The document presents an appeal against a police investigation regarding an unlawful arrest by Humberside Police for indecent exposure, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable grounds for suspicion. It details the insufficient evidence and procedural errors in the investigation, highlighting the necessity for proper inquiry into the allegations and considering all pertinent factors. The appeal concludes that the arrest was unlawful under PACE, as there were no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence had occurred.

1. Extract from appeal to IOPC of Humberside police’s
Proportionate Investigation
(Unlawful Arrest)
IOPC: 2017/082079
Humberside police: CO/432/15
ACCOUNTS
PC Officer1
Conversation on 27/07/18 and follow up Email on 28/07/18
When asked about the specific allegations of:
1) Unlawfully arresting Mr A for the offence of indecent exposure
PC Officer1 reminded himself of the incident by printing off his statement. He then told
me that the statement is accurate and he was actually dealing with another enquiry at
the time. When the incident was brought to his attention it was as per his statement and
PC Officer1 spoke to Mr B who gave him the information that was sufficient to
arrest Mr A . To enable PC Officer1 to make a decision about how to progress with
the alleged crime that had been committed he requested the details of Mr A which
were refused. So even though he could have considered this to be dealt with voluntarily,
he was left in a position where under PACE he had further grounds for arrest. This extra
necessity for the arrest was to enable the name (&/or) address of the person to be
ascertained, along with the other reasons detailed in PC Officer1’s statement.
It refers above, to there being further grounds and an extra necessity for the arrest, to
enable my details to be ascertained under PACE. It is misleading to express this in terms
of an “extra necessity” and “further grounds for arrest”. The question of “necessity” for an
arrest (to enable details to be ascertained etc.) does not arise under PACE unless the
officer has first reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence has been committed.
An officer’s power of arrest (subject to the necessity test) would therefore not be
exercisable if he only had reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence might have
been committed. So, unless PC Officer1 could satisfy this requirement (which he most
obviously could not), the arrest was unlawful and he had no statutory power to make an
arrest for any of the reasons prescribed in PACE in respect of a “necessity”. It can never
be necessary to arrest a person unless there are reasonable grounds to suspect them of
committing an offence (PACE Code G, para 2.1). What was required of PC Officer1 was
that he had to first have equipped himself with sufficient information so that he had
reasonable cause to suspect (subject to the necessity test) before the power was
exercised.

2. Clearly the information given to PC Officer1 by Mr B (when considered alongside all
other factors documented throughout these representations) was insufficient to give PC
Officer1 reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence had been committed.
’Officers must consider facts and information which tend to indicate the person’s
innocence as well as their guilt’ (ACPO Position Statement: Necessity to Arrest,
November 2012).
Notwithstanding the CPS file stating I was known to the police (Restricted -
Investigations), the question of a necessity to arrest did not arise, so on the one and only
time PC Officer1 requested my details and I declined to give them, his power of arrest
was not exercisable anyway in respect of a necessity to ascertain my details. However,
even if his power of arrest was exercisable (subject to a need to) by reason of sufficient
grounds of suspicion, then it would be expected under PACE Code G (para 2.9(a-b) and
Note 2D) that he would have given a warning that the consequences of a refusal would
likely make an arrest necessary.
The eagerness with which PC Officer1 arrested me, i.e., within seconds of declining to
give details, is an indication that he was not looking to ‘consider if the necessary
objectives [could have been] met by other, less intrusive means’ (PACE Code G, para
1.3). PC Officer1 may have considered himself to have been given a green light on the
basis that the refusal supported the need for arrest and this would cover him against a
potential claim for unlawful arrest etc.
Regarding the defence of PC Officer1’s arrest in respect of several other of the
prescribed reasons in PACE, these are rebutted further on under the outcome letter’s
sub-heading “power of arrest”.
PC Officer1 told me he had sufficient grounds to arrest Mr A at the time and he is
still confident of that decision made on the information known at the time.
