Perverting course of justice annex a-b

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
RP/10
CO/00382/20 27 April 2020
Mr
Grimsby North East Lincolnshire
DN32
Dear Mr ,
With reference to the complaint received by Humberside Police on 18/04/2020.Your complaint has
been assessed and I have determined based on the initial investigation that the matter does not
require further investigation and on this basis we will be taking no further action. This decision is
taken in line with regulation 6 of The Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2020.
I understand you wish to complain that, in relation to the investigation/outcome of investigation
report number 16/18654/19, the investigation was staged to support a police cover up. You were
sent an outcome letter on 17 April 2019 explaining the reasons why the investigation was filed. As
you have received a clear, full explanation, no further action will be taken and this complaint will
not be investigated further as this is considered to be a vexatious complaint, tending to or intended
to vex/worry/annoy officers. In addition to this and of note, you have not provided with your
complaint summary any evidence of the matters which you allege.
I am sorry you felt cause to complain on this occasion and hope that this experience will not
adversely affect any future contact you may have with Humberside Police.
Should you not agree with my decision, you should contact the appropriate review body which is
The Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC). I include a fact sheet on how to request
this review.
You have 29 days from the date of this letter, within which to submit a request for review. The 29th
day is 26/05/2020. You are advised to submit your request in good time to ensure it reaches the
OPCC before the above date. Requests for a review received after this date may not be allowed,
unless there are exceptional circumstances.
Yours sincerely
DCI A Farrow
Professional Standards Department
Humberside Police
Professional Standards Department
Police Headquarters
Priory Road
Hull HU5 5SF
Switchboard: 101
This matter is being dealt with by:
PSDadmin@humberside.pnn.police.uk
www.humberside.police.uk

Online Complaint Form
Please use this form if you wish to make a complaint about the police or other organisation covered by the
police complaints system. If you are unable to complete this form please call us on 101
COMPLAINT DETAILS
Which police force or organisation are you
complaining about?
Humberside police
Date(s) and Time(s) of when this happened
(if known)
18 April 2019
Investigation report filed as NO CRIME
Incident or reference number(s)
(if you have any)
What is your complaint about? (Please enter details below)
The officer subject of this complaint is alleged to have pursued a deliberate course of action to
affect the course of justice; by intentionally frustrating a police investigation into serious crime to
enable potential defendants to evade arrest or commit further offences. The 17 April 2019
investigation outcome along with correspondence entered into in the matter between 2 February
and 30 March 2019 supports incontrovertibly that the investigation was staged to effect a cover
up of serious criminal wrongdoing to vindicate the accused. An account briefly summarising each
aspect of the alleged conduct relating only to allegation (1) as referred to in the investigation
outcome letter of 17 April 2019 is provided in the annex to this form. Further details relating to
allegations (2) an (3) may be provided as and when required.
What would you like to happen as a result of
your complaint?
Please select
Individuals or other organisations involved to
be criminally prosecuted
Individuals involved to face disciplinary
procedures
OFFICER/POLICE STAFF DETAILS (if applicable/known)
Rank Number First name Surname
Detective Sergeant

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The suitability test.
A complaint is suitable for local resolution if the appropriate authority is satisfied that the conduct
being complained about, even if proven, would not justify criminal or disciplinary proceedings
against the person being complained about.
The conduct being complained about in this complaint would without any question if proven
justify criminal and disciplinary proceedings against the person being complained about so this
complaint is clearly not suitable for local resolution.
It is not a repetitive complaint because I have never made a complaint about DS perverting
the course of justice or a complaint of any sort for that matter.
CONFIRMATION AND COMPLETION
Please tick
I confirm that I understand that the information provided in this form will
be used by public bodies involved in the police complaints system,
including the police and IOPC
Date of submission 17 April 2020

Annex
Allegation (1) as referred to in the investigation outcome letter of 17 April 2019
Element 1
1. Review’s findings of the investigation into 10 items of post claimed to have been sent by the
MoJ over the period from 19 December 2013 to 13 December 2016 that had allegedly been
constructed by the court to cover their tracks:
“From paperwork you supplied it was clear you escalated your complaints re perceived
lack of action by Humber Magistrates court re ongoing complaints you had registered with
them. This ultimately went to the relevant Ombudsman who conducted their own review
and returned advice that there was no evidence to suggest the letters had not been sent to
you. I noted it was reported that your postcode was wrong on a number of letters but it
was clear this would not have prevented the letters reaching you. It seems clear that once
written the letters would have gone to admin staff and it would be their role to ensure they
were added to envelopes, stamped and posted in the normal postal manner. The
Ombudsman found no evidence to suggest that the letters had deliberately not been
posted. When spoke/emailed you mentioned that the letters you had been provided from
the Ombudsman investigation had embedded data suggesting they had been created in
2016 which was months after when the letters were alleged to have seen sent. On review
of the documents you forwarded to me I could also see that some documents were marked
with creation on 08/02/2016 and others on 16/12/2016 and were created from a Xerox
device. What this data actually refers to is that the PDF was created on these dates and not
the actual document. The property embedded data actually refers to the date the document
was likely scanned through a multi functional device and the PDF created. Therefore this
embedded data does not prove the letters were fabricated at a later date as a result of your
complaint and due to this there is no evidence to support your allegation of misconduct in
public office for Alison Watts.”
2. The above has just been reiterated from information sent to the force by myself. A number of
documents were sent as attachments in an email on 16 March 2019. The document entitled
“Case stated application missing docs” contained the Judicial Ombudsman’s provisional
investigation report and was clearly the source of DS ’s initial comments.
3. If enquiries were carried out in good faith, rather than merely to appear accountable as a token
gesture, all evidence that had a bearing on the offence under investigation would have been
taken into consideration. Investigations have to be thorough and the police have a legal duty
to follow all reasonable lines of enquiry. The Judicial Ombudsman, whom I alleged to be
complicit, was only ever going to defend the accused, regardless of the evidence. Simply
reiterating his findings does not constitute a line of enquiry.

4. It would have been reasonable to enquire into the postcode error on the three purported letters
for which the Ombudsman had jurisdiction and why, when it would not have affected delivery
was it so central to the Ombudsman’s report. It is feasible that if a postcode error was planted
as a red herring when the letters were later constructed it would provide a diversionary tactic
to shift focus from the alleged dishonesty. It would enable the Ombudsman to consider a
token error so minor he could justify dismissing the complaint for a full investigation,
however, this contrived course of action had to rely on him being wilfully blind to the fact that
the letters were not sent.
5. The following was even contained in the same document of compiled correspondence from
which DS had sourced the Ombudsman’s findings but chose not to pursue it as a line of
enquiry (email 27 May 2016):
“From the Ombudsman statement at paragraph 4 of his decision the matter is narrowed
down to such triviality as to decide whether he considers the alleged letters containing a
minor error in the post code constitutes maladministration, which of course it wouldn’t but
is not the issue.
The deliberate postcode error was an obvious and half-hearted attempt at a red herring, but
did serve as something on which the Ombudsman could base his report. It should be noted
that other correspondence sent by the Justices' Clerk, properly addressed, have been
received both before and after the alleged letters were sent.”
6. Continuing to the matter I had specifically raised regarding when copies of the purported
letters had been created. Again, there was no line of enquiry pursued; rather the outcome
merely reiterates what I had said in my email to DS on 20 March 2019.
“The copies of the letters allegedly sent to me by Mrs Watts over the three year period
have the date they were created embedded in the properties of the PDF files. The three
which the Judicial Ombudsman obtained and sent to me on 23 February 2016 indicate a
creation date of 8 February 2016. The seven others which were sent to me on 3 January
2017 by HMCTS (including final case stated unsigned) were created on 16 December
2016.
The final case stated (signed) dated 18 December 2013 which was sent to me on 16
January 2017 by HMCTS was created on 12 January 2017.
The above date information only relates to the files that were sent to me and does not
mean that copies had not also been made previously. It is most likely though that copies
would have been made of the letters at the same time they were produced and allegedly
sent which might even be a policy requirement. If so the Justices’ Clerk should be able to
at least prove that the letters had been created at the appropriate time by providing the
original copy, however, it would not prove that they were sent.”

