This document discusses the need for Ukraine's military to undergo transformational change in order to better adapt to the changing geopolitical environment. It notes that most military organizations are designed for stability and resist change, but that the current environment demands continuous organizational development and flexibility. Specifically, it argues that Ukraine's military structures, processes, and culture need to fundamentally change from their Soviet-era models in order to develop the capabilities required for modern warfare, such as increased deployability and logistical capacity. The document advocates for bold, visionary leadership and cultural changes throughout the military to enable rapid, continuous transformation rather than incremental reforms.

1. REGAINING MILITARY POWER FOR UKRAINE BY FOCUSSED CHANGE
Withany organisation –there isa needtobe effective and "fitforpurpose”. The keytothis
isto stay close to the demandsof the environment,whetherthatbe customersandtheir
wishesfora business,orinthe case of Defence Organisations,understanding geostrategic
shifts, ever-changingenemies, andworkinginconcertwithallies.
There are fundamentallytwowaysanorganisationcandothis(Weick& Quinn1995)i
. One is
by continuouschange,the otherbyepisodicchange.The firstmeanssmall regularchanges
that keepthe organisation alwaysclosethe environmental changes,andthe secondiswhere
the organisationlagsbehindthe changingenvironmentandisforcedtocatch up. Thisis
eitherbyplannedchange whenthe growinggapisrealised before itistoogreat or
unplannedchange whenthe gap becomes traumaticandthe organisation simply hasno
otherchoice. Episodicchange wasforceduponBulgaria aftera dramatic budgetcutin 2010
and they immediately undertook afull scale Force Structure Review. Crisistorn Montenegro
isnow dealingwith the same problem. Butitneedstobe realisedearlyinanydiscussion
that mostchange effortsfail asbeingtoolittle,toolateii
.Organisationsdonotsee the
urgency,are not boldor visonaryenoughwhentheystartanddo notget trulyexperthelp.
Theyalsomake the commonmistake of thinkingthatyoucan follow asimple processof
plan- implement–review.Butinacomplex fastmovingenvironmentthisneverworks.There
are twomainreasons.First,there isneverenoughmoneyforthe plan.Second,bythe time
the planhas beenwritten,the worldhaschangedagain.
For any defence organisationtoconductcontinuouschange isdifficultbutvital forsuccess.
More than anythingitrequires acultural attitude of mindthatmustrun throughoutthe
whole organisationbottomtotop. The MOD must have goodthinkerstofollow events,
clearguidance and lawsto make changes,the policymakersmustbe quickto spotthe need
for change and the Ministermustbe equallyquickand willingtodirectchange.Atthe
General Staff level theremustbe aan abilitytoturn MOD directionandworldwide Lessons
Learnedinto soundmilitarypolicywiththe follow-onimplementation abilitytomove
people,andchange doctrines,organisationsandtraining indaysand weeksnot years. This
continuouschange requiresverymuchbottomupideasandthinkingandaverylighttouch
fromleaders. Overcontrol byleadership simply killsinnovation andcreatesstagnationand
inertia.Above all thisthere mustbe anunderstanding atthe political level bythe President,
Government,Parliamentand alsopublicopinionthatdefence organisationsmustbe totally
responsive andadaptivecreatures,changingconstantly,nottiedby amass of outdated laws,
missions, control measuresand restrictivepractices.Andfinallythe whole organisationmust
have a budgetand programmingsystemthatisalsoadaptive andnotjust a vehicle for
deliveringmoneytofulfill some turgidSoviet-like 10year plan.
The real challenge forpolicymakersand planners atall levels isthatthe currentgeo
strategicenvironmentreallyhasnow createdthe needforcontinuous organisational
developmentandrenewal almostonadailybasisiii
.There isa constantneedtorethink
planningassumptionsagainstthe current andfuture reality,whetherthatbe for policies,
organisations,techniquesorequipment. NATOmembersagreedin2010iv
to "engage ina

2. continuousprocessof reform,modernisationandtransformation"butfew have really
graspedthe nettle.