2) Incitement of a witness to commit perjury
PC Officer1 told me that he asked the witness on the day and at the time of the offence
what had happened, he had also been provided 3rd party information from Mr C . PC
Officer1 said that he arrested on those initial verbal accounts. PC Officer1 stated that
after the arrest and placing Mr A in custody he did not speak to or contact any of the
witnesses again and he did not carry out the investigation. PC Officer1 said that he did
not tell anyone what to say and he only asked the initial questions of the witnesses in
order to obtain an account.
The above account is indicative of the limited scope and depth of the investigation or
even evidence that the exercise was merely the force going through the motions.
Enquiries need to be proportionate to the seriousness of the allegations and take into
consideration all relevant factors. The relevant factors in this case included a detailed
and persuasive analysis supporting the allegations, particularly highlighting
inconsistencies of the witnesses’ statements with one another, with what had been
verbally stated before they were taken and with other material in the trial bundle.

3. An analysis of all the inconsistencies I have so far identified is comprehensively set out
in the 22 April 2017 appeal and report of 19 February 2018 (paras 8 to 12). If the
allegations were, as in this case, incitement to commit perjury and compelling evidence
had been provided to the investigating officer to support that the witnesses had been
encouraged to lie then the above line of enquiry was not proportionate to the
seriousness of the allegations. The investigating officer clearly had no serious intentions
of being satisfied that a crime had occurred and was merely making excuses for the
accused.
It was therefore inadequate, given the seriousness of the allegations that the accused
officer was asked for his version of events which were accepted without any of the
inconsistencies and conflicting evidence being accounted for by him. His version is that
he had not spoken to or contacted any of the witnesses again after the custody officer
authorised my detention. However, this does not account for the period before, when PC
Officer1 ordered me to remain at the front office out of earshot while he accompanied Mr
B to inspect the tree and surrounding area and was then confronted with the fact
that the allegations were untrue. It is also significant that Mr B had expressed prior
to going off with PC Officer1 that he would not be making a complaint and it was shortly
after their private consultation that PC Officer1 announced I was under suspicion for
indecent exposure. It should also have been questioned what it was that caused Mr
C to be so visibly amused or pleased with himself when PC Officer1 announced that
I was under arrest.
In any event, and notwithstanding PC Officer1’s denial that he had encouraged the
witnesses, the seriousness of the allegations coupled with the compelling evidence that
somebody must have done, demanded that accounts of all other parties involved were
obtained and documented in accordance with the Statutory Guidance which states on
page 54, paragraph 9.14 that:
“Where the investigator seeks an account from a person who is the subject of
investigation, there must be an auditable record of it. The person could be invited
to sign handwritten notes or a pocket notebook entry to confirm the accuracy of a
record of a conversation. However, this is the minimum. In many cases, more
would be required, such as an account by email, letter, statement or (recorded)
interview. If an investigation is subject to special requirements (see paragraphs
9.29 to 9.34) or is an investigation into a recordable conduct matter, a notice of
investigation will in most cases have been served (see paragraph 9.39) and a
statement under an appropriate caution should be taken or requested from the
person to whose conduct the investigation relates or he or she should be required
to attend an interview, which will be recorded (see paragraphs 9.41 to 9.47 for
more information on interviews).”
PC Officer2, who took the written statement of Mrs B five days after Mr B , Mr
C and PC Officer1 had given theirs, would need to account for why, if nobody had
influenced her or she had not seen the other statements, the following quotes from PC
Officer1’s and Mrs B ’s contrived statements describing the same event both
coincidentally contain the same use of capital letters. The emphasis in both quotes (PC
Officer1’s and Mrs B ’s respectively) is true to how they appear in the witness
statements:

4. ‘he instantly became aggressive and argumentative saying “ARE YOU TELLING
ME TO TAKE A SEAT, YOU CANT MAKE ME, OR ARE YOU ASKING ME”. I
said “Just take a seat, I’m asking you to” to which M1 replied “WELL I DON’T
HAVE TO STAY THEN,” I then said “Take a seat”...’