7. The purpose of the above was to propose a new line of enquiry but it was made categorically
clear that I was not claiming it to be proof that the actual documents (if there had been any)
had been created on the dates indicated by the file properties. The information was seized
upon by the police to exploit as a smoke screen to mislead the uninformed observer. Anyone
who had read DS ’s investigation outcome without knowing what information he had
been provided would be under the false impression I was claiming the electronic file data had
proven the alleged misconduct in public office. The uninformed observer who had read only
DS ’s outcome would have been misled further by the fact that it would have appeared
that a relevant line of enquiry had been followed when clearly no enquiries were made at all.
The outcome had simply recounted the information I had already provided.
8. The police were under a duty to have obtained the original electronic copies made at the
purported time they were sent (they would have been scanned for office records), not concede
defeat at the first opportunity. That duty was even more imperative owing to an Employment
Tribunal already discovering that the MoJ had falsified documents by late production and
backdating with the intension to plug gaps or to confuse and mislead. Excerpts from the
Judgment dated 5 February 2019 (3400502/2016) record that the circumstances surrounding
the wrongdoing were strikingly similar to those alleged in this case.
“167. In this case the commissioning manager was Governor Marfleet. The investigation
should have been completed by 8 February 2016 (28 days from 11 January). It was
in fact completed on 26 April 2016.
168. In his witness statement Governor O’Connor acknowledged that “this process took a
little time” and that he obtained extensions of time. He did not identify where the
extension of time forms were in the bundle of documents but there is a form for
extension which bears the date 1 March 2016 (21 days after the due date for
completion) and which extends the completion date to 10 April 2016. The
document’s properties were provided at the request of Ms Braganza and show that
the document was created on 30th November 2017 and modified 1 minute and 31
seconds after creation. There is a single letter to the claimant of 10 February 2016
confirming that Governor O’Connor “would hope to have submitted a full report to
the Governor by 6th March” and that he was “waiting to interview one member of
staff and two prisoners” but would not be able to do so until 25th February due to his
own leave. Another extension form is dated on its’ face 11 April 2016 and gives a
new completion date of 1 April 2016 (10 days before the purported date of the
document). The properties of that document show it was created on 27th March 2017
at 09.21.
.........

170. We find as a fact that these documents were created on the dates shown on their
properties, that the purpose of their creation was to give the wholly false impression
that contemporaneous extensions had been given for “acceptable and justifiable
reasons” at the time of the investigation, when they had not and that the creation of
the document in March 2017 (less than 4 months before the final hearing in this case
and over 11 and a half months after the date which it bears on its’ face) was done to
mislead the claimant and the tribunal, no other explanation being forthcoming.
Governor O’Connor referred to their creation as “plugging gaps” and thus in our
unanimous view confirming our finding.
.......
372. No contemporaneous extensions were sought or given in accordance with this policy
and no proper information about delay was given to the claimant as it [should] have
been. The respondent sought, belatedly, to indicate that extensions had been given
by producing documents bearing the dates 1 March 2016 purporting to extend the
date for completion of the investigation to 10 April 2016 and another dated 11 April
2016 “extending” time to 1 April 2016. The properties of those documents were
sought by counsel for the claimant. The first mentioned document was created on 30
November 2017 (and modified the same day). The second was created on 27 March
2017. Governor O’Connor postulated that these documents had been produced to
“plug gaps”. It appeared to be of no further concern to him that these documents had
been produced many months after their purported dates and were put in evidence
before the tribunal with, we find, the deliberate aim of misleading the tribunal into
believing that the respondent had complied with the requirements of its own policies.
373. By contrast we consider that to be a matter of utmost seriousness.”
9. The forgery was proven simply because the claimant’s solicitor Ms Braganza (para 168)
bothered to ask for the document’s properties which were provided. The claimant’s solicitor
was acting in good faith; her intentions were to pursue all reasonable lines of enquiry so why
would she bother but Humberside’s CID manifestly show that it had no intention of seriously
pursuing the matter? A good guess is that a solicitor, as a way of gaining reputation, is
motivated by getting the best outcome they possibly can for their clients whereas the force
was continuing its long held tradition of covering up for the establishment.
10. It is also reasonable to deduce that papers relating to various complaints and proceedings I
have been provoked into pursuing were made available to the parties for use in Employment
Tribunal 3400502/2016 and as a source of reference for assisting the production of the
Judgment. For example, it refers several times to the date and time properties embedded in
electronic documents which reveal when they were created to cross reference when they were
purported to have been produced (paras 168, 170 and 372). This concept was raised as a line
of enquiry in an email to the force (copied to IOPC) on 15 March 2018 and subsequently in
proceedings due to the police not bothering to pursue it. Later it was raised in an appeal to the
Upper Tribunal in the matter of the Information Rights decision (EA/2017/0165). Earlier than

that there is a record of the letter creation concerns being raised in correspondence with the
Judicial Ombudsman (27 May 2016) specifically regarding the three letters purportedly sent
by the Magistrates Advisory Committee.
11. There are further telltale signs pointing to the almost certainty that my representations to
HMCTS complaints handing team dated 19 March 17 (see para 14 below) had been made
available as a source of reference for the Employment Tribunal. For example, a line of
enquiry recorded in the Tribunal Judgment mirrored how I had gone about identifying the
inconsistencies in the MoJ’s attempt to cover their tracks. My HMCTS complaint refers in
consecutive paragraphs to time limits within which the court had an obligation to comply
(paras 23 and 24). For example in paragraph 23 it states with emphasis added the following:
“....On this basis, the latest date by which the court had to state and sign the case would
have been 21 October 2013 (42 days from 9 September).”
The Employment Tribunal Judgment refers in paragraph 167 (see para 8 above) to a similar
concept and follows the identical format in respect of when an action should have been
completed (emphasis added):
“.....The investigation should have been completed by 8 February 2016 (28 days from 11
January). It was in fact completed on 26 April 2016.”
12. Returning to the force’s failure to obtain properties of the documents, it would also have been
perceived by the uninformed observer that the whole matter of whether or not the letters were
fabricated at a later date hinged on this one point. It did not, it was simply a new line of
enquiry suggested as the process moved forwards and one which the force implied it would
follow but instead exploited in the way already described. In fact none of the evidence that I
had initially been asked for which warranted properly investigating was considered. The force
had no more than trawled all the paperwork for anything it could use to support its findings
which was to clear the accused of wrongdoing (whether justified or not).
13. The evidence attached to my 16 March 2019 email contained the information I had been asked
for subsequent to the previous day’s meeting which established the terms of reference for the
investigation.
14. I was asked to supply the correspondence I had entered into with the court spanning the period
of the undelivered letters. I arranged the document chronologically with the letters in question
identified and placed within the correspondence according to their purported dates. From this

it was easier to spot flaws in the court’s attempt to cover their tracks. I had also extracted the
relevant content from a submission to HMCTS complaints handling team dated 19 March 17
which highlighted these anomalies. One of the letters, for example, purported to have been
sent to me on 19 December 2013 acknowledges receipt of my letter and attached
representations I sent 4 months previously on 19 August 2013 to the Justices’ Clerk (‘I
acknowledge receipt of your representations upon the draft case’). However, this letter in
particular (unlike all the others) did not refer to the date of my correspondence she was
acknowledging receipt of, presumably because she wanted to avoid drawing attention to the 4
months it had taken her to purportedly reply.
15. The MoJ, taking such an obvious risk as this, must have been able to rely on the assistance of
all relevant regulatory bodies and police. The protracted period over which the letters were
purportedly sent and the fact that there were as many as 10 of them was always going to make
the task of covering their tracks a difficult one and one which was evidently not managed
successfully.
16. Another factor contributing to the flawed plan was their oversight of an email I was sent by
the Justices’ Clerk on 6 March 2014 stating that written communication would be with me
shortly setting out the position with my case and advising me on next steps. However, the
purported letter acknowledging receipt of my representations upon the draft case had already
set out the position with my case and advised me on next steps and that was dated 19
December 2013. This purportedly had enclosed the draft case which I was required to lodge
with the Administrative Court if I wished to pursue my appeal. The letter purportedly sent on
20 February 2014 also reiterated the advice as did another purportedly sent after the 6 March
2014 email on 1 May.
17. It would not help them if they denied sending the 6 March email (electronic mail does not
provide that flexibility), so they had no control over this aspect and the attempt to cover their
tracks lost all credibility. It was inconceivable in any event that the court would advise a
litigant the following when the 10 day statutory limit within which the case had to be lodged
had been exceeded so significantly:
“If you wish to pursue your appeal, the case must be lodged with the Administrative Court
Office at the Royal Courts of Justice within 10 days of receiving it from this office..”
18. By the time the 20 February 2014 letter was purportedly sent the 10 day statutory limit had
overrun by 53 days and by 1 May 2014 it had overrun by 123 days. For there to have been any
consistency, the email of 6 March 2014 would have also mentioned the 10 day limit and that