Militaryorganisationsnowhave tobe able toadapt constantlyandmustbe organisedin
such a way thatthe conceptsof change,flexibility,adaptabilityandinnovationare normal
facts of life andpositively encouraged atall levelsof the organisation. Thisisalmostthe
total reverse of most FormerWarsaw Pact (FWP) military organisations where control and
disciplineare the key drivingconcepts,notthe flexibility demandedby todaysenvironment.
Historically militaryorganisations have existedinafairlystable environment,theyhave
become mechanisticorganisationsv
andhave usually emphasisedstability,conformity and
an everincreasingstraight-jacketof rulesandregulationsvi
withofficersselectedfortheir
abilitytodeliverthisstyle of management.Worse,the financial rulesandexpectationsof
the national Treasury themselvesare more towardsstabilityandlongtermplans which
themselvesharmthe flexibility any MODneedsto conduct business.Andoftenthe whole
systemisgovernedbya national administrative law onstructuresthatactually deliberately
stops change.It is ironicthatthe greatestcurrentthreatto EuropeanandNATO security
may be itsown lawsandsystems.
Addedtothis,and equally ironically,manycountrieshave adoptedthe USA programming
system,butwithoutalsoimplementingthe cultural changesinleadership, managementand
budgetaryspendingmethodsthatthe systemneedsforsuccess.InmanyFWPcountriesthe
tool is beingusedtoallocate moneyforspendingwhichwasneverthe intention.
Programmingisdesignedtoidentifyall the future pitfallsof liabilities,highspendingand
capabilitydevelopmentrequirements overtime toensure thatthe defence isboth
affordable anddeliverable. Thisalsomeansthatto work,programmesmustagregate all the
elementsof Capabilityforthe commanderthatrequiresthem, notsplitthemup asnow in
Ukraine so noprogramme holdercan have responsibilityforfailure of successof any
mission.
But the picture isnot all gloom.Inmany areas of worksuch as withinthe ATOUkraine has
showan amazingabilitytoadaptand change and deliverthe missionsuccessfully.Butthese
compbatactivitieshave beenoverlaidontopof the maindefence structure thatsits below,
inert,unchangingandfallingeverfurtherbehindthe environmentalcurve. Successinone
part of the systemdoesnotspell successoverall.vii
Two areasof seriousconcern are deployability and logisticstructures.Many countrieshave
historicallydesignedtheirstructuresforterritorial defence andwithlimitedlogisticcapacity
for war.Logisticsare designed oninternal lines andhave limitedcapacity, whereas formost
operations andNATOArticle V,those whoare alliance membershave agreedtodeliverviii
"maximumdeployabilityof forcesandtheircapacitytosustainoperationsinthe field".At
presentmostFWP nationscannotdo thiswithoutseriousUSsupport.
Because of the recentand rapidenvironmental changes mostFWP countries now require
episodicchange. Thisisnow at sucha seriouslevel andthe requirementssodramaticthatit
needstobe considered “transformational”innatureix
Thismeanssimplythatthe
organisation needstobreakwiththe pastand move ina totally differentdirection.Fine
tuningbycontinuouschange isnotnow enough asthe gap betweenthe maindefence

3. organisationsandthe environmentalrequirements are toolarge.Change specialistHayes
(2002) pointsoutthat thiscritial momentmeansdoingthingsdifferently,notjustbetter,
and even doingtotallynewthings. He alsonotesthatthischange becomesmore difficult
whenitis leftuntil urgentbecause thereislesstime toengage the full resourcesandenergy
of the people concerned.The lackof time reducesthe chancesof innovationand creativity.
The challenge forMODs istryingto workthrough a heavyand conservative setof domestic
political andbureaucraticviewsthatare anti-change andwantingtokeepthe unaffordable
and outdated militarily statusquo.