‘The male became quite lairy and argumentative to the officer saying “ARE YOU
ASKING ME TO SIT DOWN OR TELLING ME”. The officer replied “I’M TELLING
YOU”. The male took a seat...’
The above is just a recent observation, additional to all the other anomalies I have so far
identified which are comprehensively set out in the 22 April 2017 appeal and report of 19
February 2018 (paras 8 to 12). Another one to add which can be attributed to Mrs B
having the benefit of hindsight which strongly suggests she was encouraged is where
she untruly states that Mr B said the following before going off with PC Officer1 to
consult privately, when in fact he said he was not going to make a complaint:
‘...in a raised voice said to my partner “ARE YOU MAKING A COMPLAINT
AGAINST ME”. My partner replied “YES I AM. DOING WHAT YOU DID IN
FRONT OF MY KIDS WAS OUT OF ORDER”. My partner and this male started
exchanging heated words...’
Note the telltale signs of the capitals which are true to how they appear in her witness
statement.
CONCLUSION
Allegation 1 – Not upheld
I have reviewed the information available to PC Officer1 at the time and personally
spoken to him. A brief summary of this information is that PC Officer1 received
information from the front office clerk (Mr C ) that a member of public who PC
Officer1 had an appointment to see, told Mr C that they had seen a male outside
urinating against a tree. PC Officer1 went outside to find Mr B and Mr A arguing
and after separating them asked Mr B what had happened. Mr B had stated
that he thought the male (Mr A ) had been urinating against the tree and he didn’t
want his children to have to see it. Mr B told PC Officer1 that he had clearly seen Mr
A ’s penis. PC Officer1 attempted to ascertain details of Mr A , who refused to
provide them.
There is no evidence in the above account to suggest that the investigation has been
carried out objectively. It blatantly represents a one sided view and there has been a
failure to take into account factors relevant to my concerns.
It is not a full and accurate account of what information was available to PC Officer1 at
the time. PC Officer1 was aware (at the time) that both Mr B and the front office
clerk, Mr C , stated that they had seen me urinating against the tree. This was from a
distance accepted to be some 30 to 40 meters away (roughly 100 to 130 feet) and so
aware that the claims were likely to be no more than assumptions (Mr C

5. subsequently admitted in his written account that at no time did he see me with my
private parts exposed).
PC Officer1 evidently favours a different version (re, his response to the investigation
and his witness statement) which is that Mr B expressed that he thought I had been
urinating against the tree (not that he had explicitly seen me) which reinforces my
assertion that his witness statement was contrived to fit his agenda. If any doubt arises
as to the point I am making here it is that by retrospectively introducing an element of
uncertainty (i.e., he might have been urinating) it has served to mitigate the culpability of
making an unlawful arrest under the sexual offences act which he did as a measure to
save face on discovering that I had not been urinating and the allegations were false. It
is appropriate to be reminded that Mr C says in his witness statement that he was
approached by Mr B who informed him that “there is a man pissing up the tree
outside” and stated further that “Mr B remonstrated with him for urinating in public in
front of his children”.
Mr B expressed no reservation whatsoever about what he had seen, he
categorically wanted everyone he informed or discussed it with to believe it was fact that
he had seen me urinating.
If the investigation was carried out objectively with the intention of arriving at the truth, as
opposed to covering it up, then the line of enquiry would have been to explore the
conflicting evidence with regard to what would be visible to the naked eye from a
distance of over 100 feet. The best evidence available would have been the photo
relating to item 7 on the schedule of non-sensitive unused material which was
categorised, for reasons becoming increasingly questionable as ‘Clearly Not
Disclosable’.
It was inexcusable to neglect this element on the strength that the photo, purporting to
show the distance between myself and the witnesses, was attached to the file and
accessible to the CPS, especially when my allegations are that the CPS and court have
colluded with the police in a malicious prosecution. Obvious concerns immediately come
to mind about why the photo was not considered disclosable, despite on the balance of
probabilities it would more likely than not have been capable of undermining the
prosecution case and assisting my defence.