the draft case had already been provided on 19 December 2013. There is no perspective from
which any of this makes sense which tells you that all the letters as alleged were retroactively
created. It was these aggravating circumstances, along with other contributing factors raised in
my evidence which demonstrated, beyond reasonable doubt that dishonesty was involved, and
presumably why DS turned a blind eye to them.
Element 2 of Allegation (1) as referred to in the Investigation outcome letter of 17 April 2019
19. Review’s findings of the investigation into allegations that North East Lincolnshire Council
(NELC) had committed fraud and perjury by making a statement knowing it to be false with
the intention of misleading the judge to justify obtaining the court’s permission to enforce a
sum of money to which it was not entitled.
“You also made reference to the council and courts reversing their block on the claim for
the disputed £60 issued as a result of a letter sent to you regards no payment of council
tax. You advised that the council had blocked any attempts to obtain this money pending
your high court review which had been submitted. I have seen from yourself and also the
council a letter you emailed to the high court and copied to magistrate representatives
stating you were ‘withdrawing this judicial review claim’. I see no reason why this
would not be reviewed by any reasonable person as notification of withdrawal of your
high court claim and as a result that the block on collection of these monies would have
been lifted. I believe during the magistrates hearing in November 2013 you raised this
issue but were asked to provide a current high court reference and could not and as such
the liability order was issued. Therefore I do not find any credible evidence that would
suggest any collusion by the courts and council to manufacture a decision against you to
facilitate recovery of monies owed.”
20. The force used the same tactics to cover up the criminal wrongdoing as were employed in
investigation element 1. Failing to pursue any lines of enquiry; concealing evidence;
misrepresenting evidence to mislead the uninformed observer; turning a blind eye to relevant
evidence, etc. etc.
21. The statement that I was ‘withdrawing this judicial review claim’ was included in the final
paragraph of the letter referred to in the investigation outcome which was in fact dated 20
November 2013. This followed 8 paragraphs explaining what had happened in the
proceedings and what I as the Applicant in the high court appeal (case stated) challenging the
costs was intending to do as a consequence of the case stated application apparently being put
back on track due to the judicial review claim (for a mandatory order) being successful in
prompting the court to serve a draft of the case.

22. It was categorically made clear in the 20 November letter that the appeal disputing the costs
was a Case Stated appeal, not a judicial review claim and the letter referred to the withdrawal
of the judicial review claim for a mandatory order as it was no longer necessary to pursue
further because it had done its job (the mandatory order required the Justices to state a case
because the application was being obstructed by the Magistrates’ court). DS was
provided evidence showing that the Council had obtained the contents of the 20 November
2013 letter from a source which proved indisputably that I had continued pursuing the high
court application challenging the costs and it was the judicial review for a mandatory order
that was no longer necessary and had been withdrawn which comprehensively accounted for
why the allegations were proven beyond reasonable doubt. The reference here is the 7
February 2019 email sent to DS to which was attached the relevant document (12 July
2017 application form).
23. DS puts emphasis on the fact that he has seen the letter (sent by myself) which he
exploits to justify his contrived findings, yet does not mention any of the relevant evidence I
provided which proved indisputably that I had continued pursuing the high court application
challenging the costs. Another document attached the 7 February email (Pursuing appeal
correspondence) proved beyond any doubt that NELC’s Deputy Monitoring Officer, Mrs
Richardson-Smith had been copied in on emails I sent to the Justices’ Clerk dealing with
correspondence in pursuit of the high court (case stated) appeal that were sent after the letter
of 20 November 2013.
24. The outcome proceeds to defend the indefensible in respect of the involvement of District
Judge Daniel Curtis whom I allege is complicit. A magistrates hearing is referred to as being
held in November 2013 when it was not; it was in fact nearly two years later (30 October
2015). DS obtained from somewhere that I was unable to provide a current high court
reference when asked by the District Judge and was the reason he accepted the Council’s false
statement (which was that the case had been withdrawn), yet written evidence had been
submitted in respect of the court hearing. The judge therefore knew that the high court
application challenging the costs had not been withdrawn and the evidence adduced was
perjured.
25. The evidence I sent directly to DS was sufficient alone to satisfy himself that the
District Judge was complicit. However, he was advised that DCS Wilson would have further
relevant information. An email I sent to HMCTS on 19 March 2017 in which DCS Wilson
was copied had attached further documents containing more proof that the judge deliberately
concealed evidence to cover-up perjury committed by NELC. But there is something at odds

with the force defending the MoJ against allegations of falsifying letters whilst at the same
time defending NELC against allegations of perjury for stating to the court (knowing it to be
false) that it had no further reason to believe that the costs were being disputed because the
case had been withdrawn. The purported letter dated 19 December 2013 sent by the court
contains the following:
Re: Application to State a Case
I acknowledge receipt of your representations upon the draft case.
North East Lincolnshire Council sought an extension to the time in which they may
submit representations on the draft case as the Council stated that they had not received
the draft case. This request was granted.
Enclosed herewith is the final case.
If you wish to pursue your appeal, the case must be lodged with the Administrative Court
Office at the Royal Courts of Justice within 10 days of receiving it from this office, and
within four days of lodging the case, the you must serve on the Respondent a notice of
entry of the appeal together with a copy of the case.
I shall be grateful if you would kindly acknowledge receipt of this correspondence and
enclosure.”

Annex A
Element 1
1. Review’s findings of the investigation into allegations of the Crown Prosecution Service
(CPS) and court colluding with the police in a malicious prosecution in respect of
inconsistencies in the witness statements.
“Reference your arrest in 2015 I have reviewed the summary you provided and also
obtained the original file. I have to say on review of the evidence I would have likely
referred the case to CPS for review also. I note in your case review you refer to the
statements being very detailed, but you indicate they miss relevant points. The officers
who take statements can only record what the witnesses recall. In my experience you
would not also expect to find each and every statement from witnesses of the same
incident to be exactly the same due to different view points, recall and recollections.”
2. The uninformed observer would be led to believe that the allegations of collusion between the
police, CPS and court surrounded a fraction of the issues actually raised in the evidence, i.e.,
the differences of the witness statements and even an issue that was not raised at all. Anyone
who had read the investigation outcome (but not my evidence) would be under the false
impression I had irrationally alleged that the officers neglected to influence the witnesses. It
was the arresting officer’s statement, not those of the two members of the public, which was
referred to in respect of missing relevant points. Generally what PC Blake left out of his
statement was anything capable of undermining the prosecution case and assisting my
defence. A paper submitted to DS on 17 March 2019 (Extract - unlawful arrest)
contained the following:
“PC Blake was also aware that I had flatly denied urinating against the tree and had
explained that the witnesses were mistaken. He also knew about my response to Mr
’s accusation that he had seen me zipping or unzipping my fly, which was to the
effect, that he could not have done as the jeans I wore had no zip (he omits this in his
witness statement).”
3. The document was one of four sent via email on 17 March 2019 to DS in response to
his request regarding the allegation of collusion /unlawful arrest in 2015 (evidence referred to
at meeting of 16 March). The following explained the relevance of the attachments:
“I have separated out content from three different papers which focuses on irregularities of
the witnesses accounts etc., but have also attached one of the papers complete, as it

