutors should assess:
1. the likelihood of that evidence being held as inadmissible by the court; and
2. the importance of that evidence in relation to the evidence as a whole.
Is the evidence reliable?
Prosecutors should consider whether there are any reasons to question the reliability of
the evidence, including its accuracy or integrity.
Is the evidence credible?
Prosecutors should consider whether there are any reasons to doubt the credibility of
the evidence.”
13. However, in accordance with the Director of public prosecutions (DPP) Guidance on
Charging (para 2), before referral to the CPS, the police must assess cases to ensure the Full
Code Test can be met on the available evidence. The Guidance requires that in any case
which cannot meet the evidential standard that the police take “no further action”. It also
deals with the consequences of police charging offences in circumstances not permitted by

6
the guidance, both in respect of the police and the CPS. Paragraph 22 of the guidance states
as follows:
“An offence charged by the police in circumstances not permitted by this Guidance
may amount to a breach of [the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE)]. The
decision may be challenged at court and could be subject to judicial review
proceedings. It may give rise to liability under the civil law, especially if a suspect has
been detained in custody. Where a prosecutor having identified that the police have
incorrectly charged a case does not proceed in accordance with this Guidance, the CPS
may be in breach of PACE and may become subject to civil liability.”
14. The CPS confirms4
that the case was reviewed in accordance with the Code for Crown
Prosecutors and was satisfied there was a realistic prospect of conviction (implying that the
fact I was convicted after the trial ratified their actions). This of course is academic because
we are dealing here in circumstances where I have alleged that the police, courts and CPS
have been complicit in disadvantaging me to the greatest extent possible as a means to
succeed in falsely criminalising and defrauding me. A report of 17 July 20175
is also of note
which revealed routine failure of the police to disclose evidence that could assist the
accused, and in turn the CPS failing to challenge this and carry out their duty to consider
what should be disclosed to the defence throughout a case. However, even leaving this
aside, defending an alleged breach of the Code for allowing the case to proceed with no
realistic prospect of conviction (on the basis that I was convicted) would be unjustified for
at least two reasons.
15. Firstly, it is almost certain I was convicted for not attending the trial (not because the judge
was sure I was guilty). This is relevant because the point at which the prosecution was under
a duty to apply the full Code test (evidential stage) far preceded when it could have possibly
been aware that I would not attend the trial. It was not until 11 December 2015 that I
contacted the court expressing that I did not consider the District Judge ‘a fit and proper
person to hear the case’, which was three months after I was charged. Therefore, whoever
deemed there to be a realistic prospect of conviction was unaware that I would not have
attended the trial, and consequently, the absence could not have been a consideration.
4
Correspondence dated 3 May 2017 from the District Crown Prosecutor (CPS Yorkshire and Humberside)
5
Joint inspection by Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of
Constabulary which ‘found widespread failures across the criminal justice system when it comes to disclosure of
evidence’

7
However, if it was known, it would have been the single justification for the CPS being
satisfied that there was the remotest possibility of a conviction.
16. Secondly, the only evidence available on which a determination could have been made was
that which was clearly unreliable and of questionable credibility (see above paras 8-12). As
the evidential stage of the full Code test could not have been met on the standard of
evidence, and because cases which do not pass the evidential stage must not proceed, then
the CPS clearly breached the Code for Crown Prosecutors.6
Procedure under the Disclosure manual
17. The Disclosure Manual published by the CPS contains operational instructions to provide a
practical guide to disclosure principles and procedures which builds on the framework of the
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act (the ‘CPIA’), Code of Practice and the Attorney
General's Guidelines. The second bullet point under paragraph 3.1 of chapter 3 of the
Disclosure manual states as follows:
“The officer in charge of the investigation has special responsibility to ensure that the
duties under the Code of Practice are carried out by all those involved in the
investigation, and for ensuring that all reasonable lines of enquiry are pursued,
irrespective of whether the resultant evidence is more likely to assist the prosecution or
the accused.”
Or in the Code of Practice prescribed under s 23(1) of the CPIA, paragraph 3.5
“In conducting an investigation, the investigator should pursue all reasonable lines of
inquiry, whether these point towards or away from the suspect. What is reasonable in
each case will depend on the particular circumstances.”
18. I had stated that the Johnson’s witness accounts were untrue. Clearly all reasonable lines of
enquiry had not been pursued. If they had it would have come to light that the Johnson’s
witness statements were inconsistent as has been documented a number of times, most
comprehensively in the April Appeal. Paragraph 3.2 (chapter 3 Disclosure manual) states
that it is the chief officer’s ‘duty to ensure that disclosure officers and deputy disclosure
6
Para 3.4 of the Code for Crown Prosecutors specifies that the CPS must only start a prosecution when the case has
passed both stages of the Full Code Test

8
officers have sufficient skills and authority, commensurate with the complexity of the
investigation, to discharge their functions effectively’. If the evidence was reviewed and
deemed, as it was, fabricated then the CPS had a duty to pursue the Johnsons for perverting
the course of justice, not turning a blind eye and prosecuting the victim.
19. Supplementary to previous representations, the arresting officer PC Blake writes in his
witness statement the following in respect of making enquiries:
‘he instantly became aggressive and argumentative saying “ARE YOU TELLING ME
TO TAKE A SEAT, YOU CANT MAKE ME, OR ARE YOU ASKING ME”. I said
“Just take a seat, I’m asking you to” to which M1 replied “WELL I DON’T HAVE TO
STAY THEN,” I then said “Take a seat”...’
This conflicts with Mrs Johnson’s witness statement which described the same incident but
in the following terms:
‘The male became quite lairy and argumentative to the officer saying “ARE YOU
ASKING ME TO SIT DOWN OR TELLING ME”. The officer replied “I’M
TELLING YOU”. The male took a seat...’
Emphasis in both the above is true to how they appear in the witness statements.
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA)
20. In accordance with s.3 of the CPIA7
the CPS was obliged to disclose to me the prosecution
material as soon as was reasonably practicable after my plea of not guilty to the charge had
been confirmed to the police on the 4 September8
. However, I only became aware of the
CPS’ obligation after the conclusion of the proceedings as a consequence of researching
legislation relevant to criminal cases to support my claims of a miscarriage of justice.
7
The prosecutor must disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not previously been disclosed to the
accused and which might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution against the
accused or of assisting the case for the accused
8
CPIA Code of Practice (paragraph 10.1)

Negligence obfuscation - delaying tactics etc

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