The investigation has uncovered that the photo was provided by the police to the CPS
which is new information and therefore something requiring to be considered afresh in
respect of why the CPS made no comment about disclosure. From a distance of over
100 feet it would have been impossible to verify events with the degree of detail
described by the witnesses and would in that case have confirmed that they had
knowingly made false statements. A reasonable line of inquiry here would be to verify
whether the photo was representative of a distance between 100 and 130 feet and if it
appeared significantly less than that it would point to the force deliberately intending to
pervert the course of justice.
As the evidence was not disclosed to me I must assume that the photo was taken of the
tree, maybe with somebody stood in close proximity, from the location of the portacabin
(temporary front office). Although the portacabin is no longer there it is known to have
been located adjacent to the vehicular access to the police station. Therefore the image

6. depicting where I was stood should be the tree I was seen at corresponding to one
measured in the region of 100 to 130 feet from the vehicular access. If this test is
passed, and it can be confirmed that whoever took the photo was in an appropriate
position (and was not taking advantage of the camera's optical zoom capabilities), then
the CPS has obstructed the disclosure of evidence that would have undermined the
prosecution case and assisted my defence.
If the investigation was carried out in good faith then all these inconsistencies would
have been properly considered.
PC Officer1 was also aware that I had flatly denied urinating against the tree and had
explained that the witnesses were mistaken. He also knew about my response to Mr
B ’s accusation that he had seen me zipping or unzipping my fly, which was to the
effect, that he could not have done as the jeans I wore had no zip (he omits this in his
witness statement).
PC Officer1 would have known that on the balance of probabilities the first time Mr
B expressly stated that he had seen my penis, rather than assumed I was urinating
was when he ordered me to remain at the front office out of earshot while he
accompanied Mr B to inspect the tree and surrounding area for signs of urine (and
found none).
It should not have come as any surprise to him and entirely rational that I was unhappy
to provide my details when the circumstances were that; i) I had not urinated (or exposed
my penis for any other reason) and categorically denied doing so, ii) voluntarily remained
to clear up any misunderstanding (Mr C clearly had no interest and wanted me to
go), iii) I was certain there would be no evidence of what I had been accused of (and of
course there was none), iv) Mr B had expressed prior to going off with PC Officer1
to the tree’s location that he would not be making a complaint, and v) PC Officer1 was
already aware of anomalies such as the spurious accusation of urinating when it was
discovered I was not and being witnessed zipping or unzipping my fly, so must have
known he was on very dodgy ground pursuing the matter.
Ultimately, given all the above circumstances, PC Officer1 would have had to be on
another planet not to know I was aware I was being set-up after he had satisfied himself
that the allegations were untrue yet pursued the matter from a perspective of a sexual
offence.
Under Section 66 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, a person commits an offence if –
a) He intentionally exposes his genitals, and
b) He intends that someone will see them and be caused alarm or distress
I did not expose my genitals so it is futile and illogical to consider whether the intentional
element of the criteria applies and also whether I intended that someone would see them
and be caused alarm or distress. The above did not apply in my case and PC Officer1
had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence has been committed under
Section 66 of the Sexual Offences Act.

7. Power of arrest
I have included the full powers of a constable and highlighted the specific area that PC
Officer1 chose to utilise.
For section 24 of PACE
(1) A constable may arrest without a warrant—
(a) anyone who is about to commit an offence;
(b) anyone who is in the act of committing an offence;
(c) anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be about to commit an
offence;
(d) anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be committing an
offence.
(2) If a constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence has been
committed, he may arrest without a warrant anyone whom he has reasonable grounds to
suspect of being guilty of it.
PC Officer1 did not have reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence had been
committed, predominantly because of the circumstances set out in items i to v above but
additionally because of what PC Officer1 states in his written account with regard to the
certainty of what he considered would be visible to the witnesses, i.e., as follows:
“...it was a clear sunny afternoon and would therefore be easily visible..”
However, preceding this in the same paragraph he states (emphasis added):
“I considered that the information I had was the M1 had been seen with his penis
out, initially thought to be urinating against a tree outside the front of the Police
station...”