comprehensively highlights the wholesale breach of the Criminal Procedure and
Investigations Act 1996 and associated Codes of Practice which consequently denied me a
fair trial and ultimately caused my wrongful conviction.
The four attachments relating to the above are as follows:
Proposed areas to be investigated.pdf
Excerpt of appeal ref CO 432-15 22 April 2017.pdf
Extract - unlawful arrest.pdf
Excerpt paras 8-12 - Feb 19 IOPC.pdf ”
4. Other issues in the same paper (see below) were raised about events being left out of the
arresting officer’s account that were capable of undermining the prosecution case and
assisting my defence. For example it was omitted from his statement what it was that made
Mr change his mind and pursue a police complaint after had stated he would not:
“However, this does not account for the period before PC Blake ordered me to remain at
the front office out of earshot while he accompanied Mr to inspect the tree and
surrounding area and was then confronted with the fact that the allegations were untrue. It
is also significant that Mr had expressed prior to going off with PC Blake that he
would not be making a complaint and it was shortly after their private consultation that PC
Blake announced I was under suspicion for indecent exposure.”
5. Regarding DS ’s assertion that one would expect to find different accounts in the
statements, this missed the point because the actual allegations, which were deflected, were
that somebody (presumably the officer taking the statement) must have influenced Mrs
(Extract - unlawful arrest):
“PC Mills, who took the written statement of Mrs five days after Mr , Mr
Warriner and PC Blake had given theirs, would need to account for why, if nobody had
influenced her or she had not seen the other statements, the following quotes from PC
Blake’s and Mrs ’s contrived statements describing the same event both
coincidentally contain the same use of capital letters. The emphasis in both quotes (PC
Blake’s and Mrs ’s respectively) is true to how they appear in the witness
statements:
‘he instantly became aggressive and argumentative saying “ARE YOU TELLING ME
TO TAKE A SEAT, YOU CANT MAKE ME, OR ARE YOU ASKING ME”. I said
“Just take a seat, I’m asking you to” to which M1 replied “WELL I DON’T HAVE TO
STAY THEN,” I then said “Take a seat”...’
‘The male became quite lairy and argumentative to the officer saying “ARE YOU
ASKING ME TO SIT DOWN OR TELLING ME”. The officer replied “I’M
TELLING YOU”. The male took a seat...’”

6. Though the accounts differ slightly, the more serious aspect in respect of the alleged collusion
is that the two statements are taken from different people (5 days apart) who describe the
same event but just happen to use capital letters identically (see para 14 below). Justice
demanded that the inconsistencies were investigated in the proper context of the evidence I
submitted, so the police were not simply dealing with ‘different view points, recall and
recollections’. The context was clear enough from the evidence separated out from the three
papers referred to in my 17 March 2019 email to DS . For example the following is
quoted from the Excerpt of the 22 April 2017 appeal:
“Mr Warriner in his witness statement says he was approached by Mr who
informed him that “there is a man pissing up the tree outside”. However, by the time Mr
produced his statement he had changed his mind and stated “it looked like he was
going to have a wee against the tree”. Mr is an unreliable witness as he had not
seen me urinating, only assumed he had, which he confirmed in-between informing Mr
Warriner and producing his statement which he changed accordingly.
.....
This leaves the anomaly of why from the same viewpoint my body was no longer visible
to Mr but clearly visible to Mr Warriner who was so confident about what he saw
that he stated that my flies were closed. I don’t consider Mr Warriner’s account entirely
accurate but it is far from being the imaginings and assumptions of Mr ’s
statement. Mr Warriner stated that at no time did he see me with my private parts exposed,
which is for the very good reason that at no point in time did any act take place which
would have required the exposure of my penis. I would say also with him being a civilian
member of police staff he would be all too aware of the seriousness of committing perjury
and so not be prepared to risk lying in a witness statement which would leave him liable to
prosecution if the statement was tendered in evidence.
.....
Mr , before accompanying the officer to the tree which he had accused me of
urinating against, stated that he had seen me zipping or unzipping my fly despite the jeans
I wore having buttons. This anomaly was raised with the arresting officer shortly after the
alleged incident took place. However, by the time Mr produced his statement, the
reference to operating a zip was omitted. Mrs on the other hand did refer to
buttons, but this was in her witness statement made after becoming aware there was no zip
(1 Sept 2015). The first being “the male appeared to be unbuttoning his jeans” and later
untruthfully stated “I then saw this male having unbuttoned his jeans” and then describe in
detail the alleged offence, knowing this was a complete fabrication (see below header, ‘the
most compelling evidence of perjury’).
.....
Mrs ’s witness statement was produced five days after the alleged offence. She
had the benefit of hindsight to know what to change or leave out, on account of inaccurate
statements having been already identified. For example she knew it was best to steer away
from referring to a zipped fly and specifying buttons because the anomaly of when Mr
spuriously first referred to a zip when there was no zip had already been raised

with the arresting officer. Likewise the officer had confirmed that I had not urinated so
unlike lying about seeing my penis she knew not to lie about urinating.
.....
Mr stated falsely to Mr Warriner that he had seen me ‘pissing up the tree’. He
realised this after PC Blake had investigated the area hence changing his mind in his
statement, i.e., “it looked like he was going to....”. Mrs would have been in the
same or similar position to Mr but regarding my alleged exposed penis she was
able to identify exactly the position of my thumb and that I was not urinating. If Mrs
had clear enough vision to distinguish this then Mr would have as well.
Mr therefore had no justification for saying to Mr Warriner that he had seen me
urinating, not only because I wasn’t but also because he could clearly see that I wasn’t.”
7. If it wasn’t clear enough from the above what angle the investigation needed to be approached
from the extract taken from the 19 February 2019 representations proposing areas to be
investigated should have filled in any gaps:
“8. I was charged with the offence on 4 September 2015 by which time a further witness
statement had been obtained by PC Mills 1978 (1 September 2015) from Mrs .
She was present with her husband, Arthur on the day of the alleged offence
who had produced his statement the same day (27 August 2015). Hence, her account
was given 5 days after his witness statement (and all others) had been obtained. It is
unquestionably the statement of Mrs (if it had been true) which would have
most satisfied the investigation that there was a case to answer in respect of the serious
allegations. However, it was also Mrs who had to the greatest degree
committed wilfully to providing an account of events which were known to be false.
9. I had on 27 August 2015: (i) denied all wrongdoing; (ii) reiterated that denial later in
interview; (iii) highlighted the unsuitability/unreliability of Mr as a witness;
and (iv) remained voluntarily to assist (I knew CCTV footage could not have
incriminated me). Therefore, the circumstances even at that early stage gave ample
reason for Humberside police to question the reliability of the evidence. Furthermore,
the credibility of the evidence had to be in question given the nature of the allegations
and the alleged offence was in the immediate vicinity of the police station. I had also
stated in the defendant interview (27 August) that I hoped there was CCTV footage as
it would confirm my account. Mrs ’s delayed witness statement attests further
that there was no case to answer, not only by virtue of her untruthfulness but also
because it was an obviously contrived account, constructed from knowledge gleaned
over the 5 day period she was given to produce it, see 22 April 2017 Appeal against
the Local Resolution outcome (‘April Appeal’), under heading: “time to get the story
straight”.
10. For example, she had demonstrably exploited knowledge acquired regarding the
alleged fly undoing, i.e., she emphasised buttons knowing that Mr had already
been discredited by his false claim that he had witnessed the operation of a zip (false
in respect of being operated and a zip). This false claim had been brought to PC
Blake’s attention in the presence of the s shortly after the accusations were

made. Mr , not wishing to contradict himself, tactically omitted any reference
to how the fly operated in his written statement but Mrs in her formal account
obtained 5 days later specifically referred to a buttoned fly, thus exploiting the
circumstances.
11. Another example pointing to Mrs ’s account being contrived around events
which were confirmed prior to her witness statement was the established fact that there
was no evidence that I had urinated. Again, she had exploited knowledge acquired
regarding this i.e., that Mr had been discredited for falsely stating to Mr
Warriner that he had seen me ‘pissing up the tree’. In this instance she was able, in
retrospect, to state that she had not seen me urinate but emphasised that it appeared to
her as if I was about to. Similarly as in the previous example, Mr , with the
benefit of hindsight hedged his bets by including in his written statement that ‘it
looked like he was going to have a wee against the tree’. ”
Element 2 of Allegation (2) as referred to in the Investigation outcome letter of 17 April 2019
8. Review’s findings of the investigation into allegations of the CPS and court colluding with the
police in a malicious prosecution in respect of the arrest, charge and trial:
“You have stated also you feel you should not have been arrested, but it is clear PC Blake
asked for your details and when they were refused he only then executed an arrest utilising
his arrest powers. I note you were interviewed and bailed and subsequently charged to
court where you failed to attend and were found guilty in your absence.
In reviewing the evidence, the police act as ‘gatekeepers’, reviewing the evidence and if it
is felt that there is a realistic prospect of conviction with the evidential and public interest
test being met this can be charged by police. In some cases some offences require a crown
prosecution service (CPS) review. In your case the case was one that required CPS review
and they have independently reviewed the case and deemed that there was sufficient
evidence to charge you. At that point and in simplistic terms it is then down to the courts
as a further independent body to review any contested offences or evidence.
I also note you have contested some of the evidence in this case in your own review and
raise issue of discrepancies in your summary. By refusing to attend court you did though
in essence give up your opportunity to contest these issues to the court. The court can only
review the evidence and issues presented to them on the dates of the trial, whether from
the prosecution or the defence if they are present.
As a result I find that there is no evidence of misconduct re this matter also.”
9. The message sent out in the above is bizarrely, that from a police perspective, the overriding
objective is to secure convictions, whether defendants are guilty or not. So even if the police
know that the defendant is innocent or have evidence capable of undermining the case, they
consider it their role to convince the court differently. Though this idea is clearly

