SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Be your own
Threatbuster!
Natalia Oskina,
Giovanni Asproni
It is not just about banks!
We do a hard job to make systems work,
but, often, do not have time to think about an important aspect . . .
What impact?
● Cost
● Reputational damage
Security!
● Legal
● Missed deadlines
It is not just about banks!
Think if it was your data
● Credit cards
● Medical data
Internal threats are even riskier than external ones.
You are defending against bad people no matter where they are
● Financial data
● Addresses
● Phone numbers
It is not just about banks!
“
“Security is an aspect of
reliability that most
customers expect and
all customers want”
It is about the law
● GDPR
● Nis regulation
How big is the problem?
2018 only...
1) 1.1 billion records breached, Aadhar, January 3
2) 340 million records breached, Exactis, June 26
3) 150 million records breached, Under Armour, May 25
4) 92 million records breached, MyHeritag, June 4
5) 87 million (at least) records breached (though likely many more), Facebook, March 17
6) 37 million records breached, Panera, April 2
7) 27 million records breached, Ticketfly, June 7
8) 19.5 million records breached, Sacramento Bee, June 7
9) 6 million records breachedm PumpUp, May 31
10) 3, 5 million records breached, Saks, Lord & Taylor, April
How big is the problem?
2018 only...
http://breachlevelindex.com/
How big is the problem?
2018 only...
http://breachlevelindex.com/
Can security be retrofitted?
● It is not easy. Can be impossible in
complicated systems
● It is expensive
Security is a system quality, not a feature
How should we start?
● You are not aiming for 100% security
System considered to be secure when the cost
of hacking is higher than the value of data
● Start early
● Start when writing user stories
How should we start?
Threat modelling is a risk assessment of the application.
Introduce Threat Modelling for every story in your
backlog!
How should we start?
Threat: What an adversary may try to do to
the system
Vulnerability: Security flaw in the system
that an adversary can use to realize the
threat
1.
Know what you are building!
● Entry points
● Trust levels
● Assets
● Trust boundaries
2.
Know what can go wrong (STRIDE)
Spoofing
Authenticity
Tampering
Integrity
Repudiation
Non-repudiability
Information -
disclosure
Confidentiality
Denial of
Service
Availability
Elevation of
privilege
Authorization
3.
How to model a threat?
Bring service down
Internet access is
down
Service is shut
down
DoS attack Get root access
Access to port 21
Exploit FTP
vulnerability
4.
Document it
Microsoft Threat Modelling Tool
Trade offs
Effort
Impact
1 2
3
What is definitely needed?
Start from low effort, high impact things:
● Encrypt communication channels ( Https, MQTTs...)
● Hash passwords
● Encrypt sensitive data
● Do not log security sensitive data. No passwords!
● Do not put your production credentials ...
In your GIT repository...
Validate your inputs!
What is definitely needed?
Encrypt in tests
● No self-signed certificates in production
● When testing, test with HTTPS
● Use Let’s encrypt . It is easy and….free….
Hope you are already using HTTPS in production …
Encrypt in tests
● But it is slow...isn’t? No, it isn’t!
https://www.httpvshttps.com/
● Be careful with GET requests
It is not just about the software
● Log off your laptop!
● How and where you deploy it?
● How will your software be used?
So, is threat modelling good?
Yes:
● It is a practical view of potential attackers
● If started early it will help you create a more secure system
So, is threat modelling good?
Are there any disadvantages?
● You may miss some weaknesses
● Good threat modelling sessions don’t make good software on their
own
“Complex systems break in complex ways”
Peter G. Neumann
Make it a part of your development
● Start from the very beginning
● Make it a part of your development
● Make it a part of your Definition Of Done
● Software itself can have vulnerabilities. It is more than
Threat modelling
● Catch security flaws before something else is built on top
● Do code inspections. Regularly!
● Have a security champion Be your own security champion!
Isn’t it boring?
Automate it. There are tools for that:
○ SonarQube
○ Contrast
○ Detestify
○ Acunetix
○ Clair
○ SSLlabs
○ Sysdig
○ Mozilla Observatory
○ Scan My Server
○ Sucuri
○ https://github.com/docker/docker
-bench-security
Automate it!
Automate security testing in your CI pipeline with every commit
Be careful!
● Think about dependencies of dependencies
● Check it in Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures https://cve.mitre.org
● Don’t implement security libraries yourself!
● Use trusted libraries
● The same with Docker. Check Dockerhub
What should I do … to retrofit security?
● Use reporting tools (e.g., SonarQube)
● Deal with the critical risks first
● Prioritise risks and put bugs in stories
● When fixing a bug, write tests for it. Make them part of your
integration testing
If you do that, you haven’t been listening…
penetration testing has a goal - get into your system
It is ethical hacking
To find vulnerabilities to remove (or mitigate)
Anyone in this room can do a vulnerability check!
Penetration testing
It is a complement to threat modelling and testing
often confused with vulnerability checks
Summing up
● No system is 100% secure
● Think about the potential risks
● Thinking about security won’t guarantee you will catch every issue
but you will be in a much better position
Effort
Impact
1 2
3
Summing up
Summing up
● Make it part of your development
● Security is a system quality, not a feature
● Think about security as a whole
● It is not just about your software
Thank you!
...for your data ;P
@Gasproni giovanni.asproni@zuhlke.com @CurlyN natalia.oskina@zuhlke.com
Any questions?