So, PC Officer1 admits that if I had been doing whatever I had been accused of, the
witnesses, if they were not making wild assumptions, would have been able to account
for it unambiguously and not falsely allege I was urinating. Thus he has effectively
admitted that the only evidence available to him at the time on which he could have
determined whether an offence of indecent exposure had been committed was unreliable
and of questionable credibility, or in other words he had no reasonable grounds for
suspecting it happened.
If the investigation had been carried out objectively, as opposed to focussing on factors
from a perspective of vindicating the arresting officer then all of the above evidence
would have been considered and a different more appropriate outcome arrived at finding
the grounds of the complaint justified.

8. There was a need to arrest the B s as the information already available to PC
Officer1 was sufficient to give him reasonable grounds to suspect that the offence of
attempting to pervert the course of justice had been committed and it was Mr B who
was guilty. It was clearly necessary to do this to allow the prompt and effective
investigation into the false allegations. The fact that they were not questioned
independently without delay has had disastrous consequences.
(3) If an offence has been committed, a constable may arrest without a warrant—
(a) anyone who is guilty of the offence;
(b) anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be guilty of it.
(4) But the power of summary arrest conferred by subsection (1), (2) or (3) is exercisable
only if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that for any of the reasons
mentioned in subsection (5) it is necessary to arrest the person in question.
(5)The reasons are—
(a) to enable the name of the person in question to be ascertained (in the case where
the constable does not know, and cannot readily ascertain, the person's name, or has
reasonable grounds for doubting whether a name given by the person as his name is his
real name);
(b) correspondingly as regards the person's address;
(c) to prevent the person in question—
(i) causing physical injury to himself or any other person;
(ii )suffering physical injury;
(iii) causing loss of or damage to property;
(iv) committing an offence against public decency (subject to subsection (6); or
The force is grasping ever more desperately at straws by defending the actions of the
arresting officer on the basis that the circumstances surrounding the matter gave him
reason to believe that it was necessary to make an arrest to prevent me committing an
offence against public decency. This is born out by the fact that I was released eight
hours after being unlawfully detained (and for the reasons already outlined). If the police
had any genuine belief that I would have been a threat in any of the ways suggested
then they were grossly negligent for releasing me after the relatively short period. The
force released me because they knew I was innocent and therefore no threat but
pursued a malicious prosecution in which the CPS and court were complicit.
(v) causing an unlawful obstruction of the highway;

9. (d) to protect a child or other vulnerable person from the person in question;
The comments stated in sub-paragraph (5)(c)(iv) apply equally here. However, in
addition it is appropriate to point out the reason why the investigating officer attributes
this element to PC Officer1 having reason to believe that it was necessary to make an
arrest. Of course, he had no reason at all to believe that an arrest was necessary to
protect a child etc. It is documented in my appeal of 22 April 2017 that the police
colluded with each other (their statements / interview questions) to falsely and bizarrely
suggest I have an interest in children. Incidentally I do not know how, given that we are
three years on from this, that the officers involved are still serving with Humberside
police and not serving jail sentences.
For ease of reference the contents of the relevant page of my 22 April 2017 appeal is
quoted below:
‘My belief that PC Officer1’s witness statement was contrived is recorded in my
complaint submitted on 8 November 2015. The moment I was questioned in the
interview on 27 August 2015 about that particular contrivance I was 100% certain
that I was being set-up. My immediate response to PC Officer3 interviewing is
recorded in the CPS trial bundle. Page 3 of 6 of the “MG5(SP)” states as follows:
“Upon reading the arresting officers account in relation to why he was at
the tree he accused the interviewing officers of ‘stitching him up’ stating I
have a keen interest in trees.”
The intention was clearly to engineer an opening for the force to imply that the
false allegation was bizarrely sexually motivated (Restricted – Investigations page
23), linking the B ’s children (estimated at a distance 30 to 40 metres) and the
fact that no evidence had been found that I had urinated.