misconceived, it does not alter the fact that police forces are widely claimed to withhold
evidence if it would damage the chance of a conviction.
10. But here the allegations are that the police and CPS conspired to pervert the course of justice
and the court was complicit. Given this it is irrational that the defence of the arrest’s
lawfulness relies on the subsequent detention being authorised by the custody Sergeant and an
Inspector authorising it to be continued. By the same token, seeking to rely on the CPS was
futile based on its belief there was sufficient to charge for a public order offence on further
consideration of the evidence. It was in fact the circumstances surrounding the further
consideration of the evidence that reinforces the alleged collusion because Mrs ’s
statement was an after thought, taken on 2 September 2015, five days after the alleged offence
and when all the other statements were taken.
11. The further review of the evidence was carried out by the CPS the day after and it is with
almost certainty the securing of the additional statement which emboldened the CPS to
charge, believing that all angles would be covered in the further account. In the police’s terms
the statement ‘was taken at the request of the CPS in order to clarify some points and ensure
the whole incident was captured’, though in reality securing the additional statement was an
opportunity to account for all the inconsistencies, i.e., smooth over all the cracks in the
evidence surrounding events that had been brought to light (see this Annex, element 1 above).
12. It is undeniable that allowing Mrs several days to provide an account after her partner
had given his, would present the parties an opportunity to maliciously conspire to produce
false evidence. Both had the same agenda as the police and CPS which was obviously to see
me convicted, irrespective of guilt. Given the troublesome inconsistencies faced by the CPS,
the opportunity handed the police to obtain a statement (which just happened to account for
the anomalies) was crucially what the CPS sought to justify a charge and consequently the
most obvious indication of collusion.
13. Further clues are in the fact that the CPS trial bundle records on page 21, “Restricted –
Investigations”, that on the day of the arrest, some time before my interview but after
statements were recorded of the front office clerk and arresting officer, arrangements were
being made to obtain statements from Mr and his wife. So why did the police only
record Mr ’s that day? Justice demanded that the husband and wife were prevented
from communicating with each other and their statements taken independently because of my
categorical denial of the allegations. In fact there was a need to arrest the witnesses as the
information already available to the arresting officer was sufficient to give him reasonable
grounds to suspect that Mr was attempting to pervert the course of justice. It was

clearly necessary to do this to allow the prompt and effective investigation into the false
allegations.
14. The delay in taking the final statement enabled Mrs to give a retroactive account and
it is obvious she had been updated with facts established over the intervening period to ensure
elements of her side of the story aligned with these. The delay advantaged the CPS because
someone (presumably PC Mills 1978) obviously told her what to write and how to format it or
had been given PC Blake’s statement for reference. Mrs ’s statement taken 5 days
later recounted the same conversation between myself and PC Blake as PC Blake had
accounted for in his own. They had both said more or less the same thing but more tellingly
both identically used capital letters to give emphasis to it (see para 5 above) which more than
anything shouts out “collusion” and “malicious prosecution”.
15. So, the CPS and Courts were hardly going to raise any concerns about the evidence because
they were obviously, as alleged, complicit in the malicious prosecution. It was also clear from
material in the trial bundle that there were disclosure failings which were comprehensively
particularised in the representations issued to the police, court and CPS dated 19 February
2018 and forwarded to DS (Proposed areas to be investigated). Evidence of the CPS
and Police hopelessly failing to comply with the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act
(CPIA) also featured in the 19 February representations, as well as the Court failing to meet
its obligations in managing proceedings (the prescribed Trial Preparation Form does not even
appear on the court file).
16. As for DS ’s defence for the arrest being necessary and the power of arrest existing at
the time, this amounts to just one argument which was that the arresting officer asked for my
details and when they were refused he executed an arrest. All this tells you is that the
information I had submitted (Extract - unlawful arrest) was not taken into consideration as is
evident from the most relevant content quoted below:
“.....The question of “necessity” for an arrest (to enable details to be ascertained etc.) does
not arise under PACE unless the officer has first reasonable grounds for suspecting that an
offence has been committed. An officer’s power of arrest (subject to the necessity test)
would therefore not be exercisable if he only had reasonable grounds for suspecting that
an offence might have been committed. So, unless PC Blake could satisfy this requirement
(which he most obviously could not), the arrest was unlawful and he had no statutory
power to make an arrest for any of the reasons prescribed in PACE in respect of a
“necessity”. It can never be necessary to arrest a person unless there are reasonable
grounds to suspect them of committing an offence (PACE Code G, para 2.1). What was
required of PC Blake was that he had to first have equipped himself with sufficient

information so that he had reasonable cause to suspect (subject to the necessity test) before
the power was exercised.
Clearly the information given to PC Blake by Mr (when considered alongside all
other factors documented throughout these representations) was insufficient to give PC
Blake reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence had been committed. ‘Officers
must consider facts and information which tend to indicate the person’s innocence as well
as their guilt’ (ACPO Position Statement: Necessity to Arrest, November 2012).
Notwithstanding the CPS file stating I was known to the police (Restricted -
Investigations), the question of a necessity to arrest did not arise, so on the one and only
time PC Blake requested my details and I declined to give them, his power of arrest was
not exercisable anyway in respect of a necessity to ascertain my details. However, even if
his power of arrest was exercisable (subject to a need to) by reason of sufficient grounds
of suspicion, then it would be expected under PACE Code G (para 2.9(a-b) and Note 2D)
that he would have given a warning that the consequences of a refusal would likely make
an arrest necessary.
The eagerness with which PC Blake arrested me, i.e., within seconds of declining to give
details, is an indication that he was not looking to ‘consider if the necessary objectives
[could have been] met by other, less intrusive means’ (PACE Code G, para 1.3). PC Blake
may have considered himself to have been given a green light on the basis that the refusal
supported the need for arrest and this would cover him against a potential claim for
unlawful arrest etc.
.....
PC Blake did not have reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence had been committed,
predominantly because of the circumstances set out in items i to v above but additionally
because of what PC Blake states in his written account with regard to the certainty of what
he considered would be visible to the witnesses, i.e., as follows:
“...it was a clear sunny afternoon and would therefore be easily visible..”
However, preceding this in the same paragraph he states (emphasis added):
“I considered that the information I had was the M1 had been seen with his penis out,
initially thought to be urinating against a tree outside the front of the Police station...”
So, PC Blake admits that if I had been doing whatever I had been accused of, the
witnesses, if they were not making wild assumptions, would have been able to account for
it unambiguously and not falsely allege I was urinating. Thus he has effectively admitted
that the only evidence available to him at the time on which he could have determined
whether an offence of indecent exposure had been committed was unreliable and of
questionable credibility, or in other words he had no reasonable grounds for suspecting it
happened.
.....