Adaptability andflexibility meanschangingstructures,processesand especially culture butit
alsomeansfocussing thinkingandchange upondeveloping the capabilities thatare really
needed now –not at some indefinedpointinthe future.Itisnot a planthat isneededbut
actiontoday!. These are "the clearlyidentifyable andmeasurablevalue-addingactivitiesthat
describe whatthe organisationcando"x
. It ismost importantthatthe priority capability
requirementsforthe future are those thatget the moneyfirst - not last.Thiscannot happen
inmany countries withoutchange of currentstructuresandchangesto longtermplansand
programmes. The oldoutdatedstructuresstaythe same and simplyeatmoneythatis
neededforthe future organisation.Youcanonlyspendmoneyonce. Lawler&Worley
(2006) suggestthatthe greatestcapabilitythe organisationcanhave isthe ”change
capability” itself andmost defence organisations simply lackthis.
What has happenedsofarinmost FWP defence systems isaweak attemptat incremental
change with some limitedprofessionalisationof soldiers,adaptionof the programmingtool,
external training, andadoptionof NATO Force or PartnershipGoals.Butthese stepshave
beenaddedto the systemwithout fundamental change of the way the system itself
works. The base structure and heavycontrol type military culture remainsthe same and
bothare increasinglyfallingbehind the geostrategicdemands. The challengeforFWP
countries isto graspwithinthe political andmilitaryelite thatthe full implicationsof the
demandscreatedbychangesto the total environment,especiallypolitical andfinancial,
have not yetstruck home themasserious enoughtotake swiftaction – but the clock is
ticking.
The neednowthenisfor change,not justa review anda plan.Changingandmodernising
thingsmeansalteringthe waythe whole systemdoesbusiness.Thisdoesnothave tomean
losingcontrol orcreatinganarchy but itmeansfollowingthe bestlessonsandexperience
available fordoingthissortof work. There are manygoodand proven toolsto help MODs
leadandmanage change – Lewin(1951)xi
withhis 3 stage model, Hayes(2002)xii
withan 8
stage model, advocatingusingmodernmanagementtools tohelpdiagnosisof the problems,
and Kotter(1998)xiii
withhisfamous8 stage processconcentratinguponpeople and
deliveringapowerful vision.There are manymore beingusedbymodernconsultants. The
keyisto findthe bestbalance of control and supportinginnovationthatwill give the MOD
and General Staff the bestframework touse.
But whateverframeworktocreate change ischosen,there isstill aneedtogetthe content
rightfor modernrequirements andforthe seniorleadershiptobe fullyinvolvedindelivering
a betterfuture. Change cannotbe delegatedthenforgotten.Itisa hardtask that needs

4. energy,visionandrobustpersistence.But,the alternative isworse.It isnouse simply
reducingthe military stucture yearonyearto meetthe budget andhopingthatproblems
will goaway.Theywill not. The modernworldnow requiresafundamental rethinkforhow
businessisdone todayandthisweek.Evena10 year planis too far awayand highrisk for
the nation.
i Weick and Quinn 1995,Organizational Changeand Development, University of Michigan
ii Jacobs 1994,Real Time Strategic Change
iii Hayes 2002,The Theory and Practiceof Change Management - citingthe thoughts of the
futurologistToffler
iv NATO Strategic Concept– Active Engagement, Modern Defence - 19-20 Nov 2010
v Burns and Stalker 1961
vi Lawler&Worley 2006, Builtto Change – How to achieveSustained Organisational Effectiveness
vii Jacobs 1994 Real Time Strategic Change
viii NATO Strategic Concept– Active Engagement, Modern Defence - 19-20 Nov 2010
ix Kotter 1999 A Force for Change
x Lawler&Worley 2006, Builtto Change – How to achieveSustained Organisational Effectiveness
xi Lewin 1951,Field theory in Social Science,New York, Harper and Row
xii Hayes 2010,The theory and Practiceof Change Management
xiii Kotter 2002, A Force for Change