The set-up involved the following being quoted from PC Officer1’s witness
statement by interviewing officer PC Officer3 (emphasis as on statement):
“I WASN’T HAVING A PISS, I WASN’T DOING ANYTHING, I HAVE A
KEEN INTEREST” and then stopped himself.
PC Officer3 then implied with his questioning that the reason I stopped myself
was because I had an interest in children. It was at this point I was 100 per cent
convinced I was dealing with bent police who were fabricating evidence, hence
effectively stating so to the interviewing officer. The witnesses were not in close
proximity and I was not even aware that they or their children were in attendance
at the temporary front office, nor would I have had any interest. In view of the
serious consequences of their intended game plan, which to some extent
succeeded, I consider all parties involved should be behind bars.
PC Officer1 had the opportunity to end the matter on discovering that there were
no grounds for arrest, but instead chose to waste hundreds of thousands of
pounds of public money (which by now it must have cost) by taking the direction
he did. How it was possible to get the force, CPS, duty solicitor Magistrates’ court

10. and the Crown court all complicit in the stitch-up has to be the biggest mystery
which urgently needs investigating.’
(e) to allow the prompt and effective investigation of the offence or of the conduct of the
person in question;
The question requiring answering here is whether the prompt and effective investigation
of the offence (assuming one had been committed) could have been carried out without
my arrest. If the answer to this was yes, which of course it was, then an arrest was not
necessary. However, what matters is whether PC Officer1 had reasonable grounds to
believe that an arrest was necessary for this purpose. He had no reasonable grounds
because I had cooperated with the police by voluntarily remaining at the station in order
to assist the police even when it was clear that Mr C would have much preferred I
had left the police station.
In any event, the existence of the statutory requirement itself indicates that there may be
cases where, even though arresting may allow prompt and effective investigation, it is
not necessary to arrest because prompt and effective investigation is possible without
doing so.
It was more appropriate for the B s to be arrested (even Mr C ) to allow the
prompt and effective investigation into the false allegations which PC Officer1 had
reasonable grounds for suspecting had been made. The fact that they were not all
questioned independently without delay has had disastrous consequences.
The 5 days given Mrs B to produce her statement clearly advantaged her. The
information gleaned over this period allowed her to adjust her account, adding or leaving
out what was required to advantage the prosecution.
(f) to prevent any prosecution for the offence from being hindered by the disappearance
of the person in question.
It is not at all credible that PC Officer1 would have had reasonable grounds for believing
that an arrest was necessary for the above purpose. There was not even remotely a
question of an offence or prosecution until PC Officer1 arrived on the scene. Up until
then Mr C clearly had no interest in taking the matter further and wanted me to
leave the station. However, I remained voluntarily because I was aggrieved about being
falsely accused of being seen urinating in public and wanted to clear up any
misunderstanding. I planned to do this when Mr C was free from dealing with
members of the public. Mr C made the following statement in his written account
which incidentally is different to PC Officer1’s statement in respect of why he became
involved:
“The male could not be reasoned with and declined to leave the station so an
officer Pc Officer1 was called for.”
What he meant was that I continued to refute the false allegations, but what is more
relevant here is that PC Officer1 could have had no reasonable grounds for believing
that an arrest was necessary for fearing that I might disappear because I had

11. demonstrated I would do exactly the opposite by voluntarily remaining at the station in
order to co-operate with police enquiries.
(6) Subsection (5)(c)(iv) applies only where members of the public going about their
normal business cannot reasonably be expected to avoid the person in question.
The requirement of “necessity to arrest” under section 24 of the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984 (PACE)
For an arrest to be lawful, the arresting officer must have reasonable grounds under
section 24(2) of PACE for suspecting that an offence has been committed (as opposed
to an offence may have been committed). It is also an essential pre-requisite to a lawful
arrest (sub-section 4 of s. 24) that the officer has reasonable grounds for believing that it
is “necessary” to arrest the person in question for one of the reasons specified in section
24(5). It would therefore not sufficiently satisfy the test if the officer merely considered it
would be desirable or more convenient to arrest the person.