The question requiring answering here is whether the prompt and effective investigation
of the offence (assuming one had been committed) could have been carried out without
my arrest. If the answer to this was yes, which of course it was, then an arrest was not
necessary. However, what matters is whether PC Blake had reasonable grounds to believe
that an arrest was necessary for this purpose. He had no reasonable grounds because I had
cooperated with the police by voluntarily remaining at the station in order to assist the
police even when it was clear that Mr Warriner would have much preferred I had left the
police station.
In any event, the existence of the statutory requirement itself indicates that there may be
cases where, even though arresting may allow prompt and effective investigation, it is not
necessary to arrest because prompt and effective investigation is possible without doing
so.
It was more appropriate for the to be arrested (even Mr Warriner) to allow the
prompt and effective investigation into the false allegations which PC Blake had
reasonable grounds for suspecting had been made. The fact that they were not all
questioned independently without delay has had disastrous consequences.
The 5 days given Mrs to produce her statement clearly advantaged her. The
information gleaned over this period allowed her to adjust her account, adding or leaving
out what was required to advantage the prosecution.
.....
It is not at all credible that PC Blake would have had reasonable grounds for believing that
an arrest was necessary for the above purpose. There was not even remotely a question of
an offence or prosecution until PC Blake arrived on the scene. Up until then Mr Warriner
clearly had no interest in taking the matter further and wanted me to leave the station.
However, I remained voluntarily because I was aggrieved about being falsely accused of
being seen urinating in public and wanted to clear up any misunderstanding. I planned to
do this when Mr Warriner was free from dealing with members of the public. Mr Warriner
made the following statement in his written account which incidentally is different to PC
Blake’s statement in respect of why he became involved:
“The male could not be reasoned with and declined to leave the station so an officer Pc
Tom Blake was called for.”
What he meant was that I continued to refute the false allegations, but what is more
relevant here is that PC Blake could have had no reasonable grounds for believing that an
arrest was necessary for fearing that I might disappear because I had demonstrated I would
do exactly the opposite by voluntarily remaining at the station in order to cooperate with
police enquiries.
.....
The requirement of “necessity to arrest” under section 24 of the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984 (PACE)

For an arrest to be lawful, the arresting officer must have reasonable grounds under
section 24(2) of PACE for suspecting that an offence has been committed (as opposed to
an offence may have been committed). It is also an essential pre-requisite to a lawful
arrest (sub-section 4 of s. 24) that the officer has reasonable grounds for believing that it is
“necessary” to arrest the person in question for one of the reasons specified in section
24(5). It would therefore not sufficiently satisfy the test if the officer merely considered it
would be desirable or more convenient to arrest the person.
PC Blake clearly had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence had been
committed, for reasons previously set out, and therefore by virtue of the statutory
provision in s.24(2) of PACE the arrest was unlawful. But supposing for argument’s sake
he was able to satisfy the requirements of s.24(2), he would have still had to have had
reasonable grounds for believing that it was “necessary” (as opposed to merely desirable
or convenient) to make an arrest. The questions which required answering under s.24(4)
were, did PC Blake believe that it was necessary to make an arrest for one of the reasons
specified in s.24(5) and, if so, did he have reasonable grounds for that belief. These are
addressed under the highlighted sub-sections above and of course there was no necessity.
17. DS was faced with incontrovertible evidence that the power of arrest did not exist at the
time and was consequently unlawful. He could therefore have only have arrived at his finding
by denying the existence of the evidence he had asked for and was provided.
18. The handling of the final element of this allegation amounts to a denial of accountability for
failings that would have, if the police had taken responsibility, cleared my name. DS
relies on my non attendance of the trial to let the police, CPS and court off the hook for their
failings which all contributed to my wrongful conviction. The police are of the opinion that
they were justified in not pursuing the criminal aspect of my allegations of collusion because
by not attending court I had given up my opportunity to contest all the inconsistencies,
including the abuse of the disclosure process that amounted to the denial of a fair trial.
19. He must mean that if the defendant is not in attendance the court has no duty to weigh up the
evidence in the trial bundle and entitled to automatically find a verdict of guilt. This of course
is misconceived because a judge must be satisfied so that he is sure of a defendant’s guilt. The
Criminal Procedure Rules state that where the defendant is absent the court must proceed as if
the defendant were present and had pleaded not guilty. Clearly then the court does not have
the power to find a guilty verdict merely because the defendant is absent.
20. Everything that enabled me to prove that the evidence adduced by the witnesses was false and
the full Code test (evidential stage) was not met was available to the police and theoretically
the CPS and court. This raises questions of why the police did not establish that the statements
were questionable and ultimately untrue and how such blatant fabrications could subsequently

have been believed by the CPS and court. The most feasible answer lies in the authorities
colluding and advancing to prosecution maliciously. Though it has since been discovered that
evidence withheld from me was purportedly provided by the police to the CPS, so there is
even less excuse for the CPS to have determined wrongly that the full Code test (evidential
stage) was met. A photo was withheld from me which was referred to in the documents
provided to DS (Extract - unlawful arrest) from which the following is quoted:
“If the investigation was carried out objectively with the intention of arriving at the truth,
as opposed to covering it up, then the line of enquiry would have been to explore the
conflicting evidence with regard to what would be visible to the naked eye from a distance
of over 100 feet. The best evidence available would have been the photo relating to item 7
on the schedule of non-sensitive unused material which was categorised, for reasons
becoming increasingly questionable as ‘Clearly Not Disclosable’.
It was inexcusable to neglect this element on the strength that the photo, purporting to
show the distance between myself and the witnesses, was attached to the file and
accessible to the CPS, especially when my allegations are that the CPS and court have
colluded with the police in a malicious prosecution. Obvious concerns immediately come
to mind about why the photo was not considered disclosable, despite on the balance of
probabilities it would more likely than not have been capable of undermining the
prosecution case and assisting my defence.
The investigation has uncovered that the photo was provided by the police to the CPS
which is new information and therefore something requiring to be considered afresh in
respect of why the CPS made no comment about disclosure. From a distance of over 100
feet it would have been impossible to verify events with the degree of detail described by
the witnesses and would in that case have confirmed that they had knowingly made false
statements. A reasonable line of inquiry here would be to verify whether the photo was
representative of a distance between 100 and 130 feet and if it appeared significantly less
than that it would point to the force deliberately intending to pervert the course of justice.
As the evidence was not disclosed to me I must assume that the photo was taken of the
tree, maybe with somebody stood in close proximity, from the location of the portacabin
(temporary front office). Although the portacabin is no longer there it is known to have
been located adjacent to the vehicular access to the police station. Therefore the image
depicting where I was stood should be the tree I was seen at corresponding to one
measured in the region of 100 to 130 feet from the vehicular access. If this test is passed,
and it can be confirmed that whoever took the photo was in an appropriate position (and
was not taking advantage of the camera's optical zoom capabilities), then the CPS has
obstructed the disclosure of evidence that would have undermined the prosecution case
and assisted my defence.”
21. The only consequence for my non attendance should have been that I was unable to cross
examine the police and witnesses, but I had already been prohibited from doing that anyway

and a solicitor appointed. According to the court, the judge allowed the solicitor to withdraw
from the case as I was not present at the trial. Allowing this does not accord with the idea that
the court must proceed as if the defendant were present and had pleaded not guilty nor would
the absence have justified the court dismissing for consideration the documents submitted as
mitigating evidence or all the evidence contained in the prosecution bundle. I also learned in
protracted correspondence with the court afterwards that the solicitor who attended to cross
examine the prosecution witnesses on my behalf ‘had no option but to withdraw from the
case’ as I was not there to tell him what questions to ask.
22. This would most certainly be bluff because according to the Criminal Procedure Rules when
an advocate has been appointed to cross-examine a witness the court is required to give
directions enabling the prosecution material to be provided to the appointed solicitor. Being a
professional specialising in criminal defence he would not have needed instruction to consider
the evidence and identify inconsistencies of the witness statements and conflicting material in
the trial bundle from someone with no experience in interrogating witnesses.
23. Disclosure failures and the failure of the court to met its obligation in actively managing the
case by dealing with the ‘effective trial preparation form’ are documented comprehensively in
one of the attachments (Proposed areas to be investigated) sent on 17 March 2019 to DS
. It has since that paper was produced also been confirmed by the court that there was no
effective trial preparation form on the court file:
‘6. The ultimate safeguard, which clearly failed was the court, as a judge has to be
satisfied so that he is sure of a defendant’s guilt. The court could not conceivably have
been satisfied that there was fair disclosure of the material which was capable of
undermining the prosecution case. The court had been denied the opportunity to assess
material that called into question the witnesses, and on that basis alone, the CPS could
not have credibly proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. According to a review3
commissioned by Lord Justice Gross, then Senior Presiding Judge (emphasis added);
“The primary duty of the court is to actively manage a case following the entering
of a not guilty plea. This requires close scrutiny of the information set out in the
effective trial preparation form. The prosecution’s compliance with its disclosure
obligations must be considered and the defence must be encouraged to provide
sufficient information to progress the case at the first hearing, including the
provision of a defence statement.”
7. I had formally confirmed on 4 September 2015 that a ‘not guilty’ plea would be
entered at the first hearing. Despite this, there is no evidence to suggest that the court
required proper disclosure being made sufficiently in advance of the hearing. The
schedule of unused material was not even a matter considered at the first hearing;