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N. Oskina, G. Asproni - Be your own Threatbuster! - Codemotion Milan 2018

  • 1. Be your own Threatbuster! Natalia Oskina, Giovanni Asproni
  • 2. It is not just about banks! We do a hard job to make systems work, but, often, do not have time to think about an important aspect . . . What impact? ● Cost ● Reputational damage Security! ● Legal ● Missed deadlines
  • 3. It is not just about banks! Think if it was your data ● Credit cards ● Medical data Internal threats are even riskier than external ones. You are defending against bad people no matter where they are ● Financial data ● Addresses ● Phone numbers
  • 4. It is not just about banks!
  • 5. “ “Security is an aspect of reliability that most customers expect and all customers want”
  • 6. It is about the law ● GDPR ● Nis regulation
  • 7. How big is the problem? 2018 only... 1) 1.1 billion records breached, Aadhar, January 3 2) 340 million records breached, Exactis, June 26 3) 150 million records breached, Under Armour, May 25 4) 92 million records breached, MyHeritag, June 4 5) 87 million (at least) records breached (though likely many more), Facebook, March 17 6) 37 million records breached, Panera, April 2 7) 27 million records breached, Ticketfly, June 7 8) 19.5 million records breached, Sacramento Bee, June 7 9) 6 million records breachedm PumpUp, May 31 10) 3, 5 million records breached, Saks, Lord & Taylor, April
  • 8. How big is the problem? 2018 only... http://breachlevelindex.com/
  • 9. How big is the problem? 2018 only... http://breachlevelindex.com/
  • 10. Can security be retrofitted? ● It is not easy. Can be impossible in complicated systems ● It is expensive Security is a system quality, not a feature
  • 11. How should we start? ● You are not aiming for 100% security System considered to be secure when the cost of hacking is higher than the value of data ● Start early ● Start when writing user stories
  • 12. How should we start? Threat modelling is a risk assessment of the application. Introduce Threat Modelling for every story in your backlog!
  • 13. How should we start? Threat: What an adversary may try to do to the system Vulnerability: Security flaw in the system that an adversary can use to realize the threat
  • 14. 1. Know what you are building! ● Entry points ● Trust levels ● Assets ● Trust boundaries
  • 15. 2. Know what can go wrong (STRIDE) Spoofing Authenticity Tampering Integrity Repudiation Non-repudiability Information - disclosure Confidentiality Denial of Service Availability Elevation of privilege Authorization
  • 16. 3. How to model a threat? Bring service down Internet access is down Service is shut down DoS attack Get root access Access to port 21 Exploit FTP vulnerability
  • 19. What is definitely needed? Start from low effort, high impact things: ● Encrypt communication channels ( Https, MQTTs...) ● Hash passwords ● Encrypt sensitive data ● Do not log security sensitive data. No passwords! ● Do not put your production credentials ... In your GIT repository...
  • 20. Validate your inputs! What is definitely needed?
  • 21. Encrypt in tests ● No self-signed certificates in production ● When testing, test with HTTPS ● Use Let’s encrypt . It is easy and….free…. Hope you are already using HTTPS in production …
  • 22. Encrypt in tests ● But it is slow...isn’t? No, it isn’t! https://www.httpvshttps.com/ ● Be careful with GET requests
  • 23. It is not just about the software ● Log off your laptop! ● How and where you deploy it? ● How will your software be used?
  • 24. So, is threat modelling good? Yes: ● It is a practical view of potential attackers ● If started early it will help you create a more secure system
  • 25. So, is threat modelling good? Are there any disadvantages? ● You may miss some weaknesses ● Good threat modelling sessions don’t make good software on their own “Complex systems break in complex ways” Peter G. Neumann
  • 26. Make it a part of your development ● Start from the very beginning ● Make it a part of your development ● Make it a part of your Definition Of Done ● Software itself can have vulnerabilities. It is more than Threat modelling ● Catch security flaws before something else is built on top ● Do code inspections. Regularly! ● Have a security champion Be your own security champion!
  • 27. Isn’t it boring? Automate it. There are tools for that: ○ SonarQube ○ Contrast ○ Detestify ○ Acunetix ○ Clair ○ SSLlabs ○ Sysdig ○ Mozilla Observatory ○ Scan My Server ○ Sucuri ○ https://github.com/docker/docker -bench-security
  • 28. Automate it! Automate security testing in your CI pipeline with every commit
  • 29. Be careful! ● Think about dependencies of dependencies ● Check it in Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures https://cve.mitre.org ● Don’t implement security libraries yourself! ● Use trusted libraries ● The same with Docker. Check Dockerhub
  • 30. What should I do … to retrofit security? ● Use reporting tools (e.g., SonarQube) ● Deal with the critical risks first ● Prioritise risks and put bugs in stories ● When fixing a bug, write tests for it. Make them part of your integration testing If you do that, you haven’t been listening…
  • 31. penetration testing has a goal - get into your system It is ethical hacking To find vulnerabilities to remove (or mitigate) Anyone in this room can do a vulnerability check! Penetration testing It is a complement to threat modelling and testing often confused with vulnerability checks
  • 32. Summing up ● No system is 100% secure ● Think about the potential risks ● Thinking about security won’t guarantee you will catch every issue but you will be in a much better position
  • 34. Summing up ● Make it part of your development ● Security is a system quality, not a feature ● Think about security as a whole ● It is not just about your software
  • 35. Thank you! ...for your data ;P @Gasproni giovanni.asproni@zuhlke.com @CurlyN natalia.oskina@zuhlke.com Any questions?