PC Officer 1 clearly had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence had been
committed, for reasons previously set out, and therefore by virtue of the statutory
provision in s.24(2) of PACE the arrest was unlawful. But supposing for argument’s sake
he was able to satisfy the requirements of s.24(2), he would have still had to have had
reasonable grounds for believing that it was “necessary” (as opposed to merely desirable
or convenient) to make an arrest. The questions which required answering under s.24(4)
were, did PC Officer1 believe that it was necessary to make an arrest for one of the
reasons specified in s.24(5) and, if so, did he have reasonable grounds for that belief.
These are addressed under the highlighted sub-sections above and of course there was
no necessity.
Upon receiving the information reported to PC Officer1, he had enough to reasonably
suspect a crime had been committed under section 66 of the sexual offences act 2003
and he had reasonable belief that it was necessary to arrest Mr A under the
highlighted subsections above. See above.
This is further backed up by PS Officer4 who authorised the detention of Mr A at the
time he was taken into custody after hearing the circumstances. There was a review of
the detention by an Inspector Officer5 who confirmed that Mr A ’s continued
detention was authorised. The CPS lawyer further considered all evidence on 03/09/15
and believed there was sufficient to charge for a public order offence, which I believe
provides further assurance that the power of arrest existed at the time.
PC Officer1 made the arrest under the sexual offences act 2013 for indecent exposure
so the fact that The CPS lawyer considered all evidence and believed there was
sufficient to charge for a public order offence contrary to the investigations findings
provides evidence that the power of arrest DID NOT exist at the time.
None of the reasons above provide assurance that the power of arrest existed at the
time. PACE Code C suggests that the custody officer’s role is to note on the custody

12. record any comment the detainee makes in relation to the arresting officer’s account but
shall not invite comment. The accused therefore does not even know whether he has the
right to put his side of the story to the custody officer. It further states that “The custody
officer shall: not put specific questions to the detainee regarding their involvement in any
offence, nor in respect of any comments they may make in response to the arresting
officer’s account or the decision to place them in detention. Such an exchange is likely to
constitute an interview as in paragraph 11.1A and require the associated safeguards in
section 11.”
If Inspector Officer5 is the same Inspector ... who dealt with a previous complaint into
police conduct then his authorisation of my continued detention would not have been
worth the paper it was written on.
The fact that a CPS lawyer considered the evidence and believed there was sufficient to
charge for a public order offence would be a decision not necessarily worth the paper it
was written on (not the basis that it was a CPS lawyer). The assistant force solicitor
(Humberside police) I believe was once employed by the CPS and I have several items
of evidence that proves she is corrupt unfit for public office.
Allegation 2 – Not Upheld
I have reviewed the information and I do not believe it can be reasonably assumed PC
Officer1 committed Perjury. The reasons for this are that there were two independent
witnesses who provided statements to two different officers (neither of which were PC
Officer1). There was a police staff member who provided a statement at the time and
another constable (PC Officer3) actually carried out the investigation. PC Officer1
completed a package and handed it over, he had no further communications with the
witnesses and I cannot see therefore how he could had told them what to write in the
statement. The statements were also taken some weeks later on different days.
According to my copies of the witness statements, they were all, except for Mrs B ’s
taken on 27 August 2015 (the day of the arrest). Mrs B ’s was taken 5 days later on
1 September, therefore it is appears to have been incorrect to state that ‘the statements
were...taken some weeks later’. However, if the dates on my copies of the witness
statements are correct it would be true that they were taken (Mrs B ’s at least) on
different days.
This outcome does not give me confidence that the investigation was proportional to the
allegations. If through the investigation the officer alleged to have incited perjury was not
the person who took the statements then the investigation should have turned to the
officer who it has been discovered did take the statements. Though there is no ruling out
that that person may have been influenced by the police or CPS.
The statements do have some slight differing accounts, however I believe this further
corroborates the independency of the statement taking. Time passed and individual
perception can affect individual’s recall in different ways.