consequently no direction was made for further material to be disclosed. In fact no
matters at all were raised at the first hearing regarding disclosure, or the ‘effective trial
preparation form’. The prescribed form, which will be referred to later, was required
to be used by the parties, and the court for case management, in accordance with the
accompanying guidance notes.
.....
35. As noted (see above paras 6-7), the final safeguard failed, as a judge must be satisfied
so that he is sure of a defendant’s guilt. The guidance notes to the ‘effective trial
preparation form’ explain under ‘the overriding objective’ that the purpose of the form
is to assist the parties and the court to comply with their respective obligations under
the Criminal Procedure Rules (‘CrimPR’) and Practice Directions for preparation for
trial in a magistrates’ court. The form is to be used in any case to be tried in a
magistrates’ court in which a not guilty plea is entered. Where a not guilty plea is
anticipated the prosecutor must complete Parts 1, 2 and 4 of the form and serve it on
the defendant with the initial details of the prosecution case, or as soon after that as
possible and in any event before the first hearing (see CrimPR rule 8.2).
36. The form, which is contained in the ‘Initial Details of the Prosecution Case’ (see
above para 22) reveals that parts of it were completed though as stated there were no
matters raised at the first court hearing regarding the trial preparation form. I did not
know I would be unrepresented; this was confirmed to me just minutes before being
called into the courtroom. The solicitor, who I assumed would be representing me (and
had been initially) was no longer acting in that capacity. According to information
obtained by the usher I was not entitled to legal representation but it was not explained
why. Considering all the circumstances, paragraph 7 of the guidance notes (below)
leaves no doubt as to the fact that the court had fallen far short of meeting its
obligations:
“Before the first hearing (even if only very shortly before) or, if the court allows,
during the first hearing, the defendant must complete Parts 1, 3 and 4 of the form,
unless the court otherwise directs. The court may require a defendant who intends
to plead not guilty to complete those parts of the form before calling the case on
for the first hearing. At that hearing, at which the not guilty plea is taken, the court
then will have before it relevant information on the basis of which to give
directions for an effective trial. An unrepresented defendant may need to be
excused completion of the form before the hearing. He or she may need to be taken
through it by the court instead, and the relevant information gathered in that way.”
37. It should be sufficient that the form was not considered at all by the judge to conclude
that the court had not complied with its obligations, but it would be helpful to give an
example of information that should have been logged, but was not, to demonstrate how
the failure contributed to unfair proceedings. Part 5 of the form is for the court to
record its decisions and directions for an effective trial. One of the considerations
(para 13.9) deals specifically with directions by the court prohibiting the defendant (in
person) from cross examining the witnesses. A space is left for the court to insert the
name(s) of the witness(es) whom the defendant has been prohibited from cross

examining and another for the solicitor who the court appoints on the defendant’s
behalf.
38. I was told by the judge at the first hearing on 30 September 2015 that I was prohibited
from cross examining the witnesses, also that if I had no solicitor (or did not appoint
one) the same solicitor who had initially acted for me would be appointed10
. There is
no record of this on the prescribed form (it was never filled out by the court) nor was it
ever updated. Moreover, I knew nothing about the form at the time and would not do
so until my conviction prompted research into the laws I was oblivious to at the time I
was prosecuted.
39. I received directions in the post (1 October) confirming that I was ‘prohibited from
cross examining two witnesses ( s) in person’, also that the trial would take
place on 15 December 2015. There was no revised copy of the prescribed form nor
was it referred to; it was not explained why it was not addressed at the hearing nor
brought to my attention that I was required to fill out relevant parts. The courts only
further contact before the 15 December trial was on 11 December 2015, which was to
acknowledge an email I had sent that day.
40. I had sent further documents comprising; a conduct complaint made to the police
about the arresting officer; proof confirming beyond doubt that perjured evidence was
adduced in an earlier case11
, and; correspondence between myself and the police
predominantly concerning the refusal of the force to investigate my allegations in both
matters of perjury.
41. I had asked for acknowledgement and to ensure the information was seen by the
relevant team for the hearing on 15 [December] and expressed categorically that I did
not consider the District Judge a fit and proper person to hear the case. The court
confirmed that the District Judge would be trying the case and a direction at the first
hearing prohibited me from cross examining the 2 civilian witnesses in person. The
court also confirmed that it had appointed a solicitor to conduct cross examination on
my behalf, but there was still no reference to the prescribed form.
42. It is suspected that court would not have furnished me with the information about the
case but for the fact I had contacted the court to provide it with further evidence.
Clearly if the ‘effective trial preparation form’ had been dealt with by the court it is
unlikely there would have been any doubt about who would be trying the case.
However, what is now apparent from the accompanying guidance notes is that I was
prohibited from cross examining the witnesses in person, and an intermediary
appointed on my behalf, under sections 36 and 38 respectively of the Youth Justice
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
43. Whilst paragraph 13.9 of the prescribed form should be completed by specifying
which witnesses a defendant is prohibited from cross examining and who the court
appoints to do so, paragraph 13.8 leaves a space for inserting the date when ‘the court
will discuss ground rules for questioning’. The following explanatory note
accompanies paragraph 13.8 on the prescribed form:

“If an intermediary is appointed for a witness or for the defendant, the court must
discuss the ground rules for questioning with the intermediary and the advocates
before the witness or defendant gives evidence. Sufficient time must be allowed
for this.”
44. I did not attend the 15 December hearing as I was certain there would be no prospect
of a fair trial because of the injustice in my previous case where the same judge
conducted the proceedings. I had already complained to the Judicial Conduct
Investigations Office and reported the judge’s professional misconduct as a crime to
the police and was therefore satisfied that a right to a fair trial would be prejudiced. It
is reasonable to conclude that the research I had subsequently undertaken which
uncovered evidence of the court improperly dealing with the case reinforces my
assertion.’
24. With all the evidence available, the CID is grasping ever more desperately at straws by
defending the actions of all the parties alleged to have been complicit on the basis that I did
not attend the trial.
25. Additional to the withheld photo (see para 20 above) CCTV stills were also listed on the
schedule of non-sensitive unused material which could potentially have undermined the
prosecution case or assisted my defence. These were similarly categorised as ‘Clearly Not
Disclosable’ and described under item 6 of the schedule as CCTV stills at Grimsby Police
Station showing camera views confirming there would be no CCTV covering location the
defendant was at. However, there are very good grounds to suspect that the CCTV footage,
which would have supported my innocence, had been concealed. The representations which
were forwarded to DS (Proposed areas to be investigated) record with reference to this
in paragraphs 60 and 61 which are quoted below:
“60. I had succeeded in obtaining information through FOI in between the trial concluding
in the Magistrates’ court and his appeal to the Crown court which brought into
question the claim that there would be no relevant CCTV coverage. For example, it
was confirmed that a total 7 cameras covered relevant areas and the police made no
request on the relevant day to retain the video footage. All footage which may have
included evidence to prove my innocence had therefore been overwritten. It is unlikely
with such extensive coverage of the relevant area by CCTV that there would be
nothing of relevance to the case.
61. Even if there was nothing that was considered capable of assisting my case it would
have been in the interest of justice for the evidence to have formed part of the
prosecution, not just listing it as unused material that was in any event classified as
undisclosable. In accordance with the CPS’ continuing duty to consider and review
disclosure under the CPIA, it should have been required of the police to disclose all

the relevant video footage, which at the time the schedule was presented to the CPS,
would not have been overwritten13
. However, the ultimate responsibility lies with the
court as it has a duty to consider the prosecution’s compliance with its disclosure
obligations.....”
26. There were seven cameras in the relevant area according to the freedom of information
request so contrary to what the investigating officer recorded on the schedule of unused
material there was CCTV footage. The relevant response was as follows:
“There was one cctv camera situated in the portacabin public area and 6 cameras covering
the front of the station”
27. It is specifically stated that one of the 7 cameras was situated in the temporary front office
(portacabin) which means that the footage from that would have been indisputably capable of
undermining the case for the prosecution etc. In that case it is reasonable to doubt also
whether there really was no CCTV coverage that would have undermined the case for the
prosecution and proved my innocence in respect of the other 6 cameras.
28. The investigation was used as an opportunity to be seen to be accountable with the real
intention of clearing the accused of wrongdoing by trawling the available paperwork to single
out anything it could use to support that agenda.
29. The photo showing the location I was seen to be at was purportedly accessible to the CPS but
what has not been confirmed is whether the CCTV stills were similarly accessible to the CPS.
One would expect a proportionate line of enquiry would have been to find out exactly what
was made available to the CPS and if the stills did not include a view covering the ‘portacabin
public area’ as specified in the response to the freedom of information request then the matter
required further investigation. There is no evidence that any enquiries like these were carried
out and therefore the investigation was staged and had no point to it other than to vindicate the
police, CPS and the court.
30. Lastly, if the investigating officer, disclosure officer and CPS (if stills were made available)
were satisfied that the material was incapable of undermining the case for the prosecution etc.,
which would be highly improbable given the freedom of information response, then it would
have been in the interest of justice for the evidence to have formed part of the prosecution key
evidence to rebut a potential claim of disclosure irregularity.

Annex B
1. Review’s findings of the investigation into allegations of misconduct of a number of
Humberside police officers, members of police staff, police solicitor and an Independent
Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) Casework Manager who apparently double as the Executive
Assistant to the Deputy Director General and Deputy Chair.
“The final issue that I agreed to review was your report of misconduct by the various other
names listed. I asked for anything specific that you wanted to raise and you have not
supplied anything to me and as such I have made an assumption that you have reported
these officers as they all seem to have had some involvement in replying to you or
updating you regards previous complaints (some regards the same complaint which have
been escalated through the police ranks). There is therefore no specific evidence to
suggest there is any misconduct from any of the named individuals.”
2. The uninformed observer would be completely misled as to what events really followed after
DS asked in an email to me on 16 March 2019 the following:
“With regards to the following people please add a paragraph about the actions of each
person and what you wish to complain about, I have started with brief update re the top 3:
- CH Insp FARROW – Dealt with complaints of lack of action of Alison WATTS and has
not dealt with them appropriately
- CH Insp Parsons – Dealt with your complaint regards unlawful arrest and after not
hearing from him he replied stating he was just looking at the complaint a large number of
days after receipt – Unreasonable delay?
- Det Ch Supt WILSON – Sent a letter upholding a lack of investigation regards a matter
and refused to provide details of the reasoning – Copy of letter please.
- DCI Scaife - ?
- DI Foster - ?
- Ch Supt Heaton - ?
- Insp Harvey
- Sally BANKS - ?
- Tony WALMSLEY - ?
- Sally LAYCOCK - ?
- Sarah TURNER - ? ”
3. On 17 March my response to DS expressed the difficulty I anticipated providing what
he was asking for largely because the issues I was being affected by had gone on for so long

and escalated way out of control so the burden of having to go over the same ground but from
different perspectives was taking its toll:
“Named officers
The information about the individuals named in my complaint is difficult for me to
provide in the way you are asking. All of the officers are implicated in one way or another
in covering-up criminal wrongdoing in the way they have improperly applied legislation
governing complaints and appeals carried out under the Police Reform Act 2002. I have a
number of documents compiled relating to these concerns but they will amount to
hundreds of pages which is not what you want.
I will have to go through my records and see how I can go about providing a brief but
relevant description relating to each of the named officers without going over the top and
send this separately.”
4. DS ’s response on 18 March stated as follows:
“Your response re the NAMED OFFICERS is as I thought. I assumed from papers I have
seen that your naming of them would be due to their involvement in previous complaints
you feel have not been dealt with to your satisfaction. If there is any specific evidence you
wish to put forward please let me know otherwise I think I get the general concerns of
your report re the named persons.”
5. I was embarking on further work to present the information in the format it was being asked
for and expressed it would be sent separately. However, owing to the reassurance I was given
that DS already held the same papers that my submissions would be summarised from
and he indicated to have grasped from these what the issues were I stopped at the point I had
reached. If the papers referred to were complete, they told the whole story and fully supported
the allegations of a conspiracy to cover up criminal wrong doing attributable to the blatant
improper application of legislation (and statutory guidance) governing complaints and appeals
carried out under the Police Reform Act 2002.
6. Some of the information I had been asked for by DS was completed and sent to him,
consequently the statement in his outcome letter that I not supplied anything specific that I
wanted to raise was incorrect.
7. Specific evidence relating to the IOPC Casework Manager, Sarah TURNER was sent to the
DS . The Caseworker’s review outcome letter of 14 December 2018 came 1,132 days
after the police conduct complaint had been made and demonstrated a complete failure to
carry out what was lawfully required. The complaint to Humberside Police was submitted 8

November 2015 (ref: CO/432/15) and initially dealt with incorrectly by way of Local
Resolution. The complaint was referred to CH Insp Parsons who had not even opened the file
until 370 days after it had been allocated to him. The outcome was eventually provided on 3
April 2017 which was appealed and referred to the IOPC. On completing the review, the
IOPC deemed the statutory conditions were not met for the matter to be suitable for local
resolution and directed the force to fully investigate the complaint, taking into consideration
further information including evidence in support of alleged collusion between the police,
CPS and Courts.
8. The force completely ignored the recommendations; none of the appeal correspondence
referred to was considered by the new Investigating Officer and it is known that this was
under the advice of the Professional Standards Department. The subsequent appeal to the
IOPC raised the matter and was met with the following in the IOPC Caseworker’s 14
December 2018 review letter:
“You state that the IO did not include all complaints which the IOPC stated they should.
Please note that the decision letter in respect of your appeal of the local resolution decision
recommended Humberside Police to record new complaints, but this recommendation is
not a direction and therefore Humberside Police are not duty bound to record them.”
9. The evidence referable to the IOPC Casework Manager was compiled from excerpts of
various papers with the intention of getting the point across more concisely. The email sent to
DS on 20 March contained the following:
“Sample evidence
I have taken an experimental approach in the attached [IOPC casework manager] to see if
a more focussed presentation of the evidence is any help. I am confident (with evidence to
back it up) that the proven biased handling of the matter by the IOPC caseworker is
common among almost every public body who is under a duty to act impartially, fairly
and without discrimination or bias”
10. I had intended following a similar format relating to the other named officers but there was no
feedback from DS to indicate whether it was helpful and so did not pursue it. There was
also other specific evidence raised in the same email of 20 March 2019 in respect of other
named officers (Tony WALMSLEY and Insp Harvey) regarding complaint correspondence
sent apparently not progressed through proper channels. The content relevant to that is as
follows:

“Suspicious outcome
I have in the past noticed irregularities in the formatting of outcome letters to complaints,
giving me reason to suspect they had been dealt with outside official channels.
I have recently been made aware that an officer who is referred a complaint to deal with
under the statutory complaints process works from a template document which when
complete is sent to the PSD who reviews it before sending it out to the complainant. You
would therefore expect all letters to have identical layouts (letter heads etc.).
The attached (CO.150461.LR letter. .130115) is an original file that was sent to me
in an email on 13 January 2016 by caseworker Tony Walmsley and is as far as I can
remember the most non-standard appearing letter I have received. It looks like it has been
patched together possibly from different letters and photocopied. The first page show
signs from faint pixel markings that at some stage it has been converted to an image file
(JPG, bmp etc.) and edited.”
11. Finally on this theme and relating to the same email there was other specific evidence sent
relevant to opening a new line of enquiry in respect of the Justices Clerk’s possible motivation
for obstructing the high court application which led to the alleged fabrication of letters:
“Obstacles preventing the high court determining appeal
Excerpt paras 12-37 - EA 2017 0165
The above attachment intends to explain why a series of coincidences may possibly
account for why obstacles were put in the way by the court to prevent the appeal
progressing and being determined by the high court.
I am referred to as the ‘Appellant’ in the extract. Where appeal references are prefixed by
the letters EA/... they relate to Freedom of Information tribunals.”
12. In general the tactics that were used to cover up criminal wrongdoing that were employed in
the previous allegations have been resorted to again. Failing to pursue any lines of enquiry;
concealing evidence; misrepresenting evidence to mislead the uninformed observer; turning a
blind eye to relevant evidence, etc. More specifically here though is the uninformed observer
has been misled into believing that the reason there was no investigation was down to my
failure to provide what was asked for. The reality is that DS assured me that he had
what he needed to carry out the investigation and in any event had the front to deny that some
of what he had asked for had been provided.

Perverting course of justice annex a-b

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